Trustees of Dartmouth College vs.
Woodward FACTS:
FACTS:
Eleazar Wheelock set up an Indian charity school, with
the help of several established Americans, clothed,
maintained and educated a number of children of the
Indian natives, with a view of carrying the Gospel and
spreading the word of God. The school became
reputable among Indians in such a way that a vast
number of Indians would want their children to study in
his institution although his personal finances and estate
could no longer handle the same. Wheelock thought that
the undertaking should be accomplished by collecting
funds from well-off individuals from England. Wheelock
requested Reverend Nathaniel Whitacker for that
purpose and gave him a special power of attorney to
solicit from the worthy and generous contributors for the
cause. Eventually, Whitacker appointed several persons
to be trustees for the funds collected through a deed of
trust ratified and executed by Whitacker. Through the
efforts of the trustees alongside Wheelock and
Whitacker, Dartmouth College has been instituted with
the Trustees of Dartmouth College. Any heirs of the
Trustees, as granted by the courts, will be part of the
body politic for the furtherance of Darthmouth College.
[I tried to make a digest but the case was too long, sorry]
Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537
requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic
and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical
assistance programs of the government and another
country, and members of religious orders or
congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so
as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of
Manila. Thus, a case was filed with CFI-Manila to stop
enforcement of the ordinance. CFI-Manila declared the
ordinance void. Thus, the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the ordinance violative of the cardinal rule of
uniformity of taxation?
(2) Does it violate the principle against undue
designation of legislative power?
(3) Does it violate the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution?
RULING:
(1) Yes. The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it
is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual
aliens who are required to pay it. The same amount of
P50 is being collected from every employed alien
whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time
or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive.
(2) Yes. It does not lay down any criterion or standard to
guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has
been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails
to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or
limit the action, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary
and unrestricted power, such ordinance is invalid.
(3) Yes. Requiring a person before he can be employed
to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him
the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage
in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under
the due process and equal protection clause is given to
all persons, both aliens and citizens.
Thus, the ordinance is invalid.
Buck v. Bell 274 U.S. 200
FACTS: Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman
who was committed to the State Colony Epileptics and
Feeble Minded. She is the daughter of a feeble minded
mother in the same institution, and the mother of an
illegitimate feeble-minded child. She was eighteen years
old at the time of the trial of her case in the latter part of
1924. An Act of Virginia, approved March 20, 1924,
recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of
society may be promoted in certain cases by the
sterilization of mental defectives, under careful
safeguard, that the sterilization may be effected in males
by vasectomy and in females by salpingectomy, without
serious pain or substantial danger to life; that the
Commonwealth issue supporting in various institutions
many defective persons who, if now discharged, would
become a menace, but, if incapable of procreating, might
be discharged with safety and become self-supporting
with benefit to themselves and to society, and that
experience has shown that heredity plays an important
part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility, etc. The
statute then enacts that, whenever the superintendent of
certain institutions, including the above-named State
Colony, shall be of opinion that it is for the best interests
of the patient sand of society that an inmate under his
care should be sexually sterilized, he may have the
operation performed upon any patient afflicted with
hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, etc., on complying
with the very careful provisions by which the act protects
the patients from possible abuse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said statute authorizing
compulsory sterilization of the mentally retarded denies
the due process and equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The procedure can be no doubt had the due
process of law. Carrie Buck is the probable potential
parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted,
the she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to
her general health, and that her welfare and that of
society will be promoted by her sterilization. We have
seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It is better for all the
world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.
IMBONG vs. OCHOA
FACTS:
The Reproductive Health Law is a consolidation and
enhancement of existing reproductive laws. It seeks to
enhance the population control program of the
government in order to promote public welfare. However,
when coercive measures are found within the law,
provisions must be removed or altered in order to ensure
that it does not defy the Constitution by infringing on the
rights of the people.
Petition: to declare provisions of Republic Act No.
10354 as unconstitutional
Factual Antecedents
December 21, 2012: Congress enacted RA No.
10354 also known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH LAW)
The presidents imprimatur and support for the
said law lead to a range of petitions against the
law leading to iuris controversy in court.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were
placed by numerous parties. All in all, 14
petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention were
filed.
March 15, 2013: the RH-IRR or enforcement
of the law took place
March 19, 2013: After deliberating the issues
and arguments raised, the court issued Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which lead to a 120
day halt on the implementation of the
legislation
Due to further arguments and debates from
opposing parties, the SQAO was extended
until further orders of the court last July 16,
2013
Statute Involved:
Republic Act 10354, The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012
Position of Petitioner:
o Petitioners claim that the provisions of RA
10354 are unconstitutional as they violate
the rights to life, to health, to freedom of
expression and speech, to the privacy of
families, to academic freedom, to due
process of law, to equal protection, and
 against involuntary servitude. They also
intrude on the autonomy of local
governments and the ARMM, and violate
natural law. Furthermore, they claim that
Congress delegation of authority to the
FDA in determining which should be
included in the EDL is invalid.
Position of Respondent
There is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for
judicial determination
Some petitioners lack standing to question
the RH Law
The petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory
relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of RA 10354 infringe
upon the Right to Life, as in the Due Process, of every
person?
HELD:
Right to Life NO
Constitution intended that 1.) conception to refer to
the time of fertilization and 2.) the protection of the
unborn upon said fertilization
Not all contraceptives are to be banned (only those
that kill a fertilized ovum)
Contraceptives that prevent union of sperm and egg
are thus permissible
It is the intended by the framers of the 1987
Constitution to prevent the enacting of a law that
legalizes abortion.
RH law prohibits abortion
RH law recognizes that abortion is a crime
RH law prohibits abortifacients.
Due Process - NO
The definitions of several terms pinpointed by the
petitioners in the RH Law are not vague.
Private health care institution = private health care
service provider.
service and methods are also broad enough to
include giving information and performing medical
procedures, so hospitals run by religious groups can
be exempted.
incorrect information connotes a sense of malice
and ill motive to mislead the public.
Nebbia vs. State of New York
Facts. The New York legislature established a Milk
Control Board that was vested with the power to fix
minimum and maximum retail prices for milk sold within
the state. Appellant, Mr. Nebbia, an owner of a New York
grocery store, was convicted of selling milk for prices in
excess of the price set by the Board.
Issue. Whether the Constitution prohibits a state from
fixing the selling price of milk?
Previous
Held. No. Judgment affirmed. The production and
distribution of milk is a paramount industry of the state
and largely affects the health and prosperity of its people.
Property rights and contract rights are not absolute in
nature and may be subject to limitations. Since the price
controls were not arbitrary, discriminatory, or
demonstrably irrelevant to the policy adopted by the
legislature to promote the general welfare, it was
consistent with the Constitution.
Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila
Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other
Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same
interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The
Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing
Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No.
532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English
and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of
articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by
the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No.
532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they
are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between
persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes
an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also
contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act
beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the
foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532
is an act beyond the scope of police power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a
class legislation that infringes property rights.
Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such
purposes are permissible under the police power. The
police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No.
532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of
the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744,
authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with
the approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for
the following: xxxx xxxxx laundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No.
532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their
patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are
not able to decipher Chinese characters from being
defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of
Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe
English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court
held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right,
and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of
police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate
personal property rights. The ordinance is neither
discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It
applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether
they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any
other nationality. All, without exception, and each every
one of them without distinction, must comply with the
ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation
of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the
Administrative Code. Although, an additional burden will
be imposed on the business and occupation affected by
the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning
even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly
Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it
seems that the same burdens are cast uponthem. Yet,
even if private rights of person or property are subjected
to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from
the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient
ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative
body. The very foundation of the police power is the
control of private interests for the public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed,
and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with
costs against the appellants.
Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad
Facts:
On 1921, Act No. 2972 or the Chinese
Bookkeeping Law was passed, regulating that the
account books should not be in any other language exc.
English, Spanish or any dialect, otherwise a penalty of
fine of not more than 10K or imprisonment for not more
than 2 years will be imposed
- fiscal measure intended to facilitate the work of
the government agents and to prevent fraud in the
returns of merchants, in conformity with the sales tax and
the income tax
On March 1923, BIR inspected the books of
account of Yu Cong Eng where it was found out that it is
not in accordance with Act 2972
A criminal case was filed against Yu Cong Eng
before the CFI Manila for keeping his books of account in
Chinese
Yus defense:
 Yu Cong Eng et al are Chinese merchants,
claiming that they represent the other 12K filed a petition
for prohibition and injunction against the CIR, questioning
the constitutionality of Act No. 2972 or the Chinese
Bookkeeping Law
Issue: W/N Act No. 2972 is constitutional?
Ruling:
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality
must be raised in the lower court and that court must be
given an opportunity to pass upon the question before it
may be presented to the appellate court for resolution
Power of taxation
- strongest of all the powers of government,
practically absolute and unlimited
- It is a legislative power. All its incidents are within
the control of the legislature. It is the Legislature which
must questions of state necessarily involved in ordering a
tax, which must make all the necessary rules and
regulations which are to be observed in order to produce
the desired results, and which must decide upon the
agencies by means of which collections shall be made
The power to tax is not judicial power and that a
strong case is required for the judiciary to declare a law
relating to taxation invalid. If, of course, so great an
abuse is manifest as to destroy natural and fundamental
rights, it is the duty of the judiciary to hold such an Act
unconstitutional
The Chinese petitioners are accorded treaty rights
of the most favored nation
Their constitutional rights are those accorded all
aliens, which means that the life, liberty, or property of
these persons cannot be taken without due process of
law, and that they are entitled to the equal protection of
the laws, without regard to their race
Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure which seeks to
prohibit not only the Chinese but all merchants of
whatever nationality from making entries in the books of
account or forms subject to inspection for taxation
purposes in any other language than either the English or
Spanish language or a local dialect
the law only intended to require the keeping of
such books as were necessary in order to facilitate
governmental inspection for tax purposes
The Chinese will not be singled out as a special
subject for discriminating and hostile legislation since
there are other aliens doing business in the Phils. There
will be no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or arbitrary
spoliation of property. There will be no unjust and illegal
discrimination between persons in similar circumstances.
The law will prove oppressive to the extent that all tax
laws are oppressive, but not oppressive to the extent of
confiscation
Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person,
company, partnership, or corporation, engaged in
commerce, industry, or any other activity for the purpose
of profit in the Philippine Islands, shall keep its account
books, consisting of sales books and other records and
returns required for taxation purposes by regulations of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when this action
was begun, in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, thus
valid and constitutional
Ichong vs. Hernandez
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf
of other alien residents corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.
1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of
their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2)
the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended
in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4)
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by
aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession,
and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII
and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the
equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is
against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand
absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exists for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not. (2
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power. Is there public interest, a public
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the legislatures
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive?
Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with
the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious
use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be
achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an
unjustified interference with private interest? These are
the questions that we ask when the due process test is
applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the
power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate
aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no
absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that
would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided
there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is
given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification
has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that
the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a
matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary and that in any case such matter falls within
the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government
may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be
said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered
into on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
NO ESPINA VS ZAMORA DIGEST
SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. &
MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a
POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19,
1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was
constrained to accept a downgraded employment
contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made
Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents
did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief
Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second
Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May.
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12
months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999,
but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he
had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his
contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months
and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint
against respondents for constructive dismissal and for
payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal
of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the
finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to
the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not
applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated
Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their
salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.
Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole
issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the
Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal,
OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired
portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the
applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of
overseas employment without just, valid or authorized
cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee
with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA
computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the
monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three
months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and
23 days of his employment contract or a total of
US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause,
petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00
awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to
US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23,
equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and
23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the
monthly rate of US$2,590.00

Issue:
1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is
the lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of
his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a
period of three months?
2.) Should petitioners overtime and leave pay form
part of the salary basis in the computation of his
monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that
have been stipulated into his contract?
Held:
1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting
of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of
US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers
with fixed-term employment who were illegally
discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation
of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to
their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their
contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042,
specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally
dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their employment contract have since been
differently treated in that their money claims are subject
to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed
on local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a
suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the
claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other
OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The
subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and
burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
The Court further holds that the subject clause violates
petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it
deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits,
without any existing valid governmental purpose. The
subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled
to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract,
pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 8042.
2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not
include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like
petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996,
provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers,
in which salary is understood as the basic wage,
exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses;
whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work
performed in excess of the regular eight hours, and
holiday pay is compensation for any work performed on
designated rest days and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the
automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the
computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there
is evidence that he performed work during those periods.
CLAUDIO S. YAP,
Petitioner, vs.
THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT and
INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,
Respondents.
Facts:
Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the
vessel, M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare
Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture
Shipping Limited. for a duration of 12 months. On 23
August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and
commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about
08 November 2001, the vessel was sold. Yap, along with
the other crewmembers, was informed by the Master of
their vessel that the same was sold and will be scrapped.
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra
bonus along with the scrapping bonus. However, with
respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept
the payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that
he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of
his contract since he was illegally dismissed from
employment. He alleged that he opted for immediate
transfer but none was made.
The Labor Arbiter
Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for
Illegal Dismissal with Damages and Attorneys Fees
before the Labor Arbiter (LA). On July 26, 2004, the LA
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding the
latter to have been constructively and illegally dismissed
by respondents.
LA opined that since the unexpired portion of petitioners
contract was less than one year, petitioner was entitled to
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a
period of nine months.
The NLRC
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC.
The NLRC affirmed the LAs findings that petitioner was
indeed constructively and illegally dismissed. However,
the NLRC held that instead of an award of salaries
corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only
entitled to salaries for three months as provided under
Section 108 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,9 as
enunciated in our ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
.Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Finding merit in petitioners arguments, the NLRC
reversed its earlier Decision, holding that "there can be
no choice to grant only three (3) months salary for every
year of the unexpired term because there is no full year
of unexpired term which this can be applied."
The Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the
NLRC that petitioner was constructively and illegally
dismissed. However, the
CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining
the LAs interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In
this regard, the CA relied on the clause "or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.
No. 8042.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the
extent that it affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker
the lesser benefit of "salaries for [the] unexpired portion
of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is
unconstitutional. - YES
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
granting petitioner only three (3) months backwages
when his unexpired term of 9 months is far short of the
"every year of the unexpired term" threshold. YES
Held:
The said provision of law has long been a source of
abuse by callous employers against migrant workers; and
that said provision violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution because, while illegally dismissed
local workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code of
reinstatement with full backwages computed from the
time compensation was withheld from them up to their
actual reinstatement. It imposes a 3-month cap on the
claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other
OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment.
Respondents, aware of our ruling in Serrano, aver that
our pronouncement of unconstitutionality should not
apply in this case because Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
a substantive law that deals with the rights and
obligations of the parties incase of Illegal Dismissal of a
migrant worker and is not merely procedural in character.
Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code, there should be no
retroactive application of the law in this case.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has
not been passed at all. The doctrine of operative fact
serves as an exception to the aforementioned general
rule. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to
the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law
by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law.
Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be
included in the aforementioned exception. To rule
otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other
OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies
may violate an OFWs security of tenure which an
employment contract embodies and actually profit from
such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of
law. Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker
allowance should be excluded from the definition of the
term "salary." Fair play, justice, and due process dictate
that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal,
pass upon this question. Matters not taken up below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. A close
perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance
of US$130.00 was not categorized as a bonus but was
rather encapsulated in the basic salary clause, hence,
forming part of the basic salary of petitioner.
White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila
FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord
7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels
who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said
Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons.
The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the
Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that
the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police
power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in
favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and
void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note
that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up
rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some
are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen
up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said
ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited
group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights
may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.
Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)
Facts:
On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force
and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges.
Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the
decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers
that the motion is a request for advisory opinion.
February Revolution took place, which subsequently
required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on
the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of
Court).
Issue:
Whether publication is still required in light of the clause
unless otherwise provided.
Held:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2
of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all
statutes, including those of local application and private
laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the
Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for
the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants
of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to fill in the
details of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full
or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws.
Reasoning:
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above
defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo
in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the station
commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A
which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef
from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result
of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing
of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering
the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond.
The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of
the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the
constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright
confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard
before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative
power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the
1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency
powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of
law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the
constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of
least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality
of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they
should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the
abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive
order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a
new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law
due to the grant of legislative authority over the president
under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise
language to avoid controversy. In the due process
clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would
remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an
iron rule laying down a stiff command for all
circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to
every situation with varying degrees at protection for the
changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition
for due process lest they be confined to its interpretation
like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a
safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption
which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as
such presumption is based on human experience or
rational connection between facts proved and fact
presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with a
criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular
function of police power which both restrains and is
restrained by due process. This power was invoked in
626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of
carabaos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, it cant be said that it complies with the
existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition
and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin
proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical
only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would
not have been proved in a court of justice with the
accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of
police power because the method to confiscate carabaos
was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owner was denied
the right to be heard or his defense and punished
immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
against the separation of powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law
during that time was valid.
Evelio Javier vs COMELEC and Arturo Pacificador
Facts:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under
Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in
May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained
of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying,
fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns
under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot
boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.
COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On
the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission
on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers
of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend
the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered
the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case
before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set
aside as premature, having been made before the lapse
of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the
irregularities of the election must first be resolved before
proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the
Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former
law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was
made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires
that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb
1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The
Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it
being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in
the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled
the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and
consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge as the indispensable imperative of due process.
To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are
violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not
go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by
requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls
the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice.
There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches
a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized
after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the
parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script. There is no
writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts
and the pertinent law.
Criselda Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC
Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint against Judge
Clapis for Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices,
Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law,
and violations of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2
(Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct relative to a criminal case.
Petitioner alleged that she met Judge Clapis at
the Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City to talk about the
case of her brother. The prosecutor of the said case,
Graciano Arafol, informed the petitioner that the Judge
will do everything for her favor but on the pretext that in
return she has to give P50,000.00 to the Judge. During
the meeting, the Judge, after being satisfied of the
promise of the petitioner for that amount, told her "Sige,
kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay, leave it
all to me, we shall crush them.)
When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of
Hearings were mailed to the petitioner only after the date
of hearing. Judge Clapis started conducting the bail
hearings without an application for bail and granting the
same without affording the prosecution the opportunity to
prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. He set a
preliminary conference seven months from the date it
was set, patently contrary to his declaration of speedy
trial for the case. However, the judge claimed that notices
were made verbally because of time constraints.
Nevertheless, he stressed that both sides were given the
opportunity to be heard since in almost all proceedings,
petitioner was in court and the orders were done in open
court. He admitted that his personnel inadvertently
scheduled the preliminary conference of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of
the charges.
HELD: YES.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior in connection with ones performance of official
functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to
exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or
inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent
disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must
imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment.
The acts of Judge Clapis in meeting the petitioner,
a litigant in a case pending before his sala and telling
those words, constitute gross misconduct. Judge Clapis
wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made
overt by the circumstances on record. Judge Clapis
cannot escape liability by shifting the blame to his court
personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately
responsible for order and efficiency in their courts, and
the subordinates are not the guardians of the judges
responsibility.
The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken
together, give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and
propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct
constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, particularly: Canon 2, Section 1 and 2; Canon
3, Section 2 and 4; and Canon 4, Section 1.
We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance
of the law for conducting bail hearings without a petition
for bail being filed by the accused and without affording
the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of
the accused is strong. Here, the act of Judge Clapis is
not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and
judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules.
When an error is so gross and patent, such error
produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law. If judges are allowed
to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the
law, there will not only be confusion in the administration
of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements of due process.
Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927]
Taft (CJ):
Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was
brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North
College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing
intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because of
the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th
Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to
the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing
intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as charged,
fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until
the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of
exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of
common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the
case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the
mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought
review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate
District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and
affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the
state Supreme Court refused Tumeys application to
require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the
case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as
of right, asking that the judgment of the mayors court
and of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional
grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged
that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no
debatable constitutional question was involved in the
cause. The judgment was then brought to the US
Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief
Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly
directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and
his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting
violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor
disqualified from hearing the case.
Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not
involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship,
personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would
seem generally to be matters merely of legislative
discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment
and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due
process of law to subject his liberty or property to the
judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct,
personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him in his case. Herein, the mayor
has authority, which he exercised in the case, to order
that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in
prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus
has a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting the
defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12 of
costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not have
received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was
not exceptional, but was the result of the normal
operation of the law and the ordinance. The system by
which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when
he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded
by custom in the general practice, either at common law
or in this country, that it can be regarded as due process
of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small that
they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de
minimis non curat lex. The Court cannot regard the
prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each
case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest.
It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought before
the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his
guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a prospective
loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But
the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of his
judgment is not the only reason for holding that due
process of law is denied to the defendant here. The
statutes were drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in
the country part of counties in which there are large
cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons
accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in
the county. The inducement is offered of dividing
between the state and the village the large fines provided
by the law for its violations. The trial is to be had before a
mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and
with a review confined to questions of law presented by a
bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing
court to set aside the judgment on the weighing of
evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly
against the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or
willful disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter
what the evidence was against him, the defendant had
the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably
raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial
because of the disqualification of the judge, which existed
both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the
outcome, and because of his official motive to convict
and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the
village. There were thus presented at the outset both
features of the disqualification. The judgment of the
Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
the present opinion.
Pedro Azul vs. Judge Jose Castro & Rosalinda
Tecson
Azul owns and operates a construction shop. To finance
it he entered a loan agreement with Tecson in the
amount of P391k. Tecson was only able to collect P141k
thus leaving about P250k as a balance. She filed a
petition for collection of sum of money before the Rizal
RTC and the case was given to J Sarmiento. On 27 Mar
79, Azul received the copy of the complaint. On 10 Apr
79, Azul filed a motion for a 15 day extension to file for
responsive pleading. Azul was unaware that J Sarmiento
retired and was temporarily substituted by J Aover who
granted the extension but only for 5 days starting the next
day. But Azul only received the notice granting such on
the 23rd of the same month way passed the 5 day
period. On the 17th of April, Tecson already filed a
motion to dismiss averring that Azuls 5 day extension
has already lapsed. On the 18th of the same month, J
Castro, the permanent judge to replace J Sarmiento took
office and he ordered Azul to be in default due to the
lapse of the 5 day extension. J Castro proceeded with the
reception of evidence the next day and of course without
Azuls evidence as he was still unaware of him being in
default. On April 27th, J Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On
May 2nd Azul, unaware that J Castro already decided the
case appealed to remove his default status. On May 7th
Azul received the decision rendered by the court on Apr
27th (but on record the date of receipt was May 5th). Azul
filed a motion for new trial on June 6th. The lower court
denied the same on the 20th of the same month. On Aug
1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3rd
but was reconsidered on the 7th hence Azul filed his
record on appeal on the 21st and J Castro approved it on
the 27th but surprisingly upon motion of Tecson on the
30th, J Castro set aside its earlier decisaion on the 27th.
Finally, J Castro denied the appeal on the 7th of
September.
ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due
process.
HELD: The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied
due process. The constitutional provision on due process
commands all who wield public authority, but most
peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly maintain
standards of fundamental fairness and to insure that
procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial are
observed at all stages of a proceeding. It may be argued
that when the Azuls counsel asked for a fifteen (15) day
extension from April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was
imprudent and neglectful for him to assume that said first
extension would be granted. However, the records show
that Atty. Camaya personally went to the session hall of
the court with his motion for postponement only to be
informed that J Sarmiento had just retired but that his
motion would be considered submitted for resolution.
Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in Quezon
City are literally swamped with their own heavy loads of
cases, counsel may be excused for assuming that, at the
very least, he had the requested fifteen (15) days to file
his responsive pleading. It is likewise inexplicable why J
Aover, who had not permanently taken over the sala
vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that
only a five-day extension would be allowed. And to
compound the Azuls problems, the order was sent by
mail and received only twelve (12) days later or after the
five-day period. Before the much publicized Project
Mercury of the Bureau of Posts, a court should have
known that court orders requiring acts to be done in a
matter of days should not be sent by mail. Meanwhile,
the petitioner was declared in default. The motion to
declare defendant in default is dated April 17, 1979. No
copy was furnished the petitioner. It was acted upon on
April 18, 1979, the very first day in office of J Castro in
Quezon City.
Mayor Miguel Paderanga vs. Judge Cesar Azura
Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis
Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself from
deciding on pending cases brought before him on the
grounds that they have lost confidence in him, that he
entertained tax suits against the city and had issued
TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly
provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to
stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias, oppressive
and is abusive in his power.
ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself
from the trial.
HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the
Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), All the foregoing
notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any
to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in
a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly
and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge
from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion
is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor
of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a
way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired.
The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to
the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of
doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of
the fairness and integrity of the judge.
NO CONCIO VS. DOJ CASE
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS, et al. G.R. No. 196425, 24 July 2012, EN
BANC (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
Executive Order No. 13 which abolishes the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission and transfers its functions to the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of
the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, is
constitutional pursuant to the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency.
In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and
transferring its functions to the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA).
Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima later on filed before
the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave
misconduct against Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay),
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA) for the purchase by the
LWUA of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
In defense, Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case
involving the same transaction is already pending before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Alleging that no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, Pichay
has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not E.O. 13 is constitutional
2. Whether or not there is usurpation of legislative power
to appropriate
public funds in view of such reorganization
3. Whether or not the IAD-ODESLA encroaches upon the
powers and
duties of the Ombudsman
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 violates
Pichays right to due
process and the equal protection of the laws
HELD:
E.O. 13 is constitutional
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency.
The Office of the President must, in order to remain
effective and efficient, be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to
carry out his directives and policies.
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its
functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing delegated legislative
authority to reorganize his own office. Since both of these
offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the
reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the IAD-ODESLA is allowable
under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to
appropriate public funds.
There is an express recognition under Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act
of 2010 of the Presidents authority to direct changes in
the organizational units or key positions in any
department or agency. This recognizes the extent of the
Presidents power to reorganize the executive offices and
agencies under him, which is, even to the extent of
modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose.
Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked
for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated
by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the
President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may
be properly sourced from the Presidents own office
budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After
all, the President simply allocates the existing funds
previously appropriated by Congress for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers
and duties of the Ombudsman
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It
is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the
investigation being conducted by another investigatory
agency. Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is
an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct,
Pichay may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from
proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the
Ombudsmans authority to investigate both elective and
appointive officials in the government, extensive as it
may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies.
Moreover, as the function of the Ombudsman goes into
the determination of the existence of probable cause and
the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the
investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to
that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations
and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the
President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the
Ombudsmans constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 does not violate Pichays right to
due process and the equal protection of the laws.
Pichays right to due process was not violated when the
IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative
complaint against him. In administrative proceedings, the
filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against
him constitute the minimum requirements of due process,
which simply means having the opportunity to explain
ones side. Hence, as long as Pichay was given the
opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied
with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.
Also, Pichay is a presidential appointee occupying the
high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA.
Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction
of the President, who is well within his right to order an
investigation into matters that require his informed
decision. There are substantial distinctions that set apart
presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions
in government from non-presidential appointees and
those that occupy the lower positions in government.
Erminita Muoz v. Atty. Victoriano Yabut
Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions and
resolutions of the CA. The subject is a house and lot sold
Munoz which she sold to her sister Emilia Ching, who in
turn sold it to the Go spouses. When the Go spouses
defaulted on their loan to BPI the property was
foreclosed. BPI won as the highest bidder at the auction
and the property was sold to the Chan spouses. Munoz
registered her adverse claim and filed a complaint with
the RTC for annulment of a deed of absolute sale,
cancellation of TCT in the spouses Gos names and for
revival of the TCT under her name. She also caused the
annotation of a lis pendens.
The RTC granted Gos motion for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and Munoz was driven out of the
property. Munoz, meanwhile, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the CA assailing the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction granted by the RTC, but
it was dismissed. The RTC rendered its judgment against
Emilia Ching and the Go spouses. It
found that Munozs signature and the absolute deed of
sale was forged.
Munoz never sold the subject property to her sister and
that the Go spouses were not innocent purchasers for
value. The sale was null and void. Emilia Ching appealed
the decision, but the appellate court not only affirmed the
decision of the RTC, it ordered the spouses Go and their
successors in interest to vacate the premises. After the
RTC filed a writ of execution implementing its judgment,
the spouses Chan came forward and filed an urgent
motion to stop the execution against them. They asserted
ownership and possession on the basis of a clean title
registered in their names, also contending that the final
judgment cannot be executed against them as they were
not parties to the case and that they purchased the
property from BPI without any defects to the title.
Munoz discovered the cancellation of her adverse claim
and notice of lis pendens, plus the subsequent events
that led to transfer and registration from Go, to BPI then
to the Chans.
It was denied by the RTC. The photocopy of BPIs TCT
could hardly be regarded as proof that Munozs adverse
claim and notice of lis pendens were missing from the
original, also pointing out that the registration in the day
book is what serves as sufficient notice to the world.
There was no more need to annotate the title. They were
deemed to have taken the property subject to the final
outcome of the present dispute. The RTC then issued an
alias writ of execution and the subject property was taken
from the spouses and returned to Munoz. Their motion
for reconsideration was denied. Munoz then instituted a
complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction alleging that with the aid of armed
men, Chan and Atty. Yabut forcibly ousted Munoz of
possession. They claim Chan to be the true owner that
his possession was never interrupted, and the men were
there to attend services at the Buddhist Temple on the
fourth floor of the building on the property. Munozs claim
of
forcible entry should be dismissed for lack of merit and
legal basis. The MeTC granted Munozs petition and
restored possession to her.
Yabut and Chan questioned the MeTCs decision through
a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC. They asserted that
they were not bound by the final judgment between Go
and Munoz. Munoz on the other hand argued that the
MeTC order was an interlocutory order, and is thus a
prohibited pleading under the rules of summary
procedure. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the implementation of the MeTC
order. The RTC found that the MeTC had committed
grave abuse of discretion for not dismissing the complaint
for forcible entry on the ground of lis pendens as the
issue to who had a better right to possession between
Chan and Munoz was the subject of a pending
proceeding. The RTC dismissed the ejectment suit.
Munoz appealed to the CA, but the CA sustained the
RTC orders holding that the Chans right to due process
was vitiated by impleading them only at the execution
stage of the civil case. The order of the RTC in the civil
case was null and void, and considering they are
strangers to the case and they are innocent purchasers
for value. Thereafter Munoz filed a motion for contempt
with the RTC against the Chan spouses and Atty. Yabut.
Munoz also filed a Motion for an alias writ of execution
and application for surrender of the owners duplicate
TCT, in which she prayed to direct the RD not only to
cancel the TCT of Go, but all documents declared null
and void, and to restore her TCT free from all liens and
encumbrances.
In its order the RTC denied Munozs motion for contempt,
but ordering an alias writ of execution to deliver the
property to Munoz, ordering Go to vacate. It also ordered
the RD to cancel from the records all documents
determined void and to restore Munozs TCT.
Unrelenting Munoz filed a motion for clarificatory order,
pointing out that the spouses Chan are the present
occupants and that the property could not be delivered
unless the spouses Chan are evicted. The motion was
denied reiterating the rule that once a judgment has
become final only clerical errors may be corrected.
Munoz elevated the complaint to the SC, but it was
remanded to the CA in observance of the hierarchy. The
CA dismissed Munozs petition agreeing with the RTC
that the Chan spouses could not be covered by the writ
of execution considering they were not impleaded in the
civil case. Munoz claims that the decision in the civil case
binds not only Ching, the Go spouses and BPI, but their
successors in interest, assigns or persons acting on their
behalf, hence they cannot be considered as innocent
purchasers for value.
Issue:
Held:
The SC denies Munozs petition for contempt and motion
for clarificatory order seeking that the Chans be
executed against because the prior civil case against Go
is an action for reconveyance which is an action in
personam. Since the Chans and BPI were not impleaded
as parties, the effect of the judgment cannot bind or be
extended to them by simply issuing alias writs of
execution. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not
bound by any judgment rendered to the court. Although
the titles of Ching and Go were deemed void, there was
no similar determination as to the titles that BPI and
Chan had. Munoz cannot collateraly attack the title that
the Chans have; they must be given their day in court in
a proceeding designated for that purpose.
Filemon David vs. Judge Gregorio Aquilizan, et. al.
Facts:
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato.
He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and
caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land
is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs and
the share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew
the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to
go back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but
David refused to do so. David denied that the brothers
were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor
driver before but he resigned to take care of his dad and
to work for DOLE. Filemon on the other hand
surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to
continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the case
filed by the brothers against David and after three months
he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without
any hearing. David averred he was denied due process.
J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing
conducted but he said the decision has already become
final and executory as the period for appeal has already
lapsed.
ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision
rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be
attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and
void for want of due process. And it has been held that a
final and executory judgment may be set aside with a
view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is
void for lack of due process of law. In legal
contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered
at all.
Anita Lorenzana vs. Polly Cayetano
FACTS:
Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila
Railroad Company (later from the Bureau of Lands). She
later purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had
the property be rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to
nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment cases
against her tenant. On the other hand, Cayetano was an
occupant of a parcel of land adjacent to that of
Lorenzanas land. Cayetano was renting the same from
the Bureau of Lands. The lower court granted
Lorenzanas ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a
writ of execution to forcibly eject her tenants but she
included to eject Cayetanos property. Cayetano was not
a party to the ejectment cases so she prayed for the
lower court that her property be not touched. The lower
court denied Cayetanos petition. The CA, upon appeal,
favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is
now a party to the ejectment cases as she already
brought herself to the Courts jurisdiction by virtue of her
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cayetanos right to due process has been
violated.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the
CA. It must be noted that respondent was not a party to
any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of
demolition had been issued; she did not make her
appearance in and during the pendency of these
ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to court to protect
her property from demolition after the judgment in the
ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence,
with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases,
Cayetano remains a third person to such judgment,
which does not bind her; nor can its writ of execution be
informed against her since she was not afforded her day
in court in said ejectment cases.
NO CAOILE VS. VIVO DIGEST
NO LOBETE VS. SUNDIAM DIGEST
NO MARVEL BLDG. CORP. VS OPLE DIGEST
NO VALLADOLID VS. INCIONG DIGEST
Anglo-Fil Trading Corp. v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494
(1983)
F: The petitioners were among 23 stevedoring and
arrastre operators at the Manila South Harbor. Their
licenses had expired but they were allowed to continue to
operate on the strength of temporary permits. On May 4,
1976, the Phil Ports Authority decided to allow only one
org. to operate the arrastre and stevedoring services. On
April 28, 1980, based on the report and recommendation
of an evaluation committee, the PPA awarded the
exclusive contract for stevedoring services to the Ocean
Terminal Services Inc (OTSI). The petitioners brought
suit in the CFI to annul the contract for exclusive service.
On motion, Ct issued a TRO enjoining PPA and OTSI
from implementing the exclusive contract. Later, the ct
lifted the TRO prompting the petitioners to file an action
for certiorari with the SC contending that: (1) ex parte
lifting of TRO constituted grave abuse of discretion; (2)
the award would impair the petitioners' contracts with
foreign customers.
HELD: (1) Considering that the previous grant of TRO in
favor of pets. was made ex parte and w/o bond, notice
and hearing of the lifting were not necessary, much less
mandatory.
(2) Stevedoring services are subject to regulation
and control for the public good and in the interest of the
general welfare. A single contractor furnishing the
stevedoring requirements of a port has in its favor the
economy of scale and the maximum utilization of
equipment and manpower. In return, effective supervision
and control as well as collection and accounting of the
govt share of revenues are rendered easier than where
there are 23 contractors to oversee. As found from the
evidence, the multiple contractor system has bred cut-
throat competitions in the port. Understandably, most
contractors had been unable to acquire sufficient modern
facilities, observe labor standards, maintain efficiency,
and pay PPA dues.
The contention of pets that due process was
violated resulting in a confiscation of private property is
likewise without merit. In the first place, the pets were
operating merely on "hold over"permits. In the second
place, the award of OTSI was the result of a evaluation of
performance of existing contractors made by a special
committee created by the PPA. VV.
Notes:
The policy adopted by the Philippine Ports
Authority to allow only one organization to operate the
arrastre and stevedoring services of each port was
upheld by the SC as a valid exercise of police power.
For the "one port, one operator" rule makes possible the
better supervision, collection, efficiency and improvement
of services, and prevent cut-throat competition and
non-maximal utilization of equipment and manpower.
However, in the awarding of contracts, the procedures
must allow only the capable operator to get the franchise.
In this case, a temporary restraining order (TRO)
was issued without notice to the other party. As the
TRO was lifted also without hearing, the person in
whose favor it was originally issued cannot complain of
the lifting of the TRO without prior hearing.

NO CRUZ VS. RCBC DIGEST
NO CORDERO VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
DIGEST
NO DIONA VS. BALANGUE DIGEST
University of the Philippines vs. Hon. Agustin S.
Dizon
FACTS:
University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General
Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders
Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction of its
buildings in its Los Baos campus. UP was able to pay
its first and second billing. However, the third billing worth
P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the
Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued
the UP to collect the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision
ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16,
2002, the RTC filed its motion for reconsideration. The
RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion
was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco)
of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty.
Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the
OLS in Diliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3,
2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice
of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4,
2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the
writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs
petition. The denial became final and executory. Hence,
Stern Builders filed in the RTC their motions for execution
despite their previous motion having already been
granted and despite the writ of execution having already
issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another
motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the
RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October
4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of
garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC
ordered the release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA but the CA
sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether UPs appeal dated June 3, 2002 has
been filed out of time
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the
amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from its
trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the
judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UPs
appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002.
It is true that a decision that has attained finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it or by
this Court as the highest court of the land. But the
doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been
absolute, and has admitted several exceptions, among
them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called
nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any
party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
that render its execution unjust and inequitable.
We rule that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts
exercise of the exceptional power to disregard the
declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for
being in clear violation of the UPs right to due process.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal
Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was
admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. The rule
is that it is on the counsel and not the client that the
service should be made. Verily, the service of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly
made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is settled
that where a party has appeared by counsel, service
must be made upon such counsel. This is clear enough
from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of
Court, which explicitly states that: If any party has
appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made
upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the
party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel
appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to
one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite
side.
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty.
Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the remaining
period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by
May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the
judgment of the RTC became final and immutable
thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late
on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC
as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the
rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of
a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of
the period for filing the appeal; and that the period
resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC
might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule
then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the
UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first
announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: to standardize the
appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a
procedural law that aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order
denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order
or resolution, is impervious to any serious challenge.
This is because there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17,
2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs
filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not
tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the
UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end on
June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had
until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday,
within which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of
Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: If the last day
of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court
sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
People vs. Beriales
Facts: A case of three men who were charged for the
murder of Saturnina on Sept. 13, 1974. During the
hearing on Nov. 26, 1974, upon motion of the defense
the Court ordered the re-investigation of the case
pending submission of the Fiscal of its reports. Couple of
postponements was made until Dec. 13, 1974 hearing
when the Court proceeded with the arraignment and trial
in the absence of the Fiscal and its report on re-
investigation, and over the disagreement of the defense.
The CFI of Leyte relied on the private prosecutor being
authorized by the Fiscal to present evidence and the
defense presumed to have waived its right over its
disagreement. Trial then proceeded and the 3 found
guilty of he offense. Thus, this appeal on the
constitutional requirement of due process.
Issue: Whether or not due process of law had been
observed.
Held: Constitutional due process was violated, thus, case
remanded to CFI for arraignment and trial. Court should
have held in abeyance the trial while the report on e-
investigation was still pending. Consistent disregard of
the defense objection on the arraignment, trial,
presentation of private prosecutors evidence, and
rendition of judgment violates due process. Prosecutor or
Fiscal entrusted with the investigation is duty bound to
take charge until final termination. They shall have
direction and control of the criminal prosecution over
private prosecutors.
Marcos v. Garchitorena

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as
arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan's First Divisiondenying petitioner's
motion for leave to travel abroad for medicaltreatment.
The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by
the First Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction
she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to
seekdiagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of
oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a
serious and life threatening medical condition" requiring
facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied.
Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and
treatment in China. This was supported by several
medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto
Anastacio.
Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos
to US and Europe for treatment of several Heart diseases
alleging that the tests were not available here.
The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr.
Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine
Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for
"expert opinion on coronary medicine". The court still
found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave
and denied all of the motions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion
to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for
Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report
and letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering
to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of
twenty four members of the House of Representatives
requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad.
This was also denied by the Court also stating their
express disapproval of the involvement of the VP and the
Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions,
decisions or orders or any judicial action of respondent
court.
Issue: Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in
disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad
because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it
motu propio contacted a third party asking the latter to
give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical
findings (3) said that there was no necessity to get
medical treatment abroad.
Held: No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid
to contact a third party asking the latter to give an opinion
on petitioner's motion and medical findings was
erroneous. Respondent court had to seek expert opinion
because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of
her physician. The court could not be expected to just
accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving
her request for permission to travel. What would be
objectionable would be if respondent court obtained
information without disclosing its source to the parties
and used it in deciding a case against them.
In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed
to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It should be
emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing
charges before the courts in several cases, in two of
which she was convicted although the decision is still
pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an
absolute right to leave the country and the burden was on
her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her
life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in
foreign countries.
On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to
undergo several tests which summarily states that the
required medical treatment was available here in the
Philippines and that the expertise and facilities here were
more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment.
The heart ailments of the petitioner were not as severe
as that was reported by Dr. Anastacio.
Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice
to the filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad,
should petitioner still desire, based on her heart
condition. In such an event the determination of her
medical condition should be made by joint panel of
medical specialists recommended by both the accused
and the prosecution.
NO REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN DIGEST
NO PLDT VS. HPS SOFTWARE COMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION DIGEST
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN
FACTS:
During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed
as winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC
in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in
the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and,
based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as
the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan
to cease and desist from performing the functions of said
office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the
meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's motion for
execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed
as Mayor.
The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the
parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of
the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards.
Thus, it issued an order dated requiring Saquilayan to
deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for
the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it
issued another order for Saquilayan to augment his cash
deposit.
The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and
declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he
had been denied his right to due process because he had
not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He
argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot
images, which were secondary evidence, had been
unwarranted because there was no proof that the
integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.
The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR.
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari,
reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images without prior notice to
him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in
the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.
The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed
the same. The Court then pronounced that the First
Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the
ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that
the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary
images, but considered original documents with the same
evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on
Electronic Evidence; and that the First Divisions finding
that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered
had been fully established by the large number of cases
of double-shading discovered during the revision.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing
the instant petition despite a clear violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to due process of law considering that
decryption, printing and examination of the digital images
of the ballots were done inconspicuously upon motu
propio directive of the COMELEC First Division sans any
notice to the petitioner and for the first time on appeal.
HELD: The decision of the court a quo is granted.
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay
Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the power
of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure
the speedy resolution of its cases should still be
exercised only after giving to all the parties the
opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The
parties right to be heard upon adversarial issues and
matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be
treated so lightly because of the possibility of the
substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties,
or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should
not have upheld the First Divisions deviation from the
regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the
election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties
with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard, the most basic requirements of due process.
The picture images of the ballots are electronic
documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the
original official ballots themselves. In Vinzons-Chato v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
199149, January 22, 2013the Court held that "the picture
images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the
PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in
electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by
Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts
thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots
filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."
That the two documents the official ballot and its picture
image are considered "original documents" simply means
that both of them are given equal probative weight. In
short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not
considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the
COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and
unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of
the ballots in the proceedings had before them without
notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight
accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their
picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots
adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the
official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the
voters will. In that regard, the picture images of the
ballots are to be used only when it is first shown that the
official ballots are lost or their integrity has been
compromised.
NO CALANO VS. CRUZ DIGEST
Lawton vs. Steele
Summary: Plaintiffs sued defendant fish and game
protectors to recover damages for the loss of their seized
fishing nets. At issue was the New York statute that
prohibited fishing in the area where plaintiffs were fishing
and proscribed seizure of fishing gear used in violation of
the statute. The U.S. Supreme Court held that such a
statute is a constitutional exercise of state police power,
as the protection of fish and game has always been
within the proper domain of police power. Further, the
court found the legislature acted properly in providing a
seizure component to the statute to control what it termed
a "public nuisance."
Facts: The nets were the property of the plaintiffs, and
were taken away by the defendant Steele, and
destroyed. At the time of the taking, most of the nets
were in the waters of the Black River bay, being used for
fishing purposes, and the residue were upon the shore of
that bay, having recently been used for the same
purpose. The plaintiffs were fishermen, and the
defendant Steele was a state game and fish protector.
The taking and destruction of the nets were claimed to
have been justifiable under the statutes of the state
relating to the protection of game and fish. Plaintiffs
claimed there was no justification under the statutes, and,
if they constituted such justification upon their face, they
were unconstitutional. Defendant Sherman was a state
fish commissioner. Defendant Sargent was president of
the Jefferson County Fish & Game Association. Plaintiffs
claimed these defendants to be liable upon the ground
that they instigated, incited, or directed the taking and
destruction of the nets.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed sections of Chapter
591 of, Laws New York 1880 is valid and constitutional.
Held: YES
It is not easy to draw the line between cases where
property illegally used may be destroyed summarily and
where judicial proceedings are necessary for its
condemnation. If the property were of great value, as, for
instance, if it were a vessel employed for smuggling or
other illegal purposes, it would be putting a dangerous
power in the hands of a custom officer to permit him to
sell or destroy it as a public nuisance, and the owner
would have good reason to complain of such act as
depriving him of his property without due process of law.
But where the property is of trifling value, and its
destruction is necessary to effect the object of a certain
statute, we think it is within the power of the legislature to
order its summary abatement. For instance, if the
legislature should prohibit the killing of fish by explosive
shells, and should order the cartridges so used to be
destroyed, it would seem like belittling the dignity of the
judiciary to require such destruction to be preceded by a
solemn condemnation in a court of justice. The same
remark might be made of the cards, chips, and dice of a
gambling room.
The value of the nets in question was but $15 apiece.
The cost of condemning one (and the use of one is as
illegal as the use of a dozen) by judicial proceedings
would largely exceed the value of the net, and doubtless
the state would, in many cases, be deterred from
executing the law by the expense. They could only be
removed from the water with difficulty, and were liable to
injury in the process of removal. The object of the law is
undoubtedly a beneficent one, and the state ought not to
be hampered in its enforcement by the application of
constitutional provisions which are intended for the
protection of substantial rights of property. It is evident
that the efficacy of this statute would be very seriously
impaired by requiring every net illegally used to be
carefully taken from the water, carried before a court or
magistrate, notice of the seizure to be given by
publication, and regular judicial proceedings to be
instituted for its condemnation.
It is said, however, that the nets are not in themselves a
nuisance, but are perfectly lawful acts of manufacture,
and are ordinarily used for a lawful purpose. This is,
however, by no means a conclusive answer. Many
articles-- such, for instance, as cards, dice, and other
articles used for gambling purposes--are perfectly
harmless in themselves, but may become nuisances by
being put to an illegal use, and in such cases fall within
the ban of the law, and may be summarily destroyed. It is
true that this rule does not always follow from the illegal
use of a harmless article.
Emilio Gancayco vs City Government of Quezon City
and MMDA
Facts:
In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel
of land located in EDSA. Then on March 1956, Quezon
City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the
construction of arcades for commercial buildings to be
constructed. At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the
time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council,
there was yet no building code passed by the national
legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of
buildings was left to the discretion of local government
units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council
required that the arcade is to be created by constructing
the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few
meters away from the property line. Thus, the building
owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge
of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter
under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish
the use of the space for use as an arcade for
pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco.
Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco
sought the exemption of a two-storey building being
constructed on his property from the application of
Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from
constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on
Justice Gancaycos request and issued Resolution No.
7161, S-66, subject to the condition that upon notice by
the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable
time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own
expense when public interest so demands.
Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted
operations to clear obstructions along EDSA, in
consequence, they sent a notice of demolition to Justice
Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated
the National Building Code.
Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a
petition for TRO with the RTC Quezon City to prohibit the
MMDA from demolishing his property. The RTC rendered
its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice
Gancayco. It held that the questioned ordinance was
unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. The
RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice
Gancaycos 375 square meters of property were being
taken without compensation for the publics benefit, the
ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise
held that the ordinance violated owners right to equal
protection of laws.
MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA
went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject
property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only
refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges,
parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus
excluding Justice Gancaycos private property. Lastly, the
CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority
to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.
Issues: (1) WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO
WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF
ORDINANCE NO. 2904. (2) WHETHER OR NOT
ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.(3)
WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE
GANCAYCOS BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE. (4)
WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY
DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE
GANCAYCO.
Ruling:
(1) We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel.
When it made the undertaking to comply with all
issuances of the BIR, which at that time it considered as
valid, petitioner did not commit any false
misrepresentation or misleading act.
(2) Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on
the ground of equal protection when he also benefited
from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice
Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the
application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually
granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the
exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet
no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the
ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different
treatment of properties that appears to be similarly
situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do
so.
(3) The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice
Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is
an indication that the wing walls of the building are not
nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se
immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons
and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a
structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure
a nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a
permit to construct the building, the city council or the city
engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished
portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and
property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA
against summarily demolishing the structure.
Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as
a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does
not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular
thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per
se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation
and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature,
situation or use is not such. Those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.
MMDA illegally demolished Gancayco's property.
Zambales Chromite Mining, et. al., vs. CA
FACTS:
ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of
Mines Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and
prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta.
Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting their claim against
the group of Martinez and Pabiloa. Gozon decided in
favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of
Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself
from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his
earlier decision when he was still the director of mines.
ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI
affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the
disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or
ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply
to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the
Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case
which he had decided as Director of Mines; that
delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the
ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from
deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence
that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice,
animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to
the CA. The CA reversed Gozons finding and declared
that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al
by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the
factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be
given due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing
that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA
remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources.
Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions;
ZCM wants the CAs earlier decision to be reaffirmed
while Martinez et al demanded that Gozons finding be
reinstated. The CA denied both petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier
decision w/o disturbing due process.
HELD:
The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a
mockery of justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of
discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer
whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could
be no different view or there would be no real review of
the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a
biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in
his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the
2nd decision of the CA.
Dr. Felicidad Anzaldo vs. Jacobo Clave
FACTS: Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the
National Institute of Science and Technology for 28
years. She was holding the position Scientist Research
Associate IV when she was appointed as Science
Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved
by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by
Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his
position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the
one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldos
appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation
Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66
points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of
the president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential
Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil
Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC.
Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC.
Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the
contested position. After the denial of her motion for the
reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980,
Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the
Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he
just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case
at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA
Clave said in his decision that he was inclined to concur
in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission,
what he meant was that he was concurring with
Chairman Claves recommendation: he was concurring
with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due
process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant
Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself)
Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. Due
process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair
to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his
own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to
who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed
Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by
the President of the Philippines.
NO NASECO GUARDS ASSOCIATION VS NATIONAL
SERVICE CORPORATION DIGEST