1.

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION vs CALLEJA

FACTS:

The associated Labor Unions (ALU) informed GAW Trading, Inc. (GAWTI) that majority of the latters
employees have authorized ALU to be their sole and exclusive bargaining representative, and requested GAW
Trading Inc., for a conference for the execution of an initial CBA. GAWTI recognized ALU as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent for the majority of its employees and for which it set the time for conference and/or
negotiation at 4PM on May 12, 1986 at the Pillsbury Office, Aboitiz Building Juan Luna Street, Cebu City. On May
15, 1986, ALU in behalf of the majority of the employees of GAW Trading Inc. and GAWTI signed and executed
the CBA.

In the meantime, the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) together with Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa GAW (NAMGAW) undertook a Strike after it failed to get the management of GAWTI to sit for a
conference respecting its demands in an effort to pressure GAWTI to make a turnabout of its standing recognition of
ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of its employees, as to which strike GAWTI filed a petition
for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, and which strike Labor Arbiter Tumamak held as illegal.

On May 19, 1986, GAW Lumad Labor Union (GALLU-PSSLU) Federation filed a Certification Election
petition but as found by Med-Arbiter Cumba, without having complied with the subscription requirement for which
it was merely considered an intervenor until compliance thereof in the other petition for direct recognition as
bargaining agent filed on MAy 28, 1986 by southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL)

In the meantime, CBA executed by ALU and GAWTI was duly filed with the MOLE, Cebu city.
Nevertheless, Med-Arbiter Cumba ruled for the holding of a certification election in all branches of GAWTI in Cebu
City, as to which ALU filed MFR, which was treated as an appeal. So the entire record of subject certification case
was forwarded for the Director, Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), MOLE, Manila.

BLR Director Trajano, granted ALUs appeal (MFR) and set aside the questioned Med-Arbiter, on the
ground that the CBA has been effective and valid and the contract bar rule applicable; Philippine Social Security
Labor Union (PSSLU) and Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) filed MFR, supplemented by the
Submission of Additional Evidence. GAWTI and ALU opposed. Trajanos decision was reversed by herein public
respondent Calleja. ALU filed MFR but was denied. Hence this petition.

Calleja ordered the holding of a certification election ruling that the contract bar rule relied upon by her
predecessor Trajano does not apply in the present case. Calleja ruled that CBA is defective because it was not duly
submitted in accordance with Sec. I, Rule IX, Book V of the Implementing Rules of BP 130. Theres no proof that
CBA has been posted in at least 2 conspicuous places in the establishment at least 5 days before its ratification and
that it has been ratified by the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.

ISSUE:

Did Calleja erred in reversing Trajanos ruling and ordering the holding of a certification election?
LAW:

Article 256 of the Labor Code.

RESOLUTION:

NO. The CBA in question is defective.

The mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion only when the following jurisdictional
preconditions are present: (1) possession of the status of majority representation by the employees representative in
accordance with any of the means of selection and/or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of
majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Art.256, par. (a) of the Labor Code.

The standing of ALU as an exclusive bargaining representative is dubious. The recognition by GAWTI
appears to have been based on the self-serving claim of ALU that it had the support of the majority of the employees
in the bargaining unit.

In cases where the then Minister of Labor directly certified the union as the bargaining representative, SC
voided such certification where there was a failure to properly determine with legal certainty whether the union
enjoyed a majority representation. In such a case, the holding of a certification election at a proper time would not
necessarily be a mere formality as there was a compelling reason not to directly and unilaterally certify a union.

CBA was defective also because of: [a] the failure of GAWTI to post the CBA in at least 2 conspicuous
places in the establishment at least 5 days before its ratification, [b] the finding of Calleja that 181 of the 281 4 Art.
256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In organized establishments, when a verified
petitionquestioning the majority status of the incumbent bargainingagent is filed before the DOLE within the 60-day
period beforethe expiration of a CBA, the Med-Arbiter shall automaticallyorder an election by secret ballot when the
verified petition issupported by the written consent of at least 25% of all the EEsin the appropriate bargaining unit.
To have a valid election, atleast a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have casttheir votes. The labor union
receiving the majority of the validvotes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agentof all the workers in
the unit. When an election which providesfor three or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the
valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the labor unions receiving the two highestnumber of
votes: Provided,That the total number of votes for all contending unions is at least 50% of the number of votes cast.
workers who ratified the same now strongly and vehemently deny and/or repudiate the alleged negotiations and
ratification of the CBA.

Finally, the inapplicability of the contract bar rule is further underscored by the fact that when the disputed
agreement was filed before the Labor Regional Office on May 27, 1986, a petition for certification election had
already been filed on May 19, 1986. Although the petition was not supported by the signatures of 30% of the
workers in the bargaining unit, it was enough to initiate certification election.

OPINION:

The standing of ALU as an exclusive bargaining representative is dubious. The recognition by GAWTI appears
to have been based on the self-serving claim of ALU that it had the support of the majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit.
2. FEU-DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL
FOUNDATION INC. vs TRAJANO

FACTS:

The petitioner, Far Eastern University-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial Foundation, Inc., has a work force of
about 350 rank and file employees, majority of whom are members of private respondent Alliance of Filipino
Workers.

On February 13, 1986, private respondent filed a Petition for Consent and/or Certification Election with
The Ministry of Labor and Employment. The petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that a similar petition
involving the same issues and the same parties is pending resolution before the Supreme Court,

Apparently as early as May 10, 1976, private respondent filed a similar petition for certification election
with the Ministry of Labor and Employment but the petition was denied on the ground that the petitioner was a non-
stock, non-profit medical institution, therefore, its employees may not form, join, or organize a union pursuant to
Article 244 of the Labor Code. Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court assailing the
constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code. Pending resolution of the aforesaid petition Batas Pambansa
Bilang 70 was enacted amending Article 244 of the Labor Code, thus granting even employees of non-stock, non-
profit institutions the right to form, join and organize labor unions of their choice. In the exercise of such right,
private respondent filed another petition for certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment.

ISSUE:

Are rank and file employees of non-profit organization are covered by the right to self-organization?

LAW:

Article 244 of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:

RULING:

YES. At the time private respondent filed its petition for certification election on February 13, 1986, Article
244 of the Labor Code was already amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, to wit:

Art. 244. Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial,
industrial and charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have
 the right to self-organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant
intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite
employers may form labor organizations for the purpose of enhancing and defending their interests and for
their mutual aid and protection.

Under the aforequoted provision, there is no doubt that rank and file employees of non-profit medical
institutions (as herein petitioner) are now permitted to form, organize or join labor unions of their choice for
purposes of collective bargaining. Since private respondent had complied with the requisites provided by law for
calling a certification election (p. 15, Rollo), it was incumbent upon respondent Director to conduct such
certification election to ascertain the bargaining representative of petitioners employees (Samahang Manggagawa
Ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152).

OPINION:

The standing of ALU as an exclusive bargaining representative is dubious. The recognition by GAWTI appears
to have been based on the self-serving claim of ALU that it had the support of the majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit.

3. HALGUENA vs PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

FACTS:

Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of PAL. They are members of the Flight Attendants
and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), the exclusive bargaining representative of the flight
attendants. Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, provides that: 3. Compulsory Retirement. Subject to the
grooming standards provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement shall be fifty-five (55) for females and
sixty (60) for males. x x x. petitioners and several female cabin crews manifested that the aforementioned CBA
provision on compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male
counterparts. This demand was reiterated in a letter. On July 12, 2004, Robert D. Anduiza, President of FASAP
submitted their 2004-2005 CBA proposals and manifested their willingness to commence the collective bargaining
negotiations between the management and the association, at the soonest possible time. In 2004, petitioners filed a
Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City against respondent for the invalidity of Section 144, Part A of
the PAL-FASAP CBA.

RTC RULING: The RTC issued an Order upholding its jurisdiction over the present case. The RTC reasoned that:
The allegations in the Petition do not make out a labor dispute arising from employer-employee relationship as none
is shown to exist. This case is not directed specifically against respondent arising from any act of the latter, nor does
it involve a claim against the respondent. Rather, this case seeks a declaration of the nullity of the questioned
provision of the CBA, which is within the Court's competence, with the allegations in the Petition constituting the
bases for such relief sought. The RTC issued a TRO on August 10, 2004, enjoining the respondent for implementing
Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. CA RULING: declared RTC to have NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE

ISSUE:

Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the petitioners' action challenging the legality or constitutionality of
the provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between respondent PAL and FASAP?

LAW:

Article 217 of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:

RULING:

YES. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC,
pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is
beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals. The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code.
Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution
and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. In Georg Grotjahn GMBH &
Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only
labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes
arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other
labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement. Not every controversy or money claim by an employee
against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between
employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action
precedes from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the
employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose
from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW. Thus, where the principal relief sought is to
be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement
but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the
labor arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management
relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the
general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor
arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears
4. THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES-HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA
SUPERVISORS CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC)

The associated Labor Unions (ALU) informed NUWHRAIN-HHMSC that majority of the latters
employees have authorized ALU to be their sole and exclusive bargaining representative, and requested
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC for a conference for the execution of an initial CBA. NUWHRAIN-HHMSC recognized
ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the majority of its employees and for which it set the time for
conference and/or negotiation at 4PM on May 12, 1986 at the Pillsbury Office, Aboitiz Building Juan Luna Street,
Cebu City. On May 15, 1986, ALU in behalf of the majority of the employees of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC. and
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC signed and executed the CBA.

In the meantime, the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) together with Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa GAW (NAMGAW) undertook a Strike after it failed to get the management of NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC to sit for a conference respecting its demands in an effort to pressure GAWTI to make a turnabout of its
standing recognition of ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of its employees, as to which strike
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC filed a petition for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, and which strike Labor Arbiter
Tumamak held as illegal.

On May 19, 1986, GAW Lumad Labor Union (GALLU-PSSLU) Federation filed a Certification Election
petition but as found by Med-Arbiter Cumba, without having complied with the subscription requirement for which
it was merely considered an intervenor until compliance thereof in the other petition for direct recognition as
bargaining agent filed on MAy 28, 1986 by southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL)

In the meantime, CBA executed by ALU and NUWHRAIN-HHMSC was duly filed with the MOLE, Cebu
city. Nevertheless, Med-Arbiter Cumba ruled for the holding of a certification election in all branches of
NUWHRAIN-HHMSC in Cebu City, as to which ALU filed MFR, which was treated as an appeal. So the entire
record of subject certification case was forwarded for the Director, Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), MOLE,
Manila.

BLR Director Trajano, granted ALUs appeal (MFR) and set aside the questioned Med-Arbiter, on the
ground that the CBA has been effective and valid and the contract bar rule applicable; Philippine Social Security
Labor Union (PSSLU) and Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) filed MFR, supplemented by the
Submission of Additional Evidence. GAWTI and ALU opposed. Trajanos decision was reversed by herein public
respondent Calleja. ALU filed MFR but was denied. Hence this petition.

Calleja ordered the holding of a certification election ruling that the contract bar rule relied upon by her
predecessor Trajano does not apply in the present case. Calleja ruled that CBA is defective because it was not duly
submitted in accordance with Sec. I, Rule IX, Book V of the Implementing Rules of BP 130. Theres no proof that
CBA has been posted in at least 2 conspicuous places in the establishment at least 5 days before its ratification and
that it has been ratified by the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.
ISSUE:

Did NUWHRAIN-HHMSC erred in reversing ruling and ordering the holding of a certification election?

LAW:

Article 256 of the Labor Code.

RESOLUTION:

NO. The CBA in question is defective.

The mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion only when the following jurisdictional
preconditions are present: (1) possession of the status of majority representation by the employees representative in
accordance with any of the means of selection and/or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of
majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Art.256, par. (a) of the Labor Code.

The standing of ALU as an exclusive bargaining representative is dubious. The recognition by

NUWHRAIN-HHMSC appears to have been based on the self-serving claim of ALU that it had the support of the
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.

In cases where the then Minister of Labor directly certified the union as the bargaining representative, SC
voided such certification where there was a failure to properly determine with legal certainty whether the union
enjoyed a majority representation. In such a case, the holding of a certification election at a proper time would not
necessarily be a mere formality as there was a compelling reason not to directly and unilaterally certify a union.

CBA was defective also because of: [a] the failure of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC to post the CBA in at least 2
conspicuous places in the establishment at least 5 days before its ratification, [b] the finding of Calleja that 181 of
the 281 4 Art. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. In organized establishments, when a verified
petitionquestioning the majority status of the incumbent bargainingagent is filed before the DOLE within the 60-day
period beforethe expiration of a CBA, the Med-Arbiter shall automaticallyorder an election by secret ballot when the
verified petition issupported by the written consent of at least 25% of all the EEsin the appropriate bargaining unit.
To have a valid election, atleast a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have casttheir votes. The labor union
receiving the majority of the validvotes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agentof all the workers in
the unit. When an election which providesfor three or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the
valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the labor unions receiving the two highestnumber of
votes: Provided,That the total number of votes for all contending unions is at least 50% of the number of votes cast.
workers who ratified the same now strongly and vehemently deny and/or repudiate the alleged negotiations and
ratification of the CBA.

Finally, the inapplicability of the contract bar rule is further underscored by the fact that when the disputed
agreement was filed before the Labor Regional Office on May 27, 1986, a petition for certification election had
already been filed on May 19, 1986. Although the petition was not supported by the signatures of 30% of the
workers in the bargaining unit, it was enough to initiate certification election.

OPINION:
 The standing of ALU as an exclusive bargaining representative is dubious. The recognition by NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC appears to have been based on the self-serving claim of ALU that it had the support of the majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit.

5. AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE

PHILIPPINES VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

FACTS:

The present controversy stemmed from a labor dispute between respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL)
and ALPAP, the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of PAL.
Claiming that PAL committed unfair labor practice, ALPAP filed on December 9, 1997, a notice of strikeagainst
respondent PAL with the DOLE, docketed as NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97. Upon PALs petition and considering that
its continued operation is impressed with public interest, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute.

Accordingly, all strikes and lockouts at the Philippine Airlines, Inc., whether actual or impending, are
hereby strictly prohibited. The parties are also enjoined from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.

In a subsequent Order dated May 25, 1998, the DOLE Secretary reiterated the prohibition contained in the
December 23, 1997 Order. Despite such reminder to the parties, however, ALPAP went on strike on June 5, 1998.
This constrained the DOLE, through then Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, to issue a return-to-work order on June
7, 1998. However, it was only on June 26, 1998 when ALPAP officers and members reported back to work as
shown in a logbook signed by each of them. As a consequence, PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their
failure to comply immediately with the return-to-work order.

On June 29, 1998, ALPAP filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal lockoutagainst PAL,
docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-06-05253-98. ALPAP contended that its counsel received a copy of the
return-to-work order only on June 25, 1998, which justified their non-compliance therewith until June 26, 1998. It
thus prayed that PAL be ordered to accept unconditionally all officers and members of ALPAP without any loss of
pay and seniority and to pay whatever salaries and benefits due them pursuant to existing contracts of employment.

On PALs motion, the Labor Arbiter consolidated the illegal lockout case with NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97
(strike case) pending before the DOLE Secretary since the controversy presented in the lockout case is an offshoot
of the labor dispute over which the DOLE Secretary has assumed jurisdiction and because the factual allegations in
both cases are interrelated. In a Resolution dated January 18, 1999, the NLRC sustained the consolidation of the
illegal lockout case with the strike case, opining that the DOLE Secretary has the authority to resolve all incidents
attendant to his return-to-work order.

Through then DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, a Resolution dated June 1, 1999 was rendered in
NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, declaring the strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998 illegal and pronouncing the
loss of employment status of its officers and members who participated in the strike in defiance of the June 7, 1998
return-to-work order.and that DECLARES the strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998 and thereafter as illegal
for being procedurally infirm and in open defiance of the return-to-work order of June 7, 1998 and, consequently,
the strikers are deemed to have lost their employment status; and DISMISSES the complaint for illegal lockout for
lack of merit.

In a Resolutiondated July 23, 1999, ALPAPs motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, ALPAP filed a
Petition forCertiorariwith the CA assailing both the June 1, 1999 and July 23, 1999 DOLE Resolutions.

Meanwhile, several ALPAP members filed separate individual complaints for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of monetary benefits against PAL with the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC, questioning their termination as a
result of the strike staged by other ALPAP members on June 5, 1998.

On January 13, 2003, ALPAP filed before the Office of the DOLE Secretary a Motionin NCMB NCR NS
12-514-97, requesting the said office to conduct an appropriate legal proceeding to determine who among its officers
and members should be reinstated or deemed to have lost their employment with PAL for their actual participation
in the strike conducted in June 1998. By reason of the final ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court, the erring pilots
have lost their employment status and second, because these pilots have filed cases to contest such loss before
another forum, the Motion and Supplemental Motion of ALPAP as well as the arguments raised therein are merely
NOTED by this Office.

ALPAP filed its motion for reconsideration arguing that the issues raised in its motions have remained
unresolved hence, it is the duty of DOLE to resolve the same it having assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute.

The CA, in its Decision dated December 22, 2004, dismissed the petition. It found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Sto. Tomas and Imson in refusing to conduct the necessary proceedings to determine issues
relating to ALPAP members employment status and entitlement to employment benefits.

ALPAP moved for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in CA Resolutiondated May 30,
2005. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the termination of ALPAP is valid.

LAW:

Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:

RULING:

The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.

 The records reveal that in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, the DOLE Secretary declared the ALPAP officers
and members to have lost their employment status based on either of two grounds, viz: their participation in the
illegal strike on June 5, 1998 or their defiance of the return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary. The records of the
case unveil the names of each of these returning pilots. The logbook with the heading "Return To Work
Compliance/ Returnees" bears their individual signature signifying their conformity that they were among those
workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by DOLE. From this crucial and
vital piece of evidence, it is apparent that each of these pilots is bound by the judgment. Besides, the complaint for
illegal lockout was filed on behalf of all these returnees. Thus, a finding that there was no illegal lockout would be
enforceable against them. In fine, only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they comprise the entire
membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution.

6. METROLAB INDUSTRIES INC. VS. ROLDAN

CONFESOR

FACTS:

Herein petitioner Metrolab Industries represented by the private respondent Metro Drug Corp. a labor organization
representing the petitioners employees. After the CBA between the parties expired, negotiations for new CBA ended into
deadlock. Both parties failed to settle their dispute hence the order issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment that any
strike or acts that might exacerbate the situation is ceased and ordered the parties to execute a new CBA. Later, the petitioner
moved two lay-off acts to its rank and file employees and was opposed by the union. Petitioner assailed that the move was
temporary and exercise of its management prerogative. Herein public respondent declared that the petitioners act illegal and
issued two resolution of cease and desist stating that the move exacerbate and caused conflict to the case at bar. Included on the
last resolution issued by the public respondent which states that executive secretaries are excluded from the closed-shop
provision of the CBA, not from the bargaining unit. A petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the Resolution and
Omnibus Resolution of Roldan-Confesor on grounds that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion and excess of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Must the executive secretaries be included as part of the bargaining unit of rank and file employees?

LAW:

Article 245 of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:
RULING:

NO. By recognizing the expanded scope of the right to self-organization, the intent of the court was to
delimit the types of employees excluded from the close shop provisions, not from the bargaining unit. The
executive secretaries of General Manager and the Management Committees should not only be exempted from the
closed-shop provision but should not be permitted to join in the bargaining unit of the rank and file employees as
well as on the grounds that the executive secretaries are confidential employees, having access to vital labor
information. As stated in several cases, confidential employees are prohibited and disqualified to join any
bargaining unit since the very nature of the functions are to assist and act in a confidential capacity, or to have
access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. Finally,
confidential employees cannot be classified as rank and file from the very nature of their work. Excluding
confidential employees from the rank and file of bargaining unit, therefore, is not tantamount to discrimination.
Therefore, executive secretaries of petitioners General Manager and its Management Committee are permanently
excluded from the bargaining unit of petitioners rank and file employees

OPINION:

I agree with the intent of the court, that it had to delimit the types of employees excluded from the close shop provisions,
not from the bargaining unit.

7. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE V. PURA

FERRER-CALLEJA

FACTS:

Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (BWLU- ADLO) filed a
petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees
of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) alleging that BENECO has in its employ 214 rank and file
employees; that 198 or 92.5% of these employees have supported the filing of the petition; that no certification
election has been conducted for the last 12 months; that there is no existing collective bargaining representative of
the rank and file employees sought to represented by BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is no collective bargaining
agreement in the cooperative. An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees Labor Union
(BELU) contending that it was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the subject workers
pursuant to an order issued by the med-arbiter; that pending resolution by the NLRC are two cases it filed against
BENECO involving bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the pendency of these cases bars any
representation question. BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming that it is a non-
profit electric cooperative engaged in providing electric services to its members and patron-consumers; and, that the
employees sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form, join or assist labor organizations of
their own choosing because they are members and joint owners of the cooperative. The med-arbiter issued an order
giving due course to the petition for certification election. However, the med-arbiter limited the election among the
rank and file employees of BENECO who are non-members thereof and without any involvement in the actual
ownership of the cooperative.

The med-arbiter found that there are 37 employees who are not members and without any involvement in
the actual ownership of the cooperative. BELU and BENECO appealed but the same was dismissed for lack of
merit. So BENECO filed with the SC a petition for certiorari which the SC dismissed for lack of merit in a minute
resolution dated April 1986. The ordered certification election was held in October 1986. Prior to the conduct
thereof BENECO's counsel verbally manifested that "the cooperative is protesting that employees who are members-
consumers are being allowed to vote when they are not eligible to be members of any labor union for purposes of
collective bargaining; much less, to vote in this certification election." BENECO submitted a certification showing
that only 4 employees are not members of BENECO and insisted that only these employees are eligible to vote in
the certification election. Canvass of the votes showed that BELU garnered 49 of the 83 "valid" votes cast.
Thereafter BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by filing a Protest. The med-arbiter dismissed the protest.
BLR director Calleja affirmed the med-arbiter's order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of all the rank and file employees of BENECO.

ISSUE:

Are the employees of a cooperative qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes of collective
bargaining?

LAW:

Article 256 of the Labor Code

RULING:

Under Article 256 LC, to have a valid certification election, "at least a majority of all eligible voters in the
unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit." BENECO asserts that the certification election held was null
and void since members-employees who are not eligible to form and join a labor union for purposes of collective
bargaining were allowed to vote therein. The issue has already been resolved and clarified in the case of Cooperative
Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer Calleja, et al. and reiterated in the cases of Batangas-Electric Cooperative
Labor Union v. Young, et al. and San Jose City Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and
Employment, et al. wherein the Court had stated that the right to collective bargaining is not available to an
employee of a cooperative who at the same time is a member and co-owner thereof.

8. TUPAS vs NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

FACTS:

National Housing Corporation is a corporation organized in under Executive Order No. 399 of the Uniform
Charter of Government Corporations. Its shares of stock are and have been 100% owned by the government from its
incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are
the GSIS, SSS, DBP, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation. On the other hand, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services is a legitimate labor
organization with a chapter in NHC. In 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with
DOLE Regional Office in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was
claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by
the med-arbiter holding that NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers
are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section
1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. TUPAS appealed to BLR which, in
turn, reversed the med-arbiter and ordered a certification election to be conducted. However, the same was reversed
in the MR. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

May a certification election be conducted among the NHC employees?

LAW:

Article 24 and 276 of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:

RULING:

Yes. Under the present 1987 Constitution, the civil service now covers only government owned or
controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special
law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. Since the NHC is a GOCC without an
original charter, it is not covered by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code. Anyway, whether the NHC is
covered by Labor Code or the Civil Service Law is beside the point. The right to unionize or to form organizations is
now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.

The Bill of Rights provides that the right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. This
guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human Rights,
which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. Specifically,
with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX-B
which provides that the right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. The rationale for
this is that the government for all its sovereign functions also performs mundane tasks such that it is also an
employer in the true sense of the term. In fact, it is the biggest employer in the nation.

OPINION:

The reason behind this is that the government for all its sovereign functions also performs mundane
tasks such that it is also an employer in the true sense of the term. In fact, it is the biggest employer in the
nation.

9. SUPREME STEEL CORPORATION V.

NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG SUPREME
INDEPENDENT UNION (NMS-IND-APL)

FACTS:

On July 27, 2005, respondent filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) on the ground that petitioner violated certain provisions of the CBA. The parties failed to settle their
dispute. Consequently, the Secretary of Labor certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.

Respondent alleged eleven CBA violations, enumerated as follows: (1) denial to four employees of the
CBA- provided wage increase, (2) contracting-out labor, (3) failure to provide shuttle service, (4) refusal to answer
for medical expenses incurred by three employees, (5) failure to comply with time-off provision, (6) visitors free
access to company premises, (7) failure to comply with reporting time-off provision, (8) dismissal of an employee
supposedly due to disease, (9) denial of paternity leave benefit to two employees, (10) discrimination and
harassment, and (11) non-implementation of COLA in Wage Order Nos. RBIII-10 and 11.

Out of the eleven issues raised by respondent, eight were decided in its favor; two (denial of paternity leave
benefit and discrimination of union members) were decided in favor of petitioner; while the issue on visitors free
access to company premises was deemed settled during the mandatory conference. Petitioners appeal to the CA was
dismissed.

According to the CA, petitioner failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding that it violated certain provisions of the CBA. With regard to wage increase, The CA concluded that, based
on the wording of the CBA, which uses the words "general increase" and "over and above," it cannot be said that the
parties have intended the anniversary increase to be given in lieu of the CBA wage increase. The CA declared that
the withdrawal of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 from the employees who were not minimum wage
earners amounted to a diminution of benefits because such grant has already ripened into a company practice. Based
on the principle of liberal construction of the CBA, the CA likewise sustained the NLRCs rulings on theissues
pertaining to medical expenses, the shuttle service, time-off for attendance in grievance meetings/hearings, and time-
off due to brownouts. Finally, the CA affirmed the NLRCs finding that Madayags dismissal was illegal. It
emphasized that the burden to prove that the employees disease is of such nature or at such stage that it cannot be
cured within a period of six months rests on the employer, who failed to prove such.

ISSUE:

Did the CA err in affirming the NLRC?

LAW:

Article 284 of the Labor Code

Article 263 of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:

RULING:

It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and
compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. If the terms of aCBA are clear and there is no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail. Moreover, the
CBA must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically and the Court must place a practical and
realistic construction upon it. Any doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor should be
resolved in favor of labor. Upon these well-established precepts, the CAs findings and conclusions on all the issues
are sustained, except the issue pertaining to the denial of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 and 11 to the
employees who are not minimum wage earners, which respondent avers as a diminution of benefits.

Diminution of benefits is the unilateral withdrawal by the employer of benefits already enjoyed by the
employees. There is diminution of benefits when it is shown that:

(1) the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time;
(2) the practice is consistent and deliberate;
(3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of
law; and
(4) the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer.

The implementation of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 across the board, which only lasted for
less than a year, cannot be considered as having been practiced "over a long period of time." While it is true that
jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a specific minimum number of years in order for a practice to be
considered as a voluntary act of the employer, under existing jurisprudence on this matter, an act carried out within
less than a year would certainly not qualify as such. Hence, the withdrawal of the COLA Wage Order No. RBIII-10
from the salaries of non-minimum wage earners did not amount to a "diminution of benefits" under the law.

OPINION:

It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and compliance
therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. If the terms of aCBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail.

10. MERALCO vs NLRC

FACTS:

Apolinario Signo was employed by the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) as supervisor-leadman since
1963. During his 20 year-tenure of service in said company, he had been commended twice for honesty. However,
one time in 1981, he facilitated an illegal connection to the house of a certain Fernando De Lara; the latter
received free service of electricity for a year since he was not billed for Meralcos services. This irregularity was
later discovered and so in 1983, Signo was fired by Meralco on the ground of breach of trust and loss of confidence
which are grounds for termination under the Labor Code.

Signo filed a case for illegal dismissal and for backwages. The Labor Arbiter ruled that though there is
breach of trust on the part of Signo, dismissal is too harsh a penalty considering that Signo has been employed by
Meralco for 20 years; that except for that one time infraction, Signo had a clean slate with Meralco. On appeal, The
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter. Meralco
questioned the validity of the NLRC decision before the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Are the findings of the NLRC, an administrative body, reviewable by the Supreme Court in this case?

LAW:

Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code

CASE HISTORY:

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court sustained the decision of the NLRC. Well-established is the principle that findings
of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters
are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this Court on labor cases does not go so
far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its
determination but is limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. No such issues of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion is present in the case at bar.

Further, notwithstanding the existence of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust by an
employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty if the latter has been employed
for a considerable length of time in the service of his employer. Reinstatement of respondent Signo is proper in the
instant case, but without the award of backwages, considering the good faith of Meralco in dismissing him.

OPINION:

Judicial review by the Court on labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination but is limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.