ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR [175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO.
L- exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and
78742; 14 JUL 1989]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case:
a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and
RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland
worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as
qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President
Aquino usurped the legislatures power.
b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros
Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the
creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.
Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were
constitutional.
Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in
exercise of Police power and eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO
228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and
Eminent Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under
CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own
in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of
the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical
possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favour of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is
concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. Subject and purpose of
the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the
method employed to achieve it.
Daez v CA
Facts: Eudosia Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in
Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by
respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and
Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was subjected
to the Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as
amended by Letter of Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed
under duress by the respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but
hired laborers, Eudosia Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from
coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of
the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of the petitioner was
denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27
having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for
retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657. The DAR
Regional Director allowed Daez to retain the subject land but the DAR
Secretary reversed that decision. She appealed to the Office of the President
which ruled in her favour. Respondents appealed to the CA which reversed
the decision of the Office of the President.
Issue: Whether or not the denial of application for exemption under PD
27 would bar an application for retention under RA 6657?
Held: The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from
coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a
landowners right of retention are different. Hence, it is incorrect to posit
that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one
and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does
not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no
procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the
retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for
executory.
DAR vs DECS
Facts: In controversy are 2 lots consisting of an aggregate area of
189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental
and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental. These lands were
donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS.
Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name of
respondent DECS. DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation.
Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm
workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage with MARO. MARO sent a Notice of
Coverage to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are now
covered by CARP.
DAR Regional Director approved MAROs recommendation. DECS
appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the
Order of the Regional Director. DECS contention: Respondent DECS sought
exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived
from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for
the repairs and renovations of schools in the nearby locality.
DARs contention: Petitioner DAR, on the other hand, argued
that the lands subject hereof are not exempt from the CARP coverage
because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school
sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se,
not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes.
Issue: Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage
of CARP
Held: No.
The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable
for agriculture as possible. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657sets out the coverage of
CARP. It states that the program shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, allpublic and private agricultural
lands xxx including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
The records of the case show that the subject properties
were formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban
Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS. From that time until
they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued
to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public
domain being owned by an agency of the government.[12] Moreover,
there is no legislative or presidential act, before and after the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. Indubitably, the subject lands
fall under the classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture.
Clearly, a reading of par c, Sec 10 of CARL shows shat, in order to
be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be necessary, and 2) the purpose is for
school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated
by public or private schools for educational purposes.
The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively
used and found to be necessary cannot be understated, as what respondent
DECS would want us to do by not taking the words in their literal and
technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus,
the plain meaning rule or verbal egis in statutory construction is applicable
in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
(G.R. No. 192890: June 17, 2013)
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPINES, Petitioner v. VIRGINIA PALMARES, LERMA
P. AVELIO, MELILIA P. VILLA, NINIAN P. CATEQUISTA, LUIS PALMARES, JR.,
SALVE P. VALENZUELA, GEORGE P. PALMARES, AND DENCEL P. PALMARES
HEREIN REPRESENTED by their ATTORNEY IN FACT, LERMA P. AVELINO,
Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: Respondents inherited a 19.98 hectare agricultural land located in
Iloilo. In 1995, they voluntarily offered the land for sale to the
governmentpursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Law of 1988. DAR
acquired 19.107 hectares of the entire are which was valued by LBP at P440,
355.92. Respondents rejected said amount. DARAB resolved to adopt LBPs
valuation.Hence, the same amount was deposited to respondents credit as
provisional compensation.
The RTC of Iloilo ordered LBP to recomputed hence the land
increased from 440,355.92 to 503,148.97. Respondents still rejected the
offer.
RTC rendered a decision fixing the just compensation to
669,962.53. The trial court arrived at its own computation by getting an
average of the price per hectare as computed by LBP in accordance with DAR
guidelines and the market value of the land per hectare as shown in the tax
declaration.
LBP appealed to the CA arguing that the computation made by the
RTC failed to consider the factors in determining just compensation an
enumerated under section 17 of RA 6657.
The appellate court affirmed RTC ruling as having been arrived at
in consonance with Section 17 of RA 6657. It emphasized that the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
essentially a judicial function and, in the exercise thereof, courts should be
given ample discretion and should not be delimited by mathematical
formulas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CAs ruling is correct
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.
POLITICAL LAW: just compensation
The principal basis of the computation for just compensation is Section 17 of
RA 6657, which enumerates the following factors to guide the special
agrarian courts in the determination thereof:
1. Acquisition cost of the land
2. Current value of the properties
3. Its nature, actual use, and income
4. The sworn valuation by the owner
5. The tax declaration
6. The assessment made by government assessors
7. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property
8. The non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution of the said land, if any in the instant case, the trial court
found to be unrealistically low the total valuation by LBP and the DAR in the
amount of P440,355.92, which was computed on the basis of DAR AO No. 6
series of 1992 as amended by DAR AO No. 11 Series of 1994. It then merely
proceeded to add said valuation to the market value of the subject land as
appearing in the 1997 tax declaration, and used the average of such values to
fix the just compensation.
While the determination of just compensation is essentially a
judicial function vested in the RTC acting as a special agrarian court, the
judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the
factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules.
We agree with the LBP that the double take up of the market
value per tax declaration as a valuation factor completely destroys the
rationale of the formula laid down by the DAR.
GRANTED.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ROSA and PEDRO
COSTO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 174647 December 5, 2012
(Supreme Court, Third Division)
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated July 14,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91469, and the
Resolution dated September 15, 2006 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Herein respondents, spouses Rosa and Pedro Costo are the
registered owners of a parcel of land located at Catamlangan, Pilar, Sorsogon.
After the passage of R.A. No. 6657, respondents voluntarily offered the said
property to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and its implementing Rules.
Out of the total land area, 7.3471 hectares was deemed qualified for
acquisition under the CARP. Petitioner, Land Bank of the Philippines (Land
Bank) then computed and valued the said qualified area in the amount of
P104, 077.01.
However, respondents rejected the valuation. This impelled
petitioner to deposit the offer in the form of cash and bonds in favor of
respondents as provisional compensation for the acquired property.
Thereafter, respondents sought the determination of just compensation with
the Provincial Adjudication Board of the DAR.
On July 30, 2002, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) rendered a Decision in favor of respondents and recomputed the
land valuation, fixing the value of the property at P468, 575.92. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied. Aggrieved, pursuant to
Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657, petitioner filed a petition for determination of
just compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court (SAC).
On June 28, 2005, the SAC rendered a Decision finding the
valuation made by the PARAD as the more realistic appraisal of the subject
property.
Petitioner then sought recourse before the CA, but the appellate
court affirmed the decision of the SAC on a ground that petitioners lack of
merit.
Hence, the present petition before this Court (Supreme Court).
Issues: Whether or not the petitioner, Land Bank of the Philippines,
contention that its valuation of just compensation should be preferred.
Held: No, the determination of just compensation cases involving the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, the following factors for
consideration are taken into account under Section 17 of R.A. 6657:
(1) the acquisition cost of the land;
(2) the current value of the properties;
(3) its nature, actual use, and income;
(4) the sworn valuation by the owner;
(5) the tax declarations;
(6) the assessment made by government assessors;
(7) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and
(8) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if any.
In a previously decided case (LBP vs. Celada), the court ruled that the factors
enumerated under Sec. 17 of R.A. 6657 has already been translated into a
basic formula, to wit:
LV = Land Value;
CNI = Capitalized Net Income;
CS = Comparable Sales;
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration.
If the three factors are present, the basic formula is LV = (CN*0.6)
+ (CS*0.3) + (MV*0.1), otherwise the following shall govern:
CS is not present: LV = (CNI*0.9) + (MV*0.1);
CNI is not present: LV = (CS*0.9) = (MV*0.1);
Both CNI and CS are not present: LV = MV*2
But, in no case shall the value of idle land using formula MV*2
exceed the lowest value of land within the same estate under consideration
or within the same barangay or municipality approved by LBP within 1 year
from receipt of claimholder.
The LBP has failed to convince the SC that the RTC abused its
discretion or ruled on the matter without evidence, it decided in favor of the
respondents denying the petition and affirming the decision of the lower
courts.
Case Digest: Land Bank v. Heirs of Yujuico, et al.
G.R. No. 184719 : March 21, 2012
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF JESUS S. YUJUICO,
MARIETTA V. YUJUICO AND DR. NICOLAS VALISNO, SR.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 184720 : March 21, 2012
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY NASSER
PANGANDAMAN,Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF JESUS YUJUICO, MARIETTA
YUJUICO AND NICOLAS VALISNO, SR.,Respondents.
SERENO,J.:
FACTS: By virtue of P.D. 27 and E.O. 228,Lots 3, 4, and 7 and parts of Lots
1, 5, and 6 owned by respondent spouses were placed under the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) program of the government. The remaining parts of Lots
1, 5, and 6 were covered by R.A. 6657. Thus, the properties were acquired by
the DAR and thereafter distributed to the proper farmer-beneficiaries.
The LBP offered respondents the amount of2,422,883.88 as
payment for their properties. Thus, respondents filed an action for the
payment of just compensation with the DARAB of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan
City. They subsequently filed respondents filed a complaint for determination
and payment of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) of
the RTC even before the DARAB could resolve the case.
Pending resolution of the Complaint, initial payments for some of
the lots were accepted by respondents from the LBP. The parties agreed that
these amounts should be deducted from whatever total amount the court
would award to respondents.
DAR contended that the determination of the just compensation
for the Lots placed under the OLT program should be governed by the
provisions of P.D. 27 and E.O. 228. LBP concurred with the formula presented
by DAR.
As the taking of the other properties were carried out through the
application of the provisions of the CARL, the DAR submits that it is the CARL
that should be used or applied in determining the value of these properties.
The LBP asserts that in determining the value of respondents properties, it
merely applied and conformed to the mandate of Section 17 of the CARL as
implemented by A.O. 5.
The RTC, in its decision, asserted that the Supreme Court had
already declared the application of E.O. 228 and P.D. 27 in valuing
expropriated properties as unfair and unjust to landowners. But no
pronouncement was made in its Decision on Lot 8.
The LBP and the DAR filed Petitions for Review, which were later
consolidated by the appellate court.
On appeal, the CA ruled that it should be the law in effect on the
date of payment and not as the LBP insists, the law in effect at the time of
the taking In determining whether to apply the formula ordered by P.D. 27
and E.O. 28 or that found in Section 17 of the CARL in relation to its
implementing regulation A.O. 5.
Hence, for lands taken under PD 27, the formula in PD 27 should
be followed, for those under EO 228, the formula in EO 228 should be used,
and for those under RA 6657, the formula of that statue should apply.
However, from the very records of Land Bank, the earliest
payment was made in March 1992 long after CARP was in effect. Subsequent
payments were effected until 2003. Following judicial doctrine, the valuation
must be determined under RA 6657 as implemented by AO 5.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 27 and E.O. 228 or Section 17 of R.A. 6657
and A.O. 5 should be applied to determine the value of just compensation?
HELD: The petition is partly granted.
POLITICAL LAW: just compensation
The Court has already categorically declared inLBP v. Domingo
Soriano (G.R. Nos. 180772 and 180776, 6May 2010)that if the issue of just
compensation is not settled prior to the passage of the CARL, it should be
computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was
acquired under P.D. 27.
The same rule holds true for the present case. While some of the
lands were acquired under P.D. 27, the Complaint for just compensation was
lodged before the court only on 20 August 2001, long after the passage of
the CARL, or on 15 June 1988.
The Court, in several cases by reason of equity, applied the CARL
in determining just compensation for lands acquired under P.D. 27 and
before the effectivity of the CARL.
It is necessary to determine the actual time of taking, as it is the
value of the properties at that time that should be used to compute the just
compensation. It will also be the date when the applicable interest in
expropriation cases begins to accrue. The exact date when each property was
taken from respondents cannot be determined from the evidence already
presented by the parties.
The exact amount already paid to and received by respondents as
initial payment should also be determined, as this amount will be deducted
from whatever amount will be awarded to them as just compensation.
However, neither the RTC nor the appellate court made a pronouncement as
to the total amount already received by respondents as initial payment. Thus,
the evidence on record is not sufficient to enable this Court to determine the
said amount.
Thus, since some of the lands had already been acquired even
before the CARL became effective, the acceleration of the final disposition of
this case is warranted. The he just compensation shall be ascertained due in
accordance with this Decision, applying Section 17 of R.A. 6657 and A.O. 5.
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals.
[G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004]
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL
and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the
registered owners of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud,
Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was compulsorily acquired by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657,[1] as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988.
Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a
summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land.
Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbanks
valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed
with the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation.
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the
same on the facts established in another case pending before it.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average
production figures in another case pending before it and applying the same
to the present case without conducting a hearing and without the knowledge
or consent of the parties
HELD: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the
knowledge of the opposing party, which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a
hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the
trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce
its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper
court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice
of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case. (Emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
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Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Noel
Gr no. 180891 March 26, 2010
Facts: Land Bank filed cases for determination of just compensation of
agricultural lands against Villegas and the heirs of Noel before RTC of
Dumaguete City Branch 32, the Special Agrarian Court for the province of
Negros Oriental. The lands of the respondents happened to be outside the
regular territorial jurisdiction of RTC Branch 32 Dumaguete City. The RTC
Branch 32 dismissed both cases holding that it has no jurisdiction and that it
is RTC Branch 64 of Guihulngan City that has jurisdiction over the property of
Villegas since it is where it could be found and that the property of the heirs
of Noel is under the jurisdiction of RTC Branch 63 of Bayawan City. Land Bank
filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not RTC Branch 32 of Dumaguete City, the Special
Agrarian Court of the province of Negros Oriental, has jurisdiction over
agricultural lands outside its regular jurisdiction but within the province
where they are designated.
Ruling: Yes. The courts jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of
an action is conferred by law. In this case, the law that confers jurisdiction on
Special Agrarian Courts in every province is RA 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. RA 6657 states that a branch of an RTC
designated as Special Agrarian Court for a province has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation in that province.. Therefore RTC Branch 32 being designated
as the Special Agrarian Court for the Province of Negros Oriental has
jurisdiction over all cases for determination of just compensation
involving agricultural lands within that province, regardless of whether or not
those properties are outside its regular territorial jurisdiction.
ROBERTO SORIANO v. ATTY MANUEL DIZON
AC no. 6792 | January 25, 2006
FACTS: Atty Manuel Dizon was driving under the influence of alcohol
along Abanao st. in Baguio city when a taxi overtook him. Enraged, Dizon
tailed the taxi, pulled it over and berated and threatened Roberto Soriano,
the taxi driver. To stop the aggression, Soriano opened his door which caused
Dizon to fall to the pavement. Soriano tried to help Dizon up but had to
punch Dizon because he was going to punch him. Soriano prevented another
attempt by Dizon to hit him. Dizon went back to his car to get his gun, the
handle wrapped in handkerchief. Dizon shot Soriano who was then picking
up Dizons eyeglasses to return it to him. After shooting Soriano, Dizon sped
off with his car and left him to die on the street. The bullet hit Soriano in the
neck and lacerated his carotid artery. According to the doctors who treated
Soriano, he would have easily died if not for the timely medical assistance.
Nevertheless, the left side of Sorianos body was paralyzed, leaving him
unable to drive anymore.
A complaint for Frustrated Homicide was filed against Dizon by
Soriano. Dizon was eventually found guilty but was allowed probation. One
of the conditions of the probation is the payment of the civil liabilities. Four
years after the judgment was rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil
obligation to Soriano.
A Complain-Affidavit for disbarment was filed by Soriano before
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Dizon was declared in default and an ex-parte hearing was
held. The Commissioner of the CBD recommended to the IBP the disbarment
of Dizon for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The
IBP adopted the recommendation of the Commissioner and sent its
resolution to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
1. Whether the crime committed by Atty Dizon involved moral
turpitude.
2. Whether Atty Dizon violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility, warranting his disbarment.
RULING: The Supreme Court approved the Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and ordered the disbarment of Atty Manuel
Dizon.
1st Issue
The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Commissioner
that the frustrated homicide committed by Atty Dizon was attended by moral
turpitude. The Court defined moral turpitude as everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or
to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Atty Dizon exhibited moral turpitude when he shot a taxi driver
for no valid reason. His act did not constitute self-defense. In fact, he was the
aggressor. It was him who first tried to punch the other. Soriano was merely
defending himself and fending off the aggression when he counterpunched
Dizon. Furthermore, the trial court also ruled that the crime was committed
with treachery. Dizon shot Soriano when he was not in a position to defend
himself. Soriano was picking up Dizons eyeglasses which fell on the road
when Dizon fell to return it to him when he was shot. Furthermore, Dizon
tried to escape punishment by wrapping the handle of his gun in
handkerchief. He intended not to leave fingerprints on the gun he used.
2nd Issue
The Supreme Court also ruled that there was indeed a violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 provides that
lawyers must obey the laws of the land and promote respect or law and legal
processes. Atty Dizon was in violation of the law because he was in illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm. He also failed to obey the lawful orders
of the trial court when he failed to settle his civil liabilities, a condition for the
grant of the probation.
Atty Dizon also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct. Dizon tried to reach an out-of-court
settlement with the family of Soriano but when the negotiations failed, he
instead made it look like it was the family who approached him to get a
referral to a neurosurgeon. In addition, Dizon fabricated a story saying that it
was Soriano and two other persons who mauled him. According to three
doctors, there was no proof of assault on Soriano.
G.R. No. 182332: February 23, 2011
MILESTONE FARMS, INC., Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS: On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine
in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc,
ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform that
agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are
excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thus, in
May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-
hectare property.
The DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee
(LUCEC) recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare
property from the coverage of CARP, which was then adopted by DAR
Regional Director Dalugdug.
Petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia
and company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The MCTC ruled in
favor of petitioner, but the decision was later reversed by the RTC. The CA,
however, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and all defendants
therein to vacate portions of the property.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881 which
provided that private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and
swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the CARL. Due to this, DAR
Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776
hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director
Dalugdug. This was reinstated by the Office of the President.
Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4, 2004, without
the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court
then DAR Secretary Rene C. Villa (Secretary Villa) issued DAR Conversion
Order No. CON-0410-0016 (Conversion Order), granting petitioners
application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from
agricultural to residential and golf courses use.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use and disposition of that land is already
beyond DARs jurisdiction.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
CIVIL LAW: DAR jurisdiction
To succumb to petitioners contention that when a land is
declared exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is not agricultural as of
the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land is entirely
and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction is dangerous, suggestive of self-
regulation. Precisely, it is the DAR Secretary who is vested with such
jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from CARP
coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in accordance
with law and applicable jurisprudence. In addition, albeit parenthetically,
Secretary Villa had already granted the conversion into residential and golf
courses use of nearly one-half of the entire area originally claimed as exempt
from CARP coverage because it was allegedly devoted to livestock
production.
Petition is DENIED.
PASCO vs PISON-ARCEO AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION Case Digest
JESUS PASCO et al. v. PISON-ARCEO AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
485 SCRA 514 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, ownership of the land is
transferred only after the award of the same to the beneficiary by the
Department of Agrarian Reform.
FACTS: Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation, is the
registered owner of a parcel of land in Negros Occidental. Constructed on the
said land are houses occupied by the corporations workers.Jesus Pasco et al.
are former workers of the corporation. When their employment contracts
were terminated, they were asked to vacate the house but they refused to
do so. The corporation thereafter filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities in Bacolod City. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Pasco et al. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court
affirmed the decision. Pasco et al. appealed the decision contending that the
court has no jurisdiction over the case on the ground of a pending agrarian
reform dispute between them and the corporation.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision which affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not one who has been identified by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) as potential agrarian reform beneficiary may be
ejected from the land where he is identified as such, by the landowner, who
has already been notified by the DAR of the coverage of his land by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government
HELD: The issuance during the pendency of the case of a Notice of Coverage
to Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation does not,
however, automatically make the ejectment case an agrarian dispute over
which the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has
jurisdiction. The issuance of a Notice of Coverage is merely a preliminary step
for the States acquisition of the land for agrarian reform purposes and it
does not automatically vest title or transfer the ownership of the land to the
government.
Since during a field investigation the DAR and Land Bank of the Philippines
would make a determination as to whether, among other things, "the land
will be placed under agrarian reform, the lands suitability to agriculture," a
Notice of Coverage does not ipso facto render the land subject thereof a land
reform area. The owner retains its right to eject unlawful possessors of his
land, as what respondent Pison- Arceo Agricultural and Development
Corporation did in the present case.
Nothing in the records of the case shows that the DAR has made an award in
favor of Spouses Pasco et al. Hence, no rights over the land they occupy can
be considered to have vested in their favor in accordance with Section 24 of
the CARL which provides that the rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary
shall commence from the time the DAR makes an award of the land to him,
which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from
the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land.
Case Digest: Concha, et al. v. Rubio, et al.
G.R. No. 162446: March 29, 2010
ROMANITA CONCHA, BENITA COSICO, DOMINGO GARCIA, ROMEO DE
CASTRO, PEDRO CONCHA, CONSTANTINO CONCHA, ROLANDO NAVARRO,
ROSALINDA DE TORRES, CANDIDA DE TORRES, RODELO COSICO, TEODOLFO
CAPUNO, ANTONIO DE TORRES, MAXIMA CONCHA, GABRIEL CONCHA,
IRINEO CONCHA, AND BRAULIO DE TORRES, Petitioners, v. PAULINO RUBIO,
SOFIA RUBIO, AMBROCIA BARLETA, SEGUNDO CRISOSTOMO, MILAGROS
GAYAPA, LASARO CONCHA, AND LORENSO NAVARRO, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: The subject landholding was placed under the Compulsory
Acquisition Scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
of the government. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Tiaong,
Quezon, named petitioners as beneficiaries.
Respondents filed a complaint for declaration of their tenancy and
their identification as beneficiaries and for disqualification of the petitioners
to become beneficiaries over the subject landholding. They alleged that they
are the tenants thereof and have not relinquished their rights over the same,
as they returned the monetary awards given by the landowners.
Meanwhile, the registered owners of the subject land entered
into a joint project with 1st A.M. Realty Development Corporation,
represented by Atty. Alejandro Macasaet for its development on the
condition that the farmer- beneficiary shall be paid disturbance
compensation and that the remaining 18.5006 hectares of the land shall be
covered by the CARP.
The MARO pursued the coverage of the remaining 18.5006 has.
The petitioners herein were identified as qualified farmer-beneficiaries
where three (3) Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOA) were issued in
their favor.
Respondents, on the other hand, were paid of their disturbance
compensation. They now, however, question the validity and legality of the
institution of the petitioners as beneficiaries over the subject landholding.
They filed a case for annulment of CLOAs.
The PARAD dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal,
the DARAB set aside the PARAD decision. The DARAB ruled that in order for a
voluntary surrender by an agricultural tenant of his landholding to be valid,
the same must be done due to circumstances more advantageous to him and
his family a consideration, which, the DARAB found, was bereft of any
evidence as shown by the records of the case. Upon denial of their motion
for reconsideration, petitioners appealed to the CA but the same failed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
identifying and selecting the qualified farmer- beneficiaries of a land covered
by CARL
HELD: No.
Political Law- identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform
In Lercana v. Jalandoni, this Court was categorical in ruling that
the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving
strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively
cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and
beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
In addition, in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v.
Amante, this Court had an occasion to discuss the jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary in the selection of farmer-beneficiaries, to wit:
Suffice it to say that under Section 15 of R.A. No. 6657, the
identification of beneficiaries is a matter involving strictly the administrative
implementation of the CARP, a matter which is exclusively vested in the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, through its authorized offices. Section 15
reads:
SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination with the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall
register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farm workers who are qualified
to be beneficiaries of the CARP.
The administrative function of the DAR is manifest in
Administrative Order No. 06-00, which provides for the Rules of Procedure
for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. Under said Rules of Procedure, the
DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over identification, qualification or
disqualification of potential farmer-beneficiaries.
Based on the foregoing, the conclusion is certain that the DARAB
had no jurisdiction to identify who between the parties should be recognized
as the beneficiaries of the land in dispute, as it was a purely administrative
function of the DAR. The PARAD was, thus, correct when it declared that it
had no jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.
The finding of the MARO declaring petitioners as beneficiaries of
the land in dispute must, therefore, be accorded respect. It should also be
equally binding on the DARAB for the simple reason that the latter has no
appellate jurisdiction over the former: The DARAB cannot review, much less
reverse, the administrative findings of DAR. Instead, the DARAB would do
well to defer to DARs expertise when it comes to the identification and
selection of beneficiaries, as it did in Lercana where this Court noted with
approval that, in the dispositive portion of its decision, left to the concerned
DAR Offices the determination of who were or should be agrarian reform
beneficiaries. In fact, this course of action available to the DARAB is now
embodied in Rule II of its 2003 Rules of Procedure, thus:
`Section 5. Referral to Office of the Secretary (OSEC). In the event that a
case filed before the Adjudicator shall necessitate the determination of a
prejudicial issue involving an agrarian law implementation case, the
Adjudicator shall suspend the case and, for purposes of expediency, refer the
same to the Office of the Secretary or his authorized representative in the
locality.
In the case at bar, the DARAB has overstepped its legal boundaries
in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioners and respondents
in deciding who should be declared the farmer-beneficiaries over the land in
dispute.
GRANTED.
DAR vs Sutton
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY JOSE
MARI B. PONCe (OIC), Petitioner, vs. DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTON-
SOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON, Respondents.
Respondent inherited a land in Aroroy, Masbate devoted
exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the
existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondent made a
voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail
incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, RA 6657 known as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 took effect. It included
in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
An en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR,
ruled that land devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in
the definition of agricultural land.
In view of the Luz Farm ruling, respondent filed with petitioner
DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was
exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the
CARL. Petitioner ignored their request.
DAR issue A.O No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only
portion of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the
CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded the A.O fixed the
following retention limits, viz 1:1 animal-land ratio and the ration of 1.7815
hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise
be excluded from the operation of the CARL.
DAR Secretary Garilao issue an Order partially granting the
application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL
applying the retention limit outlined in the DAR A.O No. 9. Petitioner
ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed
under Compulsory Acquisition.
On October 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the
impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled that DAR A.O. no. 9 does not run
counter to the Luz Farm case as the A.O provided the guidelines to determine
whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising.
Issue: Whether of not DAR A.O No.9 is unconstitutional?
Held: Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in
nature. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules
to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-
making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the
increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while
administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they
are not immune from judicial review. They may be properly challenged
before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no
grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative
body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid,
administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and
must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The rule-making
power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority
given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge
the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules
and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the
scope of their regulations.
In the case at bar, SC find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by
including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of
the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia,
all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The
Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising
are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or
agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different
from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.
Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which
have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian
reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
`Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have
long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly
known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does
not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that
respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of
breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect
that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that
what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-
agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no
change of business interest in the case of respondents.
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the
reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an
implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other
hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In
the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A.
No. 7881 which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the
new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural activity and
commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted
to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this significant
modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian
laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
Alita v CA
Facts: Private respondents' predecessors-in-interest acquired the
subject parcel of lands through homestead patent under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondents herein are desirous of
personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on
the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316. On June 18, 1981, private respondents
instituted a complaint for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees,
Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as
inapplicable to lands obtained through homestead law. The RTC dismissed
the complaint but on motion for reconsideration it declared that P.D. 27 is
not applicable to homestead lands. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the
RTC was sustained.
Issue: Whether or not lands acquired through homestead law are
covered by CARP
Held: Petitioners is correct in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to
them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a
remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very
purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No.
141. The Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the
homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the
Agrarian Reform statute. Provided, that the original homestead grantees or
their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the
time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.
Roxas & Co. Inc. v CA
Facts:
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner
of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all
located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. On May 6, 1988, petitioner
filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway
pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad
were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in
accordance with the CARL. Petitioner tried to withdraw the VOS of Hacienda
Caylaway but the sane was denied. Thereafter, petitioner sought the
conversion of the three haciendas from agricultural to other use but the
petition was likewise denied.
Issue: Whether or not process of land acquisition under CARL should
observe due process
Held: For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are
required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary
conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP,
farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties; and (2) the Notice of
Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. They are
steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due
process. The taking contemplated in Agrarian Reform is not a mere limitation
of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favour of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process
of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due
process be observed in the taking of private property.
Natalia Realty v. DAR
GR No. 103302
12 August 1993
Facts: PP 1637 set aside several hectares of land in Antipolo, San Mateo,
and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the
metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite, where
Natalia Realtys properties were situated. Estate Developers and Investors
Corporation (EDIC), the developer of the Natalia properties, was granted
approval to develop the said properties into low-cost housing subdivisions.
The Natalia properties then became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
When the CARL came into effect, the DAR issued a Notice of
Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
Natalia immediately registered its objection to the said Notice and requested
the DAR Secretary to cancel the same. However, members of the Samahan
ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo (SAMBA) filed a complaint against Natalia
and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain them from
developing areas under their cultivation. The RA issued a writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Natalia and EDIC appealed to the DARAB but the latter merely
remanded the case to the RA. Natalia then requested the DAR Secretary to
set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither the DAR Secretary nor the DAR
Director concerned took action on the protest letters.
Issues: W/N the Natalia properties were validly converted from
agricultural to residential land.
W/N the Natalia properties are covered by the CARL.
Held: YES. Natalia and EDIC complied with all the requirements of law,
even securing prior approval from DAR. As a matter of fact, there was no
need for Natalia and EDIC to do so because the Natalia properties were
within the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Since PP
1637 created the townsite reservation for the purpose of providing
additional housing to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila, it in effect
converted for residential use what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided
all requisites were met.
NO. The undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
cannot be considered as agricultural lands. These lots were intended for
residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their
inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Doctrine: To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is imperative.
Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the
State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
Obiter: One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where
the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the
means. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or
the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will
excuse the bypassing of an individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that
a person invoking a right guaranteed under Art III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him
that right.
Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary
GR No. 86889
4 December 1990
Facts: In 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the
Philippines. It includes the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its
coverage.
In 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the IRR of
Secs. 11, 13, and 39 of the said law.
Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business, allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of
certain sections of RA 6657, of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing under RA 6657, and of the IRR of Section 11. It
prays that the aforesaid statutes be declared unconstitutional.
Issue: W/N the CARL should include the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage.
W/N the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of RA 6657 directing corporate
farms to execute and implement production-sharing plans is unreasonable
for being confiscatory and violative of due process, with respect to livestock
and poultry raisers.
Separate Opinion: Sarmiento, J.
W/N the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Held: NO. It was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution
to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the agrarian
reform program of the government. The intention of the Committee was to
limit the application of the word agriculture. Thus, Section II of RA 6657
which includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock,
poultry, and swine raising in the definition of commercial farms is invalid,
to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.
YES. As there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in
the coverage of agrarian reform, there is no need to call upon them to
distribute from 3% of their gross sales and 10% of their net profits to their
workers as additional compensation.
NO. Substantial distinctions exist between land directed purely to
cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively used for
livestock, poultry and swine raising that make real differences:
1. There are no tenants nor landlords in livestock and poultry
businesses;
2. Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land;
3. Land is not a primary resource;
4. Livestock and poultry production are industrial activities;
Livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law rather
than by tenancy law.
Doctrine: Raising of livestock, poultry, and swine are excluded from the
coverage of the CARL.
Milestone Farms vs Office of the President
FACTS: Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are
1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2) to breed,
raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and
animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect
In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its
316.0422-hectare property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this
Court in Luz Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series
of 1993, setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of
agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP
coverage.
Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO.
DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC)
conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property and recommended
the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the coverage
of CARP.
DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCECs
recommendation
The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the
reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director
Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary
Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia
and company before the MCTC.
MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone
RTC reversed the decision of MCTC
CA ruled in favor of Milestone
DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only
240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director
Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by
CARP.
Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of
Director Dalugdug but when the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration,
Office of the President reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.
CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire
property from the coverage of CARP. However, six months earlier, without
the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court
then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion order granting petitioners
application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from
agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions converted was
with a total area of 153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area
of the property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to
162.7373 hectares.
With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly
Secretary Villas Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the property
subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373
hectares. CA, in its amended decision, states that the subject landholding
from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-
agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the CARP.
ISSUE: Whether or not Milestones property should be exempted from
the coverage of CARP
HELD: No.
When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA
erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O.
No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and effect.
As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the
subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial
pieces of evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.
Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board 215 SCRA 86 (1992)
Facts: On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation
No. 467 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU, a
piece of land to be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a
project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels of land were leased to
its faculty members and employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU
will assist faculty members and employee groups through the extension of
technical know-how, training and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid
the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided
that there will be no tenancy relationship between the lessees and the CMU.
When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the
participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as
tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others,
the segregation of 400 hectares of the land for distribution under CARP. The
land was subjected to coverage on the basis of DAR's determination that the
lands do not meet the condition for exemption, that is, it is not "actually,
directly, and exclusively used" for educational purposes.
Issue: Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether
lands reserved for public use by presidential proclamation is no longer
actually, directly and exclusively used and necessary for the purpose for
which they are reserved?
Held: The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to
resolve and answer the question of when and what lands are found
necessary for its use. The Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue
of exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs." The Court stated that
the DARAB decision stating that for the land to be exempt it must be
"presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its
present educational program with its present student population and
academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of growth of the
university in the years to come.
Province of Camarines Sur vs CA
May 17, 1993
FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Res. 129
authorizing the Prov. Gov. To purchase/expropriate property to establish a
pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and housing project for
the government employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases
for expropriation against private respondents (San Joaquins).
RTC: denied motion to dismiss on the ground of inadequacy of price of San
Joaquins.
CA: San Joaquins raised issue of a) declaring the resolution null and void, b)
complaint for expropriation de dismissed. CA asked Sol Gen to give comment.
SolGen: under the LGC, no need for approval by the OP of the exercise of the
SP of the right to eminent domin. However, approval of DAR must first be
secured (since this involves appropriation of agricultural lands).
CA: set aside order of RTC (without however disposing of the issues raised.
The SC said that the CA assumed that the resolution is valid and the
expropriation is for a public use).
Issues:
1) WON the resolution is null and void. Corollary to this issue is WON the
expropriation is for a public use.
2) WON the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case is
restricted by the CAR Law?
3) WON the complaint for expropriation may be dismissed on the ground of
inadequacy of the compensation offered?
Held/ratio:
1) The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the resolution is
authorized and valid.
 SC explained that there had been a shift from the old to the new
concept of public purpose:. Old concept is that the property must actually
be used by the general public. The new concept, on the other hand, means
public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the
general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community.
In this case, the proposed pilot development center would inure
to the direct benefit and advantage of the CamSur peeps. (How?) invaluable
info and tech on agriculture, fishery, and cottage industry, enhance livelihood
of farmers and fishermen, etc.
2) No, (citing Ardana vs Reyes, SC here said that the implication of
the Ardana case is that) the power of expropriation is superior to the power
to distribute lands under the land reform program.
Old LGC does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure
approval of the Dept of Land Reform for conversion of agri to non-agri use.
Likewise, no provision in the CAR Law subjecting expropriation by LGUs to
the control of DAR.
Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is not in point because it is
applicable only to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform
program. This is limited only to applications for reclassification submitted by
land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring power of eminent domain to political
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.
3) Fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of
the valuation decalred in the tax declarations of their property, are
unfounded.
It is unconstitutional to fix just compensation in expropriation cases based on
the value given either by the owners or the assessor. Rules for determining
just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 ROC, evidence must be
submitted to justify what they consider is the just compensation.
12. G.R. No. 149548 December 14, 2010
ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs.DAMBA-NFSW and the
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167505
DAMAYAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID SA ASYENDA ROXAS-
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (DAMBA-NFSW), Petitioner,
vs.SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC.
AND/OR ATTY. MARIANO AMPIL, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167540
KATIPUNAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA HACIENDA ROXAS, INC.
(KAMAHARI), ET AL., Petitioners, vs.SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167543
DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM, FORMERLY DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM (DAR), Petitioner, vs.ROXAS & CO, INC., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 167845
ROXAS & CO., INC., Petitioner, vs.DAMBA-NFSW, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169163
DAMBA-NFSW REPRESENTED BY LAURO V. MARTIN, Petitioner, vs.ROXAS &
CO., INC., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179650
DAMBA-NFSW, Petitioner, vs.ROXAS & CO., INC., Respondent.
FACTS: This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed on January 13,
2010 by Roxas & Co., Inc. (Roxas & Co.) and the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration filed on January 29, 2010 by Damayan ng Manggagawang
Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-
NFSW) and Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid sa Hacienda Roxas, Inc.
(KAMAHARI), et al., which both assail the Courts December 4, 2009 Decision
in these consolidated cases.
ISSUE: Whether the subject lands are exempt from Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage?
HELD: Roxas & Co. cannot have it both ways. It must either zealously
argue its legal position if it believes it to be meritorious or altogether
abandon it if it has reservations. Its Motion to Hold in Abeyance the
Resolution of its earlier Motion for Reconsideration effectively coaxes the
Court to wait for the outcome of its TIEZA application and ultimately delay
the final resolution of these consolidated cases.
On Roxas & Co.s Motion for Reconsideration, no substantial
arguments were raised to warrant a reconsideration of the Decision. The
Motion contains merely an amplification of the main arguments and factual
matters already submitted to and pronounced without merit by the Court in
its Decision. In the Courts considered view, nothing more is left to be
discussed, clarified or done in these cases since all the main issues raised
have been passed upon and definitely resolved.
Roxas & Co. raises the fringe issue that DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 7 (Series of 2004) has no force and effect since the said DAR
Memorandum Circular was not published and filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register.
The contention fails. It should be stressed that there is no need
for the publication and filing of the said DAR Memorandum Circular with the
ONAR as it is merely an administrative interpretation.
Roxas & Co. is merely nitpicking on the issue. Since the DAR had
initially issued CLOAs to the farmer-beneficiaries of the nine parcels of land in
Hacienda Palico, the assailed Decision merely reiterated the original
designation of the affected individuals as farmer-beneficiaries who should be
entitled to disturbance compensation before the cancellation of their
respective CLOAs is effected. This is in pursuance of the directive of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6 (Series of 1994) which mandates the payment of
disturbance compensation before Roxas & Co.s application for exemption
may be completely granted.
Since subject landholding has been validly determined to be
CARP-exempt, therefore, the previous issuance of the CLOA of oppositors-
movants is erroneous. Hence, similar to the situation of the above-quoted
Supreme Court Decision, oppositors-movants only hold the property in trust
for the rightful owners of the land and are not the owners of subject
landholding who should be notified of the exemption application of applicant
Roxas & Company, Incorporated.1avvphi1
Finally, this Office finds no substantial basis to reverse the assailed
Orders since there is substantial compliance by the applicant with the
requirements for the issuance of exemption clearance under DAR AO 6
(1994).
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Roxas & Co., Inc. and
the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by DAMBA-NFSW and
KAMAHARI are DENIED for lack of merit.
13. Estribillo v DAR
Facts: Private respondent Hacienda Maria Inc. requested that 527.8308
hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and
other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be
covered under Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the
entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the
corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were
issued to petitioners, among other persons. In December 1997, HMI filed
with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under
Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings.
HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the
area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. RARAD
rendered a decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to
petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and
neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and
petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the RARAD
Decision. On appeal to the CA, the same was dismissed. Petitioners
contended that the EPs became indefeasible after the expiration of one year
from their registration.
Issue: Whether or not EPs have become indefeasible one year after their
issuance
Held: After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after
granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential
Decree No. 27, the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire
the same protection accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the
date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Lands
covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral
proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.
Gelos vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 86186.
May 8, 1992
Topic: Definition of Agricultural Tenancy
Facts: The Private Respondent owned the subject land of 25,000 square
meters in Laguna. The Landowner then entered in to a contract with the
petitioner and employed him to be laborer on the land with the wage of 5.00
peso a day.
The Petitioner first went the Court of Agrarian Relation and then
went to Ministry of Agrarian reform and asked the court to fix the
agricultural lease rental of the land and his request was granted.
The private respondent then filed a complaint of illegal detainer
against the petitioner that was that was dismissed by the Ministry of Agrarian
reform for the existence of Tenancy relations between the parties. The
Private respondents appealed to the office of the President alleging that
there was no tenancy relation between the parties.
The RTC rendered dismissed the complaint and assailed that there was a
tenancy relation between the parties.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Is there a Tenancy relation between the parties?
Held: No, it was clear that the petitioner were not intended to be tenant
but a mere employee of the private respondent as showed in the contract.
The petitioner was paid for specific kind of work. The court stressed many
cases that:
"tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the
parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case,
their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not
contrary to law, are even more important."
It should also be considered that a tenant is defined under
Section 5(a) R.A 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available
from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or
paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
Therefore the court laid down the requisites for the tenancy
relationship to exist:
1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2) The subject is agricultural land;
3) There is consent;
4) The purpose is agricultural production;
5) There is personal cultivation; and
6) There is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.
Absence of this clearly does not qualify someone to be a tenant. It is clear
that it is not a tenancy relationship that exists between the parties, what
they have is employee-employer relationship.
Gabriel v. Pangilinan
FACTS: Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the
owner of a 169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral
contract of lease with a yearly rental was entered between them. Defendant
was notified that the contract would be terminated, but upon request was
extended for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the trial
court had no jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian
Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between
the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff, the motion was denied. The
defendant filed his answer that the land was originally verbally leased to him
by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted,
subject to the condition that he would convert the major portion into a
fishpond and that which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense,
which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the
termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that he could continue
leasing as long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it
personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining
which Court shall take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings,
repairing dikes and such, personally with the aid of helpers since he became
ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over who said that
she helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his
instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who is residing near the fishpond,
defendants other children are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a
priest all residing in Manila. None of these has been seen working on the
fishpond.
Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold
tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section
35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of
the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No.
1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has been extinguished
(Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the trial court
properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code.
No tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as
defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and
decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.
ISSUES:
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant
as that of a civil lease and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199
as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature
pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
HELD: Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law
lease. The leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law
lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation,
the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate
the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally
cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in
leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the
purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the
civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is
governed by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural
Tenancy Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members
of his immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in
money or in produce or in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond
and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land",
specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use
thereof. The mere fact that a person works an agricultural land does not
necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4 of
Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other
requisites as above enumerated are complied with.
The court doesnt want to decide on the second requisite since it
wasnt raised. For the third requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in
1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became ill
and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's immediate farm
household work the land. Only the members of the family of the tenant and
such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are
dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the
farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his
immediate family to work the land. A person, in order to be considered a
tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm
household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work
the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he
pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as
having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8
of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and
privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that
the relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence,
this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs
against the appellants.
National Housing Authority v Allarde
Facts: Private respondent Rufino Mateo had lived in the disputed lots
since his birth in 1928. In1959, he started farming and working on a six-
hectare portion of said lots, after the death of his father who had cultivated a
thirteen-hectare portion of the same lots. On September 1, 1983, the
National Housing Authority notified the respondent spouses of the scheduled
development of the Tala Estate including the lots in question, warning them
that it would not be responsible for any damage which may be caused to the
crops planted on the said lots. In 1989, private respondent Rufino Mateo
filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the award to
them of subject disputed lots under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). In January1992, petitioner caused the bulldozing of the rice
fields of private respondents, damaging the dikes and irrigations thereon, in
the process. On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses, relying on their
claim that subject lots are agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP,
brought before the respondent Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from
bulldozing further and making constructions on the lots under controversy.
Petitioner contended that the said lots which were previously reserved by
Proclamation No. 843 for housing and resettlement purposes are not covered
by the CARP as they are not agricultural lands within the definition and
contemplation of Section 3 (c)of R. A. No. 6657. The RTC issued the writ.
Issue: Whether or not the disputed land is covered by CARP
Held: Lands reserved for, or converted to, non-agricultural uses by
government agencies other than the Department of Agrarian Reform, prior
to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 are not considered and treated as
agricultural lands and therefore, outside the ambit of said law. Thus, since as
early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate was reserved, inter alia under
Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the National
Housing Authority, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to
the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3 (c)of R.A. No. 6657, and is,
therefore, outside the coverage of the CARL.
CASE TITLE: Landbank v. Listana
GR NO.: G.R. No. 152611
DATE: August 5, 2003
PETITIONER: Landbank of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Severino Listana
FACTS: Respondent Listana offered to sell his land(246.0561 ha.) in
Sorsogon to the government, through the DAR under the CARL. DAR valued
the property at P5,871,689.03 but Listana refused to sell at that price. An
administrative proceeding under the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) determined the just compensation of the land at
P10,956,963 and ordered Petitioner LANDBANK to pay the same to Listana. A
writ of execution was issued by PARAD(Prov. Agrarian Reform Adjuticator) to
which LANDBANK did not comply. A Motion for Contempt was filed by
Listana with the PARAD against petitioner LANDBANK. PARAD granted the
Motion for Contempt citing for indirect contempt and ordering the arrest of
ALEX A. LORAYES, the Manager of LBP. LBP obtained a preliminary injunction
from the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon to restrain DARAB from issuing the
order of arrest. Listana filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. CA nullified the order of the RTC. Petitioner LBP then filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PARADs order of contempt was invalid.
HELD: Yes. It was invalid for the following reasons:
a.) the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the
Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge
was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed
by respondent.
b.) neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the
contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest
was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB.
Quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for
indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by
initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their
jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These
matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the
present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional
Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes
with indirect contempt.
Thus, the order was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petition granted.
G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999
ROXAS & CO., INC.vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
(1) Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner
of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all
located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024
hectares in Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area. Hacienda Caylaway is
867.4571 hectares in area.
(2) Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed
with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway
pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad
were later placed under compulsory acquisition by . . . DAR in accordance
with the CARL.
(3) Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its
President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of . . . DAR
withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner
informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.
ISSUE: Whether the Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all situated
in Nasugbu, Batangas, are non-agricultural and outside the scope of Republic
Act No. 665
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that The DAR itself has issued
administrative circulars governing lands which are outside of CARP and may
not be subjected to land reform. Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1996
declares in its policy statement what landholdings are outside the coverage
of CARP. The AO is explicit in providing that such non-covered properties
shall be reconveyed to the original transferors or owners.
These non-covered lands are:
a. Land, or portions thereof, found to be no longer suitable for agriculture
and, therefore, could not be given appropriate valuation by the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP);
b. Those were a Conversion Order has already been issued by the DAR
allowing the use of the landholding other than for agricultural purposes in
accordance with Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 and Administrative Order No.
12, Series of 1994;
c. Property determined to be exempted from CARP coverage pursuant to
Department of Justice Opinion Nos. 44 and 181; or
d. Where a Presidential Proclamation has been issued declaring the subject
property for certain uses other than agricultural.
In the present case, Proclamation 1520 dated November 20, 1975
is part of the law of the land. It declares the area in and around Nasugbu,
Batangas, as a Tourist Zone. It has not been repealed, and has in fact been
used by DAR to justify conversion of other contiguous and nearby properties
of other parties.
Furthermore, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, affirmed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, expressly defines the property as
tourist, not agricultural. The power to classify its territory is given by law to
the local governments.
HACIENDA LUISITA INC vs LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP, GR. 171101
FACTS: On 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs)
complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of
the proposed HLIs Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP). The SDOA was
formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This
attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis
and mechanics of HLIs SDP, which was eventually approved by the PARC
after a follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR, in which 5,117 FWBs,
out of 5,315 who participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.
On 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of
the hacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA
6657. The DAR approved the application subject to payment of three percent
(3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLIs continued compliance
with its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.
On 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of
stocks of Centennary, ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the latter.
Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million to
Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an
industrial complex. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to RCBC in
payment of LIPCOs PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations. LIPCOs titles were
cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart from the 500 hectares,
another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita and
acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway
(SCTEX) complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915
hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in
lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional?
HELD: There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed
by RA 6657. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural
land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the
shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the farmers should always own
majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of
directors to ensure that the farmers will have a clear majority in the board.
Before the SDP is approved, strict scrutiny of the proposed SDP must always
be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such that the value of the agricultural
land contributed to the corporation must always be more than 50% of the
total assets of the corporation to ensure that the majority of the members of
the board of directors are composed of the farmers. The PARC composed of
the President of the Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that
control over the board of directors rests with the farmers by rejecting the
inclusion of non-agricultural assets which will yield the majority in the board
of directors to non-farmers. Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR from
the correct application of the formula prescribed by the second paragraph of
Sec. 31 of RA 6675 does not make said provision constitutionally infirm.
Rather, it is the application of said provision that can be challenged. Ergo,
Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the constitutional policy of ensuring
control by the farmers.
SORIANO vs. REPUBLIC, GR 184282
FACTS: Spouses Soriano were the registered owners of two parcels of
agricultural land located in Hijo, Maco, Compostela Valley Province. The first
parcel had an area of 5.2723 hectares and was covered by TCT No. (T-8935)
T-3120, while the second parcel had an area of 4.0887 hectares and was
covered by TCT No. (T-2906) T-749. In October 1999, the two parcels of land
were compulsorily acquired by the government pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657. The LBP made a preliminary determination of the value of
the subject lands.Petitioners, however, disagreed with the valuation and
brought the matter before the DARAB for a summary administrative
proceeding to fix the just compensation.
On September 30, 2000, the DARAB rendered its decisions
affirming the LBPs preliminary determination. Notices of the decisions were
duly received by counsel for petitioners. But petitioners belatedly filed a
petition before the RTC acting as SAC, for the fixing of just compensation.
Thus, the DAR moved to dismiss the petition arguing that the petition was
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII
of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
On June 27, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and
declared that the "DARAB Rules of Procedure must give way to the laws on
prescription of actions as mandated by the Civil Code." The DAR sought
reconsideration of the order, but its motion was denied. Thus, the DAR
lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court. The CA granted the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not an action to fix just compensation for lands placed
under R.A. No. 6657 is outside the purview of the ordinary rules on
prescription as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
HELD: The court ruled that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in hastily
dismissing said refiled Petition. Accordingly, the Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals assailing the dismissal should be granted.
Under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with
the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land
reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice sent
to the landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an
offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative
proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional
(RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending
on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the
landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the
RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the
determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance
with it, the private respondents case was properly brought by it in the RTC,
and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the
terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners." It would subvert this "original and exclusive"
jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in
compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate
court for the review of administrative decisions.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing
the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is
clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such
cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate
jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and therefore would be void. What
adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to
the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.
LANDBANK vs. ARANETA, GR 161796
FACTS: At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with an area
of 1,645 hectares, more or less, which was originally registered in the name
of Alfonso Doronilla (Doronilla) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
7924 of the Rizal Registry.
On June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation
1283, carving out a wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in
Antipolo, Rizal and reserving the segregated area for townsite purposes,
"subject to private rights, if any there be.
In 1978, the OSG filed with the then CFI of Rizal an expropriation
complaint against the Doronilla property. Meanwhile, on 1979, Doronilla
issued a Certification, copy furnished the Agrarian Reform Office, among
other agencies, listing seventy-nine (79) "bona fide planters" he allegedly
permitted to occupy a portion of his land. On 1987 or nine (9) years after it
commenced expropriation proceedings, the OSG moved for and secured the
dismissal of the expropriation case.
Earlier, or on March 15, 1983, J. Amado Araneta, now deceased,
acquired ownership of the subject Doronilla property by virtue of court
litigation. A little over a week later, he had OCT No. 7924 canceled and
secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-70860 in his
name.
ISSUES: Whether or not the disputed lots are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
HELD: The primary governing agrarian law with regard to agricultural
lands, be they of private or public ownership and regardless of tenurial
arrangement and crops produced, is now RA 6657. The provisions of RA 6657
apply only to agricultural lands under which category the Doronilla property,
during the period material, no longer falls, having been effectively classified
as residential by force of Proclamation 1637. It ceased, following Natalia
Realty, Inc., to be agricultural land upon approval of its inclusion in the LS
Townsite Reservation pursuant to the said reclassifying presidential issuance.
Before Proclamation 1637 came to be, there were already PD 27
tenant-farmers in said property. In a very real sense, the "private rights"
belong to these tenant-farmers. Since the said farmer-beneficiaries were
deemed owners of the agricultural land awarded to them as of October 21,
1972 under PD 27 and subsequently deemed full owners under EO 228, the
logical conclusion is clear and simple: the township reservation established
under Proclamation 1637 must yield and recognize the "deemed ownership
rights" bestowed on the farmer-beneficiaries under PD 27. Another way of
looking at the situation is that these farmer-beneficiaries are subrogated in
the place of Doronilla and eventual transferee Araneta.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless
of tenurial agreement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to
as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable
agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential
lands. "Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the
coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-
agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies
other than respondent DAR.
GALOPE vs. BUGARIN, GR 185669
FACTS: Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva
Ecija, while petitioner farms the land. Parties respective contentions are as
follows: (a) respondent complained that she lent the land to petitioner in
1992 without an agreement, that what she receives in return from petitioner
is insignificant, and that she wants to recover the land to farm it on her own;
(b) petitioner countered that respondent cannot recover the land yet for he
had been farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from
P4,000 to P6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per harvest.
Respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession, ejectment
and payment of rentals before the DARAB, claiming that respondent lent the
land to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave nothing in return as a sign
of gratitude or monetary consideration for the use of the land. It was also
claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose Allingag who allegedly
possesses the land.
After due proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the
petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled to security of tenure.
On appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that
petitioner is not a de jure tenant. The DARAB ordered petitioner to pay
rentals and vacate the land. Petitioner appealed, but the CA affirmed
DARABs ruling that no tenancy relationship exists; that the elements of
consent and sharing are not present; that respondents act of lending her
land without consideration cannot be taken as implied tenancy; and that no
receipts prove petitioners payment of rentals.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the
parties.
HELD: The court found the petition impressed with merit and held that
the CA and DARAB erred in ruling that there is no tenancy relationship
between the parties.
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is
to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondents
act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals
therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement.
An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions
of a written contract alone. Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844,
otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an
agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement.
Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are
present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The subject
matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm land. They mutually
agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest.
The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural
production. After the harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its
equivalent in cash. Respondents motion to supervise harvesting and
threshing, processes in palay farming, further confirms the purpose of their
agreement. Lastly, petitioners personal cultivation of the land is conceded by
respondent who likewise never denied the fact that they share in the
harvest.
LANDBANK vs SUNTAY, GR 157903
FACTS: Respondent Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro with a total area of 3,682.0285 hectares. In 1972, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated 948.1911 hectares of
Suntays land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.
Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated
portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total valuation of P4,251,141.68.
Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for determination of
just compensation in the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) of Region IV, DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00;
his petition was assigned to RARAD Mias.
After summary administrative proceeding, RARAD Mias rendered
a decision fixing the total just compensation for the expropriated portion at
P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for a reconsideration, but RARAD Mias
denied its motion. Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial
determination of just compensation in the RTC (Branch 46) in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian Court, impleading Suntay and
RARAD Mias. The petition essentially prayed that the total just
compensation for the expropriated portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67.
Suntay filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that the petition had
been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period as required by Section 11,
Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of DARAB. After the RTC granted the
motion to dismiss, Land Bank appealed to the CA, which sustained the
dismissal. As a result, Land Bank came to the Court (G.R. No. 157903)
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks
petition for the determination of just compensation.
HELD: The Court has declared that the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to determine just compensation under Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL) pertains to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) as a Special Agrarian Court; that any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) and to convert the original jurisdiction of the
RTC into appellate jurisdiction is void for being contrary to the CARL; and that
what DARAB adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to the
landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.
Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks petition. It bears
stressing that the petition is not an appeal from the RARAD final Decision but
an original action for the determination of the just compensation for
respondents expropriated property, over which the RTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction.
The procedure for the determination of just compensation cases
under R.A. No. 6657, as summarized in Landbank v. Banal, is that initially, the
Land Bank is charged with the responsibility of determining the value of lands
placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking
under the voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition arrangement. The
DAR, relying on the Land Banks determination of the land valuation and
compensation, then makes an offer through a notice sent to the landowner.
If the landowner accepts the offer, the Land Bank shall pay him the purchase
price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and
surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government. In case the
landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator
conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the Land Bank and
other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for
the land. A party who disagrees with the Decision of the DAR adjudicator may
bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for the
determination of just compensation. In determining just compensation, the
RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A.
No. 6657.
AGAPITO ROM ET AL vs ROXAS & COMPANY INC., GR 169331
FACTS: Respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in
Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236
hectares and constituting portions of the land covered by TCT No. T-44664
from the coverage of CARP, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order (AO) No.
6, Series of 1994.
Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) covers only agricultural land which is defined under Section 3(c)
thereof as "land devoted to agricultural activity x x x and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." Respondent
claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL, the lands subject of its
application were already re-classified as part of the Residential Cluster Area.
Petitioners likewise aver that since respondent had previously voluntarily
offered to sell the subject parcels of land to the DAR, it can no longer
withdraw the same from the CARPs coverage. Respondent refutes
petitioners contention that a landowner can no longer withdraw his
property from the coverage of CARP once he has voluntarily offered to sell
the same to the DAR.
ISSUE: Whether or not a voluntary offer to sell a land under the CARL
may be subsequently withdrawn.
HELD: The court upheld that DARs Order which granted respondents
application for exemption. Aside from the fact that this Court in Roxas &
Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW has already upheld the grant of a similar
application which, notably, was supported by the same documents submitted
in support of the application herein, our own review of the records of this
case reveals that there was indeed no error on the part of the DAR in issuing
said Order. The documents submitted by respondent to support its
application for exemption as well as the Investigation Report of CLUPPI-II
clearly show that the 27 parcels of land, specifically identified, were already
re-classified as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL. "Well-settled is
the rule that findings of fact of x x x quasi-judicial bodies (like the DAR) which
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They
are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of
discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or
in utter disregard of the evidence on record.
Respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell to the DAR
Hacienda Caylaway, where the properties subject of this case are located.
However, this offer to sell became irrelevant because respondent was later
able to establish before the DAR that the subject 27 parcels of land were
reclassified as non-agricultural (residential) by virtue of (Nasugbu) Municipal
Zoning Ordinance No. 4 prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988.
"In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, it was held that
lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL
including lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than the DAR." This being
the case, respondent is not bound by its previous voluntary offer to sell
because the subject properties cannot be the subject of a VOS, they being
clearly beyond the CARPs coverage.
ANTONIO vs. MANAHAN, GR 176091
FACTS: Subject of the instant petition are two (2) parcels of agricultural
land situated at Gitnang Bayan I, San Mateo, Rizal, with an aggregate area of
30,906 square meters, and registered in the name of private respondent
Manahan under Original Certificate of Title Nos. 9200 and 9150 of the Rizal
Provincial Registry.
Manahan and Antonio entered into a Leasehold Agreement
whereby the latter undertook to cultivate the subject parcels for an annual
rental of 70 cavans of dried, cleaned and good quality palay, each weighing
44 kilos.
Manahan filed complaints before the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) against Antonio, for such violations of the Leasehold
Agreement as non-payment/remittance of the stipulated rentals despite
demands.
Specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint,
Antonio averred, among others, that he remitted the stipulated rentals
regularly, except for the year 1993 when Manahan refused to accept the
same.
Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of Manahan.
On appeal, DARAB ordered respondent to respect tenants peaceful
possession and cultivation of the said land. However, DARAB subsequently
set aside its initial ruling and reinstated PARADs decision. CA likewise upheld
the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not tenant petitioner is justified to be ejected from
his peaceful possession and cultivation of the disputed land.
HELD: An agricultural leasehold relationship is said to exist upon the
concurrence of the following essential requisites: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the
relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Once the tenancy
relationship is established, the tenant is entitled to security of tenure and
cannot be ejected by the landlord unless ordered by the court for causes
provided by law. In recognition and protection of the tenants right to
security of tenure, the burden of proof is upon the agricultural lessor to show
the existence of the lawful causes for ejectment or dispossession.
The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals must be
willful and deliberate in order to be considered as ground for dispossession
of an agricultural tenant. Perusal of the record shows that Antonios failure
to pay and/or incurrence of shortages from the stipulated annual lease
rentals of 70 Cavans of palay weighing 40 Kilos cannot be considered willful
and deliberate. The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, the Court found
Antonios dispossession, however, still warranted by his repeated violations
of the terms of the Leasehold Agreement which prohibited, among other
matters, the cultivation of other plants on Manahans properties, the
expansion of the tenants dwelling as well as the non-synchronized plantings
and harvests thereon.
Fealty to the fact that "R.A. No. 3844 does not operate to take
away completely every landowners rights to his land" or "authorize the
agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive manner in derogation of
the landowners rights" impelled the court to uphold Antonios
dispossession. "Although the agrarian laws afford the opportunity for the
landless to break away from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on
the kindness of others, a becoming modesty demands that this kindness
should at least be reciprocated, in whatever small way, by those benefited by
them. Hence, the petition was denied.
CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT vs. MATEO, GR 175485
FACTS: The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land with an area
of 6,693 square meters, more or less, located in Barrio Pulang Lupa, Las Pias
City, that was originally owned by Isaias Lara, the respondents maternal
grandfather. Upon the death of Lara, the property passed on to his children,
and a grandson. The co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive
ownership to one of the surviving sibling and who was the mother of herein
respondent.
Thereafter, with the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family, a
deed of sale covering the property was executed in favor of daughter Laura,
who applied for land registration. After the application was granted, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 6386 was issued in Lauras sole name.
In due course, the property now covered by OCT No. 6386 was
used as collateral to secure a succession of loans. In the end, China Bank
foreclosed the mortgage, and consolidated its ownership of the property
after Pe failed to redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-11749-A was issued in the
name of China Bank. Petitioner CDC and China Bank negotiated and
eventually came to terms on the purchase of the property, with China Bank
executing a deed of conditional sale for the purpose.
In the meanwhile, Felicidad died intestate. CDC brought an action
for unlawful detainer in the MTC of Las Pias City against the respondents
siblings and the other occupants of the property. Therein, the defendants
maintained that the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the action because
the land was classified as agricultural; that the jurisdiction belonged to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); that they had
been in continuous and open possession of the land even before World War
II and had presumed themselves entitled to a government grant of the land;
and that CDCs title was invalid, considering that the land had been
registered before its being declared alienable. MTC ruled in favor of CDC. On
appeal, RTC resolved against CDC but CA found favor in it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the title of Laura over the subject land is
indefeasible.
HELD: There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part
of the public domain, has already been placed under the Torrens system of
land registration. The Government is required under the Torrens system of
registration to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the
person named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein
described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what
the law warrants or reserves. The objective is to obviate possible conflicts of
title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further.
The Torrens system gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in
order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not
voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.
The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of
title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of Laura, and its derivative certificates)
before CDC became the registered owner by purchase from China Bank. In all
that time, neither the respondent nor his siblings opposed the transactions
causing the various transfers. In fact, the respondent admitted in his
complaint that the registration of the land in the name of Laura alone had
been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo
family. It is unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware of the
exclusive registration in her sister Lauras name, allowed more than 20 years
to pass before asserting his claim of ownership for the first time through this
case. Making it worse for him is that he did so only after CDC had
commenced the ejectment case against his own siblings.
LANDBANK vs. LISTANA, GR 168105
FACTS: Respondent is the owner of a 246.0561-hectare land located at
Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, which was voluntarily offered for sale to the
government under the (CARP) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657.
Petitioner (LBP) valued the 240.9066 hectares for acquisition at
P5,871,689.03. Since the respondent rejected the said amount, a summary
proceeding for determination of just compensation was conducted by the
(DAR). Respondent wrote LBP requesting the release of payment of the cash
portion of the "accepted x x x 151.1419 has. with an equivalent valuation of
P5,607,874.69." Consequently, a Deed of Transfer was executed by
respondent over the said portion of his landholding in consideration of
payment received from the transferee Republic of the Philippines consisting
of cash (P1,078,877.54) and LBP bonds (P2,747,858.60).
DAR Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision fixing the amount
of just compensation at P10,956,963.25 for the entire acquired area of
240.9066 hectares. Almost a year later, petitioner filed before the RTC of
Sorsogon, a petition for judicial determination of just compensation.
Petitioner argued that the PARADs valuation is unacceptable. The trial court
issued the order dismissing the petition for having been filed almost one year
from receipt of the copy of the PARADs decision. The CA dismissed
petitioners appeal from the SACs dismissal of its petition for judicial
determination of just compensation for failure to adequately explain its
failure to abide by the rules and "its loss of appellate recourse cannot be
revived by invoking the mantra of liberality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SAC may take cognizance of the petition for
determination of just compensation which is filed beyond the prescribed 15-
day reglementary period after the PARAD rendered its valuation in a
summary administrative proceeding.
HELD: While a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is
not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicators decision but an original
action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB
Rules; otherwise, the adjudicators decision will attain finality. This rule is not
only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles
of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed
a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR
adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of
uncertainty as to the true value of his property.
Although the land valuation cases decided by the adjudicator are
now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import of
Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct
resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just
compensation.
However, herein petitioner LBP admitted its "thoughtless" filing of
the petition before the SAC more than 100 days after notice of the denial of
its motion for reconsideration of the PARADs decision fixing the just
compensation for the subject property. Petitioner did not offer any
explanation for its tardiness and neglect, and simply reiterated the great
prejudice to the agrarian reform fund with the erroneous inclusion in the
PARADs valuation of the 151.1419 hectares already conveyed to the
government.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATION
SATELLITE, GR 152640
FACTS: PHILCOMSAT is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Pinugay,
Baras, Rizal, where its Philippine Space Communications Center (PSCC) is
located. The PSCC, which principally consists of herein respondents satellite
earth station, serves as the communications gateway of the Philippines to
more than two-thirds of the world. Incidentally, the property had been
planted with fruit trees, rice and corn by farmers occupying the surrounding
areas of the PSCC.
Pursuant to the decree, the Ministry of National Defense
promulgated the Revised Rules and Regulations to Implement P.D. No. 1845
dated 30 April 1982, as amended, declaring the Philippine Earth Station (PES)
Security Zone. In 1992, a Notice of Coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by
petitioner DAR informing the former that the land in question shall be placed
under CARPs compulsory acquisition scheme. PHILCOMSAT then wrote to
DAR seeking an exemption of the subject property from CARP coverage, but
the latter denied the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had
been declared a security zone under P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No.
1848, can be subjected to CARP.
HELD: P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, was issued way
before the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
The law, in effect, by declaring the area a security zone, has granted to the
Ministry of National Defense the control and administration of the same.
Upon the passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which became
effective on July 15, 1988, all public and private agricultural lands, and other
lands of public domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, were declared subject to its
coverage.
Although the area in question which is included within the
security zone is agricultural, the same should be exempt from CARP coverage
by virtue of P.D. No. 1845, as amended, which, as stated earlier, declared the
area to be a security zone under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National
Defense.
It is evident from the very wording of the law that the government
recognized the crucial role of PHILCOMSATs operations to national security,
thereby necessitating the protection of its operations from unnecessary and
even anticipated disruption.
Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A. No.
6657, as amended, provides that lands actually, directly and exclusively used
and found to be necessary for national defense shall be exempt from the
coverage of the Act. The determination as to whether or not the subject
property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for national defense
usually entails a finding of fact which this Court will not normally delve into.
Suffice it to state, however, that as a matter of principle, it cannot seriously
be denied that the act of securing a vital communication facilities is an act of
national defense. Hence, the law, by segregating an area for purposes of a
security zone for such facilities, in effect devoted that area to national
defense.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK vs. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, GR 173085
FACTS: BCDA filed several expropriation actions before the branches of
the RTC of Angeles City for the acquisition of lands needed to construct the
SCTEX. The defendants in this case are the registered owners of the
expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the CARP. Ten of
these cases were raffled off to Branch 58 of the RTC of Angeles City.
Upon learning of the expropriation cases filed, PVB filed a motion
to intervene and alleged that the properties actually belonged to Belmonte
Agro-Industrial Development Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in
1976. PVB bough the land upon foreclosure but was not able to consolidate
ownership in its name. PVBs motion was denied on the ground that the
intervention amounted to a third-party complaint that is not allowed in
expropriation cases and that it will only serve to delay the proceedings. PVBs
motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that PVB was not entitled
to intervene in the expropriation cases before Branch 58 of the Angeles City
RTC.
HELD: PVB's point regarding the authority of the court in expropriation
cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting claims over the ownership of the
lands involved in such cases is valid. But such rule obviously cannot apply to
PVB for the following reasons:
1. At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases, its
conflict with the farmer beneficiaries who held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs
emanating from such titles were already pending before Angeles City RTC
Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court. Branch 58 had no authority
to pre-empt Branch 62 of its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were
already pending before it.
2. Of course, subsequently, after the CA dismissed PVB's petition on
January 26, 2006, the latter filed a motion for reconsideration, pointing out
that it had in the meantime already withdrawn the actions it filed with
Branch 62 after learning from the decision of the Supreme Court in
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca, that jurisdiction over cases
involving the annulment of CLOAs and EPs were vested by Republic Act 6657
in the DARAB.
REPUBLIC vs. LOPEZ, GR 178895
FACTS: Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N.
Lopez Agri-Business Corporation. On 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards to the
aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under
Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657. Petitioner filed with the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) an Application for Exemption, as
the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for
grazing and habitat of petitioners 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses,
9 heads of goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the (CARL).
The MARO then conducted an onsite investigation on the two parcels of land
confirming the presence of the livestock as enumerated. The DAR Regional
Director, after inspecting the properties, denied the application for
exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly
shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock
raising since in its application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots
for additional grazing area, and such was affirmed by the DAR on appeal. The
application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was
approved. The CA partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded the
two (2) parcels of land from coverage of the CARL. However, it upheld the
Decisions of the Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the
application for exemption with respect to Lots 1454-A and 1296. These lots
were already covered by a new title under the name of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP T-16356).
ISSUE: Whether the subject lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing
lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of
the CARL.
HELD: In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands
devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of
the word "agricultural" showed that it was never the intention of the framers
of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the
government. Thus, lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus exempt
from agrarian reform.
Under the rules then prevailing, it was the (MARO) who was
primarily responsible for investigating the legal status, type and areas of the
land sought to be excluded; and for ascertaining whether the area subject of
the application for exemption had been devoted to livestock-raising as of 15
June 1988. As the primary official in charge of investigating the land sought
to be exempted as livestock land, the MAROs findings on the use and nature
of the land, if supported by substantial evidence on record, are to be
accorded greater weight, if not finality. The Court generally accords great
respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies because
of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their
jurisdiction. Hence, the Court looks with favor on the expertise of the MARO
in determining whether livestock-raising on the Lopez lands has only been
recently conducted or has been a going concern for several years already.
Absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or bias, the findings of
the MARO - as affirmed by the DAR Regional Director - are to be accorded
great probative value, owing to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties.
MENDOZA vs. GERMINO, GR 165676
FACTS: THE petitioner fileda complaint with the (MTC) of Sta. Rosa,
Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry, claiming
that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in
Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property). On his answer, respondent
claimed, among others, that his brother, was the plaintiffs' agricultural lessee
and he merely helped the latter in the cultivation as a member of the
immediate farm household. After several postponements, the plaintiffs filed
a motion to remand the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by
respondent Narciso. The MTC issued an order remanding the case to the
DARAB for further proceedings. PARAD found that the respondents were
mere usurpers of the subject property, and ordered the respondents to
vacate the subject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as
actual damages. On appeal to DARAB, respondent argued that the case
should have been dismissed because the MTC's referral to the DARAB was
void with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. DARAB affirmed the
PARAD decision. CA, however, set aside the DARAB decision and remanded
the case to the MTC for further proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB
decision. While we lament the lapse of time this forcible entry case has been
pending resolution, we are not in a position to resolve the dispute between
the parties since the evidence required in courts is different from that of
administrative agencies.
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is determined exclusively
by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act
or agreement of the parties, or acquired through or waived, enlarged or
diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the
court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court nor the parties to violate
or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. Under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the MTC shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. Furthermore, allegation of tenancy does not divest the MTC of
jurisdiction.
Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 34 of
Executive Order No. 129-A, the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction,
both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, among
others, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. For a case to involve an
agrarian dispute, the following essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy
relationship must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6)
there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION vs. LANDBANK, GR 164195
FACTS: Petitioners are registered owners of five parcels of agricultural
lands located in Davao Province, which they voluntarily offered to sell to the
government. Upon initial valuation of the LBP, petitioners considered such as
unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for the properties
and thus rejected the valuation. DAR then requested LBP to deposit the
amounts equivalent to the LBP valuations in the names of petitioners.
Thereafter, new TCTs over the lands were issued in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines, and CLOAs were subsequently issued to farmer-
beneficiaries. Petitioners, then, filed a complaint for the determination of
just compensation with the DARAB but despite the lapse of 10 years, the
latter failed and refused to render decision on the valuation of the disputed
lands, which prompted petitioners to proceed with the RTC as Special
Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation. The trial court set
the just compensation to be paid and fixed the interest due on the balance of
the compensation due at 12% per annum. CA reversed the decision on
appeal.
ISSUE: Under whose jurisdiction is the determination of the final just
compensation proper? How is the value of just compensation determined?
HELD: It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain
is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting as Special
Agrarian Court. The same cannot be lodged with administrative agencies and
may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.
On the issue determination of just compensation, Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the
guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining
just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current
value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well
as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
The RTC provided the following elucidation in its assailed decision:
The recommendation of the Commissioners Report for a value of
P85.00 per sq.m. or P850,000.00 per hectare (sic) is founded on
evidence. The schedule of market values of the City of Tagum as
per its 1993 and 1994 Revision of Assessment and Property
Classification (Exhibit "J-6" and "CC-6") give the lowest value for
residential land at P100/sq.m. for 4th class residential land in
1993. In 1994, it gave the lowest value of P80.00/sq.m. for
barangay residential lot. It appears that certain portions of the
land in question have been classified as Medium Industrial District
(Exhibit "J-4" and "CC-4"). The lowest value as for industrial land,
3rd class in a barangay is P130.00 sq.m. The average of these
figures, using the lowest values in Exhibit "6" and "CC-6" yields the
figure of P103.33 which is even higher by 22.2% than that
recommended by the Commissioners. It is even of judicial notice
that assessments made by local governments are much lower
than real market value. Likewise, the value of the improvements
thereon, not even considered in the average of P103.33. If
considered, this will necessarily result in a higher average value.
Thus, the value of just compensation as determined by the trial court is
deemed proper and equitable.
LAKEVIEW GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB vs. LUZVIMIN SAMAHANG NAYON,
GR 171253
FACTS: Petitioner was the registered owner of a 60-hectare parcel of land
located Cavite, as evidenced by TCT No. T-11026. On July 6, 1991, the MARO
issued a Notice of Coverage under the CARP of the subject property for
acquisition and distribution to private respondents as farmer-beneficiaries.
On March 17, 1992, the DAR Regional Director for Region IV served a Notice
of Acquisition on petitioner.
Petitioner protested the coverage on the grounds that the subject
property is not agricultural having been projected as a golf course prior to
1988,that the development for its conversion and utilization has already
been commenced, that it is generally mountainous with major portions
having a slope of over 18% and minimal topsoil, and that it has no tenant or
farmworker since the alleged farmer-beneficiaries are mere intruders who
entered the subject property after the enactment of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law in violation of Section 73 thereof. The DAR Secretary
denied petitioners protest and directed to proceed with the acquisition of
the subject property. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was
dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioners petition for review with this Court
was also denied.
Meanwhile, the DAR issued collective CLOA No. 00141945 in favor
of private respondents, and was subsequently registered with the Register of
Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner thereafter filed with the Office of the PARAD a
petition for cancellation of certificates of land ownership award and
reconveyance of the subject property. Private respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the petition on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of
action.
Respondents appealed to the DARAB, but the latter ruled that it
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate regarding the issue of the coverage of the
subject property under the CARP, the same being within the exclusive
prerogative of the DAR Secretary. It also declared as valid the CLOA issued in
favor of private respondents due to petitioners failure to overcome the
presumption of regularity of official functions by government employees and
officials.
ISSUE: Does the DARAB have jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue
regarding the coverage of the subject property under the CARP?
HELD: It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
by law. Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 vests in
the DAR the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform. Through E.O. No. 129-A, the President of the Philippines
created the DARAB and authorized it to assume the powers and functions of
the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.
At first glance, in the present case, it would appear that
jurisdiction lies with the DARAB. The petition before the PARAD sought the
cancellation of private respondents collective CLOA which had already been
registered by the Register of Deeds of Cavite. However, the material
averments of the petition invoking exemption from CARP coverage
constrained the court to have a second look.
Significantly, the DAR Secretary had already denied petitioners
protest and determined that the subject property was covered by the CARP.
Such ruling was even affirmed by the Court of Appeals and this Court. Absent
palpable error by these bodies, of which the Court finds none, their
determination as to the coverage of the subject property under the CARP is
controlling. Thus, petitioner cannot now invoke the jurisdiction of the DARAB
to pass upon this issue under the guise of having the issued collective CLOA
cancelled.
LANDBANK vs. HEIRS OF HONORATO DE LEON, GR 164025
FACTS: Respondents are the heirs of the registered owner of an
agricultural land situated at Nueva Ecija with an area measuring 36.1238
hectares. It was acquired by the DAR and placed under the coverage of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Respondents received the notice of
coverage sometime in 1988. DAR adopted petitioners exhibits, among them
a DAR order for petitioner to pay respondents the amount of P195,971.60.
Also submitted in evidence were a Certification showing that the total
compensation in the amount of P195,971.60 due respondents had been
deposited in cash and bonds and a letter informing respondents that the
balance of their claim remained at P706,754.00, inclusive of interest. In
arriving at the amount of just compensation, the SAC used a value of P175.00
or a total compensation value of P1,896,499.50, as the government support
price for palay based on the certification by the provincial manager of the
NFA in Cabanatuan City. Petitioner filed an appeal arguing that just
compensation should be fixed based on the formula in P.D. No. 27 in relation
to Executive Order No. 228, providing a government support price of P35.00.
Using the said formula petitioner prayed that just compensation be fixed at
P706,754.90. Respondents questioned the authority of the Court of Appeals
to give due course to the appeal, considering that the compromise judgment
had not been set aside under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The Court of
Appeals affirmed its jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners appeal.
ISSUE: How is the value of just compensation determined in the instant
case?
HELD: On 15 June 1988, the CARL or R.A. No. 6657 was enacted to
promote special justice to the landless farmers and provide a more
equitable distribution and ownership of land with due regard to the rights of
landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation.
Section 4 of the same act provides that the CARL shall cover all public and
private agricultural lands including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture. Section 75 states that the provisions of P.D. No. 27 and E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229, and other laws not inconsistent with R.A. No. 6657 shall
have suppletory effect. Furthermore, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs
of Domingo, the Court stressed the duty of the Court to balance the interests
of both the landowner and the farmer-beneficiaries, to wit:
I. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. As a
concept in the Bill of Rights, just compensation is defined as the fair market
value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to
sell.
II. Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the
redistribution of agricultural lands shall be subject to the payment of just
compensation. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on
this subject reveal that just compensation should not also make an
insurmountable obstacle to a successful agrarian reform. Hence, the
landowners right to just compensation should be balanced with agrarian
reform. In Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, we declared that it is the duty of
the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged, but this duty should
not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to the landowner
whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side.
When the passage of R.A. No. 6657 supervened before the
payment of just compensation, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just
compensation would be applicable. Pertinently, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657
provides:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining
just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current
value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessments made by government assessors shall be considered.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well
as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court ruled that the
factors enumerated under Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 had already been
translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power
under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the Court held in Celada that the
formula outlined in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998 should be applied in
computing just compensation.
OCTAVIO vs. PEROVANO, GR 172400
FACTS: Respondent filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages and
Prayer for Immediate Issuance of TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against petitioners, and (MARO) Dolores Dolores before the MTCC. In his
complaint, respondent alleged he is the lawful and registered owner of lot
subject of this case, comprising an area of 48,693 square meters, more or
less. He averred that petitioners, upon the instruction and direction, and in
connivance and conspiracy with Dolores, by threat, intimidation, strategy and
stealth, entered the land, plowed it and started planting sugarcane plants
inspite of efforts to prohibit them from trespassing on the property.
In their Answer, petitioners denied respondents allegations and
argued that the land was voluntarily offered for sale by respondents mother,
to the DAR. By reason of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS), the landowner
placed the land under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657. They further
alleged that they were among those identified and qualified as farmer-
beneficiaries of the land. Accordingly, petitioners argue that respondents
mother ceased to be the owner of the land and it is not true that respondent
is still the lawful and registered owner of the landholding. Petitioners add
that a Memorandum of Agreement was executed between the landowner
and the farmer-beneficiaries wherein they agreed that the farmer-
beneficiaries are free to take possession and cultivate the landholding after
payment was made to the landowner by the Land Bank of the Philippines.
They posit that there is no iota of doubt that the landholding is within the
coverage of CARP and it is only the PARAD which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain any action as per Section 50, Rep. Act No. 6657. They
argue that regular courts were already divested of their general jurisdiction
to try agrarian reform matters, and the filing of the case is pure and simple
harassment with the purpose of preventing or obstructing the
implementation of the CARP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is an ejectment suit within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the trial court or an agrarian dispute within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR.
HELD: Under BP 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, the MTC shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. Under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, the DAR is vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform. Under Section 3(d) of Rep. Act No.
6657, an agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
It refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted
to agriculture.
DARAB ruled that complainants-appellants were not recognized as
farmer-beneficiaries of the subject landholding. Their continued possession
thereof was through stealth. Even if they were not identified as farmer-
beneficiaries and not awarded any CLOA, they arrogated unto themselves the
portions of the subject landholding. As admitted by them in the hearing,
they came into the land on the premise that they are farmer-beneficiaries.
Without waiting for an award of any CLOA, complainants-appellants occupied
the landholding. In the process, expropriating the property of the
landowner without due process of law, prejudicing the rights of the
landowner and the legitimate farmer-beneficiaries who were duly awarded
with CLOA.The acts of the complainants-appellants are similar to that of land
grabbing. The agrarian reform law is not enacted to give license to anybody
to grab somebody elses land. Neither is it enacted to protect the land
grabbers or the squatters. Petitioners argument that the case involves an
agrarian matter divesting the regular courts of jurisdiction therefore has no
merit. They are not farmer-beneficiaries but mere usurpers of the land.
Clearly, therefore, the action is one for ejectment and the MTCC has
jurisdiction over it.appeal.
LANDBANK vs. KUMASSIE PLANTATION, GR 177404
FACTS: Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated (KPCI) is the
registered owner of 802.2906 hectares of agricultural land situated in Davao
del Sur. In 1982, KPCI and Philippine Cocoa Corporation (PCC) entered into a
contract of lease whereby the former agreed to lease the said land together
with the improvements thereon to the latter for a period of 25 years
beginning 15 May 1982. Subsequently, PCC executed a deed of assignment
transferring all its rights as lessee under the said contract of lease to
Philippine Cocoa Estates Corporation (PCEC).
A portion of the aforementioned land, measuring 457.9952
hectares, planted with coconuts and cocoa (subject land), was compulsorily
acquired by the DAR, for distribution to farmer-beneficiaries pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6657. The DAR then requested the LBP to determine the
value of the subject land. LBP pegged the value of the subject land at
P19,140,965.00or equivalent to P41,792.94 per hectare. DAR offered to KPCI
said amount as compensation for the subject land, but it was rejected by the
latter for being "unreasonably low." Despite the rejection, the amount was
deposited by LBP, upon the instructions of DAR, in the name and for the
account of KPCI. KPCI withdrew from LBP the entire amount in cash and
bonds.
KPCI filed with the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, a
Complaint against LBP and the DAR for determination and payment of just
compensation, and implored the RTC to render judgment fixing the just
compensation for the subject land at P160,000.00 per hectare, or equivalent
to a total amount of P73,279,232.00, less the amount which KPCI had
previously withdrawn from LBP. RTC valued the subject land at P100,000.00
per hectare. The appellate court sustained the finding of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whose computation of just compensation is valid: that of the LBP
or the RTC?
HELD: The procedure for the determination of compensation cases
under Republic Act No. 6657, as devised by this Court, commences with the
valuation by the LBP of the lands taken by the State from private owners
under the land reform program. Based on the valuation of the land by the
LBP, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner through a written notice. In
case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is
held and, afterwards, depending on the value of the land, the PARAD,
RARAD, or DARAB, fixes the price to be paid for the said land. If the
landowner still does not agree with the price so fixed, he may bring the
matter to the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court.
In the process of determining the just compensation due to
landowners, it is a necessity that the RTC takes into account several factors
enumerated in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, to wit:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining
just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current
value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
 the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well
as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Special agrarian courts must resolve just determination cases
judiciously and with utmost observance of Section 17 of Republic Act No.
6657 and the administrative orders issued by the DAR to implement said
statutory provision. The special agrarian court cannot ignore, without
violating Republic Act No. 6657, the formula provided by the DAR for the
determination of just compensation. Thus, the Court rejected the valuation
fixed by the RTC because it failed to follow the DAR formula.
MAYLEM vs. ELLANO, GR 162721
FACTS: Since 1963, Bonifacio Abad had been tenanting a piece of private
agricultural land less than a hectare in size (0.8497 hectare) and situated in
Santiago City, Isabela under a leasehold agreement he had entered into with
petitioners husband and the latters parents. Eight months before
Segundinos demise, the property was awarded to Abad by operation of P.D.
27. An emancipation patent was issued by virtue of two certificates of land
transfer. It appears that petitioner had instituted a certain Morsiento as
tenant-farmer to cultivate the subject land after Abad surrendered his
possession, and that petitioner had been attempting to spare her
landholdings from the operation of the agrarian reform laws. Petitioner
refused to return possession of the property. It came to Abads knowledge
that the same was mortgaged to a third person, so he filed a Complaint for
recovery of possession with the Provincial Adjudicator of DAR. On appeal, the
DARAB adopted the findings and conclusions of the Provincial Adjudicator.
Undaunted, petitioner lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA), but
to no avail. The appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
decision of the DARAB.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abad is justifiably disposed of possession of the
subject land on his alleged abandonment of such.
HELD: Abandonment or neglect, as a ground for the cancellation of an
emancipation patent or certificate of land award, according to Castellano vs.
Spouses Francisco, requires a clear and absolute intention to renounce a
right or a claim, or to abandon a right or property coupled with an external
act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.
Intention to abandon, as held in Corpuz v. Grospe, implies a
departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming
the right and the interest that have been abandoned. It consists in any one of
these conditions: (a) failure to cultivate the lot due to reasons other than the
non-suitability of the land to agricultural purposes, for at least two (2)
calendar years, and to pay the amortizations for the same period; (b)
permanent transfer of residence by the beneficiary and his family, which has
rendered him incapable of cultivating the lot; or (c) relinquishment of
possession of the lot for at least two (2) calendar years and failure to pay the
amortization for the same period. None of the instances cited above obtains
in this case.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it is thus implausible that the
surrender of the land by Abad could be interpreted as abandonment in
contemplation of the law, in view of the understanding between him and
petitioner that the surrender of possession would be merely temporary.
Suffice it to say that the allegation of abandonment is negated by the
undisputed fact that Abad actually demanded the return of the property to
him after the lapse of the one-year period. Indeed, petitioners act of
dispossessing Abad of the land awarded to him was merely calculated to
impair the latters vested right of ownership.
More importantly, as holder of an emancipation patent, Abad is
bound by the proscription against transfers of land awards to third persons,
which is prohibited by law. Paragraph 13 of P.D. No. 27 materially states:
As a final note, it is useful to reiterate the appellate courts
conclusion that the registration of Abads emancipation patents
with the Register of Deeds in accordance with law had indeed put
petitioner on notice of the fact that Abad had already acquired a
vested right of ownership of the landholding under the agrarian
reform law.
DAR vs. TONGSON, GR 171674
FACTS: Respondent is the owner of four parcels of agricultural land
located in Davao City. Since the properties were primarily devoted to rice and
corn under a system of lease-tenancy agreement, the same were brought
under the coverage of PD 27, otherwise known as Tenants Emancipation
Decree.
Sometime in 1988, the petitioner offered to pay respondent
P9,000.00 per hectare for three of her properties. Respondent, however, did
not act on the offer as she was then leaving for the United States for her
husbands medical treatment. In 1989, upon her return to Davao, respondent
was surprised to learn that, except for the portions devoted to orchards and
planted with coconuts, all her properties were taken over by petitioner.
Respondent alleged that petitioner summarily took her properties
without any notice and had fixed the acquisition cost for the same at
P1,500.00 per hectare and P800.00 per hectare. Lastly, respondent alleged
that petitioner subsequently issued Emancipation Patents to the farmer-
beneficiaries. Petitioner denied the allegations and averred that the
properties were placed under the coverage of the agrarian reform program;
hence, not summarily taken. Likewise, petitioner claimed that respondent
was notified of the proceedings when they made the initial offer to her.
Lastly, petitioner claimed that the acquisition cost was arrived at based on PD
27 in relation to EO 228, and that the subsequent issuance of Emancipation
Patents was part of the implementation of the program. Respondent
thereafter filed a Petition for the determination of just compensation before
the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) of Davao City.
The SAC, in the determination of just compensation, applied the
provisions of PD 27 and EO 228. On appeal, CA ruled that RA 6657, was
applicable in the determination of just compensation.
ISSUE: In the determination of just compensation, what law shall govern:
PD 27 or RA 6657?
HELD: Clearly, PD 27 and RA 6657 provide different factors for the
computation of just compensation. The former uses average crop harvest as
a consideration, whereas, the latter uses the current value of like properties,
its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors as factors
for consideration in determining just compensation.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed by the parties that the lands
were acquired under PD 27. Moreover, it is also undisputed that just
compensation has not yet been settled prior to the passage of RA 6657. The
issue, once the subject of a number of cases, has finally been settled by this
Court in recent years. It has been ruled that, if just compensation was not
settled prior to the passage of RA 6657, it should be computed in accordance
with the said law, although the property was acquired under PD 27.
MONTANEZ vs. PARAD, GR 183142
FACTS: Petitioner was the owner of two (2) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 35.5998 hectares, both located at Negros Occidental. In
October 1999, the DAR caused the publication of a Notice of Land Coverage
for Negros Occidental, and later, the DAR notified petitioner that her
property, to the extent of 32.4257 hectares, has been placed under CARP and
offered to compensate her the amount of PhP 5,592,3001.60based on the
valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), subject to price
adjustment to conform to the actual area coverage. Albeit petitioner rejected
the offer, LBP later issued in her favor a certification of deposit, in cash and in
bonds, corresponding to the amount aforestated.
DAR secured from the Negros Occidental Registry the cancellation
of petitioners titles and the issuance, in lieu thereof, titles in the name of the
Republic. Later on the same day, CLOAs were issued. Evidently, such
notations on the CLOAs were erroneous, the aggregate land area stated in
the CLOAs being larger than what was reflected in the titles whence the
CLOAs emanate. In any event, said CLOAs were registered in the name of,
and delivered to, individual respondents as CARP beneficiaries.
Petitioner forthwith filed a Petition PARAB for the
annulment/cancellation of titles in view of the CLOAs on the ground of
irregular and anomalous issuance thereof. However, said petition was
denied. Therefrom, petitioner went straight to the CA via a petition for
certiorari under Section 54 of RA 6657. Public respondents sought the
dismissal of this recourse on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. CA, on the holding that the petitioner is entitled to the
rectification of the technical error referred to above, but that the DAR is the
proper office to effect the correction, rendered a decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
HELD: Following the lessons of Paat and Asia International Auctioneers,
Inc., the denial of the instant petition is clearly indicated. It bears to stress at
the outset that, as aptly observed by the CA, there is no challenge from
either of the parties to the jurisdiction of the PARAB or the provincial
agrarian adjudicator to take cognizance of the basic petition of petitioner for
annulment/cancellation of titles. Just as well. For, the DARAB and its regional
and provincial adjudication boards have jurisdiction to adjudicate all agrarian
disputes and controversies or incidents involving the implementation of
CARP under RA 6657 and other agrarian law and their implementing rules
and regulations. Such jurisdiction of DARAB includes cases involving the
issuance, correction, and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which are registered
with the Land Registration Authority.
For the purpose of applying the rule on exhaustion, the remedies
available to the petitioner are clearly set out in the DARAB 2003 Rules of
Procedure, which took effect on January 17, 2004. Under Section 1.6, Rule II,
the adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate x x x cases x x x involving the correction, x x xcancellation,
secondary and subsequent issuances of [CLOAs] and [EPs] which are
registered with the Land Registration Authority. According to the succeeding
Section 2 in relation to Rule XIV, the proper remedy from an adverse final
resolution, order, or resolution on the merits of the adjudicator is an appeal
to the DARAB Proper which, among others, require the filing of a notice of
appeal and payment of an appeal fee. And from the decision of the DARAB
Proper, an appeal may be taken to the CA pursuant to Rule XV.
Given the above perspective, the CA acted correctly and certainly
within its sound discretion when it denied, in its amended decision,
petitioners petition for certiorari to nullify the PARADs decision. Under the
grievance procedure set forth in the DARAB Rules of Procedure, PARAD
Alegarios decision was appealable to the DARAB Proper. The CAs appellate
task comes laterto review the case disposition of the DARAB Proper when
properly challenged.
MAGO vs. BARBIN, GR 173923
FACTS: Respondent filed with the PARAD of Camarines Norte an action
for Cancellation of Emancipation Patents, Disqualification of Tenant-
Beneficiary, Repossession and Damages, alleging that she is the owner in fee
simple of the subject irrigated Riceland, with an area of 4.7823 hectares, and
that petitioners were tenants of the subject landholding. Respondent further
alleged that petitioners violated the terms of their leasehold contracts when
they failed to pay lease rentals for more than two years, which is a ground for
their dispossession of the landholding. On the other hand, petitioners alleged
that the subject landholding was placed under the Operation Land Transfer
program of the government pursuant to PD 27. Respondents original title
was then cancelled and the subject landholding was transferred to
petitioners who were issued Emancipation Patents by the DAR. The Transfer
Certificates of Title issued to petitioners emanating from the Emancipation
Patents were registered with the Registry of Deeds. Petitioners averred that
prior to the issuance of the Emancipation Patents, they already delivered
their lease rentals to respondent. They further alleged that after the issuance
of the Emancipation Patents, the subject landholding ceased to be covered
by any leasehold contract.
DARAB held that when the subject landholding was placed under
the Operation Land Transfer, the tenancy relationship between the parties
ceased and the tenant-beneficiaries were no longer required to pay lease
rentals to the landowner. However, when petitioners entered into an
agreement with respondent for a direct payment scheme embodied in the
Deeds of Transfer, petitioners obligated themselves to pay their
amortizations to respondent who is the landowner. CA held that the mere
issuance of an Emancipation Patent to a qualified farmer-beneficiary is not
absolute and can be attacked anytime upon showing of any irregularity in its
issuance or non-compliance with the conditions attached to it. The
Emancipation Patent is subject to the condition that amortization payments
be remitted promptly to the landowner and that failure to comply with this
condition is a ground for cancellation.
ISSUE: Whether or not herein petitioners violated the emancipation
patent.
HELD: The Court has already ruled that the mere issuance of an
emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform
beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents issued to
agrarian reform beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations
of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No.
02, series of 1994, which was issued in March 1994, enumerates the grounds
for cancellation of registered Emancipation Patents or Certificates of
Landownership Award. There is no substantial evidence on record that the
petitioners had remitted the amortizations due to the landowner in
accordance with their agreed direct payment scheme embodied in their
deeds of transfer. In view thereof, the Court has no recourse but to sustain
the findings of fact of the agency below. Well-settled is the rule that only
questions of law can be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided they are based on
substantial evidence. More so in this case where the findings of the Court of
Appeals coincide with those of the DARAB, an administrative body with
expertise on matters within its specific and specialized jurisdiction.
In the first place, the Emancipation Patents and the Transfer
Certificates of Title should not have been issued to petitioners without full
payment of the just compensation. Under Section 2 of Presidential Decree
No. 266, the DAR will issue the Emancipation Patents only after the tenant-
farmers have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under
PD 27. Although PD 27 states that the tenant-farmers are already deemed
owners of the land they till, it is understood that full payment of the just
compensation has to be made first before title is transferred to them. Thus,
Section 6 of EO 228 provides that ownership of lands acquired under PD 27
may be transferred only after the agrarian reform beneficiary has fully paid
the amortizations. In this case, both the Court of Appeals and the DARAB
found that petitioners have not fully paid the amortizations for the land
granted to them. The PARAD had a similar finding when it recommended that
the proper recourse of respondent is to file a claim for just compensation.
Clearly, the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to petitioners is
proper under the circumstances. Registered in the name of, and delivered to,
individual respondents as CARP beneficiaries.
Petitioner forthwith filed a Petition PARAB for the
annulment/cancellation of titles in view of the CLOAs on the ground of
irregular and anomalous issuance thereof. However, said petition was
denied. Therefrom, petitioner went straight to the CA via a petition for
certiorari under Section 54 of RA 6657. Public respondents sought the
dismissal of this recourse on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. CA, on the holding that the petitioner is entitled to the
rectification of the technical error referred to above, but that the DAR is the
proper office to effect the correction, rendered a decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
HELD: Following the lessons of Paat and Asia International Auctioneers,
Inc., the denial of the instant petition is clearly indicated. It bears to stress at
the outset that, as aptly observed by the CA, there is no challenge from
either of the parties to the jurisdiction of the PARAB or the provincial
agrarian adjudicator to take cognizance of the basic petition of petitioner for
annulment/cancellation of titles. Just as well. For, the DARAB and its regional
and provincial adjudication boards have jurisdiction to adjudicate all agrarian
disputes and controversies or incidents involving the implementation of
CARP under RA 6657 and other agrarian law and their implementing rules
and regulations. Such jurisdiction of DARAB includes cases involving the
issuance, correction, and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which are registered
with the Land Registration Authority.
For the purpose of applying the rule on exhaustion, the remedies
available to the petitioner are clearly set out in the DARAB 2003 Rules of
Procedure, which took effect on January 17, 2004. Under Section 1.6, Rule II,
the adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate x x x cases x x x involving the correction, x x xcancellation,
secondary and subsequent issuances of [CLOAs] and [EPs] which are
registered with the Land Registration Authority. According to the succeeding
Section 2 in relation to Rule XIV, the proper remedy from an adverse final
resolution, order, or resolution on the merits of the adjudicator is an appeal
to the DARAB Proper which, among others, require the filing of a notice of
appeal and payment of an appeal fee. And from the decision of the DARAB
Proper, an appeal may be taken to the CA pursuant to Rule XV.
Given the above perspective, the CA acted correctly and certainly
within its sound discretion when it denied, in its amended decision,
petitioners petition for certiorari to nullify the PARADs decision. Under the
grievance procedure set forth in the DARAB Rules of Procedure, PARAD
Alegarios decision was appealable to the DARAB Proper. The CAs appellate
task comes laterto review the case disposition of the DARAB Proper when
properly challenged.
RURAL BANK OF DASMARIAS vs. JARIN ET AL, GR 180778
FACTS: Respondents were awarded Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT)
over portions of a parcel of land in Dasmarias, Cavite. Before respondents
could be issued Emancipation Patents (EP), they obtained a loan from
petitioner, in whose favor they executed a Real Estate Mortgage, the owner
thereof Campos, executed a Special Power of Attorney in respondents favor
authorizing them to encumber the farm lots. Respondents undertook to
surrender their EPs as soon as they were released. In 1990, respondents
obtained additional loans from RBDI, secured by a mortgage over the same
farm lots. Respondents failed to settle their loans, hence, the mortgages
were foreclosed and RBDI purchased the farm lots as the highest bidder. As
at that time the EPs were still not yet issued, respondents authorized RBDI to
receive them.
ISSUE: Whether or not a CLT or an EP can be transferred other than
through hereditary succession or to the government.
HELD: Upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 on October
21, 1972, petitioner was DEEMED OWNER of the land in question. As of that
date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of the soil. As such, he
gained the rights to possess, cultivate, and enjoy the landholding for himself.
Those rights over that particular property were granted by the government
to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of
the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer
except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors.
x x x The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs of
other qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the Government to
develop generations of farmers to attain its avowed goal to have an
adequate and sustained agricultural production. With certitude, such
objective will not see the light of day if lands covered by agrarian reform can
easily be converted for non-agricultural purposes.
Respondents farm lots subject of the mortgages are thus not
subject to foreclosure, except by the Land Bank, because foreclosure
contemplates the transfer of ownership over the mortgaged lands
HEIRS OF REYES vs. GARILAO, GR 136466
FACTS: Petitioners are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land known
consisting of an area of 99.1085 hectares and situated in Bataan. Said
property was originally owned by the spouses Antonia Reyes and the late
Aurelio Reyes (Aurelio), who died in January 21, 1972 (before the effectivity
of Presidential Decree No 27).Upon the death of Aurelio, said property
passed by succession to petitioners, who divided the same as shown above.
On September 21, 1988, emancipation patents were issued to respondents
as farmer-beneficiaries over the entire landholding in question. On August 2,
1993, petitioners lodged a petition for the cancellation of the emancipation
patents issued to the respondents before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board San Fernando, Pampanga. Earlier, however,
petitioners filed with the DAR, their respective applications for retention at
five (5) hectares each, pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657, or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (RA No. 6657).
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners right to retention of portions of their
landholdings is not foreclosed by any vested right that farmer-beneficiaries
may claim.
HELD: In order to understand the case at bar, this Court shall hereunder
discuss the various laws and administrative order pertinent to herein petition
and their relation to one another. PD No. 27 decreed the emancipation of
tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of
the land they till. To achieve its purpose, the decree laid down a system for
the purchase by tenant-farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the
economy, of the lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands that
exceeded the minimum retention area were bound to sell their lands to
qualified farmers at liberal terms and subject to conditions. More
importantly, PD No. 27 also provides that, "in all cases, the landowner may
retain an area not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is
cultivating such area or will now cultivate it."
However, LOI No. 474, amended PD No. 27 by removing "any right
of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7
hectares, or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves
and their families." RA 6657 also provides the right of retention of
landowners reduced to 5 hectares, but further provides that xxx landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be
allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder.
The Court disagrees with the theory that RA No. 6657 has
impliedly repealed LOI No. 474. The congressional deliberations cited by
petitioners are insufficient to indicate an intent to repeal LOI No. 474. A
perusal thereof shows that said deliberations were confined only to the
matter of retention limits (i.e., 3, 5 or 7 hectares), and no mention was made
of the restrictive conditions found in LOI No. 474. As a matter of fact, what is
clear from said deliberations is that the framers of RA No. 6657 had intended
to distribute more lands. While both laws may have the same subject matter,
i.e. agrarian reform and its mechanism, if there is no intent to repeal the
earlier enactment, every effort at a reasonable construction must be made to
reconcile the statutes, so that both can be given effect.
To stress, RA No. 6657 is a social justice and poverty alleviation
program which seeks to empower the lives of agrarian reform beneficiaries
through equitable distribution and ownership of the land based on the
principle of land to the tiller. RA No.6657, however, allows landowners to
retain five hectares of their landholding. LOI No. 474, on the other hand,
imposes restrictive conditions on the exercise of the right of retention by
mandating that landowners who possess other lands used for residential,
commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes, from which they derive
adequate income to support themselves and their families are disqualified
from exercising their right of retention.
STANFILCO EMPLOYEES AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES MULTI-
PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs. DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., GR 154048
FACTS: On January 29, 1998, petitioner as seller, and respondent as
buyer, entered into a Banana Production and Purchase Agreement (BPPA).
The BPPA provided that SEARBEMCO shall sell exclusively to DOLE, and the
latter shall buy from the former, all Cavendish bananas of required
specifications to be planted on the land owned by SEARBEMCO.
On December 11, 2000, DOLE filed a complaint with the RTC
against SEARBEMCO, the spouses Elly and Myrna Abujos (spouses Abujos),
and Oribanex Services, Inc. (Oribanex) for specific performance and damages,
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and of a
temporary restraining order. DOLE alleged that SEARBEMCO sold and
delivered to Oribanex, through the spouses Abujos, the bananas rejected by
DOLE, in violation of paragraph 5(p), Article V of the BPPA which limited the
sale of rejected bananas for "domestic non-export consumption." DOLE
further alleged that Oribanex is likewise an exporter of bananas and is its
direct competitor.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint of DOLE, considering that the case involves an agrarian dispute
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB.
HELD: DOLEs complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts,
not the DARAB. SEARBEMCO mainly relies on Section 50 of RA No. 6657 and
the characterization of the controversy as an agrarian dispute or as an
agrarian reform matter in contending that the present controversy falls
within the competence of the DARAB and not of the regular courts.
The BPPA, SEARBEMCO claims, is a joint venture and a production,
processing and marketing agreement, as defined under Section 5 (c) (i) and
(ii) of DAR AO No. 2-99; hence, any dispute arising from the BPPA is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. SEARBEMCO also asserts that the
parties relationship in the present case is not only that of buyer and seller,
but also that of supplier of land covered by the CARP and of manpower on
the part of SEARBEMCO, and supplier of agricultural inputs, financing and
technological expertise on the part of DOLE. Therefore, SEARBEMCO
concludes that the BPPA is not an ordinary contract, but one that involves an
agrarian element and, as such, is imbued with public interest.
Additionally, the inclusion of third parties in the complaint
supports our declaration that the present case does not fall under DARABs
jurisdiction. DARABs quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of RA No. 6657
may be invoked only when there is prior certification from the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (or BARC) that the dispute has been submitted
to it for mediation and conciliation, without any success of settlement. Since
the present dispute need not be referred to arbitration (including mediation
or conciliation) because of the inclusion of third parties, neither SEARBEMCO
nor DOLE will be able to present the requisite BARC certification that is
necessary to invoke DARABs jurisdiction; hence, there will be no compliance
with Section 53 of RA No. 6657.
PO and MUTIA vs. DAMPAL, GR 173329
FACTS: On December 19, 1984, two farm lots located in Bukidnon with an
approximate area of 2.5773 and 2.0651 hectares, respectively, were
mortgaged for P33,000.00by the spouses Florencio and Ester Causin, through
their attorney-in-fact Manuel Causin, to the now-defunct Rural Bank of
Tagoloan, Inc. For failure to pay the obligation, the bank foreclosed the
mortgage and sold the lots at public auction to petitioner who was the
highest bidder. The original certificates of title were subsequently cancelled
and TCTs in their stead were issued in favor of Po, following the spouses
Causins failure to redeem the property.
On September 13, 1993, petitioner sold one of the bought lot to
her herein co-petitioner Mutia who was issued new TCT. On September 29,
1994, the spouses Causin and their tenant-herein respondent Dampal filed
with the Regional Trial Court a complaint against the bank for Annulment of
the Real Estate Mortgage and Sale. While the civil case was pending or on
June 16, 1997, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners before the
DARAB for Legal Redemption with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. DARAB
disallowed the redemption prayed for on the ground of prescription, albeit
he declared that Dampal is entitled to security of tenure as a tenant; and that
although Dampal was not given notice in writing of the public auction sale,
he was deemed to have knowledge thereof because of the civil case for
annulment, hence, there was substantial compliance with the rules. DARAB
Central Office reversed the Adjudicators ruling. On appeal, the appellate
court held that petitioners should have appealed the DARAB Decision via
Rule 43, instead of Rule 65, dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the need for sending him notice in writing could
be dispensed with.
HELD: In its disquisition, the DARAB held that absence of written notice
to the tenant of the sale, as well as to the DAR, is indispensable, particularly
in view of Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No.
6389, which mandates that the 180-day period must be reckoned from the
notice in writing upon registration of the sale.
Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code of
1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, otherwise known as the Code
of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, provides:
Sec. 12. Lessees right of redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a
third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall
have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration:
Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall
be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually
cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be
exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall
be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of
Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority
over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the
reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale. (emphasis supplied)
The admitted lack of written notice on Dampal and the DAR thus tolled
the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioners contention that Dampal
must be considered to have had constructive knowledge thereof fails in light
of the express requirement for notice to be in writing.
LANDBANK vs. DARAB, GR 183279
FACTS: Private respondents, namely, the heirs of Vicente, Romeo, and
Cesar, all surnamed Adaza, were owners of a tract of land with an area of 359
hectares situated in Zamboanga del Norte, of which the DAR identified a
278.4092-hectare portion as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the
CARP. In August 1991, the DAR sent out a notice of coverage. The claim
folder profile was then endorsed to petitioner LBP to determine the value of
the land. The DAR then subdivided the property into smaller lots and, in
December 1992, distributed them to identified beneficiaries. Pursuant to the
pertinent provision of the then governing 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure in
relation to Section 16(d) of RA 6657 in case of contested valuation, the
PARAD of Zamboanga del Norte conducted a summary administrative
hearing to determine just compensation. In the course of the hearing and on
its preliminary estimation that the computation was unconscionably low, the
PARAD, by Order of December 22, 2003, asked the LBP to undertake another
landsite inspection and recomputation of the value of the subject
landholding in accordance with the latest formula on land valuation.
The Adazas found the reevaluated amount level still too low,
prompting them to appeal to the DARAB. Pending resolution of their appeal,
the Adazas interposed a Motion to Withdraw Amended Valuation on August
9, 2005, seeking the release to them of the amount representing the
difference between the initial valuation and the second valuation. The
Adazas alleged having long been dispossessed of the subject property, while
the farmer-beneficiaries installed on it are enjoying full possession of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB can order the release to the
landowners, by way of execution pending appeal, of the incremental
difference of a landbank recomputation upheld in a decision of the DAR
adjudicator a quo within the purview of section 16, et seq. of RA. 6657 and
its implementing rules.
HELD: Three points need to be emphasized at the outset.
First, the amount of PhP 3,426,153.80 the Adazas want to be
released pending appeal, or pending final determination of just
compensation, to be precise, was arrived at by LBP, its re-evaluation efforts
taken pursuant to Executive Order No. 405. After effecting the transfer of
titles from the landowner to the Republic of the Philippines, the [LBP] shall
inform the DAR of such fact in order that the latter may proceed with the
distribution of the lands to the qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries x x x.
Second, the LBP, no less, had asked the PARAD to adopt LBPs
recomputed value of PhP 3,426,153.80 as just compensation for the subject
property.
And third, the Adazas landholding had already been distributed
before full payment of just compensation could be effected. In fact, the
Adazas have been deprived of the beneficial use and ownership of their
landholding since 1992 and have received only PhP 786,564.46 for their
278.40-hectare CARP-covered lands.
In light of the foregoing considerations, it is but just and proper to
allow, with becoming dispatch, withdrawal of the revised compensation
amount, albeit protested. The concept of just compensation contemplates of
just and timely payment; it embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also the payment of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot, asLand Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
instructs, be considered "just," for the owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to
wait for years before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with
his loss.
DAR vs. BERENGUER, GR 154094
FACTS: The respondents were the registered owners of several residential
and industrial lands with a total area of 58.0649 hectares located in Barangay
Bibincahan, Sorsogon. In April 1998, the respondents received from the DAR
notices of coverage of their said landholdings by the Governments CARP
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657. They protested the notices of
coverage,filing on October 5, 1998, in the office of DAR Regional Director,
their application for exclusion of their landholdings from CARP coverage, and
praying for the lifting of the notices of coverage. In October and November
1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the respondents application for
exclusion, cancelled their titles and issued certificates of land ownership
awards (CLOAs), covering their landholdings, to the members of the Baribag
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (Baribag), not to the
respondents workers on the landholdings, although Baribag was not
impleaded in the respondents application for exclusion.
In an order dated February 15, 1999, Regional Director denied the
respondents application for exclusion. Thus, they appealed the denial to the
DAR Secretary. On March 9, 1999, pending a petition seeking to implement
the February 15, 1999 order of Regional Director denying the respondents
application for exclusion. On March 15, 1999, RARAD issued an implementing
writ placing Baribag in possession of the respondents landholdings. She
denied the respondents motion for reconsideration on March 22, 1999. On
March 24, 1999, the respondents appealed before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board by filing a notice of appeal with the
office of RARAD. On April 6, 1999, then Acting DAR Secretary Conrado
Navarro denied the respondents appeal of the order of Regional Director
denying their application for exclusion and petition to lift the notice of
coverage. In an order dated April 8, 1999, RARAD noted the respondents
notice of appeal, and issued the writ of possession sought by Baribag.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondents landholdings were exempt from
the coverage of the CARP for not being agricultural, and were presumed due
to their being part of the poblacion to have been reclassified into
residential/commercial or non-agricultural area.
HELD: That the Constitutional Commission never intended to include
lands used for raising livestock and poultry, and commercial, industrial and
residential lands within the coverage of the Agrarian Reform Program of the
Government is already settled. In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian Reform, the Court pointed this out:
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word agricultural clearly show
that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
xxx
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A.
6657 which includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of commercial farms
is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made
to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply
no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian
reform.
 Moreover, the policy objective of DAO No. 9 was to prevent
landowners from taking steps to convert their agricultural lands to lands
devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in order to accord with
Luz Farms.
Nonetheless, the CA also correctly clarified that the respondents
landholdings, even if they were not devoted to cattle raising, would still be
excluded from the coverage of the CARL, because the DAR failed to establish
that the landholdings were agricultural.
Likewise, the CA correctly concluded that the DAR erred in
designating Baribag as the beneficiary of the landholdings. The DAR did not
show how its choice of Baribag as beneficiary, to the exclusion of the actual
workers.
ALANGILAN REALTY & DVT CORP vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR 180471
FACTS: Petitioner is the owner/developer of a 17.4892-hectare land in
Batangas City (Alangilan landholding). On August 7, 1996, petitioner filed an
Application and/or Petition for Exclusion/Exemption from CARP Coverage of
the Alangilan landholding with MARO-DAR. It averred that, in 1982, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City classified the subject landholding as
reserved for residential under a zoning ordinance, which was approved by
the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. It further alleged that, on
May 17, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City approved the
City Zoning Map and Batangas Comprehensive Zoning and Land Use
Ordinance, reclassifying the landholding as residential. Petitioner thus
claimed exemption of its landholding from the coverage of the CARP.
On May 6, 1997, then DAR denied petitioners application for
exemption. The DAR Secretary noted that the Alangilan landholding
remained agricultural, reserved for residential. It was classified as residential
only on December 12, 1994 under Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No.
709, series of 1994. Clearly, the subject landholding was still agricultural at
the time of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657. The qualifying phrase
reserved for residential means that the property is still classified as
agricultural, and is covered by the CARP.
On appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the decision
of the DAR Secretary. Petitioner went up to the CA via a petition for review
on certiorari, assailing the OP decision but CA dismissed the petition. The CA
noted the report of MARO, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), and
Regional Agrarian Reform Office (RARO) that the Alangilan landholding was
devoted to agricultural activities prior to the effectivity of the CARP on June
15, 1988 and even thereafter. Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Alangilan landholding is subject to the
coverage of CARP, notwithstanding that the property has been converted to
non-agricultural uses by the zoning ordinance of the city of Batangas prior to
the law.
HELD: It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as
agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as
residential in 1994. However, contrary to petitioners assertion, the term
reserved for residential does not change the nature of the land from
agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary, the
term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use. It does
not denote that the property has already been reclassified as residential,
because the phrase reserved for residential is not a land classification
category. Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the
subject landholding was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994,
reclassifying the landholding as residentia. If, indeed, the landholding had
already been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then
there would have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994 Ordinance.
In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the
subject landholding had already been converted into residential use prior to
June 15, 1988. The court noted that the subject landholding was still being
utilized for agricultural activities at the time of the filing of the application for
exemption. The ocular inspection, jointly conducted by the MARO, PARO and
RARO, disclosed that the landholding was planted with mangoes and
coconuts.
Finally, it is well settled that factual findings of administrative
agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if
such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The factual findings of
the DAR Secretary, who, by reason of his official position, has acquired
expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect and,
without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified, or reversed. In
this case, petitioner utterly failed to show justifiable reason to warrant the
reversal of the decision of the DAR Secretary, as affirmed by the OP and the
CA.
CONCHA vs. RUBIO, GR 162446
FACTS: The controversy involves the determination of who between
petitioners and respondents are qualified to become beneficiaries over a
portion of land with an aggregate area of 33.5006 hectares, more or less. The
subject landholding was placed under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. On
June 16, 1993, a Notice of Coverage was sent to the landowners. On March
24, 1995, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of their tenancy and
their identification as beneficiaries and for disqualification of the petitioners
to become beneficiaries over the subject landholding. On April 26, 1995, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approved the landowners application
for conversion. On August 9, 1999, the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator
(PARAD) rendered a Decision dismissing the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve
the issue involving the identification and selection of qualified farmer-
beneficiaries of a land covered by CARP.
HELD: The conclusion is certain that the DARAB had no jurisdiction to
identify who between the parties should be recognized as the beneficiaries
of the land in dispute, as it was a purely administrative function of the DAR.
The PARAD was, thus, correct when it declared that it had no jurisdiction to
resolve the dispute, to wit:
In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were
potential CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November
23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject
properties under CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP
beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation
of the CARP, it behoves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its
own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion
committed by the administrative agency. x x x
While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative
agencies such as the DARAB which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are accorded not only respect but
even finality by the courts. Care should be taken so that administrative
actions are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set
by the enabling law for each agency. In the case at bar, the DARAB has
overstepped its legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy
between petitioners and respondents in deciding who should be declared the
farmer-beneficiaries over the land in dispute. The CA thus erred in affirming
the decision of the DARAB, which was rendered in excess of jurisdiction.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES VIDAD vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR 166461
FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of a land located in Isabela, with an
area of 589.8661 hectares, which land was voluntarily offered for sale to the
government under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657. Of the entire area, the
government only acquired 490.3436 hectares. By virtue of EO 405 vesting
LBP with primary responsibility to determine the valuation and compensation
for all lands covered by RA 6657, LBP computed the initial value of the land at
P2,961,333.03 for 490.3436 hectares, taking into consideration the factors
under Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No.
06, series of 1992, and the applicable provisions of RA 6657. Petitioners
rejected the valuation. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The DARAB
dismissed the petition. Undaunted, petitioners filed a second petition for
review asking for a re-evaluation of the land. Acting on the petition, the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) issued an Order directing
LBP to re-compute the value of the land. In compliance with the PARADs
Order, LBP revalued the land at P4,158,947.13 for 402.3835 hectares and
P1,467,776.34 for 43.8540 hectares. LBP used the guidelines in DAR AO No.
5, series of 1998 for the revaluation. Petitioners similarly rejected this offer
and thereafter instituted a case before RARAD for the purpose of
determining the just compensation for their land. The RARAD directed LBP to
pay petitioners P32,965,408.46 as just compensation for 446.2375 hectares.
LBP filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC,
sitting as a SAC. The SAC rendered a decision, based on LBPs evidence alone,
fixing the just compensation at P5,626,724.47 for the 446.2375 hectares of
the land. Petitioners filed an appeal questioning the authority of the SAC to
give due course to the petition of LBP, claiming that the RARAD has
concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC over just compensation cases involving
lands covered by RA 6657. Furthermore, petitioners insisted that LBP has no
legal personality to institute a case for determination of just compensation
against landowners with the SAC. The CA rendered the assailed decision,
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit, and affirming the valuation of the
SAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not SAC exercises concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB
on cases involving determination of just compensation, and since it was the
DARAB, through the RARAD, which first assumed jurisdiction on the issue of
just compensation for petitioners land, then the SAC is precluded from
assuming jurisdiction on the same issue.
HELD: The procedure for the determination of just compensation under
RA 6657, as summarized by this Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Spouses Banal, commences with LBP determining the value of the lands
under the land reform program. Using LBPs valuation, the DAR makes an
offer to the landowner through a notice sent to the landowner, pursuant to
Section 16(a) of RA 6657. In case the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR
adjudicator conducts a summary administrative proceeding to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the
land. A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may
bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final
determination of just compensation.
Contrary to petitioners argument, the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do
not exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases.
The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature. In fact, RA 6657
does not make DARs valuation absolutely binding as the amount payable by
LBP. A reading of Section 18 of RA 6657 shows that the courts, and not the
DAR, make the final determination of just compensation. It is well-settled
that the DARs land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means,
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. The
courts will still have the right to review with finality the determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. It must be emphasized that
the taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the States power of
eminent domain. The valuation of property or determination of just
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial
function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative
agencies. When the parties cannot agree on the amount of just
compensation, only the exercise of judicial power can settle the dispute with
binding effect on the winning and losing parties. On the other hand, the
determination of just compensation in the RARAD/DARAB requires the
voluntary agreement of the parties. Unless the parties agree, there is no
settlement of the dispute before the RARAD/DARAB, except if the aggrieved
party fails to file a petition for just compensation on time before the RTC. LBP
thus correctly filed a petition for determination of just compensation with
the SAC, which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction in just
compensation cases under RA 6657. DARs valuation, being preliminary in
nature, could not have attained finality, as it is only the courts that can
resolve the issue on just compensation. Consequently, the SAC properly took
cognizance of LBPs petition for determination of just compensation.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. DARAB, GR 175200
FACTS: Sometime in 1960, the administrator of the estate of the late C.N.
Hodges (the Estate) asked respondent Mateo Villaruz to work as tenant of
the Estates seven-hectare ricefield in Bacolod, designated as Lot 916. The
Estate wanted to prevent the land from falling into the hands of squatters. It
had a house constructed on the lot for Villaruz and engaged his daughter and
son-in-law to serve as co-tenants. In 1976, however, squatters settled into
Lot 916, occupying four of its seven hectares. Villaruz was thus left with only
three hectares for planting rice and corn.
As it later turned out, the Estate mortgaged Lot 916 to a bank,
resulting in its foreclosure when the loan could not be paid. Petitioner NHA
bought the lot on September 11, 1985. Later that year, the DPWH
constructed roads and bridges that passed through a portion of the lot. As a
result, some plants and crops had to be cut down, prompting respondent
Villaruz to demand payment of their value.
When the demand was not heeded, respondent Villaruz filed an
action for damages and disturbance compensation against petitioner NHA
and the Estate before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City. But the
RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the NHA was not liable for
disturbance compensation as provided in Section 1 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) 1472. Villaruz did not appeal from the court order. Later on,
respondent Villaruz filed a complaint with PARAD, seeking recognition as
tenant beneficiary of the lot he tenanted under P.D. 27 and praying that his
possession of its three-hectare portion be maintained. After hearing, the
PARAD ruled in Villaruzs favor with respect to such portion provided he paid
25% of his net harvest to petitioner NHA until a fixed rental could be set. But
he could not be declared owner of the lot since it had ceased to be private
agricultural land, having been bought by the government. It was already
outside the coverage of P.D. 27.
Petitioner NHA appealed the PARAD decision to the DARAB, which
affirmed the same. Undaunted, the NHA appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA). On September 21, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, affirming the
questioned decisions of the PARAD and the DARAB. This prompted the NHA
to file the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
a) Are all lands acquired by the National Housing Authority (NHA) for
its resettlement and housing efforts beyond the scope of agrarian laws?
b) Whether or not Lot 916 is exempt from the coverage of the
agrarian reform laws, the same having been acquired by petitioner NHA for
its housing program.
HELD: The Court disagrees. P.D. 1472 exempts from land reform those
lands that petitioner NHA acquired for its housing and resettlement
programs whether it acquired those lands when the law took effect or
afterwards. The language of the exemption is clear: the exemption covers
lands or property acquired x x x or to be acquired by NHA. Its Section 1
does not make any distinction whether the land petitioner NHA acquired is
tenanted or not. When the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be
made. In addition, Section 1 of P.D. 1472 provides that petitioner NHA shall
not be liable for disturbance compensation. Since only tenants working on
agricultural lands can claim disturbance compensation, the exemption
assumes that NHA may have to acquire such kinds of land for its housing
program. If the exemption from payment of disturbance compensation
applied only to untenanted lands, then such exemption would be
meaningless or a superfluity. Thus, petitioner NHA is not bound to pay
disturbance compensation to respondent Villaruz even if he was the tenant
of Lot 916. The NHAs purchase of Lot 916 for development and
resettlement transformed the property by operation of law from agricultural
to residential.
If the ruling of the CA were to be upheld, petitioner NHA would
have to allow Villaruz and his successors-in-interest to work on Lot 916 as
agricultural tenants for as long as they liked without any chance of getting an
emancipation patent over it under P.D. 27. This would be antithetical to the
objectives of the agrarian reform program. As for the NHA, it would become
an agricultural lessor with no right to use the land for the purpose for which
it bought the same. This, in turn, would become prejudicial to the
governments housing projects.
The Court is mindful of the plight of tenant-farmers like
respondent Villaruz. But it is also incumbent upon it to weigh their rights
against the governments interest in meeting the housing needs of the
greater majority. It is in this light that P.D. 1472 has to be interpreted.
CREBA vs. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, GR 183409
FACTS: This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with
application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction) under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed
by herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc.
(CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended by
DAR AO No. 05-07, and DAR Memorandum No. 88, for having been issued by
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the aforesaid
administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 07-97,
entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, which consolidated all existing
implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules
embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural
lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural
uses after 15 June 1988. Subsequently, DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled Revised
Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
agricultural Uses, was also issued amending and updating the previous rules
on land use conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural
lands, among others, (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial,
industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes. The Secretary
issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled 2002
Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion, which further amended DAR
AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent
therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for
conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another
agricultural use. Thereafter the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended
certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07,
particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real
estate development, the Secretary further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15
April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all
land use conversion applications. By reason thereof, petitioner claims that
there is an actual slowdown of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated
the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the
substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so
of the whole nation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction over lands that
have been reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial, or for other non-
agricultural uses.
HELD: Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. In
the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth
special and important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why
this Court should give due course to this petition in the first instance. The
present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in
strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so
is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition.
Executive Order No. 129-A vested upon the DAR the responsibility
of implementing the CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the
successful implementation of the CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive
order authorized the DAR to establish and promulgate operational policies,
rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian reform implementation.
Section 4(k) thereof authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-
agricultural uses. Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same executive order has given
the DAR the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses
as may be provided for by law. Section 7 of the aforesaid executive order
clearly provides that the authority and responsibility for the exercise of the
mandate of the [DAR] and the discharge of its powers and functions shall be
vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform x x x.
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15
June 1988 have been included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so
doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his
authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A,
which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform
implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands
for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural
lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of
agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural
uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of
land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.
Any reclassification of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or by
way of Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must
undergo the process of conversion, despite having undergone
reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for other purposes.
It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations
public agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use
or purpose, i.e., public school, etc., because in such a case, conversion is no
longer necessary.
Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) including lands
not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2) issuing and enforcing DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, subjecting to DARs jurisdiction for conversion lands
which had already been reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or
for other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988. Similarly, DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification of agricultural
lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land use conversion
procedure or that DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect
reclassification, did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs.
It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon
the instruction of the President in order to address the unabated conversion
of prime agricultural lands for real estate development because of the
worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such measure was made
in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice
cultivation and production may be carried into. The issuance of said
Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of the
public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.
ADRIANO vs. TANCO, GR 168164
FACTS: Respondent Alice Tanco (Alice) purchased a parcel of land
consisting of 28.4692 hectares located in Bulacan. The land was devoted to
mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned among the respondents (Alice
and her three children, namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick), each
receiving 7 hectares, except Alice who got an extra 0.4692 hectare.
Controversy arose when Alice sent letter to petitioner Vicente
informing him that subject landholding is not covered by CARP and asked him
to vacate the property as soon as possible.Seeing the letter as a threat to his
peaceful possession of subject farmland which might impair his security of
tenure as a tenant, Vicente filed before the regional office of DARAB a
Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession. He averred that in 1970,
the husband of Alice, instituted him as tenant-caretaker of the entire mango
plantation. Since then, he has been performing all phases of farm works,
such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of the mango trees. The
fruits were then divided equally between them. He also alleged that he was
allowed to improve and establish his home at the old building left by Ang
Tibay Shoes located at the middle of the plantation. Presently, he is in actual
possession of and continues to cultivate the land. Respondents denied having
instituted any tenant on their property. Insofar as Alice is concerned,
respondents asserted that Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm
worker.
PARAD rendered a Decision in favour of Vicente. It opined that
since Vicente was performing functions more than just a mere caretaker and
was even allowed to live in subject landholding with his family, he is
therefore a tenant. Thus, respondents appealed to the DARAB which
affirmed the ruling of the PARAD. It held that since the landholding is an
agricultural land, that respondents allowed Vicente to take care of the mango
trees, and that they divided the fruits equally between them, then an implied
tenancy was created. The case was then elevated to CA via a Petition for
Review. They contended, among others, that the essential elements of
tenancy relationship are wanting in the instant controversy. They claimed
that their property is not an agricultural land, but lies within a mineralized
area; Alice hired Vicente as a caretaker and, therefore, the nature of their
relationship is that of an employer-employee relationship; and, there is no
proof that the parties share in the harvest. The CA rendered a Decision in
respondents favor. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a bonafide tenant-farmer.
HELD: Laws which have for their object the preservation and
maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favour the poor and the
underprivileged. They apply with equal force to those who, notwithstanding
their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of protection
from the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the
rich in the guise of defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is
being committed against them.
The findings of the agrarian tribunals that tenancy relationship
exists are not supported by substantial evidence.
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a
landowner and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to
undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a
result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working
on and cultivating the land.
The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and
allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of
tenure. For tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential requisites
must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by
the tenant; and, (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. All
the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal.
After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case, we affirm
the findings of the CA that the essential requisites of consent and sharing are
lacking.
ARNAIZ vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR 170623
FACTS: Petitioner A. Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. filed a Petition for Exclusion
from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage dated
April 25, 1994 before the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) of an aggregate area of 843.3990 hectares, situated at
Barangay Asid, Sinalugan, Masbate, Masbate on the basis that (1) the said
parcels of land had been devoted to cattle-ranching purposes since time
immemorial; (2) said lands are not tenanted; and (3) said lands have more
than 18% slopes.
On January 24, 1995, the DAR Regional Director issued an Order
denying the petition, to wit:
In view of the foregoing, the instant petition for Exclusion is
denied and it is hereby ordered that the acquisition of the properties under
the coverage of CARP be pursued subject to the retention right of the
landowner accordant with existing laws, rules, regulations and DAR policies.
ISSUE: Whether or not said parcel of land is excluded from the CARP
coverage?
HELD: Anent the findings that the subject properties are not excluded
from the coverage of the CARP, the Court agrees with the conclusion of the
CA. As aptly found by the CA:
Hence, from the foregoing disquisitions, petitioners contention
that the respondents failed to apply the doctrine laid down in Luz Farms v.
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform is without merit. In said Luz
Farms case, it was held that Section 11 of R.A. 6657 which includes "private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-
raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that
the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the
agrarian reform program of the State. Thus, the High Court declared as null
and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of Republic
Act No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage, as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith. As clearly found by the respondents,
the petitioner, in the instant case, failed to show that the subject lands have
been devoted for commercial livestock-raising. (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, petitioner cannot argue that the findings of the DAR
Regional Director, the DAR Secretary, and the OP were unfounded, baseless,
and unjustifiable. A perusal of the Order of the DAR Regional Director
denying the petition for exclusion would reveal that it was based on the
findings of the Chief of Regional Field Task Force V, the Municipal Agricultural
Officer, the representative of the Land Bank of the Philippines, the Provincial
Director of the Philippine National Police, and various documents. Surely,
these institutions did not whimsically conclude not to exclude the properties
of petitioner from the coverage of the CARP. However, in the present case,
the fact remains that based on the findings of the DAR, the OP, and the CA,
the subject properties do not fall within the ambit of the Constitutional
exemption as petitioner failed to establish its contention that the subject
lands are excluded from the coverage of the CARP.
HEIRS OF CERVANTES vs. MIRANDA, GR 183352
FACTS: Respondent was a holder of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No.
160774 covering a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 1532 in the name
of Jesus Panlilio, located in Pampanga measuring about 2.8070 hectares. In
1981, Arturo executed a waiver surrendering his CLT in favor of his cousin
Jose Cervantes, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners. In 2002,
respondent plowed through the land by force and stealth. As mediation
between Jose and respondent failed to settle the matter, Jose filed a
complaint at the PARAB before which he submitted documentary evidence
including Arturos waiver and the Samahang Nayon Resolution approval of
the surrender of the CLT to him; tax declarations of the subject land in
Arturos name, and affidavits from various individuals stating that he (Jose) is
a tenant of the land whereas respondent was not, the latter being a bus
driver and, therefore, could not have cultivated it.
PARAB Adjudicator, ruling in favor of Jose, held that the land is
covered by the operation land transfer scheme of the government and as
between the two parties, Jose had shown through documentary evidence
that he had a better right as tenant; and that assuming arguendo that
respondent indeed cultivated the land prior to its being submerged in water
in the 1960s, his non-payment of rentals and he having returned to the
country only in 2002 amounted to abandonment.
Before the CA, respondent challenged the DARAB Decision raising,
among other issues, the DARABs lack of jurisdiction over the case. CA set
aside the decision saying it lacked jurisdiction over the case as it was
essentially one for forcible entry and unlawful detainer that should have
been lodged with the MTC. For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over a
similar dispute, the appellate court held, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties which is lacking in the present case. Hence
the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the dispute?
HELD: The DARAB has jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. An agrarian
dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired and
other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to
farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates to any controversy
relating to, among others, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture.
In the present case, although there is admittedly no tenancy
relationship between Jose and respondent and the complaint filed before the
DARAB was denominated as one for forcible entry, it is the DARAB and not
the regular courts which has jurisdiction of the case.
As to the DARABs disquisition of the case on the merits, the Court
has consistently held that the findings of fact of administrative agencies and
quasi-judicial bodies, like the DARAB, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded
respect. In the present case, there is no ground to disturb the DARABs
findings, which affirmed those of the PARAB after due hearing and
appreciation of the evidence submitted by both parties.
LANDBANK vs. HEIRS OF TRINIDAD S. VDA. DE ARIETA, GR 161834
FACTS: Private respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of
agricultural land situated in Sampao, Kapalong, Davao del Norte with an
approximate area of 37.1010 hectares, 14.999 hectares of which was covered
by RA No. 6657 through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of the
CARP. Private respondent offered to the DAR the price of P2,000,000.00 per
hectare for said portion of the land covered by CARP.
Petitioner bank valued and offered as just compensation for said
14.999 hectares the amount of P1,145,806.06 or P76,387.57 per hectare. The
offer was rejected by private respondent. In accordance with Section 16 of
RA No. 6657, petitioner LBP deposited for the account of private respondent
P1,145,806.06 in cash and in bonds as provisional compensation for the
acquisition of the property. Thereafter, DARAB conducted summary
administrative proceedings and rendered a decision fixing the compensation
of the property at P10,294,721.00 or P686,319.36 per hectare.
Petitioner LBP filed a petition against private respondent for
judicial determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian
Court. Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a similar petition against
DAR before the same Special Agrarian Court.
ISSUE: What is the correct amount of provisional compensation which
the LBP is required to deposit in the name of the landowner if the latter
rejects the DAR/LBPs offer: Landbanks initial valuation of the land subject of
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) or the sum awarded by the
PARAD/RARAD/DARAB in a summary administrative proceeding pending final
determination by the curts?
HELD: In both voluntary and compulsory acquisitions, wherein the
landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the
landowner and conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the
landowner disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to the
RTC, acting as a special agrarian court. But as with the DAR-awarded
compensation, LBPs valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as
an initial determination, which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination of just
compensation, taking into consideration the factors enumerated in Section
17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations. It is now settled that
the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function,
which is vested with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. The same
cannot be lodged with administrative agencies and may not be usurped by
any other branch or official of the government.
Although under the CARL of 1988, the landowners are entitled to
withdraw the amount deposited in their behalf pending the final resolution
of the case involving the final valuation of his property, the SAC may not, as
in this case, order the petitioner to deposit or deliver the much higher
amount adjudged by the RARAD considering that it already complied with the
deposit of provisional compensation by depositing the amount of its initial
valuation which was rejected by the respondent. And while the DARAB Rules
of Procedure provides for execution pending appeal upon meritorious
grounds, respondent has not established such meritorious reasons for
allowing execution of the RARAD decision pending final determination of just
compensation by the court.
As the Court had previously declared, the LBP is primarily
responsible for the valuation and determination of compensation for all
private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject the land valuation
and just compensation for a private agricultural land placed under the CARP.
In case the LBP disagrees with the valuation of land and determination of just
compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has
the right, but the duty, to challenge the same, by appeal to the CA or to this
Court, if appropriate. Both LBP and respondent filed petitions before the SAC
disputing the RARAD judgment awarding compensation in the amount of
P10,294,721.00. In view of the substantial difference in the valuations -- the
initial valuation by the LBP being only P1,145,806.06 -- the more prudent
course is to await the final resolution of the issue of just compensation
already filed with said court.
LANDBANK vs. COLARINA, GR 176410
FACTS: Respondent is the registered owner of three (3) parcels of
agricultural land which he acquired from their former owner, Damiana
Arcega. The parcels of land have a total area of 972,047 square meters. Upon
acquisition thereof, respondent manifested his voluntary offer to sell the
properties to the DAR for coverage under R.A. No. 6657. Respondents
assessment value of the properties was P45,000.00 per hectare.
The DAR, through petitioner LBP assessed the properties and
offered to purchase only 57.2047 hectares out of the 97.2047 hectares
voluntarily offered for sale by respondent. The excluded area (40 hectares)
fell under the exemptions and exclusions provided in Section 10 of the CARL,
i.e., all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over.
As the LBPs assessment and valuation of the properties was
unacceptable to, and rejected by, respondent, he elevated the determination
of just compensation of the properties to the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD). Unfortunately for respondent, the PARAD affirmed the
valuation set forth by the LBP.
Disappointed with the low valuation by petitioner and the DAR,
respondent filed a Complaint before the RTC, for the judicial determination
of just compensation. During pre-trial, LBP manifested that the subject
properties may be reassessed and revaluated based on the new guidelines
set forth in DAR A.O. No. 11, Series of 1994. Intent on finding a common
ground between petitioner and respondent and to amicably settle the case,
the SAC ordered the revaluation. However, the valuation was still rejected by
respondent. Hence, trial ensued.
ISSUE: How should the value of just compensation be computed?
HELD: Citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court declared:
While SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land,
the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made
by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally
true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR
pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of RA No. 6657. As the
government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform
program, it is the DARs duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the
object of the law. DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998 precisely filled in the details of
Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors
mentioned therein may be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to
disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said provision.
It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect.
Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their
favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative
issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue.
Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but
to apply the same.
While the Court commends respondent in readily participating in
the governments agrarian reform program, our previous rulings preclude us
from validating the valuation of the subject properties proffered to, and
affirmed by, the SAC. The government cannot be forced to purchase land
which it finds no need for, regardless of Olivas unschooled opinion.
Considering respondents belief that the properties are worth more than the
valuation made by the DAR, he can proceed to develop the land excluded by
the DAR from expropriation into its potential use as assessed by Oliva.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. CA and TITO B. DATO
FACTS: In January 1, 1960 - private respondent Dato was appointed as
Private Agent by the then Gov. of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza.
October 12, 1972 - Dato was promoted and appointed Assistant
Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr. Dato had no civil service
eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not be legally
extended a permanent appointment. He was extended a temporary
appointment, which was renewed annually.
January 1, 1974 Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's
employment status from temporary to permanent upon the latter's
representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising
security guards. Said change of status however, was not favorably acted upon
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did not possess the
necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His
appointment remained temporary and no other appointment was extended
to him.
March 16, 1976 Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor
after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for allegedly
conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention
prisoners who escaped from confinement. Two years after the request for
change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur
Unit of the Civil ServiceCommission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing him
that the status of private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary
to permanent, the latter having passed the examination for Supervising
Security Guard. The change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11,
1974, the date of release of said examination.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the
position of Assistant Provincial Warden and deleted private respondent's
name from the petitioner's plantilla. Dato was subsequently acquitted of the
charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Gov. for reinstatement
and backwages. His request was not heeded. Dato filed an action before the
RTC.
RTC Decision: Ordered the payment of backwages of Dato equivalent
to five years. Province of Camarines Sur appealed the decision to the CA.
CA: Affirmed RTCs decision. Hence the present petition.
ISSUE: W/N Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of
Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended on March 16, 1976.
Petitioners contention: When Gov. Alfelor recommended to CSC
the change in the employment status of private respondent from temporary
to permanent, which the CSC approved as only temporary pending
validation of the results of private respondent's examination for supervising
security guard, private respondent's appointment in effect remained
temporary. Hence, his subsequent qualification for civil service eligibility did
not ipso facto convert his temporary status to that of permanent.
SC Held: Agrees with Petitioners contentions. Dato, being merely a
temporary employee, is not entitled to his claim for backwages for the entire
period of his suspension.
Ratio: At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on
January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate examination for
the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his
appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is
dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power.
 The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility
later on is of no moment as his having passed the supervising security guard
examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a
permanent one.
What is required is a new appointment since a permanent
appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment these
are two distinct acts of the appointing authority
The letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of
Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of power properly belonging to the
appointing authority. CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an
appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make the
appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the
employment status of an employee. CSC should have ended its participation
in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it
confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil
service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19,
1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching
on the discretion vested solely upon the latter.
Republic of the Philippines Rep. by the Department of Agrarian Reform vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals and
Green City Estate Development Corporation
G.R. No. 139592 (October 5, 2000)
Facts: The five (5) parcels of land in issue with a combined area of
112.0577 hectares situated at Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala,
Province of Rizal were acquired by private respondent through purchase on
May 26, 1994 from Marcela Borja vda. de Torres. The tax declarations
classified the properties as agricultural. On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR
issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory
acquisition pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II of R.A. No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Land Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). Private respondent filed
with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land from
agrarian reform pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994
and DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990. The DAR Regional Director
recommended a denial of the said petition on the ground that private
respondent "ailed to substantiate their (sic) allegation that the properties are
indeed in the Municipality's residential and forest conservation zone and that
portions of the properties are neither irrigated nor irrigable".
Private respondent filed an Amended Petition for
Exemption/Exclusion from CARP coverage, this time alleging that the
property is within the residential and forest conservation zones and offering
a portion of about 15 hectares of land (irrigated riceland) to sell to farmer
beneficiaries or to DAR. On October 19, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued an
Order denying the application for exemption. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration but the same was likewise denied. Appeal was made to the
Court of Appeals.
The latter in turn created a commission to conduct ocular
inspection and survey. DAR likewise constituted its own team to conduct an
inspection and thereafter objected to the report filed by the commission.
On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision
reversing the Assailed DAR Orders and declaring the mountainous and
residential portions of the petitioner's land to be exempt from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Hence, this petition for
review.
Issue: Whether or not the landholdings subject of this controversy are
exempt from CARL coverage?
Held: There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land
classification embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor
would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are
clearly not the sole basis of the classification of the land. In fact, DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994 lists other documents, aside from
tax declarations, that must be submitted when applying for exemption from
CARP. In Halili vs. Court of Appeals, we sustained the trial court when it ruled
that the classification made by the Land Regulatory Board of the land in
question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration. The
classification of the Board in said case was more recent than that of the tax
declaration and was based on the present condition of the property and the
community thereat.
The commissioner's report on the actual condition of the
properties confirms the fact that the properties are not wholly agricultural. In
essence, the report of the commission showed that the land of private
respondent consists of a mountainous area with an average 28 degree slope
containing 66.5 hectares; a level, unirrigated area of 34 hectares of which 5
to 6 hectares are planted to palay; and a residential area of 8 hectares. The
finding that 66.5 hectares of the 112.0577 hectares of land of private
respondent have an average slope of 28 degrees provides another cogent
reason to exempt these portions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10
of the CARL is clear on this point when it provides that "all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall
be exempt from the coverage of this Act."
Petitioner DAR and the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG)
contest the finding of the Court of Appeals that the subject parcels of land
have a mountainous slope on the ground that this conclusion was allegedly
arrived at in a manner not in accord with established surveying procedures.
They also bewail the consideration given by the Court of Appeals to the
"slope" issue since this matter was allegedly never raised before the DAR and
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner DAR and the OSG thus claim that laches had
already set in.
As pointed out earlier, the crux of the controversy is whether the
subject parcels of land in issue are exempt from the coverage of the CARL.
The determination of the classification and physical condition of the lands is
therefore material in the disposition of this case, for which purpose the Court
of Appeals constituted the commission to inspect and survey said properties.
Petitioner DAR did not object to the creation of a team of commissioners
when it very well knew that the survey and ocular inspection would
eventually involve the determination of the slope of the subject parcels of
land. It is the protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour. The
team of commissioners appointed by respondent court was composed of
persons who were mutually acceptable to the parties. Thus, in the absence of
any irregularity in the survey and inspection of the subject properties, and
none is alleged, the report of the commissioners deserves full faith and credit
and we find no reversible error in the reliance by the appellate court upon
said report.
CONVERSION/DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION, IN THE EVENT
THAT TENANTED LAND IS CONVERTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 36 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3844, THE ONLY RELIEF AVAILABLE TO THE RESPONDENTS
IS THE PAYMENT OF A DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION EQUIVALENT TO FIVE
TIMES THE AVERAGE OF THE GROSS HARVESTS OF THE LANDHOLDING
DURING THE LAST FIVE PRECEDING CALENDAR-YEARS. IN THIS CASE, THE
AWARD OF A 75 SQUARE METER HOMELOT WAS MERELY MADE IN LIEU OF
THE AFOREMENTIONED DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION.
DAR v. DECS
FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari to set aside decision of CA which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration -Lot No.2509 and Lot No. 817-
D consists of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe,
Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental,
respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by Esteban
Jalandoni to respondent DECS. Titles were transferred in the name of
respondent DECS.
-DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural
crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994.
The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural
crop years, commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.
-June 10, 1993: Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to be permanent and regular farm
workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO)
of Escalante.
-After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a Notice of Coverage to
respondent DECS, stating that the lands are covered by CARP and inviting its
representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries. Then, MARO
Piosa submitted his report to OIC- PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who
recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of
the landholdings.
-August 7, 1998: DAR Regional Director Andres approved the
recommendation and directed Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to facilitate
acquisition and distribution of landholdings to qualified beneficiaries.
-DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed
the Order of the Regional Director.
-Aggrieved DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the
instant petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 6657/ Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998
(CARL)NO
2. Whether or not the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP--YES
The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable
for agriculture as possible.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP. The
program shall: cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of
the public domain suitable for agriculture. Following lands are covered by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program :
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account, ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as
determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for
agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
Section 3(c): agricultural land- land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. agriculture or agricultural activity - means
the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of
livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and
other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction
with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
The records of the case show that the subject properties were
formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and
were donated to respondent DECS. From that time until they were leased to
Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural
primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain being owned
by an agency of the government. There is no legislative or presidential act,
before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Indubitably, the
subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
-DECS: sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the
income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation
were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
-DAR: the lands subject are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the
same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or
campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation.
Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income
derived that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes.
HELD: I. We agree with the petitioner DAR that they are not exempted.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are
exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their
exemption:
c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm
stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, ,
shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
xxxxxxxxx
In order to be exempt from the coverage : 1) the land must be actually,
directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary; and
2) the purpose is for school sites and campuses, including experimental
farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational
purposes.
The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used and
found to be necessary
cannot be understated. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous.
The plain meaning rule or
verba legis is applicable. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central Mindanao University
v.Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, wherein we declared
the land subject exempt from CARP coverage. However, DECS reliance is
misplaced because the factual circumstances are different in the case at bar.
1st , in the CMU case, the land involved was not alienable and disposable
land of the public domain because it was reserved by the late President
Carlos P. Garcia under Proc. No. 476 for the use of Mindanao Agricultural
College (now CMU). In this case, however, the lands fall under the category
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
2nd, in the CMU case, the land was actually, directly and exclusively used and
found to be necessary for school sites and campuses. Although a portion of it
was being used by the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils.,
Inc.) under a Management and Development Agreement, the undertaking
was that the land shall be used by the Philippine Packing Corporation as part
of the CMU research program, with direct participation of faculty and
students. The retention of the land was found to be necessary for the
present and future educational needs. On the other hand, the lands in this
case were not actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses.
They were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational but
business purposes. Also, it was the income and not the lands that was
directly used for the repairs and renovations of the schools.
II. We disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that they were not
qualified beneficiaries.
The identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested
in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No. 6657:
SECTION 15.
Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination with the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all
agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be
beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of
the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:
(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;
(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of
tenurial relationship;
(c) location and area of the land they work;
(d) crops planted; and
(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the
barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or other public
buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection by the public at
all reasonable hours.
In the case at bar, the BARC certified that the farmers were potential CARP
beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under
CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters
involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves
the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of
the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the
administrative agency. In this case, there was none.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the
bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to
redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to
liberate them from oppressive tenancy. The objective of the State is that:
landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to
promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural
development and industrialization.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, thepetition is GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The decision dated August 30, 2000
of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands under CARP
coverage , is REINSTATED.
DAR vs Delia Sutton
FACTS: The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by
respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding.
On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program
of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner
DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was
devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of
the CARL.
MARO inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted
solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary
that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
DAR ignored their request
DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only
portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the
CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the
following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio.
DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order partially granting the
application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire
landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising.
Their motion was denied.
Office of the President affirmed the order of DAR
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents.
It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of
the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land
reform program of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a
maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is
constitutional.
HELD: Assailed AO is unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by
including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of
the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia,
all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising.
Roxas and Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NSFW and DAR
FACTS: Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner
of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally
convened and took over legislative power from the President. This Congress
passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and
took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988,
[Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS]
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas
Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR
in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through its
President, sent a letter to theSecretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of
Hacienda Caylaway.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the
reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural
As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was
applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.
The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential Proclamation (PP)
1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND
TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN
BATANGAS AS A TOURISTZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Essentially,
Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion of its three haciendas from
agricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP
1520 which declared Nasugbu,
Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural
uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the
farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which
was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of
G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption
from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of
1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6,
Series of 1994, which states that all lands already classified as commercial,
industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need
conversion clearance from the DAR.
ISSUES: Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the
Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non- agricultural useto
exempt Roxas & Co.s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage;
RULING: PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE AGRICULTURAL
LANDS IN THE THREE MUNICIPALITIES INCLUDINGNASUGBU TO NON-
AGRICULTURAL LANDS. Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the
three municipalities as each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all
landstherein to tourism and, therefore, converted their use to non-
agricultural purposes.The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only
"certain areas in the sector comprising the [three Municipalities that]
havepotential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary
studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" toachieve its
purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)
to identify what those potential tourism areas are. If all the lands in those
tourism zones were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural use, there
would have been noneed for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those
"specific geographic areas" are.In the above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA,
the Court made it clear that the "power to determine whether Haciendas
Palico,Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the
coverage of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] lies withthe
[Department of Agrarian Reform], not with this Court." The DAR, an
administrative body of special competence, denied, byOrder, the application
for CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not
automatically reclassify all the lands in theaffected municipalities from their
original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the
"specific geographic areas" for tourism development and had no pending
tourism development projects in the areas. Further, report from the Center
for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the
areas were planted with sugar cane and other crops.
Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2004,12 came
up with clarificatory guidelines and therein decreed thatB. Proclamations
declaring general areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays,
islands or peninsulas astourist zones that merely:(1) recognize certain still
unidentified areas within the covered provinces, municipalities, barangays,
islands, or peninsulasto be with potential tourism value and charge the
Philippine Tourism Authority with the task to identify/delineate
specificgeographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value and to
coordinate said areas development; or
(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located within the
general area declared as tourist zone (i.e. x x x x)and direct the Philippine
Tourism Authority to coordinate said areas development;could not be
regarded as effecting an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the land
area declared as tourist zone. This is sobecause "reclassification of lands"
denotes their allocation into some specific
use and "providing for the manner of their utilization and disposition (Sec.
20, Local Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural lands
shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan." A proclamation that merely
recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general
area declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate,reserve, or intend the
entirety of the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Neither
does said proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable lands within the zone
shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural. Moreover, to view
these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes
of entire provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas would
be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic and sweeping exemption
from CARP in the name of tourism development. The same would also
undermine the land use reclassification powers vested in local government
units in conjunction with pertinent agencies of government.C. There being no
reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances, assuming
[these] took effect before June 15, 1988,could not supply a basis for
exemption of the entirety of the lands embraced therein from CARP
coverageD. The DARs reading into these general proclamations of tourism
zones deserves utmost consideration, more especially in the present
petitions which involve vast tracts of agricultural land. To reiterate, PP 1520
merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the
general area declared as tourism zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-
agricultural use. A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that
process of conversion before one is permitted to use it for other purposes
 MILESTONE FARMS, INC., Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS: On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine
in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc,
ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform that
agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are
excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thus, in
May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-
hectare property
The DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee
(LUCEC) recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare
property from the coverage of CARP, which was then adopted by DAR
Regional Director Dalugdug.
Petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia
and company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The MCTC ruled in
favor of petitioner, but the decision was later reversed by the RTC. The CA,
however, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and all defendants
therein to vacate portions of the property.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881 which
provided that private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and
swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the CARL. Due to this, DAR
Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776
hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director
Dalugdug. This was reinstated by the Office of the President.
Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4, 2004, without
the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court
then DAR Secretary Rene C. Villa (Secretary Villa) issued DAR Conversion
Order No. CON-0410-0016 (Conversion Order), granting petitioners
application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from
agricultural to residential and golf courses use.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use and disposition of that land is already
beyond DARs jurisdiction.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
CIVIL LAW: DAR jurisdiction
To succumb to petitioners contention that when a land is
declared exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is not agricultural as of
the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land is entirely
and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction is dangerous, suggestive of self-
regulation. Precisely, it is the DAR Secretary who is vested with such
jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from CARP
coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in accordance
with law and applicable jurisprudence. In addition, albeit parenthetically,
Secretary Villa had already granted the conversion into residential and golf
courses use of nearly one-half of the entire area originally claimed as exempt
from CARP coverage because it was allegedly devoted to livestock
production.
Petition is DENIED.
Secretary Florencio Abad
Department of Agrarian Reform
Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
This refers to your letter of the 13th instant stating your
"position that prior to the passage of R.A. 6657, the Department of Agrarian
Reform had the authority to classify and declare which agricultural lands are
suitable for non-agricultural purposes, and to approve or disapprove
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses."
In support of the foregoing view, you contend that under R.A.
No. 3844, as amended, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is
empowered to "determine and declare an agricultural land to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purpose" and to
"convert agricultural land from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes";
that P.D. No. 583, as amended by P.D. No. 815 "affirms that the conversion of
agricultural lands shall be allowed only upon previous authorization of the
[DAR]; with respect to tenanted rice and corn lands"; that a Memorandum of
Agreement dated May 13, 1977 between the DAR, the Department of Local
Government and Community Development and the then Human Settlements
Commission "further affirms the authority of the [DAR] to allow or disallow
conversion of agricultural lands"; that E.O. No. 129-A expressly invests the
DAR with exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses';
and that while in the final version of House Bill 400, Section 9 thereof
provided that lands devoted to "residential, housing, commercial and
industrial sites classified as such by the municipal and city development
councils as already approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board,
in their respective zoning development plans" be exempted from the
coverage of the Agrarian Reform program, this clause was deleted from
Section 10 of the final version of the consolidated bill stating the exemptions
from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
We take it that your query has been prompted by the study
previously made by this Department for Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig Jr. and Secretary Vicente Jayme (Memorandum dated February 14,
1990) which upheld the authority of the DAR to authorize conversions of
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses as of June 15, 1988, the date of
effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). it is
your position that the authority of DAR to authorize such conversion existed
even prior to June 15, 1988 or as early as 1963 under the Agricultural Land
Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844; as amended).
It should be made clear at the outset that the aforementioned
study of this Department was based on facts and issues arising from the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
While there is no specific and express authority given to DAR in the CARP law
to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands to non- agricultural
uses, because Section 65 only refers to conversions effected after five years
from date of the award, we opined that the authority of the DAR to approve
or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses
applies only to conversions made on or after June 15, 1988, the date of
effectivity of R.A. No. 6657, solely on the basis of our interpretation of DAR's
mandate and the comprehensive coverage of the land reform program. Thus,
we said:
"Being vested with exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, it is believed to be the agrarian
reform law's intention that any conversion of a private agricultural land to
non- agricultural uses should be cleared beforehand by the DAR. True, the
DAR's express power over land use conversion is limited to cases in which
agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes. But to suggest that these are
the only instances when the DAR can require conversion clearances would
open a loophole in the R.A. No. 6657, which every landowner may use to
evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. Hence, it should
logically follow from the said department's express duty and function to
execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private
land as a residential, commercial or industrial property should first be cleared
by the DAR."
It is conceded that under the laws in force prior to the enactment and
effective date of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR had likewise the authority, to
authorize conversions of agricultural lands to other uses, but always in
coordination with other concerned agencies. Under R.A. No. 3344, as
amended by R.A. No. 6389, an agricultural lessee may, by order of the court,
be dispossessed of his landholding if after due hearing, it is shown that the
"landholding is declared by the [DAR] upon the recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes."
Likewise, under various Presidential Decrees (P.D. Nos. 583, 815 and
946) which were issued to give teeth to the implementation of the agrarian
reform program decreed in P.D. No. 27, the DAR was empowered to
authorize conversions of tenanted agricultural lands, specifically those
planted to rice and/or corn, to other agricultural or to non-agricultural uses,
"subject to studies on zoning of the Human Settlements Commissions" (HSC).
This non-exclusive authority of the DAR under the aforesaid laws was, as you
have correctly pointed out, recognized and reaffirmed by other concerned
agencies, such as the Department of Local Government and Community
Development (DLGCD) and the then Human Settlements Commission (HSC) in
a Memorandum of Agreement executed by the DAR and these two agencies
on May 13, 1977, which is an admission that with respect to land use
planning and conversions, the authority is not exclusive to any particular
agency but is a coordinated effort of all concerned agencies.
It is significant to mention that in 1978, the then Ministry of Human
Settlements was granted authority to review and ratify land use plans and
zoning ordinance of local governments and to approve development
proposals which include land use conversions (see LOI No. 729 [1978]). This
was followed by P.D. No. 648 (1981) which conferred upon the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (the predecessors of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] the authority to promulgate zoning and
other land use control standards and guidelines which shall govern land use
plans and zoning ordinances of local governments, subdivision or estate
development projects of both the public and private sector and urban
renewal plans, programs and projects; as well as to review, evaluate and
approve or disapprove comprehensive land use development plans and
zoning components of civil works and infrastructure projects, of national,
regional and local governments, subdivisions, condominiums or estate
development projects including industrial estates.
P.D. No. 583, as amended by P.D. No. 815, and the 1977 Memorandum
of Agreement, abovementioned, cannot therefore, be construed as sources
of authority of the DAR; these issuances merely affirmed whatever power
DAR had at the time of their adoption.
With respect to your observation that E.O. No. 129-A also empowered
the DAR to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands into non-
agricultural uses as of July 22, 1987, it is our view that E.O. No. 129-A likewise
did not provide a new source of power of DAR with respect to conversion but
it merely recognized and reaffirmed the existence of such power as granted
under existing laws. This is clearly inferrable from the following provision of
E.O. No. 129-A to wit:
"Sec. 5. Powers and Functions. Pursuant to the mandate of the
Department, and in order to ensure the successful implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, the Department is hereby
authorized to:
1) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses
as may be provided by law" (Emphasis supplied.)
Anent the observation regarding the alleged deletion of residential,
housing, commercial and industrial sites classified by the HLURB in the final
version of the CARP bill, we fail to see how this circumstances could
substantiate your position that DAR's authority to reclassify or approve
conversions of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses already existed
prior to June 15, 1988. Surely, it is clear that the alleged deletion was
necessary to avoid a redundancy in the CARP law whose coverage is
expressly limited to "all public and private agricultural lands" and "other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture" (Sec. 4, R.A. No. 6657).
Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines "agricultural land" as that "devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in the Act and not classified as mineral forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land."
Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view that with respect
to conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to non-
agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such conversions may be
exercised from the date of the law's effectivity on June 15, 1988. This
conclusion is based on a liberal interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of
DAR's mandate and the extensive coverage of the agrarian reform program.
Rodrigo Almuete and Ana Almuete Vs. Marcelo Andres and CA
Facts: On March 25, 1957, a parcel of agricultural land, located at San
Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela, was awarded to Rodrigo Almuete by National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). Since then, Rodrigo
exercised exclusive possession over the subject property, planting crops and
growing fruits therein for 22 years.
On August 17, 1979, unknown to Rodrigo, Letecia Gragasin, an
Agrarian Reform Technologist, filed an inspection and investigation report
stating that: The whereabouts of Rodrigo was unknown. That he has waived
all of his right as awardee of the said land by NARRA, because of poor health
and financial crisis. And that the occupant of the land was Marcelo Andres
since 1967. She then recommended to the Director of the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR) that the land be awarded to Andres and cancel the
award given in favor of Rodrigo.
Marcelo further contended to MAR that Rodrigo sold the land to
one Victor Masiglat, and since Masiglat is disqualified to be an awardee of
the said land, he transferred it to Marcelo by paying P600 and 1 Carabao. All
of these transfers were not covered by written contracts. Thereafter, MAR
granted Marcelo a homestead patent and was soon issued an Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) no. P-52521 on July 7, 1988, upon recommendation
of DAR.
Rodrigo, unaware that the award given to him by NARRA was
cancelled, continued to cultivate the land. Until one day, Marcelo Andres,
together with 10 men, armed with boloes and sharp objects, entered the
property, took possession and controlled half of the subject land.
Rodrigo immediately complained to the DAR authorities about
what happened, and it was only at this time that he became aware that his
property was already titled now to Marcelo. He filed an action in court for
reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo with the RTC of
Isabela. The court rendered a decision in favor of Rodrigo, finding that
Marcelo didnt acquire any right over the subject property as he was not able
to present any valid documents that would support his contention. That
Rodrigo never abandoned the subject property. And Gragasin made obvious
false assertions on her report resulting to the cancellation of Rodrigos award
and issuance of the homestead patent in favor of Marcelo.
Marcelo failed to file an appeal on time and the decision became
final and executory. Marcelo filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA,
stating that the case was within the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and not with regular courts,
because the property involved is an agricultural land.
ISSUE: Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: No, DARAB has no jurisdiction. The action filed by Rodrigo was
cognizable by regular courts. The action filed by petitioners before the trial
court was for recovery of possession and reconveyance of title. The issue to
be resolved was who between petitioner Rodrigo Almuete and respondent
Marcelo Andres has a better right to the subject property considering that
both of them are awardees of the same property. It was thus a controversy
relating to ownership of the farmland, which is beyond the ambit of the
phrase "agrarian dispute." No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was
alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would so
characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and
respondent were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of
land.
The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a
tenancy relationship between the parties. The following elements are
indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and
(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.
Chavez v Philippine Estate Authority and AMARI
G.R. No. 133250
July 9, 2002
Facts:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating PEA.
PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged
areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands." Then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the
Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land
so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP) containing a total area of 1,915,894 square meters." Subsequently,
the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands
known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) through
negotiation without public bidding. President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation
and among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA
seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA
cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom
Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
Petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed a Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government
stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article
III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.
Issue: Whether or not the stipulations in the amended joint venture
agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to
be reclaimed is valid
Held: No. The mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or
submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the
mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to
PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No.
525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred
"ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA,
while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be
owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop,
improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by
the government." There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to
sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain.
PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with
the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain
does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands. Moreover, the
government is required to sell valuable government property through public
bidding. In the case at bar the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not
only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be
reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350
hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation
area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991,
involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale
of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or
patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be
transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked
to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or
patrimonial lands. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross
violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations.
GAVINO CORPUZ vs. Spouses GERONIMO and HILARIA GROSPE
G.R. No. 135297. June 8, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, he was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land (Lot
Nos. 3017 and 012) with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija. The lots were formerly owned by a certain Florentino
Chioco and registered under Title No. 126638.
To pay for his wifes hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the
subject land on January 20, 1982, in favor of Virginia de Leon. When the
contract period expired, he again mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria Grospe,
wife of Geronimo Grospe, for a period of four years (December 5, 1986 to
December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32, 500. The parties executed a
contract denominated as "Kasunduan SA Pagpapahiram Ng Lupang Sakahan,"
which allowed the respondents to use or cultivate the land during the
duration of the mortgage.
Before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in Cabanatuan City (Region III), petitioner instituted against the
respondents an action for recovery of possession. In his Complaint, he
alleged that they had entered the disputed land by force and intimidation on
January 10 and 11, 1991, and destroyed the palay that he had planted on the
land. Respondents, in their Answer, claimed that the "Kasunduan" between
them and petitioner allowed the former to take over the possession and
cultivation of the property until the latter paid his loan. Instead of paying his
loan, petitioner allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights"[7]
over the landholding in favor of respondents in consideration of P54, 394.
Petitioner denied waiving his rights and interest over the landholding and
alleged that his and his childrens signatures appearing on the Waiver were
forgeries.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Ernesto P. Tabara
ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the
Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had passed
Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of the said lots to
the respondent spouses, who were the "most qualified farmer[s]-
beneficiaries." The appellate court also ruled that petitioner had abandoned
the landholding and forfeited his right as a beneficiary. It rejected his
contention that all deeds relinquishing possession of the landholding by a
beneficiary were unenforceable.
Issue: Did the petitioner abandoned or voluntarily surrendered his
rights as a beneficiary under PD 27?
HELD:
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Supreme Court DENIED instant petition and the assailed Decision and
Resolution was AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed petitioners appeal. The
sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights are, as a rule, void in order
to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws. However, in the present
case, the voluntary surrender or waiver of these rights in favor of the
Samahang Nayon is valid because such action is deemed a legally permissible
conveyance in favor of the government. After the surrender or waiver of said
land reform rights, the Department of Agrarian Reform, which took control of
the property, validly awarded it to private respondents.
Heirs of Juanite vs CA
GR No. 138016
FACTS:
Sps Romero owned a piece of agricultural land which they sold
separate portions to Pania, Sanchez and Yonson on different dates. Claiming
as agricultural tenants of the land in dispute, petitioners Jose Juanite (now
deceased) and wife Nicolasa, filed a complaint with the Provincial Agricultural
Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) for the cancellation of the sales and to
exercise their right of redemption pursuant to RA No. 3844, section 12 of
which provides: Sec. 12. Lessees Right of Redemption. In case the
landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a
reasonable price and consideration xxx
Defendants Sps Romero alleged that being the owners of the
property, they had the perfect right to sell any portion thereof to any person;
and denied the Juanites contention that they were their tenants.
PARAB issued a ruling declaring petitioners as tenants. Dept of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), affirmed by CA, reversed the
decision, hence this appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners Juanite were tenants of the
Romero spouses as to entitle them to the right of redemption.
HELD: Yes, petitioners Juanite are tenants.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties. Although the petitioners failed to submit
evidence that there existed a sharing of harvests between petioners and Sps
Romero, however, the landowners admission that petitioners were tenants
on the subject landholding, the element of sharing harvest is assumed as a
factual element in that admission.
PHILBANCOR FINANCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 129572. June 26, 2000]
Private respondents Alfredo Pare, Pablo Galang and Amado Vie
filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) a
complaint for maintenance of possession with redemption and tenancy right
of pre-emption against petitioners Philbancor Finance, Inc. and Vicente
Hizon, Jr. They allege that the subject lots are occupied by them as legitimate
and bona fide tenants thereof, spanning for 50 years, and that such was
mortgaged by the owner Hizon to Philbancor without their knowledge. The
lots were subsequently foreclosed and sold at public auction to Philbancor
upon failure of Hizon to comply with his obligations to the former. They
further allege that they came to know of the transaction only when they
were notified by petitioner Philbancor to vacate the lots, threatening to take
from them the actual or physical possession of the agricultural lots.
On the other hand, Philbancor avers that it has no tenancy or
agricultural relationship with private respondents considering that it acquired
ownership over the disputed lots by virtue of an extra-judicial foreclosure
sale and that it is not an agricultural lessor as contemplated in Section 10 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3844, as amended. Furthermore, it contends that
assuming private respondents have the right to redeem the lots in question,
it had already expired as it was not exercised within 2 years from the
registration of the sale.
The Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of private
respondents, which was affirmed in toto by DARAB. Petitioners then filed a
petition for review of the decision of the DARAB, but such was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents could still exercise their
right of redemption over the property sold at public auction due to
foreclosure of the mortgages thereon considering that they invoked their
right to redeem only after seven years after the date of registration of the
certificate of sale.
NO. Republic Act No. 3844, Section 12, provides that in case the
landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a
reasonable price and consideration. The right of redemption under this
section may be exercised within two (2) years from the registration of the
sale and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption." In this
case, the certificate of sale of the subject property, which was sold at public
auction, was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on July 31,
1985. The two-year redemption period thus expired on July 31, 1987. The
complaint for redemption was filed by respondents only on July 14, 1992,
five (5) years after expiration of the redemption period prescribed bylaw.
Nonetheless, private respondents may continue in possession and
enjoyment of the land in question as legitimate tenants because the right of
tenancy attaches to the landholding by operation of law. The leasehold
relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding.
REMIGIO ISIDRO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND NATIVIDAD GUTIERREZ.
G.R. No. L-105586 December 15, 1993
Facts:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of
land with an area of 4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva
Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the
overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the
swampy portion of the abovementioned land, consisting of one (1) hectare,
in order to augment his (petitioner's) income to meet his family's needs. The
occupancy of a portion of said land was subject top the condition that
petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the
landwithout paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond. In
1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner
the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession
of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in
converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija which was docketed as Civil Case No.
4120. Petitioner set up the following defenses: (a) that the complaint was
triggered by his refusal to increase his lease rental; (b) the subject land is a
fishpond and therefore is agricultural land; and (c) that lack of formal
demand to vacate exposes the complaint to dismissal for insufficiency of
cause of action.
The trial court found that the land in question is a fishpond and,
the complaint was dismissed, ruling that the land is agricultural and therefore
the dispute over it is agrarian which is under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian relations as provided in Sec. 12(a) of
Republic Act No. 946 (now embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board). An appeal was filed
by private respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 889. In due course, the RTC rendered a
decision on 5 November 1991 concurring with the findings of the MTC and
affirming in toto the trial court's decision. The RTC held that under the given
facts there was a tenurial arrangement, within the meaning of Sec. 3(d) of RA
6657, thereby placing the dispute involved in this case within the jurisdiction
of the DARAB.
Private respondent Gutierrez appealed to the respondent Court of
Appeals. On 27 February 1992, Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, ordering petitioner to vacate the parcel of land in
question and surrender possession thereof to private respondent, and to pay
private respondent the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation. It ruled that the agrarian dispute over which the DAR
may have jurisdiction by virtue of its quasi-judicial power is that which
involves tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Tenurial arrangement is
concerned with the act or manner of putting into proper order the rights of
holding a piece of agricultural land between the landowner and the farmer or
farmworker. It held that absent any prima facie proof that private
respondent has a tenancy relationship with petitioner, the established fact is
that private respondent is possessing the property in dispute by mere
tolerance, and when such possession ceased as such upon demand to vacate
by the petitioner, private respondent became a squatter in said land. The
MTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija has jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case.
Petitioner moved for but, also as earlier stated, it was denied in a resolution
for lack of merit.
ISSUES: WON petitioner Isidro should vacate the subject fish pond and
WON such fish pond is considered as an agricultural land.
HELD:
The Court ruled that petitioner Isidro must leave the fish pond.
The private respondent had the legal right to demand upon petitioner to
vacate the land. The tenancy of the petitioner was based only on mere
tolerance. Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a lessee, it is clear
that there is no tenancy or agricultural/ leasehold relationship existing
between the petitioner and the private respondent. There was no contract
or agreement entered into by the petitioner with the private respondent nor
with the overseer of the private respondent, for petitioner to cultivate the
land for a price certain or to share his harvests. Petitioner has failed to
substantiate his claim that he was paying rent for the use of the land.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the
parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written
agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law,
are even more important.
The land in question which used to be an idle, swampy land was
converted by the petitioner into a fishpond. Such fishpond is an agricultural
land. An agricultural land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in Republic Act No. 6657 15 and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. 16 Republic Act No. 6657 defines
agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of
fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of
such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether
natural or judicial.
But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically
make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction.
The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the
possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law provides for conditions or
requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only
one of them. 18 The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a
controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to
agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such arrangement may be
leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. The petition is denied. The questioned
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby affirmed.
LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF DAR
PARAS J., Dec. 4, 1990
FACTS:
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the
livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business
allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b),
Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657
otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing
under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on
January 9, 1989
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and
rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public
respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to
Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar
as they are made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the
definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural
lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing
plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform
the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for
lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in
Section 13
The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
ARTICLE XIII
x x x
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless,
to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
x x x"
It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has
transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. Livestock or poultry
raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource
in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the
total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers.
Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the
country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock
and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby
processing corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers
Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of
animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor
or consideration in productivity in this industry.
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock
and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of
such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that
Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the
following words:
"Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and
harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of
livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .
Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.
Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other
animals."
ISSUE: WON Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as
the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith
is constitutional?
HELD:
The petition is impressed with merit. The question raised is one of
constitutional construction.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show
that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as
defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth,
including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and
abandoned land
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the
word "agriculture."
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A.
6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms"
is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made
to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply
no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian
reform.
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the
requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms"
which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement
"production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings)
whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their
gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as
additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and
therefore violative of due process
GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as
the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as
well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance
therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and
the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.
Title: JAIME MORTA, SR. and PURIFICACION PADILLA, petitioners, vs. JAIME
OCCIDENTAL, ATTY. MARIANO BARANDA, JR., and DANIEL CORRAL,
respondents. (G.R. No. 123417. June 10, 1999)
Facts:
Petitioners Jaime Morta, Sr. and Purificacion Padilla filed 2 cases
for damages with preliminary injunction with the MTC against respondents
Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr. and Daniel Corral. Petitioners
alleged that respondents, through the instigation of Atty. Baranda, gathered
pilinuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective land, delivered
the produce to Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr., and destroyed their banana and
pineapple plants. In their answer, respondents claimed that petitioners were
not the owners of the land in question. They alleged that the torrens titles of
the land indicated a certain Gil Opiana as the registered owner. Gil Opiana
was the father of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan who inherited the lots upon the
former's death. Respondent Jaime Occidental contended that he was a bona
fide tenant of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan. Respondents stated that there was
no annotation on the titles establishing petitioners' right over the land. They
denied harvesting the anahaw leaves and coconuts, as well as delivering the
produce to Atty. Baranda, Jr.
The MTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. It held that
petitioners had been in actual, continuous, open and adverse possession of
the land in question for 45 years. Respondents appealed to the RTC. They
questioned the trial court's jurisdiction contending that the case was
cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board
(DARAB). The RTC rendered a decision reversing that of the MTC, ruling that
these cases for damages are tenancy-related problems which fall under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The CA affirmed the lower
courts ruling. Thereafter, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
stressing that there was no tenancy relationship between the parties, as
certified by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO). The CA denied
the motion, hence, a petition for review on certiorari filed in the SC.
Petitioners claim that Morta is not a tenant of either Jaime Occidental or
Josefina Opiana-Baraclan, as shown by the MARO certification. They argue
that the present action for damages is not tenancy-related, and, hence, is
properly cognizable by the trial court, not the DARAB.
Issue: WON the present action is properly cognizable by the trial court
Held: YES. The issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the
DARAB.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a
tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement
to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reforms is limited to the
following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of
agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related
problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring
or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial,
and other non-agricultural uses.
There is a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land:
Josefina Opiana-Baraclan or petitioner Morta. The issue of ownership cannot
be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely outside its jurisdiction, and must
be resolved in the trial court. At any rate, whoever is declared to be the
rightful owner of the land, the case can not be considered as tenancy-related
for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming that
Josefina Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, then the case is not between the
landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental
cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship
between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the above
requisites, the SC concluded that the issue involved is not tenancy-related
cognizable by the DARAB.
Nuesa vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 132048. March 6, 2002
FACTS:
On May 25, 1972, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an
Order of Award in favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels of agricultural
land, Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
covering 14,496 and 19,808 square meters with the conditions that the
awardee shall personally cultivate or develop at least one-fourth of the area
or occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and pay at
least the first installment. It also stated that failure to comply shall be
sufficient cause for the cancellation of the said order.
On August 26, 1993, or after twenty-one years, private
respondent filed an application with the Regional Office of the Department
of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of said lots claiming that he had
complied with the conditions set forth in the Order. Restituto Rivera, herein
petitioner, filed a letter of protest against private respondent claiming that
contrary to the manifestation of private respondent, it is petitioner who had
been in possession of the land and had been cultivating the same.Petitioner
had filed his own application for said parcels in opposition to that of private
respondent.
On December 27, 1993, a representative of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Regional Office undertook an investigation to look into the
conflicting claims of the petitioner and the private respondent. It was found
out that the said lots were in possession/cultivation of other persons
exclusive of Jose Verdillo. It is crystal clear that Jose Verdillo has culpably
violated the terms and conditions of the Order of Award issued in his favor
for lots covered thereby.
The Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa, promulgated an
Order canceling the Order of Award issued on favor of Jose Verdillo. The
DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, however, chose to resolve the case on the
merits and on October 14, 1994, promulgated a Decision denying the
petitioners Motion to Dismiss and reversing the Order of the Regional
Director. Thereafter, the Petition for Review filed by herein petitioners with
the Court of Appeals was denied due course and ordered dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners
claim that in this case, the Board (DARAB) acted in grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of its jurisdiction
HELD:
After carefully perusing the records of this case and considering
the contentions of the parties thereto, the SC found the petition impressed
with merit. The SC agreed with petitioners that respondent Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the DARAB and its officials have not committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction in this case.
The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier
Order of Award by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative
functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of
adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of the case, then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional
Director and deciding the case on the merits without affording the petitioner
opportunity to present his case.
Under Section 3(d) of R.A. 6657 (CARP Law), agrarian dispute is
defined to include (d) ...any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial,
leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this
controversy between them within the ambit of the abovecited provision.
Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and
should not have taken cognizance of private respondents petition in the first
place.
In this case, respondent DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central,
had overstepped their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the
controversy between petitioner Rivera and private respondent Verdillo as to
who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate.
Respondent appellate court erred in sustaining DARABs unjustified action
taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of its
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
OCA v. CA
Facts: This is a case about Tenancy of fishponds in the province of
Pangasinan. Jose and Isabelo Oca are the civil owners and Abalos is the one
who claims to cultivate the fishponds. The setup of such arrangement
entitles Abalos to the sari- sari fish while the Ocas get all the Bangus. In
1992 when Abalos asked for his compensation he was asked to vacate the
premises and thats when he filed a demand for Peaceful possession,
Leasehold and Damages with motion for the issuance of Interlocutory Order,
aside from this he prayed for the order that the rental must be fixed to 25%
of the average net normal harvest of Bangus annually.
The Ocas filed a counterclaim alleging that the accusations of
Abalos are not true and the he was compensated in a piece meal basis. They
also alleged that they personally cultivate the land with occasional help from
their piece meal workers. The Adjudicator ruled in favor of Abalos. The case
was appealed to DARAB and was denied, even in the CA, it was affirmed that
Abalos had a better right to the land and that the DARAB should assist in the
protection of Abaloss rights.
Issue: WON the DARAB had jurisdiction over this case since it was about
fishponds and not land?
HELD: After being denied in the DARAB and CA, Oca raised the issue that
DARAB had no power to decide the case and asked that the decision of
DARAB be nullified and the case be tried again in the proper court. The Court
said that the doctrine of Laches applies, raising the issue of jurisdiction can
no longer be entertained since it has passed through various courts already
with the participation of the petitioners without the raising this issue at once,
showing that they were sitting on their rights. Petitioners also filed a
Counterclaim, which automatically recognizes the power and jurisdiction of
the Adjudicator. To invoke the changing of the decision of the DARAB which
would entail power to decide then subsequently questioning the power and
jurisdiction of that entity is wrong and against public policy.
PNR v. Del Valle
Facts: Philippine National Railways (PNR) owned three strips of land
along the Manila- legazpi route, part of its railroad right of way. Some
portions of the land were occupied by people, prompting disputes. PNR
adopted temporary rules for the possession of the land through rentals. PNR
awarded the use of the land after a bidding to Pantaleon Bingabing for a
period of three years creating a civil law lease expressly stipulating Bingabing
to "occupy and us the property. temporarily for agriculture." Bingabing
failed to take possession of the said piece of land as Pampilo Doltz had
occupied the land and claims that he is a tenant of the previous awardees
and Bingabing too. In response to this, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against
Doltz for recovery of the possession of the land, to remove the house of Doltz
and pay for compensation to Bingabing.
Doltz defenses state that he is inter alia tenant on the property for
20 years placed by deceased lessor Pablo Gomba, and successor Demetrio de
Vera. He also claimed that he had given Bingabing 1/3 of the crop harvest
profits and by effect become a tenant of Bingabing.Upon the court's request,
Doltz and Bingabing agreed to temporarily liquidate the harvest on a sharing
ratio of 70-30 in Doltz' favour. While the case was pending, Doltz registered
with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) a petition against Bingabing for
security of tenure, the adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-30 of the crops, and
reliquidation of past harvests. PNR intervened in the case. Petitioners herein
there maintained the position that the premises in controversy are not an
agricultural land within the contemplation of the Agricultural Tenancy Act
(Republic Act 1199) or the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act
3844); that no tenancy relationship existed between the parties; that CAR,
therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the case; and that there is a pending case
between the same parties in another court involving the same subject matter
and the same cause of action. CAR decided in favor of Doltz and that the
sharing ratio be maintained.
Issues: (1) Is the land in dispute agricultural land within the Agricultural
Tenancy act and the Agricultural Land ref orm code?
(2) Is Doltz considered a tenant?
Held: (1) No. Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "agricultural
tenancy is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture
belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production
through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm
household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest
with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or
in money, or in both.
Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, "agricultural
land" means land devoted to any growth including but not limited to crop
lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle land and abandoned land as defined in
paragraphs 18 and 19 of this section
The land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of
agricultural land. PNR cannot devote it to agriculture because by its own
charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture. Agricultural
activities may hamper the operation, security and safety of the PNR.
(2) The contract of lease executed by PNR in favour of Bingabing
was merely temporary and may be revocable at any time the PNR needs the
leased land for its own use. Also, the contract rules stipulate that any form of
sublease of the land is prohibited and that previous awardees de Vera,
Gomba or present leaseholder Bingabing cannot create one, since PNR did
not consent to the creation of such.
ROXAS & CO., INC. vs. CA
Facts: Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner
of three haciendas, namely Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all
located in Nasugbu, B atangas. Before the effectivity of the CARL law (RA
6657), petitioner filed with DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway
pursuant to provisions of EO 229 (before CARL). Haciendas Palico and Banilad
were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with
CARL.
Nevertheless, on Aug 6, 1992, Roxas and Co. through its President,
Eduardo J. Roxas sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of
Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangunniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to
non-agricultural land. As a result thereof, DAR was informed by the petitioner
of the application for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to
other uses. Petitioner filed for this application for conversion, assuming that
when PP 1520 declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourist zone, reclassified
them to non-agricultural uses. Pending application for conversion of
petitioner, DAR already issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs)
to the farmer-beneficiaries.
1. Issue: WON PP 1520 automatically convert all lands in the
Maragondon-Ternate-Nasubgu tourism zone to non-agricultural
use to exempt Roxas and Co.s three haciendas in Nasugbu from
CARP coverage?
1. Held: No. The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified
only certain areas in the sector comprising the three
Municipalities that have potential tourism value and mandated
the conduct of necessary studies and the segregation of
specific geographic areas to achieve its purpose. Which is why
the PP directed the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify
what those potential tourism areas are. If all the lands in those
tourism zones were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural
use, there would have been no need for the PP to direct the PTA
to identify what those specific geographic areas are.
This Court has made it clear that the power to determine
whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence,
exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law lies
with the Department of Agrarian Reform and not with this Court. The DAR, is
an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order of October
22, 2001, the application for CARP exemption of Roxas and Co. it finding that
PP 1520 did NOT automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected
municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the PTA had not yet, at
that time, identified the specific geographic areas for tourism development
and had no pending tourism development projects in the areas. Further,
report from the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation
(CLUPPI) indicated that the areas were planted with sugar cane and other
crops.
All these were contained and clarified by the Memorandum
Circular No. 7 Series of 2004.
A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value
of certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone clearly does
not allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone for
non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation direct that
otherwise CARPable lands with the zone shall already be used for purposes
other than agricultural.
Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a
reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces,
municipalities, barangays, islands or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it
amounts to an automatic and sweeping exemption from CARP in the name of
tourism development. The same would also undermine the land use
reclassification powers vested in local government units in conjunction with
pertinent agencies of government.
Furthermore, Roxas and Co.s application in DAR Administrative
Case for CARP exemption in Hacienda Palico subject of GR 179650 cannot be
granted in view of discrepancies in the location and identity in the subject
parcels of land.
2. Issue: WON the CLOAs issued by DAR are valid?
2. Held: No. The CLOAs should be cancelled.
The failure of DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in
the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the
CLOAs already issued. To assume the power is to short circuit the
administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent
DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the
acquisition proceedings. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property
in trust for the rightful owner of the land.
 In the main, there is no logical recourse except to cancel the
CLOAs issued for the nine parcels of land identified in Hacienda Palico (or
those covered by DAR administrative case). But as for the rest of the CLOAs,
they should be respected since Roxas and Co, as shown, failed to prove that
the other lots, aside from the abovementioned nine lots, are CARP exempt.

Roxas and Co. is thus mandated to first satisfy the disturbance

compensation of affected farmer-beneficiaries in the areas covered by the
nine parcels of lands before the CLOAs covering them can be cancelled.

Vda. De Tangub v Court of Appeals

FACTS: Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in March, 1988, "an agrarian case for damages
by reason of their unlawful dispossession was tenants from the landholding"
owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. Several persons were
also impleaded as defendants, including the Philippine National Bank, it being
alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a mortgage on the
land involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of
the property by the bank as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in
the sale by the latter, some time later, of portions of the land to the other
persons named as its co-defendants who were all employees of the National
Steel Corporation, and it being prayed that mortgage and the transactions
thereafter made in relation thereto be annulled and voided.

In an Order rendered on August 24, 1988, respondent Judge

Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint. He opined that by virtue of
Executive Order No. 229 "providing the mechanisms for the implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program approved on July 24, 1987"
Executive No. 129-A approved on July 26, 1987, as well as the Rules of the
Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the
Department of Agrarian Reform.

The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the Regional

Trial Court. Hence, the Tangub Spouses then filed a petition for Certiorari
with the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, acting as special agrarian
court, in the light of Executive Orders Numbered 129-A and 229 and Republic
Act No. 6657 has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

The provisions of Executive Order 229 and Executive Order 129-A

relating to the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform are
evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial
Court by Presidential Decree No. 946, which extended to the rights and
obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land, and
other matters affecting tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-
cultivators, farms' cooperatives or organizations under laws, Presidential
Decrees, Orders, instructions, Rules and Regulations in relation to the
agrarian reform program. Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have been
eliminated by its being subsumed in the broad jurisdiction conferred on the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The intention evidently was to transfer
original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition
stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the Department for the
implementation of the executive orders.

The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in

dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a case concerning the rights of
the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special
jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly
came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,
established precisely to wield the adjudicatory powers of the Department.