Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, Jan.
3, 1963 Gibbs and his wife were American nationals, domiciled in
FACTS:
Edward Christensen, who at his death was a US citizen but
domiciled in the Philippines, left a will, devising unto Maria
Helen a certain amount of money and giving the rest of his
estate to Maria Lucy. Helen opposed the partition on the
ground that she is deprived of her legitime. Her contention
is that the law of California directs that the law of the
domicile (Philippines) should govern the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law or the domiciliary
law should apply
HELD:
The intrinsic validity of wills is governed by the national
law of the decedent. In the present case, the national law
of Edward is the laws of California. However, there were
two conflicting California laws regarding succession. One is
enunciated in In Re Kaufman (which does not provide for
legitimes) and another is Art. 946 of the California Civil
Code (which provides that the law of the domicile
applies). SC held that the national law is Art. 946, which is
the conflict of laws rule of California. The reason is that In
Re Kaufman applies only to residents while Art. 946 is
specific to non-residents. Thus, since Art. 946 contains a
refer-back to Philippine laws (the law of the domicile), then
Maria Helen is entitled to her legitime.
Bellis vs. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, a US citizen, died a resident of Texas. He left
two wills -- one devising a certain amount of money to his
first wife and three illegitimate children and another,
leaving the rest of his estate to his seven legitimate
children. Before partition, the illegitimate children who are
Filipinos opposed on the ground that they are deprived of
their legitimes.
ISSUE: Whether the applicable law is Texas law or
Philippine laws
HELD:
Applying the nationality rule, the law of Texas should
govern the intrinsic validity of the will and therefore
answer the question on entitlement to legitimes. But since
the law of Texas was never proven, the doctrine of
processual presumption was applied. Hence, SC assumed
that Texas law is the same as Philippine laws, which
upholds the nationality rule.
Renvoi doctrine is not applicable because there is no
conflict as to the nationality and domicile of Bellis. He is
both a citizen and a resident of Texas. So even if assuming
the law of Texas applies the domiciliary rule, it is still
Texas law that governs because his domicile is Texas.
Gibbs v. Government of Philippine Islands
Facts:
Private International Law
California. They acquired lands in the Philippines. The wife
died in California. Gibbs was appointed administrator of
the intestate proceedings instituted in Manila. Gibbs asked
the court to adjudicate to him lands acquired in the
Philippines not under our laws on succession but because
in accordance with the law of California, the community
property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon
the death of the wife previous to that of the husband,
belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without
administration. CFI granted such to Gibbs upon proof of
California law. The register of deeds refused to transfer
such properties on the ground of non-payment of
inheritance tax. Gibbs argued that the conjugal right of a
California wife in a community property is a personal right
and even if this was a case of succession, California law
would still apply.
Issue: is Gibbs exempt from inheritance tax?
Held:
The appellee contends that the law of California should
determine the nature and extent of the title, if any, that
was vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs citing article 9 of the
Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her
title under said certificates be governed by the law of the
Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the
succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of
article 10 of the Civil Code. It is argued that the conjugal
right of the California wife in community real estate in the
Philippine Islands is a personal right and must, therefore,
be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is,
the law of California. But our attention has not been called
to any law of California that incapacitates a married
woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign
jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitae.
The trial court found that under the law of California,
upon the death of the wife, the entire community
property without administration belongs to the surviving
husband; that he is the absolute owner of all the
community property from the moment of the death of
his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her
death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of
the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the
community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary
of his deceased wife, but because she never had more
than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is
extinguished upon her death. However, the argument of
the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes
nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how can the
second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the
appellee be heard to say that there is a legal succession
under the law of the Philippine Islands and no legal
succession under the law of California? It seems clear that
the second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a
legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the
Philippines and in accordance with the law of the
Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in
regard to the order of succession or the extent of the
successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph
Page 1
of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was
vested with a descendible interest in property within the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
However, the court held that it is principle firmly
established that to the law of the state in which the land
is situated we must look for the rules which govern its
descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances. This
fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of
article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property
is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof;
real property to the laws of the country in which it is
situated.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the
jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the
acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes
immediately vested with an interest and title therein
equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of
management and disposition which the law vests in the
husband. It results that the wife of the appellee was, by
the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible
interest, equal to that of her husband and the descendible
interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was
transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this
transmission plainly falls within the language of section
1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative
Code which levies a tax on inheritances.
Fleumer vs. Hix
54 Phil 610
Facts:
The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate
of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latters will was
executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3,
1925 by Hix who had his residence in that
jurisdicti on, and that the laws of that state govern.
To this end, the peti ti oner submitted a copy of
Secti on 3868 of Acts 1882, c.84 as found in West
Virginia Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2
1914, p. 1690 and as certi fi ed to by the Director of
Nati onal Library.
The Judge of the First Instance however denied the
probate of the will on the grounds that the will did not
show the following:
acknowledgment by Hix in the presence of 2
competent witnesses
Witnesses subscribed to will in presence of the
testator, and of each other
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdicti on the
existence of such law in West Virginia as a
prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said
will?
Held:
Private International Law
Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdicti on do not
prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the
Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the laws of the various states of the
American Union. Such laws must be proved as
facts.
Here the requirements of the law were not met.
There was no showing that the book from
which an extract was taken was printed or
published under the authority of the state of
West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the offi cer having charge of the
original, under the seal of the State of West
Virginia as provided in Sec 301.
No evidence was introduced showing that the
extract from the laws of West Virginia was in
force at the ti me the alleged will was executed.
Due execution of the will was not established: only
showed testimony of the petitioner
The court therefore did not err in denying the
probate of the will. The existence of such law in
West
Virginia must be proved.
Miciano v. Brimo
Decedent is a Turkish citizen. He left a will stating that he
wishes to dispose of his properties in accordance with
Philippine Laws. His brother, Andre Brimo opposed the
partition. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact
that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for
which reason they are void as being in violation or article
10 of the Civil Code which states that testamentary
successions shall be governed by the national law of the
deceased. He was therefore excluded from the inheritance
pursuant to a clause in the decedents will that anyone
who would oppose the decedents wish to dispose his
estate under Philippine law shall have his share annul or
cancelled.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration that Turkish laws are
impertinent to this case;
Whether or not the appellants exclusion from the will is
valid?
Held:
1st issue
The oppositor did not prove that said testamentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws,
inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing
what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the
absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines.
Page 2
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to
prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, the Court
finds no abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court
in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the
record that the national law of the testator Joseph G.
Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in
question which, not being contrary to our laws in force,
must be complied with and executed.
2nd issue
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and
the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect
the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides
the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law
or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly
ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national
law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.
death of Hodges and not in any other
time.
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on
the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the
evidence that would be presented in the probate court.
Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at
any other time).
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the national
law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found, shall prevail. However, the
Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the national law of the
testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary
law (Philippine law see paragraph 2, supra) should
govern the testamentary dispositions and successional
rights over movables (personal properties), and the law of
the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to
properties located in the Philippines) with regards
immovable (real properties). Thus applying the Renvoi
Doctrine, as approved and applied by our Supreme Court
in the case of In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of
Eduard E. Christensen, G.R. No. L-16749, promulgated
January 31, 1963, Philippine law should apply to the Will
of Linnie Jane Hodges and to the successional rights to
her estate insofar as her movable and immovable assets
in the Philippines are concerned. We shall not, at this
stage, discuss what law should govern the assets of Linnie
Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma and Texas, because the
only assets in issue in this motion are those within the
jurisdiction of this motion Court in the two above-
captioned Special Proceedings.
Nota bene: When can foreign law be given judicial notice

PCIB VS. ESCOLIN 1. If the court of the forum is familiar of the law
56 SCRA 266 2. Or it is within the actual knowledge of the court

FACTS: Suntay v. Suntay

Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions Jose B. Suntay died intestate leaving properties in the
to her husband. At the time of her Philippines and a house in China. He is survived by children
from the 1st marriage and a child and his widow from the
death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however
2nd. Intestate proceedings were instituted. Thereafter the
domiciled in the Philippines. To see whether widow filed a petition for a probate of a will but was later
the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and denied when the will was lost after the filing of said
necessary to know what law should be petition. On appeal, the petition was granted since there
applied. was sufficiency to prove the loss of the will. In spite of the
fact that a commission from the probate court was issued
on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh,
ISSUE:
an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the
probate court denied a motion for continuance of the
Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.
hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving
widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime the
RULING: Pacific War supervened. After liberation, Silvino claimed to
have found a will by his father which was filed, recorded
Prior evidence already presented to prove the existence of and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of
Fookien, China and thus filed a petition in the intestate
Texas Law.
proceedings praying for the probate of the will.

It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it

Issue:
must be proven whether a renvoi will
happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary May a will filed, recorded, and probated in China be
provisions valid. In line with Texas law, reprobated in the Philippines?
that which should be proven is the law enforced during the

Private International Law Page 3

Held:
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January
1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule 78.
Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country,
according to the laws of such country, may be
allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper
Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance
thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a
petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the
executor or other person interested, in the court
having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and
place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof
to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should
be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so
allow it, and a certificate of its allowance,
signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of
the courts, to which shall be attached a copy of
the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk,
and the will shall have the same effect as if
originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China,
is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on
procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also
be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a
valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.
The unverified answers to the questions propounded by
counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the
Republic of China objected to by counsel for the appellee,
are inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the
office of Consul General does not qualify and make the
person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on
procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted,
the adverse party would be deprived of his right to
confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are
appointed to attend to trade matters.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China,
does not purport to probate or allow the will which was
the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will
and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have
been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the
probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the
municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed
and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or
allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to
therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a
competent court of this country.
Likewise, the proceedings had in the municipal district
court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the
Private International Law
testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that
the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not
purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that
the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and
on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may
be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of
probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a
deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it
were so it does not measure same as those provided for in
our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for
the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties must be
made. The interested parties in the case were known to
reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no
such notice was received by the interested parties
residing in the Philippines. The proceedings had in the
municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to
or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the
Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and
the proceedings were held at the back of such interested
parties.
The decree appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
In re: Johnson
Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized
citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila,
leaving a holographic will and is signed by himself and two
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, a
petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground
that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the
State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was
duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State;
and hence could properly be probated here. Petitioner
contends that the decedent is not a citizen of Illinois and
prays to annul the decree of probate and put the estate
into intestate administration, thus preparing the way for
the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole
legitimate heir of her father.
Issue:
Whether or not judgment from which the petitioner seeks
relief should be set aside because the testator was not a
resident of the State of Illinois and the will was not in
conformity with the laws of that State.
Held:
Emil Johnson was a citizen of the State of Illinois. In the
absence of clear proof to the contrary it should be
presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a certain
State thereby becomes a citizen of that State as well as of
the United States.
In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared
that "the allowance by the court of a will of real or
personal property shall be conclusive as to its due
execution."
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a
number of matters, such as the age and mental capacity of
Page 4
the testator, the signing of the document by the testator,
or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of
the instrument by him in the presence of the required
number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will
to attest the act. The proof of all these requisites is
involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them
the probate is conclusive. Our reported cases do not
contain the slightest intimation that a will which has been
probated according to law, and without fraud, can be
annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on account of
any supposed irregularity or defect in the execution of the
will or on account of any error in the action of the court
upon the proof adduced before it.
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of
one State leaves it and takes up his abode in another State
with no intention of returning, he immediately acquires
citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This is in
accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which
says that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of
the State where in he resides. The effect of this provision
necessarily is that a person transferring his domicile from
one State to another loses his citizenship in the State of
his original above upon acquiring citizenship in the State
of his new abode. The acquisition of the new State
citizenship extinguishes the old. That situation, in our
opinion, has no analogy to that which arises when a
citizen of an American State comes to reside in the
Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new
citizenship; nor by the mere change of domicile does he
lose that which he brought with him.
Proper rule in taking judicial notice: The proper rule is to
require proof of the statutes of the States of the American
Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the
issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Collector vs. Fisher
Facts:
This case relates to the determination and settlement of
the hereditary estate left by the deceased Walter G.
Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G.
Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of
British parents and married in the City of Manila on
January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another
British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and
established their permanent residence since May 10,
1945. In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22,
1947, and which was duly probated in the Superior Court
of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted his
wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and
personal properties acquired by the spouses while
residing in the Philippines.
Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the
estate in the Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was
duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray Statt
was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate, filed a
preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the
reservation of having the properties declared therein
finally appraised at their values six months after the death
of Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary
administrator in order to secure the waiver of the Collector
of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose in the
Private International Law
United States. Acting upon said return, the Collector of
Internal Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal
properties declared therein, but increased the appraisal of
the two parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing
their fair market value. After allowing the deductions
claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses
in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and
administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the
Collector assessed the state the amount of P5,147.98 for
estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a total of
P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the
estate.
The ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and
inheritance tax return in pursuance of his reservation
made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and
for the purpose of availing of the right granted by section
91 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and
interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina
Fisher, respondents herein.
The ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate
and inheritance tax return. This return declared the same
assets of the estate stated in the amended return of
September 22, 1952, except that it contained new claims
for additional exemption and deduction to wit: (1)
deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross
estate of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4)
of the U.S. Federal Internal Revenue Code which the
ancillary administrator averred was allowable by way of
the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax
Appeals in case No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector,"
August 14, 1952; and (2) exemption from the imposition
of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. also
pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. In this last return, the
estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of
P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and
that, as a consequence, it had overpaid the government.
The refund of the amount of P15,259.83, allegedly
overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. The
Collector denied the claim. For this reason, action was
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondents, as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson,
for the recovery of said amount. Pursuant to Republic Act
No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the Court of Tax
Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered decision :
that: (a) the one-half () share of the surviving spouse in
the conjugal partnership property as diminished by the
obligations properly chargeable to such property should be
deducted from the net estate of the deceased Walter G.
Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the National
Internal Revenue Code; (b) the intangible personal
property belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is
exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the provision of
section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in
relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but
decedent's estate is not entitled to an exemption of
P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c) for
purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real
estate of the spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d)
the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for
funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.
Issue: whether or not foreign law needs to be proved in
our jurisdiction?
Ruling:
Page 5

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved. Section 41, Rule
123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving
foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we
believe it desirable that these laws be proved in
accordance with said rule, we held in the case
of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471,
that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil
Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one
that these sections do not exclude the presentation of
other competent evidence to prove the existence of a
foreign law." In that case, we considered the testimony of
an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California who
quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and
who stated that the same was in force at the time the
obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. In line with this view,
we find no error, therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in
considering the pertinent California law as proved by
respondents' witness.
Phil Trust Company vs. Bohanan
Facts:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding, dismissing the
objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan
and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted
by the executor and approving the said project.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo,
presiding, admitted to probate a last will and testament of
C. O. Bohanan, executed by him in Manila. In the said
order, the court made the following findings:
According to the evidence of the opponents the testator
was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state,
or at least a citizen of California where some of his
properties are located. This contention is untenable.
Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the
Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he
continued and remained to be a citizen of the United
States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend
the rest of his days in that state. His permanent residence
or domicile in the United States depended upon his
personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his
homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he was a
citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or
permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive
personal right.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan
was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States
and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and
testament, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state
of Nevada and admits the same to probate. Accordingly,
the Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of
the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and upon
the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00.
The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24,
1956, making adjudications, in accordance with the
provisions of the will.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children
question the validity of the testamentary provisions
disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated,
claiming that they have been deprived of the legitime
that the laws of the forum concede to them.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30,
1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20,
Private International Law
1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan
married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at
the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to
share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists
in the State of Nevada and since the court below had
already found that there was no conjugal property
between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the
latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the
estate left by the testator.
Issue:
whether the estementary dispositions, especially those for
the children which are short of the legitime given them by
the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid?
Ruling:
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case
because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be earned
by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question. Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent
of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question, whatever may be
the nature of the property and the country in which it is
found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as
par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found
out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of
the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his
domicile and his permanent residence. It is not disputed
that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all
his properties by will. It does not appear that at time of the
hearing of the project of partition, the above-quoted
provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the
executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign
law can only be proved in our courts in the form and
manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. An official
record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . .
(Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the
court below and we have found that during the hearing on
October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan
for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law,
especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws was
introduced in evidence by appellant's counsel. Again said
laws presented by the counsel for the executor and
admitted by the Court during the hearing of the case on
before Judge Rafael Amparo.
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator,
do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of
the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances,
we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of
Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada
Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us,
without proof of such law having been offered at the
hearing of the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the
validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by
the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided
Page 6
and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator
is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above,
which allows a testator to dispose of all his property
according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the
court approving the project of partition made in
accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as
it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Zalamea vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea,
and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3)
airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent
TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los
Angeles.
The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a
discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare
ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed
reservations.
Petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their
reservations for said flight. On the appointed date,
however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour
earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were
placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers
who had checked in before them had already taken all the
seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as
the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas
were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the
42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names were
eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles,
including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the
other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were
not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets
were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers.
Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his
daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife
and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were
denied boarding.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea
and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it
was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book
in another flight and purchased two tickets from American
Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00)
Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an
action for damages based on breach of contract of air
carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. As
aforesaid, the lower court ruled in favor of petitioners.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that
moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit
predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a
matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common
and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and
is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal
Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor
bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld
Airlines.
Ruling:
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of
respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to
board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed
tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation
allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by
Private International Law
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such
officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a
secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. 7
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms.
Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her
deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of
Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official
publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis
in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does
exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in
accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which
require that the law of the place where the airline ticket
was issued should be applied by the court where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and
the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. 8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be
Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking
amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned
to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court
of Appeals, 9 where passengers with confirmed bookings
were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held
that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger
confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a
contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every
right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that
date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit
for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had
deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to
deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them
would show up for the check in. For the indignity and
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the
last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral
damages.
Wild Valley Shipping Co. Vs. CA
Facts:
The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine
President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in
Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore.
Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel
was ready to leave port, an official pilot of Venezuela, was
designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to
navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River.
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it
entered the San Roque Channel. The vessel proceeded on
its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the
vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel.
The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel
and verified that it was in the centre of the channel.
The Philippine Roxas ran around in the Orinoco River, thus
obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel
owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company,
Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a
suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III
against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer
Page 7
Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine
Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and
interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus
attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.
Issue: whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the
case at bar?
Ruling:
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible,
the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be
attested by the officer having legal custody of the records
or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a
certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or
foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The
latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is
intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the
genuineness of a document in a foreign country.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is
objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a
foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires
that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the
statute.
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan
law was not pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an
allegation in the pleading about the existence of the
foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the
event or transaction in issue.
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never
alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of
the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international
law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as
a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a
foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same
as our own local or domestic law and this is known as
processual presumption.
Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa
Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of
William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the
citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June
27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila
from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of
Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration
and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in
Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of
the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and
sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the
Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification
certificate to William. The board of commissioners was
directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases
where entry was granted on the ground that the entrant
was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As
a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry
which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the
Private International Law
Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an
order affirming the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and
Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and was
released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the
29th of the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to
dismiss was filed but denied.
Issue:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a
Filipino citizen
Held:
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having
declared the assailed marriage as valid, respondent
William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a
Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class
of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of the constitution.
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA
292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration
(supra), this Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in
Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship
of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an
administrative agency, as a material issue in the
controversy, after a full-blown hearing with the active
participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the
party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter
shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship
in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in
no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in
such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any
other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance
with the procedure herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be
applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a
material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution thereof,
and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Doctrine of processual presumption
Civil Code
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. (9a)
Page 8
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the
country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
(10a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed
before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which
have, for their object, public order,
public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous marriages as determined by
Philippine law. (19a)
Art. 124. If the marriage is between a citizen of
the Philippines and a foreigner,
whether celebrated in the Philippines
or abroad, the following rules shall
prevail:
1. If the husband is a citizen of the
Philippines while the wife is a
foreigner, the provisions of this
Code shall govern their relations;
2. If the husband is a foreigner and
the wife is a citizen of the
Philippines, the laws of the
husband's country shall be
followed, without prejudice to the
provisions of this Code with
regard to immovable property.
(1325a)
Private International Law
Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country,
he is authorized to make a will in any of
the forms established by the law of the
country in which he may be. Such will
may be probated in the Philippines. (n)
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if
made with the formalities prescribed
by the law of the place in which he
resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in
conformity with those which this Code
prescribes. (n)
Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a
will jointly, or in the same instrument,
either for their reciprocal benefit or for
the benefit of a third person. (669)
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding
article, executed by Filipinos in a
foreign country shall not be valid in the
Philippines, even though authorized by
the laws of the country where they
may have been executed. (733a)
Art. 829. A revocation done outside the
Philippines, by a person who does not
have his domicile in this country, is
valid when it is done according to the
law of the place where the will was
made, or according to the law of the
place in which the testator had his
domicile at the time; and if the
revocation takes place in this country,
when it is in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. (n)
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the
law of the nation of the decedent. (n)
Rule 132 Sec. 25
What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy
of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court. (26a)
Rule 130
Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of
statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the
truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation
and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39)
Section 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise,
periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science,
or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a
matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a
Page 9
witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of
the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is
recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the
subject. (40a)
How to acquire nationality
1. by birth
2. by repatriation
3. by naturalization
4. by subrogation and cession
how to lose a nationality
1. release
2. deprivation
3. expiration
4. renunciation
domicile
1. intent to stay
2. physical presence
3. conduct indicative of such intention
Rep. Act No. 9225
signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August
29, 2003
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens
of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of
the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be
deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who
retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
Private International Law
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
1. Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage
must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
2. Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;
3. Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe
and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That
they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country
where they took that oath;
4. Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
5. That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by,
or extended to, those who:
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public
office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or
b. are in the active service as commissioned or
noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of
the country which they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of
this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other
section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid
and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules
and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or
mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
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 3. Those born before January
17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who
are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry
aliens shall retain their citizenship,
unless by their act or omission, they
are deemed, under the law, to have
renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law.
NCC Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. (9a)
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the
country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
(10a)
Art. 66. When either or both of the contracting
parties are citizens or subjects of a
foreign country, it shall be necessary,
before a marriage license can be
obtained, to provide themselves with a
certificate of legal capacity to contract
marriage, to be issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular
officials. (13a)
Private International Law
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the
law of the nation of the decedent. (n)
Art. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is the
place of their habitual residence. (40a)
Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing
them, or any other provision does not
fix the domicile of juridical persons, the
same shall be understood to be the
place where their legal representation
is established or where they exercise
their principal functions. (41a)
Art. 99. No person shall be entitled to a legal
separation who has not resided in the
Philippines for one year prior to the
filing of the petition, unless the cause
for the legal separation has taken place
within the territory of this Republic.
(Sec. 2a, Act No. 2710)
Art. 1251. Payment shall be made in the place
designated in the obligation.
There being no express stipulation and
if the undertaking is to deliver a
determinate thing, the payment shall
be made wherever the thing might be
at the moment the obligation was
constituted.
In any other case the place of payment
shall be the domicile of the debtor.
If the debtor changes his domicile in
bad faith or after he has incurred in
delay, the additional expenses shall be
borne by him.
These provisions are without prejudice
to venue under the Rules of Court.
(1171a)
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized in Chapter 2 of
this Title, but not those under Article
75, no marriage shall be solemnized
without a license first being issued by
the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides. (7a)
Art. 829. A revocation done outside the
Philippines, by a person who does not
have his domicile in this country, is
valid when it is done according to the
law of the place where the will was
made, or according to the law of the
place in which the testator had his
domicile at the time; and if the
revocation takes place in this country,
Page 11
 when it is in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. (n)
Cases:
AASJS vs. Datumanong
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007
Sec. 3, RA 9225 stayed clear of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue
of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned
foreign country.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent,
then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official
tasked to implement laws governing citizenship in order to
prevent the Justice Secretary from implementing R. A.
9225. Petitioner argues that RA 9225 is unconstitutional as
it violates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which states
that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to national
interest and shall be dealt with by law. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely
declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further
claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual
allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino
citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his
foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the
oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the
Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation
of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.
Issue:
Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional and whether the
court
Held:
R.A. 9225 is constitutional and that the Court has no
jurisdiction yet to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance.
The court held that that the intent of the legislature in
drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes
away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What
Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-
born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.
By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic,
the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out
of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden
Private International Law
of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern
of Rep. Act No. 9225.
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be
dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is
enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any
jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.
Moreover, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on
dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225,
the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per
se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate
to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what
really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it
would be premature for the judicial department, including
this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
ELLIS V. REPUBLIC
7 SCRA 962
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco,
California and is married to Gloria G. Ellis in Banger, Maine,
United States. Both are citizens of the United States. Baby
Rose was born on September 26, 1959. Four or five days
later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary
Villa an institution for unwed mothers and their babies
stating that she (the mother) could not take of Rose
without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's family.).
Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs.
Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby.
At the time of the hearing of the petition on January 14,
1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in
the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned
thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force
Base, in Angeles, Pampanga where both lived at that time.
They had been in the Philippines before, or, to exact, in
1953.
Issue:
Whether or not being permanent residents in the
Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose.
Held:
Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the
Philippines and, hence, non-resident aliens the Court
cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over the status,
under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary
theory.
Page 12
Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides
that:
"The following cannot adopt:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Non-resident aliens;".
xxx xxx xxx
This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation.
Since adoption is a proceedings in rem, no court may
entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the
subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also
over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as
well as that of petitioners herein.
Art. 15 adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the
status of a natural person is determined by the latters'
nationality. Pursuant to this theory, the Court has
jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a
citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the
petitioners, who are foreigners.
Under the Philippines political law, which is patterned
after the Anglo-American legal system, the Court have,
likewise, adopted the latter's view to the effect that
personal status, in general, is determined by and/or
subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary law
(Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The
Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-
714).
This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not
permit adoption by non-resident aliens, and we have
consistently refused to recognize the validity of foreign
decrees of divorce regardless of the grounds upon
which the same are based involving citizens of the
Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum,
even when our laws authorized absolute divorce in the
Philippines (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v.
Hashim, 30 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix v. Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851;
Barretto Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden,
L-6897, Nov. 29, 1955)".
Republic v. Maddela
27 SCRA 702
This is a petition to have the petitioners Miguela Tan Suat,
and Chan Po Lan, all Chinese Nationals, to be declared a
Filipino citizens.
That sometime in the year 1937 Miguela was legally
married to Sy Ing Seng, a Filipino citizen; likewise, in the
year 1961, Chan Po Lan was legally married to Cu Bon Piao,
a Filipino citizen; and that the petitioners have all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become
Filipino citizens.
The court inquired from Fiscal Veluz, who represents the
Solicitor General, if he has any opposition to the petition to
which the Fiscal answered that he has no opposition. The
Court had it announced to the public if there is any
opposition to the petitions of both to be declared a Filipino
citizen and nobody in the crowded courtroom registered
his opposition.
Private International Law
As such, the petitioners Miguela Tan Suat and Chan Po Lan
were declared a Filipino citizens by marriage and the
Commissioner of Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel
the necessary alien certificate of registration and
immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner and to
issue the corresponding identification card.
The Solicitor General filed the instant petitions instead,
including the Commissioner of Immigration as co-
petitioner in view of the fact that the dispositive parts of
the decisions of the lower court are addressed to him for
compliance.
Issue:
Whether or not a person claiming to be a citizen may get a
judicial declaration of citizenship.
Held:
Under Philippine laws, there can be no action or
proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship
of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement
of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned
by law, for said breach of right.
As an incident only of the adjudication of the right of the
parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and
make a pronouncement relative to, their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial
power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be
instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or
petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child,
although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary
premise to justify a given relief available only to one
enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the
acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization by
judicial decree. But there is no similar legislation
authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to
declare that a given person is a Filipino Citizen. (Tan v.
Republic, L-14159, April 18, 1960).
Burca v. Republic
51 SCRA 248
1st case: Burca not granted citizenship because such power
is granted under the executive branch.
Moya Lim Yao: alien wife deemed ipso facto Filipino citizen
as long as no disqualifications, no need to prove the
qualifications;
Burca motion for reconsideration:
Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the decision in this case
which reversed that of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, the said court
have found her to be married to a Filipino citizen and to
possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become Filipino citizen enumerated in
the Naturalization Law.
Page 13
Issue:
Whether or not a court may grant a judicial declaration of
citizenship.
Held:
The Court cannot grant petitioner-appellee's prayer for the
affirmance of the trial court's judgment declaring her a
Filipino citizen. It must be noted that the sole and only
purpose of the petition is to have petitioner declared a
Filipino citizen. Under Philippine laws there can be no
judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. It is as an incident only of the
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy,
that the courts may pass upon, and make a
pronouncement relative to, their status.
In Moy Ya Lim Yao, the Court emphasized the
administrative procedure that needs to be followed in the
Bureau Immigration regarding the steps to be taken by an
alien woman married to a Filipino for the cancellation of
her alien certificate of registration, and thus secure
recognition of her status Filipino citizen. Such a procedure
could be availed of Petitioner. Judicial recourse would be
avoidable to Petitioner in case of an adverse action by the
Immigration Commissioner.
However, if the decision of an administrative agency on
the question of citizenship, is affirmed by this Court on
the ground that the same is supported by substantial
evidence on the whole record, there appears to be no
valid reason why such finding should have no conclusive
effect in other cases, where the same issue is involved.
The same observation holds true with respect to a decision
of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter
in issue in the case before it, which is affirmed by this
Court. For the "effective operation of courts in the social
and economic scheme requires that their decision have the
respect of and be observed by the parties, the general
public and the courts themselves. According insufficient
weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and
disregard of courts and their decisions and invites
litigation" (Clear, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 Yale Law
Journal, 345).
Wherefore, the Court declared it to be a sound rule, that
where citizenship of a party in a case is definitely
resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a
material issue in controversy, after a full-blown hearing,
with the act participation of the Solicitor General or his
authority representative, and this finding on the
Citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the
decision on the matter shows constitute conclusive proof
of such person's citizenship, in another case or
proceeding. But it is made clear that in instance will a
decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be
considered conclusive or binding in any other case
proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the
procedure herein stated.
Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner
Private International Law
41 SCRA 292
Facts:
On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a
passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant.
In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at
Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great-grand-
uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961,
and was permitted to stay for a period of one month
which would expire on 13 April 1961. On the date of her
arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen
Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or
before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in
this country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow. After repeated
extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962,
she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner
of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest
and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with
preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place
one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that
Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog.
Except for a few words, she could not speak either English
or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with
a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the
names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. The Court
of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the
prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau
Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino
citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Held:
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino
citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim
Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
January 1962.
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien
woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided
that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires
Page 14
to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a
parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen
hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common
sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws
of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand
today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for
naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own
citizenship settled and established so that she may not
have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to
perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no
proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of
marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the
case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even
as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a
person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.
Nota bene:
There are two laws, which govern the Loss of Philippine
citizenship. These are Commonwealth Act No. 63 and
Commonwealth Act No. 473. The former applies to both
natural-born and naturalized citizens and the latter applies
only to naturalized citizens.
As stated in Commonwealth Act. No. 63,
A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
1. By naturalization in a foreign country;
2. By express renunciation of citizenship;
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more: Provided,
however, That a Filipino may not divest himself of
Philippine citizenship in any manner while the
Republic of the Philippines is at war with any
country;
4. By rendering services to, or accepting commission
in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided,
That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of
such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance
incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his
Philippine citizenship if either of the following
circumstances is present:
a. The Republic of the Philippines has a
defensive and/or offensive pact of
Private International Law
alliance with the said foreign country;
or
b. The said foreign country maintains
armed forces on Philippine territory
with the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines: Provided, That the
Filipino citizen concerned, at the time
of rendering said service, or
acceptance of said commission, and
taking the oath of allegiance incident
thereto, states that he does so only in
connection with his service to said
foreign country: And provided, finally,
That any Filipino citizen who is
rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a
foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph
(a) or (b), shall not be permitted to
participate nor vote in any election of
the Republic of the Philippines during
the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of
said foreign country. Upon his
discharge from the service of the said
foreign country, he shall be
automatically entitled to the full
enjoyment of his civil and political
rights as a Filipino citizen;
5. By cancellation of the of the certificates of
naturalization;
6. By having been declared by competent authority, a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of
war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or
amnesty has been granted; and
7. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a
foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husband's country, she acquires his nationality.
Commonwealth Act No. 473, Section 18 of said law
provides that:
A naturalization certificate may be cancelled by a
competent judge on any of the following grounds:
1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate
was obtained fraudulently or illegally;
2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years
next following the issuance of said
naturalization certificated, return to his native
country or to some foreign country and
establish his permanent residence there:
Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized
remaining for more than one year in his native
country or the country of his former nationality,
or two years in any other foreign country, shall
be considered prima facie evidence of his
intention of taking up his permanent residence in
the same;
3. If the petition was made on an invalid
declaration of intention
Page 15
 4. If it is shown that the minor children of the
person naturalized failed to graduate from a
public high school recognized by the Office of
Private Education of the Philippines, where
Philippine history, government and civics are
taught as part of the school curriculum, through
the fault of their parents either by neglecting to
support them or by transferring them to another
school or schools. A certified copy of the decree
of naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by
the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior
and the Bureau of Justice.
5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has
allowed himself to be used as a dummy in
violation of the constitutional provisions
requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for
the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right,
franchise or privilege.
The main reason why a decision in a naturalization
proceeding is not res judicata is because such is not a
judicial adversarial proceeding. Similarly, estoppel or
laches cannot apply to the government in action for the
cancellation of a certificate of naturalization, since it is a
known principle that the government is never estopped by
the mistakes on the part of its agents.
However, according to the Constitution, marriage to an
alien would not automatically divest a person of his
citizenship, unless he or she performs certain acts or
omission which would result to the loss of his or her
citizenship. This provision, however, is not retroactive;
thus, does not repatriate those who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
Oh Hek How v. Republic
29 SCRA 94
Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization
through his petition filed a motion alleging that he had
complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530
and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of
allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding
certificate of naturalization.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued
forthwith an order authorizing the taking of said oath. On
that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to
appeal from said order of February 9, 1966 and filed its
record on appeal among the grounds that the oath was
taken prior to judgment having been final and executor.
Issue:
Is the oath valid?
Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is
necessary from the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist
China.
Private International Law
Held:
First issue:
The order of February 9, 1966 (oath-taking) had not
and up to the present has not become final and
executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the
Government.
2nd Issue:
It is argued that the permission is not required by our
laws and that the naturalization of an alien, as a citizen of
the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and
cannot be controlled by any foreign law. However, the
question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of
that status is necessarily governed pursuant to Articles
15 and 16 of our Civil Code by the laws of China, not by
those of the Philippines.
As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be
naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, unless he has
complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring
previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the
renunciation of nationality.
Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
provides, however, that before the naturalization
certificate is issued, the petitioner shall
"solemnly swear," inter alia, that he renounces
"absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate" and particularly
to the state "of which" he is "a subject or
citizen." The obvious purpose of this
requirement is to divest him of his former
nationality, before acquiring Philippine
citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have
two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2)
distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not
permit, except that, pursuant to Republic Act No.
2639, "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-
born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and
any friendly democratic Ibero-American
countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of
his Philippine citizenship, if the law of that
country grants the same privilege to its citizens
and such had been agreed upon by treaty
between the Philippines and the foreign country
from which citizenship is acquired."
Tecson v. Comelec
424 SCRA 277
Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to
be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth
Page 16
to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. And even if Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of
the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F.
Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ.
Issue:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed
to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines.
Held:
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines
was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his
place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ.
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa
Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of
William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the
citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June
27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila
from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of
Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration
and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in
Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of
the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and
sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and
Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and was
released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the
29th of the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari
Private International Law
and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to
dismiss was filed but denied.
Petitioners, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of
their position, petitioners point out that Santiago
Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as
the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to
Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by
any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony
nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It
is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said
marriages to be valid in this country, it should have been
shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein
the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners
conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be
considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including
Francisco, followed the citizenship of their mother, having
been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the
validity of the Francisco's marriage not having been
demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the
citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
Issue:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a
Filipino citizen
Held:
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector
of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a
particular subject are presumed to be the same as those
of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof
of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the
presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be
blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent
William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor.
The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed
by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws
of China relating to marriage, having been content with
the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate
was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of
China.
The testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco
Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration
authorities regarding their marriages, birth and
relationship to each other are not self-serving but are
admissible in evidence as statements or declarations
regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of
pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis,
adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages
contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of
the Family Code) provides that "all marriages performed
outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ."
And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity
and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage
may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is
answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In
case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
Page 17
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the
community of property during marriage, the authority of
parents over their children, and the validity of defense for
any member of the family in case of unlawful
aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in mind the
"processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and
other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid
under our law bears the burden of proof to present the
foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid,
respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of
his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the
latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the
legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is
admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order
dated July 12, 1960.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class
of Filipino citizens who became as such at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. . . .
Nota bene: for Gatchalian
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA
292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration
(supra), this Court declared that:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in
Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the
citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a
court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue
in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with the
active participation of the Solicitor General or his
authorized representative, and this finding or the
citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the
decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of
such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding.
But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on
the question of citizenship in such cases be considered
conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding,
unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein
stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be
applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a
material issue in a controversy where said person is a
party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution thereof,
and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
NUVAL VS. GURRAY
Facts:
This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio
Nuval from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of La Union, upholding the defense of
Private International Law
res judicata and dismissing the quo warranto
proceedings instituted by the said Gregorio
Nuval against Norbeto Guray and others, with
costs against the petitioner.
Gregorio Nuval filed, in his dual capacity as a
voter duly qualified and registered in the election
list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly
registered candidate for the office of municipal
president of said municipality, a petition against
Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his
name from the election list of said municipality,
not being a qualified voter of said municipality
and he had not resided therein for six months as
required by section 431 of the said
Administrative Code.
Norbeto Guray was elected to the office of
municipal president of Luna by a plurality of
votes, Gregorio Nuval obtaining second place.
Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo
warranto asking that Norberto Guray be
declared ineligible had a legal residence of one
year previous to the election as required by
section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in
order to be eligible to an elective municipal
office.
Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality
of Luna, his birthplace, where he had married
and had held the office of municipal treasurer.
On that date he was appointed municipal
treasurer of Balaoan, Province of La Union. The
rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, to
which Norberto Guray was subject as such
municipal treasurer, require that municipality
treasurers live continuously in the municipality
where they perform they official duties, in order
to be able to give an account of their acts as such
treasurers at any time. In order to qualify and be
in a position to vote as an elector in Balaoan in
the general election of 1925, Norberto Guray
asked for the cancellation of his name in the
election lists of Luna, where he had voted in the
general elections of 1922, alleging as a ground
therefore the following: "On the ground of
transfer of any residence which took place on
the 28th day of June, 1922. My correct and new
address is Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union;" and in
order to be registered in the subscribed affidavit
Exhibit F-1 before the board of election
inspectors of precinct No. 1 of Balaoan, by virtue
of which he was registered as an elector of the
said precinct, having made use of the right of
suffrage in said municipality in the general
elections of 1925. In his cedula certificates issued
by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan
from the year 1923 to 1928, included, he made it
appear that his residence was the residential
district of Balaoan. In the year 1926, his wife and
children who, up to that time, had lived in the
municipality of Balaoan, went back to live in the
town of Luna in the house of his wife's parents,
due to the high cost of living in that municipality.
Norberto Guray used to go home to Luna in the
Page 18
 afternoons after office hours, and there he
passed the nights with his family. His children
studied in the public school of Luna. In January,
1927, he commenced the construction of a
house of strong materials in Luna, which has
not yet been completed, and neither be nor his
family has lived in it. On February 1, 1928,
Norberto Guray applied for and obtained
vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the
16th of the same month he filed his resignation
by telegraph, which was accepted on the same
day, also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he
was already provided with a cedula by himself as
municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31,
1928, declaring him resident of said town, he
obtained another cedula from the municipality
of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was dated
January 15, 1928, in which it is presented that he
resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality of
Luna, Province of La Union. On February 23,
1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained
the cancellation of his name in the election list of
the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14,
1928, he applied for registration as a voter in
Luna, alleging that he had been residing in said
municipality for thirty years. For this purpose he
made of the cedula certificate antedated.
Issue:
Whether or not Norberto Guray had the legal residence of
one year immediately prior to the general elections of June
5, 1928, in order to be eligible to the office of municipal
president of Luna, Province of La Union?
Ruling:
It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his
residence in a state and acquires one in another state, he
cannot again vote in the state of his former residence
until he has qualified by a new period of residence" (20
Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28). "The term 'residence' as so
used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not
only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)
Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the
municipality of Luna and acquired another in Balaoan, in
order to vote and be a candidate in the municipality of
Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter
municipality for the length of time prescribed by the law,
and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to
do so, but his personal presence in said municipality.
VELILLA VS. POSADA
Facts:
That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta,
India, on February 18, 1931.
Private International Law
That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the
Philippine Islands a will, by virtue of which will,
he bequeathed all his property to his only sister,
Ida M. Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen
and resident of the State of New York, United
States of America.
That on February 24,1931, a petition for
appointment of special administrator of the
estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody
was filed by W. Maxwell Thebaut with the Court
of First Instance of Manila.
That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a
petition to the will of the deceased Arthur
Graydon Moody, and the same was, after
hearing, duly probated by the court in a decree
dated May 5, 1931.
That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was
declared to be the sole and only heiress of the
deceased Arthur Graydon Moody
That the property left by the late Arthur
Graydon Moody consisted principally of bonds
and shares of stock of corporations organized
under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank
deposits and other personal properties.
That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue prepared for the estate of the late
Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax
return.
That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return
for the fractional period from January 1, 1931 to
June 30, 1931, was also prepared by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue for the estate of the said
deceased Arthur Graydon Moody.
That on December 3, 1931, the committee on
claims and appraisals filed with the court its
report.
That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the
letter mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the
attorney for Ida M. Palmer another letter, copy of
which marked Exhibit NN is hereto attached and
made a part hereof.
That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon
Moody paid under protest the sum of P50,000
on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of
P40,019.75 on January 19, 1932, making
assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of
P13,001.41 covers the assessment for income tax
against said estate.
That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of
Internal Revenue overruled the protest made by
Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.
The parties reserve their right to introduce
additional evidence at the hearing of the present
case.
Page 19
 Manila, August 15, 1933.
In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of
facts, both parties introduced oral and
documentary evidence from which it appears
that Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came
to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and
engaged actively in business in these Islands up
to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on
February 18, 1931. He had no business
elsewhere and at the time of his death left an
estate consisting principally of bonds and shares
of stock of corporations organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and
other intangibles and personal property valued
by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at
P609,767.58 and by the Collector of Internal
Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at
P653,657.47. All of said property at the time of
his death was located and had its situs within
the Philippine Islands. So far as this record
shows, he left no property of any kind located
anywhere else. In his will,he made a statement
that: Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United
States of America, residing in the Philippine
Islands, hereby publish and declare the following
as my last Will and Testament . . ..
Ruling:
To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must
be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile,
coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a
declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed
and permanent place of abode, one's home. There is a
complete dearth of evidence in the record that Moody
ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.
Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the
appellant, the court affirm the judgment of the trial court,
first, because the property in the estate of Arthur G.
Moody at the time of his death was located and had its
situs within the Philippine Islands and, second, because his
legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the
Philippine Islands.
UJANO VS. REPUBLIC
Facts:
Facts:
Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship in a petition filed before the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur. Petitioner was born 66 years
ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. He is
married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one
son, Prospero, who is now of legal age. He left the
Philippines for the United States of America in 1927
where after a residence of more than 20 years he
acquired American citizenship by naturalization. He
returned to the Philippines on November 10, 1960 to
which he was admitted merely for a temporary stay.
He owns an agricultural land and a residential house
situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur. He receives a
monthly pension from the Social Security
Private International Law
Administration of the United States of America. He
has no record of conviction and it is his intention to
renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A. After hearing,
the court a quo rendered decision denying the
petition on the ground that petitioner did not have
the residence required by law six months before he
filed his petition for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
Ruling:
The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the
following comment: "One of the qualifications for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the
applicant 'shall have resided in the Philippines at
least six months before he applies for naturalization'
[Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This
'residence' requirement in cases of naturalization, has
already been interpreted to mean the actual or
constructive permanent home otherwise known as
legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a
country or state where he lives and stays
permanently, and to which he intends to return after
a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his
domicile. In other words domicile is characterized by
animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted
into this country as a temporary visitor, either for
business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though
actually present in this country cannot be said to have
established his domicile here because the period of
his stay is only temporary in nature and must leave
when the purpose of his coming is accomplished. In
the present case, petitioner, who is presently a
citizen of the United States of America, was admitted
into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he
has maintained at the time of the filing of the
present petition for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship and which continues up to the present.
Such being the case, he has not complied with the
specific requirement of law regarding six months
residence before filing his present petition."
CAASI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
These two cases were consolidated because they
have the same objective; the disqualification
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the
position of municipal mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local
elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that
he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of the United States of America, not of
Bolinao.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted
that he holds a green card issued to him by the
US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is
a permanent resident of the United States. He
allegedly obtained the green card for
convenience in order that he may freely enter
Page 20
 the United States for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there. He
alleged that he is a permanent resident of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous
elections, including the plebiscite on February
2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, and the congressional elections on
May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before
it, the COMELEC dismissed the petitions on the
ground that: The possession of a green card by
the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently
establish that he has abandoned his residence in
the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of
his green card, Respondent has sufficiently
indicated his intention to continuously reside in
Bolinao as shown by his having voted in
successive elections in said municipality. As the
respondent meets the basic requirements of
citizenship and residence for candidates to
elective local officials (sic) as provided for in
Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there
is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No.
84508).
Issues: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the
holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and
(2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a
permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to
the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Ruling: Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's
immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely
to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the
limited States with the intention to have there
permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that
application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government
the requisite green card or authority to reside there
permanently.
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the
Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a
green card holder must have "waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute
a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green
card should be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for
elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver,
he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68,
Omnibus Election Code).
MARCOS vs COMELEC
(residence and domicile, for purposes of election laws are
synonymous)
Private International Law
The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim
from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the
possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with
the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve
that community."
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on
March 8, 1995.
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate
for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging
that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private
respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives.
Held:
So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law
that in these and other election law cases, this Court has
stated that the mere absence of an individual from his
permanent residence without the intention to abandon it
does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely
committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven"
in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate
to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the
physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have
two or more residences, such as a country residence and a
city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on
the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in
the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is
also established in some other place.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and
domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political
laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact
that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term
residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports
not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention." Larena vs. Teves reiterated
the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of
the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President
of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, held
Page 21
that the absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss
of residence. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our
election law that in these and other election law cases, this
Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to
abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, this Court concluded that the framers of
the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition
given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as
having the same meaning as domicile.
A Person cannot have 2 domiciles. As long as the Domicile
was not lost, it continues to be the same until replaced by
a new one. Marcos did not overtedly abandon her
domicile since even if living in Malakanyang, she
constantly goes home to her domicile.
Prior to this:
The civil code provides that the wife follows the domicile
of her husband.
JIMENEZ V. REPUBLIC
109 PHIL 273
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying of a
decree annulling his marriage with Remedios
Canizares.
2. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals was too
small to allow the penetration of a male organ or
penis for copulation.
3. He also claimed that the condition of her genitals
existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist.
4. The wife was summoned and served with a copy of
the complaint but she did not file an answer.
5. The court entered an order requiring defendant to
submit to a physical examination by a competent lady
physician to determine her physical capacity for
copulation.
6. Defendant did not submit herself to the
examination and the court entered a decree annulling
the marriage.
7. The City Attorney filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, among the grounds that the
defendants impotency has not been satisfactorily
established as required by law; that she had not been
physically examined because she refused to be
examined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the
strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who
claimed and testified that his wife is impotent.
HELD:
Private International Law
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that
must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a
marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony
of the husband who was expected to give testimony
tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his
marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein.
Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in
court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude
the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence
could not arise or be inferred because women of this
country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not
submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by
competent authority.
A physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating.
She is not charged with any offense . She is not being
compelled to be a witness against herself.
Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The
lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically
incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear
asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.
Recto v. Harden
100 Phil 427
Facts:
Recto and Harden entered into a contract for professional
services wherein the latter engaged the services of the
former as her counsel against her husband for a claim in
their conjugal property. Mr. Harden previously filed for
divorce against the Mrs. The Court awarded Mrs. Harden
an amount totaling to almost 4 million pesos plus litis
expensae.
Subsequently however, Mrs. Harden ordered her counsel
to vacate all orders and judgments rendered therein, and
abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal
partnership existing between her and Mr. Harden. Later,
she entered into an amicable settlement with Mr. Harden
agreeing to a share of a lesser amount.
Appellee counsel for Mrs. Harden alleged that the
purpose of the said instruments, executed by Mr. and Mrs.
Harden, was to defeat the claim of the former for
attorneys fees, for which reason, he prayed that the court
grant him the necessary fees.
Appellants assail the contract for professional services as
void, mainly, upon the grounds that:
1. that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without her husbands consent; c
2. that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees; c
3. that the contract in question has for its purpose
to secure a decree of divorce, allegedly in
Page 22
 violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines;
4. that the terms of said contract are harsh,
inequitable and oppressive.
Held:
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the
contract in dispute does not seek to bind the conjugal
partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely
bound herself or assumed the personal obligation to
pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in said
partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to
give, to the Appellee any right whatsoever, personal or
real, in and to her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is
simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise,
untenable. Moreover, it has already been held that
contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and
are impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of
Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad
Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in the
United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
in the United States, the great weight of authority
recognizes the validity of contracts for contingent fees,
provided such contracts are not in contravention of public
policy, and it is only when the attorney has taken an
unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client that such a
claim is condemned. (See 5 Am. Jur. 359 et seq;
Ballentine, Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.)
The third objection is not borne out, either by the
language of the contract between them, or by the intent of
the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a
divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a
divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs.
Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency
of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States.
What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are
admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and
the dissolution thereof are governed pursuant to
Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in
the Philippines at the time of the execution of the
contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines by the laws of the United States, which
sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services,
between Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
It is a basic principle that status, once established by the
personal law of the party, is given universal recognition.
Therefore, aliens can sue and be sued in our courts
subject to Philippine procedural law even on matters
relating to their status and capacity. However, the law to
be applied by Philippine courts in determining their
capacity and status is their personal law.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but,
pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity must come with
clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil.,
195; 30 C.J. S. 475), and Appellants have not done so, for
the circumstances surrounding the case show, to our
satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements,
ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between
husband and wife, were made for the purpose of
circumventing or defeating the rights of herein Appellee,
under his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs.
Harden.
Private International Law
BARNUEVO V. FUSTER
29 PHIL 606
FACTS:
Gabriel and Constanza were married in Spain. Thereafter,
Gabriel went to the Philippines, settled, and acquired real
and personal properties. Constanza later followed. A few
years however, both parties executed a contract for their
separation wherein the wife returned to Spain and has
agreed to be supported by the husband to be paid in
Madrid, Spain. Eventually, the wife instituted a petition for
divorce here in the Philippines against the husband. The
husband opposed the petition on the grounds that:
a. neither the trial court nor any other court in the
Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint, because, as to
the allowance for support, since neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of
Manila, or of any other place in the Philippine
Islands, the agreement upon the subject was
neither celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in
the Philippine Islands;
b. and as to the divorce, because the action
therefore ought to be tried by the ecclesiastical
courts.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the
suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and
defendant;
Issue:
Do Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the petition for
divorce?
What law should apply in construing the term pesetas?
Held:
The lower court did not commit this error attributed to
him. The defendant had not proved that he had
elsewhere a legal domicile other than that which he
manifestly had in the Philippines during the seventeen
years preceding the date of the complaint. On the
contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the contrary,
that during this not inconsiderable period, extending from
the year 1892 until a month prior to the arrival of his wife
in the Philippines in March, 1909, he had constantly
resided in the said Islands, had kept open house, and had
acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property
which is now the object of the division of the conjugal
society.
It has been established that defendant is domiciled in the
Philippines.
Defendant, although a Spanish subject, was a resident of
these Islands. Article 26 of the Civil Code that he cites itself
provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a
foreign country, where they may be considered as natives
without other conditions than that of residents therein,
shall be required, in order to preserve the Spanish
nationality, to state that such is their wish before the
Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must record
them in the registry of Spanish residents, as well as their
spouses, should they be married, and any children they
may have." From this provision, which is the exclusive and
irrefutable law governing the defendant, we are to
Page 23
conclude that the domicile of the defendant and the
plaintiff is fully proven, irrespective of the Treaty of Paris.
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure leaves to the
election of the plaintiff the bringing of a personal action
like the one at bar either in the place where the
defendant may reside or be found, or in that where the
plaintiff resides.
As held by the Husband:
That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code
of Spain, "jurisdiction in actions for divorce and
nullification of canonical marriages lies with ecclesiastical
courts," while that of civil tribunals is limited to civil
marriages; that this being so, the action for divorce
brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within
the jurisdiction of the civil courts, according to his own
law of persons, because these courts ought to apply the
Spanish law in accordance with the said article 9 of the
Civil Cod of Spain, and this Spanish law grants the
jurisdiction over the present cause to the ecclesiastical
courts, in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands
con subrogate itself.
However, husband was unable to prove by any law or legal
doctrine whatever that the personal statute of a foreigner
carries with it, to whether he transfers his domicile, the
authority established by the law of his nation to decree his
divorce, which was what he had to demonstrate.
As the Court upheld:
"The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to
procedure are considered to be of a public nature and
consequently are generally submitted to the territorial
principle. . . . All persons that have to demand justice in a
case in which foreigners intervene, since they can gain
nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply
to the tribunales of the state which have coercive means
(property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision
they may render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in
the suit to making useless expenditures which, although he
won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights
because of the court's lack of means to enforce them."
(Torres Campos, "Elementos de Derecho International
Privado," p. 108.)
The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is
only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not
accompany the persons of the Spanish subject wherever
he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided
in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory
not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics
domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in
actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the
Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by
invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of
their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to
territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without
the territory of their nation.
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibaez vs.
Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325).
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the
persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic
Private International Law
subjects, they were residents of this city and had their
domicile herein.
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have
the power and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. That
of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction by reason of
the subject matter of the litigation.
With respect to their property regime, the Foral Law
presented by the husband in an affidavit, with which
conjugal partnership is known to be inexistent, cannot
apply since this affidavit was never presented in proof,
was never received by the trial judge, and cannot
seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law
of a foreign jurisdiction. Sections 300, 301 and 302 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, now in force in these islands,
indicate the method by which the law of a foreign country
may be proved. The Court maintains that the affidavit of a
person not versed in the law, which was never submitted
as proof, never received by the trial court, and which has
never been subjected to any cross-examination, is not a
means of proving a foreign law on which the defendant
relies. Thus, since no proof has been submitted to this
effect, all the property of the marriage, says article 1407 of
the Civil Code, shall be considered as conjugal property
until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.
ON PLAINTIFFS APPEAL
The court did not commit it in applying the rule contained
in article 1287 of the Civil Code. "The usages or customs of
the country shall be taken into consideration in
interpreting ambiguity in contracts. . . ." If in the contract
the word " pesetas," not being specific, was ambiguous,
then it was in harmony with this precept to interpret it as
being the peseta then in use or current when and where
the agreement was made, Mexican being then the usual
and current money in the Philippines.
QUITA V. PADLAN
GR NO. 124371, DECEMBER 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way
their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. and obtained a
final judgment of divorce. She married thrice thereafter.
On 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Respondent Blandina
Padlan claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of
Arturo Padlan opposed the petition. Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased
Arturo, also intervened.
The court held that no dispute exists as to the right of the
six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner could inherit as the surviving
spouse of Arturo?
Page 24
Held:
Case remanded subject to determination of petitioners
citizenship. However, Private respondent's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby
resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from
the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit
from him as this status presupposes a legitimate
relationship.
Case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings
since the trial court was not able to completely ascertain
petitioners citizenship. The trial court must have
overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved
that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of
their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
Arturo.
Nota bene:
Van dorn: ang bana ga laot sa wife since under Philippine
law, theyre still married.
LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 124371, November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were
married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an
enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for
the US where through naturalization, he became a US
Citizen. Upon his visit to his wife, he discovered that she
was living with his brother and a child was born. The child
was registered as illegitimate but the name of the father
was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California in
which Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and
actively participated in the proceedings, which later on
became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for
25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and
testament stating that all his properties will be given to his
second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made
or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate.
Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorentes estate.
The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for
reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the
Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever
properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired in
their 25 years of cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not national law shall apply?
RULING:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Private International Law
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no
such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions
in the United States. Each State of the union has its own
law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of
the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second,
there is no showing that the application of the renvoi
doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (emphasis ours)
Likewise, Lorenzo Llorente was already an American
citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the
situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As
stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided that they are valid in their
National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is
valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine
Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted
after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his
National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes
will and determination of the parties successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law.
Nota bene:
The following are the requisites of res judicata:
1. the former judgment must be final;
2. the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties;
3. it is a judgment on the merits; and
4. there is between the first and the second
actions an identity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies,
it is essential that:
1. the issue be identical;
2. If a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action,
3. and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or
question,
4. a former judgment between the same parties or
their privies will be final and conclusive in the
second if that same point or question was in
issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v.
Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
5. Identity of cause of action is not required but
merely identity of issue.
Page 25

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
(FRDSCL)
Personal status legal position of an individual in a
society
Capacity power to acquire and
exercise rights
Incidental to personal status
A 16-year old Cambodian inherited real properties from
the Philippines; he died and left a will which disposes of his
properties in the Philippines; supposing, Cambodian law
provides that age of majority is 16, is the will now if
probated in the Philippines valid?
If an 18-year old foreigner, where in his country, the age of
majority is 21 goes to the Philippines and gets married, is
such marriage valid?
Family rights, duties, status, condition and legal capacity
of persons accompany a person even when he moves to a
foreign country;

Foreign laws regulating the persons status and capacity

are to be disregarded where they are political or penal in MARRIAGE
character;
Art. II Section 12, 1987 Constitution
Legislative jurisdiction authority of the state of his
nationality or domicile or where he may be physically The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
present to promulgate laws affecting his status; protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
Judicial jurisdiction the authority of the court to hear and
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
determine the cause of action
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
Beginning of personality conception provided natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
subsequent birth rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
End death development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.
Other questions of status
Art. XV, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution
1. Absence a special legal status, if one is not in
his domicile and his whereabouts is unknown; Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
When can be declared: under civil code
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
a. Lapse of 2 years without news or since the
State.
receipt of last news
b. Lapse of 5 years if absentee has left
someone in charge of the administration of NCC Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
his properties duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding
Who may declare: upon citizens of the Philippines, even
a. Spouse though living abroad. (9a)
b. Heirs
c. Relatives who will benefit in intestacy Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
d. Those who have rights over the properties
wills, and other public instruments
2. Conflicts problems respecting an individuals shall be governed by the laws of the
name and extent of protection against abuse of country in which they are executed.
his name
When the acts referred to are executed
Right to use a title of nobility is determined in before the diplomatic or consular
accordance with his national law officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the
3. Minority solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their
CAPACITY execution.

1. Juridical capacity the fitness to be the subject

of legal relations; considered inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death;
2. Capacity to act the power to do acts with legal
effects; it is acquired and may be lost;
Nota bene:
Under Philippine law, the capacity to dispose of real
property is governed by the lex situs while the capacity to
succeed is governed by the national law of the deceased.
Question:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which
have, for their object, public order,
public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Art. 66. When either or both of the contracting
parties are citizens or subjects of a
foreign country, it shall be necessary,
before a marriage license can be
obtained, to provide themselves with a

Private International Law Page 26

 certificate of legal capacity to contract
marriage, to be issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular
officials. (13a)
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous marriages as determined by
Philippine law. (19a)
or in open court, in the church, chapel
or temple, or in the office the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the
case may be, and not elsewhere,
except in cases of marriages contracted
on the point of death or in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 of
this Code, or where both of the parties
request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may
be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect. (57a)

FC Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens

Art. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens
abroad may be solemnized by a consul-
abroad may be solemnized by consuls
general, consul or vice-consul of the
and vice-consuls of the Republic of the
Republic of the Philippines. The
Philippines. The duties of the local civil
issuance of the marriage license and
registrar and of a judge or justice of the
the duties of the local civil registrar and
peace or mayor with regard to the
of the solemnizing officer with regard
celebration of marriage shall be
to the celebration of marriage shall be
performed by such consuls and vice-
performed by said consular official.
consuls. (n)
(75a)

FC Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of

permanent union between a man and
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
a woman entered into in accordance
Philippines, in accordance with the
with law for the establishment of
laws in force in the country where they
conjugal and family life. It is the
were solemnized, and valid there as
foundation of the family and an
such, shall also be valid in this country,
inviolable social institution whose
except those prohibited under Articles
nature, consequences, and incidents
35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
are governed by law and not subject to
(17a)
stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within Where a marriage between a Filipino
the limits provided by this Code. (52a) citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
1. Any incumbent member of the capacity to remarry under Philippine
judiciary within the court's law. (As amended by Executive Order
jurisdiction; 227)
2. Any priest, rabbi, imam, or
minister of any church or religious
FC Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
sect duly authorized by his church
from the beginning:
or religious sect and registered
1. Those contracted by any party
with the civil registrar general,
below eighteen years of age even
acting within the limits of the
with the consent of parents or
written authority granted by his
guardians;
church or religious sect and
2. Those solemnized by any person
provided that at least one of the
not legally authorized to perform
contracting parties belongs to the
marriages unless such marriages
solemnizing officer's church or
were contracted with either or
religious sect;
both parties believing in good
3. Any ship captain or airplane chief
faith that the solemnizing officer
only in the case mentioned in
had the legal authority to do so;
Article 31;
3. Those solemnized without license,
4. Any military commander of a unit
except those covered the
to which a chaplain is assigned, in
preceding Chapter;
the absence of the latter, during a
4. Those bigamous or polygamous
military operation, likewise only in
marriages not failing under Article
the cases mentioned in Article 32;
41;
5. Any consul-general, consul or
5. Those contracted through mistake
vice-consul in the case provided in
of one contracting party as to the
Article 10. (56a)
identity of the other; and
6. Those subsequent marriages that
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized are void under Article 53.
publicly in the chambers of the judge

Private International Law Page 27

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. (As amended by
Executive Order 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are
incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether relationship
between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
1. Between ascendants and
descendants of any degree; and
2. Between brothers and sisters,
whether of the full or half blood.
(81a)
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
1. Between collateral blood
relatives whether legitimate
or illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;
2. Between step-parents and
step-children;
3. Between parents-in-law and
children-in-law;
4. Between the adopting parent
and the adopted child;
5. Between the surviving
spouse of the adopting
parent and the adopted
child;
6. Between the surviving
spouse of the adopted child
and the adopter;
7. Between an adopted child
and a legitimate child of the
adopter;
8. Between adopted children of
the same adopter; and
9. Between parties where one,
with the intention to marry
the other, killed that other
person's spouse, or his or her
own spouse. (82)
Muslim Code PD 1083, Art. 13. Application.
(1) The provisions of this
Title shall apply to
marriage and divorce
wherein both parties
are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a
Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized
in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code
in any part of the
Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage
between a Muslim and a
non-Muslim, solemnized
Private International Law
not in accordance with
Muslim law or this
Code, the Civil Code of
the Philippines shall
apply. .chan robles
virtual law library
(3) Subject to the
provisions of the
preceding paragraphs,
the essential requisites
and legal impediments
to marriage, divorce,
paternity and filiation,
guardianship and
custody of minors,
support and
maintenance, claims for
customary dower
(mahr), betrothal,
breach of contract to
marry, solemnization
and registration of
marriage and divorce,
rights and obligations
between husband and
wife parental authority,
and the properly
relations between
husband and wife shall
be governed by this
Code and other
applicable Muslim laws.
Art. 14. Nature. Marriage is not only a civil
contract but a social institution. Its
nature, consequences and incidents
are governed by this Code and the
Shari'a and not subject to stipulation,
except that the marriage settlements
may to a certain extent fix the property
relations of the spouses.
Art. 180. Law applicable. The provisions of
the Revised Penal Code relative to the
crime of bigamy shall not apply to a
person married in accordance with the
provisions of this Code or, before its
effectivity, under Muslim law.
Essential and Formal Requisites
FC Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
requisites are present:
1. Legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must
be a male and a female; and
2. Consent freely given in the
presence of the solemnizing
officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
1. Authority of the solemnizing
officer;
2. A valid marriage license
except in the cases provided
Page 28
 for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
and
3. A marriage ceremony which
takes place with the
appearance of the
contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration
that they take each other as
husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age. (53a,
55a)
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under
any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 37 and 38, may contract
marriage. (54a)
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
1. Those contracted by any party
below eighteen years of age even
with the consent of parents or
guardians;
2. Those solemnized by any person
not legally authorized to perform
marriages unless such marriages
were contracted with either or
both parties believing in good
faith that the solemnizing officer
had the legal authority to do so;
3. Those solemnized without license,
except those covered the
preceding Chapter;
4. Those bigamous or polygamous
marriages not failing under Article
41;
5. Those contracted through mistake
of one contracting party as to the
identity of the other; and
6. Those subsequent marriages that
are void under Article 53.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential
requisites shall not affect the validity of
the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. (n)
Art. 35 (2) supra
Muslim Code, Art. 15. Essential requisites.
No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the
following essential requisites are compiled with:
Private International Law
a. Legal capacity of the contracting
parties;
b. Mutual consent of the parties freely
given;
c. Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul)
duly witnessed by at least two
competent persons after the proper
guardian in marriage (wali) has given
his consent; and
d. Stipulation of customary dower (mahr)
duly witnessed by two competent
persons.
GOITIA VS. CAMPOS RUEDA
Facts:
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on
January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established
their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they
lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff
returned to the home of her parents.
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted
marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs;
that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the
defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal
and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date
had continually on other successive dates, made similar
lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff,
who always spurned them, which just refusals of the
plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to
maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon
her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that,
as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the
defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease
from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Issue: whether or not that the wife may claim for support
against her husband outside of their conjugal abode?
Ruling: marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary
contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It
is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of
which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but
upon the general law which defines and prescribes those
rights, duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution,
in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties
cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from
this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law
determines from time to time, and none other. When the
legal existence of the parties is merged into one by
marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by
the state or government upon principles of public policy
for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when
the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
some way should be obtainable. With these principles to
guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching
and governing the question under consideration.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the
part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is
founded not so much on the express or implied terms of
Page 29
the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty
of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is
of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will
not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in
driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A
judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable
either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the
strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling
for the performance of a duty made specific by the
mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and
with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of
the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands
upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her.
The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for
separate support is not an impeachment of that public
policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and
inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy
overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such
separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public
peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any
respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any
purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
Where the wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode
by her husband without fault on her part, may maintain an
action against the husband for separate maintenance
when she has no other remedy, notwithstanding the
provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the
person who is obliged to furnish support the option to
satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving
and maintaining in his own home the one having the right
to the same.
WONG WOO YIU VS. VIVO
Facts:
The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision
finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas
and admitting her into the country as a non-quota
immigrant. This decision was affirmed by the Board of
Commissioners of which petitioner was duly informed in a
letter sent on the same date by the Secretary of the Board.
However, the same Board of Commissioners, but
composed entirely of a new set of members, rendered a
new decision reversing that of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from
the country. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial
requesting an opportunity to clarify certain points taken in
the decision, but the same was denied for lack of merit.
Whereupon, petitioner initiated the instant petition for
mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of
First Instance of Manila which incidentally was considered
by it as a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in
1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas
to whom she was married in Chingkang, China ;that they
had several children all of whom are not in the Philippines;
that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a
village leader; that on June 28, 1961 the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding, among others,
that petitioner is legally married to Perfecto Blas, a Filipino
Citizen, and admitted her into the country as a non-quota
immigrant; that this decision was affirmed by the Board of
Commissioners of which petitioner was duly notified by
the Secretary of said Board in a letter dated July 12, 1961;
that in a motu proprio decision rendered by the Board of
Commissioners composed of a new set of members the
Private International Law
latter found that petitioner's claim that she is the lawful
wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis in evidence as it
was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife
relationship"; that said Board further held that, it
appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas
had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited
China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936, it could not
possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in
1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto
Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and
1941, although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that
he first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939,
and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same
affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when
he was merely four years old so that computed from his
date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.
In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made
by petitioner and her alleged husband Perfecto Blas in the
several investigations conducted by the immigration
authorities concerning their alleged marriage before a
village leader in China in 1929, coupled with the fact that
the only basis in support of petitioner's claim that she is
the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral and
documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of
husband-wife relationship," the Board of Commissioners
motu proprio reviewed the record concerning the
admission of petitioner into the country resulting in its
finding that she was improperly admitted.
Issue: whether or not that the marriage is valid?
Ruling: there is no documentary evidence to support the
alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas but the
record is punctured with so many inconsistencies which
cannot but lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the
pretended marriage in China in 1929. This claim cannot
also be entertained under our law on family relations.
Thus, Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws
relating to family rights or to the status of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order
that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid
it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court
inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a
priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly
registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public
Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume, therefore, that
the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village
leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those
authorized in our country.
A marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is
valid under the law of the country in which it was
celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity
can be given to this contention because no proof was
presented relative to the law of marriage in China. Such
being the case, we should apply the general rule that in
the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it
should be presumed that it is the same as our own.
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before
any of the officers mentioned therein, and a village leader
is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner's marriage,
even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
ADONG VS. CHAONG SENG GEE
Facts:
Page 30
Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga,
Philippine Islands on August 5, 1919 and left property
worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed by
two parties - (1) Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he
was a legitimate child by marriage contracted by Cheong
Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora Adong
who alleged that she had been lawfully married to
Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had
two daughters with the deceased namely Payang and
Rosalia. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boos estate were
ventilated in the lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng
Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage
through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan
Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee
had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of
the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural
child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and
her daughters, the trial court reached the conclusion that
the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been
adequately proved but that under the laws of the
Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful
marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would
inherit as natural children. The lower court believes that
Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the
Philippine Islands laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing
officer and under Quaranic laws.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Chinese marriage between
Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid ?
Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between
Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid?
RULING: The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese
marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has
only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the
Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid,
thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate
children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them
under the law.
(FOR STATCON) The Supreme Court held that marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new
relation, an instruction in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. The presumption as to
marriage is that every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency of the law. As to retroactive
force, marriage laws is in the nature of a curative provision
intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages.
Public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate
marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can properly
incline the scales of their decision in favor of that solution
which will most effectively promote the public policy. That
is the true construction which will best carry legislative
intention into effect.
(FOR PERSONS) Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that
all marriages contracted outside the islands, which would
be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in these islands. To establish a valid
foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is
first necessary to prove before the courts ofthe Islands
the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and
it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage
Private International Law
by convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage followed by
23 years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be
impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband
through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, save upon
proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a
moral conviction of the existence of such impediment. A
marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and
proven mainly by a so-called matrimonial letter held not to
be valid in the Philippines.
CHING HUAT VS. CO HEONG
Facts:
It is alleged in the petition, that the said minor is his
legitimate daughter; that up to June 21, 1946, said minor
had been living with and had under the custody of
petitioner; that respondent, taking advantage of his
confidential and spiritual relation with Maria Ching as her
godfather, persuaded and induced her by means of trick,
promises and cajolery, to leave the parental home and to
elope with him in the night of June 21, 1946, to Plaridel,
Bulacan, where they were married on the following day
before the Justice of the Peace of said municipality, said
Maria Ching being at the time 15 years old; and that ever
since respondent has had the minor Maria Ching under his
custody in Malolos, Bulacan, and has restrained her at her
liberty.
It is further alleged that respondent had been previously
married in China to Gue Min, said marriage being said to
be subsisting at the time respondent married Maria Ching.
Petitioner further avers that Gue Min has never been
declared an absentee nor generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by respondent at the time he
married Maria Ching.
Respondent, in his answer, among other things, asserts
that on June 21, 1946, he and Maria Ching alias Avelina
Ching were legally married before the Justice of the Peace
of Plaridel, Bulacan, and alleges that the essential
requisites for such marriage were complied with.
Issue: whether or not petitioner still retains his right to the
custody of his minor daughter Maria Ching alias Avelina
Ching?
Ruling: the Philippine marriage between said respondent
and Maria Ching before the Justice of the Peace of
Plaridel, Bulacan, is undisputed. It is also beyond question
that marriage was contracted by a man much over 16 years
old with a girl 15 years old (Act No. 3613, section 2),
neither of whom was included in any of the exceptions
mentioned in section 28 of the same Act; nor in those
stated in section 29 thereof for the reason that the alleged
prior Chinese marriage has not been established.
If the supposed prior Chinese marriage had been
sufficiently proven, then in order that the subsequent
Philippine marriage could be valid, it would have been
necessary either (a) that the Chinese marriage should
have been previously annulled or dissolved: or (b) that
the first wife of respondent should have been absent for
7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the respondent having news of the absentee
being alive; or (c) that the absentee should have been
Page 31
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
respondent at the time of contracting the subsequent
marriage, in either of which last two cases the
subsequent marriage will be valid until declared null and
void by a competent court, while in the first it will be
valid without this limitation. (Act No. 3613, section 29 [a]
and [b]; section 30 [b].) But as already adverted to, the
complete absence of proof of the supposed former
Chinese marriage makes sections 29 and 30 of the
Marriage Law inapplicable.
Maria Ching having been validly married on June 21,
1946, she became emancipated on that same date (arts.
314 [1] and 315, Civil Code). This emancipation brought
about the loss by the father of the parental authority that
he claims. On the other hand, by article 48 of Chapter V of
the Spanish Marriage Law of 1870, whose articles 44 to 78
were, and are now partly, in force in the Philippines
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil., 34), the wife has the
duty, among others, of living in her husband's company
and of following him to wherever he transfer his domicile
or residence. (Yaez de Barbuevo vs. Fuster, 29 Phil., 606,
612.)
PEOPLE V. DUMPO
62 Phil 247
Facts:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married
according to the rites and practice of the Mohammedan
religion. Without this marriage being dissolved, it is
alleged that Dumpo contracted another marriage with
Moro Sabdapal after which the two lived together as
husband and wife. Dumpo was prosecuted for and
convicted of the crime of bigamy.
The accused interposed an appeal. It has been established
by the defense, without the prosecution having presented
any objection nor evidence to the contrary, that the
alleged second marriage of the accused is null and void
according to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her
father had not given his consent thereto.
Held:
Marriage among Moslems is a fact of which no judicial
notice may be taken and must be subject to proof in
every particular case. In the case at bar we have the
uncontradicted testimony of Tahari, an Imam or
Mohammedan priest authorized to solemnize marriages
between Mohammedans, to the effect that the consent of
the bride's father or in the absence thereof, that of the
chief of the tribe to which she belongs is an indispensable
requisite for the validity of such contracts.
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence
of the first marriage. However, accuseds subsequent
marriage was void for lack of requisites necessary under
Moslem law, she must be acquitted.
LAO AND LAO V. DEE TIM
45 Phil 739 (1924)
Private International Law
Facts:
Yap Siong died intestate. During the distribution of his
estate, Maria Lao and Jose Lao appeared claiming to be the
legitimate spouse and son of the deceased. Maria claims
that they had been married in the Philippines on June 24,
1903. On the other hand, Dee Tim claims to be the
legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she and Yap Siong
were joined in holy matrimony on the 14th day of
September, 1893, in accordance with the laws of China.
Maria Lao presented marriage certificates as proof. Dee
Tim likewise presented a certificate of marriage and that it
was positive proof of her marriage and that it complied
with the custom and practice in China with reference to
marriage ceremonies. To support her contention she
presented a number of witnesses. Jan Peng, a Chinaman of
52 years of age, swore that he knew the forms of
ceremonies of marriage in China, Dee Tim also presented a
witness, Ty Cong Ting, a Chinaman, 32 years of age and a
lawyer, who testified concerning the laws and customs in
China with reference to the forms of marriage ceremony.
He testified that he knew and was well acquainted with
the customs and practices of Chinamen in China with
reference to marriages and the manner and form in which
they were celebrated, and the form of proof issued for the
purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had been
performed. Mr. Ty Cong Ting was, at the time he testified
as a witness, the legal attorney of the Chinese Consul
General in the City of Manila.
Issue:
Who is the legal wife?
Held:
It is perhaps true that Yap Siong did on various occasions,
depending upon his interest and convenience at the
particular time, state that Maria Lao was his querida and
not his wife. It is also perhaps true, for the same reason,
that he stated that Dee Tim was not his wife but his
querida. Evidently he was attempting to keep the
information, which he was quite able to do, until he had
passed to that bourn from which none returns, and until
a distribution of his large accumulated earnings among
his heirs became necessary.
Based on a preponderance of the evidence the Court was
convinced that both Dee Tim and Maria Lao were legally
married to Yap Siong in good faith, believing that each
was his sole and separate wife, living in absolute ignorance
of the fact of his double marriage. They were each
married in good faith and in ignorance of the existence of
the other marriage. Yap Siong up to the time of his death
seems to have been successful in keeping each of his two
wives ignorant of the fact that he was married to the other.
Under the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1, title 13, partida 4),
where two women innocently and in good faith are
legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their
children born will be regarded as legitimate children and
each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of
the husband upon distribution of his estate. That
provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and
wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have
entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their
descendants. The good faith of all the parties will be
Page 32
presumed until the contrary is positively proved. (Article
69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines
vs. Hennen, 65 U.S., 553.)c
YAO KEE V. GONZALES
167 SCRA 736
FACTS:
1. Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Calooocan
City where he was then residing leaving behind
real and personal properties here in the
Philippines.
2. Private respondents (Aida Sy-Gonzales et al.,)
filed a petition for the grant of letters or
administration alleging that they were the
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego.
3. Petition was opposed by herein petitioners (Yao
Kee et al.,) alleging that they were the legitimate
family.
4. The probate court found that Sy Kiat was legally
married to Yao Kee and that their 3 offsprings
were the legitimate children.
5. The court likewise ruled that respondents are the
acknowledged illegitimate offspring of Sy Kiat
with Asuncion Gillego.
6. On appeal, the lower courts decision was set
aside declaring petitioners as the acknowledge
natural children of Sy Kiat and Asuncion Gillego.
7. Oppostiors were declared the acknowelged
natural children of the deceased since the
legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao
Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to
the laws of China.
ISSUE:
Was the fact of marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in
China proven as a custom?
HELD:
Custom is defined as a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as
a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. The law
requires that a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence. [Article 12, Civil
Code] On this score the Court had occasion to state
that a local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any
other fact. The same evidence, if not one of a higher
degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
Construing this provision of law the Court has held
that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things
must be proven, namely 1) the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact; and 2) the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any
competent evidence relative to the law and custom
of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan
Ching (brother) cannot be considered as proof of
Chinas law or custom on marriage not only because
they are self serving evidence, but more importantly,
there is no showing that they are competent to
testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the
foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity
of the marriage in accordance with said law or
Private International Law
custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
However, as petitioners failed to establish the
marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws
of China, they cannot be accorded the status of
legitimate children but only that of acknowledged
natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it
appearing that at the time of their conception Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry one another. [See Art. 269, Civil
Code] And they are acknowledged children of the
deceased because of Sy Kiats recognition of Sze Sook
Wah and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen
who are her sisters of the full blood.
Private respondents on the other hand are also the
deceaseds acknowledged natural children with
Asuncion Gillego , a Filipina with whom he lived for 25
years without the benefit of marriage. They have in
their favor their fathers acknowledgment, evidence
by a compromise agreement entered into by and
between their parents and approved by the CFI
wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowledged them as his
children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made
provisions for their support and future inheritance.
REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
Myros M. Villanueva in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis
City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live in San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because
it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is
a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
Held:
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
Page 33
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should
be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE
1. PERSONAL RELATIONS
Civil Code Art. 15, supra
Family Code
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the
family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse
from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other
valid and compelling reasons for the
exemption. However, such exemption
shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for
the support of the family. The expenses
for such support and other conjugal
obligations shall be paid from the
community property and, in the
absence thereof, from the income or
fruits of their separate properties. In
case of insufficiency or absence of said
income or fruits, such obligations shall
be satisfied from the separate
properties. (111a)
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any
legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity without the
consent of the other. The latter may
object only on valid, serious, and moral
grounds.
Private International Law
In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide whether or not:
1. The objection is proper; and
2. Benefit has occurred to the family
prior to the objection or
thereafter. If the benefit accrued
prior to the objection, the
resulting obligation shall be
enforced against the separate
property of the spouse who has
not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not
prejudice the rights of creditors who
acted in good faith. (117a)
Muslim Code
Art. 34. Mutual rights and obligations.
1. The husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support in
accordance with this Code.
2. When one of the spouses neglects
his or her duties to the conjugal
union or brings danger, dishonor
or material injury upon the other,
the injured party may petition the
court for relief. The court may
counsel the offender to comply
with his or her duties, and take
such measures as may be proper.
3. The husband and the wife shall
inherit from each other in
accordance with this Code.
4. The husband and the wife shall
have the right to divorce in
accordance with this Code.
Art. 35. Rights and obligations of the husband.
The husband shall fix the residence
of the family. The court may exempt
the wife from living with her husband
on any of the following grounds:
a. Her dower is not satisfied in
accordance with the stipulations;
or
b. The conjugal dwelling is not in
keeping with her social standing
or is, for any reason, not safe for
the members of the family or her
property.
Art. 36. Rights and obligations of the wife.
1. The wife shall dutifully manage the
affairs of the household. She may
purchase things necessary for the
maintenance of the family, and the
husband shall be bound to reimburse
the expenses, if he has not delivered
the proper sum.
Page 34
 2. The wife cannot, without the
husband's consent, acquire any
property by gratuitous title, except
from her relatives who are within the
prohibited degrees in marriage.
3. The wife may, with her husband's
consent, exercise any profession or
occupation or engage in lawful
business which is in keeping with
Islamic modesty and virtue. However, if
the husband refuses to give his consent
on the ground that his income is
sufficient for the family according to its
social standing or his opposition is
based on serious and valid grounds,
the matter shall be referred to the
Agama Arbitration Council.
4. The wife shall have the right to
demand the satisfaction of her mahr.
5. Unless otherwise stipulated in the
marriage settlements, the wife retain
ownership and administration of her
exclusive property.
6. The wife shall be entitled to an equal
and just treatment by the husband.
2. PROPERTY RELATIONS
Civil Code:
Art. 15, supra
Art. 117. The wife may exercise any profession
or occupation or engage in business.
However, the husband may object,
provided:
1. His income is sufficient for
the family, according to its
social standing, and
2. His opposition is founded on
serious and valid grounds.
In case of disagreement on this
question, the parents and
grandparents as well as the family
council, if any, shall be consulted. If no
agreement is still arrived at, the court
will decide whatever may be proper
and in the best interest of the family.
(n)
Art. 118. The property relations between
husband and wife shall be governed in
the following order:
a. By contract executed before the
marriage;
b. By the provisions of this Code;
and
c. By custom. (1315a)
Art. 124. If the marriage is between a citizen of
the Philippines and a foreigner,
whether celebrated in the Philippines
Private International Law
or abroad, the following rules shall
prevail:
1. If the husband is a citizen of the
Philippines while the wife is a
foreigner, the provisions of this
Code shall govern their relations;
2. If the husband is a foreigner and
the wife is a citizen of the
Philippines, the laws of the
husband's country shall be
followed, without prejudice to the
provisions of this Code with
regard to immovable property.
(1325a)
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership. (n)
Family Code:
Art. 74. A marriage in articulo mortis may also
be solemnized by the captain of a ship
or chief of an airplane during a voyage,
or by the commanding officer of a
military unit, in the absence of a
chaplain, during war. The duties
mentioned in the two preceding
articles shall be complied with by the
ship captain, airplane chief or
commanding officer. (n)
Art. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens
abroad may be solemnized by consuls
and vice-consuls of the Republic of the
Philippines. The duties of the local civil
registrar and of a judge or justice of the
peace or mayor with regard to the
celebration of marriage shall be
performed by such consuls and vice-
consuls. (n)
Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage. (n)
Art. 77. In case two persons married in
accordance with law desire to ratify
their union in conformity with the
regulations, rites, or practices of any
Page 35
 church, sect, or religion it shall no
longer be necessary to comply with the
requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title
and any ratification made shall merely
be considered as a purely religious
ceremony. (23)
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
1. Those contracted under the ages
of sixteen and fourteen years by
the male and female respectively,
even with the consent of the
parents;
2. Those solemnized by any person
not legally authorized to perform
marriages;
3. Those solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages
of exceptional character;
4. Bigamous or polygamous
marriages not falling under Article
83, Number 2;
5. Incestuous marriages mentioned
in Article 81;
6. Those where one or both
contracting parties have been
found guilty of the killing of the
spouse of either of them;
7. Those between stepbrothers and
stepsisters and other marriages
specified in Article 82. (n)
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose
by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until
Private International Law
after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void
marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In
the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the
cohabitation. (144a)
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling
under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply
to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married
to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her
shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall
likewise apply even if both parties are
in bad faith. (144a)
Muslim Code:
Art. 37. How governed. The property
relations between husband and wife
shall be governed in the following
order:
a. By contract before or at the time
of the celebration of marriage;
b. By the provisions of this Code;
and
c. By custom.
Art. 38. Regime of property relations. The
property relations between the
spouses, in the absence of any
stipulation to the contrary in the
marriage settlements or any other
contract, shall be governed by the
regime of complete separation of
Page 36
 property in accordance with this Code
and, in a suppletory manner, by the
general principles of Islamic law and
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
VII. Dissolution of Marriage
1. Annulment
Civil Code:
Art. 66. When either or both of the contracting
parties are citizens or subjects of a
foreign country, it shall be necessary,
before a marriage license can be
obtained, to provide themselves with a
certificate of legal capacity to contract
marriage, to be issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular
officials. (13a)
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous marriages as determined by
Philippine law. (19a)
Family Code
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
1. That the party in whose behalf it
is sought to have the marriage
annulled was eighteen years of
age or over but below twenty-
one, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent
of the parents, guardian or person
having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that
order, unless after attaining the
age of twenty-one, such party
freely cohabited with the other
and both lived together as
husband and wife;
2. That either party was of unsound
mind, unless such party after
coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
3. That the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud, unless
such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
4. That the consent of either party
was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party
Private International Law
thereafter freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
5. That either party was physically
incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears
to be incurable; or
6. That either party was afflicted
with a sexually-transmissible
disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable. (85a)
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances
shall constitute fraud referred to in
Number 3 of the preceding Article:
1. Non-disclosure of a previous
conviction by final judgment of
the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude;
2. Concealment by the wife of the
fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband;
3. Concealment of sexually
transmissible disease, regardless
of its nature, existing at the time
of the marriage; or
4. Concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism or
homosexuality or lesbianism
existing at the time of the
marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit
as to character, health, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as
will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage. (86a)
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage
must be filed by the following persons
and within the periods indicated
herein:
1. For causes mentioned in number
1 of Article 45 by the party whose
parent or guardian did not give his
or her consent, within five years
after attaining the age of twenty-
one, or by the parent or guardian
or person having legal charge of
the minor, at any time before such
party has reached the age of
twenty-one;
2. For causes mentioned in number
2 of Article 45, by the same
spouse, who had no knowledge of
the other's insanity; or by any
relative or guardian or person
having legal charge of the insane,
at any time before the death of
either party, or by the insane
spouse during a lucid interval or
after regaining sanity;
Page 37
 3. For causes mentioned in number
3 of Article 45, by the injured
party, within five years after the
discovery of the fraud;
4. For causes mentioned in number
4 of Article 45, by the injured
party, within five years from the
time the force, intimidation or
undue influence disappeared or
ceased;
5. For causes mentioned in number
5 and 6 of Article 45, by the
injured party, within five years
after the marriage. (87a)
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the
preceding paragraph, no judgment
shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment. (88a)
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and
in the absence of adequate provisions
in a written agreement between the
spouses, the Court shall provide for the
support of the spouses and the
custody and support of their common
children. The Court shall give
paramount consideration to the moral
and material welfare of said children
and their choice of the parent with
whom they wish to remain as provided
to in Title IX. It shall also provide for
appropriate visitation rights of the
other parent. (n)
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs
(2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by
Article 44 shall also apply in the proper
cases to marriages which are declared
ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall
provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children, and the
delivery of third presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as
of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership shall be notified
of the proceedings for liquidation.
Private International Law
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling
and the lot on which it is situated, shall
be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the
presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of
the final judgment of the trial court,
shall be delivered in cash, property or
sound securities, unless the parties, by
mutual agreement judicially approved,
had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the
trustee of their property may ask for
the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive
legitimes herein prescribed shall in no
way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children
accruing upon the death of either of
both of the parents; but the value of
the properties already received under
the decree of annulment or absolute
nullity shall be considered as advances
on their legitime. (n)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of
absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the
delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries
of property; otherwise, the same shall
not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may
marry again after compliance with the
requirements of the immediately
preceding Article; otherwise, the
subsequent marriage shall be null and
void.chan robles virtual law library
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the
judgment of annulment or absolute
nullity of the marriage under Article 36
has become final and executory shall
be considered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent
marriage under Article 53 shall likewise
be legitimate.
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be
filed on any of the following grounds:
1. Repeated physical violence
or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the
petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;
2. Physical violence or moral
pressure to compel the
petitioner to change religious
or political affiliation;
Page 38
 3. Attempt of respondent to union or brings danger, dishonor
corrupt or induce the or material injury upon the other,
petitioner, a common child, the injured party may petition the
or a child of the petitioner, to court for relief. The court may
engage in prostitution, or counsel the offender to comply
connivance in such with his or her duties, and take
corruption or inducement; such measures as may be
proper. .chan robles virtual law
4. Final judgment sentencing library
the respondent to
imprisonment of more than 3. The husband and the wife shall
six years, even if pardoned; inherit from each other in
accordance with this Code.
5. Drug addiction or habitual
alcoholism of the 4. The husband and the wife shall
respondent; have the right to divorce in
accordance with this Code.
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality
of the respondent;

7. Contracting by the
respondent of a subsequent ROEHR VS. RODRIGUEZ
bigamous marriage, whether
in the Philippines or abroad;
Facts:
8. Sexual infidelity or
perversion; Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a
Filipina, Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. The marriage was
9. Attempt by the respondent ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Private respondent
against the life of the filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
petitioner; or before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The petitioner
10. Abandonment of petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First
by respondent without Instance of Hamburg - Blankenese and granting the custody
justifiable cause for more of the children to the father.
than one year.
Issue:
For purposes of this Article, the term
"child" shall include a child by nature Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from
or by adoption. (9a) a foreign country such as support and custody of the
2. Absolute Divorce children can be determined in our courts?

Held:
Civil Code:
Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must
Art. 15, supra clearly show that the opposing party has been given
ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civil
Art. 17, Supra Procedure. Accordingly, the respondent was not given the
opportunity to challenge the judgement of the German
Muslim Code: Court, therefore, legal effects of divorce must be
determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court
has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to
45-55 supra who has the parental custody.

Art. 27. By a husband. Notwithstanding the rule of

Islamic law permitting a Muslim to RECTO VS. HARDEN (supra)
have more than one wife but one wife
unless he can deal with them with
equal companionship and just
treatment as enjoined by Islamic law GONZALES VS. GONZALES
and only in exceptional cases.

Art. 34. Mutual rights and obligations.

1. The husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support in
accordance with this Code.
2. When one of the spouses neglects
his or her duties to the conjugal
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands
and at present residents of the City of Manila. They were
married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and
lived together as man and wife in the Philippine Islands
until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and
since that time have not lived together as man and wife. Of

Private International Law Page 39

this union four children were born. Negotiations between
the parties, both being represented by attorneys,
whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for
her support and that of her children, five hundred pesos
(P500) monthly; this amount to be increased in case of
illness or necessity, and the title of certain properties to be
put in her name. Shortly after this agreement the husband
left the Islands, betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and
secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the
ground of desertion. Shortly thereafter the defendant
moved to California and returned to these Islands in
August 1928, where he has since remained. On the same
date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went through
the forms of marriage with another citizen of these Islands
and now has three children as a result of that marriage.
Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced
the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support
of his wife and four minor children and has not made the
payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
Issue:
Whether or not that the divorced acquired in Nevada is
valid here in the Philippines?
Held
While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial
matters they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of
this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno
divorce. On the record here presented this can not be
done. The public policy in this jurisdiction on the question
of divorce is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710, and the
decisions of this court.
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their
separation until the case was submitted to this court, in
which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and
confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the
laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to
secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and
under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times
the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within
the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the
State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing
a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer
jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the
bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.
While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to
recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been
expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack
of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not
overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in
these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity or
persons, are binding upon Spaniards even
though they reside in a foreign country.
And article 11, the last part of which reads:
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts and their property, and those
intended to promote public order and good
morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by
any foreign laws or judgments or by anything
done or any agreements entered into a foreign
country.
Private International Law
It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign
divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be
recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and
under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands
would grant a divorce. The lower court in granting relief as
prayed for frankly stated that the securing of the divorce,
the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into
the world of innocent children brings about such a
condition that the court must grant relief. The hardships of
the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well
known to the members of the Legislature. It is of no
moment in this litigation what he personal views of the
writer on the subject of divorce may be. It is the duty of
the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right
to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal.
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO 15 SCRA 355
Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez married Vicenta Escano on Feb. 24,
1948 in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds
were already estranged. Vicenta left for the US and
filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
Pastor in the State of Nevada on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
A decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court.
Later on, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo
Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California
and has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955,
Pastor filed a complaint for legal separation and
damages against Vicenta and her parents in the CFI-
Cebu.
HELD:
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta,
like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was
then subject to Philippine laws under Art. 15 of the
New Civil Code. Philippine law, under the NCC then
now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but
only provides for legal separation.
For Philippine courts to recognize foreign divorce
decrees between Filipino citizens would be a patent
violation of the declared policy of the State,
especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, of the
New Civil Code which reads: Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have, for their object, public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country. Moreover, recognition would give
rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy
citizens to the detriment of those members of our
society whose means do not permit them to sojourn
abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the
Philippines.
Therefore, a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is
not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
SIKAT V. CANSON
67 PHIL 207
Page 40
 Hilaria Sikat and John Canson contracted marriage
and lived together as husband and wife until 1911
when they separated.
During the same year the wife commenced divorce
proceedings against her spouses, but the case was
dismissed without the court passing upon the merits
thereof.
At the time of their marriage in 1904, John Canson
was an Italian citizen but on February 27, 1922, he
became a naturalized Filipino citizen.
In 1929, he went to Reno, Nevada, United States of
America, and on October 8, of that year, he obtained
an absolute decree of divorce on the ground of
desertion.
Hilaria, in 1933, filed another action, civil case No.
5398 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, wherein
she sought to compel the defendant to pay her a
monthly pension of P500 as alimony or support.
Canson interposed three defenses: (1) adultery on the
part of the plaintiff: (2) absolute divorce obtained by
the defendant as decreed by the court in Reno,
Nevada, United States of America; and (3) that the
defendant did not have the means to pay the
allowance sought. The lower court dismissed the
complaint and declined to accord validity to the
divorce obtained in Reno but found that Hilaria Sikat
had forfeited her right to support because she had
committed adultery.
This judgment was not appealed and it became final.
On June 1, 1934, the present action was instituted by
the plaintiff-appellant to obtain the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. The action is predicated on the
existence of a final decree of absolute divorce
rendered by the court of Reno, Nevada, since 1929.
Held:
It is not, however, the citizenship of the plaintiff for
divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but
his legal residence within the State (Cousins Hix vs.
Fluemer, 55 Phil. 851). And assuming that John
Canson acquired legal residence in the State of
Nevada through the approval of his citizenship
papers, this did not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada
court to grant a divorce that would be valid in this
jurisdiction nor jurisdiction that could determine their
matrimonial status, because the wife was still
domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never
acquired jurisdiction over her person. (Gorayeb vs.
Hashim, 50 Phil. 26, and Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer,
supra.) This was not a proceeding in rem to justify a
court in entering a decree as to the res or marriage
relation entitled to be enforced outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Plaintiff-appellant had made her choice of two
inconsistent remedies afforded her by law: (1) to
impugn the divorce and file an action for support, or
(2) uphold the validity of the divorce and sue for a
liquidation of conjugal partnership. She chose the
first remedy when she filed her action for support.
She lost the case and should take the consequences.
The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only
on the ground of "adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband" as
provided for under section 1 of Act No. 2710. The
divorce decree in question was granted on the ground
of desertion, clearly not a cause for divorce under our
laws.
Private International Law
That our divorce law, Act No. 2710, is too strict or too
liberal is not for this court to decide. (Barretto
Gonzalez vs. Gonzalez, supra.)
The allotment of powers between the different
governmental agencies restricts the judiciary within
the confines of interpretation, not of legislation. The
legislative policy on the matter of divorce in this
jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710 and has
been upheld by this court;
ARCA V. JAVIER
95 PHIL 579
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite ordering him to give a monthly
allowance of P60 to plaintiffs beginning March 31,
1953, and to pay them attorney's fees in the amount
of P150 defendant took the case directly to this Court
attributing five errors to the court below. The facts are
not disputed.
Javier and Arca got married in Manila. Javier, an
enlisted US Navy personnel left for the States 7 years
after the birth of their first born. At such time, Arca
lived with Javiers parents. However, due to strained
relations with the latter, she left and transferred to
her hometown. Thereafter, Javier filed a case for
divorce in Alabama against Arca alleging
abandonment. Arca made her reply claiming among
other things that she never abandoned her husband
and that their separation was due to a physical
impossibility which justifies her separation if the
husband moves to ultra-marine colonies. The divorce
however was granted.
Javier got married the 2 nd time but was subsequently
divorced. After a few years, he went back to the
Philippines, and believing that the first two divorces
were valid, remarried the 3rd time.
Issue:
Did the Circuit Court of Mobile County acquire jurisdiction
of both spouses and effectively rendered a judgment in
rem when it granted divorce to Javier?
Held:
No, one of the essential conditions for the validity of
a decree of divorce is that the court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that
this may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in
good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins
Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856).
While it is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in
the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in
view of the summons served upon her in this
jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as
placing her under the jurisdiction of the court
because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of
appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that
time was Mobile County, and to show that the
ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and
false. Such answer should be considered as a special
appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the
jurisdiction of the court over the case.
It is established by the great weight of authority that
the court of a country in which neither of the
spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of
them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining
a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their
matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a
Page 41
 court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See
Note to Succession of Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143) The
voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a
tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction.
(Andrews vs. Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.)
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the
ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or
country of the judicial forum, his residence must be
bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and
goes to another State for the sole purpose of
obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of
remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the courts of the State. (Ramirez
vs. Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.)
But even if his residence had been taken up is good
faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his
favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the
matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of
Manila;
Ramirez v. Gmur
42 Phil 855
Leona Castro was the natural daughter of decedent Samuel
Bischoff. Whereas Ana Ramirez was the latter's widow to
which they had no children. Leona was married to
Kauffman. They had 3 children, Elena, Federico, and
Ernesto. Later, Kauffman brought Leona to Switzerland to
recuperate her health. A few years later, she fell for a Dr.
Mory to whom she had a child, Leontina. She informed
Kauffman that she no longer wished to stay with him to
which the latter obtained a divorce in France where Leona
was in default. Leona, after the divorce got married in
London, and after which bore two children from which the
last childbirth caused Leona her life. The heirs of Leona
from the first marriage and the second now claims the
Estate of Samuel to which Ana Ramirez opposed since
Leona is not a recognized natural child.
Held:
The status of Leona Castro as recognized natural daughter
of Samuel Bischoff is fully and satisfactorily shown.
With reference to the right of the von Kauffman children,
it is enough to say that they are legitimate children, born
to their parents in lawful wedlock; and they are therefore
entitled to participate in the inheritance which would have
devolved upon their mother, if she had survived the
testator.
The Court is of the opinion that the decree of divorce
upon which reliance is placed by the representation of
the Mory children cannot be recognized as valid in the
courts of the Philippine Islands. The French tribunal has
no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the dissolution of
a marriage contracted in these Islands by person domiciled
here, such marriage being indissoluble under the laws then
prevailing in this country.
The evidence shows that the decree was entered against
the defendant in default, for failure to answer, and there is
nothing to show that she had acquired, or had attempted
to acquire, a permanent domicile in the City of Paris. It is
evident of course that the presence of both the spouses in
that city was due merely to the mutual desire to procure a
divorce from each other.
Private International Law
It is established by the great weight of authority that the
court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort
merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no
jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a
divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to
recognition elsewhere.
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground
of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the
judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a
spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another
State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with
no intention of remaining, his residence there is not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that State.
This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one
not recognized by the laws of the State of his own
domicile.
MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY VS. TEODORO
FACTS:
Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo
on January 5, 1935. On November 29,1954, a decree of
divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada
dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares
and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . .
Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on
October 30, 1955. . . . On March 26, 1956, they went
through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon
their return to the Philippines they took up residence in a
rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street . . . Manila. On
September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were
married for a second time on Washoe County, Nevada.
U.S.A.
Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision
under review and controverted by the parties, are that
Sonia Lizares is still living and that the conjugal partnership
formed by her marriage to Corominas was dissolved by the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila upon
their joint petition, the decree of dissolution having been
issued on October 21, 1957. Trinidad questioned the levy
on the property since the property in question was her
paraphernal property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties in question are conjugal?
RULING:
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by
the Court of Nevada in 1954 is not valid under Philippine
law, which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the
matrimonial bonds between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia
Lizares have not been dissolved, although their conjugal
partnership was terminated in 1957; and that the former's
subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is
bigamous and void.
In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on
this question. The particular properties involved here
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which were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro,
cannot be deemed to belong to such co-ownership
because, as found by the trial court and confirmed by the
Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said
properties were fruits of respondent's paraphernal
investments which accrued before her "marriage" to
Corominas. In other words they were not acquired by
either or both of the partners in the void marriage through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries, and
hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article
144. They remain respondent's exclusive properties,
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the judgment
debt of Corominas.
VAN DORN V. ROMILLO
139 SCRA 139
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is
a US citizen; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972;
after the marriage, they established their residence in
the Philippines and begot 2 children; Alicia filed for
divorce in Nevada; the parties were divorced in
Nevada, US, in 1982; and petitioner has remarried
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On June 18, 1983 Upton filed a suit against petitioner
in the RTC-Pasay, stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila (the Galleon Shop), is conjugal
property and asking that petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that Upton
be declared as having the right to manage the
conjugal property.
Held:
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art.
13, NCC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorce the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines
provided they are valid according to their national
law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondents from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Court said that Ours is not only a court of law but
also a court of equity. The Court could not turn its
back on its citizen when the foreign national itself
benefited from such divorce decree;
Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband who is entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets.
To maintain, as Upton does, that under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to him
and still subject to a wife's obligations under the NCC
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs w/ possible
rights to conjugal properties. She should not be
Private International Law
discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be observed.
PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
174 SCRA 653
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen,
and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married in the Federal
Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together
for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20,
1980.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual
recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, private
respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was
failure of their marriage and that they had been living
apart since April, 1982. Petitioner, on the other hand,
filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila.
Thereafter a decree of divorce was promulgated. The
records show that under German law said court was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce
proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage
was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
More than five months after the issuance of the
divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet another
man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Issue:
WON the adultery case be sustained even though there
has already been a finality of a divorce decree.
Held:
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for
adultery and concubinage the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and
nobody else.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar
and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in
civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition. In these cases, therefore, it is
indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, as already demonstrated, such status
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 or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, it is deemed admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned
in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the matter of status of persons.
Therefore, private respondent, being no longer the
husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture
that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 124371, November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were
married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an
enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for
the US where through naturalization, he became a US
Citizen. Upon his visit to his wife, he discovered that she
was living with his brother and a child was born. The child
was registered as illegitimate but the name of the father
was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California in
which Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and
actively participated in the proceedings, which later on
became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for
25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and
testament stating that all his properties will be given to his
second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made
or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate.
Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorentes estate.
The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for
reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the
Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever
properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired in
their 25 years of cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not national law shall apply?
RULING:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no
such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions
Private International Law
in the United States. Each State of the union has its own
law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of
the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second,
there is no showing that the application of the renvoi
doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (emphasis ours)
Likewise, Lorenzo Llorente was already an American
citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the
situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As
stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided that they are valid in their
National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is
valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine
Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted
after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his
National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes
will and determination of the parties successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law.
GARCIA V. RECIO
October 2, 2001
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson, an
Australian in Malabon Rizal. However, on 1989, they
got divorced in an Australian family court.
On 1992, Rederick became an Australian Citizen. He
later married Petitioner in 1994 in Cabanatuan City.
Thereafter, the two separated and petitioner filed a
complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of bigamy.
While the suit was pending, Rederick was able to
obtain a divorce decree in Australia. Trial Court
declared the marriage dissolved based on the
subsequent divorce decree obtained by the
respondent.
Issues:
Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven;
Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated
to marry petitioner;
Held:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized
in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according
to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven according to our law on evidence.
Page 44

Was the first divorce validly obtained and binding?
At the outset, the Court lays the following basic legal
principles; Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, Philippine courts cannot grant it. A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even
by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and
1723 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient. In the case at bar, Respondent only presented
the divorce decree;
Likewise, before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.
However, under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of
a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2)
a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent, this matter was not objected
to by the petitioner, thus by virtue of such waiver, is
deemed admitted as evidence.
Who has the burden of proving a foreign law?
Respondent has the burden of proof; The burden of proof
lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action." It is a well-settled that courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among
those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason
of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must
be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
nd
2 Issue: Is Respondent legally capacitated to remarry?
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a
Private International Law
vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There
is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was
procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce.
It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the
lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters the Courts contention that the
divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted.
It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate
mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the
alien applicant for a marriage license.
In the case at bar, there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Based on the above records, the Court cannot conclude
that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
January 12, 1994. The court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the
legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner's prayer to declare
her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground
of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian
law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree.
Hence, case was remanded to the court a quo for further
determination of legal capacity and to receive evidence to
determine if bigamy has been committed;
REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady
Myros M. Villanueva in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis
City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter.
Page 45
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live in San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because
it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is
a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
Held:
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should
be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
3. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
4. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
5. Legal Separation
Civil Code:
Art. 97. A petition for legal separation may be
filed:
Private International Law
1. For adultery on the part of the
wife and for concubinage on the
part of the husband as defined in
the Penal Code; or
2. An attempt by one spouse against
the life of the other. (n)
Art. 99. No person shall be entitled to a legal
separation who has not resided in the
Philippines for one year prior to the
filing of the petition, unless the cause
for the legal separation has taken place
within the territory of this Republic.
(Sec. 2a, Act No. 2710)
TITLE II
LEGAL SEPARATION
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any
of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive
conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel
the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the
respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the
respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a
subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of
the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent
without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a
child by nature or by adoption. (9a)
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on
any of the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the
offense or act complained of;
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 (2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to
the commission of the offense or act complained
of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the
parties in the commission of the offense or act
constituting the ground for legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for
legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties
to obtain decree of legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription.
(100a)
Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within
five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause.
(102)
Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be
tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing
of the petition. (103)
Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the
Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the
spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that
reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon
a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. (101a)
Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation,
the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between
the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third
person to administer the absolute community or conjugal
partnership property. The administrator appointed by the
court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a
guardian under the Rules of Court. (104a)
Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal
separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply
to the support of the spouses and the custody and support
of the common children. (105a)
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the
following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but
the offending spouse shall have no right to any
share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which
Private International Law
shall be forfeited in accordance with the
provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be
awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the
provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified
from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made in the will of
the innocent spouse shall be revoked by
operation of law. (106a)
Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation,
the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by
him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as
the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance
policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be
recorded in the registries of property in the places where
the properties are located. Alienations, liens and
encumbrances registered in good faith before the
recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries
of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change
in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take
effect upon written notification thereof to the insured.
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must
be brought within five years from the time the decree of
legal separation become final. (107a)
Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding
joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall
be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal
separation. (n)
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding
Articles shall have the following consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still
pending, shall thereby be terminated at
whatever stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be
set aside, but the separation of property and any
forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse
already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses
agree to revive their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be
recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a)
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property
regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be
executed under oath and shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the
restored regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties
of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their
addresses and the amounts owing to each.
Page 47
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval
shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for
legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the
creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall,
in its order, take measure to protect the interest of
creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper
registries of properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property
shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified,
unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties
to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a)
Capacity to Remarry
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles
35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
(17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (As amended by Executive Order
227)
Nota bene:
Formal validity law of the place of celebration; lex loci
contractus rule
Substantial validity governed by:
1. Personal law: status/legal capacity National law
of the parties
2. lex loci celebrationis:
exceptions:
Family Code Art. 26, paragraph 1
Consular Marriages consul granted by
the accepting country where such
consular office was located to
solemnize marriage
VIII. Parents and Children (Parental Relationship)
Civil Code:
Art. 15, supra
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
1. Those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction;
2. The guardian, with respect to the
ward, before the final approval of
his accounts;
3. A married person, without the
consent of the other spouse;
4. Non-resident aliens;
Private International Law
5. Resident aliens with whose
government the Republic of the
Philippines has broken diplomatic
relations;
6. Any person who has been
convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude, when the
penalty imposed was six months'
imprisonment or more. (174a)
Art. 339. The following cannot be adopted:
1. A married person, without the
written consent of the other
spouse;
2. An alien with whose government
the Republic of the Philippines has
broken diplomatic relations;
3. A person who has already been
adopted. (n)
Muslim Code:
TITLE V
Parental Authority
CHAPTER I
Nature and Effects
Art. 71. Who exercises.
(1) The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise just and
reasonable parental authority and
fulfill their responsibility over
their legitimate and
acknowledged children. In case of
disagreement, the father's
decision shall prevail unless there
is a judicial order to the contrary.
(2) The mother shall exercise parental
authority over her children born
out of wedlock, but the court may,
when the best interests of the
children so require, appoint a
general guardian. .chan robles
virtual law library
Art. 72. Duty to parents.
(1) Children shall respect, revere, and
obey their parents always unless
the latter cast them into disbelief.
(2) Grandparents are likewise entitled
to respect and reverence, and
shall be consulted whenever
practicable by all members of the
family on all important questions.
Art. 73. Duty to children. Every parent and
every person exercising parental
authority shall see to it that the rights
of the children are respected, and their
duties complied with, and shall
particularly by precept and example,
imbue them with religious and civic
attachment to the ideal of permanent
world peace.
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Art. 74. Effects upon person of children. The
parents have, with respect to their
unemancipated children:
(a) The duty to support them, have
them in their company, educate
and instruct them in keeping with
their means and represent them
in all actions which shall redound
to their benefits; and
(b) The power to correct, discipline,
and punish them moderately.
Art. 75. Effects upon property of children.
(1) The father, or in his absence the
mother, shall be the legal
administrator of the property of
the child under parental authority.
If the property is worth more than
five thousand pesos, the father or
the mother shall give a bond to be
approved by the court.
(2) The court may appoint a guardian
(wasi) in the absence of one who
is natural or testamentary.
Art. 76. Parental authority non-transferable.
Parental authority can neither be
renounced nor transferred except as
otherwise provided in this Code and
the general principles of Islamic law.
Art. 77. Extinguishment of parental authority.
(1) Parental authority terminates
upon the death of the parents or
the child, or upon emancipation.
(2) Subject to Article 78, the widowed
mother who contracts a
subsequent marriage shall lose
parental authority and custody
over all children by the deceased
husband, unless the second
husband is related to them within
the prohibited degrees of
consanguinity.
(3) The court may deprive a person of
parental authority or suspend the
exercise thereof if he treats his
children with excessive harshness,
gives then corrupting or immoral
orders and counsel, or abandons
them.
CHAPTER II
Custody and Guardianship
Art. 78. Care and custody.
(1) The care and custody of children
below seven years of age whose
parents are divorced shall belong
to the mother or, in her absence,
to the maternal grandmother, the
paternal grandmother, the sister
and aunts. In their default, it shall
devolve upon the father and the
nearest paternal relatives. The
Private International Law
minor above seven years of age
but below the age of puberty may
choose the parent with whom he
wants to stay.
(2) The unmarried daughter who has
reached the age of puberty shall
stay with the father; the son,
under the same circumstances,
shall stay with the mother.
Art. 79. Guardian for marriage (wali). The
following persons shall have authority
to act as guardian for marriage (wali) in
the order of precedence:
(a) Father
(b) Paternal grandfather;
(c) Brother and other paternal
relatives;
(d) Paternal grandfather's executor or
nominee; or .chan robles virtual
law library
(e) The court.
Art. 80. Guardian of minor's property. The
following persons shall exercise
guardianship over the property of
minors in the order of precedence:
(a) Father;
(b) Father's executor or nominee;
(c) Paternal grandfather;
(d) Paternal grandfather's nominee;
or
(e) The court.
Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by
adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. (n)
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage
of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of
the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor
or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and
his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified
such insemination in a written instrument executed and
signed by them before the birth of the child. The
instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together
with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this
Code. (n)
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on
the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child
because of:
Page 49
 (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife
were living separately in such a way
that sexual intercourse was not
possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband,
which absolutely prevented sexual
intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been
that of the husband, except in the instance
provided in the second paragraph of Article 164;
or
(3) That in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization
or ratification of either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence. (255a)
Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a)
Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother
contracted another marriage within three hundred days
after such termination of the former marriage, these rules
shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days
after the solemnization of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived
during the former marriage, provided it be born
within three hundred days after the termination
of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days
following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived
during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the
termination of the former marriage. (259a)
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after
three hundred days following the termination of the
marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such
legitimacy or illegitimacy. (261a)
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child
shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of
the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband
or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the
city or municipality where the birth took place or was
recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not
reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph
or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if
they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from
or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period
shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the
Private International Law
birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth,
whichever is earlier. (263a)
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation
of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding
article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should died before the
expiration of the period fixed for bringing his
action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the
complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the
husband. (262a)
Chapter 2. Proof of Filiation
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted
to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of five years within which to institute the action.
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, in conformity with the provisions of the
Civil Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their
ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers
and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of
this Code on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other
successional rights granted to them by the Civil
Code. (264a)
Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
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The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. (289a)
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-
half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code
governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)
Chapter 4. Legitimated Children
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other may be legitimated. (269a)
Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent
valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a
voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
(270a)chan robles virtual law library
Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights
as legitimate children. (272a)
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the
time of the child's birth. (273a)
Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the
celebration of the marriage shall benefit their
descendants. (274)
Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who
are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the
time their cause of action accrues. (275a)
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents
over the person and property of their unemancipated
children, parental authority and responsibility shall include
the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being. (n)
Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be
renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by
law. (313a)
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision
shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence
towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as
long as the children are under parental authority. (311a)
chan robles virtual law library
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising parental authority.
The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court
appoints another person to be the guardian of the person
or property of the children. (n)
Private International Law
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by
the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by
the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one
designated by the court, taking into account the same
consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall
exercise the authority. (355a)
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal
case, to testify against his parents and grandparents,
except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime
against the descendant or by one parent against the other.
(315a)
Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed
guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute
parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art.
214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the
property of the child becomes necessary, the same order
of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or
abused children and other children similarly situated,
parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial
proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and
similar institutions duly accredited by the proper
government agency. (314a)
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are
shall have special parental authority and responsibility
over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility
under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they
exercised the proper diligence required under the
particular circumstances.
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All other cases not covered by this and the preceding
articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority
Upon the Persons of the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental
authority shall have with the respect to their
unemancipated children on wards the following rights and
duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support,
educate and instruct them by right precept and
good example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and
counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual
guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity,
self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift,
stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire
in them compliance with the duties of
citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome
educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect
them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health,
studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting
their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and
obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be
required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed
by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's
property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of
the child so requires. (317)
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the
individual, entity or institution exercising parental
authority, may petition the proper court of the place
where the child resides, for an order providing for
disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be
entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or
appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be
conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be
heard.
Private International Law
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the
petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the
petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court
may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental
authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem
just and proper. (318a)
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article
may include the commitment of the child for not more
than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child
care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper
government agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere
with the care of the child whenever committed but shall
provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own
instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the
child whenever just and proper. (391a)
Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority Upon
the Property of the Children
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated
common child without the necessity of a court
appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's
decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual
income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such
amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten
per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual
income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations
prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in
the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if
the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of
the place where the property or any part thereof is
situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special
proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the
performance of the obligations referred to in the second
paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely
suppletory except when the child is under substitute
parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a
parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on
guardianship shall apply. (320a)
Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned
or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or
gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and
shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and
education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the
child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's
support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the
family. (321a, 323a)
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or
administration of any of their properties to an
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unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property
shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a
reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than
that which the owner would have paid if the administrator
were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire
proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give
in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's
legitime. (322a)
Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment,
parental authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of
the child in a case filed for the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court
divesting the party concerned of parental
authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or
incapacity of the person exercising parental
authority. (327a)
Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction
of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime
which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The
authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the
penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a)
Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a
related case may also suspend parental authority if the
parent or the person exercising the same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or
cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or
example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be
subjected to acts of lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include
cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the
parent or the person exercising parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of
the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty
party of parental authority or adopt such other measures
as may be proper under the circumstances.
Private International Law
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the
parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or
in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause
therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a)
Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has
subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to
sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived
by the court of such authority. (n)
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental
authority shall have the same authority over the person of
the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of
individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Ching Leng v. Galang
57 OG 2312
In Ching Leng the provision in the 1935 Constitution
stating "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines" refers only to legitimate children. When the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions were drafted, the framers did
not attempt to change the intent of this provision, even as
they were presumably aware of the Ching Leng doctrine.
Nevertheless, I believe that it is now time to abandon the
Ching Leng doctrine. (Tecson V. Comelec)
The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of
a Filipino father and an alien mother follows the citizenship
of the alien mother as the only legally known parent. The
illegitimate child, even if acknowledged and legally
adopted by the Filipino father, cannot acquire the
citizenship of the father. The Court made this definitive
doctrinal ruling in Ching Leng v. Galang which involved the
illegitimate minor children of a naturalized Filipino of
Chinese descent with a Chinese woman, Sy An. The
illegitimate children were later on jointly adopted by the
naturalized Filipino and his legal wife, So Buan Ty.
The facts in Ching Leng as quoted by the Court from the
trial courts decision are as follows:
After the petitioner Ching Leng Alias Ching Ban Lee
obtained judgment in this Court dated May 2, 1950
granting his petition for naturalization, he together with
his wife So Buan Ty filed another petition also in this Court
in Special Proc. No. 1216 for the adoption of Ching Tiong
Seng, Ching Liong Ding, Victoria Ching Liong Yam, Sydney
Ching and Ching Tiong An, all minors and admittedly the
illegitimate children of petitioner Ching Leng with one Sy
An, a Chinese citizen. Finding the petition for adoption
proper, this Court granted the same in a decision dated
September 12, 1950, declaring the said minors free from
all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with
respect to their mother Sy An and to all legal intents and
purposes the children of the adopter Ching Leng alias
Ching Ban Lee and So Buan Ty with all the legal rights and
obligations provided by law.
On September 29, 1955, Ching Leng took his oath of
allegiance and became therefore a full pledge (sic)
Filipino citizen. Believing now that his adopted illegitimate
children became Filipino citizens by virtue of his
Page 53
naturalization, petitioner Ching Leng addressed a
communication to the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration requesting that the alien certificate of
registration of the said minors be cancelled. (Bold
underscoring supplied)
In Ching Leng, the Court made a definitive ruling on the
meaning of "minor child or children" in Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law, as well as the meaning of children
"whose parents are citizens of the Philippines" under the
Constitution. The Court categorically ruled that these
children refer to legitimate children only, and not to
illegitimate children. Thus, the Court held:
It is claimed that the phrases "minor children" and "minor
child", used in these provisions, include adopted children.
The argument is predicated upon the theory that an
adopted child is, for all intents and purposes, a legitimate
child. Whenever, the word "children" or "child" is used in
statutes, it is generally understood, however, to refer to
legitimate children, unless the context of the law and its
spirit indicate clearly the contrary. Thus, for instance,
when the Constitution provides that "those whose parents
are citizens of the Philippines, "and "those whose mothers
are citizens of the Philippines," who shall elect Philippine
citizenship "upon reaching the age of majority", are
citizens of the Philippines (Article IV, Section 1,
subdivisions 3 and 4), our fundamental law clearly refers to
legitimate children (Chiong Bian vs. De Leon, 46 Off. Gaz.,
3652-3654; Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952).
Similarly, the children alluded to in said section 15 are
those begotten in lawful wedlock, when the adopter, at
least is the father. In fact, illegitimate children are under
the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality, not that of the illegitimate father (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, 335-336; Santos Co vs. Govt of the
Philippines, 52 Phil. 543, 544; Serra v. Republic, supra;
Gallofin v. Ordoez, 70 Phil. 287; Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-
4693, Feb. 16, 1953). Although, adoption gives "to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter", pursuant to said Article
341 of our Civil Code, we have already seen that the
rights therein alluded to are merely those enumerated in
Article 264, and do not include the acquisition of the
nationality of the adopter.
Moreover, as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization
Law, the term "children" could not possibly refer to those
whose relation to the naturalized person is one created
by legal fiction, as, for instance, by adoption, for,
otherwise, the place and time of birth of the child would
be immaterial. The fact that the adopted persons involved
in the case at bar are illegitimate children of appellant
Ching Leng does not affect substantially the legal situation
before us, for, by legal fiction, they are now being sought
to be given the status of legitimate children of said
appellant, despite the circumstance that the Civil Code of
the Philippine does not permit their legitimation.
Ng Hian v. Collector
34 Phil 248
On 30th of October, 1915 the steamship Tian arrived
at the port of Manila.
A woman, Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, together with two
children, Ng Tio a female of the age of 9 years, and Ng
Hian a boy of 16 years of age (the petitioner herein)
were on board.
Private International Law
Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, a Filipina born of a Filipina
mother and a Chinese father was married to a
Chinaman by the name of (Filipino name) Juan Uy
Tue, (Chinese name) Ng Chion Tue.
That Juan Uy Tue (Ng Chion Tue), before his marriage
with Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, had been married to a
Chinese woman with whom he had some children,
the petitioner herein and also one called Ng Guan.
It appears that Ng Guan was residing in the Philippine
Islands at the time of the presentation of the present
petition;
The Chinese wife of Juan Uy Tue died while the
petitioner herein, Ng Hian, was a very small child;
Juan Uy Tue, after the death of his Chinese wife,
married Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco.
Ng Tio was the daughter of the brother of the said
Juan Uy Tue, born of a Chinese father and mother;
that the father of the little girl had given her to
Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco;
Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco, being the stepmother of the
said Ng Hian, adopted him and was bringing him to
the Philippine Islands to study.
The Board of Special Inquiry refused the right of each
child to enter the Philippine Islands;
However, after a rehearing, Ng Tio was admitted but
Ng Hian was not.
Petitioner petitioned for habeas corpus in the CFI, CFI
granted entry to petitioner, Collector of Customs
appealed; Thus the present petition;
Issue:
Whether or not the minor children of a deceased resident
Chinese merchant have a right to enter the territory of the
Philippine Islands;
Held:
It is true that the petitioner, Ng Hian, had never been in
the Philippine Islands before. It is also true that the said
Marcosa S. Dy Jingco was his stepmother. She swore
positively that she had adopted him. That fact is not
denied of record. Until the fact is denied we must accept it.
There is nothing in the record which shows or tends to
show that she had not adopted him in good faith. The
question whether or not Marcosa S. Dy Jiongco could bring
Ng Hian into the territory of the Philippine Islands as her
adopted son has been discussed by the Federal Courts of
the United States. In the case of Ex parte Fong Yim (134
Fed. Rep., 938), the court held that:
A Chinese merchant domiciled in the United States has
the right to bring into this country with his wife minor
children legally adopted by him in China, where it is
shown that the adoption was bona fide, and that the
children have lived as members of his family and have
been supported by him for several years.
The court further said:
Of course, the question whether the adoption is a genuine
one is a question of fact, open to investigation . . . . The
evidence shows that the practice of adopting children in
China is very common, that it takes place substantially
without legal formalities, but that the rights and
obligations of children adopted and recognized as such
are similar to those of natural children. Under these
circumstances I can see no difference between the legal
status of adopted children and of natural children. The
Supreme Court (of the United States) having decided that a
Chinese merchant domiciled in this country has the right
Page 54
to bring into it his natural children, I think that the same
decision is authority for the proposition that he has the
right to introduce his adopted children;
ROEHR VS. RODRIGUEZ
Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a
Filipina, Respondent Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. The
marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had
two children. Private respondent filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the
trial court. However, The petitioner obtained a decree of
divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg -
Blankenese with the custody of the children granted to the
father.
Issue:
Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from
a foreign country such as support and custody of the
children can be determined in our courts?
Held:
Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must
clearly show that the opposing party has been given
ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Accordingly, the respondent was not given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German
Court, therefore, legal effects of divorce must be
determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court
has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to
who has the parental custody.
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente
v. Court of Appeals, the Court consistently held that a
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according
to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the
present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, where the Court
specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by
a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. The Court held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect
of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is
as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing,
the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the
judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment
may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in
this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes
prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private
respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for
declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the
rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two
children. The proceedings in the German court were
summary.
Exam is on Wednesday
630 to 830
Coverage is from start to parents and children

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German

court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged
by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of
parental custody, even the trial court recognized said
decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private
respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present
controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of
their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to
petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners

in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but
the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata
to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the

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