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The Christian Right and the Pro-Life Movement:

An Analysis of the Sources of Political Support

Article in Review of Religious Research June 1990

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Religious Research Association, Inc.

The Christian Right and the Pro-Life Movement: An Analysis of the Sources of Political
Support
Author(s): Clyde Wilcox and Leopoldo Gomez
Source: Review of Religious Research, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Jun., 1990), pp. 380-389
Published by: Religious Research Association, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3511563
Accessed: 19-07-2017 20:02 UTC

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380

THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCES OF
POLITICAL SUPPORT'

Clyde Wilcox

Leopoldo Gomez

Georgetown University

Review of Religious Research, Vol. 31, No. 4 (June, 1990)

Although Christian Right elites predicted a united front between the funda
talist Right and pro-life groups, the alliance has been an uneasy one at b
Only a minority of pro-life supporters have thrown their support to the C
tian Right, and Christian Right supporters do not universally support the
life groups. We explore the differences between the supporters of the Chri
Right and the pro-life movement using data from a national survey in 1984
find that religious differences are quite important in distinguishing betwee
supporters of the two sets of groups, with evangelicals supporting the Chri
Right and Catholics supporting the pro-life movement. Among evangelic
those who attend church frequently are more likely to support both gr
while those who belong to evangelical denominations but do not attend r
larly are more likely to support only the Moral Majority. In additi
religious differences, the supporters of the two sets of groups displayed im
tant political differences as well, with the pro-life supporters markedly
moderate on foreign policy and minority politics. Supporters of both gr
were decidedly more conservative than those who supported only one se
organizations.

Most studies of public support for the New Christian Right during the
reported that support was limited to between 10% and 15% of whites (B
Sigelman, 1985; Wilcox, 1987a; Sigelman, Wilcox and Buell, 1987; W
1989). These organizations have been unable to expand beyond their initial
support, a fate which also fell on the Presidential campaign of Pat Roberts
drew primarily from charismatic churches. The failure of the Christian R
expand beyond a small minority of dedicated supporters was not predicted by
early observers, who foresaw the possibility of a united front of the Moral M
various pro-life groups, and other sympathetic organizations.
There were good reasons to suspect that the Christian Right would draw
from pro-life citizens. Groups like the Moral Majority made abortion one o
central issues, and Rev. Jerry Falwell, head of the Moral Majority during
the 1980's, spoke often of the common ground which the two sets of organ
shared. Falwell predicted that his organization would draw support from a
of pro-life Catholics, as well as morally conservative Jews. In fact, howeve
of the activists of the Moral Majority were concentrated in independent B
churches (Liebman, 1983; Wilcox, 1987b). Practically no activists were Ca
and support among Catholics was quite low. Although pro-life and Christia
forces have joined together at the elite level to lobby Congress on abort
predicted common front has failed to materialize.

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 381

In some ways, elite level cooperation is important, regardless of any mass level
coalitions. For many members of the Moral Majority or national right-to-life
organizations, membership consists almost entirely of contributing money through
direct mail. Hayes (1986) has argued that the nature of interest groups has changed
radically over the past twenty years, and that in many of the newer groups member-
ship consists merely of contributing money, with little potential for face-to-face
contact for the membership. For these sorts of organizations, elite cooperation on
lobbying and the sharing of direct-mail solicitations lists which are the lifeblood of
mass organizations (Godwin, 1988) may be important.
Yet neither the Moral Majority nor the right-to-life movement are purely direct-
mail organizations. The Moral Majority made a concerted effort to mobilize the
grass roots, and succeeded in building state level organizations which varied in
strength (Liebman, 1983; Wilcox, 1987b; Pierand and Wright, 1984). There has
been even more activism at the local level in the pro-life movement, with many
supporters logging long hours of volunteer work (Luker, 1984). The failure of a
larger movement to emerge at the grass roots, then, has important political conse-
quences.
In this paper we explore some of the reasons for the failure of the Christian Right
to draw greater support among pro-life forces. We present bivariate analysis of
national survey data which allows us to compare supporters of the Moral Majority,
supporters of the Right-to-Life movement, and those who supported both organiza-
tions. We next use multivariate discriminant analysis to help us sort out the sets of
variables which best predict which citizens were more likely to support each
organization, and which were likely to support both.
We explore two possible explanations for the failure of the Christian Right
coalition to emerge. First, it is possible that the intolerance of the fundamentalists
of the Christian Right has prevented them from gaining support from Catholics in
the pro-life movement. Wilcox (1986) reported that activists in the Ohio Moral
Majority publicly expressed anti-Catholic sentiments, and Kellstedt (1988) found
that anti-Catholicism was a significant predictor of support for the Moral Majority
platform among evangelicals, even after multivariate controls.
A second possible explanation rests in the nature of the pro-life movement.
Because pro-life groups have steadfastly resisted attempts by some activists to
expand their agenda to incorporate a broader conservative orientation, they may be
able to attract support from moderates and occasionally liberals whose religious or
moral beliefs lead them to oppose abortion without endorsing other conservative
positions. These moderate or liberal pro-life supporters would be unlikely candi-
dates for membership in the Moral Majority. This political strategy makes good
sense for right-to-life groups, since Catholics are more likely than Protestants to
identify themselves as Democrats, to identify themselves as liberals, and to support
spending for social programs. These moderate Catholics, however, may be unlikely
converts to a Moral Majority.

The Data

The data for this study comes from the 1984 American National Election Study
(ANES) conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan
in 1984. This survey was a short-term panel study of a national sample Americans

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382

conducted in September and November of 1984. We limit our analysis to whites,

because religion among blacks has quite different political consequences from
religion among whites. The survey contained two items which were used to identify
supporters of the Christian Right and pro-life forces. Respondents were asked to
place a number of political groups and figures on an imaginary feeling thermome-
ter ranging from 0'(very cold) to 1000(very warm).
Because there is a good deal of variation in individual responses to feeling
thermometer items (Wilcox, Sigelman and Cook, 1989), we have adjusted these
items to account for individual differences. Supporters of the Christian Right are
those respondents who rated "evangelical groups active in politics like the Moral
Majority" at least 100 warmer than their individual mean across all groups in the
survey, and supporters of pro-life forces are those respondents who rated "anti-
abortionists" in the same manner. This operational approach has been used in other
studies of support for the Christian Right (Wilcox, 1987a; Sigelman, Wilcox and
Buell, 1987). From these two items, we have identified those which support neither
set of organizations, those who support only the Christian Right or the pro-life
organizations, and those who support both.
The ANES also contained a number of demographic, religious, and political
items which were used to help discriminate among supporters. From these items
we have constructed several scales. We have constructed a scale of evangelical
doctrine by identifying those who report a born-again experience and who accept
the inerrancy of Scripture. We have constructed several political issue scales,
including one which measured attitudes on women's issues, foreign policy issues,
issues of minority politics, spending on social programs, spending on defense and
fighting crime, affect towards minority groups, affect towards liberal groups, affect
towards groups of the left, affect towards mainstream liberal groups, general
equality values, and sexual equality values2

The Christian Right and Pro-Life Forces

Our analysis suggests that in 1984, approximately 6% of the white public

supported the Christian Right only, nearly 15% supported only the pro-life move-
ment, and around 6 % supported both. Over 25 % of the white population supported
at least one of these groups. If the united front which Falwell sought had developed,
then, they would have constituted a sizable electoral force. Instead, only about a
quarter of pro-life supporters also supported the Moral Majority, while approxi-
mately half the supporters of the Christian Right gave their support to anti-abortion
activists. This imbalance in support suggests that the anti-abortion forces are more
negatively predisposed towards the Christian Right than are Moral Majority sup-
porters towards the pro-life movement.
A few important demographic differences emerged from our bivariate analysis.
The details are presented in Table 1. Supporters of the Moral Majority were more
likely to reside in the South, to be male, and to be drawn from the lower socio-
economic stratum than were pro-life forces. Predictably, supporters of the Moral
Majority were more likely to belong to evangelical churches and to hold evangelical
beliefs than were pro-life supporters, who were more likely to be Catholics. There
was a marked inequality of cross-support among those two religious groups,
however. Those who supported both groups were very likely to hold evangelical
beliefs, and less likely than the population to be Catholic.

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 383

Table 1

BIVARIATE RESULTS: DEXOGRAPHIC AND ATITIUDINAL DIFFERENCES

Neither MM Abort Both

Demographics

Education:
less than High School 14% 24% 20% 21%
College Degree + 22% 13% 17% 15%
Occupation:
Worker 38% 49% 42% 47%
Professional/Manager 24% 13% 21% 12%
Region: South 27% 35% 30% 37%
Rural Born 30% 35% 37% 46%
Doctrinal Evangelical 18% 50% 31% 72%
Denminational Evang. 13% 25% 21% 29%
Catholic 30% 18% 37% 18%
Male 46% 56% 41% 44%

Political Attitudes

Affect - Left 41 33 34 22
Affect - Liberals 55 51 54 44
Affect - Minorities 59 50 59 57
Foreign Policy 3.7 4.3 4.1 4.6
Women's Issues 3.2 3.9 3.6 4.6
Minority Issues 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.4
School Prayer 4.6 6.1 6.0 6.7
Spending - Social Progs. 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1
Spending - Cons. Progs. 2.2 2.3 2.2 3.4
General Equality Values 3.6 3.2 3.5 3.2
Gender Equality Values 3.8 3.2 3.5 2.8
Partisanship 2.9 3.4 3.2 4.0

N 1084 91 215 87

Percentage of cases falling into each category, or mean value on each scale.
Affect scales reflect degree of warmth respondent reported for groups in
scale. Issue scales and partisanship are reflected so that the higher scores
indicate more conservative positions.

Important attitudinal differences emerged as well. The data in Table 1 represent

mean scores for each group on three scales which measure affect2, and a number of
issue scales. All issue scales are coded so that high scores indicate more conserva-
tive positions. Those who supported both groups were consistently more conserva-
tive than those who supported only one group. In many cases, however, the pro-life
forces were significantly more liberal than those who supported the Christian
Right. This was particularly true for equality values, including gender equality.
Moreover, close inspection revealed that there was a sizable bloc of pro-life support
which adopted fairly liberal positions on other issues. These bivariate data suggest
that one reason for the failure of a larger Christian Right coalition to emerge may be
the political moderation of right-to-life activists.

Multivariate Analysis

We next tested the impact of these demographic, religious, and attitudinal varia-

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384

bles on support using multivariate discriminant analysis. The three discriminant

functions enabled us to correctly predict over half of the cases. We do particularly
well predicting those who support both groups-successfully predicting approxi-
mately two-thirds of those in this category. Table 1 presents the summary informa-
tion of the analysis.
The first function explains 70% of the variance, and serves to discriminate
degrees of support for the American Moral Right. The group means on this
function are fairly linear by number of groups supported-that is, between support-
ing none of the groups, supporting either one, or supporting both. The function did
not help distinguish between those who supported only the Moral Majority and
those who supported only the pro-life movement. The most important variables in
this function are negative affect for organizations of the left and for mainstream
liberal groups, evangelical doctrine, frequent church attendance, conservative for-
eign policy views, conservative views on women's issues, conservative views on
social program spending, Republican partisanship, support for school prayer, and
low support for sexual equality values. Table 2 presents the correlations between
the variables and the canonical discriminant functions.
The second function explained approximately 23 % of the variance. It discrimi-
nated between those who supported only one or the other of the two sets of
organizations. Variables which correlated highly with this function included gen-
eral and gender equality values, Catholicism, low levels of evangelical doctrine,
affect towards minorities, attitudes on minority issues, gender, and region. Those
who supported only the pro-life movement were generally more moderate on
political issues such as foreign policy, aid to minorities, and school prayer, and
were more supportive of societal equality and warmer towards minorities. It seems
likely that these moderate activists might be repelled by the consistent strong
conservatism of the Christian Right, and might withhold support on policy
grounds.
The final function explained only about 10% of the variance. It discriminates
primarily between those who support only the Moral Majority and those who
support both organizations. It can therefore be interpreted as distinguishing be-
tween two types of Moral Majority supporters-those who do and those who do not
also support the Right-to-Life movement. Those who do not support pro-life
groups are more likely to come from evangelical denominations, to favor school
prayer, to be less supportive of gender equality, to be older, to report Republican
partisanship, and to have higher incomes and occupational status, combined with
lower levels of education. They are also the least likely of the three groups of
supporters to attend church frequently. Closer inspection suggests that those who
do not also support the pro-life movement are actually more likely to be infrequent
attenders of churches in the fundamentalist wing of evangelical Protestantism.
Because these individuals are no less conservative on the abortion issue than those
who also support the pro-life movement, the explanation seems to lie primarily
with the cultural implications of these demographic and attitudinal variables.
Rural-born fundamentalists are generally more anti-Catholic than other evangeli-
cals.
The finding that those who fail to support the pro-life movement are infrequently
attending fundamentalists echoes findings of Allport (1966) and Allen and Spilka
(1967), who reported a curvilinear relationship between church attendance and
prejudice. These authors argued that infrequent attenders were more prejudiced

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 385

Table 2

MULTIVARIATE RESULTS: PREDICTING SUPPORT

Function 1 Function 2 Function 3

Evangelical Doctrine .60 -.41 -. 14

Affect - left -.54 -.00 -.13
Frequency Church Att. .48 .35 -.19
Women's Issues .32 -.15 .27
Spending - Soc. Progs. -.29 -.17 .03
Affect - Liberals -.26 .07 .14
Spending - Cons. Progs. .19 -.14 -.00
Occupation .09 -.07 -.03

Equality Values -.08 .40 -.21

Foreign Policy .38 -.39 .05
Catholic -.04 .35 .13
Affect - Minorities -.10 .30 -.16
Male .12 -.26 .19
Minority Issues -.09 .20 -.08
Rural Birth .14 -.15 .00
South .07 -.11 .01

School Prayer .31 .11 .39

Evangelical Denanin. .12 -.06 .36
Republican .30 -.02 .35
Gender Equality Values -.27 .24 -.30
Income .05 .08 .20
Age -.00 -.00 .18
Education -.08 .10 -.18

Canonical Discriminant Fu
Function 1 Function 2 Function 3

Support Neither -.34 -.04 -.07

Support Moral Majority .40 -.86 .39
Support Pro-Life .36 .50 .19
Support Both 1.75 -.16 -.34

Percentage Predicted Correctly

Support Neither 53%
Support Moral Majority 47%
Support Pro-Life 48%
Support Both 70%

Total 53%

because their religi

theirs, however, in
were the most likely
tent with the work
attendance exposed c

The Failure of a Ma

Why has the predic

offered above two p

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386

the fundamentalist supporters of the Moral Majority for Catholics, and the second
focusing on the narrow agenda of the pro-life movement, which allows moderates
and even liberals to support its cause. Our data suggest that there is some truth to
both explanations. The results from the discriminant analysis suggest that those
who support only the anti-abortionists and do not support the Moral Majority are
markedly more moderate than Moral Majority supporters on nearly all measures:
foreign policy, spending on social welfare, other women's issues and gender
equality, minority issues and minority affect, and affect towards the Left. It seems
likely that the consistent conservatism of the Moral Majority is not attractive to
these moderates, whose only common ground is opposition to abortion.

Table 3
JULTIVARIATE RESUL=S: ANTI-CATHOLICISM AND SUPPORT AMDNG PRUtESTANTS

Function 1 Function 2 Function 3

Evangelical Doctrine .57 -. 22 -.09

Affect - Left -.56 .17 .08
Frequency Church Att. .45 .28 -.19
Wanen's Issues .34 -.08 .09
Spending - Soc. Progs. -.30 -.22 -.00
Affect - Liberals -.28 -.26 .27
Spending - Cons. Progs. .18 -.00 .04
Occupation .15 -.00 -.10

Equality Values -.18 .24 -.01

Foreign Policy .42 -.25 .21
Affect, Catholics -.13 .27 -.01
Affect - Minorities -.19 .36 -.03
Male .17 -.25 -.17
Minority Issues -.10 .34 -.15
Rural Birth .09 -.07 .35
South .01 -.02 .01

School Prayer .31 .03 .36

Evangelical Denanin. .09 -.10 .43
Republican .30 -.02 .35
Gender Equality Values -.30 .25 -.27
Incame .09 -.00 -.17
Age -.02 -.13 .16
Education -.08 .10 -.18

Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means

Function 1 Function 2 Function 3

Support Neither -.43 -.04 -.08

Support Moral Majority .56 -.86 -.08
Support Pro-Life .43 .25 -.47
Support Both 1.77 -.28 -.38

Percentage Predicted Correctly

Support Neither 63%
Support Moral Majority 47%
Support Pro-Life 40%
Support Both 69%

Total 58%

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 387

The Moral Majority supporters may fail to support the anti-abortion movement
in part because of their anti-Catholicism. To further test this explanation, we
repeated our discriminant analysis, selecting only Protestant respondents and in-
cluding a measure of affect toward Catholics as an independent variable. The
results were substantively similar to our earlier results, with some interesting
differences. The data are presented in Table 3. In this analysis, the second function
discriminated between those who supported only the Moral Majority and those
who supported the anti-abortion movement, and affect toward Catholic loaded
heavily on this function. This would suggest that anti-Catholicism is an important
barrier in the expansion of the Christian Right coalition to include pro-life Catho-
lics.
An additional discriminant analysis (not shown) suggests that Catholics may
respond to this anti-Catholicism: among Catholics, those who attend church most
frequently and those who feel the greatest positive affect toward other Catholics are
the least likely support the Moral Majority.

Conclusions

The data suggest that in part we can view support for these two organizations as
additive: the function associated with the lion's share of the common variance is
best interpreted as tapping support for the Right, with Moral Majority and pro-life
supporters equally associated with the function. Important differences between
those who support only one or the other of these two organizations emerge,
however. Those who support only the pro-life movement are more moderate politi-
cally, more likely to be Catholic, to oppose school prayer, and more egalitarian in
their values. Among the most important distinguishing variables are religious
variables, with evangelicals and Catholics supporting different organizations.
Those who support both sets of groups seem to be those who hold evangelical
beliefs and attend church frequently, though not necessarily in an evangelical
denomination.
Two sets of barriers have kept the predicted Christian Right coalition from
emerging. First, those who support the pro-life movement, (and in particular
Catholic supporters) are political moderates who support greater equality for
blacks and women, as well as spending for social programs. These moderates are
doubtlessly not attracted to the consistent conservatism of the Moral Majority
leadership and supporters. Second, many of the supporters of the Moral Majority
have not attempted to form political bridges, in part because of anti-Catholic
sentiments.

NOTES

1. We would like to thank Elizabeth Cook and anonymous reviewers for helpf
comments. The data was collected by the Center for Political Studies at the Univ
sity of Michigan, and made available by the Inter-University Consortium f
Political and Social Research. The authors alone bear the responsibilities for
analysis and interpretations.

2. For details of scale construction, contact the authors.

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388

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