SPO2 LOLITO T. NACNAC, Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
being the highest ranking officer during the shift, was designated the officer-
G.R. No. 191913 March 21, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Every circumstance favoring the accuseds innocence must be duly
taken into account. The proof against the accused must survive the test of
reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged. If the prosecution fails to discharge the
burden, then it is not only the accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more, the
courts constitutional duty to acquit him.[1]
This treats of the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Resolution dated August 25, 2010, affirming
the July 20, 2009 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 30907
entitled People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Lolito T. Nacnac. The CA affirmed the May 23, 2007
Judgment[3] in Criminal Case No. 10750-14 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14
in Laoag City, which convicted petitioner of homicide.
The Facts
An Information charged the accused as follows:
That on or about February 20, 2003, in Dingras, Ilocos Norte, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused SPO2 Lolito I. Nacnac, a public
officer, being then a member of the Philippine National Police, assigned with
the Dingras Police Station, Dingras, Ilocos Norte, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, shoot one SPO1 Doddie Espejo
with a gun resulting into the latters death.[4]
A reverse trial ensued upon the claim of self-defense by the accused. As summarized by
CA,[5] the shooting incident happened as follows:
The victim, SPO1 Doddie Espejo[,] had a history of violent aggression and
drunkenness. He once attacked a former superior, P/Insp. Laurel Gayya, for
no apparent reason. On the day of his death, he visited a cock house for
merriment. He was shot by accused-appellant [petitioner] on February 20,
2003 at around 10:00 p.m. at the Dingras Police Station, Dingras, Ilocos
Norte.
On that fateful night of February 20, 2003, accused-appellant, the victim and a
number of other police officers were on duty. Their shift started at 8:00 in the
morning of the same day, to end at 8:00 the next morning. Accused-appellant,
of-the-day. Shortly before 10:00 in the evening, the victim, together with then
SPO1 Eduardo Basilio, took the patrol tricycle from the station grounds. When
accused-appellant saw this, he stopped the victim and his colleague from
using the tricycle. The victim told accused-appellant that he (the victim)
needed it to go to Laoag City to settle a previous disagreement with a security
of a local bar.
Accused-appellant still refused. He told the victim that he is needed at the
station and, at any rate, he should stay at the station because he was drunk.
This was not received well by the victim. He told accused-appellant in
Ilocano: Iyot ni inam kapi (Coitus of your mother, cousin!). The victim alighted
from the tricycle. SPO1 Eduardo Basilio did the same, went inside the office,
and left the accused-appellant and the victim alone. The victim took a few
steps and drew his .45 caliber gun which was tucked in a holster on the right
side of his chest. Accused-appellant then fired his M-16 armalite upward as a
warning shot. Undaunted, the victim still drew his gun. Accused-appellant then
shot the victim on the head, which caused the latters instantaneous death.
Accused-appellant later surrendered to the stations Chief of Police.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. The RTC held that the claim of self-
defense by the accused was unavailing due to the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. The dispositive portion of the RTC Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused SPO2 Lolito Nacnac is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Taking into account the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court hereby sentences
him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from EIGHT YEARS of prision
mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN YEARS of reclusion temporal as
maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased (1) P50,000.00
as indemnity for his death, (2) P100,000.00 as actual damages, (3)
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (4) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. Costs
against the accused.[6]
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. It held that the essential and primary element
of unlawful aggression was lacking. It gave credence to the finding of the trial court that no one
else saw the victim drawing his weapon and pointing it at accused Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2)
Lolito T. Nacnac. The fallo of the CA Decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
challenged Judgment dated May 23, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 10750-14
is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.[7]
On August 25, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution, denying Nacnacs petition for review for failure
to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in the challenged decision and
resolution as to warrant the exercise of this Courts appellate jurisdiction.
On October 11, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution dated
August 25, 2010. On March 21, 2012, this Court granted the Motion and reinstated the petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. [Whether the CA erroneously held that] the victims drawing of his handgun
or pointing it at the petitioner is not sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression
based on existing jurisprudence.
2. [Whether the CA incorrectly appreciated the photo] showing the victim
holding his handgun in a peculiar manner despite the fact that no expert
witness was presented to testify thereto x x x.
3. [Whether petitioner] has met the second and third requisites of self-defense
x x x.[8]
Petitioner argues that he did not receive a just and fair judgment based on the following: (1) the
trial court did not resort to expert testimony and wrongly interpreted a photograph; (2) the trial court
ignored the evidence proving unlawful aggression by the victim; (3) the trial court ignored the two
gun reports and two empty shells found at the crime scene which support the claim that petitioner
fired a warning shot; and (4) the trial court failed to appreciate petitioners act of self-
defense. Petitioner also claims that the CA gravely erred in not giving proper weight and due
consideration to the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
In its Comment[9] dated April 27, 2011, the OSG avers that petitioner is entitled to an acquittal, or at
the very least, not one but two mitigating circumstances.
Our Ruling
We revisit Our ruling in the instant case.
The Revised Penal Code provides the requisites for a valid self-defense claim:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances.The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that
the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Unlawful Aggression
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. We explained, Without unlawful
aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and
will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present.[10] It would presuppose an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a personnot a mere
threatening or intimidating attitudebut most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken
against the aggressor. x x x There is aggression in contemplation of the law only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not just speculative.[11]
As We held:
Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the firearm at any particular target is
not sufficient to conclude that ones life was in imminent danger. Hence, a
threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to
be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly
revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts showing the
commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression.[12]
The following exchange showing actual and material unlawful aggression transpired during the
examination of petitioner:[13]
Atty. Lazo: At any rate, when you again prevented them from getting the
tricycle telling them again that they should not get the tricycle, what
happened next?
Accused: When police officer Basilio alighted from the tricycle SPO1 Espejo
also alighted sir.
Q What did Doddie Espejo do when he alighted from the tricycle?
A I saw him hold his firearm tucked on his right waist. (witness demonstrating
by placing his right hand at his right sideways). And he was left
handed, sir.
Q And what happened next?
A When I saw him holding his firearm that was the time I fired a warning shot,
sir.
Q And when you fired [a] warning shot, what happened next?
 A He drew his firearm, sir.
Q When he drew his firearm, what did you do?
A When he drew his firearm I shot him [on] his head once, sir.
xxxx
Atty. Cajigal:
Q By the way, what kind of firearm did the victim draw from his waist?
A Cal. 45, sir.
Q What firearm did you use in defending yourself?
A M-16 armalite, sir.
xxxx
Q Alright, you mean to tell the Honorable Court then that at the time that you
pointed or squeezed the trigger of your gun the cal. 45 was already
pointed at you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ever observe if he squeezed the trigger but the gun [was] already
pointed at you?
A He just pointed his firearm at me, sir.
Q Who first pointed his firearm, the victim pointed his firearm at you before
you pointed your firearm at him?
A The victim, sir.
Q In short, it was the victim whose gun was first pointed at you?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the time when you raised your armalite and also pointed the
same at him is that right?
A Yes, that was the time that I shot him, sir. (Emphasis supplied.)
According to the trial court, petitioners claim that the victim pointed his gun at petitioner was a mere
afterthought. It ruled that petitioners sworn statement and direct testimony as well as the
testimonies of SPO1 Eduardo Basilio and SPO2 Roosevelt Ballesteros only established that the
victim drew his gun. The trial court went on to differentiate the act of drawing a gun and pointing it
at a target. It held that the mere act of drawing a gun cannot be considered unlawful aggression. In
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed the trial courts findings and further
held that petitioner had fuller control of his physical and mental faculties in view of the victims
drunken state. It concluded that the likelihood of the victim committing unlawful aggression in his
inebriated state was very slim.[14]
We disagree. The characterization as a mere afterthought of petitioners testimony on the presence
of unlawful aggression is not supported by the records.
The following circumstances negate a conviction for the killing of the victim:
(1) The drunken state of the victim;
(2) The victim was also a police officer who was professionally trained at
shooting;
(3) The warning shot fired by petitioner was ignored by the victim;
(4) A lawful order by petitioner was ignored by the victim; and
(5) The victim was known for his combative and drunken behavior.
As testified by the victims companion, SPO1 Basilio, petitioner ordered him and the victim not to
leave because they were on duty. SPO1 Basilio also confirmed that the victim was inebriated and
had uttered invectives in response to petitioners lawful order.[15]
Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference between the act of drawing ones
gun and the act of pointing ones gun at a target. The former cannot be said to be unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. In People v. Borreros,[16] We ruled that for unlawful aggression
to be attendant, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. Unlawful aggression requires
an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude x x x. Here, the act of the [deceased] of allegedly drawing a gun
from his waist cannot be categorized as unlawful aggression. Such act did not put in real peril the
life or personal safety of appellant.
The facts surrounding the instant case must, however, be differentiated from current jurisprudence
on unlawful aggression. The victim here was a trained police officer. He was inebriated and had
disobeyed a lawful order in order to settle a score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning
shot fired by a fellow police officer, his superior, was left unheeded as he reached for his own
firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore, justified in defending himself from an
inebriated and disobedient colleague.Even if We were to disbelieve the claim that the victim
pointed his firearm at petitioner, there would still be a finding of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. We quote with approval the OSGs argument[17] on this point:
A police officer is trained to shoot quickly and accurately. A police officer
cannot earn his badge unless he can prove to his trainors that he can shoot
out of the holster quickly and accurately x x x. Given this factual backdrop,
there is reasonable basis to presume that the appellant indeed felt his life was
actually threatened. Facing an armed police officer like himself, who at that
time, was standing a mere five meters from the appellant, the [latter] knew
that he has to be quick on the draw. It is worth emphasizing that the victim,
being a policeman himself, is presumed to be quick in firing.
Hence, it now becomes reasonably certain that in this specific case, it would
have been fatal for the appellant to have waited for SPO1 Espejo to point his
gun before the appellant fires back.
Reasonable Means Employed

To successfully invoke self-defense, another requisite is that the means employed by the accused
must be reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be
averted.[18]
Supporting petitioners claim of self-defense is the lone gunshot wound suffered by the victim. The
nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered
as important indicia.[19] In People v. Catbagan,[20] We aptly held:
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to immediately RELEASE petitioner
from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause, and to INFORM this Court
within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision of the date petitioner was actually released from
confinement.
SO ORDERED.

The means employed by the person invoking self-defense is reasonable if PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
equivalent to the means of attack used by the original aggressor. Whether or Associate Justice
not the means of self-defense is reasonable depends upon the nature or
quality of the weapon, the physical condition, the character, the size and other
circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the person who invokes WE CONCUR:
self-defense; and also the place and the occasion of the assault.

In the instant case, the lone wound inflicted on the victim supports the argument that petitioner DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
feared for his life and only shot the victim to defend himself. The lone gunshot was a reasonable Associate Justice
means chosen by petitioner in defending himself in view of the proximity of the armed victim, his
drunken state, disobedience of an unlawful order, and failure to stand down despite a warning shot.

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Lack of Sufficient Provocation Associate Justice Associate Justice
The last requisite for self-defense to be appreciated is lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself or herself. As gleaned from the findings of the trial court,
petitioner gave the victim a lawful order and fired a warning shot before shooting the armed and
drunk victim. Absent from the shooting incident was any evidence on petitioner sufficiently
provoking the victim prior to the shooting. ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
All told, We are convinced that petitioner was only defending himself on the night he shot his fellow
police officer. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal.[21] This rule is binding except where the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or ATTESTATION
misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance.[22] As earlier pointed out, the trial
court did not consider certain facts and circumstances that materially affect the outcome of the
instant case. We must, therefore, acquit petitioner. I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Given the peculiar circumstances of this case, We find that the prosecution was unable to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner. Even the OSG shares this view in its Comment
appealing for his acquittal.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated July Associate Justice
20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 30907 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner SPO2 Lolito T. Chairperson
Nacnac is ACQUITTED of homicide on reasonable doubt.
 The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the Regional Trial Court, and as confirmed by the
CERTIFICATION Court of Appeals on appeal, may be so summarized:

On 6 August 2000, at about 10 oclock in the evening, private complainant Andy Merto, bearing a
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons grudge against the petitioner, went to the house of the latter in the Municipality of Sta.
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation Cruz, Zambales. While standing outside the house, private complainant Merto shouted violent
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. threats, challenging the petitioner to face him outside.

Sensing the private complainants agitated state and fearing for the safety of his family, petitioner
went out of his house to reason with and pacify Merto. However, as soon as he drew near the
private complainant, the latter hurled a stone at the petitioner. The petitioner was able to duck just
RENATO C. CORONA in time to avoid getting hit and instinctively retaliated by hitting the left leg of the private
Chief Justice complainant with a bolo scabbard. The private complainant fell to the ground. Petitioner then
continuously mauled the private complainant with a boloscabbard, until the latters cousin,
____________________________________ Rodolfo Muya, restrained him.[3]

As a consequence of the incident, private complainant Merto sustained two (2) bone fractures, one
in his left leg and another in his left wrist. It took about six (6) months for these injuries to
LADISLAO ESPINOSA, Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. completely heal.[4]
No. 181071
On 22 September 2000, petitioner was originally charged with Frustrated Homicide, under an
DECISION Information[5] which reads as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August 2006 at about 10 oclock in

PEREZ, J.: the evening, at Brgy. Pagatpat, in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province
of Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, with treachery, evide[nt] premeditation and intent to kill, did
The Case then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and hack
several times one Andy Merto, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following
physical injuries, to wit:
This case comes before this Court as an appeal, by way of a Petition for Review 1. Fracture open III A P/3 Tibia left secondary to Hacking Wound;
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals 2. Incised wound, wrist joint with Incised
affirming the conviction of herein petitioner, Ladislao Espinosa, for the crime of Serious Physical Extensor Pollicis Brevis Tendon, Left S/P F Debridement
Injuries under the third paragraph of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]The dispositive Right Wrist S/P Long Circular Cast, Left
portion of the assailed decision reads:
thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
Branch 71 dated 30 March 2005, finding causes independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical
appellant Ladislao Espinosa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime assistance rendered to said Andy Merto which prevented his death.
of SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES is AFFIRMED with CONTRARY TO LAW.
the MODIFICATION that he will suffer the straight penalty of six (6) months
of Arresto Mayor and pay the amount of P54,925.50 as actual damages.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and trial thereafter ensued.
With costs against accused-appellant.
On 14 December 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, convicted petitioner
only of Serious Physical Injuries under the third paragraph of Article 263 of the Revised Penal
The Facts Code, noting that the prosecution had failed to prove the element of intent to kill, which is
necessary to a conviction for Frustrated Homicide. The dispositive[6] portion of the ruling reads:
 WHEREFORE premises considered, judgment is rendered finding
accused Ladislao Espinosa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Serious Physical Injuries defined and penalized under Art. 263, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced [to] suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of Arresto Mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months
and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum. Accused is ordered to
pay private complainant Andy Merto the amount of P54,925.50 as and by way
of actual damages.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 7 February 2005, before the trial
court, invoking for the first time complete self-defense, under the first paragraph of Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code. In a Resolution[7] dated 30 March 2005, the trial court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration holding that self-defense cannot be appreciated to justify the act of
petitioner. The trial court cites the means adopted by the petitioner in repelling the attack as not
reasonably necessary in view of the surrounding circumstances and the severity of the victims
injuries.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction with the modification that the
penalty imposed by the trial court should be lowered by one degree in accordance with the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 69[8] of the Revised
Penal Code. Consequently, the Motion for Reconsideration[9] filed by the petitioner was also
denied by the Court of Appeals via a Resolution[10] dated 4 January 2008.
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether under the set of facts given in this case, complete
self-defense may be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court rules in the negative.
The requirements of self-defense as a justifying circumstance are found in the first paragraph of
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
that the following requisites concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
In their decisions, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the first and third
elements of self-defense are present in the case at bar. This finding was never questioned by
either of the parties and, as such, may be taken as established for purposes of this
appeal. Nonetheless, to dispel any doubts, the Court hereby affirms the existence of the first and
third elements of self-defense, based on the following reasons:
First, unlawful aggression on the part of private complainant Merto was manifested by his attack
upon the person of the petitioner in throwing a stone at the latter. This sudden and unexpected
assault posed actual danger on the life or limb of the petitioner, prompting the latter to take steps
in his defense. To the mind of the Court, this is an offensive positively strong enough to be the
basis for a defensive action.
Second, there is lack of sufficient, if not total absence of, provocation on the part of the
petitioner. The facts are clear that it is private complainant Merto who invited the confrontation with
petitionerby shouting violent threats at the latter.
The argumentation is on the existence of the second element, i.e., reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals were in agreement that the means employed by the petitioner in conducting his defense is
disproportionate to what was necessary to prevent or deter the attack of private
complainant Merto.
In arguing that the means employed was reasonable to repel the unlawful aggression, the
petitioner invokes the application of the doctrine of rational equivalence, delineated in People
v. Gutual,[11] to wit:
x x x It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not
imply material commensurability between the means of attack and
defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the
consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency,
the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the
instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and
the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but
rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. (Emphasis supplied)
Tersely put, petitioner contends that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in citing the
severity of the injuries sustained by private complainant Merto, as an indicator that belies the
reasonableness of the means adopted by the former to repel the attack of the latter. Instead,
petitioner wants to place emphasis on the fact that he merely acted out of instinct and that he used
a bolo scabbardas opposed to using the bolo itselfin incapacitating the private complainant.
The Court is not impressed.
The very application of the doctrine of rational equivalence, invoked by the petitioner, militates
against his claim. The doctrine of rational equivalence presupposes the consideration not only of
the nature and quality of the weapons used by the defender and the assailantbut of the totality of
circumstances surrounding the defense vis--vis, the unlawful aggression.
Significantly, a perusal of the facts shows that after petitioner was successful in taking down private
complainant Mertothe former continued to hack the latter, who was, by then, already neutralized by
the blow. This fact was clearly established by the testimony of Rodolfo Muya, who recounted
having seen the petitioner continuously hacking the private complainant with the bolo scabbard,
even as the latter lay almost motionless upon the muddy ground.[12] Clearly, this continuous
hacking by the petitioner constitutes force beyond what is reasonably required to repel the private
complainants attackand is therefore unjustified.
As to whether the fractures suffered by the private complainant resulted from a single blow or a
product of multiple hackings is a question of fact best left to the judgment of the trial court. It is a
well-settled principle that factual findings of the trial courtespecially if already affirmed by an
appellate courtare binding and conclusive upon this Court, save only for certain compelling reasons
which are absent in this case.[14] Hence, the Court refuses to disturb the facts, and defers to the
determination of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the appealed Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated 25 September 2007, in CA-G.R. CR No. 29633 is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No pronouncement as to costs.

People v. Beltran, Jr.,[13] which also involves repetitious hacking by the accused even after the SO ORDERED.
aggressor had been neutralized, is especially instructive:

The act of appellant in repeatedly hacking Norman on his head

and neck was not a reasonable and necessary means of repelling the JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
aggression allegedly initiated by the latter. As stated earlier, no convincing Associate Justice
evidence was presented to show that Norman was armed with an ice-pick at
the time of the incident. In fact, no ice-pick was found in the crime scene or in
the body of the victim. There was also no proof showing that Norman
attempted to stab appellant or tried to barge into the latter's house.
Granting arguendo that Norman was armed with an ice-pick, the repeated
hackings were not necessary since he can overpower or disable Norman by a
single blow on non-vital portion/s of his body. WE CONCUR:

Again, as correctly observed by the OSG, had the appellant merely

wanted to protect himself from what he perceived as an unlawful aggression
of Norman, he could have just disabled Norman. When Norman fell on the ANTONIO T. CARPIO
ground, appellant should have ceased hacking the former since the Associate Justice
alleged aggression or danger no longer exists. By appellant's own Chairperson
testimony, however, he hacked Norman with his bolo even when the
latter was already lying on the ground. It appears, therefore, that the
means used by appellant, which were simultaneous and repeated
hackings, were adopted by him not only to repel the aggression of
Norman but to ensure the latter's death. In sum, such act failed to pass
the test of reasonableness of the means employed in preventing or ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
repelling an unlawful aggression. (Emphasis supplied) Associate Justice Associate Justice

Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner merely used a scabbard in fending off the unlawful
aggressionthe totality of the circumstances shows that after the aggressor was taken down to the
ground, the petitioner ceased to be motivated with the lawful desire of defending himself. He was,
by then, acting with intent to harm the private complainant whose aggression had already ceased. ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Finally, in trying to disprove the testimony of Rodolfo Muya that there was continuous hacking, the
petitioner also posits that the injuries sustained by the private complainant could not have been
serious enough to be the product of repeated hacks, and claims that the same are merely a
product of a single blow. This contention has had ample study and consideration in the trial court
and in the Court of Appeals. It deserves no further ado.
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MELANIO NUGAS y MAPAIT,
Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 172606 November 23, 2011
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Self-defense is often readily claimed by an accused even if false. It is time, then, to
remind the Defense about the requisites of the justifying circumstance and about the duty of the
Defense to establish the requisites by credible, clear and convincing evidence.
Melanio Nugas y Mapait appeals the decision promulgated on March 8, 2006,[1] whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for murder under the decision rendered on
August 17, 2000 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, in Antipolo City (RTC).
Antecedents
On June 25, 1997, the Office of Provincial Prosecutor in Antipolo City charged Jonie
Araneta y Nugas (Araneta) with murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of March 1997, in the Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a bladed
weapon, conspiring and confederating with an unidentified male person,
whose true identity and present whereabout is still unknown, with treachery
and taking advantage of their superior strength, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed
weapon one Glen Remigio y Santos hitting the latter on the left neck, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal stab wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On April 7, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, learning of the identity of the
unidentified male co-conspirator of Araneta as Melanio Nugas y Mapait (Nugas), amended the
information to include Nugas as a co-principal, to wit:
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with a bladed weapon, with
intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, and taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with the said bladed weapon one Glen Remegio y Santos
hitting the latter on the left neck, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wound
which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Upon arraignment on June 9, 1998, Araneta and Nugas, both assisted by counsel de officio,
voluntarily and spontaneously pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[4]
In the course of the presentation of evidence for the Defense, Araneta manifested his
willingness to change his plea, and to enter a plea of guilty as an accomplice in homicide. On July
19, 1999, the RTC approved his offer to change plea. The plea bargaining was with the conformity
of the State Prosecutor and the heirs of the victim. Thus, after ensuring that Araneta had
understood the consequences of his new plea of guilty, the RTC allowed him to enter a new plea.
He was subsequently duly convicted as an accomplice in homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.[5]
The trial proceeded against Nugas.
Evidence of the Prosecution
On March 26, 1997, at about 9:00 in the evening, Glen Remigio (Glen), his wife, Nila
Remigio (Nila), and their two children, Raymond and Genevieve, then 11- and 6-years old,
respectively, were traveling on board their family vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, along Marcos Highway in
COGEO, Antipolo, Rizal. Glen was driving, while Nila sat to his extreme right because their
children sat between them. While they were passing along Carolina Village, two men waved at
them signalling their request to hitch a ride. Glen accommodated the two men, one of whom was
carrying a maroon plastic bag, allowing them to board the vehicle at the rear. When the vehicle
neared Masinag Market, the two men suddenly brandished knives that each pointed at Glens and
Nilas necks, warning them not to make any wrong move if they did not want to be harmed.
Considering that the two men demanded to be brought to Sta. Lucia Mall, Glen continued driving
the vehicle. Upon the vehicle reaching Kingsville Village, the man behind Glen suddenly stabbed
Glen on the neck. Thereafter, the two men alighted and fled. Glen pulled the knife from his neck
and handed it to Nila. He drove to the nearest hospital, but he collapsed on the way and lost
control of the vehicle, causing it to run over two pedestrians, one of whom died and the other
suffered a broken arm. Once the vehicle hit the railings of a gas station, Nila cried for help.
Concerned citizens immediately rushed Glen to the nearest hospital, which was about 50 to 60
meters away. Nila stayed behind to look after their children. When she checked the vehicle, she
found the knife, its scabbard, and the maroon plastic bag left by the assailants at the rear of the
vehicle. She gathered the articles and later turned them over to the police officer in charge of the
investigation. The maroon plastic bag was found to contain the following items: a National Bureau
of Investigation clearance,[6] a police clearance,[7] Social Security System papers,[8] and official
receipts,[9] all issued in the name of Araneta, a stainless fork knuckle, and a bunch of keys.
Despite undergoing treatment, Glen succumbed,[10] and his body was brought for autopsy to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory. The autopsy revealed that Glen had sustained a fatal
stab wound on the left side of his neck originating from the front and going towards the back and
downwards towards the center of his body, piercing the apex of the left lung and transecting the left
common carotid artery; that the stab wound had been inflicted by a single bladed weapon; and that
the immediate cause of his death was the hemorrhage resulting from the stab wound. [11] It was
opined that the position of the stab wound would suggest that had the assailant used his left hand,
he was probably directly behind the victim; but had he used his right hand, he had to be
somewhere to the extreme left of the victim.
During trial, Nila identified Nugas as the person who had sat behind her husband and who had
stabbed her husband in the neck, and Araneta as the person who had sat behind her and who had
carried the maroon plastic bag that she had later recovered from the backseat.
Other witnesses presented were the investigating police officer, the medico-legal officer
who had performed the autopsy, and Atty. Jose S. Diloy, the lawyer who had assisted Araneta in
executing a sworn statement pointing to Nugas, his own uncle, as the person who had stabbed the
driver of the vehicle they were riding on March 26, 1997.
The State adduced object and documentary evidence, including the knife, the maroon
plastic bag and all its contents, Medico Legal Report No. M-0406-97,[12] and the sworn statement of
Araneta.[13]
Evidence of Nugas
Albeit admitting having stabbed Glen, Nugas maintained that he did so in self-defense.
He claimed that the Tamaraw FX driven by Glen was a passenger taxi, not a family vehicle; that
when he and Araneta boarded the vehicle at Gate 1 in COGEO, Antipolo, about four other
passengers were already on board; that he argued with Glen about the fare, because Glen was
overcharging; that when he was about to alight in front of Rempson Supermarket, Glen punched
him and leaned forward as if to get something from his clutch bag that was on the dashboard; that
thinking that Glen was reaching for a gun inside the clutch bag, he stabbed Glen with his left hand
from where he was seated in order to protect himself (Inunahan ko na sya); and that when asked
why he carried a knife, he replied that he needed the knife for protection because he was living in a
squatters area.
Ruling of the RTC
On August 17, 2000, the RTC convicted Nugas of murder, ruling that his guilt had been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC accorded greater credence to the testimony of Nila because she had
consistently narrated the incident. It observed that although Nila had initially made a mistake in
identifying who, as between Nugas and Araneta, had stabbed her husband, she had rectified her
error upon seeing the two accused together in person; that despite the resemblance of Nugas and
Araneta to each other, she had firmly pointed to Nugas as the person who had stabbed Glen; that
even granting to be true Nugas version that Glen had pushed and punched him, his stabbing of
Glen could not be a reasonable and necessary means to repel the attack, for, by all standards, fists
were no match to knives; that treachery had been duly proved beyond reasonable doubt, because
Nugas position inside the vehicle in relation to Glen, who had sat on the drivers seat, and Nugas
manner of inflicting the fatal blow from behind warranted the inference that Nugas had taken
advantage of his position to specially ensure the execution of the felony, without risk to himself
arising from any defense that Glen might make.
The RTC disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused MELANIO NUGAS
is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Nugas is hereby further ordered to pay to heirs of Glen Remigio the
amount of P80,000.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 for funeral expenses
and P50,000 as death indemnity.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Ruling of the CA
Upon review,[15] the CA affirmed the factual and legal conclusions of the RTC, and declared that
Nugas invoking of self-defense shifted the burden to him to prove the attendance of the elements
of self-defense, but he failed to discharge such burden.
Issue
Nugas has now come to the Court to reverse his conviction, and begs us to delve into whether the
affirmance by the CA was proper, and whether the attendant circumstance of treachery was duly
proven.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
By pleading self-defense, an accused admits the killing,[16] and thereby assumes the burden to
establish his plea of self-defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, his
conviction will follow from his admission of killing the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably
appreciated when it is uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is
extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on
the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the States evidence,[17] because the
existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence of the crime, and establishing self-
defense does not require or involve the negation of any of the elements of the offense itself.[18]
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or imminent
threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity
in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation
executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the
victims aggression.[19]
The RTC found that Nugas did not establish the requisites of self-defense. The CA
concurred.
The Court upholds both lower courts.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in
defense of oneself. [20] The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.[21] Accordingly, the
accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a)
there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or,
at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.[22]
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or
at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely
imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent
to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression
must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip
where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a
pot.[23]
Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched him and then reached for
his clutch bag on the dashboard, making Nugas believe that he had a gun there. For one, as the
CA pointed out, Nugas admitted not actually seeing if Glen had a gun in his clutch bag.[24] And,
secondly, the CA correctly found and declared Nugas testimony about Glen punching him to be
improbable, viz:[25]
It is also highly improbable that the victim, in relation to accused-
appellant Nugas position, can launch an attack against the latter. First, the
victim was at the drivers seat and seated between him were his wife and two
children. Second, the victim was driving the FX vehicle. Third, accused-
appellant Nugas was seated directly behind the victim. All things considered, it
is highly improbable, nay risky for the victims family, for him to launch an
attack.
Consequently, Nugas had absolutely no basis for pleading self-defense because he had
not been subjected to either actual or imminent threat to his life. He had nothing to prevent or to
repel considering that Glen committed no unlawful aggression towards him.
With unlawful aggression, the indispensable foundation of self-defense, not having been
established by Nugas, it is superfluous to still determine whether the remaining requisites of self-
defense were attendant. As the Court made clear in People v. Carrero:[26]
Unlawful aggression is the main and most essential element to
support the theory of self-defense and the complete or incomplete
exemption from criminal liability; without such primal requisite it is not
possible to maintain that a person acted in self-defense within the terms
under which unlawful aggression is subordinate to the other two
conditions named in article 8, No. 4, of the Penal Code.[27] When an act of
aggression is in response to an insult, affront, or threat, it cannot be
considered as a defense but as the punishment which the injured party inflicts
on the author of the provocation, and in such a case the courts can at most
consider it as a mitigating circumstance, but never as a reason for exemption,
except in violation of the provisions of the Penal Code. (emphasis supplied)
Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (a) that the means, methods
and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (b) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person.[28]
The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and the attack is
swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape, thereby ensuring its accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor,
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that the execution of
the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Treachery may also be
appreciated when the victim, although warned of the danger to his life, is defenseless and unable
to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.[29]
 The CA exhaustively discussed and rightly determined the presence of treachery as a
circumstance attendant in the killing of Glen and the improbability of Glen launching an attack
against or defending himself from Nugas by reason of their relative positions. We affirm the CA,
because there was nothing adduced by Nugas that refuted how the relative positions of Glen and
Nugas had left the former defenseless and unable to parry or to avoid the fatal blow of the latter.
Verily, Nugas stabbed Glen from behind with suddenness, thereby deliberately ensuring the
execution of the killing without any risk to himself from any defense that Glen might make.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on March 8, 2006
finding MELANIO NUGAS y MAPAIT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton
violence is never justified when their duty could be performed otherwise. A shoot first, think later
disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never has homicide or murder been a
function of law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the cost of human life.
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the June 30, 1995 Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and
16614 cases for murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts of attempted murder,
respectively. The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay
Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and
injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco)
and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the
Integrated National Police (INP)[2] stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando,
Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of
Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra
(Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan
(Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and
Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated
murder in three Informations, the inculpatory portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 16612:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then policemen,
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force
Associate Justice (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and
while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said
barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in
CERTIFICATION relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with deliberate intent to
take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S.
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on
opinion of the Courts Division. the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death
of the latter.

RENATO C. CORONA CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Chief Justice
Criminal Case No. 16613:
SALVADOR YAPYUCO, PETITIONER VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR NO. 120744-46, June 25,
2012 That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then policemen,
 Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and
while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said
barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in
relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack
Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V.
Panlican with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota
Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera,
Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission
of murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the murder
by reason of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous
desistance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 16614:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then policemen,
Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and
while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said
barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in
relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent of taking the
life of Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing
directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva
and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal and
having performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of
murder, but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the defendants
will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given to said Noel C.
Villanueva, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, [6] the
accused except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990,[7] and Yapyuco who was then
allegedly indisposed[8] entered individual pleas of not guilty.[9] A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered a negative plea. [10] In the
meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a
Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612.[11] Said motion was heard on the premise, as
previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and the defense, that these cases would be jointly
tried and that the evidence adduced at said hearing would automatically constitute evidence at the
trial on the merits.[12] On May 10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No.
16612.[13]Yapyuco likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted
on May 21, 1991.[14] Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,[15] and accordingly, the charges
against him were dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-trial
inquest. [16] Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from where the presentation of
evidence left off at the hearing on the bail applications.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De
Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta
celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m.,
shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang
reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open
canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of
his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights
dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and
instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.[17]
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did not
see any one on the road flag them down.[18] In open court, Flores executed a sketch [19] depicting
the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they
had come from and the house situated on the right side of the road right after the curve where the
jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where
the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how
many firearms were used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and
Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan
emerging from the yard of Narons house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced
himself and his companions to be employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan
reproved them for not stopping when flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva
cried out and told him to summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were
wounded. He dashed back to Salangsangs house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he
observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a
Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital.[20] This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that
as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan, approached them and
transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.[21]
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very rapidly succeeded
each other, and that they were given no warning shot at all contrary to what the defense would
say.[22] He professed that he, together with his co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao jeepney
on its way to the hospital and inside it he observed two men, each holding long firearms, seated
beside the driver. He continued that as soon as he and his companions had been dropped off at
the hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with his two armed
companions.[23] He further narrated that the day after the shooting, he brought Licup to the Makati
Medical Center where the latter expired on April 7, 1988. [24] He claimed that all the accused in the
case had not been known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified to
be his wifes uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused for that
matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. [25] He claimed the bullet holes on the
Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there were no other bullet holes at the back
or in any other portion of the vehicle.[26]
 Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed the
presence of his companions at his residence on the subject date and time, and corroborated
Villanuevas and Flores narration of the events immediately preceding the shooting. He recounted
that after seeing off his guests shortly after the procession had passed his house and reminding
them to proceed carefully on the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed when moments later, he
heard a volley of gunfire from a distance which was shortly followed by Flores frantic call for
help. He immediately proceeded to the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the lamppost
just outside the gate of Narons house where, inside, he noticed a congregation of more or less six
people whom he could not recognize. [27] At this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being
loaded into another jeepney occupied by three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then
retrieved the keys of the Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mothers
house, but before driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an
owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same jeepney which he
remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He claimed he
spent the night at his mothers house and in the morning, a policeman came looking for him with
whom, however, he was not able to talk.[28]
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric post
in front of Narons house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none of the neighboring
houses was illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty as to whether it was Yapyucos group or the
group of Pamintuan that brought his injured companions to the hospital, but he could tell with
certainty that it was the Sarao jeepney previously identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought
his injured companions to the hospital.[29]
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas,
affirmed that she had previously examined the firearms suspected to have been used by
petitioners in the shooting and found them positive for gunpowder residue. She could not, however,
determine exactly when the firearms were discharged; neither could she tell how many firearms
were discharged that night nor the relative positions of the gunmen. She admitted having declined
to administer paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused because the opportunity therefor
came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed having also examined the Tamaraw jeepney
and found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most of which had punctured the door at the passenger
side of the vehicle at oblique and perpendicular directions. She explained, rather inconclusively,
that the bullets that hit at an angle might have been fired while the jeepney was either at a standstill
or moving forward in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the
road.[30]Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply officer of the INP-Pampanga
Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of firearms and ammunitions to members of the
local police force and CHDF and CVO members, identified in court the memorandum receipts for
the firearms he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and Yapyuco. [31]
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined the
injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal shrapnel from the
occipital region of Villanuevas head as well as from the posterior aspect of his chest; he noted
nothing serious in these wounds in that the incapacity would last between 10 and 30 days only. He
also located a bullet wound on the front lateral portion of the right thigh, and he theorized that this
wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in front of the victim, assuming the assailant and
the victim were both standing upright on the ground and the firearm was fired from the level of the
assailants waist; but if the victim was seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that
with the shot coming from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He hypothesized
that if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the seated victim
and exit at a lower level.[32]
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the
patient, he noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the head one consistent with
being hit by a hard and blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds the
locations of which suggested that Licup was upright when fired upon from the front: one is a
through-and-through wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of the right leg;
another, through-and-through wound at the middle portion of the right forearm; and third one, a
wound in the abdomen which critically and fatally involved the stomach and the intestines. He
hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger seat as claimed, his right leg must have
been exposed and the assailant must have been in front of him holding the gun slightly higher than
the level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found that the wound in the abdomen had entered from
the left side and crossed over to and exited at the right, which suggested that the gunman must
have been positioned at Licups left side. He explained that if this wound had been inflicted ahead
of that in the forearm, then the former must have been fired after Licup had changed his position as
a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on the leg must have been caused
by a bullet fired at the victims back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting any
hard surface prior.[33]
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licups right forearm must have been caused by a
bullet fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim.Hypothesizing, he held the
improbability of Licup being hit on the abdomen, considering that he might have changed position
following the infliction of the other wounds, unless there was more than one assailant who fired
multiple shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however, he proceeded to rule out the
possibility of Licup having changed position especially if the gunfire was delivered very rapidly. He
could not tell which of Licups three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could be that the bullet to the
abdomen was delivered ahead of the others because it would have caused Licup to lean forward
and stoop down with his head lying low and steady.[34]
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had been
administratively charged with and tried for gross misconduct as a consequence of the subject
shooting incident and that he had in fact conducted investigations thereon sometime in 1989 and
1990 which culminated in their dismissal from service.[35] Dolly Porquerio, stenographer at the
NAPOLCOM, testified that at the hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the
report on the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had previously prepared at his office.
This, according to her, together with the sketch showing the relative position of the responding law
enforcers and the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the
NAPOLCOM Central Office for consideration.[36] The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these
documents together with the joint counter-affidavits which had been submitted in that case by
Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself
as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the superior
officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction included
Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he
and his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon for
police assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a reported
presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station
in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence,
he decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles
with them.[37]
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan
who told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their
collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of
nearby Del Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men and that there were likewise
Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the
approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road
at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. As
the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with
Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed
that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired
him, and his fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno,[38] to fire warning shots but the jeepney
continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and instantaneously,
gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Narons house directly at the subject
jeepney.[39]
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed
at Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and
his men then immediately searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured
passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From
there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who
fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone.[40]
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the
time was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who had
been ambushed supposedly by rebel elements,[41] and that he frequently patrolled the barangay on
account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men therein.[42]That night, he said, his group
which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the
Sindalan Police Substation, [43] the team composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team
headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself, were armed.[44] He
denied that they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the
Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed. [45] He said that the shots which directly hit the
passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather
from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only
when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were assembled.[46]
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the
accused after the incident because he was at the time very confused; yet he did know that his co-
accused had already been investigated by the main police station in San Fernando, but the
inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno.[47] He admitted an administrative case against
him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of which they had been ordered dismissed from service; yet
on appeal, the decision was reversed and they were exonerated. He likewise alluded to an
investigation independently conducted by their station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. [48]
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando,
Pampanga acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation in his jurisdiction, where
members of the police force had fallen victims of ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he
himself has actually conducted investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel elements had
been trying to infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel Corporation plant, and that he has
accordingly conducted clearing operations in sugarcane plantations in the barangay. He intimated
that days prior to the incident, Yapyucos team had already been alerted of the presence of NPA
members in the area. Corroborating Yapyucos declaration, he confessed having investigated the
shooting incident and making a report on it in which, curiously, was supposedly attached
Pamintuans statement referring to Flores as being married to a resident of Barangay Quebiawan
and found after surveillance to be frequently visited by NPA members. He affirmed having found
that guns were indeed fired that night and that the chief investigator was able to gather bullet shells
from the scene. [49]
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco
as well as the latters documentary evidence.[50] Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu
and Manguera, waived their right to present evidence and submitted their memorandum as told.[51]
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the
regular and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order either as
barangay officials and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in
the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they
had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them.[52] With the evidence in hand,
it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals
in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged
in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva
(instead of frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in
those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in
respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador
Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco,
Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres
Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
and crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
the deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts
of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P600,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate
shares of the costs of said action.
 II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence,
all the accused charged in the information, namely,
Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan,
Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario
Reyes y David, Carlos David y Baez, Ruben
Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato
Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense
of Multiple Attempted Murder charged therein, with
costs de oficio.
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador
Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco,
Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres
Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as defined
and penalized under Article 249, in relation to Article 6,
paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and
crediting them with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional as the minimum, to SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
offended party Noel Villanueva in the amount
of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
plus P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to
pay their proportionate share of the costs of said action.
SO ORDERED.[53]
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and
which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under
the guise of maintaining peace and order;[54] that the acts performed by them preparatory to the
shooting, which ensured the execution of their evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a
clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; that the fact they had by collective action
deliberately and consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those
acts negates their defense of lawful performance of official duty;[55] that the theory of mistaken
belief could not likewise benefit petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they
had sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuans report that the victims were
armed NPA members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or
gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did;[56] that there was insufficient or total
absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney were members of the NPA or
criminals for that matter; and that the shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-
planned and well-coordinated police operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda
concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish attempt
to gain commendation.[57]
These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of prosecution
witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the circumstances prior to the subject
incident. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that the Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if
it had truly been flagged down as claimed by Yapyuco especially since as it turned out after the
search of the vehicle they had no firearms with them, and hence, they had nothing to be scared
of.[58] It observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide residents of Barangay
Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay captain no less, not to have
known them and the location of their houses which were not far from the scene of the incident; so
much so that the presence of the victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsangs house that
evening could not have possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuans Sworn
Statement dated April 11, 1988 did not sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the identities of the
victims as well as his apparent certainty on the identity and whereabouts of the subject Tamaraw
jeepney. [59] It surmised how the defense, especially Yapyuco in his testimony, could have failed to
explain why a large group of armed men which allegedly included Cafgu members from
neighboring barangays were assembled at the house of Naron that night, and how petitioners were
able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target vehicle. From this, it inferred that petitioners
had already known that their suspect vehicle would be coming from the direction of Salangsangs
house such knowledge is supposedly evident first, in the manner by which they advantageously
positioned themselves at the scene to afford a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in
the fact that the house of Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post referred to by
prosecution witnesses were deliberately not lit that night.[60]
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores sketch depicting the position of
the Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded that judging by the bullet
holes on the right side of the jeepney and by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory
of the bullets that hit Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard of Narons residence
and the shots were fired at the jeepney while it was slowly moving past them. It also gave weight to
the testimony and the report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of petitioners had been tested
and found to be positive of gunpowder residue, therefore indicating that they had indeed been
discharged.[61]
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial
evidence pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet holes on the
jeepney and the gunshot wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused
such damage and injuries; particularly, the number, location and trajectory of the bullets that hit the
front passenger side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the accused on the right side of the
street and inside the front yard of Narons house; the deliberate shutting off of the lights in the
nearby houses and the lamp post; and the positive ballistic findings on the firearms of
petitioners. [62]
This evidentiary resum, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified petitioners
admission that they did discharge their firearms, but also provided a predicate to its conclusion that
petitioners conspired with one another to achieve a common purpose, design and objective to
harm the unarmed and innocent victims. Thus, since there was no conclusive proof of who among
the several accused had actually fired the gunshots that injured Villanueva and fatally wounded
Licup, the Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on all those who were shown to have
discharged their firearms that night petitioners herein.[63] Interestingly, it was speculated that the
manner by which the accused collectively and individually acted prior or subsequent to or
contemporaneously with the shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of
them, had a grudge against the employees of San Miguel Corporation;[64] and that on the basis of
the self-serving evidence adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a massive
cover-up of the incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga as well as by
the NAPOLCOM.[65] It likewise found very consequential the fact that the other accused had
chosen not to take the witness stand; this, supposedly because it was incumbent upon them to
individually explain their participation in the shooting in view of the weight of the prosecution
evidence, their invocation of the justifying circumstance of lawful performance of official duty and
the declaration of some of them in their affidavits to the effect that they had been deployed that
evening in the front yard of Narons residence from which the volley of gunfire was discharged as
admitted by Yapyuco himself.[66]
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was supposedly not shown how the
aggression commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup
began and developed, and second, this circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate
and conscious adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from
circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding holds true for evident
premeditation because between the time Yapyuco received the summons for assistance from
Pamintuan through David and the time he and his men responded at the scene, there was found to
be no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of all the elements of that circumstance. [67]
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave from work
for 60 days which were all charged against his accumulated leave credits; [68] that he was
earning P8,350.00 monthly;[69] and that he had spent P35,000.00 for the repair of his Tamaraw
jeepney.[70] Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family had spent P18,000.00 for the funeral of
his son, P28,000.00 during the wake, P11,000.00 for the funeral plot and P20,000.00 in attorneys
fees for the prosecution of these cases.[71] He also submitted a certification from San Miguel
Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased son.[72] On these bases, the Sandiganbayan
ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify (a) Villanueva P51,700.00 as actual and
compensatory damages and P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate
costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual
damages and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the
action.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayans finding of conspiracy
and labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the court a quo has not clearly
established that he had by positive acts intended to participate in any criminal object in common
with the other accused, and that his participation in a supposed common criminal object has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the finding is belied by Flores and Villanueva,
who saw him at the scene only after the shooting incident when the wounded passengers were
taken to the hospital on his jeepney.[73] He also points out the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayans
declaration that the incident could not have been the product of a well-planned police operation,
but rather was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted against the victims by the barangay
officials involved or an amateurish attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if
it were the latter alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide
but rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. [74] He laments
that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the victims were caused by his warning
shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the scene of the incident as
a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his presence at the scene of the incident was in
line with the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful performance thereof a fact which
has been affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on appeal the complaint for
gross misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno. [75] He also invokes the concept of mistake of
fact and attributes to Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these
cases, had entertained the belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements.[76]
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim that
the Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the assailed decision
was based on acts the evidence for which has been adduced at a separate trial but erroneously
attributed to them. They explain that there were two sets of accused, in the case: one, the police
officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs
comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the presentation of
evidence. They question their conviction of the charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu,
Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay officials and had waived their right to present
evidence in their behalf. They emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay officials and
CHDFs did not participate in the presentation of the evidence by the accused police officers and,
hence, the finding that they too had fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an
established fact.[77] Also, they believe that the findings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were based on
inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the court itself and those presented in a
separate trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and suspicious and,
hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal prosecution. [78] Finally, they
lament that the finding of conspiracy has no basis in evidence and that the prosecution has not
even shown that they were with the other accused at the scene of the incident or that they were
among those who fired at the victims, and neither were they identified as among the perpetrators of
the crime.[79]
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of conspiracy. They claim that
judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was
the result of a legitimate police operation or a careless plot designed by the accused to obtain
commendation, conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This, because they
believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of them are concerned, shown that they had ever
been part of such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that alluded to in the assailed
decision. They advance that as police officers, they merely followed orders from their commander,
Yapyuco, but were not privy to the conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments
before the shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had community of criminal
design with the rest of the accused.[80] They affirm Yapyucos statement that they fired warning
shots at the subject jeepney,[81] but only after it had passed the place where they were posted and
only after it failed to stop when flagged down as it then became apparent that it was going to speed
away as supposedly shown by bullet holes on the chassis and not on the rear portion of the
jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives that would have otherwise urged
them to commit the crimes charged, especially since none of the victims had been personally or
even remotely known to either of them. That they were not intending to commit a crime is, they
believe, shown by the fact that they did not directly aim their rifles at the passengers of the jeepney
and that in fact, they immediately held their fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of
San Miguel Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could have easily
fired at the victims directly.[82]
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the
finding of conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed, had
assembled themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as though having previously known that it
would be coming from Salangsangs residence. It posits that the manner by which the jeepney was
fired upon demonstrates a community of purpose and design to commit the crimes charged. [83] It
believes that criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on the
road that would give them a direct line of fire at the target as shown by the trajectories of the bullets
that hit the Tamaraw jeepney.[84] This intent was supposedly realized when after the volley of
gunfire, both Flores and Licup were wounded and the latter died as a supervening
consequence.[85] It refutes the invocation of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was
no factual basis to support the belief of the accused that the occupants were members of the NPA,
as indeed they have not shown that they had previously verified the whereabouts of the suspect
vehicle. But while it recognizes that the accused had merely responded to the call of duty when
summoned by Pamintuan through David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the performance
thereof when they fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by innocent
individuals instead.[86]
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the evidence
adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon should not be binding on
them, the OSP explains that said petitioners, together with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and
Yu, had previously withdrawn their motion for separate trial and as directed later on submitted the
case for decision as to them with the filing of their memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of
due process to said petitioners in view of their agreement for the reproduction of the evidence on
the motion for bail at the trial proper as well as by their manifestation to forego with the
presentation of their own evidence.The right to present witnesses is waivable. Also, where an
accused is jointly tried and testifies in court, the testimony binds the other accused, especially
where the latter has failed to register his objection thereto.[87]
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that seem to
rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the case and found that evidence
nonetheless exists to support the penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the situs of
the incident on the date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony which was
adopted by Cunanan and Puno as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their
affidavits which had been offered in evidence by the prosecution, [88] explained that their presence
at the scene was in response to the information relayed by Pamintuan through David that armed
rebel elements on board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the victims were reportedly
spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal to
justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake of
fact. Petitioners admit that it was not by accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting
transpired when it became apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention
arises as to whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and
who among them had discharged the bullets that caused the eventual death of Licup and injured
Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the
criminal.[89] To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint counter-
affidavit[90] of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the counter-affidavit[91] of Mario Reyes; the joint
counter-affidavit[92] of Cunanan and Puno; the counter-affidavit[93]of Yapyuco; and the joint counter-
affidavit[94] of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed immediately after the incident in question. In
brief, Cunanan and Puno stated therein that [their] team was forced to fire at the said vehicle when
it accelerated after warning shots were fired in air and when it ignored Yapyucos signal for it to
stop;[95] in their earlier affidavit they, together with Yapyuco, declared that they were constrained x x
x to fire directly to (sic) the said fleeing vehicle. [96] Yapyucos open court declaration, which was
adopted by Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the
subject jeepney after it allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires thereof
when it came clear that it was trying to escape.[97] He suggested substantiating the implication in
his affidavit that it was the whole team [which fired] at the fleeing vehicle [98] that the bullets which
hit the passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney could have come only from the CHDFs posted inside
the yard of Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted having taken post
while awaiting the arrival of the suspect vehicle.[99]
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was only
Manguerra from their group who discharged a firearm but only into the air to give warning
shots,[100] and that it was the policemen [who] directly fired upon the jeepney.[101] Manguerra himself
shared this statement.[102] Yet these accounts do not sit well with the physical evidence found in the
bullet holes on the passenger door of the jeepney which Dabor, in both her report and testimony,
described to have come from bullets sprayed from perpendicular and oblique directions. This
evidence in fact supports Yapyucos claim that he, Cunanan and Puno did fire directly at the
jeepney after it had made a right turn and had already moved past them such that the line of fire to
the passengers thereof would be at an oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim that,
almost simultaneously, gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot where he,
Cunanan and Puno had taken post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of
Narons house sitting on the right side of the road after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario
Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such that the line of fire would be direct and
perpendicular to it.[103]
While Dabors ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to who
among the accused actually discharged their firearms that night, her report pertaining to the
examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted
within the yard of Narons house had indeed sprayed bullets at the said vehicle. Manguerra, Mario
Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be
applied to them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted, they may not
evade the effect of their having withdrawn their motion for separate trial, their agreement to a joint
trial of the cases, and the binding effect on them of the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco.[104]
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only
against said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter
repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the
other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission is
admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission. [105] It is
thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well
as the latters testimony implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to
present evidence when, in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-
participation in the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied
due process in this regard, as they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution
as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of
their co-accused.
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a
right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused
acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury
caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.[106] The justification is based on the complete
absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony
connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. [107] Where invoked,
this ground for non-liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury
or has committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the
resulting injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or the
lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to
the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to
prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
do not obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law
enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them who were
either police and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and
order were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the
locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and
search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even effect a
bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects had just committed, were
committing or were bound to commit a crime. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a
continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were
acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances.
Even more telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as
would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority
that would have instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with
their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented at the trial to show that
the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the victims, except maybe their
bare suspicion that the suspects were armed and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and
whether or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they
do not stand as accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the
accused believed them to be, the actuations of these responding law enforcers must inevitably be
ranged against reasonable expectations that arise in the legitimate course of performance of
policing duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly
knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he
should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call.
Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a
damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since
the completion of the process pertains to other government officers or agencies.[108]
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm.[109] United States v.
Campo[110] has laid down the rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the authorities is
not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of
resistance, and finds no other means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and
obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise of such force, the same
could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the officer had used
necessary force.[111] He is, however, never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the
offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be
effected otherwise.[112] People v. Ulep[113] teaches that
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only
as a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot
otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers
with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police
officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a
situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed.
However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police
officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither
capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a
clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the
dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law. We
cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who
indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are
apprehending. They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing
with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these
criminals are also human beings with human rights.[114]
Thus, in People v. Tabag,[115] where members of the Davao CHDF had killed four
members of a family in their home because of suspicions that they were NPA members, and the
accused sought exoneration by invoking among others the justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5)
of the Revised Penal Code, the Court in dismissing the claim and holding them liable for murder
said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and
6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals
can by no means be considered as done in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a superior for
some lawful purpose. Other than suspicion, there is no evidence that
Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their children were
members of the NPA. And even if they were members of the NPA, they
were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful night, they were
peacefully resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn of another
uncertain day. Clearly, therefore, nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked
attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but a
merciless vigilante-style execution.[116]

Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by claiming
that it failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well as the signal for it to stop and instead
tried to flee. While it is possible that the jeepney had been flagged down but because it was pacing
the dark road with its headlights dimmed missed petitioners signal to stop, and compound to it the
admitted fact that the passengers thereof were drunk from the party they had just been to, [117] still,
we find incomprehensible petitioners quick resolve to use their firearms when in fact there was at
least one other vehicle at the scene the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco which they could
actually have used to pursue their suspects whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity justifies
the use of force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such necessity. We find,
however, that petitioners failed in that respect. Although the employment of powerful firearms does
not necessarily connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not seem to have been
confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney occupied by the victims.
No explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at their
suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or impatience or simply their careless disposition to
take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment of police duties the moment they actualized
such resolve, thereby inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to Villanueva and
exposing the rest of the passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb all of which
could not have been the necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain
failure. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true,
would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. [118] Generally, a
reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component
of the crime.[119] It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general
intent.[120] The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,[121] and it does not look at all to
the belief or state of mind of any other person.[122] A proper invocation of this defense requires (a)
that the mistake be honest and reasonable;[123] (b) that it be a matter of fact;[124] and (c) that it
negate the culpability required to commit the crime [125] or the existence of the mental state which
the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.[126]
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United
States v. Ah Chong,[127] but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense
where the physical circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the accused an
aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was
woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no response from the
intruder after having demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened
to kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the
door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who
turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest
mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court
explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in
point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every
crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from
criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part
and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on
the circumstances as they appear to him." x x x
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable
cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing or, in terms
more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if
without fault or carelessness he does not believe them he is legally guiltless of
homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of
self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of
reason, and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding
some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-
defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If,
without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts
to be, the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and
he has really no occasion for the extreme measure. x x x [128]
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis[129] and Baxinela v. People,[130] the justification of an
act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad
faith on the part of the accused.[131] Thus, Ah Chong further explained that
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this
jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the
true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question
we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged
ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.[132]
IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide
has been established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that the
prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does not relieve the
prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[133] By reasonable doubt
is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such
investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.[134] The overriding consideration is
not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.[135]
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by
direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.[136] Corpus delicti consists of two
things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act. [137] In
homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the
party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than
the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant
committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced
the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such
evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. [138] In such case, even if there is no intent to kill,
the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible
for all the consequences thereof. [139] Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a finding of
frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element of these offenses, and
thus must be proved with the same degree of certainty as that required of the other elements of
said offenses.[140]
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is
interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the occupants
of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the
defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners affidavits as well as Yapyucos testimony are
replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the
suspects as it was he who their (petitioners) minds that which they later on conceded to be a
mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had
once reported to him that Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA
members and that the San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being
penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyucos claim that there had been a number of
ambuscades launched against members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring
areas supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the incident. But as the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during the pendency of these cases even
before his opportunity to testify in court emerged.[141]
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and
materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element of a crime. It
gains significance when the commission of a crime is established by evidence purely circumstantial
or otherwise inconclusive.[142] The question of motive is important in cases where there is doubt as
to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but when there is no doubt
that the defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is not so important to
know the reason for the deed.[143]
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend to
kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their service firearms; and the manner
by which the bullets concentrated on the passenger side of the jeepney permits no other
conclusion than that the shots were intended for the persons lying along the line of fire. We do not
doubt that instances abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to
sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there are instances where the attendant circumstances
conclusively establish that the discharge was not in fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is
that in ascertaining the intention with which a specific act is committed, it is always proper and
necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they
develop in the evidence.[144]
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30
caliber carbine.[145] While the use of these weapons does not always amount to unnecessary force,
they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the bullets were fired and hit the
jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even
killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and
at that moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine
the peril to which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at
the tires especially considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or
unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms
employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact even the driver himself of
being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise. This, we find to
be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney
came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like
this, their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or
to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the jeepney
suggests that petitioners actuations leaned towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was
seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all the
consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference
than that the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill.
Thus, Cupps v. State[146] tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and
natural consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital
cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination
of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law
presumes that every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears.
Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if the
circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that it was
not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the
deceased was designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him
to show that it was otherwise.
V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the deliberate
intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyucos alternative claim in G.R. No.
120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why:
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without malice. [147] People v.
Guillen[148] and People v. Nanquil [149] declare that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo,[150] we held
that that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless
negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated homicide
cannot exist.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found,
continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold
an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[151]
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the
offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[152] The instant case
requires no proof of any previous agreement among petitioners that they were really bent on a
violent attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude that conspiracy arose from the
moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had converged and strategically posted
themselves at the place appointed by Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that petitioners had been
ignited by the common impulse not to let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority when
it suddenly occurred to them that the vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly
accelerated despite the signal for it to stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point,
petitioners were confronted with the convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by
preventing the jeepneys supposed escape even if it meant killing the driver thereof. It appears that
such was their common purpose. And by their concerted action of almost simultaneously opening
fire at the jeepney from the posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment of
the suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did achieve their object
as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side of the jeepney at angular
and perpendicular trajectories.Indeed, there is no definitive proof that tells which of all the accused
had discharged their weapons that night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by
Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayans conclusion that since only
herein petitioners were shown to have been in possession of their service firearms that night and
had fired the same, they should be held collectively responsible for the consequences of the
subject law enforcement operation which had gone terribly wrong.[153]
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the
crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the
non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with the
other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims. [154] The
allegation of evident premeditation has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt because the
evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds of petitioners
as instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be attempting flight and evading arrest. The
same is true with treachery, inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of
attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion
temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty
lower by two degrees than that prescribed for principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in
these cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there
being no aggravating circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the penalty from six (6)
years and one (1) day, but should have denominated the same as prision
mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed
attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order. The penalty of attempted homicide is
two (2) degrees lower to that of a consummated homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking
into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the minimum period of prision correccional, which
is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, whereas the minimum of the sentence, which under the Indeterminate Sentence Law
must be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is one
(1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of
Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 in moral
damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly and
severally, the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as
moral damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there being no aggravating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate
sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the
maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince
Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as
Noel Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
 DIOSDADO M. The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended
PERALTA
Associate Justice

VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. GR NO 149275

WE CONCUR: DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (Ty) filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to set
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995,
Associate Justice promulgated on 31 July 2001. The Decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty of seven
Associate Justice Associate Justice (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22[2] (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against
Ty before the RTC of Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to
No. 93-130465. The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads
as follows:

ATTESTATION That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors Hospital to
apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30,
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of P30,000.00, said accused well knowing
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said
Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Contrary to law.[3]
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks and dates
of issue. The data are hereunder itemized as follows:
CERTIFICATION Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount
93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 30,000.00
93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 P30,000.00
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation 93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 P30,000.00
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. 93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 P30,000.00
93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 P30,000.00
93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 P30,000.00
93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 P30,000.00[4]
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty.[5]
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296,
 The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at
the Manila Doctors Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patients
daughter, Ty signed the Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of
Admission dated 30 October 1990.[6] As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account[7]shows the total
liability of the mother in the amount of P657,182.40. Tys sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at
the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount
of P418,410.55.[8] The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June
1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in
installments.[9] To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against
Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount
of P30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee
bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed
advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As
the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the
instant case.[10]
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of
a greater injury. She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her
mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the
hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-
condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off
of the telephone line, late delivery of her mothers food and refusal to change the latters gown and
bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her mother. The
debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental, psychological and physical
health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the
hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was
compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to
effect her mothers immediate discharge.[11]
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution, the trial court found
that Ty issued the checks subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother and
rejected the theory of the defense.[12] Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered
a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a
prison term. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of
a valid obligation, which turned unfounded on their respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of
seven (7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty-two (42) months.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty
reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She also argued that the trial court erred in
finding her guilty when evidence showed there was absence of valuable consideration for the
issuance of the checks and the payee had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the
account. She protested that the trial court should not have applied the law mechanically, without
due regard to the principles of justice and equity.[14]
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court
with modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine
of sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each
case.[15]
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of involuntariness in the
issuance of the checks and the hospitals knowledge of her checking accounts lack of funds.It held
that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it
being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.[16]
Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration for the
issuance of the checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.[17]
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the case
of Vaca v. Court of Appeals[18] wherein this Court declared that in determining the penalty imposed
for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be
observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the social order.[19]
Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court
of Appeals. More specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate court based on the following
grounds:
A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS
FORCED TO OR COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE
ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF
AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER INJURY OR IN AVOIDANCE
OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE OFTHE SUBJECT CHECKS.
D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY
AWARE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE
TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW
MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
AND EQUITY.
In its Memorandum,[20] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing jurisprudence,
contends that a check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for
payment, has the same effect as an ordinary check; hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And
when a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank will generally accept the same,
regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee said
obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum.[21]
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys conviction.
 Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which
would substantially affect the disposition of the case. [22] Jurisdiction of this Court over cases
elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the
Court of Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said
court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of
support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion.[23]
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings
arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case. She, however,
claims that the issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She would also have the Court believe that there
was no valuable consideration in the issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defenses claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or
avoidance of a greater evil or injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues which are best
determined by the trial court. And, as previously intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the
theory of the defense and rendered judgment accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised before
the trial court and the Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual questions already
passed upon twice below, rather than questions of law appropriate for review under a Rule 45
petition.
The only question of law raisedwhether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to
warrant her exemption from criminal liabilityhas to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting
circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater
than or at least equal to that committed.[24]
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and
imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. [25] It should be based on a real,
imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb.[26] A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It
should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote.[27] A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show
therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only
without will but against his will as well.[28] It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to
the accused for escape.[29]
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims
that she was compelled to issue the checksa condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her
before her mother could be dischargedfor fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due
to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is
speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such
that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a
well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that any fear
exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit
suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of
all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals
threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a
crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing
one. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior
to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry.[30] And if indeed
she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the
opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may
result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current
account nor issue postdated checks because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big
problem.[31] Besides, apart from petitioners bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to
corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in
to the hospitals demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petition and Memorandum that the
justifying circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may
find application in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor
from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the
injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.[32]
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil
sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is
not applicable.[33] Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a
crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead
of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared
should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction
of the actor.[34] In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own
failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. It
would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced
checks was done without her full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear that
neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the
bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil Case[35] for
damages filed by Tys mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the
case at bench. While the findings therein may establish a claim for damages which, we may add,
need only be supported by a preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender
reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.
 As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration.[36] Section 24[37] of
the Negotiable Instruments Law creates a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired
the same for a consideration[38] or for value.[39] In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that
the checks were issued without consideration. She must present convincing evidence to overthrow
the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of
proof. Valuable consideration may in general terms, be said to consist either in some right, interest,
profit, or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment,
loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other
aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in
favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.[40]
In this case, Tys mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the
hospital. For the care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of
her relationship with them and by force of her signature on her mothers Contract of Admission
acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the promissory note she executed in favor of the
hospital.
Anent Tys claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal obligation
because she was not the patient, and therefore there was no consideration for the checks, the
case of Bridges v. Vann, et al.[41] tells us that it is no defense to an action on a promissory note for
the maker to say that there was no consideration which was beneficial to him personally; it is
sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred upon a third person, or a detriment suffered
by the promisee, at the instance of the promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or
privilege or suffers some detriment and the release and extinguishment of the original obligation of
George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement.Appellee accepted one debtor in
place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting obligation for the note executed by the
appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the new notes.
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for
which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.[42] B.P. 22 does not make
any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an
obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation.[43] The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of
worthless checks and putting them into circulation.[44] As this Court held in Lim v. People of the
Philippines,[45] what is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the fact of its
worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a required element under
B.P. Blg. 22.
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer
pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of
funds.[46] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.[47]
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not have
sufficient funds with the drawee bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the
drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P.
22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the
issuance thereof is inconsequential.[48]
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals[49] wherein this Court inquired
into the true nature of transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the
accused, to persuade the Court that the circumstances surrounding her case deserve special
attention and do not warrant a strict and mechanical application of the law.
Petitioners reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts therein obtaining
are different from those established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the bounced checks
were issued to cover a warranty deposit in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the
financier of the deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or lease the
goods while privately financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. The
maker of the check thus became an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a
lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks
were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or
credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual account or for
value. Substantial evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, has established that
the checks were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of imprisonment, absent
any proof that petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith.Administrative
Circular 12-2000,[50] adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[51] and Lim v.
People,[52] authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to
certain conditions. However, the Court resolves to modify the penalty in view of Administrative
Circular 13-2001[53] which clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is stated therein:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment
as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the
penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the
offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say,
the determination of whether circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon
the Judge. Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
 It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned may, in
the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each
case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or
whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work
violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only a
fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.[54]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE
equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code. She is also ordered to pay private complainant, Manila Doctors Hospital, the amount of Two
Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) representing the total amount of the dishonored
checks. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel
theory -- the battered woman syndrome (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the
proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful
aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she
shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of
cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
psychological paralysis she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the
mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The
acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact
that she was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and
her unborn childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well
as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from
custody on parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under
detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic
Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding
treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby
sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.[2]
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate
husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the
purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
Cadaveric spasm.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from
its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
 Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting
[in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior
surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe
intracranial hemorrhage.
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.
which caused his death.[4]
With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on
March 3, 1997.[6] In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions version of the facts
in this wise:
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City.
Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Bens
younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and
Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with
their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary.
They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Bens house before
reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to
Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it,
waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant
arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas rented house, he heard her say I wont
hesitate to kill you to which Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That was the last time
Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas rented house appeared
uninhabited and was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living
about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a
pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor
Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc
when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag,
locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty
(50) meters behind the Genosas rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same
bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to
him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating
from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the
stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him,
Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through
the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban
went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the
lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs
with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to
the mother of Ben about his sons misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben,
identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police
station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas rented house.
Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to
the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side
wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3
Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from
where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches
long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a
red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside
at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the
presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal
cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already
decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the
Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Bens death
was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed
fracture of the occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995,
she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a
payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns
at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas
house. Ecel went home despite appellants request for her to sleep in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She
allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework.
Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a
chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According
to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands
and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this
point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes
upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom
towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her You might as well be killed so nobody
would nag me. Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but
since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She
however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet.
Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his
wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She
supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot,
though, but in the bedroom.[7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage,
Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husbands death, as a Secretary to
the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and
Marie Bianca.
2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in
Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were
against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her.
Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together with Bens brother,
Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily. But apparently,
soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and
Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come
home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw
Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with
blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Bens
forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently
rushed to Bens aid again and saw blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle.
Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens forgiveness.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic married
in 1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City. She said as the marriage went along,
Marivic became already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of
Marivics two sons, there were three (3) misunderstandings. The first was when Marivic stabbed
Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when
Marivic struck Ben on the forehead using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was
wounded and also the ear and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995
when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Bens hand was
plastered as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 After we collected our
salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO. They stayed there for three (3) hours, after
which they went to Uniloks and drank beer allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they
bought barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while
talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait for the runner and the usher of the
masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was
waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place my bet. On his way home at about 9:00 in
the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was
one Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas testimony on the root of the
quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying I will never hesitate to kill you, whilst
Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent. Basobas thought they were joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence.
Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He
claims that he once told Ben before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa that he
should leave her and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him so many
times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been
quarreling. He said Ben even had a wound on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only
one (1) year.
6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual
drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the
bed, and sometimes beat her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben
would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She
said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and
Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports.
Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a
week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse
and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on
November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for
help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses grappling with each other. Ben had
Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note
this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he
heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the
window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw the spouses grappling with
each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic
Genosa. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the
children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00
the next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel,
Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew
them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic
confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he
went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified if somebody
would come. He testified that while Ben was alive he used to gamble and when he became drunk,
he would go to our house and he will say, Teody because that was what he used to call me,
mokimas ta, which means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben would
box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness
pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said
that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the
afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben.
They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him.
She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house
because she might be battered by her husband. When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00
in the evening, Miss Arano said that her husband was already there and was drunk. Miss Arano
knew he was drunk because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face. Marivic
entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time
Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband
would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the
evening when Ben arrived because the couple were very noisy in the sala and I had heard
something was broken like a vase. She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door.
When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife and showed us the knife through the window
grill and he scared us. She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-
examination, she said that when she left Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were
still quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS,
Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient many times and had also received treatment from other
doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6)
episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient
Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and
considered him an expert witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23)
separate occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos
Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical
injuries reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the
injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified
to examine the psychological make-up of the patient, whether she is capable of committing a crime
or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified that
about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She
sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing family troubles. He
told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed that they
might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband
who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and
she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted
later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the
baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times,
but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why
Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent
girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the
bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his
testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone
in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias
Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a
safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did not
know what happened to the pipe she used to smash him once; that she was wounded by Ben on
her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and
dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.
 9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of
the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution
witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the
time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal
cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a
forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was
called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw some police
officer and neighbor around. She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone
position with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the
head which she described as a fracture. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2
or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the
crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with
the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.
12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September
1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT
finding Marivic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and further found
treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24
January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as
counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellants Briefs he had
prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of
appearance of undersigned counsel.
15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to
the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of
Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her Brief without counsels to the Court.
This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court
on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his
death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-
opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only
qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as
culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating
with a lead pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivics
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea, within ninety (90)
days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together
with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunito
L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic
Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999,
but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own
private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she
was the Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of
Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Josephs College; and was the counseling
psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of
the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD
from the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is
a member of the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International
Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology
Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with
the Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological
profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide
Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled Energy
Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first
time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at
about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that there are lots of variables that
cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.
Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of psychological abuse,
verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of
herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think very
lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke
it, that they were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically,
verbally and even sexually abusive to them. Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes
from a dysfunctional family or from broken homes.
Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a very low opinion of
himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant,
very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for
frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they
become violent. The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers
them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused
each other so there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her
husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes
her hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs
for the sake of the children.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock
themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering physical violence on both of
them. She said that in a normal marital relationship, abuses also happen, but these are not
consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out. In an abnormal marital relationship,
the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and even would cause hospitalization on the
victim and even death on the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her
opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because inspite of her feeling of self-
confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of
humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she
still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for
nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then
thought of herself as a victim.
xxxxxxxxx
19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared
and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board
of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of
psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the
Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After
that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna
Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he
obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of
Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon
City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military
Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy
from the Period 1954 1978 which was presented twice in international congresses. He also
authored The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000, which was likewise
published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam
on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he
published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and neurology
deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a
bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in
psychiatry.
Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already
encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty
thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of
his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman
Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there
is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to
an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder depends on the vulnerability of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not
very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological
stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive
trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.
In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the anxiety neurosis or
neurologic anxcietism. It is produced by overwhelming brutality, trauma.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it
were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks of nothing but the
suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable,
and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher
sensitivity and her self-world is damaged.
Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals illness, such as the
deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally
internalizes what is around him within the environment. And it becomes his own personality. He is
very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong faade but in it
there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one
who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the
individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves,
and primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the
immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the household. He said a
victim resorts to weapons when she has reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no
other recourse left on her but to act decisively.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for two
(2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case
studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22
January 2001.
xxxxxxxxx
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her
husband Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma. He said that we
are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic.
It will just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-
experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind. At the time he interviewed Marivic she was more
subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the
predicament she is involved.
xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor.
Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened
trial a quo were elevated.[9]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the
prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further,
the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben
Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic
smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic
review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court
allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind
at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening
of the case for the lower court to admit the experts testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellants Motion,
remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric
opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to
this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if
any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two
clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts on
domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented
to and admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the
records of the case.[12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Courts consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on
the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally
married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and
unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and
further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and her subsequent
apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of
treachery.
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the
existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic
Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death.[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-
defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the
resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his
discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight
and substance that could affect the outcome of the case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial courts disposition of the
case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense. We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge
Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense
witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his
evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and
the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial
judges conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he
failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an obviously hasty manner.
The Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began
and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the
conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case
with dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly
hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find
his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had
been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v.
Malabago,[16] this Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is
the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact
of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellants
deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.[17] The defense raised
no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made
a judicial admission of her marriage to Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is
conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission
was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made. [19] Other than merely
attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the
admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made
through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Bens death --
whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court
elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, [c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the
fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at
the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to
determine which of said acts actually caused the victims death. Determining which of these
admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk,
gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not
raised the novel defense of battered woman syndrome, for which such evidence may have been
relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed
shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent
with the surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his
past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellants
children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under
the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which
witnesses and evidence are necessary to present.[20] As the former further points out, neither the
trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus,
she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to
Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to
save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial courts appreciation of these
circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense
and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent
upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.[21] Well-
settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third
person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.[22]
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome.
While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as
a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a
victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their understanding of the
justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a
period of time.[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to
do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must
go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is
defined as a battered woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional
beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the
dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterers actions; and false hopes that
the relationship will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of
violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident;
and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight
physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer
through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually
happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All
she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however,
proves to be double-edged, because her placatory and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that
he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually
successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss
of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered
woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more
the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the
violence spirals out of control and leads to an acute battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and,
sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable.
During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature
can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The
battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although
she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence
may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows
from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often
very savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get
hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends.
During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer
may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been
viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat
her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will
never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this good, gentle and
caring man is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of
the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth,
though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek
professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation xxxxxxxxx
that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered womans psyche. In Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his
nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of tension, violence A Yes, sir.
and forgiveness, each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one Q Who inflicted these injuries?
may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.[31]
A Of course my husband.
History of Abuse
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
in the Present Case
A Yes, sir.
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several
witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows: xxxxxxxxx

ATTY. TABUCANON [Court] /to the witness

Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to
me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive
to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned
me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your
occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the
occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me. [32]
Referring to his Out-Patient Chart[33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D.
Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of
your clinic?

A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I A Yes, sir.
go to him and he said sorry. Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior A I did.
by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
A Yes, sir.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and
Q Who are these doctors? redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
 2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and xxxxxxxxx
contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla; ATTY. TABUCANON:

4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the
Dr. Caing; month of November, 1995 when this incident happened?

5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. A As per record, yes.
Canora; and Q What was the date?
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. A It was on November 6, 1995.
Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending
physician, is that correct? A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir. Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient
pregnant?
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient.
What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla? A Eight (8) months pregnant.
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
substance if force is applied.
A Yes, sir.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion. pregnancy or for some other findings?
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma? A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
[pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is
tenderness pain. A Yes, sir.

Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor? Q For how many days?
A One day.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Where?
Q Were you able to talk with the patient? A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q What did she tell you?
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able
she told me that it was done to her by her husband. to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months
pregnant.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
What is this all about?
A Yes, sir.
 A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I
think I have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a
consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had
hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does
not response when the medication was given to her, because tension headache
is more or less stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family
history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from
the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension
which is unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of
the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of
blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. [34]
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel,
Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions
Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben. [35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to
sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt
her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten oclock at night,
because the couple were very noisy and I heard something was broken like a vase. Then Marivic
came running into Ecels room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a
chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben
-- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already
drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his
state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to
leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other
witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of
the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his
cruelty towards her:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the
evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office
hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang,
I immediately asked my son, where was his father, then my second child said,
he was not home yet. I was worried because that was payday, I was anticipating
that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from
school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that
time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he
 would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she
resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because
of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he
do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just
worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid
trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed
because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said
to him, why did you switch off the light when the children were there. At that time
I was also attending to my children who were doing their assignments. He was
angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and
[got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and
he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that
bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing
his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.
 Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he
drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her
front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting
at me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he
could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he
was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the
other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this
blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to
assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for
five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the
latters ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in laymans
term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was
suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to
emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a
very meager income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of
the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas,
drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very
angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience
a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused
her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not
his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed
 because she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it
was happening day in and day out. [39]
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or
unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to
her about three hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important
information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital
life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of
the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of
the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as
substantial.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they
were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were
fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering
their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in
Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that
room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it
really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I
think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your
opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was
really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also
believe that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction
because of all the battering that happened and so she became an abnormal
person who had lost shes not during the time and that is why it happened
because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the psychological
abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x
[is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose
of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone
who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can
trust. That the data that Im gathering from her are the truth.[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his
Psychiatric Report,[42] which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The
Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the
atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was
also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining
his barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family,
particularly to his wife. The Report continued: At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as
time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband
was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate
whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for
twelve years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly
and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting
from the Report, [s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends
in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became
more and more frequent and more severe. x x x.[43]
 From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Courts mind that
Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of
mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of
an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident.
A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering
on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. How can the mental state of
the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a
woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How
could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect
the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and
make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-
called battered wife syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should not be drawn from
that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been
subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to --
those who have not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and
refute common myths and misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic
violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the
treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her
violent partner. The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the
battered woman immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel
trapped in the relationship with no means of escape.[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found
that the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger
of dying then.[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered woman usually has
a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x
[W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the
one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally
and even sexually abusive to them.[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily
leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latters belief that she
provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of
their children, and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.[49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously
testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated probably ten to twenty thousand
violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded.
As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered
Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe
domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her
loss of consciousness.[50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in posttraumatic
stress disorder, a form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism.[51] After being repeatedly and
severely abused, battered persons may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to
change their situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the
development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victims ability to muster an
active response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that
anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania,
found that even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be
more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape. He said
that it was the cognitive aspect -- the individuals thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred
to this phenomenon as learned helplessness. [T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less
important than the individuals set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered
women dont attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that
escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or
anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances. [54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent
behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no
escape.[55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the
relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she
typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be
found and hurt even more.[57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing
that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of
time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient
evidence that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence
that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started,
Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in
adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not
prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another
battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering?
How did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to
try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She
simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mothers or fathers house;[58] that Ben
would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words,
she would return to their common abode.
 Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did
she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his
emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel
helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to
separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and
thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense.
Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the
personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and
severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each others
testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However,
they failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to
them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be
proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would
establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case
of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the
legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context
of self-defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS
defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense[60] -- she must have
actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in
order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense
must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites
and effect of self-defense:[62]
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.[63] It presupposes actual,
sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person.[64] In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She
had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens
bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even
the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom -- and
based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her
and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have
ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have
a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she
can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by installment.[65] Still, impending
danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendants
use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger.[66] Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-
defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-
defense.[67] In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or
incomplete -- on the part of the victim.[68] Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified
under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying
circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her
favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a
criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by
the parties.[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced
with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down her
psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened
sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced
at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be ended by
an act of violence on her part. [70]
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of
repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment as well as the severity
and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.[71] Expounding
thereon, he said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity
of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged
commission of the battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of
the victim and another one is the public and social support available to the
victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxxxxxxxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity
of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress
disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very
very severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others
are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the
individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation
therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is
pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only protect
herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end
[sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will
manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse,
restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be
happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any
prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six
(6) months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book
specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the
repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become
normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x
x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in
cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control,
psychological paralysis, and difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to
an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving
her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action,
intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 [74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been
held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful
as to overcome reason.[77] To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur:
(1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act
is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
the accused might recover her normal equanimity.[78]
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor,
preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the
neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight
months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.[79]His
abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her
unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she
was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to
her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and
her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben
kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable
period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr.
Pajarillos testimony[80] that with neurotic anxiety -- a psychological effect on a victim of
overwhelming brutality [or] trauma -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real,
although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control re-experiencing the whole
thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered. She thinks of nothing but the suffering.
Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been
what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her
normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as
passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the
battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period
of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
 The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had
inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant
with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their
unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense
that the offended party might make.[81] In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances
invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere
inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.[82] Because of the
gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.[83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of
death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless
body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an open, depressed, circular fracture located at the
back of his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the
prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the
events surrounding his death:
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he
could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going
to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one
he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he
was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the
other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this
blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?

Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
drag you?
Q It is a flexible blade?
COURT:
A Its a cutter.
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
front neck)
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
Q How did he do it?
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q Where did he bring you?
Q With the same blade?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting
at me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
xxxxxxxxx
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer? ATTY. TABUCANON:

A I was aware that it was a gun. Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?

COURT INTERPRETER A Yes, because I smashed him.

(At this juncture the witness started crying) Q What happened?

ATTY. TABUCANON: A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him
and I ran to the other room.
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
 Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when
I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood
pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood
pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the
same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with him, I took pity on
myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the
baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no
showing of the victims position relative to appellants at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally
axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot
be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor
must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.[86] There is no
showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To
the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same
moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that
she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order
to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have
been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one
(1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5[88] of the same Code.[89] The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be
taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances
were shown to have attended the commission of the offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree --
prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion
temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as
minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as
maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for
and be released from detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy
nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court
agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal
manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to
the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look
at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and
the distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much.
And definitely, the solicitor general and appellants counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in
such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the
limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we
amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle
of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of
the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm
from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third,
at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is
hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
 Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, The accused was acquitted in the First Instance of the charge of robbery, upon which he was
the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due prosecuted. The complaining witness and the provincial fiscal appealed against the judgment of
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. acquittal.
Costs de oficio.
The evidence in the record shows: (1) That the accused, who was employed as a secret-service
SO ORDERED. agent by the military authorities, received orders from Lieut. J. B. Hennesy to seize all the money in
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur. the possession of Father Angel Ilagan, the complaining witness, it being believed, upon information
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., join Justice Santiago in her received by the said lieutenant, that the money referred to was the property of a revolutionary
dissent. officer; (2) that in obedience to the said order the accused, together with three sergeants of scouts,
Vitug and Quisumbing JJ., in the result. whom the lieutenant had put under his orders to assist him in the execution of the command,
Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion. proceeded to the dwelling house of Father Ilagan and that of Sixto Rojas, to which Father Ilagans
family had removed, and seized a certain amount of money; (3) that the accused appropriated part
of this money before delivering to Lieutenant Hennesy the funds seized, turning over to him a sum
less than that which was really found by him in the house of Father Ilagan and that of his family.
EN BANC
The record does not disclose the exact amount of money converted by the accused. The
[G.R. No. 1043. May 15, 1903. ]
information charges that it amounted to 1,381 pesos and 15-1/2 cents. This may have been the
fact, but we do not consider the evidence conclusive upon this point. In the document appearing on
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellant, v. JULIAN ATIENZA, Defendant-Appellee.
pages 138 and 139 of the record, signed by the accused, and which, according to the testimony of
Cecilio Rosal and Marciano Arguelles, contains a statement made by the accused before the
Solicitor-General Araneta for Appellant.
provost judge of Lipa, Mr. Johnson, he acknowledges and confesses that he did appropriate the
sum of 300 pesos. The authenticity of this document has not been denied by the accused at the
F . G. Waite for Appellee.
trial, and the witnesses Rosal and Arguelles affirm that they were present and heard the statement
made by the accused before the provost judge, as recorded in the said document. consequently, it
SYLLABUS
may be regarded as proven that the accused converted at least the sum mentioned, 300 pesos.
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY; ESTAFA. . secret-service agent, acting under orders from Nevertheless, this act does not constitute the crime of robbery, with which the accused is charged
military authorities, who seizes moneys in a dwelling house and appropriates a part thereof to his in the complaint. The seizure of the money in Father Ilagans house and that of his family was not
own use before turning over the balance to his superiors is not guilty of robbery. in itself unlawful, because it was done in obedience to a lawful order given for that purpose by
competent authority. The unlawful and punishable appropriation took place subsequently to this
2. ID.; ID. The unlawful taking of property is an essential part of the crawl of robbery, and where act, when the money appropriated was lawfully in the possession of the accused. The order given
the taking was lawful and the unlawful misappropriation was subsequent to such taking the crawl is to him by his commanding officer was for the precise pileups of the seizure of this money, and
not robbery. consequently the seizure in itself does not constitute an act of unlawful taking, a necessary
element for the existence of the crime of robbery, as well under the different cases covered by
Per TORRES, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library article 502 and the other articles included in the chapter of the Penal Code, which deals specifically
whitewall robberies, as in the special case covered by article 206 of the said Code.
3. ID.; ID. Adhere a secret-service agent makes search for and seizes moneys under orders,
and in so doing fails to comply with the formalities required by law as to counting the same, the The subsequent conversion by the accused, after getting the money into his possession, by
taking is unlawful, and where the lucri causa is evidenced by a misappropriation of a part of the keeping part of it instead of turning it all over to the officer who had directed the seizure, may
money the crime is robbery. perhaps constitute the crime of malversation of public funds or that of estafa, according to whether
the accused may or may not be regarded as having been in the discharge of the duties of a public
officer when committing the deeds and that the money converted came into his possession by
DECISION reason of his office. Upon this point we can not at this time express an opinion, as that would be to
prejudge a question which is not presented to us for our decision. The prosecuting attorney is at
liberty to file such information as he may see fit upon these facts.
MAPA, J. :
For the reasons stated, and upon the sole ground that the facts proven in the case do not
constitute the crime of robbery charged in the information, and without prejudice to the presentation
by the prosecuting attorney of the corresponding information upon the facts, the judgment
appealed is affirmed, with the costs of this instance de oficio. the Criminal intent to steal and appropriate to his own use part of the money denounced by him.

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard and Ladd, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Upon the facts proven in the case, and especially the fact that Julian Atienza, in obedience to
orders from Lieut. J. B. Hennesy, proceeded to search the dwelling house in which lived Father
angel Ilagan, parish priest of Lipa, Batangas, looking for money, which, according to the
statements of Atienza, was the property of a revolutionary officer, in the possession of the said
priest; that Atienza, as a member of the secret police, accompanied by three sergeants of scouts,
seized all the money found in the dwelling house of Father Ilagan and that of Sixto Rojas, to which
the priests family had removed, having used intimidation in so doing and having made threats,
revolver in hand, against the relatives of Father Ilagan in case they should hide or fail to point out
the latters money; and that, without having counted the money at the time of the seizure, or at the
time it was returned by Lieutenant Hennesy to its owner, the evidence in the record sufficiently
shows that the accused appropriated at least the sum of 300 pesos out of the total amount seized.
By the testimony of the two witnesses who were present and layered the statements of the
accused, and upon the written statement, made and signed by the accused before the provost
judge, Mr. Johnson, and which appears on pages 138 and 139 of the record, it is unquestionably
proven that the accused converted and appropriated the said sum of 300 pesos, part of the money
belonging to Father Ilagan, which was seized. The authenticity of this statement has not been
denied or impugned during the trial, and it was proven at the trial that the said priest had a
considerable sum of money in cash which was seized during his absence.
This appropriation constitutes the crime of robbery with personal violence, defined and punished in
paragraph 2 of article 206, in connection with article 502 and paragraph 5 of article 503, of the
Penal Code. Atienza, while engaged in the public service as a detective of the military authorities,
and therefore acting as a public officer, and on the occasion of the search for and seizure in the
house of the complaining witness of the sum of money belonging to the latter, appropriated and
converted to his own use part of this money lucri causa and to the prejudice of its owner. This
crime is specially defined by the law in article 206 as robbery with personal violence, in
consideration of the character and special circumstances of the criminal act.
He availed himself of the occasion to proceed to search Father Ilagans house, and cede a
considerable sum of money belonging to the latter in order to appropriate (lucri causa) the sum of
300 pesos. Although the punishable act and unlawful conversion may not be regarded as
simultaneous, the malicious intent to keep part of the money found is made manifest by the mere
fact that the search was conducted whitewall unnecessary harshness and intimidation, and that all
the money found in the two houses was seized Without the same having been counted in the
presence of the parties in interest, this being an indispensable requisite to the legality of the act.
The nature and character of the crime committed by the accused are such that the offense does
not fall within the conditions of the law with respect to the crimes of estafa and malversation.
Persons guilty of estafa or malversation lawfully come into the possession of the money which they
subsequently convert or embezzle. The deceit, the fraud, and the abuse of confidence are
supervenient to the original lawful act. The policeman, Julian Atienza, did not receive from anyone
Father Ilagans money, but, by virtue of a lawful order, seized this money himself without
compliance with the legal requisites, and on the occasion of his irregular compliance with this
order, took and appropriated the sum of 300 pesos, separating it from the total amount seized.
The facts may not, perhaps, disclose all the characteristics of a crime of robbery. Nevertheless the
fact remains that the criminal law so defines these facts in article 206, and attributes to a public
officer who so unworthily abuses his official position a higher degree of criminality and malice.
For these reasons, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances having concurred in the commission
of the crime, the writer is of the opinion that the information upon which this trial was commenced
should be sustained, the judgment of acquittal reversed, and Julian Atienza convicted as principal
in the crime of robbery with personal violence, and condemned to four years of presidio
correccional, with the accessories of suspension from all public office, profession, trade, or right of
suffrage, and to the restitution of the 300 pesos to Father Ilagan, and, in case of insolvency, to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs of battle instances.
McDonough, J., did not sit in this case.

The search for and seizure of the money was made without compliance with the formalities
prescribed by the law. The money was not counted in the presence of the owner or his nearest
relatives, or of two neighbors, and therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the seizure of the money
was effected by virtue of a lawful order given by competent authorities, the seizure was not carried
out in the manner prescribed by the law.

For this reason it can not be held that the punishable conversion took place subsequently to the
seizure of the money by virtue of an order from competent authorities, inasmuch as the failure to
comply with the requisites prescribed by the law, and the fact that the money seized was not
counted, and that the accused was the person who had denounced the existence of this mallow,
raise a strong presumption that Atienza, when carrying out the orders of seizure, went there with