G.R. No.

177751 : January 7, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FLORENCIO

AGACER,* EDDIE AGACER, ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER and
ERIC*** AGACER, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

For resolution is appellants' Motion for Reconsideration1 of our December 14,

2011 Decision2 affirming their conviction for the murder of Cesario Agacer,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: cra lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 17, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01543 which affirmed the August 7,
2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan, finding
appellants Florencio, Franklin, Elynor, Eddie and Eric, all surnamed Agacer.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with the following
modifications: c ralawlib ra ry

(1) actual damages is DELETED;

(2) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer
P25,000.0 as temperate damages; and

(3) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer h interest
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the amounts of
damages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.
??? r?b l? ??r ??l l?? l ?b r?r

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.3 ?r?l1

Appellants assert that their mere presence at the scene of the crime is not
evidence of conspiracy;4 that there was no treachery since a heated
argument preceded the killing of the victim;5 and that even assuming that
their guilt was duly established, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority should have been appreciated in favor of appellant Franklin Agacer
(Franklin) who was only 16 years and 106 days old at the time of the
incident, having been born on December 21, 1981.6 ?r?l1

In our February 13, 2012 Resolution,7 we required the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration particularly on
the issue of Franklins minority.

Meanwhile, in a letter8 dated June 8, 2012, the Officer-in-Charge of the New

Bilibid Prison, informed us that appellant Florencio Agacer (Florencio) died on
February 17, 2007, as evidenced by the attached Certificate of Death
indicating cardio pulmonary arrest secondary to status asthmaticus as the
cause of death.9 ?r?l1

The OSG, in its Comment,10 asserts that there exists no cogent reason to
disturb our findings and conclusions as to the guilt of the appellants since the
facts and evidence clearly established conspiracy and treachery. However, it
did not oppose and even agreed with appellants argument that minority
should have been appreciated as a privileged mitigating circumstance in
favor of Franklin, the same being duly supported by a copy of Franklins
Certificate of Live Birth secured from the National Statistics Office (NSO)
Document Management Division.11 ?r?l1

Issues

Hence, the following issues for our resolution: cralawlib rary

1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish the existence of conspiracy and

treachery in the commission of the crime charged?

2. Should the mitigating circumstance of minority be appreciated in favor of

appellant Franklin?

3. Does the death of appellant Florencio extinguish his criminal and civil
liabilities?

Our Ruling

There is partial merit in appellants Motion for Reconsideration.

Reiterated Arguments in a Motion for Reconsideration Do Not Need a New

Judicial Determination.

Appellants contention that the prosecutions evidence is insufficient to prove

conspiracy and treachery is a mere rehash of their argument set forth in their
brief, "which we already considered, weighed and resolved before we
rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered."12 It is not a new issue that
needs further judicial determination.13 There is therefore no necessity to
discuss and rule again on this ground since "this would be a useless formality
of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set
forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by
the movant."14?r?l1

As a Minor, Franklin is Entitled to the Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of

Minority.

Nevertheless, we agree with appellants that Franklin is entitled to the

privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Franklins Certificate of Live
Birth shows that he was born on December 20, 1981, hence, was merely 16
years old at the time of the commission of the crime on April 2, 1998. He is
therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
embodied in Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It provides that when
the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the accused but always in
the proper period. The rationale of the law in extending such leniency and
compassion is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to have
acted with less discernment.15 This is regardless of the fact that his minority
was not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly
presented for our consideration, since to rule accordingly will not adversely
affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs.

Penalty to be Imposed Upon Franklin.

Pursuant to the above discussion, the penalty imposed upon Franklin must be
accordingly modified. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
A degree lower is reclusion temporal.16 There being no aggravating and
ordinary mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on Franklin
should be reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, which
ranges from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.17 Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor, the medium
period of which ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years. Due to the seriousness of the crime and the manner it was committed,
the penalty must be imposed at its most severe range.

The Death of Florencio Prior to Our Final Judgment Extinguishes His Criminal
Liability and Civil Liability Ex Delicto.

On the effect of the death of appellant Florencio on his criminal liability,

Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that: cralawl ibra ry

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is

totally extinguished.

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to

pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxx

It is also settled that "upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer
a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it
is on the criminal."18?r?l1

While Florencio died way back on February 7, 2007, the said information was
not timely relayed to the Court, such that we were unaware of the same
when we rendered our December 14, 2011 Decision. It was only later that
we were informed of Florencios death through the June 8, 2012 letter of the
Officer-in- Charge of the New Bilibid Prison. Due to this development, it
therefore becomes necessary for us to declare Florencio 's criminal liability as
well as his civil liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death
prior to final judgment. The judgment or conviction is thus set aside insofar
as Florencio is concerned.

WHEREFORE, appellants' Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Our Decision dated December 14, 2011 is MODIFIED as follows: (a) appellant
Franklin Agacer is sentenced to suffer the penalty often (10) years of prision
mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (
4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, and (b)
the criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto of appellant Florencio Agacer
are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment. The
judgment or conviction against him is therefore SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187048 : January 23, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENJAMIN

PETELUNA AND ABUNDIO BINONDO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

We review the 11 July 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
with modification the trial court's conviction of appellants Benjamin Peteluna
(Benjamin) and Abundio Binondo (Abundio) for the murder of an elderly man
named Pablo Estomo (Pablo).2 ?r?l1

The Facts

On 11 June 1996, appellants were charged with the murder of Pablo before
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.3 On arraignment, appellants pleaded not
guilty.4 Trial proceeded with the prosecution and the defense presenting their
respective witnesses. The prosecution presented sixteen-year old Romeo
Pialago (Romeo),5 who was with Pablo at the time of the incident, and Dr.
Dympna Aguilar (Dr. Aguilar),6 Municipal Health Officer of the Barili District
Hospital. On the other hand, the appellants themselves7 and the father of
appellant Abundio, Teofilo Binondo (Teofilo),8 appeared for the defense.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that on 30 April 1996, Romeo and
Pablo watched a cockfight during the fiesta of Barangay Lamak, Barili, Cebu.
On their way home at about five oclock in the afternoon, Pablo, followed by
the appellants, with the young Romeo behind them, walked along the road of
Sitio Liki, Barangay Mayana, Barili, Cebu. Romeo, who knew appellants
because they used to pass by his house, noticed them whispering to each
other. He saw the appellants place their arms on Pablos shoulder, after which
they struck Pablo with stones each of which was as big as the size of a fist.
Pablo pleaded the appellants to stop but they did not. When Pablo fell to the
ground, Benjamin smashed his head with a stone as big as Pablos head.
Afterwards, appellants dragged him downhill towards the farm of one Efren
Torion (Efren) in Sitio Liki. Romeo did not know what happened next because
he ran to seek help. He went to the house of Espiridion Presbitero (Pideon),
the barangay captain of Mayana. Pideon, in turn, coordinated with a certain
Simo, the barangay captain of Bagacay. Romeo escorted Pideon and Simo to
the place where the incident took place but Pablo was no longer there. They
went to the house of appellant Abundio at Barangay Cangundo but the
appellant was not there. The two captains then proceeded to the house of
appellant Benjamin, who accompanied them to the farm of Efren. There they
found the body of Pablo, which Dr. Aguilar later examined.
Before the court, Dr. Aguilar testified that Pablo sustained eleven (11)
Wounds9 caused by blunt instrument(s) like stone(s). There were blood clots
in the cranium and meninges. The death, according to her autopsy report,
which she identified in court to have been prepared and signed by her, was
caused by "cerebral hemorrhage due to laceration and contusion of the
head."10?r?l1

The defense, on the other hand, presented different versions for each of the
appellants.

Appellant Benjamin, testified on his behalf. While he admitted of having been

in the hilly portion of the road at Sitio Liki at around 2:30 in the afternoon of
30 April 1996, he denied any participation in the commission of the crime.
Instead, he alleged that on his way home from the fiesta, he saw Pablo and
appellant Abundio boxing each other beside the road fifteen (15) fathoms
away from him. Appellant Benjamin did not see how the fight ended because
he proceeded home. It was around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon when he got
to his house. Fifteen (15) minutes later, appellant Abundio came and told
him that it was Pablo who boxed him first and that he should not tell anyone
about the incident. The appellants spent the night at the Abundios. The
following morning, the barangay officials were there looking for Pablo.
Appellant Benjamin, who was still in the house, told the barangay captain
that he witnessed the fight between appellant Abundio and Pablo. Appellant
Abundio fled but was nevertheless apprehended in the afternoon of the same
day.

On the other hand, appellant Abundio raised the defense of alibi. His father
Teofilo testified to the effect that appellant Abundio and his other children
were in the farm of one Tonying Paras at the time the crime was committed.
They had breakfast in their house, which is approximately one kilometer
away from the farm. Then they went back to the farm and stayed there until
6:00 oclock in the afternoon. By 8:00 oclock in the evening, they retired for
the night. It was only the following morning that he learned of the death of
Pablo whose body was found in the creek around two kilometers from his
house, and that his son appellant Abundio was identified as one of the
suspects.

Appellant Abundio corroborated his fathers testimony stating that he was

helping out in the farm at the time the crime was committed. He only learned
that Pablo had been killed the day after the incident.

After trial, both appellants were convicted of murder. The dispositive portion
of the decision of the trial court reads:
cralawl ibra ry

JUDGMENT is therefore rendered declaring the two (2) accused, Benjamin

Peteluna and Abundio Binondo, GUILTY of the crime of MURDER and they are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the
heirs of the victim the sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
as indemnity.11 ?r?l1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the assailed
decision in this wise:cral awlib rary

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 60, Barili, Cebu in Criminal Case No. CEB-BRL-050, finding appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION only in the award of damages. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua is affirmed.

Appellants are ordered to pay solidarily the heirs of the victim Php50,000.00
as civil indemnity and Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages.12 ?r?l1

Before this Court, appellants Benjamin and Abundio argued that the crime
committed was only homicide because of the absence of the circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation, which would have qualified the killing
to murder, and that their respective defenses of denial and alibi were
meritorious. They likewise pointed out that the testimony of the prosecutions
witness Romeo is not credible.13 ?r?l1

Our Ruling

We sustain the conviction of both appellants.

The crime committed was murder.

To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person

was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance
of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 24814 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.15 ?r?l1

Appellants maintain that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not

attendant in the commission of the crime considering that there was no
element of surprise when Pablo was attacked. Pablo had the opportunity to
defend himself. Appellant Benjamin, in his Supplemental Brief, further
argued that even if there was suddenness of the attack, Pablo could have
chosen to retreat.

We are not convinced.

We have time and again declared that "the essence of treachery is a

deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape,"16 and that it may still
exist even if the attack is frontal so long as the same is sudden and
unexpected.17 ?r?l1

In this case, it was clear that the elderly victim had no inkling of the
impending danger against him. The attack was sudden notwithstanding the
prior act of placing the assailants arms on the shoulder of the victim because
such was done in a friendly manner. As the young Romeo, on cross
examination, testified: cralawlib ra ry
Q: You said that they then put their arms on the shoulder of Pablo Estomo,
how did they do it? Was it in a friendly manner?

A: Yes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

Romeo was also correct as regards the inability of the victim to defend
himself or at least run from the assailants. Thus: cralawlibra ry

Q: In other words the victim could have run away had he liked to?

A: He could not run because he was already old.

Q: How old was Pablo Estomo if you know?

A: According to my estimate he was 60 years old or more.19 ?r?l1

xxx

Q: And Pablo Estomo saw the two accused picking up the stone?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So while the two accused was in the act of picking up the stones which
according to you the victim saw, why did he not run?

A: He did not r[u]n because he believed that the two accused will not kill
him.20?r?l1

Records would show that Pablo was fifty-seven (57) years old at the time of
his death.21 Admittedly, ones thought processes and reflexes slow with age
that Pablo did not readily understand the intentions of the appellants. The
attack was, therefore, clearly sudden and unexpected.

In the case of People v. Sinda,22 the Court had the occasion to further
illustrate the attendance of treachery in a situation where the defenseless
victims had already fallen to the ground and there was no risk to the
assailant against any attack from the victims thereby facilitating the
execution of the commission of the crime. Thus: cralawlibra ry

The appellants, in waylaying the victims, obviously employed a mode of

attack which was deliberately designed to insure the death of their victims
without any risk they could have made against them. Felix and Rogelio were
both unarmed at the time the appellants pelted the two with stones. It must
be stressed that when the victims fell on the ground after the appellants
threw stones at them, there was no danger on the part of the appellants of
any attack from the victims. The victims were not in a position to defend
themselves at the time appellant Gaspar hacked them on their necks. In
other words, the method employed by the accused insured his safety from
any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the victims.23 (Emphasis
supplied)
Like the victims in Sinda, Pablo fell to the ground unarmed and defenseless,
except that, in the present case, after the victim had fallen to the ground,
the appellants used a big stone the size of a head of a man instead of a
bladed weapon. Romeo described how the two appellants attacked Pablo, to
wit:c ralawl ibra ry

Q: What happened to Pablo Estomo when he was struck with stones by

Abundio Binondo and Benjamin Peteluna?

A: Pablo Estomo was still standing at that time and said "dont harm me
because I have no grudge against you." ???r?bl ? ??r ??l l?? l ?br?r

Q: What did the accused do when they heard that statement from Pablo
Estomo?

A: They still struck stones towards Pablo Estomo.24 ?r?l1

xxx

He detailed cross examination: cralawl ibra ry

A: When the victim was struck and he was hit for the first time at the left
side of the head the victim was still standing. The second hit was at the left
portion of the chest and that is the time Pablo fell to the ground. Then
Benjamin Peteluna picked up a stone and smashed the victim who was on
the ground.25 ?r?l1

We agree with the appellants, however, that the prosecution failed to

establish the presence of the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation. Such could only be appreciated if there was evidence to show
the following: c ralawli bra ry

(1) the time when the offender [was] determined to commit the crime; (2)
an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and

(3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow

himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.26 ?r?l1

None, for any such circumstance, was offered in the instant case. The
testimony of Romeo, save from the statement that the appellants were
whispering to each other before they placed their arms on Pablos shoulder,
was confined to the acts that caused the death of the victim.

Denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
assailants by the witness;

Denial is inherently weak if uncorroborated; For alibi to prosper, it must be

established that it was physically impossible for the appellant to have been at
the locus criminis
It is a time-honored principle that the positive identification of the appellant
by a witness destroys the defense of alibi and denial.27 Thus: cralawlib rary

x x x It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have
always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which
they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all and
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the
prosecution witnesses.28 For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that
appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by
clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of any weight in law.29 Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating
justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant
impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.30 ?r?l1

In this case, Romeo positively identified the appellants, whom he both knew
since he was a child,31 thereby rendering the defenses of alibi and denial
weak. Certainly, it was not physically impossible for appellant Abundio to be
at the hilly portion of Sitio Liki where Pablo was attacked, the same being
only a kilometer away from his own house and two (2) kilometers away from
the farm where he and his father allegedly were on that fateful day.
Appellant Benjamins bare denial, on the other hand, is definitely self-serving.
It cannot stand against the positive identification of an unbiased and credible
witness.

Credibility of the testimony is not affected by inconsistencies on points not

relevant to the elements of the crime

Appellant Benjamin faulted the witness for being able to give a complete
account of the incident even during the time that he was supposed to have
been scampering away for safety.32 ?r?l1

Romeo, on cross-examination, clarified that when he decided to take cover,

he did not turn his back from his companion. He just stepped back and
accidentally found the bushes from where he hid.33 This, he said, gave him
the opportunity to witness the entire incident. He nonetheless testified during
the continuation of the cross-examination that he was not able to look at the
direction of Pablo all the time for he had to look for where he was going. This
notwithstanding, appellant Benjamin cannot conclude that Romeo was not
telling the truth when he said that Pablo was attacked by the appellants
using the stones on the ground. The autopsy report supported his testimony.
If at all, Pablo could have actually been hit more than the number of times
Romeo claimed it to be.

Be that as it may, we see this inconsistency trivial. It is not relevant to the

elements of the crime as to affect the credibility of Romeos testimony. So
with the inconsistencies primarily on the same points separately raised by
appellant Abundio.34 ?r?l 1

Settled is the rule on the matter that: cra lawlib rary

x x x Our scrutiny of the so-called inconsistencies relied upon by Asilan

showed that they only referred to minor details, which did not affect the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.35 In People v. Albarido,36 this Court
said:c ralawli bra ry

It is elementary in the rule of evidence that inconsistencies in the testimonies

of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters
do not affect the substance of their declaration nor the veracity or weight of
their testimony. In fact, these minor inconsistencies enhance the credibility
of the witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that their testimonies were
contrived or rehearsed. In People v. Maglente, this Court ruled that
inconsistencies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime
are not grounds for acquittal. x x x.37 ?r?l1

As to the rest of the testimony of Romeo, a reading of the transcript of

stenographic notes would show that he rendered a straightforward and
consistent testimony even on cross examination. There is, therefore, no
reason for us to depart from the well-entrenched principle that: cralawl ibra ry

x x x The task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and

weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms first-hand
impressions as witnesses testify before it. It is thus no surprise that findings
and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule,
a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage of observing the
demeanor of witnesses as they testify. x x x38 ?r?l1

All considered, we are convinced that the guilt of appellants had been
sufficiently established with moral certainty.

The imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua in the absence of aggravating

and mitigating circumstances

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty
attached to the commission of the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attended the
commission of the crime, the proper imposable penalty on the appellant is
reclusion perpetua.39 ?r?l1

Appellant is liable for civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages

and 6% interest on all damages

The civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the Court of

Appeals is in order.40 There is, however, a need to increase the award of
exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 to conform to existing
jurisprudence.41 In addition, the victims heirs shall be entitled to moral
damages even in the absence of proof that they suffered mentally and
emotionally42 considering that "a violent death invariably and necessarily
brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family."43
A 6% interest on all the monetary awards for damages to be reckoned from
the date of finality of this decision until fully paid shall likewise be imposed.44 ?r?l 1

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 11 July 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CEB-C.R.-H.C. No. 00554 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

Accordingly, appellants Benjamin Peteluna and Abundio Binondo are hereby

found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are further
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Pablo Estomo the amounts
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
as exemplary damages, and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 188603 : January 16, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMIL RARUGAL

alias "AMAY BISAYA," Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is the appeal of the June 30, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413,2 which affirmed with modification
the May 29, 2006 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86,
Quezon City in Crim. Case No. -Q-99-82409, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal that found appellant Ramil Rarugal alias "Amay
Bisaya" guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder.

On December 8, 1998, the following information for the crime of murder was
filed against appellant: cralawlib ra ry

That on or about the 19th day of October, 1998, in Quezon City, Philippine,
the above-named appellant, with intent to kill, qualified by evident
premeditation and treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
one Arnel M. Florendo, by then and there stabbing him with a bladed
weapon, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause
of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
Arnel M. Florendo.4?r?l1

Appellant was only arrested sometime in August 2001. During his

arraignment on August 27, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty.5 Trial on the
merits ensued.

Based on the testimonies of witnesses presented by the prosecution, the RTC

found that on the night of October 19, 1998 at around 9:45 p.m., while
victim Arnel Florendo (Florendo) was cycling along Sampaguita Street,
Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City, appellant, with the use of a long
double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; thus, forcibly depriving him of his
bicycle. Immediately thereafter, appellant hurriedly fled the scene. This
incident was witnessed by Roberto Sit-Jar, who positively identified appellant
in court.

Florendo arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his siblings,

including his brother Renato. When Renato recounted the events of that
night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and his other relatives
that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then took Florendo to
Tordesillas Hospital but had to transfer him to Quezon City General Hospital,
due to the unavailability of blood. It was there that Florendo died6 on October
26, 1998 with the family spending about P2,896.007 for his hospitalization
and P25,000.008 for his funeral.

Autopsy Report signed by Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Dominic L. Aguda,

showed the following Postmortem Findings9: cralawlib ra ry

Cyanosis, lips and fingernailbeds

Brain- pale

Heart-chambers, contain small amount of dark clotted blood

STAB WOUND-

sutured, healing, 3.0 cms, located on left chest, 15.0 cms. from the anterior
median line directed backwards and medially involving the skin and
underlying tissues passing between the 6th and 7th left ribs, entering the
thoracic cavity and severed the lower lobe of the left lung with a depth of 7-8
cms.

THORACOSTOMY INCISIONS-

sutured, 3.5 cms., located on the left chest, 19.0 cms. from the anterior
median line; sutured, 3.2 cms. located on the right chest 20 cms. from the
anterior median line

Hemothorax- left, 500 cc

Visceral organs- pale

Stomach- empty

CAUSE OF DEATH: cralawlibra ry

STAB WOUND, LEFT CHEST ??? r?b l? ??r??l l ?? l ?b r?r

In his defense, appellant denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was at

that time working as a farm administrator for the town mayor in Pangasinan.
He said he was living with his cousin in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan on October
19, 1998, where he had been staying since 1997. He stated that during the
period 1997 to 1998, he did not visit Manila at any point. On cross-
examination, appellant stated that he was arrested in front of his house in
Novaliches, Quezon City.10 ?r?l 1

On May 29, 2006, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
It stated:
cralawlib rary

After evaluation, the Court finds that the guilt of the appellant was proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as
the assailant of Florendo. In view of the positive identification made by Sit-
Jar, the denial and alibi made by [appellant] has no leg to stand on. Under
prevailing jurisprudence alibis and denials are worthless in light of positive
identification by witnesses who have no motive to falsely testify.

Moreover, Florendo did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the
appellant. Florendo, apparently conscious that he could die of his wound,
identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules,
statements made by a person under the consciousness of an impending
death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The
positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the
consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the
liability of herein appellant.

xxx

As shown by the evidence, the killing of Arnel Florendo was sudden indicating
treachery and the appellant being then armed with a knife, the killing was
done with abuse of superior strength. These circumstances qualify the crime
to murder, all of the elements of the offense being present.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered finding the

appellant Ramil Rarugal alias "Amay Bisaya" GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of
P28,124.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 for civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as and for moral damages.11 (Citations omitted.)

Appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 21, 2006.12 He questioned the
RTCs finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the commission of the crime
and its appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. He argued
that witness Sit-Jar lacked credibility for giving inconsistent testimony.
Moreover, he averred that there was no basis for the finding that treachery
qualified the crime to murder since its elements were not established.13 ?r?l1

On June 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the May
29, 2006 decision of the RTC. It stated that witness Sit-Jars positive
identification of appellant as the one who stabbed Florendo takes precedence
over appellants defense of denial and alibi. Moreover, appellant failed to
adduce evidence to show that Sit-Jar had any improper motive to falsely
testify against him. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal in the
following manner: cralawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED

with the MODIFICATION that the appellant RAMIL RARUGAL is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P27,896.00 as actual
damages and the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The said
Decision in all other respect STANDS.14 ?r?l1
Hence, this appeal.15 Petitioners confinement was confirmed by the Bureau
of Corrections on September 30, 2009.16 ?r?l1

Both the appellee17 and the appellant18 waived the filing of supplemental
briefs and adopted the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals.

We affirm the June 30, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals, with
modification respecting the award of damages.

This Court has consistently stated that the trial court is in a better position to
adjudge the credibility of witnesses, especially if its decision is affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.19 We have been reminded in People v. Clores20 that: cralawlib rary

When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the

guiding rules some of which are that (1) the appellate court will not disturb
the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case x x x;
(2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his
demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if
such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains
consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. (Citations omitted.)

The rationale for these guidelines is that the trial courts are in a better
position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses
themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of
testifying under grueling examination.21 ?r?l 1

We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. After a careful review
of the records, we find that appellant failed to negate the findings of the trial
court with concrete evidence that the latter had overlooked, misconstrued, or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would
have affected the result of the case. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
the prosecution witness recounted the details of that fateful night in a "clear,
straightforward and convincing manner, devoid of any signs of falsehood or
fabrication."22
?r?l 1

First, prosecution witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as the victims

assailant in contrast to the appellants defense of denial and alibi. We have
stated in Malana v. People23 that: cralaw lib rary

It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification

that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. The prosecution witnesses positively identified
appellants as two of the perpetrators of the crime. It is incumbent upon
appellants to prove that they were at another place when the felony was
committed, and that it was physically impossible for them to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. x x x. (Citations
omitted.)

The records are devoid of any indication that it was physically impossible for
appellant to have been in the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. Appellants bare alibi that he was working as a farm administrator
in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan and was allegedly staying there at the time of the
commission of the crime does not suffice to prove the alleged physical
impossibility that he committed the crime charged, moreso in the face of
positive identification by the witness, who was not motivated by any
improper motive to falsely testify against him.

Second, the victim was still alive after the stabbing incident. He had time to
reach his house and confide in his brother, witness Renato, that it was
appellant who had stabbed him.

Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides: cra lawlib rary

SEC. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under
the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case
wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death.

The Court has stated in People v. Maglian24: cralawlib ra ry

The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if

the following circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the cause and the
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) it is made when
death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of
impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify
had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in
which the subject of inquiry involves the declarants death." x x x. (Citation
omitted.)

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo made to
his brother Renato has complied with the requisites of a dying declaration. It
is important to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by appellant twice on
the chest, went home and under labored breathing, told Renato that it was
appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an
expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death, and
under the consciousness of impending death. There being nothing in the
records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been
competent to testify had he survived.25 It is enough to state that the
deceased was at the time competent as a witness.26 Lastly, the dying
declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death.
We reproduce the statement of the RTC: cralawlibra ry
Moreover, the victim did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the
appellant. The victim, apparently conscious that he could die of his wound,
identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules,
statement made by a person under the consciousness of an impending death
is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The positive
identification made by the victim before he died, under the consciousness of
an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability of herein
appellant.27
?r?l 1

It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from the stabbing incident
and after receiving adequate care and treatment, because the apparent
proximate cause of his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a consequence
of appellants stabbing him in the chest.

Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellants act of
suddenly stabbing Florendo while he was innocently cycling along
Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City constituted
the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As we previously ruled, treachery is
present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.28 Here, appellant
surprised Florendo when he suddenly and swiftly attacked and stabbed him
in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless to protect
himself, allowing appellant to commit the crime without risk to his own
person. Thus, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the
commission of the crime.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of
murder. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.29 ?r?l1

However, to conform to existing jurisprudence, the Court must modify the

amount of indemnity for death and exemplary damages awarded by the
courts a quo.

Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6)
interest, in proper cases.30
?r?l 1

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim were able to
prove before the trial court actual damages in the amount of P27,896.00
based on the receipts31 they submitted. Moreover, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the award of exemplary damages is proper in this case. We
have stated that: cralawlibrary

Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended
party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying.
Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to
the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.32 (Emphasis omitted.)

We, however, increase the award of exemplary damages to P30,000.0033 and

the award for mandatory civil indemnity to P75,000.0034 to conform to recent
jurisprudence.

We sustain the RTCs award for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victims
heirs.35 As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the
part of the victims family.36 ?r?l1

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the
monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.37
?r?l1

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The June 30, 2008 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413 is AFFIRMED. Appellant RAMIL
RARUGAL alias "Amay Bisaya" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
MURDER, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Arnel M. Florendo the
amounts of P27,896.00 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All
monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. NO. 175327 : April 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDMUNDO VITERO,

Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before Us is the appeal from the Decision1 dated July 18, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00070, affirming the Decision dated
October 9, 20032 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Ligao City,3 in
Criminal Case Nos. 4242-47, -which found accused-appellant Edmundo Vitero
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape as defined by
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a),4 in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1 )5
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. In lieu of
the death penalty originally imposed by the RTC, the Court of Appeals
sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.6 cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary

Accused-appellant was charged with six counts of rape in six Informations

filed before the RTC on March 21, 2001, which uniformly read: cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

That sometime in the month of April, 1998, at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, more or less, at Barangay XXX, Municipality of Ligao, Province of
Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, by means of force,
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of his own daughter, 13-year-old AAA7,
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.8 chan roble svi rtualawl ib rary

When arraigned on June 14, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all
six rape charges.

The six rape cases against accused-appellant were jointly tried.

The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA, the victim herself; BBB, the
mother of AAA; and Doctor Lea Remonte (Dr. Remonte), Ligao Municipal
Health Officer. It also submitted as documentary evidence the Marriage
Certificate of accused-appellant and BBB, the Birth Certificate of AAA, and
the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Remonte.

The defense, for its part, called to the witness stand accused-appellant
himself; Ireneo Vitero (Ireneo), accused-appellant's uncle;9 and Vilma
Prelligera (Vilma), accused-appellant's sister.

The RTC rendered a Decision on October 9, 2003. According more weight and
credibility to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as compared to
those of the defense, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of raping his minor daughter, AAA. However, the RTC held
that the prosecution was only able to prove one of the six counts of rape
against accused-appellant. Thus, the RTC decreed: chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary

WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, judgment is rendered finding the accused

EDMUNDO VITERO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime
of RAPE for one (1) count as such crime is defined and punished by Article
266-A, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph a, in relation to Article 266-B, fifth
paragraph, sub-paragraph 1, The Revised Penal Code, As Amended by
Republic Act No. 8353, and this Court hereby imposes on him the supreme
penalty of DEATH. As his civil liability, he shall pay the victim AAA the
amount of 75,000 pesos as civil indemnity, the amount of 50,000 pesos as
moral damages, and the amount of 25,000 pesos as exemplary damages. He
shall pay the costs of suit.

For the other remaining five (5) counts of rape, finding reasonable doubt,
this Court finds the accused-appellant EDMUNDO VITERO NOT GUILTY, and
hereby ACQUITS him of such criminal charges.

Elevate the entire record[s] of the six (6) above-entitled cases to the
Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment by such Court
en banc pursuant to Article 47 of The Revised Penal Code, As Amended by
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.10
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

The entire records of the cases were brought before us, but we transferred
the same to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution11 dated August 24, 2004,
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.12 chanrob les virtua lawlib rary

The Court of Appeals summarized the evidence of the prosecution, to wit: chan rob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

Edmundo Vitero, accused, and BBB were married on April 5, 1984. Out of the
marriage, they begot six (6) children, four (4) girls (AAA, the eldest, CCC,
DDD and EEE) and two (2) boys (FFF and GGG). In September 1996,
accused and BBB separated. She left the conjugal home bringing with her
CCC, EEE, and GGG and established her own residence at Barangay XXX,
Polangui, Albay.

AAA, DDD and FFF were left to the custody of the accused. They transferred
to the house of the parents of the accused at Barangay XXX, Ligao City,
Albay. The said house, a one-storey structure has two (2) rooms. One room
was occupied by the parents of the accused while the other was occupied by
accused and his three children.

Sometime in the month of April 19[9]8, at around 7 o'clock in the evening,

AAA, then already thirteen (13) years old, having been born on April 30,
1985, was sleeping in their room with the accused, her sister DDD, and her
brother FFF. AAA slept in the extreme right portion of the room, immediately
beside the wall separating their room from that of her grandparents. To her
left was the accused followed by DDD and FFF.

AAA was roused from her sleep when she felt somebody on top of her. When
she opened her eyes, she saw her own father mounting her. After stripping
AAA naked, accused brought out his penis and inserted it into AAA's vagina
and made a pumping motion. At the same time, he was kissing her lips and
neck and fondling her breasts. AAA felt searing pain and her vagina bled. She
started to cry, but he was unmoved and warned her not to make any noise.
She tried to resist his lewd desires, but her efforts were in vain. She did not
shout for help because she feared accused who had a 20-inch knife beside
him might kill her. After ravishing AAA, accused dressed himself and went
back to sleep. Because of the harrowing experience she suffered from the
hands of her own father, AAA was not able to sleep anymore. AAA did not
report her ordeal to her grandparents for fear they would only scold her.

Sometime in 1998, between the months of May and September, appellant

brought AAA to the house of his sister Salvacion at Lian, Batangas.

Meantime, HHH, AAA's maternal grandfather, visited his daughter BBB, and
showed to her an anonymous letter stating that AAA had been raped by [her]
father. Thereafter, BBB went to see Salvacion, her sister-in-law in her house
at Lian, Batangas to look for AAA, but she did not find her. She, however, got
word that AAA had already gone home. Frustrated and weary, BBB went back
to Bicol and looked for AAA in her grandparents' house at Barangay XXX,
Ligao City, Albay, but the house was empty. BBB learned that AAA had been
brought back to Lian, Batangas.

She finally found AAA in the house of her employer in Lian, Batangas in
November 2000. BBB asked AAA if she was indeed raped by her father. AAA
disclosed that accused ravished her six (6) times while they were still living
in her grandparents' house. He usually raped AAA at night when she and her
siblings were already sleeping in their room. Upon learning of her suffering,
she brought AAA with her to Guinobatan, Albay. They reported the incident
to the Ligao Police Station and with the help of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), they went to see a doctor for AAA's
medical examination.

On November 17, 2000, Dr. Lea F. Remonte, the City Health Officer of Ligao
City, examined AAA. Her Medico-Legal Certificate revealed the following
findings:chan roblesv irtualawl ibra ry

Genitalia: Normal external genitalia, nulliparous introitus, scanty pubic hair

over mons pubis.

- Labia minora protruding beyond labia majora.

- Hymen not intact, presence of healed laceration at 5:00 o'clock position.

- Vagina admits examining finger with ease.

- No discharge nor blood noted upon withdrawal of the examining finger.

- Patient was on her 5th day of menstruation when the examination was
done (Exhibit "C," p. 7, Records)

Dr. Remonte testified that sexual intercourse is the number one cause of
hymenal laceration.13 chan robles virtua lawlib rary

The evidence for the defense, on the other hand, was recapitulated as
follows:chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

Accused Edmundo vigorously denied the allegations against him. He testified

that from 1996 to 2000, he was employed as a construction worker in
Manila. However, upon his return to Albay, he learned that he was criminally
charged with raping his own daughter AAA. He further stated that such
charge was fabricated by his wife. According to him, AAA was not working as
house help in Batangas. She just stayed where his sister resides.

For his part, Ireneo Vitero corroborated the testimonies of the accused. He
testified that in 1996, while working in Manila, accused stayed in his house
for two (2) weeks. In fact, it was he who recommended the accused to his
friend who was a construction foreman. It was only in 2000, when he
returned to Albay.

His sister Virginia attested that in 1996, accused left Albay as she was the
one who financed his fare in going to Manila.14 chanro blesv irt ualawlib ra ry

In its Decision dated July 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of conviction of the RTC. However, the penalty was modified
because of Republic Act No. 9346. Accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death. The dispositive portion of
the appellate court's Decision is quoted hereunder: chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated October 9, 2003 of the RTC,

Branch 13, Ligao City, finding appellant Edmundo Vitero guilty of the crime of
qualified rape is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. In lieu of the death penalty
imposed by the trial court, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. As his
civil liability, he shall pay the victim AAA the amount of 75,000 pesos as civil
indemnity, the amount of 50,000 pesos as moral damages and the amount of
25,000 pesos as exemplary damages. He shall pay the cost of suit.

Costs de officio.15 chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

Undeterred, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal16 and brought his

case before us.

Both plaintiff-appellee17 and accused-appellant18 filed their respective

Manifestations stating that they were no longer filing supplemental briefs and
were adopting the briefs they submitted to the Court of Appeals.
Accused-appellant seeks his acquittal on the sole ground that: chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT Accused-appellant
essentially argues that AAA's testimony was "highly incredible and illogical"19
as she had ample opportunity to ask for help. According to AAA herself, at
the time of the alleged rape, her siblings were sleeping right beside her and
accused-appellant in the room, while her grandparents were right in the next
room.20 Accused-appellant also highlights AAA's delay in reporting the
purported rape and instituting a criminal case against him, and further
implies that AAA might have some sinister or ulterior motive in falsely
charging him with rape. Moreover, accused-appellant's alibi that he was
living and working in Manila from 1996 to 2000 was corroborated by two
witnesses.21chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

There is no merit in the instant appeal. We find no reason to disturb the

findings of the trial and the appellate courts.

Accused-appellant was charged with qualified rape, defined and punishable

under the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353: Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape
is committed

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

xxx

Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding

article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the
victim.

The elements of the crime charged against accused-appellant are: (a) the
victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender
is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either
through force, threat, or intimidation.22 c hanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry
There is no dispute that the first two elements exist in this case.
Documentary and testimonial evidence, including accused-appellant's own
admission, establish that AAA is the daughter of accused-appellant and BBB
and she was born on April 30, 1985. This means that AAA was almost or
already 13 years old when she was raped in April 1998.

As to the third element of the crime, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
ruled that it was duly proven as well, giving weight and credence to AAA's
testimony. AAA was able to describe in detail how accused-appellant
mounted her, undressed her, and successfully penetrated her against her
will, one night in April 1998. The RTC described AAA's testimony to be "frank,
probable, logical and conclusive,"23 while the Court of Appeals declared it to
be "forthright and credible"24 and "impressively clear, definite, and
convincing."25 Relevant herein is our pronouncements in People v. Manjares26
that:chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things, as in this case. There is a
plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by
holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where
her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on
the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it
takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to
concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his
remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of
shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the
straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal
prosecutions for rape.

x x x When the issue focuses on the credibility of the witnesses or the lack of
it, the assessment of the trial court is controlling because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witness and the latter's demeanor, conduct, and
attitude especially during the cross-examination unless cogent reasons
dictate otherwise. Moreover, it is an established rule that findings of fact of
the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted which would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the
case. x x x. (Citations omitted.)

We reiterate that the rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are
accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is truer if such findings were
affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, as in the case at bar, said findings are
generally binding upon us. We find no reason to depart from the general rule.
Accused-appellant's attempts at damaging AAA's credibility are unpersuasive.
AAA's account that accused-appellant was able to have carnal knowledge of
her in April 1998 was corroborated by the results of Dr. Remonte's physical
examination of AAA, showing hymenal laceration at 5 o'clock position,
indicating sexual intercourse.

That AAA did not shout for help should not be taken against her. In People v.
Sale,27 we rejected a similar argument raised by the accused-appellant
therein, thus: cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

Third. Accused-appellant likewise found it suspicious why the private

complainant did not shout for help while she was being raped considering
that the bunkhouse where the alleged rapes occurred is quite near several
offices and buildings where people also stay during the night. According to
accused-appellant, the act of complainant in not shouting for help while she
was being molested is not consistent with common experience as she should
have shouted for help as she knew fully well that there were people nearby.

Again, the argument of accused-appellant deserves scant consideration.

Different people react differently to different situations and there is no
standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a
frightful experience. While the reaction of some women, when faced with the
possibility of rape, is to struggle or shout for help, still others become
virtually catatonic because of the mental shock they experience. In the
instant case, it is not inconceivable or improbable that [private complainant],
being of tender age, would be intimidated into silence by the threats and
actions of her father. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

We have also previously pronounced that in incestuous rape cases, the

father's abuse of the moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter can
subjugate the latter's will thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants.
Otherwise stated, the moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient
to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires.28 Even so, it is
notable in this case that accused-appellant did not only use his moral
ascendancy and influence over AAA as her father, he employed actual force
and intimidation upon her. AAA recounted on the stand that accused-
appellant "boxed" her on her right shoulder, near her armpit. When AAA tried
to push accused-appellant away from her and to turn her body away from
him, accused-appellant pulled her back. Additionally, accused-appellant had
a 20-inch knife close by as he was sexually molesting AAA.

AAA's delay in reporting the rape is understandable. As we declared in People

v. Sinoro29:
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

At the outset, we note that the initial reluctance of a rape victim to publicly
reveal the assault on her virtue is neither unknown nor uncommon. It is quite
understandable for a young girl to be hesitant or disinclined to come out in
public and relate a painful and horrible experience of sexual violation. x x x.
Indeed, the vacillation of a rape victim in making a criminal accusation does
not necessarily impair her credibility as a witness. Delay in reporting the
crime neither diminishes her credibility nor undermines her charges,
particularly when the delay can be attributed to a pattern of fear instilled by
the threats of one who exercises moral ascendancy over her. (Citations
omitted.)

As for AAA, not only was her rapist her own father, but she was also living
amongst her father's relatives. AAA was even brought far away from her
hometown in Albay and made to stay with accused-appellant's sister in
Batangas, isolating her from people and places she had known all her life. It
was only when BBB finally found AAA in 2000 and took AAA with her did AAA
felt safe enough to narrate to BBB what accused-appellant did to her two
years ago.

In contrast, accused-appellant's defenses, consisting of mere denial and alibi,

fail to persuade us. As we explained in People v. Ogarte30: chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

This Court has uniformly held, time and again, that both "denial and alibi are
among the weakest, if not the weakest, defenses in criminal prosecution." It
is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law.

In People v. Palomar, we explained why alibi is a weak and unreliable

defense: chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and
unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or
rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by
eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely.

x x x.

We have also declared that in case of alibi, the accused must show that he
had strictly complied with the requirements of time and place: In the case of
alibi, it is elementary case law that the requirements of time and place be
strictly complied with by the defense, meaning that the accused must not
only show that he was somewhere else but that it was also physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. x x x. (Citations omitted.)

Accused-appellant's alibi is that he was continuously living and working in

Metro Manila from 1996 to 2000. Even when accused-appellant presented
two corroborating witnesses, we are not convinced. Vilma could only testify
on giving accused-appellant the money which he used to go to Metro Manila
in 1996. Ireneo admitted that accused-appellant did not live permanently at
his house in Metro Manila, and accused-appellant would usually visit only
during weekends. Moreover, the RTC observed that: chan roblesv irtualawli bra ry

The defense witnesses could not identify the names of the construction
companies that hired the accused Edmundo Vitero, their exact addresses,
much less identified the names of his co-workers. As can be seen of record,
nobody among his working companions testified in court to vouch for his
physical presence at any time at any of the construction working sites in
Metro Manila. The whereabouts of the accused Edmundo Vitero while working
as a construction worker in Metro Manila was not catalogued with certainty.
Whatever period of time he might have spent in Metro Manila as a
construction worker is unclear.

The accused Edmundo Vitero admitted that he worked in Metro Manila as a

construction laborer an employment that was irregular. As a laborer whose
work was irregular, he had gaps in his employment. He could leave his
irregular employment that was obviously temporary at any time he wanted
to proceed elsewhere including to his grandfather's house in barangay XXX,
Ligao City.31
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

Hence, even if it were true that accused-appellant had been living and
working in Metro Manila from 1996 to 2000, it does not exclude the
possibility that he went home for visits to his grandparent's house in Ligao
City, Albay, in the course of the four years. What is needed is clear and
convincing proof that in April 1998, when AAA was raped, accused-appellant
was actually in Metro Manila. However, accused-appellant presented no such
evidence.

After affirming that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

qualified rape, we move on to determining the proper penalties to be
imposed.

While we agree with the Court of Appeals that pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in lieu of death, we specify that accused-appellant will not be
eligible for parole. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 explicitly provides: chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or

whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. (Emphasis ours.)

We also modify the amount of damages awarded to conform with recent

jurisprudence. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.32 The amounts of damages thus awarded
are subject further to interest of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment until they are fully paid.33 chan rob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 18, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00070 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edmundo Vitero is GUILTY of qualified
rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion pe1petua without
eligibility of parole and is ordered to pay AAA the amounts ofP75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The amounts of damages awarded are subject further to interest of
6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until they are fully
paid.

No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 190862, October 09, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICARDO DEARO, PAULINO LUAGUE AND

WILFREDO TOLEDO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Cebu City affirming the Judgment2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 34 (RTC), finding appellants
guilty of three counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count.

On the evening of 26 February 1996, Jose Jaro (Jose), Emeterio Santiago (Emeterio) and his son
Rolly, as well as Porferia Luague Guardario (Porferia) and her daughter Analiza, were attending a
fiesta celebration at Bugay, Bayawan, Negros Oriental.3 Around midnight, Emeterio asked Jose
whether they might be able to spend the night in the latter's house, which was only about 500 meters
away from the dancing area. Jose acceded and told Emeterio, Porteria and Analiza to proceed to his
house while he looked for Rolly. Jose eventually found Rolly, and both of them followed the three
others to Jose's home.

When Jose and Rolly were about 10 meters away, they heard a single gunshot coming from the
house.4 The two went down on the ground for safety as they saw Paulino Luague (Luague) coming
down from Joses house, saying Ti, tapos ka man! (There, now you are finished!). Immediately after,
they heard cries of women from inside the house asking for help, followed by a rapid series of gunfire
from the back of the house.

When the firing stopped, they saw appellants Ricardo Dearo (Dearo) and Wilfredo Toledo (Toledo),
both carrying long firearms, walk with Luague from the back of the house towards the road.5 The three
had other companions, but Jose and Rolly were not able to identify them.

After appellants left, Jose and Rolly went inside the house and saw Emeterio on the floor, already
dead.6 Porferia was lying nearby, also dead, while Analiza was still moaning in pain. Rolly wasted no
time in looking for a vehicle to bring the victims to the hospital, but Analiza was later also pronounced
dead.

Authorities from the Bayawan police station arrived in the house on the afternoon of 27 February 1996
to investigate.7 Both Jose and Rolly opted not to divulge any information to them.8 Instead, Rolly
sought the help of the elements of the Criminal Investigation System (CIS) of Dumaguete City for
investigation.9
cra lawlib rary

In the course of the investigation, it was found that the Luague family owned a vast tract of land in
Bayawan, Negros Oriental. It was the subject of a sharing dispute between the heirs, including Luague
and his sister Porferia.10 Part of the dispute involved the appointment of Emeterio as overseer of the
land, a move that angered Luague. The animosity deepened when Emeterio padlocked the old house
of Aquilino Luague (Aquilino), father of Luague and Porferia.

A few days before the incident, or on 24 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., Luague and appellants
Dearo and Toledo asked Jose Santiago, brother of Emeterio, to accompany them to the old house to
remove the padlock.11 While there, Jose Santiago heard appellant Dearo berating Aqulinos tenants in
this wise: You tenants, you believe everything Emeterio tells you. He is not from here. There is no
Emeterio Santiago living in Bugay. If only he was here, I would show you how Id kill him. Before the
end of three days, Ill finish him!12 c ralawlib ra ry

Marcelo Guardario, husband of Porferia and father of Analiza, confirmed the existence of a land
dispute between his wife and her siblings.13 They used to reside in Bugay, Bayawan, Negros Oriental,
but decided to relocate to Cebu when Luague threatened that they would lose a family member if they
returned to Bugay. There was even a time when Luague pointed a gun at Porferia with the same
threats.14 The latest confrontation between brother and sister was on 26 February 1996, a day before
the shooting, when the police advised Luague that he could not prevent Porferia from attending to the
farm.15
cra lawlib rary

On 4 June 1996, in three Informations, appellants were charged with murder, all committed by
conspiracy and attended by treachery and evident premeditation.16 cralawlib rary

During trial, appellant Dearo interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. He stated that he was at the
fiesta celebration until 1:00 a.m. of 27 February 1996 and arrived home about 2:00 a.m. together
with his family.17 He denied being with Luague and Toledo and stated that he only learned about the
incident from Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Georgin Sefe and Police Officer 3 (PO3) Napoleon Tuble of
the Bayawan police station on the afternoon of 27 February 1996. He heard the police officers ask
Jose and his wife Larry about the details regarding the incident, and they categorically answered that
they could not say anything, because they were not present when it happened.

This statement was corroborated by the police officers, who said that they failed to file a case
concerning the incident, because nobody could give them any information.18 When SPO2 Sefe and PO3
Tuble went to the house of Jose on the afternoon of 27 February 1996, they only saw bullet holes in
the wall of the house and three empty shells of an M-16 rifle. When they sought the other members of
the victims family, they could not name any suspect.

RULING OF THE RTC

On 30 July 2004, the RTC rendered a Judgment19 finding Luague and appellants Dearo and Toledo
guilty of the three counts of murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each count.20 For each of the three counts of murder, appellants were also ordered to pay the
victims heirs in the amounts of P70,000 as civil indemnity, P25,000 as temperate damages and
P20,000 as moral damages.

The RTC found that while none of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual shooting of the three
victims, the attendant circumstantial evidence in the case are all consistent with the conclusion that
Luague and appellants Dearo and Toledo are responsible for the death of the three victims.21
Conspiracy was also shown by the closeness and coordination of their acts a few days before and
immediately after the shooting.22
c ralawlib ra ry
The RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. According
to the trial court, treachery was evident when the victims were fired upon while they were inside the
house sleeping.23 Evident premeditation was also present, since appellant Dearo had already
boisterously announced his intention to kill Emeterio a few days before.24 Luague was likewise shown
to have threatened the life of Porferia a number of times.25 cralawl ibra ry

On appeal to the CA, Luague and appellants Dearo and Toledo decried the alleged violation of due
process due to supposed partiality and vindictiveness of Judge Rosendo B. Bandal, Jr. (Judge
Bandal).26 They also pointed out the lack or insufficiency of evidence, which did not satisfy the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING OF THE CA

On 7 July 2009, the CA rendered a Decision27 affirming the Judgment of the RTC, with modification in
that the civil indemnity was increased to P75,000 and the moral damages to P50,000, and exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000 were added. The award of temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000 was maintained.

According to the CA, the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were of such nature that
these would lead to a conviction that Luague and appellants Dearo and Toledo had acted in concert to
kill the victims. Thus, it affirmed the finding of the RTC that the attendant circumstantial evidence in
the case was sufficient to support a finding of guilt on their part. The appellate court also affirmed the
finding of the RTC that treachery and evident premeditation had attended the crime.28 c ralawli bra ry

The CA found no showing that the decision of Judge Bandal was affected at all by the letter of Teodora
Luague, wife of Luague, sent to this Court seeking his inhibition and pointing out that the case had
remained unacted upon for eight years by the trial court.29 The CA ruled that the evidence on record
was clear that Luague and appellants Dearo and Toledo were the perpetrators of the crimes.

Hence, this appeal. On 20 February 2012, we considered the case closed and terminated insofar as
Luague was concerned in view of his death on 15 September 2011.

ISSUE

Whether the guilt of appellants Dearo and Toledo was proven beyond reasonable doubt

OUR RULING

We deny the appeal.

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, applies when no witness has seen the actual commission of
the crime.30 It states: chanro blesvi rtualaw lib rary

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:
c hanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Under the rule on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances shown must be consistent with each
other. They should all support the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and, at the same time, be
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the accused is innocent.31 Thus, to justify a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to
leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.32 cralawlib rary

We agree with the RTC and the CA in their finding that the following circumstances, proven by the
prosecution and uncontroverted by the defense, combine to leave no reasonable doubt that the
appellants conspired to kill the victims:cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary

a) Luague was at odds with Porferia regarding the sharing of their inherited tract of land, as a result
of which Luague had threatened her life a few times before.
b) Emeterio was the overseer of the land.
c) Three days before the killing, appellant Dearo vowed to kill Emeterio.
d) About 10 meters away from the house, Jose and Rolly heard the sound of a gunshot coming from
inside the house, after which they saw Luague come out saying, Ti, tapos ka man! (There, now
you are finished!).
e) Jose and Rolly heard womens cries for help immediately followed by a series of rapid gunfire
coming from the back of the house.
f) Appellants Dearo and Toledo emerged from the back of the house carrying long firearms.
g) Jose and Rolly found the victims with gunshot wounds inside the house, with Emeterio and Porferia
already dead, and Analiza still moaning in pain.
h) A ballistic examination of the recovered metallic fragments and cartridge cases showed that they
were fired from an M-16 rifle, a long firearm.33

Appellants try to make much of the alleged insufficiency of lighting at the scene of the incident and
argue that it is not enough to make a positive identification of appellants as the assailants. We
entertain no doubt regarding their identification immediately after the shooting. Both Jose and Rolly
testified that there was sufficient illumination for them to recognize appellants.34 Furthermore, they
were all well-known to one another, since appellant Dearo was the barangay captain, appellant Toledo
was a known Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) member, and Luague was Joses close
friend.35
cralawl ib rary

Appellants allege that Jose never mentioned the name of any suspect when the Bayawan police
interviewed him, and only came up with one when the CIS came into the picture. However, we note
with approval the observation of the CA that Jose initially did not want to get involved and only told
his relatives about what he saw.36 In fact, he was so scared for his life, considering that the killing took
place in his house, that he moved from Bugay, Bayawan, Negros Oriental, after the incident.

The weakness of appellants position is in their reliance on the alleged finding of the Bayawan police
that the assailants were unknown, and that the result of its investigation was negative.37 Rather
than focusing their energies on contradicting the evidence proven by the prosecution, appellants
insisted that the Bayawan police had not filed a case against anybody because of lack of information.

It is well to point out that Jose and Rolly both admitted that they chose not to divulge any information
to the Bayawan police. On his part, Jose was so scared for his life that he initially did not want to get
involved. On the other hand, Rolly cannot be faulted for choosing to put his trust on the elements of
the CIS from Dumaguete City to conduct the investigation, instead of relying on the authorities from
Bayawan.

We also find that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated by the RTC and
the CA. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.38 We
have ruled that treachery is present when an assailant takes advantage of a situation in which the
victim is asleep,39 unaware of the evil design, or has just awakened.40
cralawlib ra ry

It has been established by the prosecution, and even confirmed by the defense,41 that the victims
were sleeping when they were shot. To be precise, it was Emeterio who was asleep when he was shot,
considering that the women were able to cry for help before the rapid firing that silenced them. In any
case, it was clear that the women were in no position to defend themselves, having been rudely
awakened by the shooting of their companion. The fact that they shouted for help also showed their
loss of hope in the face of what was coming rapid gunfire from long firearms.

Evident premeditation further aggravates the crime of murder committed by appellants. The essence
of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient
to arrive at a calm judgment.42 Evidence shows that Luague had a grudge against Porferia, and that
their last confrontation occurred a day before the shooting. The involvement of appellants Dearo and
Toledo was shown by the testimony of Jose Santiago that the two were with Luague three days before
the shooting. Appellant Dearo then vowed to kill Emeterio. These uncontroverted pieces of evidence
clearly showed the instances when appellants resolved to commit the felony. The space of time from
the resolution to the actual execution allowed them to contemplate on the matter, or maybe even
reconsider. That they did not reconsider is shown by the case before us now.

Thus, it has been established that appellants killed Emeterio, Porferia and Analiza. Appreciating
treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the crime is properly denominated as murder. Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes murder with reclusion perpetua to death. With the further
appreciation of evident premeditation as generic aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall
be applied, pursuant to Article 6343 of the RPC. However, since the imposition of the death penalty has
been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346,44 the penalty that shall be imposed on appellants is
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.45
cra lawlib rary

As to the award of damages to the heirs of each victim, we find that the awards of civil indemnity and
temperate damages made by the CA in the amounts of P75,000 and P25,000, respectively, are in
keeping with prevailing jurisprudence.46 However, considering that the penalty imposed should have
been death but was reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, the amount of moral
damages is increased from P50,000 to P75,000, and the award of exemplary damages from P25,000
to P30,000.47 These awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% from the finality of this Decision until
fully paid.48
cra lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals Cebu City in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00035 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Ricardo Dearo and Wilfredo Toledo are hereby
SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each of the
three counts of murder, and ORDERED to pay the heirs of each of the victims Emeterio Santiago,
Porferia Luague Guardario and Analiza Guardario the amounts of P75,000 as. civil indemnity, P75,000
as moral damages, P30,000 as exemplary damages, and P25,000 as temperate damages, plus the
legal interest at the rate of 6% from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Reyes, and Leonen,*JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 202842, October 09, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FLORENTINO

GALAGAR, JR., Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated December 20, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00620-MIN, affirming with
modification the Judgment2 dated May 26, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Gingoog, Branch 43, which found Florentino Galagar, Jr. (accused-
appellant) guilty of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.

The Information charging the accused-appellant reads as follows: chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry

That on April 13, 2003, at more or less 8:00 oclock in the evening, in [S]itio
Taon-Taon, Bal-ason, Gingoog City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously force and intimidate
[AAA]3, by threatening to kill her and then forcibly committed sexual
intercourse with the said [AAA], against her will.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in

relation to Republic Act No. 8353.4

AAA testified that on April 13, 2003 at around 8:00 p.m., while she was
inside her house with her children, the accused-appellant called her from
outside, informing her that he brought a letter from her husband, BBB, who
was then working in a sugar plantation in Bukidnon. When AAA opened the
door, the accused-appellant pulled a kitchen knife and pointed it to her. He
grabbed her hand and bumped her head against the wall, making her dizzy.
The accused-appellant then forced AAA to lie on the floor, forcibly pulled
down her jogging pants and panty, pinned her down while he was on top of
her, inserted his penis in her vagina, and subsequently ejaculated therein. He
did all these while pointing the knife at her.5
cralawli bra ry

After having carnal knowledge with her, the accused-appellant threatened to

kill AAA and her whole family, including her special child, if she would report
to the authorities. AAAs special child could not talk but she witnessed the
incident from the upper portion of the house. AAA claimed she decided to
keep her silence to protect her family from harms way.6 cra lawlib rary
However, when BBB returned home from Bukidnon on April 30, 2003, he
noticed a sudden change in AAA who was always crying and was withdrawn.
BBB asked AAA what was troubling her. The latter revealed what transpired
how the accused-appellant violated her person and threatened to kill her and
her loved ones. Thereafter, AAA and her husband confronted the accused-
appellant. The accused-appellants wife begged for forgiveness but AAA and
BBB refused. They reported the incident to the barangay. Barangay Captain
Regino Tecson called the parties to a meeting in order to convince them to
settle the matter by signing an agreement called Malinawon Nga Kasabutan
dated May 24, 2003, but AAA refused to sign the same.7 cralawl ibra ry

On May 14, 2003, AAA went to a doctor at Gingoog District Hospital for a
medical examination. The doctor, however, refused to conduct the
examination, explaining that it would only be useless since she already had
her menstruation and thus semen could no longer be found in her organ.8 cra lawlib rary

For his defense, the accused-appellant presented three (3) witnesses:

Bonifacio Palma (Palma) who was the Chief of the Barangay Tanod of
Barangay Bal-ason from 1996 to 2004; Regino Tecson (Tecson) who was the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Bal-ason, Gingoog City from 1994 until 2007;
and the accused-appellant himself.

The accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that on

April 13, 2003 at about 6:00 p.m., he was at the Civilian Volunteer
Organization (CVO) outpost to conduct a roving operation. He alleged that he
was with Lupon member Rosendo Labadan (Labadan), Barangay Kagawad
Raymund Capito (Capito), and three other members of the CVO, namely,
Mariano Badana, Rolando Bonbon and Palma. They divided themselves into
two (2) groups and the accused-appellant was grouped with Capito and
Palma. He claimed staying with his companions, Capito and Palma at the
outpost up to 10:00 p.m., after which, they started their roving operation in
the six (6) puroks of their barangay. The accused-appellant and his
companions roved around Purok Lipunan, Sugma and Sun Flower-A. They
finished roving before midnight and returned to their outpost and stayed
there until 2:00 a.m. Thereafter, they exchanged areas with the other group
and thus inspected the Centro of the barangay and ended at Purok Lapak. At
3:30 a.m. of April 14, 2003, the group of the accused-appellant ended their
roving operation and stayed at the outpost until 5:00 a.m. Subsequently,
they went to their respective homes.9cralawl ib rary

The accused-appellant stated that aside from being the Lupon member of
Barangay Balason, Gingoog City, he was also the Purok Chairman of Sitio
Taon-taon. He claimed that during the confrontation meeting at the
barangay, BBBs complaint was not about the rape of AAA. The document
named Malinawon Nga Kasabutan contained a promise that he would not
pass by or go to the house of AAA and BBB, nor buy cigarettes from the
couples store. However, the said document was signed only by the accused-
appellant, while AAA and BBB did not sign it. He admitted that his house was
only fifty (50) meters away from the house of AAA and BBB and that they
have been neighbors for nine (9) years. He also admitted knowing that BBB
went to work in a farm in Bukidnon. He testified that in the afternoon of
March 18, 2003, he bought cigarettes from the store of AAA and asked for a
light, which AAA who was in the kitchen supplied. AAA actually complained
about being embraced by him on this occasion. He further testified that on
March 25, 2003, he went to the house of the couple to negate their claim of
his alleged molestation of AAA, and countered that when he was lighting his
cigarette from the lamp given by AAA, the light was put out, and AAA even
jokingly knocked his head, saying that his nostrils are so big.10
c ralawl ibra ry

To corroborate the testimony of the accused-appellant, Palma testified that

on April 13, 2003, his companions, including the accused-appellant, started
their duty at 6:00 p.m. until 4:00 a.m. of the following day. He testified that
the accused-appellant was at the outpost with them from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00
p.m.; and at 10:00 p.m., he was in one group while the accused-appellant
was with another group (Capito and Labadan). They then returned to the
outpost at 11:00 p.m. for coffee break and then went back to roving. After
which, they returned to the outpost at 3:00 a.m. and thereafter they went
home. When asked about the logbook of the CVO outpost where the
presence and duty hours of the members were recorded, he alleged that it
could not longer be found.11 cralawl ibra ry

Witness Tecson also testified for the accused-appellant. He claimed that on

May 24, 2003 a confrontation meeting between the spouses AAA and BBB
and the accused-appellant transpired. He alleged that the complaint of the
couple concerned trespass to dwelling, and not rape. He also confirmed the
existence of Malinawon Nga Kasabutan; that the accused-appellant in the
confrontation meeting asked for the couples forgiveness because of the
charge of trespass to dwelling and not for rape; that when he executed the
certification marked as Exhibit D for the prosecution, certifying that Palma
was on duty on April 13, 2003, the same was not based on the records of the
CVO because these were lost; that he was only told by Capito of the accused-
appellants presence and duty schedule on April 13, 2003; that the records of
the Barangay concerning night-guard duty on April 13, 2003 had been lost;
that the houses of the complaining couple and of the accused-appellant, who
were neighbors in Sitio Taon-taon, were about one (1) kilometer away from
the CVO outpost, and could be reached by walking for ten (10) to fifteen (15)
minutes.12c ralawli bra ry

On May 26, 2008, the RTC of Gingoog City, Branch 43, rendered Judgment13
finding the accused-appellant guilty of violating Article 266-A of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353.

The RTC gave credence to the testimony of the victim AAA who narrated her
ordeal in a straightforward, convincing, and consistent manner. She was
unshaken even under rigid cross-examination. The accused- appellants alibi
that he was with his companions from the CVO at the time of rape did not
convince the trial court despite the testimonies of Palma and Tecson. First,
the trial court found contradictions in the testimonies of the accused-
appellant and Palma. The accused-appellant claimed to belong to the group
of Palma, while Palma testified that he belonged to another group. Second,
the trial court took note of the fact that neither Capito nor Labadan, the
alleged companions of the accused-appellant in the team, testified on his
presence in the roving activity. Third, the testimony of Tecson as to the
presence of the accused-appellant was hearsay since the same information
was relayed to him only by Capito and the accused-appellant himself. In fact,
he admitted that he did not base his certification about Palmas duty
schedule on any record or logbook of attendance or duty schedule of the CVO
because such record was lost. Last, the distance between the outpost and
the house of AAA was mere 10 to 15-minute walk and that there was no
testimony to the effect that the accused-appellant never left his station.
Thus, there was no physical impossibility for the accused-appellant to be
present at the scene of the crime. Indeed, the trial court held that for alibi to
prosper it must be so convincing so as to preclude any doubt of the accused-
appellants physical presence at the crime scene at the time of the
incident.14
c ralawli bra ry

The trial court sentenced the accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party the amount of P75,000.00
as indemnity ex delicto and another P75,000.00 for moral damages. The fallo
of the decision reads as follows:chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, finding that Prosecution evidence has established the guilt of

the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the accused FLORENTINO
GALAGAR, JR. is adjudged GUILTY of the crime charged and he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The accused is
likewise ordered to pay the private offended party the amount of
[P]75,000.00 as indemnity ex deli[c]to, and another [P]75,000.00 for moral
damages in light of prevailing jurisprudence that the victim is assumed to
have suffered such damages.

SO ORDERED.15

The accused-appellant appealed to the CA. He questioned the credibility of

AAA who failed to immediately report the incident to authorities and to
present a medical certificate supporting her claim of rape. Addressing these
issues, the CA gave weight to the findings of the trial court, explaining that
in passing upon the credibility of witnesses, the highest degree of respect
must be afforded to the findings of the trial court.16 The CA found that the
trial court did not overlook or disregard material facts and circumstances
which when considered would change the result of the decision. In fact, it
agreed with the trial court that AAA was able to, in simple yet positive
language, give details of her sexual abuse.17 The CA also ruled that AAAs
failure to immediately report her ordeal did not diminish her credibility,
considering the fear that the accused-appellant instilled in her. Likewise, the
absence of a medical examination did not affect AAAs credibility since the
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution for
rape. It is not essential to prove rape; it is in fact merely corroborative
evidence.18 Finally, the CA found the accused-appellants defense of alibi
weak in the light of AAAs positive identification pointing to the accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.19 c rala wlibra ry

The CA affirmed the trial courts ruling but modified it by awarding exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00.20 cra lawlib rary

Hence, the instant appeal.

After a careful review of the records of this case, we see no reason to reverse
or modify the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, albeit with
modification as to the award of exemplary damages.

Both the RTC and the CA gave credence to the testimony of the victim who
narrated her ordeal in a straightforward, convincing, and consistent manner.
The Court also agrees with the observations of the RTC and the CA regarding
the contradictions in the testimonies of the accused- appellant and Palma,
the absence of documentary records to prove the accused-appellants claim,
and the proximity of the outpost to the house of AAA, which all lead to the
guilt of the accused-appellant.

The failure of AAA to report her ordeal is not unique in her case. Many
victims of rape would choose to suffer in silence rather than put the life of
their loved ones in danger. [I]t is well entrenched that delay in reporting
rape cases does not by itself undermine the charge, where the delay is
grounded in threats from the accused. Delay in revealing the commission of
a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of
belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than
expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. Only when the
delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the
complainant.21cralaw lib rary

As to the failure of AAA to present a medical certificate or report, the Court

has consistently held that in proving rape the medical examination of the
victim or the presentation of a medical report is not essential. The victims
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime.
The medical examination of the victim and the corresponding medical
certificate are merely corroborative pieces of evidence.22 cralawlib rary

All things considered, AAA was able to prove that the accused- appellant is
guilty of the crime charged.

The Court sustains the penalty of reclusion perpetua but modifies the award
of damages in this case. As aptly explained in People v. Macapanas,23: chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
respectively provide:chan roble svirtualawlib ra ry

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

xxxx

Art. 266-B. Penalties.Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article

shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by

two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

x x x x
For one (1) to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one (1) of the
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, must be alleged in the Information and
duly proved during the trial. In the case at bar, appellant used a sharp-
pointed bolo locally known as sundang in consummating the salacious act.
This circumstance was alleged in the Information and duly proved during
trial. Being in the nature of a qualifying circumstance, use of a deadly
weapon increases the penalties by degrees, and cannot be treated merely as
a generic aggravating circumstance which affects only the period of the
penalty. This so-called qualified form of rape committed with the use of a
deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. As such, the
presence of generic aggravating and mitigating circumstances will determine
whether the lesser or higher penalty shall be imposed. When, as in this case,
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attended the commission of
the crime, the minimum penalty, i.e., reclusion perpetua, should be the
penalty imposable pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
both trial and appellate courts properly imposed on appellant the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

As to the award of damages, the trial court awarded P50,000.00 as civil

indemnity. The Court of Appeals, in addition thereto, awarded moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Under the present law, an award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
rape. This is exclusive of the award of moral damages of P50,000.00, without
need of further proof. The victims injury is now recognized as inherently
concomitant with and necessarily proceeds from the appalling crime of rape
which per se warrants an award of moral damages.

Exemplary damages should likewise be awarded pursuant to Article 2230 of

the Civil Code since the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a
deadly weapon attended the commission of the rape. When a crime is
committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an
award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified. This kind of
damages is intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings, as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured, or as punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.24 (Citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 205413, December 02, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ROGELIO MANICAT Y DE GUZMAN, Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal, filed by Rogelio Manicat y de Guzman (appellant), from the decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated May 4, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03930. The decision affirmed with
modification the January 14, 2009 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 169, Malabon
City, in Crim. Case No. 24550-MN, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

The RTC Ruling

In its January 14, 2009 decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
simple rape. It gave credence to the testimony of AAA, the 13-year old victim, that while she was on
her way to buy coffee and sugar, the appellant pulled her inside his house, undressed her, and then
forced her to lie down on her back. The appellant afterwards inserted his penis inside her
vagina. AAA explained that she felt pain but she did not cry because the appellant threatened to kill
her if she made any noise. According to the RTC, the fact that AAA is afflicted with mild mental
retardation with a mental age of 7-8 years old does not make her an incompetent witness, as she
testified in a clear and straightforward manner. Thus, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordered him to pay the victim the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment with the modification that the award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 be deleted. The CA held that AAA testified in a
straightforward, candid and convincing manner.3 Her testimony was corroborated by Medico Legal
Report No. M-257-01 dated April 29, 2001 stating that the victim is in a non-virgin physical state. The
CA noted that the Clinical Abstract issued by the National Center for Mental Health does not indicate
whether AAAs condition impairs her capacity as a witness. It also explained that AAAs credibility
cannot be impaired by her behavior as a rape victim because rape victims do not all react in the same
way. The CA rejected the appellants defense of denial and alibi for failure to substantiate these
defenses. Lastly, the CA found that the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole
was proper because under Resolution No. 24-4-10,4 those convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua are disqualified from the benefit of parole.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal, but modify the awarded indemnities.

For the charge of rape (under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code [RPC], as amended) to prosper,
the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he
accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
In the present case, the prosecution established the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of
the RPC. First, the appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA was straightforward when she
testified that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Her testimony was supported by Medico
Legal Report No. M-257-01 dated April 29, 2001, reflecting the victims non-virgin physical state. We
have held that when the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is
sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge.5ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Second, the appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. AAA categorically
testified that she resisted when the appellant pulled her inside his house. She also recalled that she
cried when the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Nonetheless, she was helpless and afraid
to make further noise because the appellant threatened to kill her. These facts sufficiently indicate
that the appellants acts were against AAAs will.

Being afflicted with mild mental retardation does not mean that AAAs testimony was merely imagined.
We agree with the RTC and the CAs conclusion that the testimony of a mental retardate depends on
the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make these known to the court.6 In the
present case, the questions asked were couched in terms that AAA could easily understand, as
recommended by Ma. Cristina P. Morelos, M.D., Medical Officer III.7 Hence, we are convinced that AAA
understood the questions propounded to her, which she answered in a clear and straightforward
manner.

Contrary to the appellants argument, the behavior of the victim does not establish the truth or falsity
of her accusation. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, rape is subjective and not all victims react in
the same way; there is no typical form of behavior for a woman when facing a traumatic experience
such as a sexual assault.8

In addition, the appellants denial cannot overturn his conviction in light of AAAs positive testimony.
We have consistently held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent
and without any showing of ill motive of the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the
mere denial of the appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.9

We reject the appellants argument that the phrase without eligibility for parole is a penalty which is
appropriate only to qualified rape. Article 266-B of the RPC10 is explicit that rape committed through
force, threat, or intimidation is punishable by reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, Resolution No.
24-4-1011 states that those convicted of offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua are disqualified for
parole. Thus, the RTC did not alter the appropriate penalty for simple rape as it merely reflected the
consequence of having been convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua.

We reinstate the award of exemplary damages to deter similar conduct and to set an example against
persons who abuse and corrupt the youth. We set the amount of P30,000.00 to conform to prevailing
jurisprudence.

Finally, interest at rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be applied to the award of civil indemnity,
moral damages and exemplary damages from the finality of judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03930 is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) the appellant is further ordered to pay AAA P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

(b) he is ordered to pay interest, at the rate of 6% per annum to the award of civil indemnity, mora
damages, and exemplary damages from finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1 Rollo, pp. 2-20; penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-C

Accordingly, the civil indemnity should be reduced to P50,000.00. Likewise,

moral damages should only be P50,000.00. In line with recent jurisprudence
on the matter, the accused-appellant is not eligible for parole considering the
penalty imposed upon him;25 and that the amounts awarded to the victim
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to earn from
the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.26
cralaw lib rary

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2011 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00620-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED with
modifications. Accused-appellant Florentino Galagar, Jr. is ORDERED to
pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on accused-appellant Florentino

Galagar, Jr. shall be without eligibility for parole. Moreover, the damages
awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of the finality of this resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Leonen,* JJ.,

concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERDINAND BANZUELA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The accused-appellant Ferdinand Banzuela (Banzuela) challenges in this appeal the August 31, 2011,
Decision1 promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03868, wherein he was
convicted for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness.

On July 25, 2003, Banzuela was charged with Rape and Attempted Rape under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 76102 before Branch 209, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaluyong City. The Informations read as follows:

I. For Rape (Criminal Case No. MC03-919-FC-H)

That sometime [i]n February 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means of
force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with [AAA3], minor (6 years old), against her will and consent, thus debasing and/or demeaning the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being.4
II. For Attempted Rape (Criminal Case No. MC03-918-FC-H)
That sometime in February 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attempt to have carnal knowledge of [BBB], a girl seven (7) years of age, by then and
there bringing her to a grassy portion of Mandaluyong Cemetery, made to lie down, undressed her,
thus directly by overt acts but failed to perform all acts of execution when a third party helped the
victim to get away from the accused.5
Banzuela pleaded not guilty to both charges during his arraignment on November 20, 2003.6 After the
completion of the pre-trial conference on January 22, 2004,7 trial on the merits ensued.

The following narration of facts was made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals:

Version of the Prosecution

Sometime in February 2003, while six-year old AAA and seven-year old BBB were watching TV in
AAAs house, Banzuela approached them and asked them to go with him to the nearby cemetery. AAA
and BBB refused, but Banzuela carried AAA away prompting BBB to follow suit. Upon reaching the
cemetery, Banzuela blindfolded BBB, who thereafter removed the blindfold and looked for AAA and
Banzuela. Meanwhile, Banzuela laid AAA on a dirty tomb, pulled up her dress, and removed her
underwear. He thereafter removed his shorts and briefs, mounted AAA, kissed her, inserted his penis
in her vagina, and moved his body up and down against the crying AAA. He threatened to kill her
entire family if she ever spoke of the incident. When BBB finally found them, Banzuela hurriedly
pulled up his briefs and shorts and then ran away. BBB approached AAA and saw that there was blood
on the tomb from AAAs vagina. They wiped the blood with a banana leaf, then proceeded to BBBs
house, where AAA washed her bloodied dress and underwear before going back to AAAs house.8

After the incident with AAA, Banzuela used the same method on BBB, the daughter of his mothers
half-brother. One morning in February 2003, Banzuela asked BBB to go with him to the
cemetery. When BBB refused, Banzuela carried her out of the house and brought her to the
cemetery. BBB cried, but Banzuela proceeded to lay her down on the ground, pulled her dress up,
removed her underwear, and kissed her. However, before Banzuela could do anything more, a man
passed by causing Banzuela to flee the scene. The man thereafter instructed BBB to go home. Upon
reaching her house, Banzuela, who was already there, threatened her against telling anyone of the
incident, otherwise, he would kill everyone in their house.9

AAA, with her mother, submitted herself for examination but both the Initial Medico-Legal Report10 and
the Medico-Legal Report No. M-0914-0311 stated that AAA was physically in a virgin state, and her
hymen intact.

Version of the Defense

Banzuela denied the accusations against him, claiming that he was working for at least twelve (12)
hours a day at Bestflow Purified Drinking Water Refilling Station the whole month of February
2003. To prove this, he submitted photocopies of his Daily Time Record (DTR) from November 2002
to February 2003.12 Banzuela added that he did not go to the cemetery the entire February of 2003.13

Ruling of the RTC

On February 27, 2009, the RTC convicted Banzuela of the crimes of rape of AAA and attempted rape
of BBB. The dispositive portion of the Decision14 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. MC03-919-FC-H, finding accused FERDINAND BANZUELA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 7659 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify
the victim, [AAA], of the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity; [and]

2. In Criminal Case No. MC03-918-FC-H, finding accused FERDINAND BANZUELA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, and there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and pursuant to Article 51, in relation to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of pris[i]on correccional as minimum to ten years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum and to indemnify the victim, [BBB] of the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00)
PESOS.15 (Emphases supplied.)
In AAAs charge of rape, the RTC deemed as insignificant the results of the medical examination that
AAAs hymen was still intact. The RTC, invoking established jurisprudence, said that the mere
touching of the labia consummates rape, and that a broken hymen is not an essential element of
rape. The RTC added that a medical examination, in any event, was not essential in the prosecution
of a rape case, being merely corroborative in character.16
The RTC also found the prosecution to have proved its charge of attempted rape against BBB as it was
clear that Banzuela intended to have sexual congress with BBB had he not been unexpectedly
disturbed.17

Anent Banzuelas defense of alibi, the RTC did not give it merit for being weak. The RTC shot down
the DTRs Banzuela presented for not having been authenticated and verified, and for having been
weakened by his own testimony.18

In essence, the RTC decided in favor of the prosecution due to AAAs and BBBs testimonies, to wit:
The testimonies of AAA and BBB are worthy of credence as they were straightforward, spontaneous
and bore the hallmarks of truth. More notable is that they were able to withstand the rigors of
cross-examination without wavering or being caught in inconsistencies. Indeed, it defies belief that
these victims, who were below 12 years old, would fabricate a sordid tale of sexual abuse and indict
their very own cousin. Their testimonies of the separate incidents of sexual abuse that happened to
them recounted vivid details that could not have been concocted by girls of tender age. The testimony
of the complainants are consistent, clear and free of serious contradictions.19
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Having lost in the RTC, Banzuela appealed to the Court of Appeals,20 which, on August 31, 2011,
rendered a verdict no better than the RTCs, viz:
FOR THE STATED REASONS, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 209) of
Mandaluyong City is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:

1. In Criminal Case No. MC03-919-FC-H, Ferdinand Banzuela is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without parole and to indemnify AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
ex delicto, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

2. In Criminal Case No. MC03-918-FC-H, Ferdinand Banzuela is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years, and 1 day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 16 years, reclusion temporal, as maximum and to indemnify BBB
the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.21 (Citation
omitted.)
In agreeing with the RTCs finding of guilt, the Court of Appeals said that Banzuela failed to destroy
the victims credibility or taint their straightforward and categorical testimonies.22

However, the Court of Appeals did not agree with the RTCs finding that Banzuela attempted to rape
BBB. The Court of Appeals, alluding to jurisprudence, said that [a]ttempted rape is committed when
the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there can
only be acts of lasciviousness. Thus, the Court of Appeals declared, that because Banzuelas intent to
rape BBB was not clearly established, he could only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness.23

Issues

Undaunted, Banzuela elevated his case to this Court,24 assigning the same errors he did before the
appellate court, to wit:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
 I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE MATERIALLY INCONSISTENT AND
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.25
Banzuela is attacking the credibility of the witnesses for being highly inconsistent, unusual, doubtful
and thus insufficient to sustain a conviction. Banzuela claimed that AAAs testimony was full of
inconsistencies and contradictions, such as how she managed to remove his hand from her mouth and
yet she did not shout for help, how Banzuela managed to blindfold BBB while still carrying her, and
more importantly, how confused she was as to whether his penis actually penetrated her or simply
touched her groin area. Banzuela argued that the fact that AAA was still a virgin was confirmed by the
medico-legal examination, and as the medico legal officer said during his testimony, although the
consensus was that it is possible for a woman to remain a virgin physically despite penetration, he
himself has had no personal encounter of such a case.26

Moreover, Banzuela said, even BBBs actions were highly unusual, considering the circumstances of
her situation. First, Banzuela said, BBB continued to follow him and AAA despite being blindfolded,
instead of turning back and calling for help. Second, in view of what BBB witnessed happened to AAA
earlier that month, it was contrary to human nature, Banzuela averred, that she did not resist or try to
attract the attention of her neighbors when he brought her to the cemetery.27

Finally, Banzuela reasoned, the prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of his defense in light of
their failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, he said, he should be acquitted of
the charges against him.28

Ruling of this Court

We find no reason to reverse the conviction of Banzuela.

In essence, Banzuelas appeal is hinged on the proposition that the victims were not credible
witnesses for having made several inconsistent statements when they testified in court.

We do not agree.

Credibility of the witnesses

The guidelines to follow, when this Court is confronted with the issue of credibility of witnesses on
appeal, are established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez,29 we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTCs assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower courts findings, particularly when no
significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been
overlooked or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. (Citations
omitted.)
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the determination of the credibility of the witnesses is
correctly assigned to the trial court, which is in the best position to observe the demeanor and bodily
movements of all the witnesses.30 Elucidating on the rationale for this rule, this Court, in People v.
Sapigao, Jr.,31 said:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand
and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are important in
determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of
conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids
in ascertaining the witness credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage
of these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate court can see
are the cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what
the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated by an
American court, There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of accuracy what
credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no
doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally,
under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand
that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by
which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be transcribed upon the record,
and hence they can never be considered by the appellate court. (Citations omitted.)
In the case at bar, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of the witnesses to be
credible. Furthermore, this Courts own independent examination of the records leads us to the same
conclusion.32 As the Court of Appeals said, both AAAs and BBBs testimonies were straightforward,
detailed, and consistent.33 Their credibility is further strengthened by their clear lack of ill motive to
falsify such a charge against their cousin, who shattered their youth and innocence.34

The inconsistencies in AAAs testimony, as catalogued by Banzuela in his brief,35 have no bearing in
the determination of his guilt or innocence, and are too trivial in character to damage AAAs
credibility. The material details of the rape were clearly established,36 and BBB corroborated AAAs
testimony on every relevant point. As this Court stated in People v. Saludo37:
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an offense is not
analogous to a persons achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it
is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring
her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape
victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic
and horrifying experience she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)
BBB was likewise candid, straightforward, and detailed in her narration of not only how AAA was
raped, but also of how she almost suffered the same fate. Her alleged unusual actions during AAAs
ordeal, and later hers, are not enough to discredit her. It has been established that a victim of a
heinous crime such as rape cannot be expected to act with reason or in conformity with societys
expectations. This acquires greater significance where the victim is a child of tender age. The
workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress cannot be predicted; and people cannot be
expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation. Furthermore, it is not accurate to say that there is
a standard reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims, as each of them had to deal with
different circumstances.38

Crime of Rape proven beyond reasonable doubt

Sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age, whether she consented to it or not, is
punishable as rape under our laws. As such, proof of force, threat, or intimidation is unnecessary in
cases of statutory rape, they, not being elements of the crime. When the complainant is below 12
years old, the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed as the law supposes that a woman
below this age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the
sexual act.39

In order to successfully convict an accused of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove the
following:
The age of the complainant;

The identity of the accused; and

The carnal knowledge between the accused and the complainant.40

The first element was established by the prosecution upon the presentation and submission to the
court of a Certification from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City dated
August 24, 2004 stating that AAA was born on September 10, 1996.41 Hence, she was only 6 years
old when the rape was committed in February 2003.

The second element was clearly satisfied when AAA positively and consistently identified Banzuela as
her offender.42

As regards the third element, it is instructive to define carnal knowledge in the context it is used in
the Revised Penal Code:
[C]arnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily
require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. The crime of rape is deemed
consummated even when the mans penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ or, as
once so said in a case, by the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of
consummating the sexual act.43 (Citations omitted.)
This element was proven when AAA detailed in open court how Banzuela forcefully inserted his sex
organ into her genitalia in February 2003 and how she felt pain during her ordeal.

Banzuela makes much of the fact that the medico-legal examination yielded negative results, i.e., that
AAA remained a virgin. This Court, in People v. Boromeo,44 suitably refuted that argument, viz:
Proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. An intact hymen does not negate a finding that
the victim was raped. To sustain a conviction for rape, full penetration of the female genital organ is
not necessary. It is enough that there is proof of entry of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum of the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even
without laceration of the hymen, is enough to constitute rape, and even the briefest of contact is
deemed rape. As long as the attempt to insert the penis results in contact with the lips of the vagina,
even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, the rape is consummated. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
Significantly, as this Court has held before,45 the pain that AAA suffered is, in itself, an indicator of the
commission of rape. Moreover, AAAs ordeal was witnessed by BBB, who in fact was the one who told
AAAs mother about the incident. Thus, contrary to Banzuelas assertions, this Court is convinced that
the prosecution was able to establish that he had carnal knowledge of AAA, making him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

Crime of Attempted Rape not established but crime of Acts of Lasciviousness proven beyond
reasonable doubt

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals found no evidence to prove with the moral certainty required by
law that Banzuela intended to have carnal knowledge of BBB, thus, it modified the crime the RTC
convicted Banzuela of from Attempted Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) in relation to Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code, to Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610.

This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals. In an attempt to commit a felony, the offender
commences the commission of such felony directly by overt acts, but does not perform all the acts of
execution, which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.46 In other words, a crime is in its attempted stage when the offender has
already performed the acts preliminary to the consummation of the crime. However, because of some
reason besides his own spontaneous desistance, he is not able to perform all the acts necessary to
consummate the crime. The elements, therefore, of an attempted felony are as follows:
The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;

The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; and

The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance.47 (Citation omitted.)
In the crime of rape, penetration, however slight, is an essential act of execution that produces such
felony. Thus, for Banzuela to be convicted of the crime of attempted rape, he must have already
commenced the act of inserting his sexual organ in the vagina of BBB, but due to some cause or
accident, excluding his own spontaneous desistance, he wasnt able to even slightly penetrate BBB.48

It has not escaped this Court that rape and acts of lasciviousness are crimes of the same
nature. However, the intent to lie with the woman is the fundamental difference between the two, as
it is present in rape or attempt of it, and absent in acts of lasciviousness.49 Attempted rape is
committed when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate;
otherwise, there can only be acts of lasciviousness.50

In this case, Banzuelas acts of laying BBB on the ground, undressing her, and kissing her, do not
constitute the crime of attempted rape, absent any showing that [Banzuela] actually commenced to
force his penis into [BBBs] sexual organ.51

The fact that Banzuela employed on BBB the exact same tactics he used on AAA from the invitation
to go to the cemetery to visit their dead relatives, to the carrying of the child when she refused, to the
laying down of the child, undressing her, and kissing her, cannot justify the presumption that he
intended to rape BBB, just like he did AAA. Such a presumption hardly constitutes proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape. The gauge in determining whether the crime of
attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e.,
penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption.52 Here, Banzuela was not even able
to commence the act of sexual intercourse as he still had his pants on. What the prosecution was able
to establish in Criminal Case No. MC03-918-FC-H is that Banzuela was able to lay down BBB, undress
her, and kiss her, before the untimely arrival of a third party. Such acts, as the Court of Appeals
said,53 constitute lascivious conduct.

Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the crime of acts of lasciviousness as follows:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other
persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be
punished by prision correccional.
Its elements are:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

By using force or intimidation; or

When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and

(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.54 (Citation omitted.)
The foregoing elements are clearly present in BBBs case, and were sufficiently established during
trial. Although the crime charged against Banzuela was for attempted rape, convicting him for the
crime of acts of lasciviousness does not violate any of his rights as such crime is included in the crime
of rape.55

Anent BBBs actions or inaction, suffice it to say that BBB was direct and consistent in narrating her
own experience with Banzuela. The argument that she did not struggle, asked for help, or shout from
when she was carried out of her house and brought to the cemetery is unavailing. [F]ailure of the
offended party to make a struggle or outcry is immaterial in the rape of a child below twelve years of
age because the law presumes that the victim on account of her age does not and cannot have a will
of her own.56

Banzuelas Defense

We agree with the lower courts that Banzuelas defense of alibi hardly deserves credit. Such defense
is one of the weakest not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy
to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut.57 Thus, for alibi to succeed as a defense, the following
must be established by clear and convincing evidence:
The accuseds presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense; and

The physical impossibility of the accuseds presence at the scene of the crime.58
Banzuela himself admitted the proximity of his work place and his residence to the houses of AAA and
BBB and the cemetery. As such, his alibi is negated by the fact that it was not physically impossible
for him to have been at the cemetery where the crimes occurred.59

The presentation of Banzuelas DTRs is also unpersuasive for lack of corroboration. The DTRs were
mere photocopies, Banzuela himself made the entries therein, and they bore no signature from any of
his employers. If in fact the owner of the refilling station was no longer in the country, his former
manager or the brother of the owner, from whom Banzuelas mother was able to procure the
photocopied DTRs could have testified to confirm the veracity of the entries therein. Banzuelas alibi
therefore cannot prevail over the credible testimonies and positive identification that he was the
perpetrator of the crimes, by AAA and BBB, who have known him prior to the incidents, as their
cousin.

Liability for Rape

Article 266-A, paragraph (1)d of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,60
which is the basis of statutory rape, provides as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

xxx
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Undoubtedly, AAA was below 12 years old at the time she was raped. However, the law qualifies the
crime of statutory rape when it is committed on a child below seven years old, to wit:
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.

xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

xxx

5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old.

For having been found guilty of the crime of qualified rape, AAA being a child below seven years of age
when the crime occurred, the death penalty should have been imposed on Banzuela. However,
Republic Act No. 9346,61 which took effect on June 24, 2006, prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty. Under this Act, the lower courts correctly imposed upon Banzuela the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole62 in lieu of the death penalty.63

Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness

The Court of Appeals convicted Banzuela of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. For Banzuela to be convicted as such,
both the requisites of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code as earlier
discussed, and sexual abuse under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, must be met and established
by the prosecution.64 The following are the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and

(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.65

A review of the Information filed against Banzuela reveals that there was no allegation of the second
element of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 that the act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. There was also no attempt to prove
that element, as it would have been a violation of Banzuelas constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Although the Information stated that the crime being
charged was in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, it is a well-settled rule that the character of the
crime is determined neither by the caption or preamble of the information[,] nor by the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the information.66 Therefore, Banzuela can only be punished
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.

The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is prision
correccional in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,67 the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree,68i.e.,
arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months.69 The maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall come from the proper penalty70 that could be imposed under the Revised
Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness.71 In this case, since there are neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty is the medium period of prision correccional, which
ranges from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.72

Banzuela is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as maximum.73

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases the award of exemplary damages from
P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 to AAA (rape);74 and awards P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as
moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages to BBB (acts of lasciviousness).75

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
03868 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
In Criminal Case No. MC03-919-FC-H, we find accused-appellant Ferdinand Banzuela GUILTY of Rape
defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole; and is ORDERED to pay the victim,
AAA, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment; and

In Criminal Case No. MC03-918-FC-H, we find accused-appellant Ferdinand Banzuela GUILTY of Acts
of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. He is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 6 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the
victim, BBB, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 205442, December 11, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JONATHAN CON-UI AND

RAMIL MACA, Accused-Appellants. R E S O L U T I O N

REYES, J.:

For review is the Decision1 dated December 20, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. HC No. 00462-MIN, which modified the Decision2 dated May 24, 2006 rendered
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, Branch 40, in Criminal
Case No. 4327, finding Jonathan Con-ui (Con-ui) and Ramil Maca (Maca) (accused-
appellants) guilty of the crime of Kidnapping. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
provides:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 24, 2006 of the court a quo in Crim. Case No.
4327 is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Ramil Maca and Jonathan Con-ui are hereby
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
[are] hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

Accused-appellants are further ORDERED to pay each of the victims, the following:
moral damages in the amount of [P]200,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of
[P]100,000; and civil indemnity of [P]75,000.00. chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

SO ORDERED.3
The accused-appellants, together with Kiking Mendoza (Mendoza) alias Kiking
Salahay, Arturo Umba y Antad alias Lico-Licoan and two John Does, were charged
with the kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Alejandro Paquillo (Alejandro), Mae
Paquillo (Mae), Marvelous Perez (Marvelous) and Marelie Perez (Marelie).4 At the time of
the kidnapping, all three girls Mae, Marvelous and Marelie were minors.

Based on the testimony of Alejandro, Con-ui has been going to his house for three
consecutive nights, including the night of the abduction on October 14, 2001, offering to
sell his property but he refused. On the night of October 14, while the two were talking
at the terrace, five men suddenly went inside the house and pointed their guns at
Alejandro. Someone then asked Con-ui what took him so long, and said that they were
tired of waiting for him. At that time, the sisters Marvelous and Marelie were inside the
bedroom of Mae, Alejandros daughter and their cousin. While there, someone knocked
on the bedroom door and ordered the girls to go out of the room. Maca and Mendoza
then collared them and asked for the key to the drawer. Con-ui opened the drawer and
took the money inside. Alejandro, Mae, Marvelous, Marelie and Con-ui were then
hogtied.

They were brought outside the house and thereafter boarded Alejandros jeepney. When
the jeep broke down at the crossing of Barangay Castillo, San Miguel, they were forced
to move on foot until they reached the mountains of Bagyangon, where they stopped
for a rest.
The next day, Alejandro was ordered to go home and get P300,000.00 ransom money.
When he was in his parents-in-laws house, their pastor arrived. Apparently, someone
informed the pastor the night before that Alejandro and the girls were kidnapped. The
pastor accompanied Alejandro to the bridge of NIA TRIP where they left clothes for the
girls.

Meanwhile, in the mountains, Mendoza ordered Con-ui to buy food but the latter
refused, so it was Maca who did the task. Macas father then arrived and told them that
there were military men on the road leading to Caromata and that Maca has been
arrested. After a while, the group decided to free the girls.

In his defense, Con-ui denied the charges and claimed that he was also a victim. He
admitted that he was in Alejandros house on the night of the incident but claimed that
he was there to negotiate the sale of his property to Alejandro. He was hogtied,
together with Alejandro and the girls, but managed to escape from their abductors. He
claimed that he asked his co-asset to report the incident to the police, and allegedly,
he even helped the soldiers search for the victims but failed to locate them.

Maca, meanwhile, claimed alibi as defense. He claimed that he was helping in the
construction of a waiting shed in Purok 4, which was being supervised by Barangay
Captain Felicula Gran (Gran). He said that on the night of October 14, he was with some
construction co-workers and barangay officials in Purok 4, having a drinking spree. He
also claimed that he went to work at 8:00 a.m. of October 15. On October 16, he was
hired as an agricultural hand by Gran and worked the entire day. He was arrested on
October 17, 2001 by the CAFGUs. Gran testified in the defense of Maca.

The RTC did not give credence to the defense of the accused- appellants and convicted
them of Kidnapping.5 The dispositive portion of the RTCs judgment of conviction
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Ramil Maca Meniano and
Jonathan Con-ui guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of death. No cost.

SO ORDERED.6
The CA, however, modified the judgment, convicted the accused appellants of
Kidnapping for Ransom and reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole. The CA also awarded civil indemnity, and moral and exemplary damages in
favor of each of the victims.

In their appeal, the accused-appellants persistently argue that the prosecution failed to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.7 They point out that the statement of
Marvelous that they were first hogtied and then later gave the key to their abductors is
unbelievable as they were tied up and could not have handed over the key. The
accused-appellants also contend that Alejandro did not testify that the kidnappers asked
for the key to the drawer and took the money in it. Con-ui also claims that the RTC
overlooked the fact that he was also hogtied and abducted along with the others. Maca,
on the other hand, claims that the RTC ignored the testimony of Gran corroborating his
claim that he was working on the construction of the waiting shed at the time of the
incident and that he also worked on her farm thereafter.8

The Court reviewed the accused-appellants case and found no compelling reason to
overturn their judgment of conviction.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect the same. Moreover,
if the victim is a minor, or the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose
of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. Ransom is
the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person that will release him from captivity.9

In proving the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, the prosecution has to show that: (a)
the accused was a private person; (b) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner
deprived another of his or her liberty; (c) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and
(d) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.10

All these were proven in the criminal case on review.

The testimony of Alejandro and Marvelous sufficiently established the commission of the
crime and the accused-appellants culpability. Maca was positively identified by
Marvelous as one of the men who collared her, Marelie and Mae by the bedroom, tied
them up and brought them to the mountains of Bagyangon. He was also identified as
the one who left the group when they were on the mountains to buy food after Con-ui
refused. Con-ui, on the other hand, was identified by Alejandro as the one who was
addressed by one of the abductors with the statement, [w]hy did it take you so long in
coming back? We were already tired of waiting for you.11 Con-ui was also identified by
Marvelous as the one who took the key to the drawer, opened it and took the money in
it.

Their testimony also established the fact that they were deprived of their liberty when
they were all hogtied and forcibly brought out of the house and into the mountains.
That the deprivation of their liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom was
confirmed by Alejandro who testified that the abductors asked him for money and even
let him off so he can come up with the P300,000.00 ransom.

The Court cannot sustain the accused-appellants argument regarding the alleged
unbelievable testimony of Marvelous or the lack of testimony by Alejandro as regards
the key incident. The rule is that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the
findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and
its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This holds truer if such
findings were affirmed by the appellate court. Without any clear showing that the trial
court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.12 In this case,
there is nothing unbelievable in Marvelous testimony. For one, the accused-appellants
failed to show that the physical state of the victims, having been hogtied, rendered
them immobile. For another, it is still quite possible for one to move around even if tied
up as established in this instance where evidence shows that the victims, at gunpoint,
actually even managed to walk out of the house, board the jeep and move further on
foot to the mountains. Moreover, the fact that Alejandro did not testify that he saw Con-
ui asked for the key to the drawer and took the money in it does not make his
testimony as regards the latters participation in the commission of the crime less
believable. Neither does it negate the fact that it actually happened. It should be noted
that the key incident was testified to by Marvelous and could have occurred only in
the girls presence.

The Court also notes and upholds the finding made by the CA sustaining the observation
of the RTC, to wit:
What is also compelling is the apt observation of the trial court that the accused-
appellant [Con-ui] had an opportunity to escape from the kidnappers when he was
directed to look for food, yet for reasons only known to him, he refused to oblige.
Accused-appellant testified that he was able to escape from the kidnappers while they
were arguing. This Court finds the testimony of accused-appellant self-serving. If[,]
indeed, he intended to escape, he would have taken with him the three minors, who
were admittedly, his relatives. Moreover, if indeed escaping was on his mind, he could
have done this at the earliest opportunity, and at the most convenient excuse, that is
when he was directed to look for food by one of the kidnappers.13
The Court also finds that the RTC properly disregarded the testimony of Gran, who said
that she saw Maca on the date of the incident, October 14, and on October 15. As
correctly ruled by the RTC, the testimony of Gran merely established that she saw Maca
only on certain hours of October 14 and 15, 2001.14 Thus, on October 14, she visited
the construction site only at 10:00 a.m. and left at lunch time, and went back to the
site at 4:00 p.m. and left at 8:00 p.m. She was not on site the entire day of October 14,
which raises the possibility that she could not have seen Maca physically present at the
construction site at all times or that Maca left during the period when she was not on
site. Moreover, her testimony that she saw Maca on October 15 at the same times that
she visited on October 14 is belied by the testimony of Police Inspector Judy Jumanoy
(Jumanoy). According to Jumanoy, he reported for duty on October 15 and after
receiving a call from barangay officials of Caromata, he went to Caromata where a
barangay official and a CAFGU commander presented Maca to him. He was also
informed by the officials that it was Maca who bought food for the victims, and upon
investigation, Maca admitted his complicity in the crime.15

Given the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to disturb the accused- appellants
judgment of conviction.

The Court also sustains the reduction of the penalty by the CA. Kidnapping for ransom is
punishable by death;16 however, with the passage of Republic Act No. 9346,17 the
imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall instead be imposed.18 Further, the same shall be without eligibility for
parole.19

The Court, however, finds that the damages awarded by the CA should be modified.
Recent jurisprudence established the amount of damages to be awarded. In People of
the Philippines v. Halil Gambao y Esmail, et al.,20 which also involves a Kidnapping for
Ransom case, the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the
penalty warranted by the facts but is not imposable under present law, as follows:
1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and
thus needs no proof; and
3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.21
The accused-appellants who are principals to the crime shall be jointly and severally
liable for these amounts awarded in favor of each of the victims. Moreover, these
amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to earn from
the date of the finality of the Courts Resolution until fully paid.22
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. HC No. 00462-MIN is MODIFIED.

Accused-appellants Jonathan Con-ui and Ramil Maca are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals in the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole. They are also ordered to
jointly and severally indemnify each of the victims in the following amounts: (1)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Courts Resolution until fully
paid.

In all other respects, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Villarama, Jr.,

JJ., concur.

Order dated November 8, 2005. See CA Decision dated December 20, 2011; id. at 93.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 200508, September 04, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER RIVERA Y

ROYO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the June 23, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
affirming the Judgment2 handed down by the Regional Trial Court Branch 17, Manila
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. 04-230720, finding the accused, Christopher Rivera y Royo
(Rivera), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined under Article 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and penalized under Article 266-B thereof.

The Facts

On October 4, 2004, an Information for Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code was filed against Rivera stating:
chan roble s vi rtua1aw 1 ibra ry

That on or about September 29, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and
there forcibly undressing one AAA and inserting his penis in her vagina, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her
against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
As succinctly stated in the decision of the CA, AAA narrated the following:
cha nrob les vi rtua 1aw 1ib rary

She was 20-years old and worked as a housemaid in a house located at Quezon City.
She came to know Rivera on September 28, 2004 because he was also working thereat
as a security guard. She told Rivera about a misunderstanding with a co-worker. Rivera
then offered to help her look for another job.

At around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of September 29, 2004, AAA went with Rivera
believing that the latter will bring her to his parent's house in Quiapo. Rivera brought
her to Ilang Ilang Motel4 located along Quezon Boulevard. AAA asked Rivera if that was
his parent's house, to which he replied Yes.

Rivera shoved her inside, pushed her towards the bed, forced her to remove her
clothes. He went on top of her, shoved her penis into her underwear and inserted the
same into her vagina. She struggled to push Rivera but the latter held her hands tightly.
She shouted for help, but nobody heard her.

Rivera stayed on top of AAA for about ten (10) minutes. Thereafter, they went to her
cousin's house in Antipolo City. She reported the incident to the police authorities and
Rivera was apprehended.

AAA went to Camp Crame for medico-legal examination, which later revealed that her
hymen had sustained shallow fresh laceration at 9:00 o'clock position.

AAA did not complain to the nearest police station because she was ashamed and
thought of bringing Rivera to her cousin's house.5
For the defense, Rivera and a certain Grace Dueo (Dueo), were presented as
witnesses.

Rivera claimed that AAA was his girlfriend, whom he promised to help look for another
job; that on September 29, 2004, AAA went with him and looked for a lodging house in
Quiapo; and that they checked in at the Ilang Ilang Lodge,6 with AAA contributing
P25.00 for the P125.00 rental rate of their room for three (3) hours. He added that: chan roble s virtua1aw 1 ibra ry

Once inside the room, AAA professed her love for him and is ready to face the
consequences of their acts. They started kissing each other after a brief conversation.
He started undressing AAA and the latter assisted him in removing her pants. AAA took
a bath while Rivera went downstairs to buy banana que and buko juice. AAA got
annoyed when he told her that they would eat as soon as they are downstairs. AAA got
dressed and went out of the room ahead of him.

Together, they left the motel, rode a jeepney towards Cubao and disembarked thereat.
They took another ride going to Cogeo where they arrived at the place where AAAs
relative resides. AAA discussed something with her relative in Visayan dialect and
mentioned something about the police. When they entered the house, Rivera watched
TV. AAA went out and when she returned, a policeman accosted him due to a complaint.
He went with the policeman to the police precinct. He was forced to admit the charge.7
Rivera insisted that AAA voluntarily went with him to the Ilang Ilang lodging house in
Quiapo.

The other defense witness, Dueo, the cashier at the lodging house, supported the
version of Rivera. She observed that both were happy when they checked in at the
lodge and added that it was even AAA who paid for the room.8 cra law virtualaw li bra ry

Thereafter, the RTC rendered its Judgment9 finding Rivera guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape, the dispositive portion of which reads: chanroble s virtua1aw 1 ibra ry

WHEREFORE, by reason of the foregoing premises, judgment of conviction beyond an

iota of doubt for the felony of consummated rape defined in Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code is hereby rendered against accused Christopher Rivera y Royo in Criminal
Case No. 04-230720 for which he must suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Apart
from the principal penalty of incarceration, which is subject to Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, the accused must indemnify the complainant with the sum of P50,000.00
as civil liability ex delicto, P50,000.00 moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.10
In finding Rivera guilty, the RTC explained that even then, it was precisely defendants
machination that the room was where his parents stayed, or they only will spend time
to simply rest therein, which constitutes the very essence of cajolery as prelude to what
was in the offing.11 It further wrote that even assuming ex gratia argumenti that AAA
and the accused were indeed lovers, as claimed by Rivera, there is judicial aversion to
the sweetheart theory and a love affair is not a license to expel lust.12 Specifically, the
pertinent portions of its evaluation read:chanro bles vi rt ua1aw 1ib rary

At first blush, a flashback of the complainants story of defloration evoked some somber
reflection if there was semblance of accuracy to her statements. Evidence on record
from Miss X disclosed that she was a high school graduate 20 years old, and had been
in Manila for about a year prior to the incident on September 29, 2004. These
acknowledged details might have raised quizzical eyebrows to her public outcry of
deflorare for she could not have been duped into believing that the area where she went
with the accused was far from a place for romance or a quick sexual tryst. Even then, it
was precisely defendants machination that the room was where his parents
stayed, or they only will spend time to simply rest therein, which constitutes
the very essence of cajolery as prelude to what was in the offing.

Given the recognized isolated state in rape as a crime, if walls could only speak as a
mute witness to either a dastardly deed or the product of sheer love within Room 22,
judicial quandary could have been diminished. The Courts predicament becomes even
more piercing when there is heavy reliance on the sheer revelation of the complainants
cry for vindication, when equated with defendants protestation of innocence. In
resolving such impasse, jurisprudence dictates supremacy of affirmative evidence when
compared with the adverse partys disavowal, especially so when the complainants
candid version herein was not properly impeached by the defense through acceptable
evidence of a sinister plot supposedly concocted by the complainant and her relative.
Indeed, it is hornbook precept that the lone testimony of the victim in the crime of rape,
if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction for, by the very nature of offense, the only
evidence that oftentimes can be relied upon is the victims own lips.

Shifting ones attention now to the demeanor of Miss X prior to, during, and
after the incident on September 29, 2004, evidence at hand revealed that she
resisted the sexual advances of the accused. She also shouted but her voice fell on
deaf ears and she had no other option but to immediately report the matter to the
police after she and the accused arrived in the place of Cogeo. Amendatory of the law
on rape is Republic Act No. 8353, which reclassified it as a crime against persons, and it
clearly spelled a presumption in Article 266-D of the Revised Penal Code that any
physical overt act of opposition, irrespective of degree from the complainant, can be
rightly appreciated as evidence in a prosecution for rape in Article 266-A.

Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that Miss X and the accused were lovers as put
forward by the accused, there is judicial aversion to the sweetheart theory and a love
affair is not a license to expel lust. Surely, defendants response in the vernacular, as
quoted in the text of this discourse, to the effect that he did not expect that the
complainant would seek assistance of the police amidst defendants trust
reposed on her, was also a formidable piece of vital information, nay, a
negative pregnant, that the accused had accomplished a misdeed.
Notwithstanding some disparities in Miss Xs declarations as to the exact floor where the
task was accomplished and how the defendant inserted his penis beneath the
underwear of Miss X, such divergence in perceptions cannot create significant doubt for
the accused as these matters referred to minor details of the sexual breach. Besides,
the witness for the defendant can hardly corroborate defendants revelation, since the
witness who testified for the accused referred to an incident on September 22, 2004,
unlike the crucial date mentioned by both Miss X and the accused. [Emphases supplied]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment of conviction. It stated that Rivera, other
than his bare assertions, failed to adduce convincing proof showing the existence of a
romantic relationship. It likewise agreed with the RTC in stating that even assuming
they were lovers, the relationship did not give him the license to sexually assault AAA.13
The CA further pointed out that the gravamen of the offense of rape was sexual
congress with a woman by force and without consent.14 cralaw virtua law lib rary

As to AAAs behavior after the sexual assault, the CA was of the view that her failure to
escape despite an opportunity to do so and to immediately seek help thereafter should
not be interpreted as consent; that these circumstances, by themselves, did not
necessarily negate rape or taint her credibility; and that there was no code of conduct
prescribing the correct reaction of a rape victim to the sexual assault.15 cralaw vi rt ualaw lib rary

Thus, in affirming the RTC, the CA ruled that Rivera, having the burden of proof, failed
to clearly and convincingly prove that AAA consented to the sexual act.

Hence, this appeal.

Ruling of the Court

Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even

secrecy, it is usually the victim alone who can testify with regard to the fact of the
forced sexual intercourse.16 Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the
victim is almost always the single and most important point to consider. Thus, if the
victims testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted
on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the accused should be acquitted of the
crime.17 c ralaw virtualaw l ibra ry

After a thorough review of the evidentiary record, the Court affirms the conviction.

Paragraph (1), Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in relation to paragraph
(2), Article 266-B thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, provides that:
virtua 1aw 1ib rary
chanrob les

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

 c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

xxx

Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxx
By invoking the sweetheart defense, Rivera essentially admitted having carnal
knowledge with AAA. The next query is whether or not she consented to the sexual act
for the gravamen of the offense of rape, as the CA correctly stated, is sexual congress
with a woman by force and without consent.18 cralaw vi rtual aw lib rary

In determining whether or not the act was consensual and that no force of any kind and
degree was employed, circumstances as to the age, size and strength of both parties
must also be looked into because force in rape is relative.19 Here, records reveal that as
per the Medico-Legal Report20 of the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
AAA was 18 years old at the time of the alleged rape. She stood four (4) feet and nine
(9) inches (49) and weighed 93.3 lbs. On the other hand, as per the Booking Sheet
and Arrest Report21 of the Western Police District, Central Market Sta. Cruz Police
Station, Rivera was 24 years old, stood five (5) feet and six (6) inches and weighed
143.3 lbs.

AAA consistently claimed that the bigger Rivera pushed her to the bed, forcefully
undressed her and succeeded in ravishing her. In her affidavit,22 dated September 30,
2004, she stated: chanrob les vi rtua 1aw 1ib rary

T Maaari mo bang ikuwento sa akin ang nangyari?

S x x x Dinala niya ako sa may ilang ilang at pumasok kami doon at nakita ko siya na
may pinirmahan. Pumasok po siya sa kwarto at tinawag niya ako pero tinanong ko
siya ng ITO BA ANG BOARDING HOUSE MO? Sumagot siya ng oo. Pumasok po
ako sa loob at doon niya ako pinagsamantalahan. Sumigaw ako ng sumigaw pero
sinabihan niya ako na kahit magsisigaw ako ay walang makakarinig sa akin. Tinulak
niya ako sa kama at pinilit niyang hubarin ang aking damit pero nanlalaban
ako pero malakas siya kaya nagawa niyang akong pagsamantalahan. x x x
On December 21, 2005, during her direct examination, AAA testified on the details as
follows:23
Q: Reaching Quiapo, Manila, with the accused, what happened next?
A: Biglang pinasok nya po ako sa may motel, pero hindi ko po alam na motel yun
kasi first time kong pumasok dun.
He suddenly brought me inside a motel but I did not know that it was a motel since
that was my first time to enter a motel, sir.

Q: You said that reaching Quiapo with the accused, the accused suddenly pushed you
inside a motel, what happened there inside the motel?
A: Pinilit nya pong hinubad po yung damit ko.
He forced me to remove my clothes, sir.

Q: Now, prior to that undressing [of] you by the accused, you said you were pushed
inside a motel by the accused, what happened before that undressing?
A: Tinanong ko po na ito ba yung bahay ng parents mo na sinasabi mo.
I asked him if that was the house of his parents, sir.

Q: And when you asked him that, what was his reply?
A: He answered yes, sir.

Q: And when he answered yes, what happened next?

A: Yun po, bigla na lang po ako tinulak nya.
He suddenly pushed me, sir.

Q: Pushed you to what?

A: To the bed, sir. [Emphases supplied]
On the other hand, Rivera, when he was at the witness stand, desperately tried to show
that theirs was a consensual act by claiming that AAA was his girlfriend and that she
voluntarily went with him to the lodging house.

The RTC, which had the vantage point in observing the witness' demeanor at the
witness stand, considered AAAs testimony as credible and sufficient to sustain Riveras
conviction for the crime of rape, and did not believe his defense of denial. It was of the
strong view that AAA did not consent to the sexual act as she, in fact, resisted his
aggression. As earlier cited, the RTC observed that: chan robles v irt ua1aw 1i bra ry

Shifting ones attention now to the demeanor of Miss X prior to, during, and after the
incident on September 29, 2004, evidence at hand revealed that she resisted the sexual
advances of the accused.24
This appreciation of the trial court judge carries a lot of weight. The rule in this regard,
applicable to this case, is: "The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grilling examination. These are the utmost significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face
of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the
trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony
to accept and which witness to disbelieve. Verily, findings of the trial court on such
matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the
disposition of the case."25 In the case of People v. Belga,26 the Supreme Court reiterated
and expounded on the rule.
Time and again, we have held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of
witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial courts observations and
conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears
in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would
alter the result of the case. The trial judge enjoys the advantage of observing the
witness deportment and manner of testifying, her furtive glance, blush of conscious
shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full
realization of an oath -- all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if such
witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it
had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying and detect if they are lying.27 [Italicization supplied]
In this case, the CA also concluded that AAAs unwavering answers during cross-
examination removed all doubt as to her credibility and manifested the truthfulness of
her testimony.28 Citing People v. Canuto,29 the CA stated that when a rape victims
testimony was straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and
unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its vital points, the same must be given
full faith and credit.30 When the findings of the trial court are affirmed by the appellate
court, the Court will not disturb the same, save for exceptional circumstances which are
not present in this case.

The Court, in its own assessment of the case, casts no doubt on AAAs credibility and to
the truthfulness of her testimony, as opposed to Riveras weak reliance on the
sweetheart theory. Not even an iota of ill motive to file such a malicious case for rape
on the part of AAA was shown by Rivera to at least discredit her claim that the act was
not consensual. As held in People v. Cabanilla,31 the sweetheart defense is an
affirmative defense that must be supported by convincing proof. As correctly ruled by
the CA, such defense is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and
consequently places on accused-appellant the burden of proving the alleged relationship
by substantial evidence.32 Independent proof is required.

Rivera, however, failed to discharge such burden. It is inconceivable that, in barely one
day of having known each other, Rivera and AAA were already in a relationship. Rivera
wanted to impress upon the Court that, after having met AAA on September 28, 2004
for the first time at around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and conversing with her about
her problem with a co-worker, he courted33 her and she accepted34 him as her
boyfriend. In less than 24 hours or at around 10:00 oclock in the morning of the
following day, September 29, 2004, she agreed to go with him to Ilang-Ilang Lodge to
have consensual sex. The Court, though, is not very impressed. A careful perusal of the
records, including Riveras own testimony, shows that AAA agreed to go with him
because of his promise that he would help her look for another job.

It cannot be argued that because AAA voluntarily went with Rivera to the Ilang-Ilang
Lodge, she consented to have sex with him. To presume otherwise would be non
sequitur. It must be noted that AAA, who was not in good terms with a co-worker,
wanted a change in employer. She easily believed Rivera who convinced her that he
could help her look for a new job. Thus, she trusted Rivera and went along with him
because of his assurance that he could help her find a new employment.

Considering that she trusted him, it is not far-fetched that she fell for his every word,
including the claim that his parents also stayed in said lodging house. With his
assurance, she felt comfortable going with him to the place. It was only when they were
inside the room that she realized his true intentions. From that time on, she became
uneasy.

The trial court heard her story and became convinced that it was part of his machination
to take advantage of AAAs naivet and satisfy his lust. Rivera contended that there was
lack of physical evidence to prove that AAA ever resisted his advances.35 In this regard,
the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997), particularly Article
266-D, provides for a presumption that any physical overt act manifesting resistance
against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended
party is so situated as to render her incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted
as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A. This rule
properly applies in this case as AAAs credibility in testifying that she was ruthlessly
ravished by Rivera has been clearly established. She testified as follows:36
Q: You said you were pushed by the accused to the bed, what happened when the
accused pushed you to the bed?
A: Ginahasa nya po ako, sir.
He raped me, sir.

Q: Would you please tell us in particular how the accused raped you?
A: Hawak nya po yung aking dalawang kamay.
He held my two hands, sir.

Q: What happened next?

A: He inserted his penis to me, sir.

Q: To where?
A: To my vagina, sir.

Q: What happened when the accused inserted his penis to your vagina, what did you
do?
A: Tinutulak ko po sya pero hindi ko po kaya kasi malakas siya.
I pushed him hard but he was strong, sir.

Q: What happened when you were pushing him?

A: Wala po.

Fiscal Orda, Jr.:

Ano yun?

Interpreter:
Ano daw nangyari nung tinutulak mo siya?
A: Mas hinigpitan po yung hawak nya sa akin, sir.
He held me tightly, sir.

Q: When he held you tightly, when you said you were pushing him and then he held you
tightly, what happened next?
A: Sumisigaw po ako pero wala pong makarinig sa akin, sir.
 I was screaming but nobody heard me, sir.
Resistance from Riveras sexual advances, although not an element of rape, was
sufficiently narrated by AAA. Profusely, in People v. Baldo,37 the Court ruled that:
chan roble s virtua1aw 1 ibra ry

AAAs failure to shout or to tenaciously resist appellant should not be taken against her
since such negative assertion would not ipso facto make voluntary her submission to
appellants criminal act. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light
of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. As
already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way. Some people
may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may
appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be
too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Moreover, resistance is not an element
of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist
the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation is
present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.
In his last ditch effort to secure his exoneration, Rivera pointed out that the records
were bereft of evidence to prove that AAA suffered vaginal lacerations.38 The lack of
lacerated wounds in the vagina, however, does not negate sexual intercourse.39
Laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and irrefutable physical
evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the
crime of rape. In the context used in the RPC, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary
connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be
penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.40 Accordingly, granting arguendo that AAA
did not suffer any laceration, Rivera would still be guilty of rape after it was clearly
established that he did succeed in having carnal knowledge of her. At any rate, it has
been repeatedly held that the medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in
a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not
essential to a conviction.41
cralaw virtualaw li bra ry

The testimony of Dueo cannot be of help either. She merely related what transpired
when they arrived at the lodge. She had no knowledge or inkling of what befell AAA in
the hands of Rivera inside Room 22.

All told, the controversy is not simply about justifying AAAs presence in the lodging
house with Rivera, but rather, it was about the consent that she did not give to satisfy
his thirst for lust.

Indeed, the situation in which AAA found herself may cast suspicion on her, but the fact
remains that Rivera forced himself upon her and she resisted to no avail.

There appears to be a growing public awareness and an improving environment for

reporting of cases of violence against women such as rape. Rape victims are showing
greater resolve to bring their accusation to court. It is rather an unfortunate reality
though, that in prosecution of rape cases, the proceedings against the man perpetrator
almost always turn into a trial of the woman victim as well. The Court intends to
disabuse the victims on the belief that, in a court of justice, she will be judged for what
she did or did not do, rather than her ravisher be condemned for his criminal actions.

There being no showing of any reversible error in the CAs affirmance of the RTC
judgment of conviction, the Court sees no compelling reason to reverse it.

The damages imposed by the trial court upon accused Rivera, to wit: P50,000.00 as
civil liability ex delicto; P50,000.00 moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, are correct being in accordance with the latest jurisprudence on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the June 23, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04104, affirming the judgment of conviction
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 04-230720, is
hereby AFFIRMED. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Brion,*Peralta, and Abad, JJ., concur.

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175602, February 13, 2013]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. P02 EDUARDO

VALDEZ AND EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the
RTC convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of
each victim P93,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the
modification that each of the accused pay to the heirs of each victim
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of
suit.

The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007,
Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on
October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwins appeal closed and terminated.1

On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of
PO2 Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead
of three counts of murder, and meting on him for each count of homicide the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum,2 to wit:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18,

2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer for each
count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum
to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective
heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a self- explanatory
letter3 dated March 12, 2012, where he pleaded for the application to him of
the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground that the
judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused. The letter reads as
follows:

HON. MIDAS MARQUEZ

Court Administrator
Office of the Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines Manila

SUBJECT: Re. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of Rules of Court, Request for.

Your honor,

The undersigned most respectfully requesting through your Honorable office,

assistance on the subject mentioned above.

I, Edwin and Eduardo, both surnamed Valdez were both charged before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Quezon City for the entitled Crime of Murder
in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-90718 to Q-0090720, which convicted us to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each of the three (3) offense.

Then after the decision of the RTC Branch 86, the same was appealed to the
Court of Appeals with CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00876 and again on July 18, 2006
the Honorable Court of appeals Ninth Division issued a Decision AFFIRMED
the questioned Decision with MODIFICATION.

Only my Co-principal Accused EDUARDO V. VALDEZ enterposed appealed

(sic) the Affirmatory Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals to the
Highest Tribunal with G.R. Nos. 175602. On my part, I decided to withdraw
my appeal, because I believe that there is no more hope for me, but I was
wrong when I read the Decision of the First Division of the Supreme Court,
dated January 18, 2012 signed by the Chief Justice Honorable Renato C.
Corona and finally I found hope.

And now I come to your Honorable Office through this letter to seek help and
assistance that the Decision of the Supreme Court to my Brother Eduardo V.
Valdez may also benefitted (sic) the undersigned through Section 11 (a) ,
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

(a) An Appeal taken by [the] one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the Appellate
Court is favorable and applicable to the latter: x x x

Favorable Humanitarian consideration on this matter. Thank you very much

and more power, God Bless. Respectfully yours
EDWIN V. VALDEZ

Through a comment filed on September 25, 2012,4 the Solicitor General

interposed no opposition to the plea for the reduction of Edwins sentences
for being in full accord with the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence.

We grant the plea for reduction of Edwins sentences.

The final judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 downgraded the crimes
committed by Eduardo from three counts of murder to three counts of
homicide, and consequently prescribed lighter penalties in the form of
indeterminate sentences. As a result, Eduardo would serve only an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum, under which he can qualify for parole in
due course by virtue of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, instead of suffering
the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

The Court rationalized the result as follows:

x x x The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary
to the established facts and circumstances showing that he and
Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai alai
betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the
betting booth then busily attending to bettors inside the booth; that
because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out of the booth,
Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened
Moises; Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that immediately after Moises
replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises, causing
him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the
fallen Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises,
his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains;
that somebody shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that
Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and that Joselito fell on a
burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims were apparently
fired from short distances.

The testimonial accounts of the States witnesses entirely jibed with the
physical evidence. Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that
Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head; that two gunshot wounds
entered Joselitos back and the right side of his neck; and that Moises
suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot wounds in the chest.
Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the
presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the
gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range. Given that physical evidence
was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all
witnesses put together, the congruence between the testimonial recollections
and the physical evidence rendered the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and
Edwin conclusive.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony.
Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct
because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. Herein, both
lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the accused from the mode
and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We are satisfied that their
deduction was warranted.

Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal

responsibility for the fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and
Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in
concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed
victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only
from their going together to the betting station on board a single
motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez
commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and immediately
followed by Edwins shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the
other. It was also significant that they fled together on board the
same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common
purpose.

To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of

the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed
by his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts.
Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and
Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their acts that were
indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.

And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2

Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of three murders, on
account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance
of treachery.

Treachery is the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of

any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure
its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety of
actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular
to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a
circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on
each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the state
to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute
the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in
the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.

It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal

charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. In People v.
Dimaano, the Court elaborated:

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the

accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the
title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions
of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must
be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable
the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions
and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging
the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of
the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to
suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused
has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. [emphasis supplied]

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused
with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength did x x x assault, attack and employ
personal violence upon the victims by then and there shooting
[them] with a gun, hitting [them] on various parts of their bodies
which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]
did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing
how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult
to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him
with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the
crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused
from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the
gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are
other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did
the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for
that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not
an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances
constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were
missing from the informations.
x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to
inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him
in order to enable him to prepare his defense. This requirement
accords with the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to
which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts
stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which
he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords
with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, x x x.

xxxx

x x x. There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty

is applied in its medium period (ie., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision mayor, and the
maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the Court
imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each
count of homicide.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18,

2006 is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him
to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of
prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson,
Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)

On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of
the downgrading of the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter
penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of murder
due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes
committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth pointing out is that to
deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be
highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have
acted in concert in their deadly assault against the victims, warranting their
equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.

We grant Edwins plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court, which relevantly provides:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. (a) An appeal
taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court
is favorable and applicable to the latter.

xxxx

In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals6 that
the benefits of this provision extended to all the accused, regardless of
whether they appealed or not, to wit:

As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the
event of Guingguings acquittal, petitioner should likewise be acquitted,
based on Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended, which states:

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.

Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to

petitioner inasmuch as he appealed from his conviction, and the provision
states that a favorable judgment shall be applicable only to those who did
not appeal.

A literal interpretation of the phrase did not appeal, as espoused by private

respondent, will not give justice to the purpose of the provision.

It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as

to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal
of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact,
several cases rendered by the Court applied the foregoing provision without
regard as to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co- accused, so long as
the judgment was favorable to him.

In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguezs co-

accused to him despite the withdrawal of his appeal, applying the Rule 122,
Section 11(a), and considering that the evidence against both are
inextricably linked, to wit:

Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-
established rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole
case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the
parties. The records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to
financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
provides that [a]n appeal taken by one or more [of] several accused shall
not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellant court is favorable and applicable to the latter. As we have
elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both appellant and
Rodriguez are inextricably linked. Hence, appellants acquittal, which is
favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.

In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty only of

homicide. Such verdict was applied to his co-accused, Jose Precioso, who was
previously found guilty by the trial court of robbery with homicide, despite
the fact that Precioso appealed but failed to file an appellants brief. The
Court also modified Preciosos civil liability although the additional monetary
award imposed on Arondain was not extended to Precioso since it was not
favorable to him and he did not pursue the appeal before the Court.

In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas, together with several co- accused, were
found by the trial court guilty of forcible abduction. During pendency of the
review before the Court, Villas withdrew his appeal, hence his conviction
became final and executory. Thereafter, the Court found Villas co-accused
guilty only of grave coercion. Applying Rule 122, Section 11(a), the Court
also found Villas guilty of the lesser offense of grave coercion since it is
beneficial to him.

In People v. Escao, the Court granted a motion filed by accused Julian Deen
Escao, praying that the Courts Decision dated January 28, 2000, acquitting
his co-accused Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez in Criminal Case No. 95-
936 for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, be applied to him. Escao originally filed a Notice of Appeal with
the trial court but later withdrew the same.

In the foregoing cases, all the accused appealed from their judgments of
conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and
executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable
judgment in favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that the Decision
dated September 30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated, ''the verdict of guilt
with respect to Lim fherein petitioner] had already become final and
executory." In any event, the Court cannot see why a different treatment
should be given to petitioner, given that the judgment is favorable to him
and considering further that the Court's tinding in its Decision dated
September 30, 2005 specifically stated that "the publication of the subject
advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have
been done with actual malice."7

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the
application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty of three counts of homicide, and sentencing
him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, the late Moises
Sayson, Jr., and the late Joselito Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate
damages for each count.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, (Acting Chairperson), Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and

*Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175876, February 20, 2013]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOMAS TEODORO Y ANGELES,

Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The recantation of her testimony by the victim of rape is to be disregarded if the records
show that it was impelled either by intimidation or by the need for the financial support
of the accused.

This rule comes to the forefront once again in our review of the affirmance by the Court
of Appeals (CA) of the conviction for two counts of rape of Tomas Teodoro y Angeles,1 in
which the victim, AAA,2 was the 8-year old daughter of BBB, his common-law wife. The
Regional Trial Court had pronounced Teodoro guilty of two counts of statutory rape on
December 10, 2001, and condignly meted him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count.3

Antecedents

Two informations, both dated March 25, 1998, charged Teodoro with statutory rape
committed as follows:

Criminal Case No. 98-02

That on or about the 18th day of December, 1997, at, 10:00 oclock in the evening,
more or less, in Sitio Seringan, Poblacion, Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of AAA, an eight (8) year old minor.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659)4

Criminal Case No. 98-03

That on or about the 8th day of February, 1998, at 10:00 oclock in the evening, more or
less, in Sitio Seringan, Poblacion, Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of AAA, an eight (8) year old minor.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659)5
With respect to the statutory rape charged in Criminal Case No. 98-02, the records
show that on December 18, 1997 BBB left home in Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte on an
errand in Surigao; that her children, including AAA, were left under the care of Teodoro,
her common-law husband; that late that night, he returned home drunk, and his arrival
roused the children from their sleep, because they had not yet eaten; that they eagerly
ate the food he set down for them; that soon after the dinner, he told the children to go
to bed; that the children went to sleep in their respective places on the floor; that AAA
became puzzled when he turned off the lights that were supposed to be left on; that
AAA eventually fell asleep beside her siblings; that at some point later in the night, he
roused AAA, and ordered her to strip naked; that she initially defied him, but he himself
then undressed her; that he took off his pants and drawers down to his knees, exposing
his penis; that he went on top of her, inserted his penis in her vagina, and made push
and pull movements; that she felt a sharp pain inside her vagina; that he stopped his
movements when she protested due to her pain becoming unbearable, because he did
not want the other children to be roused from sleep; that he returned to his own place,
but she got up to relieve herself; that she felt searing pain in her vagina as she was
relieving herself; and that she did not tell her mother upon the latters return from
Surigao about what Teodoro had done to her.

Anent the rape committed on February 8, 1998 (Criminal Case No. 98-03), BBB was
again away from the house, having gone to Manila. Teodoro committed the rape in a
fashion similar to that in the first rape. However, AAA could no longer bear her ordeal,
and told of the rapes to CCC, the older brother of BBB: Tay, guihilabtan ko ni Tomas
Teodoro (Tay, I was touched by Tomas Teodoro).6 CCC immediately reported the crimes
to the Kitcharao Police Station. The police quickly arrested Teodoro. Upon BBBs return
in the afternoon, CCC informed her about what Teodoro had done to her daughter. BBB
and CCC took AAA to the Kitcharao District Hospital for physical and medical
examination.

Dr. Mary Ann D. Abrenillo of the Kitcharao District Hospital examined AAA, and issued a
medical certificate on her findings, as follows:

1.Intact Hymen that admits Right Small Finger of examiner and with slight peripheral
erythema.
2.Labia Majora and Minora slightly Gaped Exposing Hymenal Opening, with tenderness.7

Based on the medical certificate, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del
Norte charged Teodoro with two counts of statutory rape through the aforequoted
informations.8

At his arraignment on August 17, 1998, Teodoro pleaded not guilty to the informations.
Although he subsequently manifested a willingness to change the pleas to guilty, he
balked when he was re-arraigned on December 23, 1998 by qualifying that he had only
fingered AAA. Accordingly, the RTC reinstated his pleas of not guilty.

During the trial, AAA9 and BBB10 testified for the Prosecution, but two years later
recanted and turned hostile towards the Prosecution, now telling the RTC that Teodoro
had only touched AAAs vagina on the nights of December 18, 1997 and February 8,
1998.11

On his part, Teodoro claimed12 that he had only caressed or touched AAAs body on the
night of February 8, 1998; that before going home from work on that day, he had
joined his friends in drinking Kulafu; that he had arrived home late that night, and had
gone to bed after serving the children food to eat; that he had later awakened to find
somebody sleeping beside him; that he had embraced and caressed the different parts
of the body of that person, whom he thought was BBB whom he had earlier sent off to
Surigao on an errand; that he had realized that he was caressing AAA only after she
shouted: Cle, Cle, ayaw! (Uncle, stop that!); that he had then gotten up to go to a
different part of the room;13 and that he did not rape AAA on the night of December 18,
1997,14 although he admitted being at home then.15

Ruling of the RTC

After the trial, on December 10, 2001, the RTC rendered its judgment convicting
Teodoro on both counts of statutory rape notwithstanding the recantations by AAA and
BBB. The RTC disposed:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused TOMAS
TEODORO Y ANGELES in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-02 and 98-03 GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape committed against AAA, an eight (8)-year old
minor. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA in each of the cases, with the accessories provided for by law, to pay the
offended party the sum of P100,000.00, P50,000.00 for each case, and to pay the
costs.

In the service of his sentence, accused is credited with the full time during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment conformably to Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.16

The RTC rejected AAAs recantation of her accusation for being inconsistent with the
testimony of Dr. Abrenillo showing that the redness on the edges of the protective
structure of her vaginal opening had been caused by friction from the forceful
introduction of an erect penis; and that such forceful introduction of an erect penis had
led to the gaping of the labia minora and labia majora of AAA.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, Teodoro focused on the RTCs rejection of AAAs recantation. He argued in

his appellants brief17 that no rape was committed considering that the Cebuano-Visayan
word guihilabtan used by AAA in describing what he did to her signified only touching,
as contrasted with lugos, the proper Cebuano-Visayan term for rape that AAA did not
use.

Unimpressed, the CA sustained the RTC, and ignored AAAs recantation for being
dictated by her familys financial difficulties. It agreed with the observation of the Office
of the Solicitor General to the effect that AAAs recantation should not be considered
because it came about after she had returned home from the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). In contrast, it found AAAs
court testimony given on November 17, 1998 consistent with the physical findings of
Dr. Abrenillo.

The CA decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DISMISSED for evident

lack of merit and the assailed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
granting in each case moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the sum of P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.18

Issues

1.Were the rapes charged against Teodoro established beyond reasonable doubt?
2.Should the recantation by AAA be accepted?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353,19 define and punish rape as follows:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

The crimes charged were two counts of statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape
are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender
has carnal knowledge of the victim. Considering that the essence of statutory rape is
carnal knowledge of a female without her consent, neither the use of force, threat or
intimidation on the female, nor the females deprivation of reason or being otherwise
unconscious, nor the employment on the female of fraudulent machinations or grave
abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape.20 Full penile penetration of the
females genitalia is not likewise required, because carnal knowledge is simply the act of
a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.21

Describing the rape committed against her on December 18, 1997, AAA declared thus:

Q: How about your uncle, Tomas Teodoro, do you know what did he do after you
have already eaten and drank water?
A: Yes. My uncle commanded us and he told my elder brother, EEE, to go to sleep
and on that night, I was surprised because he put off the light.
Q: Now, AAA, could you describe how your uncle look like when he arrived in your
house?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: How did he look like? Did he look normal?
A: Yes, Maam, but he was drunk.
xxxx
Q: What do you mean by he drinks something?
A: It was Kulafu, Maam, because it smelt bad.
xxxx
Q: x x x. After your uncle put off the light, did you immediately fall asleep?
A: Not yet. I first looked at the light because I was surprised why it was put off and
I noticed that it was my uncle who put off the light.
xxxx
Q: So you are telling the Court that you were the last one to sleep that night
including your uncle, of course, among you and your siblings? You were the last
one who went to sleep that .
A: Yes maam
Q: Now, when you already fell asleep, was it then the time you were awakened
again because your uncle came near you?
A: Yes maam
xxxx
Q: How did he force you to undress?
A: He was the one who undressed me maam.
Q: After he undressed you, your uncle also undressed his trousers and drawers,
correct?
A: He just lowered his pants up to his knee
Q: After lowering his pants up to his knee, he laid on top of you correct?
A: He laid on top of me
Q: After that, x x x what was the next thing that he did?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
xxxx
Q: Now, AAA, before this incident happened on December 18, 1997, do you have a
good relationship with your step-father?
A: Yes, maam we have a good relationship.22 (Emphasis supplied)

Concerning the rape committed on February 8, 1998, AAAs testimony ran as follows:

Q: Now, what happened to you while you were sleeping or about to sleep on
February 8, 1998 at your house?
A: He touched hilabtan me, Sir.
Q: When you said he touched you, you are referring to your step-father,
the accused in these cases?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, would you kindly tell this Honorable Court how did the accused
Tomas Teodoro touch you?
A: He laid on top of me, Sir.
Q: Before he laid on top of you, what did he do to you?
A: He undressed me.
Q: What kind of clothes did you wear?
A: I was wearing a whole dress, Sir.
Q: When you said whole dress, it is the same kind of clothes you are
wearing now?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Before he laid on top of you, you said that he undressed you. Now, was
he able to undress you?
A: I undressed myself.
Q: You undressed yourself because your father told you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, were you wearing a panty at that time?
A: Yes, Sir, I was wearing a panty.
Q: Now, what happened to your panty before your step-father laid on top of
you?
A: He lowered my panty up to my thigh.
Q: When your father lowered your panty up to your thigh and you were
completely naked, were you lying down on the floor of the room where
you were sleeping?
A: Yes, Sir, I was lying down.
Q: How about your step-father before he laid on top of you, what kind of
clothes did he wear?
A: He was wearing a jacket and a t-shirt, Sir.
Q: Did he remove his jacket and t-shirt?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How about his pants, did he remove his pants before he laid on top of
you?
A: When he laid on top of me, he just lowered his pants up to his knee.
Q: Did he also lower his drawers?
A: He also lowered his drawers up to his knee, Sir.
Q: Now, when he laid on top of you, what else did he do to you aside from
lying on top of you?
A: He touched me, Sir; he inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: After he inserted his penis into your vagina, what else did he do?
A: He made some push and pull movement, Sir.
Q: When he made that push and pull movement, what did you feel?
A: I felt pain, Sir.
Q: Where did you feel that pain?
A: In my vagina, Sir.
Q: Now, while your father made that push and pull movement, what did
you do or say?
A: I begged him to stop because it was really painful and after that I
urinated and it was really very painful.
Q: Where did you feel that pain while you were urinating?
A: In my vagina, Sir.23 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court declares that the findings of the RTC and the CA on the commission of the
two counts of statutory rape by Teodoro were well-founded. AAAs recollections given in
court when she was only eight years old disclosed an unbroken and consistent narration
of her ordeals at his hands. She thereby revealed details that no child of her very tender
age could have invented or concocted. The only rational and natural conclusion to be
made by any objective arbiter is to accord the fullest credence to her.

Yet, Teodoro would have us undo his convictions for statutory rape, arguing that AAAs
description of his acts in Cebuano-Visayan, the dialect spoken by AAA, was guihilabtan,
not lugos, the former being the dialect term for touching and the latter for rape.

Teodoros argument is directly belied by the established facts. AAA remained categorical
and steadfast about what Teodoro had done to her all throughout her testimony in
court, even during her delivery of the supposed recantation. She narrated how he had
committed the rape in the evening of December 18, 1997 by undressing her and
himself, going on top of her, inserting his male organ into her vagina, and making push
and pull motions, causing her to suffer severe pain in her vagina, to wit:

Q: Now, do you remember what happened to you while you were inside that room
about to sleep on that evening of December 18, 1997?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, what happened to you?
A: At that time, he laid beside me and he told me to take off my clothes. After that,
he also took off his clothes then he laid on top of me.24
xxxx
Q: When your father laid on top of you, what did he do aside from lying on top of
you?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina and he made some push and pull
movement.
Q: You said that your father inserted his penis into your vagina and made a
push and pull movement. Now, when this was happening, what did you
feel?
A: I asked him to stop because I felt pain, but he told me to keep quite
because others might hear us.
Q: When you told your father or begged your father to stop because you
were feeling pain, which part of your body did you feel that pain?
A: In my vagina, Sir.
Q: When you begged your father to stop because there was pain on your vagina,
did your father heed your request to stop?
A: He stopped, Sir.
Q: You mean your father stopped his push and pull movement?
A: Yes, because after that, I told him.
Q: Now, after your father stopped his push and pull movement, what did your
father do next?
A: He stopped and after that I urinated and I felt pain.
Q: Now, where did you feel that pain?
A: In my vagina.
Q: When you urinated, did your father go to sleep?
A: He did not go to sleep right away but he just lay down on bed.
Q: You mean to tell this Court that he returned to his place where he was lying
down before he raped you?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, before you urinated, did your father tell you about what to do?
A: He told me never to tell the incident that happened because the moment I will
tell the truth, he will reprimand me.25 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx

Moreover, to believe Teodoros argument is to belie that AAA exhibited at the time of
her physical examination by Dr. Abrenillo a peripheral erythema, or redness, in her
hymen, as well as tenderness and gaping in her labia majora and labia minora. Dr.
Abrenillo explained the significance of her physical findings, to wit:

Q. So, you are telling this Honorable Court that when an erect male penis may
contact in this particular area, that might have caused the discoloration of the
reddish in color of that particular area, is that correct?
A. Yes, because the force of the friction might be that adequate to cause the
reddish or inflammation that resulted in the discoloration of the normal tissue or
structure.
xxxx
Q. Now, in your second findings, you said that there is a slightly Gaped Exposing
Hymenal Opening of the Labia Majora and Minora, in your expert opinion as
medico legal expert, what might have caused this Gape Opening?
A. Again related to number 1, a friction also mean something can cause the gaping
or exposure of the opening and it can be substantiated also that there was pain
that was experienced by the patient.
Q. Now, you are telling this Honorable Court that when you touched this particular
area, the patient experienced pain?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. As a medico legal expert, could this particular injury be caused by a contact of
an erect male organ?
A. Well, it is sustain and with a force.
Q. In this particular case because there is a gape opening of the lips which you said
this medico legal term, Labia Majora and Minora, could this opening be caused
by a contact of an erect male organ?
A. Yes, Sir, because normally, gape should not be exposing the Hymenal Opening
and the smaller lip should be covered by the bigger one.26

In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated

statutory rape, does not require full penile penetration of the female. The Court has
clarified in People v. Campuhan27 that the mere touching of the external genitalia by a
penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is for the
penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact with
the lips of the pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is consummated once
the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act touches either labia of
the pudendum. As the Court has explained in People v. Bali-Balita,28 the touching that
constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing of
organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims
vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis touching the labias or sliding into
the female genitalia. Accordingly, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the
labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape proceeds from the
physical fact that the labias are physically situated beneath the mons pubis or the
vaginal surface, such that for the penis to touch either of them is to attain some degree
of penetration beneath the surface of the female genitalia. It is required, however, that
this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and convincingly established.

Here, the proof of the penis of Teodoro touching the labias of AAA was sufficient and
convincing. Dr. Abrenillo found the peripheral erythema in the hymen of AAA and the
fact that her labia majora and labia minora were tender and gaping, exposing the
hymenal opening. In other words, the touching by Teodoros penis had gone beyond the
mons pubis and had reached the labias of the victim. Such physical findings, coupled
with the narrative of AAA that, one, Teodoro went on top of her body; two, he inserted
his penis into her vagina; three, he made push and pull motions thereafter; and, four,
she felt great pain inside her during his push and pull movements, rendered the findings
of rape against him unassailable as to the rape committed on February 8, 1998. With
respect to the rape committed on December 18, 1997, we concur with the RTC and CAs
conclusion that AAAs testimonial account thereon likewise sufficiently and convincingly
established the commission of rape. She suffered severe pain inside her genitalia while
his penis was penetrating her, which could only be understood in the light of the
foregoing explanation made herein about his penis attaining some degree of penetration
beneath the surface of her genitalia.

Apart from being incompatible with the established facts, Teodoros argument remained
a matter of pure semantics. For sure, rape as defined and used by the Revised Penal
Code is a legal term whose exact nuances and juridical consequences no victim of AAAs
tender age and naivete could already fully know or realize. As such, her usage of the
term guihilabtan to describe in the dialect what he had done to her should not be
confined to what he would have us accept as the entire characterization of his deeds.
Indeed, his argument on the distinction between the dialect terms guihilabtan and lugos
reflected nothing better than his self-serving opinion on their meanings. Such opinion,
already by its nature argumentative, should not prevail over the physical evidence.
Worse, it was not even relevant, for what he ought to have done, instead, was to flesh
out his opinion through a credible demonstration during the trial that by her usage of
the dialect term guihilabtan she really meant mere touching of her genitalia that did not
amount to his having carnal knowledge of her.

Teodoros further submission that AAA recanted the accusations against him is bereft of
substance.

The relevant portions of AAAs recantation on November 20, 2000 went as follows:

Q: Now, it appears that during the time that you were made to testify, you testified
before this honorable court that your stepfather had carnal knowledge with you,
the question is why did you make that testimony before?
A: Because I saw him doing that to me, Sir.
Q: Which one?
A: Because he undressed me and he touched my private parts. He touched
my vagina and I told him to stop because I felt the need to urinate.
When I urinated, it was very painful since the act has just been done.
xxxx
Q: AAA, why are you crying?
A: Because of my problem, sir.
Q: What is your problem, AAA?
A: When my step-father touched me.
Q. AAA, you pity your step-father or your uncle because he has been in jail
for a long time and nobody can help your mother now?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You want your step-father to come home, is that correct, to help you
and your mother?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxxx
COURT
Q: Why are you crying?
A: Because it is against my will, your honor.
Q: Which one is against your will?
A: When my uncle touched me your honor. That is why I cried.
Q: You are no longer with the DSWD in Butuan city?
A: Not any more Your Honor.
xxxx
Q: You informed the Court before when you testified for the prosecution
that your uncle removed your panty, touched your vagina and inserted
his penis into your vagina is it not?
A: That is not true, Your Honor.
Q: What do you mean that is not true? What is your understanding about
that?
A: He was only touching me, Your Honor.
Q: Okay he touched your vagina?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: He did not insert his fingers into your vagina?
A: He did not, Your Honor.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Even during her intended recantation, AAA cried most of the time. Such demeanor
reflected how much she despised what he had done to her twice. As such, her supposed
recantation did not conceal the impelling motive for it being that her mother and her
family still needed the material support of Teodoro. This was confirmed even by BBB,
whose own testimony on AAAs supposed recantation was as follows:

Court:
But despite the fact that your common law husband according to you he is a
troublesome person everytime he gets drank, this case will be dismissed. You
want to maintain your relationship again?
A: Not anymore, Your Honor.
Q. Why?
A. I want him to get out from Jail so that I could have somebody to help
me and to assist me in rearing my children specially so, Your Honor, my
children are now growing up.
Q. Okay, now if you want him to rear or help in rearing your children,
naturally he used to go home to your house and sleep together with you,
do you want him to sleep in another house?
A. He promised to me, Your Honor, that he will live in the residence of his
employer.30 (Emphasis supplied)

BBB was then rearing four young children by Teodoro (the youngest being born when
he was already detained),31 as well as AAA and her five siblings that BBB had from an
earlier relationship.32 She unabashedly needed the material support of Teodoro; hence,
she prevailed on AAA to withdraw her charges against him. But a recantation under
such insincere circumstances was unacceptable.

As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation of her
testimony by a vital witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and
secondly because there is always the possibility that such recantation may later be
repudiated.33 Indeed, to disregard testimony solemnly given in court simply because the
witness recants it ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations
may have caused the recantation. Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or
affirmation is required to be truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the
recantation. The trial in which the recanted testimony was given is made a mockery,
and the investigation is placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous witness. Before allowing
the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too willing to accept it, but must test
its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected
to cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and
the motivations for it.34 The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test
of credibility based on the relevant circumstances, including the demeanor of the
recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons
necessitate its re-examination, the reason being that the trial court is in a better
position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses.35
Finally, we rectify the amounts of the civil liability of Teodoro. The RTC had granted to
AAA only the amount of P50,000.00 for each case, or a total of P100,000.00 for both
cases, without stating the character of the award, but the CA modified the award by
granting in each case moral damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P25,000.00.

Both lower courts thereby erred. There is no longer any debate that the victim in
statutory rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of P50,000.00, moral damages
of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages of P30,000.00. The award of civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.36 Similarly, the award of
moral damages of P50,000.00 is mandatory, and made without need of allegation and
proof other than that of the fact of rape,37 for it is logically assumed that the victim
suffered moral injuries from her ordeal. In addition, exemplary damages of P30,000.00
are justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code 38 to set an example for the public good
and to serve as deterrent to those who abuse the young.39

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on April 24, 2006, with the
MODIFICATION that TOMAS TEODORO y ANGELES is ordered to pay to AAA for
each count of rape the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from
the finality of this decision.

The accused is further liable for the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

1 CA rollo, pp. 119-136; penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dima

G.R. No. 182152, February 25, 2013 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MIRIAM RUTH T. MAG

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 182152, February 25, 2013]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MIRIAM RUTH T. MAGSINO, Petitioners, v. PO1 RICARDO
P. EUSEBIO, SPO2 ROMEO ISIDRO, AND JOJIT GEORGE CONTRERAS, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

ABAD, J.:

On September 27, 2000 the Department of Justice charged the accused PO3 Jesus Bongon, Jr., SPO2
Romeo Isidro, Robert Sy, Jojit George Contreras, Boyet Parilla, and PO1 Ricardo P. Eusebio of murder
committed in conspiracy with each other before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City. Since
accused Sy and Parilla remained at-large, trial proceeded only with respect to Bongon, Isidro,
Contreras, and Eusebio.1

The prosecution evidence shows that at around 6:00 p.m. on August 7, 1999 Jaime Magsino received
a phone call at home, prompting him to leave on board his motorcycle. He proceeded to the store of
accused Bongon on a street in Pasay City, stopping his motorcycle right near where Bongon stood. At
this point, accused Eusebio, Isidro, and Contreras, as well as accused Sy and Parilla appeared from a
nearby alley and took positions near Magsino.

As Magsino alighted from his motorcycle, Bongon shot him three times, causing him to fall. Eusebio
and Isidro, together with Contreras, Sy, and Parilla drew their guns and they, too, fired at the fallen
victim. All six shooters, said the witnesses, approached Magsino, turned his body over, and kicked him
as they laughed. Bongon then ordered Rommel Gicoso,2 a tricyle driver, to take Magsino to the Pasay
City General Hospital.

Rogelio Amihan, a tricycle driver who parked his vehicle on the same street, testified3 that shortly
before the shooting, he saw the six accused talking in front of Bongons store. Five of them went into
an alley, leaving Bongon behind. Later, Amihan saw Bongon and the other accused shoot Magsino.
Renjo Villaraza corroborated Amihans story. Villaraza said that he was buying cigarettes at the store
when he overheard Bongon tell the other accused O, handa kayo, darating si Jaime Magsino,
kailangan itumba na natin siya ngayon, tandaan nyo huwag natin siyang bibigyan ng pagkakataon na
makalaban pa, kailangan biglain natin siya.4

Bongon admitted shooting Magsino but in self-defense.5 Bongon claimed that he heard someone
shouting and cursing at him in front of his house. When he saw that it was Magsino, he confronted
him. Magsino suddenly shot Bongon five times but missed him, prompting Bongon to shoot back.

For his part, Isidro insisted6 that he was at the Multinational Village in Paraaque City when Magsino
was shot dead. Accused Contreras,7 on the other hand, claimed that he was at his in-laws residence
at Tripa De Gallina in Pasay City.
On January 5, 2006 the RTC rendered judgement,8 finding the accused Bongon guilty of murder, as
principal, meting out to him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of
Magsino damages of P2,669,661.309 and costs of suit.10 It found accused Eusebio, Isidro, and
Contreras, guilty as accomplices and imposed on them the penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 14 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.11

While none of the accused appealed the RTC Decision,12 the prosecution appealed from it to the Court
of Appeals (CA), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in CA-G.R. CR 30187, assailing the
milder sentence that the RTC imposed on accused Eusebio, Isidro, and Contreras. The OSG argued
that, since the RTC found the three accused to have conspired with Bongon to kill Magsino, Bongons
act was their act as well based on the collective responsibility of all of the accused in a conspiracy.

On November 21, 2007 the CA granted13 in part the petition, holding accused Eusebio, Isidro, and
Contreras jointly and solidarily liable with Bongon to pay damages to Magsinos heirs. The CA ruled,
however, that it could not review and increase the criminal liability of the three accused, from mere
accomplices to principals, for such will place them in double jeopardy. Assuming that the RTC erred in
imposing the proper penalty, said the CA, its error was one of judgment which could not affect the
decisions intrinsic validity. The OSG moved for the reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied
the motion.14

The issue presented in this petition is whether or not the CA erred in failing to impose on the accused
Eusebio, Isidro, and Contreras the same penalty that the RTC imposed on Bongon for the murder of
Magsino.

The OSG takes the position that it is not right for the RTC to impose unequal penalties to several
accused found guilty of conspiracy in the commission of the crime charged since the rule is that, in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. 15 In conspiracy to commit murder by shooting, all of the
accused are deemed equally guilty as co-principals, even if one or some of them never fired a gun.

But, actually, the RTC did not find the accused Eusebio, Isidro, and Contreras guilty as principals with
Bongon. It rather found them guilty as mere accomplices. The trouble is that, in discussing the liability
of these three, the RTC first ventured to say that, based on their concerted actions, Eusebio, Isidro,
and Contreras appeared to it to have acted in conspiracy with Bongon in killing Magsino. Said the RTC:

While the Court is convinced that the four accused, Bongon, Jr., Eusebio, Isidro and Contreras were
bound by conspiracy or a community of design or purpose to kill the victim, Magsino, and that they
committed overt acts to effectively accomplish such design or purpose and hence, their respective acts
of shooting Magsino can be attributed to all and each of their co-accused. x x x16

This far, the RTC seemed convinced that conspiracy attended the killing. But the above sentence did
not stop there. It resumed:

[I]t is believed however that the accused Eusebio, Isidro and Contreras should not be convicted as
principals for the crime of murder but should be deemed to be accomplices. Thus it is only accused
Bongon, Jr. who remains as the principal in this heinous crime of murder.17

And the RTC offered justifications for dropping its initial conspiracy theory after a closer evaluation of
the facts. Thus, it continued:

The Court made the finding that when Magsino was alighting from his motorcycle, accused Bongon,
Jr., without warning, immediately shot Magsino three times at close range (one arms length away).
When Magsino fell from his motorcycle, it was only then that the accused Eusebio, Isidro and
Contreras drew their guns and fired, at the direction of Magsino. No direct evidence was shown as to
who from the accused Eusebio, Isidro and Contreras fired the shots that actually hit Magsino. It was
established that the three gunshot wounds of Magsino could have emanated from caused by one or
two three times firearms (Testimony of Dr. Rolando C. Victoria). Such conclusion is at most a
probability but without clear proof to support it. Thus, since Bongon, Jr. was quite near Magsino, then
there is a great possibility that it was Bongon, Jr. who fired the shots that inflicted the three gunshot
wounds on Magsino while the gun shots [sic] from the guns of accused Eusebio, Isidro and Contreras
merely hit the motorcycle of Magsino, the accordion door of the store, the concrete wall, the cement
post and the iron pipe based on the ocular inspection conducted at the scene of the crime. Based on
the evidence on record, the Court cannot conclusively say however whether or not the discharge from
the firearms of accused Eusebio, Isidro and Contreras actually hit Magsino despite the findings of NBI
medico-legal officer (Dr. Rolando C. Victoria) that the three gunshot wounds of Magsino could have
been caused by one, two an [sic] or three guns. One thing is certain through which is all the accused
are liable for the death of Magsino. x x x18

The RTC had ample basis for changing its initial assumption. It noted that Magsino had only three
gunshot wounds despite the many shots fired at him. Since Bongon shot Magsino thrice at very close
range, causing him to fall, the RTC was convinced that it was only Bongon who inflicted those wounds.
And, considering that the prosecution evidence did not show that the shots Eusebio, Isidro and
Contreras fired from their guns made their marks, the RTC entertained doubts that the three agreed
beforehand with Bongon to kill Magsino. It did not rule out the possibility that they fired their guns
merely to scare off outside interference.

At any rate, conspirators are persons who, under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Because witnesses are
rarely present when several accused come to an agreement to commit a crime, such agreement is
usually inferred from their concerted actions while committing it. On the other hand, accomplices,
according to Article 18 of the RPC, are the persons who, not being included in Article 17 [which
identifies who are principals], cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.

The line that separates a conspirator by concerted action from an accomplice by previous or
simultaneous acts is indeed slight. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed;
but they assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment.19 The solution in case of doubt is
that, as the RTC said with ample jurisprudential support, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the
accused.

It was held that when there is doubt as to whether a guilty participant in a homicide performed the
role of principal or accomplice, the Court should favor the milder form of responsibility. He should be
given the benefit of the doubt and can be regarded only as an accomplice. (People v. Jose Tamayo, 44
Phil. 38; People v. Bantangan, 54 Phil. 834, 840; People v. Lansang, 82 Phil. 662, 667; People v.
Ubina, 97 Phil. 515; People v. Raganit, 88 Phil. 467; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498; People v.
Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514). Hence, in the case at bar, the accused Eusebio, Isidro and Contreras should
be granted the benefit of doubt and should considered merely as accomplices and should be meted a
penalty one degree lower than that to be imposed on accused Jesus Bongon, Jr. who is unequivocally
the principal.20

Consequently, it cannot be said that the RTC maintained its initial belief that the three accused
conspired with Bongon to kill Magsino. The evidence of the shooting changed its mind. The RTCs real
error was in stating such initial belief so categorically that it sounded like it regarded such belief as
final. Still as demonstrated above, further down its reasoning process, the RTC managed to state
clearly the final position it was taking with respect to the role of the three accused in the subject
crime.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 21, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR 30187.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ERWIN TAMAYO Y

BAUTISTA, Appellant.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

The City Prosecutor of Manila originally filed separate charges of homicide

and theft of a necklace worth P1,500.00 against accused Erwin Tamayo y
Bautista (Erwin) and John Del Rosario (John) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila in Criminal Cases 04-225922-23. Subsequently, however,
the prosecution amended the charge of homicide to one of murder, qualified
by taking advantage of superior strength and employing means to weaken
the defense and afford impunity. It also claimed the attendance of the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.1 Trial
took place only as to Erwin since John jumped bail and remained at-large. 2 cra llawli bra ry

The prosecution presented Norman Pleno (Norman), Wilson Quinto (Wilson),

Alvin Hernaez (Alvin), and Leonard Miranda (Leonard). They testified that in
the early morning of April 8, 2004, while Joey M. Obamen (Joey), Wilson,
Alvin, and Lorenzo Gloria (Lorenzo) were having drink and merriment beside
the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) chapel on Lacson Street in Tondo, Manila,3
someone hurled empty bottles of gin at them.4 As Wilson went to look for
whoever had done it, he saw accused Erwin and John, in the company of
several others, also having their drink.5
c rallawl ib rary

Retaliating, Joey and his group threw stones and empty gin bottles at
accused Erwin and his companions.6 Enraged, the latter group gave chase to
Joey and the others with him. Unfortunately, Joey tripped on an iron chain
that guarded the INCs parking area and fell to the ground.7 He was in this
position when Erwin and his companions attacked and mauled him. Some,
including Erwin, stabbed Joey with their knives. The assailants scampered
away afterwards.8 c rallaw lib rary

Joey was rushed to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but died shortly on
arrival.9 A subsequent autopsy of his body showed that he died of traumatic
injuries on the head and multiple stab wounds on the abdomen.10 crallawl ibra ry

In his defense, Erwin claimed that when the killing took place, he was asleep
at home with his wife and a certain Maricel Bustarde although it would take
but about 20 to 25 minutes to walk from his house to where the incident took
place.11 He also claimed that he and Norman, his wifes former boyfriend and
one of the prosecution witnesses, had an altercation shortly before the killing
incident.12 This was the reason Norman testified falsely against him.13 cral lawlib rary
On November 21, 2008 the RTC found accused Erwin guilty of murder but
innocent of the separate charge of theft.14 Although it did not find sufficient
evidence of treachery, evident premeditation, or employment of means to
weaken the defense and afford impunity, the RTC elevated the crime that
Erwin committed from homicide to murder based on its finding that abuse of
superior strength attended the killing. The RTC sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Joeys heirs P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P36,981.85 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.15 Erwin appealed the conviction.16 crallaw lib rary

On November 19, 2010 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Decision
with modification in that it further ordered Erwin to pay Joeys heirs
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages,17 hence, the appeal to this Court. 18 cral lawlib rary

Accused Erwin claims that since about 15 men mauled Joey, it is highly
possible that the prosecution witnesses made a mistake in saying that it was
he who caused Joeys death.19 Erwin cites several variances in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that lend credit to his defense that
he was elsewhere when the incident took place.20 He also insists that
Normans testimony cannot be believed for being tainted with ill motives.
Lastly, Erwin contends that the CA and the RTC erred in finding that abuse of
superior strength qualified the killing of Joey to murder.21 cra llawli bra ry

But the Court has always been inclined, with few exceptions, to defer to the
findings of fact of the trial court since it had the opportunity to observe how
each witness expressed himself and whether his eyes agreed with his lips.
The Court finds nothing from the transcripts that would indicate that the trial
court and the CA misapprehended the facts.

The Court also finds no error in the RTC and the CAs rejection of his alibi.
The site of the murder was not far from where he lived. Besides, he
presented no corroborating testimony that he was then at his house. As to
his lament that the RTC and the CA should not have given credit to Normans
testimony for he had a grudge against him, Erwin presented no proof apart
from his word that this was so. At any rate, the accounts of the remaining
eyewitnesses were just as positive, straightforward, consistent, and clear.
They all testified that Erwin stabbed Joey with a knife.

Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who

inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwins liability is
not diminished since he and the others with him acted with concert in beating
up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally
liable as co-principals by direct participation.22 crallaw lib rary

Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one helpless
victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed him on the
stomach until he was dead, there is no question that the accused took
advantage of their superior strength.
In disposing the civil aspect of the case, the RTC correctly awarded to Joeys
heirs the amount of P36,981.85 as actual damages representing medical and
funeral expenses23 as this amount was adequately supported by the
receipts.24 In addition, this Court sustains the award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages given to Joeys heirs for being in accord with established
jurisprudence.25
crallawl ib rary

With regard to the penalty, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 9346,26 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua27
to death for the crime of murder. In this case, the RTC correctly
imposed28reclusion perpetua as the penalty for murder due to absence of any
modifying circumstance.29 crallawlib rary

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03851 dated November 19, 2010 which affirmed
with modification as to damages the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Criminal Cases 04-225922-23 dated November 21, 2008.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 191360, March 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHERWIN BIS Y

AVELLANEDA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

fIn prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes

the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain
a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is duty-
bound to establish with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug
presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same prohibited
substance seized from him.

For final review is the September 22, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03348 which affirmed the Regional Trial Courts
(RTC) January 31, 2008 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. 7555 finding appellant
Sherwin Bis y Avellaneda (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 91654 and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00.

Factual Antecedents

Appellant was charged before the San Fernando, La Union RTC, Branch 29
with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 committed as follows: chanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

That on or about the 28th day of November 2006, in the City of San
Fernando, Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above[-]named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously distribute, sell and deliver three (3) heat sealed transparent
plastic sachet[s] containing methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise
known as shabu, with a corresponding weight of ZERO POINT ZERO FORTY
THREE (0.043) gram; ZERO POINT ZERO SIXTEEN (0.016) gram; and ZERO
POINT ZERO TEN (0.010) gram with a total weight of ZERO POINT ZERO
SIXTY NINE (0.069) gram to PO2 Manuel Espejo who posed as the poseur-
buyer thereof and in consideration of said shabu, used marked money, a
piece of One thousand peso bill (P1,000.00) with serial number EB 893087,
without first securing the necessary permit, license from the proper
government agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

On January 23, 2007, appellant assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.
Version of the Prosecution

On November 26, 2006, a civilian informant tipped the San Fernando City
Police Station about the alleged drug pushing activity of appellant at his
residence in Pagdalagan Norte, San Fernando City, La Union. Hence, a team
composed of Police Officers Manuel Espejo (Espejo), Jose Arce (Arce) and
Joselito Casem (Casem) went to the area on the same day to conduct a
surveillance. They stayed at a store about 10 meters away from appellants
house and from there saw people coming in and out. Another surveillance
conducted by the same team on the following evening confirmed that drug
activities were indeed happening in that place.

The said police officers immediately reported the matter to their superior who
ordered them to conduct a buy-bust operation on November 28,
2006. Espejo was designated as poseur-buyer while Arce and Casem were to
serve as back-ups. Following the usual procedure, Espejo was provided with
a P1,000.00 bill bearing the initials MCE as marked money.

At about 10:40 p.m., the team proceeded to the target area on a

tricycle. Upon arriving at the locus criminis, Arce and Casem posted
themselves at a store near appellants house while Espejo approached
appellant who was standing in front of his house. He told him, Pards
pakikuha ng isang bulto. Appellant looked at Espejo and asked where is
your money? After Espejo handed the P1,000.00 bill to appellant, the latter
went inside the house. He emerged after a while and gave Espejo three
plastic sachets placed in another plastic container. Convinced that the white
crystalline substance inside the plastic sachets is shabu, Espejo made the
pre-arranged signal by putting his hand on top of his head. At once, Espejo
introduced himself together with Arce and Casem who already rushed to
assist him, as members of the San Fernando City Police. Forthwith, appellant
was placed under arrest and apprised of his constitutional rights. Thereafter,
he was brought to the police station wherein a further search on him by
Espejo yielded aluminum foils6 and the marked money.

In the meantime, Espejo marked the three plastic sachets he bought from
appellant with the initials MC-1, MC-2 and MC-3.7 Afterwards, the team
brought the Request for Laboratory Examination8 together with the
confiscated items to the Regional Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service. The results of the laboratory examination on the specimen yielded
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.9 cral lawlib rary

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied all the allegations against him. He claimed that while he
was going out of his house at around 10:00 p.m. of November 28, 2006,
Espejo, whom he did not know at the time, suddenly grabbed him. He was
then taken to a place near the highway where he was frisked. When nothing
was found on his possession, he was taken to the police station at
Pagdalagan. From there, he was whisked away to the main police station in
San Fernando City on the pretext that he would be asked on something and
would be released the following day. Upon reaching the main police station,
however, Espejo showed him three aluminum foils and three plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance which were allegedly found on him.

On cross examination, appellant claimed to not know Espejo, Arce and

Casem prior to the November 28, 2006 incident. That except for the said
incident, there was no other reason for the said police officers to file a case
against him.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

According full faith and credence to the version of the prosecution, the RTC
found that the elements necessary to prove the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs have been sufficiently established.10 It debunked appellants denial
after considering the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in line
with the presumption that law enforcement officers have performed their
duties in a regular manner. Consequently, the RTC found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in its Decision11 of January 31,
2008, the dispositive portion of which reads: chanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

Wherefore, the Court finds the accused Sherwin Bis, GUILTY as charged and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Php500,000.00 and to pay costs.

The three (3) sachets of shabu with a total weight of 0.069 gram is hereby
confiscated and ordered turned over to PDEA for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.12

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, appellant questioned the RTC Decision on the ground that his
guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He also averred that the
police officers failed to regularly perform their official functions.

Concurring with the findings and conclusions of the RTC, the CA affirmed the
said lower courts judgment in its now assailed Decision13 of September 22,
2009, disposing thusly: chanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the January 31, 2008 Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 29, in Criminal Case
No. 7555, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.14 crallawlibra ry
Unable to accept both lower courts verdict of conviction, appellant is now
before this Court for final determination of the very same issues he
submitted before the CA.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the appeal.

Credibility of witnesses not affected

by minor inconsistencies.

Appellant points out inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution

witnesses Espejo and Arce, to wit: (1) Espejo testified that he found the
aluminum foils and the marked money tucked on appellants waistline while
Arce testified that he saw Espejo frisk appellant and found the specimen in
the latters pocket; (2) Espejo stated that appellant was then wearing
basketball shorts while Arce described him as wearing a six-pocket short
pants. Appellant argues that these inconsistent statements render Espejo and
Arce incredible witnesses.

The Court is not convinced. While there are indeed minor contradictions in
Espejo and Arces testimonies, the same are nevertheless inconsequential
and do not detract from the proven elements of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. As the CA correctly observed: chanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

The foregoing inconsistencies, however, relate only to minor matters and do

not touch on the essence of the crime. Jurisprudence is replete with
pronouncement by the Supreme Court that a few discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details
which do not touch the essence of the crime do not impair their credibility.15 c rallawl ibra ry

It is now too well-settled to require extensive documentation that

inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor
details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their
testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence
and the positive identification of the accused.16 Significantly, in the case at
bench, the testimonies of the said witnesses for the prosecution were in
harmony with respect to their positive identification of appellant as the one
who sold the illegal drugs to Espejo, the poseur-buyer, in a planned buy-bust
operation, as well as to the other surrounding circumstances that transpired
during the said operation.

Chain of custody properly

established.

Appellant posits that the prosecution did not strictly comply with the
procedures laid down in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations regarding the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items. Non-compliance therewith, he argues, casts
doubt on the validity of his arrest and the identity of the suspected shabu
allegedly bought and confiscated from him.

On the matter of handling the confiscated illegal drugs after a buy-bust

operation, Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165 provides:chanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

Accordingly, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA

9165 which implements the afore-quoted provision reads: chanRoble sVirtualawli bra ry

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items;

Case law has it that non-compliance with the abovequoted provision of RA

9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations is not fatal and will not
render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.17 crallawli bra ry

In the present case, the totality of the prosecutions evidence shows the
integrity of the drugs seized to be intact. The identity of the drugs was
proven and the chain of its custody and possession has been duly accounted
for and not broken. This can be gleaned from the testimonies of Espejo and
Arce who narrated that from the moment the items were seized from
appellant, the same were brought to the police station where Espejo marked
them with his initials MC-1, MC-2 and MC-3, properly inventoried, and,
together with the laboratory request, were immediately delivered by Espejo
himself to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to determine the
presence of dangerous drugs. Police Inspector Melanie Joy Ordoo
conducted an examination on the specimens submitted with the
corresponding markings and concluded that the three heat sealed
transparent plastic sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug. Incidentally, this conclusion is bolstered by the
defenses admission18 of the existence and due execution of the request for
laboratory examination, the Chemistry Report and the specimens
submitted. Moreover, Espejo, when confronted during trial, identified the
three plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance as the very same
items confiscated from the appellant.19 Under the situation, this Court finds
no circumstance whatsoever that would hint any doubt as to the identity,
integrity and evidentiary value of the items subject matter of this
case. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved
unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has
been tampered with20 and in such case, the burden of proof rests on the
appellant.21 Here, appellant miserably failed to discharge this
burden. Moreover, and as aptly observed by the CA, appellant did not
seasonably question these procedural gaps before the trial court. Suffice it
to say that objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.22 c ral lawlib rary

In fine, the prosecutions evidence positively identified appellant as the seller

of white crystalline substance found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a dangerous drug, for P1,000.00 to Espejo, a police officer who
acted as a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation. The plastic sachets
containing the said substance presented during the trial as Exhibits F-1 to F-
3 were positively identified by Espejo as the same substance which were
sold and delivered to him by appellant during the said operation.

Appellants defense of denial properly rejected.

Appellants defense hinges principally on denial. But such a defense is

unavailing considering that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a
legitimate buy-bust operation. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi,
has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily
be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.23 crallawl ibra ry

Penalty

Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 provides the penalty for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, viz:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution

and Transporation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug,
including any and all species of opium poppy, regardless of the quantity and
purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of the law, appellant was properly

sentenced by the lower courts to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 22, 2009 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03348, which affirmed the Decision dated
January 31, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Fernando City,
La Union in Criminal Case No. 7555 finding accused-appellant SHERWIN BIS
y AVELLANEDA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175926 : July 06, 2011]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RESTITUTO

CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal by Henry Milan and Jackman Chua from the Decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934 dated May 10,
2006. Said Decision affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
convicting them and one Restituto Carandang for two counts of murder and
one count of frustrated murder in Criminal Cases No. Q-01-100061, Q-01-
100062 and Q-01-100063, the Informations for which read:

Criminal Case No. Q-01-100061

That on or about the 5th day of April 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and with treachery
and evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO, by then and there
shooting the latter several times with the use of a firearm of unknown caliber
hitting him on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the immediate heirs of
said PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO.

That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities. [2]

Criminal Case No. Q-01-100062

That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and with treachery
and evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of SPO2 WILFREDO RED Y PILAR, by then and there
shooting the latter several times with the use of a firearm of unknown
caliber, hitting him on the different parts of the body and as soon as the said
victim fell on the ground, by placing a hand grenade (sic) underneath the
body which directly caused an explosion and mutilated the body which
directly caused the death of SPO2 WILFREDO RED Y PILAR, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount as may be awarded to
them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities. [3]

Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063

That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault,
attack and employ personal violence upon the person of SPO1 WILFREDO
MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, by then and there shooting the latter with the use
of a firearm of unknown caliber, hitting him on his neck, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal injuries, the offender thus performing all the
acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reasons or causes
independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said SPO1 WILFREDO MONTECALVO Y
DALIDA, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

That the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities. [4]

On May 15, 2001, accused-appellants Carandang, Milan and Chua pleaded

not guilty to the crimes charged.

The prosecution evidence, culled from the testimonies of Senior Police Officer
(SPO) 1 Wilfredo Montecalvo, SPO1 Rodolfo Estores, Police Senior Inspector
(P/Sr. Insp.) Virgilio Calaro, P/Supt. Manuel Roxas and Dr. Wilson Tan,
yielded the following version of the facts:

In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of the La Loma
Police Station 1 received a request for assistance from the sister of accused
Milan regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take place in her house at
Calavite St., Brgy. Salvacion, Quezon City. The station commander called
SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and instructed him to talk to Milan's sister, who was
in their office. SPO2 Red, accompanied by Police Officer (PO) 2 Dionisio
Alonzo, SPO1 Estores and SPO1 Montecalvo, talked to Milan's sister.
Thereafter, SPO2 Red formed a team composed of the officers who
accompanied him during the interrogation, with him as team leader. The
team received further instructions from the station commander then
proceeded to Calavite Street aboard two vehicles, a mobile patrol car and an
unmarked car. [5]

When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m., [6] they alighted from
their vehicles and surrounded Milan's house. SPO1 Montecalvo's group went
to the left side of the house, while SPO2 Red's group proceeded to the
right. The two groups eventually met at the back of the house near Milan's
room. The door to Milan's room was open, enabling the police officers to see
Carandang, Milan and Chua inside. SPO2 Red told the group that the
persons inside the room would not put up a fight, making them confident
that nothing violent would erupt. However, when the group introduced
themselves as police officers, Milan immediately shut the door. [7]

PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and
propelling them inside the room. PO2 Alonzo shouted "Walang
gagalaw!" Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red who
dropped to the floor one after the other. Due to the suddenness of the
attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red were not able to return fire and were
instantly killed by the barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who was right
behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the assailants when
Carandang shot and hit him. SPO1 Montecalvo fell to the ground. SPO1
Estores heard Chua say to Milan, "Sugurin mo na!" Milan lunged towards
SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire his gun and hit Milan. SPO1
Estores went inside the house and pulled SPO1 Montecalvo out. [8]

Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. upon the arrival of P/Sr. Insp.
Calaro, Chief Operations Officer of the La Loma Police Station 1, and P/Supt.
Roxas, the Deputy Station Commander of Police Station 1 at the time of the
incident. [9] SPO1 Montecalvo was brought to the Chinese General
Hospital. Milan stepped out of the house and was also brought to a hospital,
[10] but Carandang and Chua remained holed up inside the house for several

hours. There was a lengthy negotiation for the surrender of Carandang and
Chua, during which they requested for the presence of a certain Colonel
Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo. [11] It was around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00
midnight when Carandang and Chua surrendered. [12] SPO2 Red and PO2
Alonzo were found dead inside the house, their bodies slumped on the floor
with broken legs and gunshot and grenade shrapnel wounds. [13]

Dr. Winston Tan, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, conducted the post-mortem examination of the bodies of
SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo. He found that the gunshot wounds of Red and
Alonzo were the cause of their deaths. [14]

According to SPO1 Montecalvo's account, Dr. Bu Castro of the Chinese

General Hospital operated on him, removing a bullet from the right portion of
his nape. SPO1 Montecalvo's hospitalization expenses amounted to
P14,324.48. He testified that it was a nightmarish experience for him as he
feared that he might be paralyzed later on. [15]

The defense presented the three accused as witnesses, testifying as follows:

Carandang claims that he had no firearm during the incident, and that it was
the police officers who fired all the shots. He was in Milan's house during the
incident in order to ask Milan to accompany him to convert his cellular
phone's SIM card. When he arrived at Milan's place, he found Milan and Chua
playing a card game. A short time later, there was banging on the door. The
door of the house was destroyed and gunfire suddenly erupted, prompting
him to take cover under a bed. Chua cried out to him that he was hit and
that he might lose blood. Milan ran outside and sustained injuries as
well. There was an explosion near the door, causing burns on Carandang's
left arm. Gunfire continued coming from different directions for two to three
minutes. Suddenly, the place became dark as the lights went out. [16]

Since gunshots were still heard every now and then, Carandang stayed in the
house and did not come out. Col. Tor, the new Chief of the Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) Sikatuna, negotiated for Carandang to come
out. Carandang requested for the presence of his wife, Col. Doroteo Reyes
and media man Ramon Tulfo. He went out of the house at around midnight
when the three arrived. [17]

Milan testified that he was at home in Calavite St. at the time of the
incident. He knew Carandang for seven months. Chua was their
neighbor. While playing a card game inside his room, they heard someone
pounding at the door. He stood and approached the door to check. The door
was destroyed, and two unidentified men barged in. Gunshots erupted. He
was hit on the left side of his body. He ran out of the room, leaving Chua
and Carandang behind. As he was doing so, he saw his mother lying down
and shouting "Itigil niyo ang putukan; maraming matatanda dito!" Milan was
then hit on his left leg by another gunshot. [18]

Chua testified that he went to the house of Milan at around noontime of April
4, 2001 to play a card game. They played inside Milan's ground floor
room. Five to ten minutes later, Carandang arrived and laid down on the
bed. Chua did not pay much attention as Milan and Carandang discussed
about cellular phones. Later, they heard a loud banging in the door as if it
was being forced open. Milan stood up to see what was happening. Chua
remained seated and Carandang was still on the bed. The door was forcibly
opened. Chua heard successive gunshots and was hit on his left big toe. He
ducked on the floor near the bed to avoid being hit further. He remained in
that position for several hours until he lost consciousness. He was already
being treated at the Chinese General Hospital when he regained
consciousness. In said hospital, a paraffin test was conducted upon him. [19]

P/Sr. Insp. Grace Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
later testified that the paraffin test on Chua yielded a negative result for
gunpowder nitrates, but that performed on Carandang produced a positive
result. She was not able to conduct a paraffin test on Milan, who just came
from the operating room when she saw him. Milan seemed to be in pain and
refused to be examined. [20]
On April 22, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision [21] finding Carandang,
Milan and Chua guilty of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated
murder:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN

AND JACKMAN CHUA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
described and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 63 of the same Code, for the killing of SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar
Red and PO2 Dionisio Alonzo qualified by treachery and acting in conspiracy
with each other, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of murder and to indemnify the heirs of the victims,
jointly and severally, as follows:
To the heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red:
3.P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
4.P50,000.00 as moral damages;
5.P149,734.00 as actual damages; and
6.P752,580.00 as compensatory damages

To the heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo:

3.P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
4.P50,000.00 as moral damages;
5.P139,910.00 as actual damages; and
6.P522,960.00 as compensatory damages.

Likewise, finding the accused Restituto Carandang, Henry Milan and Jackman
Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder,
described and penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 6, paragraph
2, having acted in conspiracy with each other and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6)
years of prision mayor to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, and to indemnify the victim Wilfredo Montecalvo as follows:

1.P14,000.00 as actual damages;

2.P20,000.00 as moral damages;
3.P20,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees; and
4.To pay the costs. [22]

Carandang, Milan and Chua appealed to this Court. [23] The appeals were
separately docketed as G.R. Nos. 160510-12. [24] Pursuant, however, to the
decision of this Court in People v. Mateo, [25] the appeals were transferred [26]
to the Court of Appeals, where they were assigned a single docket number,
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934.

On May 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision
modifying the Decision of the trial court:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Quezon City, Branch 76, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061-63 finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
Murder and one (1) count of Frustrated Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as follows:

1) In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, accused-appellants

are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2
Wilfredo P. Red an indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of
P2,140,980.69 and P2,269,243.62, respectively; and

2) In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, accused-appellants are hereby instead

sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

With costs against the accused-appellants. [27]

Milan and Chua appealed to this Court anew. [28] Carandang did not appeal,
and instead presented a letter informing this Court that he is no longer
interested in pursuing an appeal. [29] On April 9, 2008, Milan and Chua filed a
Supplemental Appellant's Brief to further discuss the Assignment of Errors
they presented in their September 28, 2004 Appellant's Brief:

I.

The court a quo erred in holding that there was conspiracy among the
appellants in the case at bar.

II.

Assuming arguendo that conspiracy exists, the court a quo gravely erred in
convicting them of the crime of murder and frustrated murder instead of
homicide and frustrated homicide only, the qualifying circumstance of
treachery not having been duly proven to have attended the commission of
the crimes charged. [30]

The trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in conspiracy
in the commission of the crimes charged. Thus, despite the established fact
that it was Carandang who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2 Alonzo and
SPO1 Montecalvo, all three accused were held equally criminally responsible
therefor. The trial court explained that Carandang, Milan and Chua's
actuations showed that they acted in concert against the police officers. The
pertinent portion of the RTC Decision reads:

Milan, Carandang and Chua were all inside the room of Milan. Upon arrival of
police officers Red, Alonzo and the others and having identified themselves
as police officers, the door was closed and after Alonzo and Red pushed it
open and as Alonzo shouted, "walang gagalaw," immediately shots rang out
from inside the room, felling Alonzo, then Red, then Montecalvo. Chua was
heard by Estores to shout to Milan: "Sugurin mo na" (tsn, October 16, 2001,
page 8). And as Milan lunged at Montecalvo, the latter shot him.

That the three acted in concert can be gleaned from their actuations. First,
when they learned of the presence of the police officers, they closed the
door. Not one of them came out to talk peacefully with the police
officers. Instead, Carandang opened fire, Alonzo and Red did not even have
the chance to touch their firearms at that instant. [31]

In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals further expounded on the acts
of Milan and Chua showing that they acted in concert with Carandang, to wit:

In the present case, when appellants were alerted of the presence of the
police officers, Milan immediately closed the door. Thereafter, when the
police officers were finally able to break open said door, Carandang peppered
them with bullets. PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result while
SPO1 Montecalvo was mortally wounded. Then, upon seeing their victims
helplessly lying on the floor and seriously wounded, Chua ordered Milan to
attack the police officers. Following the order, Milan rushed towards
Montecalvo but the latter, however, was able to shoot him.

At first glance, Milan's act of closing the door may seem a trivial contribution
in the furtherance of the crime. On second look, however, that act actually
facilitated the commission of the crime. The brief moment during which the
police officers were trying to open the door paved the way for the appellants
to take strategic positions which gave them a vantage point in staging their
assault. Thus, when SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were finally able to get
inside, they were instantly killed by the sudden barrage of gunfire. In fact,
because of the suddenness of the attack, said police officers were not able to
return fire.

Insofar as Chua is concerned, his participation in the conspiracy consisted of

lending encouragement and moral ascendancy to his co-conspirators as
evidenced by the fact that he ordered Milan to attack the already fallen police
officers with the obvious intention to finish them off. Moreover, he did not
immediately surrender even when he had the opportunity to do so but
instead chose to stay with Carandang inside the room until their arrest. [32]

Milan and Chua object to the conclusion that they were in conspiracy with
Carandang due to their acts of closing the door and not peaceably talking to
the police officers. According to them, those acts were caused by their being
frightened by the police officers who were allegedly in full battle gear.
[33] Milan and Chua further assert that the fortuitous and unexpected

character of the encounter and the rapid turn of events should have ruled out
a finding of conspiracy. [34] They claim that the incident happened so fast,
giving them no opportunity to stop Carandang. [35]

Appellants contest the factual finding that Chua directed Milan to go after
SPO1 Montecalvo, alleging that they were both unarmed and that there was
no way for Milan to attack an armed person. What really happened,
according to them, was that Milan ran out of the room for safety and not to
attack SPO1 Montecalvo. [36] Milan claims that he was already injured in the
stomach when he ran out, and it was natural for him to seek safety.

Assuming arguendo that Chua uttered "Sugurin mo na!" to Milan, appellants

argue that no crime was committed due to the same as all the victims had
already been shot when said words were shouted. [37] Furthermore, it
appears to have been uttered as a result of indiscretion or lack of reflection
and did not inherently carry with it inducement or temptation. [38]

In the Supplemental Brief, Milan and Chua point out that the assault on the
victims was the result of the impulsive act of Carandang and was not a result
of any agreement or a concerted action of all the accused. [39] They claim
that when the shootout ensued, Chua immediately dove down near the bed
while Milan ran out of the room out of fear. [40] It is allegedly hard to imagine
that SPO1 Montecalvo with certainty heard Chua utter the phrase "Sugurin
mo na," considering that the incident happened so fast, there were lots of
gunshots. [41]

To summarize, Milan's and Chua's arguments focus on the lack of direct

evidence showing that they conspired with Carandang during the latter's act
of shooting the three victims. However, as we have held in People v.
Sumalpong, [42] conspiracy may also be proven by other means:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence
need not establish the actual agreement among the conspirators showing a
preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of
concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates
their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of
participation of each. [43]

In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with
Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the
victims (Milan's closing the door when the police officers introduced
themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the
shooting (Chua's directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milan's
following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of appellants, these
facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by inducement, or that
Milan's act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by
direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial
evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the three. As co-
conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct participation.

Appellants' attempt to instill doubts in our minds that Chua shouted "sugurin
mo na" to Milan, who then ran towards SPO1 Montecalvo, must fail. SPO1
Estores's positive testimony [44] on this matter prevails over the plain denials
of Milan and Chua. SPO1 Estores has no reason to lie about the events he
witnessed on April 5, 2001. As part of the team that was attacked on that
day, it could even be expected that he is interested in having only the real
perpetrators punished.

Furthermore, we have time and again ruled that factual findings of the trial
court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on
this Court when supported by the evidence on record. [45] It was the trial
court that was able to observe the demeanors of the witnesses, and is
consequently in a better position to determine which of the witnesses are
telling the truth. Thus, this Court, as a general rule, would not review the
factual findings of the courts a quo, except in certain instances such as
when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is
no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7)
the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of
the trial court; (9)the Court of Appeals manifestlyoverlookedcertain relevant
and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of
the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties. [46]

Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of

conspiracy. Unlike evident premeditation, there is no requirement for
conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period of time to elapse to afford
full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on
the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the
subject felony. [47]

As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milan's act of closing the
door facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in
ambush. The sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed the door
open illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to prevent any
chance for the police officers to defend themselves. Treachery is thus
present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance
is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to
defend themselves or to retaliate. [48]

The trial court correctly sentenced appellants to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-
100062. The penalty for murder under Article 248 [49] of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Article 63 [50] of the same
Code, since there was no other modifying circumstance other than the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the penalty that should be imposed is
reclusion perpetua.

In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the Court of Appeals correctly modified

the penalty for the frustrated murder of SPO1 Montecalvo. Under Article 50
[51] in connection with Article 61, paragraph 2 [52] of the Revised Penal Code,

the penalty for frustrated murder is one degree lower than reclusion
perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal. Reclusion temporal has a
range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Its medium period, which should
be applied in this case considering that there is no modifying circumstance
other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, is 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months - the range of the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty under Section 1 [53] of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. The minimum term of the indeterminate penalty should then be within
the range of the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal, and thus may be
any term within prision mayor, the range of which is 6 years and 1 day to 12
years. The modified term of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, is within these ranges.

The civil liabilities of appellants should, however, be modified in accordance

with current jurisprudence. Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-
01-100062, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each victim must
be increased to P75,000.00. [54] In cases of murder and homicide, civil
indemnity of P75,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 are awarded
automatically, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of
the victim. [55] Appellants are furthermore solidarily liable to each victim for
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, which is awarded when the crime was
committed with an aggravating circumstance, be it generic or qualifying.
[56] However, since Carandang did not appeal, he is only solidarily liable with

Milan and Chua with respect to the amounts awarded by the Court of
Appeals, since the Court of Appeals' Decision has become final and executory
with respect to him. The additional amounts (P25,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages) shall be borne only by Milan and
Chua, who are hereby held liable therefor solidarily.

In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the solidary liability of Milan and Chua for
moral damages to SPO1 Wilfredo Montecalvo is likewise increased to
P40,000.00, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. [57] An award of
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages is also warranted. [58] The additional
amounts (P20,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages) are likewise to be solidarily borne only by Milan and Chua.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.

01934 dated May 10, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

1.In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, appellants Henry

 Milan and Jackman Chua are held solidarily liable for the amount of
P25,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages
to the heirs of each of the victims, PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2
Wilfredo P. Red, in addition to the amounts to which they are
solidarily liable with Restituto Carandang as held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the lower courts and
this Court:
a. The heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red are entitled to the following
amounts:
i. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 of which shall
be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua, while
P25,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and
Chua only;
ii. P50,000.00 as moral damages to be solidarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iii. P149,734.00 as actual damages to be soldarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iv. P2,140,980.00 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity
to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
and
v. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne
by Milan and Chua only;
b.
c. The heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo are entitled to the following
amounts:
i. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 of which shall
be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua, while
P25,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and
Chua only;
ii. P50,000.00 as moral damages to be solidarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iii. P139,910.00 as actual damages to be solidarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iv. P2,269,243.62 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity
to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
v. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne
by Milan and Chua only;
2.
3.In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, appellants Henry Milan and Jackman
Chua are held solidarily liable for the amount of P20,000.00 as moral
damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to SPO1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo, in addition to the amounts to which they are solidarily
liable with Restituto Carandang as held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the lower courts and this
Court, SPO1 Wilfredo Montecalvo is entitled to the following
amounts:
a. P14,000.00 as actual damages to be solidarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua;
b. P40,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 of which shall be
solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua, while
P20,000.00 shall be the solidary liability of Milan and Chua
only;
c. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to be solidarily borne by
Milan and Chua only; and
d. P20,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees, to be solidarily borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua.
4.
5.Appellants are further ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at
the legal rate of Six Percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of
this judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Del Castillo, and Mendoza,*

JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 186417 : July 27, 2011]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FELIPE

MIRANDILLA, JR., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For Review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00271, [1] dated 29 February 2008, finding accused Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., (Mirandilla) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape; four counts of rape; and, one count of rape
through sexual assault.

Mirandilla is now asking this Court to acquit him. He contends that he could
not have kidnapped and raped the victim, AAA, [2] whom he claims to be his
live-in partner. The records, however, reveal with moral certainty his guilt.
Accordingly, We modify the CA Decision and find him guilty of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.

THE FACTS

AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla.

It was 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco,

Legazpi City. At the plaza, AAA was dancing with her elder sister, BBB. [3]

AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While
making her way back through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm
wrapped her shoulders, with a knife's point thrust at her right side. She will
come to know the man's name at the police station, after her escape, to be
Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. [4] He told her not to move or ask for help. Another man
joined and went beside her, while two others stayed at her back, one of
whom had a gun. They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked
farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds. After a four-hour walk
through the grassy fields, they reached the Mayon International Hotel, where
they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon passing the Albay Cathedral, the others
alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a
companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the darkness. Minutes
later, they reached the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis. [5]

Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete
house. At gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants. [6] When she defied
him, he slapped her and hit her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her
pants, into her panty, and reaching her vagina, slipped his three fingers and
rotated them inside. The pain weakened her. He forcibly pulled her pants
down and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis inside. [7] "Sayang ka,"
she heard him whisper at her, [8] as she succumbed to pain and exhaustion.

When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried
for help, shouting until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue
came.

At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun
at AAA, he ordered her to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced
his penis inside her mouth, pulling through her hair with his left hand and
slapping her with his right. After satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the
tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the road's side, Mirandilla pushed
her against a reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth, punched her arm,
thigh, and lap, and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was gone.
Then she felt Mirandilla's penis inside her vagina. A little while, a companion
warned Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away. [9]

They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again
covered with cloth. Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed
her shirt, forced her legs open, and again inserted his penis into her vagina.
[10]

The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan,
where she suffered the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime,
moved her back and forth from one place to another on the following nights,
first to Bonga, then back to Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a cell-
type house and was raped repeatedly on the grassy field right outside her
cell, then to Camalig, where they caged her in a small house in the middle of
a rice field. She was allegedly raped 27 times.[11]

One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell.
Seeing that Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she
rushed outside and ran, crossed a river, got drenched, and continued
running. She rested for awhile, hiding behind a rock; she walked through the
fields and stayed out of people's sight for two nights. Finally, she found a
road and followed its path, leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who
brought her to the police station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul
smell, starving and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the
police gave her food. When the police presented to her pictures of suspected
criminals, she recognized the man's face - she was certain it was him. He
was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her. [12]

The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to

Dr. Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi City's Health Officer for medical examination.
The doctor discovered hymenal lacerations in different positions of her
hymen, indicative of sexual intercourse. [13] Foul smelling pus also oozed from
her vagina - AAA had contracted gonorrhoea. [14]
Mirandilla denied the charges against him. This is his version.

Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped
into each other at the Albay Park where AAA, wearing a school uniform,
approached him. They had a short chat. They were neighbors in Barangay
San Francisco until Mirandilla left his wife and daughter there for good. [15]

Two days later, Mirandilla and AAA met again at the park. He started courting
her, [16] and, after five days, as AAA celebrated her 18th birthday, they
became lovers. Mirandilla was then 33 years old.

Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends' houses and
in cheap motels. On 24 October 2000, after Mirandilla went to his mother's
house in Kilikao, they met again at the park, at their usual meeting place, in
front of the park's comfort room, near Arlene Moret, a cigarette vendor who
also served as the CR's guard. [17] They decided to elope and live as a couple.
They found an abandoned house in Rawis, at the back of Gallera de Legazpi.
Emilio Mendoza who owned the house, rented it to them for P1,500.00. [18]
They lived there from 28 October until 11 December 2000. [19] From 12
December 2000 until 11 January 2001, [20] Mirandilla and AAA stayed in
Rogelio Marcellana's house, at the resettlement Site in Banquerohan, Legazpi
City.

Mirandilla and AAA's nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only
during AAA's menstrual periods, the last of which she had on 7 December
2000. [21] In late December, however, Mirandilla, who just arrived home after
visiting his mother in Kilikao, saw AAA soaked in blood, moaning in
excruciating stomach pain. [22] AAA had abortion - an inference he drew upon
seeing the cover of pills lying beside AAA. Mirandilla claimed that AAA bled
for days until she left him in January 2001 after quarrelling for days. [23]

Mirandilla, however, had a second version of this crucial event. He claimed

that AAA missed her menstruation in December 2000 [24] and that he would
not have known she had an abortion had she not confessed it to him. [25]

THE RTC RULING

Mirandilla was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City,
Branch 5, with kidnapping with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of
rape (Crim. Case Nos. 9274 to 9277), and rape through sexual assault (Crim.
Case No. 9279).

The RTC, in its decision dated 1 July 2004, convicted Mirandilla of

kidnapping, four counts of rape, and one count of rape through sexual
assault with this finding:

This Court has arrived at the factual conclusion that Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., in
the company of three others [conferrers], kidnapped AAA in Barangay xxx,
City of xxx, on or on about midnight of December 2, 2000 or early morning
of December 3, 2000, held her in detention for thirty-nine days in separate
cells situated in the City of xxx; xxx; and xxx. Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., carnally
abused her while holding a gun and/or a knife for twenty seven times,
employing force and intimidation. The twenty seven sexual intercourses were
eventually perpetrated between the City of xxx and the towns of xxx and
xxx. At least once, Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., put his penis inside the mouth of
AAA against her will while employing intimidation, threats, and force. [26]

THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING

On review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, convicting

Mirandilla. It found him guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping
with rape (instead of kidnapping as the RTC ruled), four counts of rape, and
one count of rape by sexual assault. [27] It rejected Mirandilla's defense that
he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual encounters were
consensual. [28] It noted that Mirandilla failed to adduce any evidence or any
credible witness to sustain his defense. [29]

Hence, this appeal.

Mirandilla repeats his allegations that the prosecution's lone witness, AAA,
was not a credible witness and that he and AAA were live-in partners whose
intimacy they expressed in consensual sex.

OUR RULING

We find Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping

and illegal detention with rape.

Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA,
which happened almost nightly during their cohabitation. He contended that
they were live-in partners, entangled in a whirlwind romance, which intimacy
they expressed in countless passionate sex, which headed ironically to
separation mainly because of AAA's intentional abortion of their first child to
be - a betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard to forgive.

In stark contrast to Mirandilla's tale of a love affair, is AAA's claim of her

horrific ordeal and her flight to freedom after 39 days in captivity during
which Mirandilla raped her 27 times.

First Issue:

Credibility of Prosecution Witness

Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it

must not only come from a credible witness but must be credible in itself -
tested by human experience, observation, common knowledge and accepted
conduct that has evolved through the years. [30]

Daggers v. Van Dyck, [31] illuminates:

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself - such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial
cognizance. [32]

First, the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing AAA's manner
and demeanour on the witness stand, was convinced of her credibility: "AAA
appeared to be a simple and truthful woman, whose testimony was
consistent, steady and firm, free from any material and serious
contradictions." [33] The court continued:

The record nowhere yields any evidence of ill motive on the part of AAA to
influence her in fabricating criminal charges against Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. The
absence of ill motive enhances the standing of AAA as a witness. x x x.

When AAA testified in court, she was sobbing. While she was facing Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., to positively identify him in open court, she was crying. Felipe
Mirandilla Jr.'s response was to smile. AAA was a picture of a woman who
was gravely harmed, craving for justice. x x x. [34]

Second, the trial court found AAA's testimony to be credible in itself. AAA's
ordeal was entered into the police blotter immediately after her escape, [35]
negating opportunity for concoction. [36] While in Mirandilla's company, none
of her parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, classmates, or anyone who knew
her, visited, saw, or talked to her. None of them knew her whereabouts. [37]
AAA's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi City's
Health Officer, who discovered the presence not only of hymenal lacerations
but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted disease.

More importantly, AAA remained consistent in the midst of gruelling cross

examination. The defense lawyer tried to impeach her testimony, but failed
to do so.

The Court of Appeals confirmed AAA's credibility in affirming the RTC

decision.

We emphasize that a trial court's assessment of a witness' credibility, when

affirmed by the CA, is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence.
[38]This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts are in a
better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the
witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and
manner of testifying under gruelling examination. [39] Thus, in Estioca v.
People, [40] we held:

In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is

guided by the following principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the
findings of the lower courts, unless there is a showing that it overlooked or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may
affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it
had the opportunity to examine their demeanour when they testified on the
witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and
convincing manner is a credible witness. [41]

Second Issue

"Sweetheart Theory" not Proven

Accused's bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be

credible, it must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other
evidence. [42] Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible
testimonies of those who know the lovers. [43]

The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal

knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution
the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape.
Love, is not a license for lust. [44]

This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is
not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; [45] after the
prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case, [46] the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused, [47] who has to adduce evidence that the
intercourse was consensual. [48]

A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has
produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of
the issue in litigation. [49]

Burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any

particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favour or to
overthrow one when created against him." [50](Emphasis supplied)

Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above attempted to meet the
prosecution's prima facie case. To corroborate it, he presented his mother,
Alicia Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and,
his friend Arlene Moret.
Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CR's guard,
testified that on 30 October 2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at the
park. [51] They approached her and chatted with her. On cross examination,
she claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived alone two hours earlier, chatting
with her first, before AAA finally came. [52] She also claimed meeting the
couple for the first time on 30 October 2000, only to contradict herself on
cross examination with the version that she met them previously, three times
at least, in the previous month. [53] On the other hand, Mirandilla claimed first
meeting AAA on 3 October 2000 at the park. [54]

The accused's mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once,
and living in Kilikao only after his imprisonment. [55] This contradicted
Mirandilla's claim that he visited his mother several times in Kilikao, from
October 2000 until January 2001. [56]

Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in
blood, agonizing in pain, with the abortifacient pills' cover lying nearby,
cannot be reconciled with his other claim that he came to know AAA's
abortion only through the latter's admission. [57]

Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses' testimonies

contradicted each other and flip-flopped on materials facts, constraining this
Court to infer that they concocted stories in a desperate attempt to
exonerate the accused.

As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of witnesses should

be reconciled, [58] it being true that such is possible since a witness is not
expected to give error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory. [59] But, this principle, learned from lessons of
human experience, applies only to minor or trivial matters - innocent lapses
that do not affect witness' credibility. [60] They do not apply to self-
contradictions on material facts. [61] Where these contradictions cannot be
reconciled, the Court has to reject the testimonies, [62] and apply the maxim,
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. Thus,

To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness based on the maxim

falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, testimony must have been false as to a
material point, and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate
intention to falsify a material point. In other words, its requirements, which
must concur, are the following: (1) that the false testimony is as to one or
more material points; and (2) that there should be a conscious and
deliberate intention to falsity. [63]

Crimes and Punishment

An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question,
including one not raised by the parties. [64] This was our pronouncement in
the 1902 landmark case of U.S. v. Abijan, [65] which is now embodied in
Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:

SEC 11. Scope of Judgment. - The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or
modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by
the trial court, remand the case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial or
retrial, or dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)

The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the
sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law
and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. [66]

To reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping and

serious illegal detention with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape
(Crim. Case Nos. 9274-75-76-77), and one count of rape through sexual
assault (Crim. Case No. 9279).

The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9278 alleged
that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA and seriously and illegally detained her for
more than three days during which time he had carnal knowledge of her,
against her will. [67]

The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the
RTC ruled. It was the RTC, no less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped
AAA, held her in detention for 39 days and carnally abused her while holding
a gun and/or a knife. [68]

Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -

7.By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
8.
9.By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting
his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A,
par. 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge
of her; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation. She was also able to prove
each element of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis into her mouth; (2)
through force, threat, or intimidation.

Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code:

Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private

individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him
of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx
An imminent Spanish commentator explained:

la detencin, la pricin, la privacin de la libertad de una persona, en

cualquier forma y por cualquier medio por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la
cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su actividad." [69]

Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, [70] states that when the victim is killed or dies as
a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This
provision gives rise to a special complex crime. As the Court explained in
People v. Larraaga, [71] this arises where the law provides a single penalty
for two or more component offenses. [72]

Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the
special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only
one kidnapping with rape. [73] This is because these composite acts are
regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes
these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the
seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was
raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed - the
special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.

However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender
should not have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, [74] we
explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was
raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary
for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct
and separate count of rape. [75]

It having been established that Mirandilla's act was kidnapping and serious
illegal detention (not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he
raped AAA several times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape, warranting the penalty of death. However, in view of
R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines, [76] the penalty of death is hereby reduced to reclusion
perpetua, [77] without eligibility for parole. [78]

We, therefore, modify the CA Decision. We hold that the separate

informations of rape cannot be considered as separate and distinct crimes in
view of the above discussion.

As to the award of damages, we have the following rulings.

This Court has consistently held that upon the finding of the fact of rape, the
award of civil damages ex delicto is mandatory. [79] As we elucidated in
People v. Prades, [80] the award authorized by the criminal law as civil
indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.
[81] Thus, we held that the civil liability ex delicto provided by the Revised

Penal Code, that is, restitution, reparation, and indemnification, [82] all
correspond to actual or compensatory damages in the Civil Code. [83]

In the 1998 landmark case of People v. Victor, [84] the Court enunciated that
if, in the crime of rape, the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex
delicto for the victim shall be in the increased amount of NOT [85] less
than P75,000.00. To reiterate the words of the Court: "this is not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial
fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the
Court over the incidence of heinous crimes..." [86] xxx (Emphasis
supplied)

After the enactment R.A. 9346, [87] prohibiting the imposition of death
penalty, questions arose as to the continued applicability of the Victor [88]
ruling. Thus, in People v. Quiachon, [89] the Court pronounced that even if the
penalty of death is not to be imposed because of R.A. No. 9346, the civil
indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 still applies because this indemnity is not
dependent on the actual imposition of death, but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the penalty of death attended
the commission of the offense. [90] As explained in People v. Salome, [91]
while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact
remains that the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous offense is
still death, and the offense is still heinous. [92] (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the

Civil Code, [93] without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other
than the fact of rape. This move of dispensing evidence to prove moral
damage in rape cases, traces its origin in People v. Prades, [94] where we held
that:

The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under
consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the
victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems
just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as
has heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement
of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should
be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect
included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such
allegations can be made. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial
by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such
agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary
implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through
superfluity of still being proven through a testimonial charade. (Emphasis
supplied) [95]

AAA is also entitled to exemplary damages of P30,000.00, pursuant to the

present jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00271 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with rape under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, by R.A. No. 7659, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to
pay the offended party AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,* Brion, and Peralta,** JJ.,

concur.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 185844 : November 23, 2011]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARNEL

MANJARES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated December 21, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02368, entitled People of the Philippines
v. Arnel Manjares, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] dated April
6, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Labo, Camarines Norte, Branch
64, in Criminal Case Nos. 00-0488 to 0495, 00-0497 to 0512, 0571, 0590
and 0653. The trial court found appellant Arnel Manjares guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of twenty-seven (27) counts of the crime of rape as defined
and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610 or the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation, and Discrimination Act." The incidents of rape involved in this
case were committed before the repeal of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code by Republic Act No. 8353 or the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997" that
introduced new provisions in the Revised Penal Code on rape which are now
found in Articles 266-A to 266-D under Crimes Against Persons and which
came into effect only on October 22, 1997.

The facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed December 21, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals, are as follows[3]:

On September 23, 1998, private complainant [AAA][4] filed with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a sworn complaint accusing her father,
accused-appellant MANJARES, of having raped her on one hundred sixty[-
]four (164) occasions, from the period of April 1992 until September 1995,
while she was then still a minor. After preliminary investigation, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of one hundred sixty[-
]four separate Informations for rape against accused-appellant MANJARES.
Accordingly, State Prosecutor Merba A. Waga filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Labo, Camarines Norte, Branch 64, one hundred sixty[-]four (164)
Informations charging accused-appellant MANJARES with rape, which
Informations were similarly worded except for the dates of commission of the
rape, as follows:

xxxx

"That sometime during [date] in Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused and father of
the victim [AAA], and with moral ascendancy over his daughter, then a 14[-
]year[-]old minor,[5] did then and there, with force and intimidation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with the victim."

When arraigned, accused-appellant MANJARES, with the assistance of his

counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges.

During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to conduct a joint pre-trial
conference for the one hundred sixty[-]four (164) Informations filed.

On November 11, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment: acquitting

accused-appellant MANJARES in Criminal Case Nos. 00-0472 to 00-0484 (a
total of thirteen (13) counts for rape), for failure of the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

On August 6, 2003, the trial court issued an Order vacating the plea of "not
guilty" of accused-appellant MANJARES in three (3) cases, namely, Criminal
Case Nos. 00-0571, 00-0590 and 00-0653, and changed those pleas into
"guilty" pleas after accused-appellant asked the trial court if he, accused-
appellant, could change his plea to "guilty", and after accused-appellant
had been re-arraigned x x x.[6]

On June 9, 2004, in view of the Manifestation of the prosecution that it had

already presented evidence for twenty[-]seven (27) counts for rape, these
twenty[-]seven (27) cases, which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 00-
0488 to 0495, 00-0497 to 0512, 0571, 0590 and 0653, and which were the
subject of this automatic review, were ordered separated from the other
cases and tried as a group.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of private complainant and [BBB,

AAA's uncle].

Private complainant [AAA] testified that she was born on August 19, 1977;
that she was the eldest of seven children of accused-appellant MANJARES,
who was a fisherman, and [CCC], a fish vendor; that when the crimes were
committed, their family still lived in San Lorenzo, Sta. Elena, Camarines
Norte. Private complainant [AAA] further testified, as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 00-0488,

Sometime in the first week of July 1992, while private complainant [AAA],
then fourteen (14) years old and in second year high school, was asleep
inside their bedroom with two of her siblings namely, [DDD], eleven (11)
years old, and [EEE], ten (10) years old, she was awakened when she felt
hands touching her breasts and vagina. She instantly recognized her violator
to be her father.

She struggled from her father's clutches, but as her father was stronger, she
was easily overpowered. Accused-appellant MANJARES undressed her and,
after removing her undergarments, accused-appellant laid on top of her. She
felt pain as her father inserted his penis into her vagina. At that time, her
mother was not at home.[7]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0489,

On the second week of July 1992, around midnight, private complainant

[AAA] was asleep inside the bedroom with her four (4) siblings, namely,
[FFF], [GGG], [DDD] and [EEE], when accused-appellant MANJARES entered
the bedroom and touched her breasts and vagina. Accused-appellant
MANJARES took off her clothes and forced her to have sex with him. At that
time, her mother was in Barangay Bulala.[8]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0490,

The same thing happened on the third week of July 1992. Accused-appellant
MANJARES inserted again his penis into her vagina. She felt much pain and
she pitied herself because "Binababoy po ako ng sarili kong ama."[9]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0491,

Sometime on the fourth week of July 1992, accused-appellant MANJARES

pulled her out of the bedroom and brought her to the living room. Accused-
appellant MANJARES touched her private parts and undressed her. Accused-
appellant MANJARES, who was not wearing any briefs then, removed his
shorts and t-shirt and inserted his penis into her vagina.[10]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0492,

She was sexually molested again on the first week of August 1992. She was
at home when accused-appellant MANJARES arrived after fishing at sea and
he summoned her to get him a cup of coffee, which she dutifully did. While
preparing her father's coffee, she was embraced, kissed at the neck and
touched at her private parts by accused-appellant MANJARES. Accused-
appellant MANJARES inserted his finger into her vagina and after taking out
his finger, he then inserted his penis. She attempted to fight back but she
was no match for her father's strength.[11]

In Criminal Case Nos. 00-0493 and 00-0494,

The same incident was repeated on the second and third weeks of August
1992. On both instances, accused-appellant MANJARES mashed her private
parts, inserted his finger into her vagina and thereafter replaced his finger
with his penis.[12]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0495,

On August 29, 1992, she asked her mother if she could come with her and
help in selling fish, but accused-appellant MANJARES objected and told her to
remain at home.

At around midnight, after arriving from the sea, accused-appellant

MANJARES entered the bedroom and pulled private complainant [AAA] out.
Accused-appellant MANJARES touched her private parts and forced her to
submit to [his] prurient desires.

She entered this incident in her diary, which reads:

"Augusto 29, 1992 Sabado hating gabi umuwi galling sa dagat nag usap sila
ni mama na may tinda si mama ng isda don sa Bulala sa kapatid ni mama
kinaumagahan nag sabi ako kay mama na sasama ako sa kanya tutulungan
ko syang magtinda. Hindi sya pumayag sabi nya walang magbabantay sa
mga kapatid mo yon pala gagahasain na naman ako."[13]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0497,

The rape was repeated sometime during the first week of September 1992.
While she was asleep inside the bedroom, accused-appellant MANJARES
suddenly entered, poked a knife at her neck and told her not to make any
noise that might awaken her siblings. Accused-appellant MANJARES held her
by her legs and pulled her out of the room. Once outside, accused-appellant
MANJARES forced her to lie on the ground face down, laid himself atop her
back and inserted his penis into her vagina. She struggled to free herself, but
accused-appellant MANJARES subdued her by placing her hands behind her
back.[14]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0498 and 00-0499,

On the second and third week of September 1992, accused-appellant

MANJARES repeated the same acts against her person. Accused-appellant
MANJARES mashed and kissed her body and inserted his penis into her
vagina.[15]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0500,

The same incident took place on the fourth week of September 1992.
Accused-appellant MANJARES mashed her body, removed her skirt and
inserted his penis inside her vagina.[16]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0501,

Sometime in the first week of October 1992, she was again raped by
accused-appellant MANJARES even though she was sick. She felt ashamed of
herself ("Nandidiri ako sa sarili ko").[17]
In Criminal Case No. 00-0502,

Sometime in the second week of October 1992, she was again raped by
accused-appellant MANJARES. After her body, accused-appellant MANJARES
inserted his penis into her vagina.[18]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0503,

Sometime in the third week of October 1992, she was again raped by
accused-appellant MANJARES even if she had her menstrual period.[19]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0504,

Sometime in the fourth week of October 1992, accused-appellant MANJARES

told her to stay at home. Accused-appellant MANJARES entered the bedroom
where he undressed her, took off her bra and sucked on her breasts.
Accused-appellant MANJARES then removed her panty and inserted his finger
into her vagina. Thereafter, accused-appellant MANJARES replaced his finger
with his penis.[20]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0505 and 00-0506,

Sometime in the first and second week of November 1992, the same incident
happened. Accused-appellant MANJARES mashed her breasts, removed her
panty, licked her vagina and then inserted his penis into her vagina. She was
so hurt because she was not treated as a daughter by her own father.[21]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0507,

Sometime in the third week of November 1992, accused-appellant

MANJARES mashed her body and undressed her. Accused-appellant
MANJARES then sucked on her breasts and inserted his penis into her
vagina.[22]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0508,

On November 22, 1992, she suffered the same fate. She remembered having
been raped on that day because she entered that event in her diary. She
could no longer feel anything because her body was already numb. Her diary
reads as follows:

"November 22, 1992 ng gamitin nya ako lingo bandang hapon ganon na
naman ang nangyari halos manhid na ang katawan ko at wala na akong
maramdaman."[23]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0509,

Sometime during the first week of December 1992, while asleep inside the
bedroom with her siblings, she was awakened by her father who told her not
to make a noise, otherwise he would kill her siblings. She believed that her
father was capable of carrying out his threats.

Accused-appellant MANJARES covered her mouth with a blanket and pulled

her out of the bedroom. Once outside, she cried while accused-appellant
MANJARES was removing her dress including her panty. Thereafter, accused-
appellant MANJARES inserted his penis into her vagina.[24]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0510 to 00-0512,

The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth weeks of
December 1992. On these occasions, accused-appellant MANJARES removed
her dress including her panty, and then inserted his penis into her vagina.[25]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0571,

In the wee hours of December 28, 1993, accused-appellant MANJARES came

home drunk. Accused-appellant MANJARES entered the bedroom, and once
inside, covered her mouth, took off her clothes and sexually molested her.
Not satisfied, accused-appellant MANJARES inserted his fingers into her
vagina and simultaneously made push and pull movements. She almost lost
her breath from the pain she felt. She tried to push accused-appellant
MANJARES away but the latter punched her on the stomach. She begged for
mercy but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She was warned, that accused-
appellant would hurt her siblings if she told anybody about the incident. She
was then 16 years old. She recorded the incident in her diary.

On December 30, [1993], unable to endure her torment, she confided her
ordeal to her mother, who did not believe her and told her that her father
could not possibly do such things to his own daughter.[26]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0590,

She was raped again by her father on March 3, 1994. She remembered that
it was a Saturday and it was dark. She was in deep sleep inside the bedroom
with her siblings when accused-appellant MANJARES suddenly covered her
face with a pillow and pinned her legs down with his knees, which caused her
to almost lose her breath. Accused-appellant MANJARES then inserted his
four fingers inside her vagina, and, after pulling them away, inserted his
penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant MANJARES repeated his threat not
to tell anyone of the incident. She once again recorded the incident in her
diary.[27]

In Criminal Case No. 00-0653,

On April 12, 1995, when she was then already seventeen (17) years old,
after doing some laundry work, she was again raped by her father. At that
time, she thought that nobody was inside the house but when she entered,
she saw her father drinking liquor alone. Upon seeing her, accused-appellant
MANJARES remarked that his young lady was already home. Accused-
appellant MANJARES approached her, took her hands and pulled her to him.
She asked accused-appellant MANJARES to stop as she could no longer bear
what he was doing to her, but he ordered her not to refuse his advances. She
tried to free herself but accused-appellant MANJARES punched her and
caused her to lose consciousness.

When she regained consciousness, she found herself naked and she felt pain
all over her body. She saw accused-appellant MANJARES seated beside her,
already putting on his shoes.

She likewise recorded the incident in her diary.[28]

On September 5, 1995, private complainant [AAA] suddenly felt dizzy. Her

teacher brought her to a doctor in Sta. Elena, who examined her and found
out that she was pregnant. She revealed her condition to her mother and
grandmother and informed them that her own father was her molester.
Private complainant [AAA]'s mother and grandmother confronted accused-
appellant MANJARES, but the latter denied the accusation and said that he
could not do such things to private complainant [AAA].[29]

On September 9, 1995, private complainant [AAA]'s parents brought her to

stay with their relative, [HHH], at Paraaque City, to hide her and spare her
the humiliation since it was already obvious that she was pregnant. On
December 18, 1995, she gave birth to a baby girl, which she later on gave up
for adoption. x x x[30]

The other witness, [BBB], testified that private complainant [AAA] was his
niece, as the latter's grandmother and his mother were sisters. He saw
private complainant [AAA] in Paraaque City at the house of his sister. He
observed that private complainant [AAA] was usually absentminded and was
crying alone at times. Sometime in 1998, she confided to him that she was
raped by her own father. [BBB] was shocked and angry by his niece's
revelation. After two days, he accompanied private complainant [AAA] to the
NBI and DOJ to file a complaint against accused-appellant MANJARES.[31]

On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant MANJARES

himself and [his] mother, [III], as witnesses.

Accused-appellant MANJARES testified that he, together with his wife and
eight (8) children, resided in Purok Puktol, Brgy. Del Pilar, Capalonga,
Camarines Norte in 1975. In 1992, three (3) of his children, namely, private
complainant [AAA], [DDD] and [EEE], stayed in the boarding house of
Apolinario Macapagal (MACAPAGAL) in Lower, Brgy. San Lorenzo, Sta. Elena,
Camarines Norte because they were already studying. It was only during the
15th and 30th of the month that he and his wife visited the three (3) children
to give them their supply for their daily needs. From their house in Purok
Puktol, the house of MACAPAGAL can be reached through a motorized boat
for an hour travel. He vehemently denied that he ever sexually molested
[his] daughter as he loved her very much. There was no occasion that he
spent a night in the house of MACAPAGAL.[32]

During the first week of November 1992, his wife was summoned by
MACAPAGAL to the latter's house as their daughter [DDD] suffered stomach
ache. His wife spent the night there.[33]

In the second week of November 1992, he and his wife visited their children
at MACAPAGAL's house, where the latter told him that private complainant
[AAA] did not spend the night in the boarding house for about one week.
Most of the time, private complainant [AAA] was in the company of several
men, spending the night on the bridge. When he confronted his daughter
about what MACAPAGAL told him, she told him that MACAPAGAL was not
telling the truth. For this reason, he and his wife decided to transfer their
children to another house.[34]

When his mother told him that private complainant [AAA] was pregnant,
accused-appellant MANJARES asked private complainant [AAA] about it but
the latter did not reply. When his wife learned of this pregnancy, she brought
private complainant [AAA] to the house of his parents-in-law, who, in turn,
brought private complainant [AAA] to Manila. At first, he became angry
because his parents-in-law made the said decision without him knowing
about it. Private complainant [AAA] stayed in Manila for so long so that he
only received two letters from her. One letter said that she already delivered
a baby. On March 29, 2000, he was arrested and it was only at that time
that he learned of the rape cases filed against him by private complainant
[AAA].[35]

[III], mother of accused-appellant MANJARES, testified that her house was

just adjacent to the house of her son, so that she was privy to what was
happening in the house of her son. She averred that her son's relationship
with his children was fine. When she saw her granddaughter, herein private
complainant [AAA], looking pale while attending school, she advised her to
consult a doctor. When she again saw private complainant [AAA], the latter
told her that she had a tumor. Private complainant [AAA]'s mother even
accompanied private complainant [AAA] to have her treated. When she
learned of the rape cases filed by private complainant [AAA] against her son,
she became mad because she was not informed about it beforehand.[36]

In a Decision dated April 6, 2006 in Criminal Case Nos. 00-0488 to 0495, 00-
0497 to 0512, 0571, 0590 and 0653, the trial court convicted appellant for
the crime of twenty-seven (27) counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of death for two (2) counts of rape and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for twenty-five (25) counts of rape.[37] Furthermore, the trial court
also ordered appellant to pay the victim, AAA, a total of P1,400,000.00 as
civil indemnity, another P1,400,000.00 as moral damages and P685,000.00
as exemplary damages. The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ARNEL MANJARES is hereby

found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of twenty[-] seven (27) counts of rape
perpetrated against his own daughter.

Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced, for each count of rape in Criminal Cases

Nos. 00-0488 to 00-0495, 00-0497 to 00-0512 and 00-0571 or a total of
twenty-five (25) counts, to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Accused is also ordered to pay his victim, [AAA], the amount of
Php50,000.00 for each count, or a total of Php1,250,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity, another Php50,000.00 for each count or a total of
Php1,250,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 for each count or a
total of Php625,000.00 as exemplary damages.

For each count of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 00-0590 and 00-0653, accused
is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. Likewise, he is ordered
to pay his victim, [AAA], the amount of Php75,000.00 for each count or a
total of Php150,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, another Php75,000.00 for
each count or a total of Php150,000.00 as moral damages and Php30,000.00
for each count or a total of Php60,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Considering that this is a joint trial and the pieces of evidence presented are
common to all cases, let the complete records of these twenty[-]seven (27)
counts of rape be immediately forwarded to the Honorable Court of Appeals
for automatic review of Criminal Cases Nos. 00-0590 and 00-0653.[38]

Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse ruling
was merely affirmed with modification by the appellate court in its Decision
dated December 21, 2007. The appellate court disallowed the imposition of
the death penalty on appellant in view of the enactment of Republic Act No.
9346 or "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines" on June 24, 2006. Moreover, the award of exemplary damages
in Criminal Case Nos. 00-0590 and 00-0563 was reduced by the appellate
court to P25,000.00 pursuant to the then prevailing jurisprudence on
qualified rape. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed April 6, 2006 Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte, Branch 64, in Criminal Case
Nos. 00-0488 to 0495, 00-0497 to 0512, 0571, 0590 and 0653, which
convicted accused-appellant Manjares of twenty-seven (27) counts of
incestuous rape, is hereby MODIFIED in that, in Criminal Case Nos. 00-0590
and 00-0653, the penalty imposed should be reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua only, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, and the amount of
exemplary damages should be decreased from P30,000.00 to P25,000.00 to
conform with current jurisprudence. Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC
dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004,
this judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.[39]

Hence, appellant interposed this appeal before this Court and adopted his
Appellant's Brief with the Court of Appeals, wherein he put forth a single
assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED APPELLANT

GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[40]

Appellant maintains that the trial court totally disregarded material and
substantial facts, as well as several purportedly incredulous statements made
by the alleged victim. He argues that not only was the testimony of the
alleged victim inconsistent and uncorroborated but that it was also incredible
since she claimed to have been raped by him for several years without even
telling her mother and grandmother. Furthermore, it is inexplicable that she
did not shout while being raped so that her siblings could have helped her, as
she testified that most of the rapes were committed inside their house while
her other siblings were sleeping just beside her.

In addition, appellant argues that the elements of the crime of rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code were not present in the facts of the
instant case.

We are not persuaded.

Given that the incidents of rape occurred prior to the enactment of Republic
Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997), the applicable law is Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by

having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The elements of rape under the said provision of law are: (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished
through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age.[41]

Contrary to Appellant's assertions, all the essential elements of rape are

present in the case at bar. The evidence on record, particularly the victim's
detailed and damning testimony, clearly proves that the appellant had carnal
knowledge of his own minor daughter on multiple occasions.

In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things, as in this case.[42] There is a
plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by
holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where
her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on
the basis thereof.[43] Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it
takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to
concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his
remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of
shame.[44] For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the
straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal
prosecutions for rape.

We note that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found and
considered the victim's testimony as credible and worthy of belief. We have
previously held that when the issue focuses on the credibility of the
witnesses or the lack of it, the assessment of the trial court is controlling
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witness and the latter's
demeanor, conduct, and attitude especially during the cross-examination
unless cogent reasons dictate otherwise.[45] Moreover, it is an established
rule that findings of fact of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal
unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted which would otherwise materially affect
the disposition of the case.[46] In the case at bar, we see no compelling
reason to veer away from this rule.

In an attempt to erode the victim's credibility, appellant points to the victim's

failure to immediately report the repeated incidents of rape to her mother
and grandmother. Likewise, appellant underscores the implausibility of the
charges since the victim could have easily shouted for help during the alleged
instances of sexual assault.

However, we are not impressed by these claims as we have previously held

that the delay in reporting a rape could be attributed to the victim's tender
age and the Appellant's threats. A rape victim's actions are oftentimes
influenced by fear, rather than reason. In incestuous rape, this fear is
magnified because the victim usually lives under the same roof as the
perpetrator or is at any rate subject to his dominance because of their blood
relationship.[47]

As his main defenses, appellant puts forward denial and alibi which the Court
has consistently regarded as inherently weak defenses and must be rejected
when the identity of the accused is satisfactorily and categorically established
by the eyewitnesses to the offense, especially when such eyewitnesses have
no ill motive to testify falsely.[48] In the instant case, the defense failed to
show that the victim and sole eyewitness to the crimes of rape was
motivated by ill will.

Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that for the defense of alibi to prosper,

the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time
of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.[49] Appellant's
own categorical admission that he regularly went to the alleged boarding
house of the victim and his two other children to give them their provisions
for food and other expenses cast major doubt on his defense of alibi because,
even if it were true, this only demonstrates that it was not physically
impossible for appellant to be at the locus delicti when the victim was
repeatedly raped.

In view of the foregoing, we therefore affirm the conviction of appellant in

this case for all twenty-seven (27) counts of rape.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the proper penalty for
qualified rape (as charged in Criminal Case Nos. 00-0590 and 00-0653) is
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346 which prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. In addition,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape in order to set a
public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the
youth and to protect the latter from sexual abuse,[50] we modify the trial
court's Decision as regards the exemplary damages that should be granted to
the victim and increase the same from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for each of the twenty-
five (25) counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 00-0488 to 0495, 00-0497 to
0512, and 0571. Furthermore, we revise the modification made by the Court
of Appeals with regard to the amount of exemplary damages awarded in
Criminal Case Nos. 0590 and 0653 for qualified rape by increasing the same
from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) following established jurisprudence.[51]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 21, 2007

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02368 is hereby AFFIRMED
with further MODIFICATIONS that:

(1) Appellant Arnel Manjares is GUILTY of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE
in Criminal Case Nos. 00-0590 and 00-0653 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and
ordered to pay Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages in each count;
(2) The exemplary damages to be paid by appellant Arnel Manjares is
increased from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) in each of the twenty-five (25) counts of
SIMPLE RAPE; and

(3) Appellant Arnel Manjares is further ordered to pay the private offended
party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of Six Percent (6%)
per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 183092, May 30 : 2011]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO SABELLA Y

BRAGAIS, APPELLANT.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We decide the appeal, filed by accused Antonio Sabella y Bragais (appellant),

from the March 4, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01958.[1] The appealed Decision affirmed with modification the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur,
Branch 30, in Criminal Case No. T-1934, finding the appellant guilty with the
murder, qualified by treachery, of Prudencio Labides, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Factual Antecedents

On November 19, 1998, the prosecution charged the appellant with murder[2]
before the RTC, under the following information:

That on or about the 28th day of September 1998 in the evening thereof, at
Barangay Nato, Municipality of Sagay, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-
named accused with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab
from behind with the use of a bolo commonly known as "palas" one
Prudencio Labides, thus inflicting upon the victim mortal stab wounds as
shown in the necropsy report issued by Roger E. Atanacio, Municipal Health
Officer, Sagay, Camarines Sur, which was the direct and immediate cause
of his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
late Prudencio Labides.[3]

The appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment and interposed self-defense

at the pre-trial.[4] Pursuant to Section 11(e), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a
reverse trial ensued.

The Appellant's Version

The evidence for the appellant consisted of his testimony, the testimonies of
four (4) witnesses, namely, Virgilio Bolima, Raymundo Melchor, Marilyn
Palma and Leonardo Credo, the formal presentation of the excerpts of the
police blotter signed by Police Inspector Efren Moreno, the bolo with its
scabbard which the appellant surrendered to the police authorities of
Sagay, Camarines Sur, and a sketch.
The appellant's evidence and version of events are summarized below.

At about 9:00 p.m. of September 28, 1998, the appellant was sleeping when
he was awakened by the noise of someone trying to break into his house.
Once inside, the unidentified man attacked him with a piece of rounded
wood, but he parried the blow and took hold, from his bedside, of an object
that he initially thought was a nightstick. He hit the man once, and only then
realized that his weapon was a bolo. Wounded, the unidentified man went to
the lighted portion of his residence. The appellant immediately recognized
the man as Prudencio Labides. After Labides left, the appellant immediately
surrendered to the police at its station in Sagay, Camarines Sur and
turned over his bolo.[5]

The appellant's story was corroborated by the testimonies of Leonardo Credo

and Virgilio Bolima who claimed to be in the vicinity of the appellant's house
on the night of the incident. According to the two witnesses, they saw
Labides, who appeared to be wounded, coming out of the appellant's house
into the illuminated portion of the road from where he shouted for help.
Caught by surprise, the two witnesses did not help Labides. Subsequently,
they saw two (2) men arrive in a tricycle. They assisted Labides in boarding
the tricycle, which then drove away in the direction of the poblacion of
Sagay, Camarines Sur.[6]

The Prosecution's Version

The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of the victim's
wife, Alicia Labides, and four (4) witnesses, namely, Willy Duro, Romulo
Competente, Paterno Laurenio and Dr. Roger Atanacio; the formal
presentation of the Necropsy Report signed by Dr. Roger Atanacio; the
appellant's bolo; the list of funeral and other expenses incurred by the
victim's wife, and the latter's sworn statement. From these pieces of
evidence, we reconstruct the prosecution's version of events summarized
below.

In the evening of September 28, 1998, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Romulo

Competente was walking home after talking to the victim at Marcos
Verdeflor's home. Along the way, Competente encountered the appellant who
suddenly hit him in the back with a bolo and threatened to cut off his head if
he did not go home. Feeling pain in his back due to the blow, Competente
decided to rest beside a nearby banana plant. Moments later, he saw the
appellant stab Prudencio Labides (who had just left Marcos Verdeflor's house)
in the abdomen with a bolo about two (2) feet long. When Labides turned
away from the appellant, the latter stabbed Labides a second time in the
back. Fearful because of what he had just witnessed, Competente hurried
home.[7]

Meanwhile, Marcos Verdeflor appeared at Willy Duro's house to ask for help
for Labides. Duro and Verdeflor boarded Duro's tricycle and proceeded to
Kikoy Verdeflor's yard where Labides laid wounded and bleeding. According
to Duro, while they were helping Labides into his tricycle, he saw the
appellant, ten meters away, still holding the bolo. Duro at that point heard
the appellant say, "[y]ou must not bring him (Prudencio) anymore to the
hospital because he will not survive; that is the way to kill a man."[8]

Duro and Verdeflor then brought Labides to Paterno Laurenio's house to ask
for the latter's assistance in getting an ambulance.[9] When Laurenio asked
Labides who stabbed him, Labides replied "Antonio Sabella."[10] Laurenio
further testified that at the time they loaded the victim into the ambulance,
Labides was already "lupaypay" or very weak.[11] Labides was declared dead
on arrival, when they arrived at the Bicol Medical Center in Naga City.[12]

Dr. Roger Atanacio's postmortem examination revealed that Labides died due
to massive blood loss from two stab wounds sustained in the abdomen and
at the back.[13] He described the two wounds as follows:

10. Stabbed (sic) wound, 3 inches long, vertical, 1 inch above umbilicus,
along median line with intestinal evisceration.
11. Stabbed (sic) wound, 2 inches long, 3 inches depth, vertical, left,
lumbar area.

CAUSE OF DEATH: HEMORRHAGE.[14]

Alicia Labides, the victim's widow, testified that she spent P30,718.00 for the
victim's wake and burial, evidenced by a list of expenses.[15]

The RTC Ruling

In its July 16, 2001 Decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty of murder.
In brushing aside the appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC noted that
the appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of Labides.
The RTC observed that the appellant failed to produce any evidence to
support his claim that Labides broke into his house, such as evidence of a
damaged door or any damage done to the house. The appellant also failed to
introduce into evidence the piece of wood that Labides allegedly tried to
attack him with. In contrast, Dr. Atanacio's testimony on the number,
location and severity of Labides' wounds disproved the appellant's claim of
self-defense.

The RTC also gave credence to the positive testimony of the prosecution
witnesses, particularly Laurenio's testimony that Labides identified the
appellant as his assailant before he died, classifying the statement as a dying
declaration.

The RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the

attack was sudden and unexpected, rendering the victim unable and
unprepared to defend himself. But the court disregarded the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation because it was not duly established at
the trial. Appreciating in the appellant's favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The RTC ordered the appellant to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,718.00 as actual damages for
the wake and burial expenses.[16]

The CA Ruling

On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC,

but modified the award of damages. It deleted the award of P30,718.00 as
actual damages for lack of receipts. In lieu thereof, the CA awarded
P25,000.00 as temperate damages. The appellate court also awarded
P50,000.00 as moral damages.[17]

From the CA, the case is now with us for final review.

Our Ruling

We affirm the appellant's guilt.

When an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape
criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by
credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow
from his admission that he killed the victim.[18]

To escape liability, one who admits killing another in the name of self-
defense bears the burden of proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
claiming self-defense.[19]

The most important element in self-defense is unlawful aggression - there

can be no self-defense unless the victim first committed unlawful aggression
against the person who resorted to self-defense.[20] Unlawful aggression
presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, not just a threatening or intimidating attitude.[21]

In this case, the appellant miserably failed to prove unlawful

aggression on the part of Labides. As both the RTC and the CA observed,
there was no evidence to support the appellant's claim that Labides broke
into his home by destroying the door. Nor was there any evidence that
Labides tried to attack him with a piece of wood. The appellant himself
admitted that he did not sustain any injury due to the incident.

In contrast, the physical evidence belies the appellant's claim of self-defense.

The number, location and severity of the hack wounds the appellant inflicted
on Labides all indicate an intention to kill, and not merely wound or defend.
Furthermore, Dr. Atanacio's postmortem findings are consistent with
Competente's eyewitness account, and are further corroborated by Labides'
ante-mortem statement to Paterno Laurenio less than an hour after the
stabbing. The totality of this evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that
the aggressor was in fact the appellant and not Labides.

Both the RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. From the established set of facts, the appellant's attack on Labides
was deliberate, sudden and unexpected; the victim was unarmed and
completely unaware of any impending danger to his life.[22] The treachery
employed is all the more emphasized when we recall that the appellant
stabbed the victim a second time in the back, despite the lack of any
resistance from Labides, and even after Labides had already been stabbed in
the stomach. Under the circumstances, the RTC and the CA correctly
sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
regardless of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.[23]

While we affirm the CA's factual findings and the imprisonment imposed, we
find it necessary to award the heirs of Prudencio Labides with exemplary
damages, in keeping with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, which provides, "[i]n
criminal offenses, exemplary damages as part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances." The award of exemplary damages is fixed at P30,000.00 to
conform with recent jurisprudence.[24]

WHEREFORE, the March 4, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CR-H.C. No. 01958 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
Antonio Sabella y Bragais is found guilty of murder as defined and penalized
in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of
Prudencio Labides P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Sereno,

JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 182690, May 30 : 2011]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EDGARDO OGARTE Y

OCOB, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Accused-appellant Edgardo Ogarte y Ocob (Ogarte) is now before Us on review after the
Court of Appeals, in its Decision[1] dated November 20, 2007, in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00100, affirmed with modification the March 9, 2000 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), 9th Judicial Region, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, in Criminal
Case Nos. L-0043 and L-0044, wherein Ogarte was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of Rape, qualified by relationship and age, as defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death and the payment of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil
indemnity, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, for each count of
rape.

On May 2, 1997, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC, charging Ogarte
with two separate counts of Rape. The accusatory portions of the respective
Informations read:

Criminal Case No. L-0043[3]:

That, in the evening, on or about the 1st day of November, 1996, in the municipality of
xxx, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, moved by lewd
and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with one
[AAA],[4] his 16[-]year[-]old daughter, against her will and without her consent.[5]

Criminal Case No. L-0044[6]:

That, in the morning, on or about the 3rd day of November, 1996, in the municipality of
xxx, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, moved by lewd
and unchaste desire and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with one
[AAA], his 16[-]year[-]old daughter, against her will and without her consent.[7]
On October 15, 1997, Ogarte was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the two
charges.[8] Joint trial on the merits ensued after the termination of the pre-trial
conference.[9]

The prosecution's first witness was the private complainant herself, AAA. She confirmed
that it was she who had filed the two complaints for rape against her own father Ogarte,
whom she identified in open court. According to AAA, the first instance of rape
happened at around ten o'clock in the evening of November 1, 1996, in their home in
xxx. AAA claimed that while she was sleeping beside her four younger sisters, Ogarte
woke her up, held her hands, grabbed her head, and brought her to the kitchen wherein
she was forced to lie down on the floor. AAA said that her struggles were no match for
Ogarte's strength[10] who proceeded to take off her pants and underwear, climb on top
of her, and insert his penis into her vagina. AAA averred that she cried in pain and
pleaded with her father "not to do it"[11] but Ogarte told her "to be silent because he will
do it slowly"[12] and "not to worry because nothing will happen to [her]."[13] AAA said
that after Ogarte ejaculated - which she knew because of the white fluid she saw on his
penis after he removed it from her vagina - he threatened to kill her if she told her
mother, who was at that time in Guinabucan, Zamboanga del Sur,[14] or anybody else of
what had happened. For fear that Ogarte is capable of carrying out his threats, AAA
kept her silence even when her mother arrived the following day.[15]

At around nine o'clock in the morning of November 3, 1996, AAA alleged that she was
again raped by Ogarte. This occurred when, upon her mother's order, she reluctantly
obeyed to help Ogarte gather some firewood in the wooded area near their house. AAA
narrated that upon carrying some of the wood pieces Ogarte had cut, Ogarte, still
carrying the bolo he used to cut the wood, pulled her shoulders and told her not to
make any noise as he missed her very much. AAA recounted how Ogarte then went on
to remove her undergarments, and ignoring her cries, once again placed himself on top
of her and with a "push and pull motion,"[16] consummated his sexual desires. After
Ogarte was done, he again warned and threatened AAA against breaking her silence.[17]

AAA described how in the following days and weeks she was able to foil Ogarte's
attempts, by avoiding him and by pinching and waking up her sleeping sisters whenever
Ogarte tried to make advances. She had managed to keep the incidents to herself up
until December 5, 1996, when her mother again asked her to help her father Ogarte
gather some wood. AAA, believing that she would again be violated by Ogarte in the
woods, mustered the courage to reveal to her mother the events that transpired on
November 1 and 3, 1996. Upon learning about this, Ogarte, in his anger, pulled AAA
and was about to stab her when he was stopped by AAA's mother who arrived just in
time. Thereafter, AAA's mother told her to keep quiet about what her father did to
her.[18]

On March 20, 1997,[19] AAA told her grandmother BBB her ordeal in the hands of her
own father.[20] On April 2, 1997, AAA and BBB went to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Dipolog City where they executed the sworn affidavits[21] that
were used as bases for the charges against Ogarte.[22]

BBB, AAA's grandmother, was presented next. BBB identified Ogarte in open court and
said she knew Ogarte because he is her son-in-law, being the husband of her daughter,
AAA's mother. BBB confirmed that AAA was her granddaughter, that she was only 16
years old when the rapes happened, and that AAA told her about the rapes on March
20, 1997, when AAA went to see her in Zamboanga del Sur.[23]

Before resting their case, the prosecution also submitted the following Medico-Legal
Findings made on April 2, 1997 by Dr. Milagros M. Cavan, whose testimony was deemed
no longer necessary by the RTC, in view of the fact that the medical certificate she
submitted was admitted by the defense, subject to rebuttal.[24]

DIAGNOSIS/FINDINGS:

- Examined conscious, coherent, ambulatory:

Weight: 49.6 kgs. Height: 162 C.M.

Pertinent PE Findings:
Breast: Conical in shape; areola pinkish
Chest and Lungs: Clear breath sounds
CVS - Regular rate and rhythm
Abdomen - Flat, soft, no masses, no normoactive bowel sounds
Genitalia:
Introitus: Admits two examining fingers with ease.
Hymen - With old healed lacerations, at 5 0'clock and 7 0'clock positions[25]

Ogarte, addressing the first charge against him, vehemently denied that he had raped
his own daughter on the night of November 1, 1996. He said that although it was true
that he was at their residence that evening, his wife, AAA's mother, was also there that
night, contrary to AAA's allegations. Ogarte described the layout of their house and
argued that because AAA slept at the other end of the room, beside the wall, thus, at
the farthest side to the kitchen where the rape allegedly took place, it would have been
impossible to pull her and bring her to the kitchen without stepping on or awakening his
other children who were sleeping right beside AAA.[26]

Ogarte likewise claimed innocence on the second charge of rape and averred that he
was not in the wooded area with AAA on November 3, 1996 as he was plowing his farm
that day. Ogarte contended that AAA filed these charges against him as an act of
revenge because he and his wife slapped her sometime in February 1997[27] when she
adamantly denied having sexual intercourse with three men at her school, as reported
by Ogarte's cousin who worked as a teacher in AAA's school.[28]

Ogarte, invoking his love for AAA, his eldest child,[29] whom he admitted to being 16
years old at the time the alleged incidents happened,[30] asserted that for the very
reason that AAA is his child, he could not commit these crimes as charged.[31]

Ogarte's close friend Modesto Capalac, who was also their Barangay Captain at that
time, attested to Ogarte's well-being and good moral character. He said that he knew
Ogarte because they have been neighbors for a long time, even before they became
neighbors in San Roque. He said that Ogarte had no criminal record in their Barangay
and that since Ogarte was a cooperative man, nobody had ever filed a complaint against
him.[32]

On March 9, 2000, the RTC found Ogarte guilty as charged in both criminal cases and
imposed on him the supreme penalty of death for each count of rape:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Edgaro Ogarte Y Ocob guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged, aggravated by relationship and age, in relation to Art.
47 of the same Code, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH
for each count and orders him to pay the private offended party the sums of P75,000.00
as indemnity for each count and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count, or a
total of P250,000.00.[33]

The RTC said that the constitutional presumption of innocence that Ogarte originally
enjoyed was sufficiently overcome by AAA's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful
declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her, without her consent and against her will, in violation of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. The RTC also debunked Ogarte's imputation of ill motive on AAA,
stating that while the supposed "whipping and slapping" happened only in February
1997, AAA had exposed Ogarte's appalling acts as early as December 5, 1996. Citing
People v. Victor,[34] the RTC held that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses
that the accused committed the crime.[35] Moreover, Ogarte, in interposing the defense
of denial and alibi, "failed to demonstrate and show that `he was somewhere else at the
time of the commission of the crime and that is why it is physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and commit the
crime.'"[36] The RTC also held that AAA's delay in filing a case against Ogarte is not
uncommon and is justified in light of the threats made against her life if she told anyone
about the rapes, on top of the fact that her own mother told her to keep quiet about
it.[37]

On intermediate appellate review,[38] the Court of Appeals "synthesized for coherence"[39]

the errors assigned by Ogarte as follows: "(1) credibility of the victim-witness, (2)
appellant's defense of denial, and (3) aggravating circumstance of minority."[40] Ogarte
argued AAA's testimony was replete with inconsistencies, her minority was never duly
established, and his credible alibi should have been believed in view of the weakness of
the prosecution's evidence.[41]

The Court of Appeals gave full weight to the RTC's determination that AAA's testimony
was "credible, worthy of full faith and credit," since there was nothing in the records,
which showed that the RTC misappreciated the facts or was arbitrary in giving probative
value on AAA's testimony. The Court of Appeals also held that the "allegation of
inconsistency does not detract AAA's credibility"[42] as sworn statements, not being
conclusive proofs, cannot prevail over AAA's testimonies given in open court. On the
issue of delay in filing this case, the Court of Appeals said it was justified "considering
the intimidation, threat, and force employed"[43] by Ogarte against AAA. The Court of
Appeals also agreed with the RTC that Ogarte's defense of denial, being an inherently
weak and unreliable defense, could not prevail over AAA's positive and categorical
statements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's appreciation of the aggravating
circumstances of minority and relationship, as they were alleged in the information and
duly proven during the trial.[44]

On November 20, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, modifying the RTC's
decision in so far as the current law and jurisprudence are concerned, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is
found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of rape in Crim. Case No. L-0043
and Crim. Case No. L-0044 and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count of rape. Appellant shall indemnify AAA in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, also for each count of rape.[45]

Ogarte is now before this Court with the same assignment of errors he posed before the
Court of Appeals, viz:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE MINORITY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WAS NEVER DULY ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
MANUEL LIBAN, G.R. NO. 136247 & 138330, NOVEMBER 22, 2000.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ACCORDING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE

UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT DESPITE THE FACT
THAT IT IS REPLETE WITH MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES AND THERE WAS
CONSIDERABLE DELAY BEFORE SHE INSTITUTED THE INSTANT CASE, WHICH SHE
ONLY DID SO ON ACCOUNT OF ILL-MOTIVE ON HER PART.

III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF TWO (2)

COUNTS OF RAPE AND NOT FINDING CREDIBLE THE ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE
DEFENSE IN VIEW OF THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.[46]

In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three settled principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to
prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove;
(2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[47]

Rape is a serious transgression with severe consequences for both the accused and the
complainant. Using the above guiding principles in the review of rape cases, this Court
is thus obligated to conduct a comprehensive and extensive assessment of a judgment
of conviction for rape.[48]

This Court has thoroughly scrutinized the entire records of the case, and has found no
reason to reverse the courts below.
Ogarte was charged in the information under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. The pertinent portions of this Article are emphasized as follows:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on

the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
12. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the
parent of the victim.
13. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
14. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
15. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
16. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
17. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
18. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation.[49] (Emphases supplied.)

Ogarte was convicted of two counts of rape by using force and intimidation, qualified by
the concurrent circumstances of AAA's minority and Ogarte's relationship with AAA. In
an effort to escape the penalty of death, as imposed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code when the crime of simple rape is qualified, Ogarte claims that the courts below
erred in appreciating AAA's minority as a qualifying circumstance, because it was never
duly proven by the prosecution.
We disagree.

While we are aware of the divergent rulings on the proof required to establish the age of
the victim in rape cases, this has already been addressed by this Court in People v.
Pruna,[50] wherein we established certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. We have reiterated these
guidelines in the more recent case of People v. Flores,[51] as follows:

7.The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
8.In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
9.If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who
is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
10.
11. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony
of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.
12. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
age shall not be taken against him.[52]

The qualifying circumstances of age and relationship were not only properly alleged in
the information but were also duly established by the prosecution during the trial of the
cases against Ogarte. Records show that AAA submitted a certification from the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Labason, Zamboanga del Norte that her birth records
appear in its Register of Births and that her date of birth is listed as "June 24,
1980."[53] Under the above guidelines in establishing the victim's age, this certification
qualifies as an authentic document. Moreover, Ogarte himself admitted, not only on
cross examination, but also to his own counsel during his direct examination, that AAA
is his eldest child and was 16 years old on November 1, 1996:

On direct examination:

Q: How old was [AAA] on November 1, 1996?

A: Sixteen.
 xxxx

Q: [AAA] according to you was sixteen years old at that time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was she the eldest child sleeping with you on November 1, 1996?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: So the other five children of yours were younger than [AAA]?

A: Yes, sir.[54]

And again on cross-examination:

Q: What was the age of your daughter?

A: [AAA] is sixteen.

xxxx

Q: How many children do you have?

A: Eight.

Q: How young is your eldest?

A: Sixteen.

Q: Who is your eldest?

A: [AAA].[55]

Ogarte insists that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in giving full weight and
credence to AAA's testimony considering that it was uncorroborated and was replete
with inconsistencies. However, he only gave a general statement and failed to
specifically identify the alleged inconsistencies in AAA's testimony. Nevertheless, this
Court has declared that inconsistencies in a victim's testimony will not weaken her
credibility because we cannot expect a rape victim to remember every ugly detail of her
appalling experience.[56] In People v. Del Rosario,[57] we said:

Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim of a savage crime cannot be
expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of every lurid detail
of a frightening experience - a verity born out of human nature and experience. This is
especially true with a rape victim who is required to utilize every fiber of her body and
mind to repel an attack from a stronger aggressor. x x x.[58]

Again, this Court is compelled to repeat the well-entrenched rule that the trial court's
evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to the highest respect absent a
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.[59] This is because the
trial court is deemed to be in a better position to decide the question of credibility, since
it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' manner of testifying, their furtive
glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full realization of their oath.[60]

The RTC was "convinced, without reservation"[61] in AAA's credibility especially since her
testimony was "clear, straightforward, credible and truthful."[62] We also agree with the
RTC's assessment that the ill motive Ogarte imputed on his daughter is baseless and
concocted only to escape liability, to wit:

Although this Court noted that the accused, in an attempt to exculpate himself from any
liability brought about by the couple of charges leveled against him, imputed ill-motive
on the part of the private complainant in indicting him of the crimes as charged, the
same deserves scant consideration in view of the fact that the accused had
whipped or slapped the herein private complainant only sometime in February
1997 as testified to by the accused (p-10, TSN, April 22, 1999) which incident
was considered by the defense as the source of the ill-motive of the
prosecution witness [AAA], while the private complainant had reported the
rapes to her mother on December 5 yet (p-10, TSN, March 3, 1998).[63] (Emphasis
ours.)

AAA's delay in reporting the incident to the proper authorities is also insignificant and
does not negate the veracity of her charges.[64] It should be remembered that Ogarte
threatened to kill her if she revealed the rapes to anyone. Moreover, her own mother
told her to keep her silence when AAA told her about the rapes a month after their
occurrence. This Court reiterates that:

The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons
close to her or to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the
conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her charges against the accused
are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an
indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal
charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than
reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders' making good their threats to kill or
hurt their victims."[65]

Since there are usually only two witnesses in rape cases, it is also a settled rule that
rape may be proven by the lone uncorroborated testimony of the offended victim, as
long as her testimony is clear, positive, and probable.[66]

As we have established that AAA was a credible witness, her clear, positive, and
probable, uncorroborated testimony is enough to convict Ogarte of the crime of
rape. As the Court held in People v. Tayaban[67]:

[I]t is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and
credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.[68]

Ogarte is trying to persuade this Court to believe that he could not have committed the
crimes on the bases of his denial and alibi.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in disregarding Ogarte's defenses. This
Court has uniformly held, time and again, that both "denial and alibi are among the
weakest, if not the weakest, defenses in criminal prosecution."[69] It is well-settled that
denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion
that deserves no weight in law.[70]

In People v. Palomar,[71] we explained why alibi is a weak and unreliable defense:

Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable,
but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper
motive to testify falsely. x x x.[72]

We have also declared that in case of alibi, the accused must show that he had strictly
complied with the requirements of time and place:

In the case of alibi, it is elementary case law that the requirements of time and place be
strictly complied with by the defense, meaning that the accused must not only show
that he was somewhere else but that it was also physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. x x x.[73]

This Ogarte utterly failed to do. While he merely denied the rape on November 1, 1996,
his alibi for the November 3, 1996 rape failed to show that it was impossible for him to
have committed the crime. Ogarte testified that he was at his farm, plowing the field
instead of at the wooded area with AAA on November 3, 1996. He further stated that
his farm was just a kilometer away from their house and would not even take half an
hour to traverse.[74] Clearly, the proximity of the farm to the wooded area and to their
house refutes the defense of alibi.[75]

Aside from his testimony, Ogarte never presented any other evidence to prove that he
could not have committed the rapes. He did not present any other witness, let alone his
wife, whom he claimed was with him on November 1, 1996 and whom AAA claimed to
have ordered her to go with Ogarte to gather wood on November 3, 1996. This Court
cannot over-emphasize the repeatedly quoted doctrine that positive identification
prevails over denial and alibi. [76]

The RTC was correct in imposing upon Ogarte the penalty of death as it found Ogarte
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape, AAA being Ogarte's
16-year-old daughter when the rapes were committed. However, although under the
Death Penalty Law,[77] the crime of qualified rape is punishable by death, Republic Act
No. 9346,[78] which took effect on June 24, 2006, prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty. Under this Act, the proper penalty to be imposed upon Ogarte in lieu of the
death penalty is reclusion perpetua,[79] without eligibility for parole.[80]

Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape. Moral
damages are automatically awarded without need of further proof, because it is
assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to
such award.[81]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00100, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant
Edgardo Ogarte y Ocob is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
QUALIFIED RAPE in Criminal Case No. L-0043 and Criminal Case No. L-0044 and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, in lieu of death, without eligibility for parole, for each
count of rape. He is ordered to pay the victim AAA Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral
damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, for each
count of rape, ALL with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 182918 : June 06, 2011]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. EFREN PATELAN

LAMBERTE @ KALBO AND MARCELINO RUIZ NIMUAN @
CELINE, ACCUSED, MARCELINO RUIZ NIMUAN, APPELLANT.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We decide the appeal filed by accused Marcelino Ruiz Nimuan (appellant) [1]
from the November 23, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 02352. [2]

The Factual Antecedents

On November 25, 2004, the appellant, together with Efren Patelan Lamberte,
[3] was charged with murder [4] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch

31, Agoo, La Union. [5] A year and a half later, on April 7, 2006, the appellant
was arrested. [6] On April 12, 2006, the prosecution filed an amended
information charging the appellant and Lamberte with the same crime of
murder. [7] The appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned. [8] His co-
accused, Lamberte, remained at large. At the trial that followed, the
prosecution established the facts outlined below.

At about 6:00 p.m. of September 22, 2004, Eulalia Garcia was tending her
sari-sari store along the National Highway in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union
when the appellant and Lamberte came to borrow her gas lamp. She noticed
that both were drunk and armed. They said they were looking for a bullet
that fell on the ground. After finding the bullet, she asked them where they
were going and they answered, We are going to kill the doctor. The
two then waited under a mango tree. Shortly thereafter, the victim (Dr. Jose
Villanueva), on board a truck, passed by Garcias store on the way to his
poultry farm. The appellant and Lamberte followed on foot. Ten (10) minutes
later, Garcia heard two (2) gunshots coming from the direction of the poultry
farm. [9]

It appears that the victim arrived at his poultry farm at around 7:00 p.m. to
deliver medicines and bread to his workers, Alvin Manolong, Crispino Yaranon
and Ferrer Anasario. After the delivery, the victim instructed the workers to
resume their work. The workers then proceeded to Building 1 and left the
victim standing beside his truck near Building 5. [10]

Subsequently, the workers heard gunfire coming from the victims

direction. Manolong went down to investigate. On hearing a second shot,
Manolong ran towards the parked truck and saw the victim lying on the
ground with a gunshot wound in his stomach. Manolong called his
companions, yelling that the victim had been shot. [11]

On hearing Manolongs cries for help, Yaranon and Anasario ran toward
Building 5. On the way, they met the appellant and Lamberte. The appellant
kicked Yaranon three times and hit him on the stomach with the butt of the
carbine he was holding, while Lamberte poked a shotgun at Anasario. The
appellant and Lamberte threatened Yaranon and Anasario with harm should
they tell anyone that they (the appellant and Lamberte) were responsible for
the killing of the victim. The appellant and Lamberte then left, going
northward in the direction of the mango plantation, owned by Atty. Paulino
Cases, where both worked as security guards. [12]

A postmortem examination confirmed that the victim died from shotgun

wounds in the back. [13] The victims widow, Dr. Eufemia Villanueva,
presented in court the official receipts, amounting to P56,500.00, for the
victims funeral and burial, [14] and the victims 2003 and 2004 income
tax returns to establish loss of earning capacity. [15]

The appellant denied any participation in the killing of the victim, and pointed
to Lamberte as the person solely responsible. He claimed that he merely
accompanied Lamberte to the victims farm when the latter suddenly shot
the victim; Lamberte threatened him with death if he (appellant) did not
escape with him. [16]

The RTC Ruling

In its May 31, 2006 Decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty of murder. It
gave credence to the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses who
saw the accused before and after the shooting incident, thus pointing to a
conspiracy in the killing of the victim. It rejected the appellants denial of
criminal liability. In imposing the death penalty, the RTC appreciated the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation
and nighttime, without, however, explaining its reasons. The RTC ordered the
appellant to pay the heirs of the victim P3 million in lost income, P8 million
as moral damages, P2 million as exemplary damages, P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and P60,000.00 as actual damages. [17]

The CA Ruling

On intermediate appellate review, the CA fully agreed with the RTCs

appreciation of the adduced evidence. While the appellate court appreciated
the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the appellant was shot at
the back, it disregarded nighttime as an aggravating circumstance because
it is absorbed by treachery. The CA appreciated evident premeditation
because the accused had sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of
their acts from the time they told Garcia that they would kill the victim to the
time of killing. It likewise appreciated in the appellants favor the
mitigating circumstance of intoxication because Garcia testified that the
accused were drunk. Since the mitigating circumstance of intoxication offsets
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the CA sentenced the
appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On civil indemnity, the appellate court modified the amounts awarded by the
RTC. Civil indemnity and moral damages were reduced to P50,000.00 each,
while the amount of exemplary damages was reduced to P25,000.00,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. The amount of actual damages was
reduced to P56,150.00, based on actual receipted expenses. [18] The amount
for loss of earning capacity was reduced to P622,453.95, [19] based on the
victims income tax returns [20] from 2002 to 2004. [21]

From the CA, the case is now with us for final review.

Our Ruling

We affirm the appellants conviction for murder.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses clearly prove that a conspiracy

existed in the commission of the crime. Garcia testified that the appellant
and Lamberte had the common design of killing the victim. The fact that each
one was armed with a firearm shows that they acted with the singular
purpose of killing the victim. Both accused threatened workers Manolong,
Yaranon and Anasario with harm should they tell anyone that they (accused)
killed the victim. Under these facts, it does not matter who actually shot the
victim because of the conspiracy that existed. In conspiracy, the act of one
is the act of all; each of the accused is equally guilty of the crime committed.
[22]

The CA correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery as the

victim was shot at the back. [23] The attack was deliberate, sudden and
unexpected; it afforded the unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or
defend himself. [24]

Nonetheless, we find that the CA misappreciated the aggravating

circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be
appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself,
of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an
act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3)
a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow
himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [25]

In this case, there is dearth of evidence on when the accused first conceived
of killing the victim and that they were afforded sufficient time to reflect on
the consequences of their contemplated crime before its final execution.
Moreover, the span of time (less than thirty minutes), from the time the
accused showed their determination to kill the victim (when they told Garcia
that they were going to kill the doctor) up to the time they shot the
victim, could not have afforded them full opportunity for meditation and
reflection on the consequences of the crime they committed. [26] Thus, the
circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.

We also find that the CA erred in crediting the appellant with the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication simply because Garcia testified that the
accused were both drunk. [27] For intoxication to be considered as a
mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the intoxication impaired the
willpower of the accused that he did not know what he was doing or could
not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. [28]

In this case, there is no convincing proof of the nature and effect of the
appellants intoxication. The mitigating circumstance of intoxication
cannot be appreciated in the appellants favor merely on the testimony of
a prosecution witness that he was drunk during the incident. [29] Such
testimony does not warrant a conclusion that the degree of the accuseds
intoxication had affected his faculties. [30]

The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Since neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the felony, the proper
imposable penalty on the appellant is reclusion perpetua.

Lastly, we find it necessary to increase to P30,000.00 the amount of

exemplary damages, to conform with recent jurisprudence. [31]

WHEREFORE, the November 23, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02352 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Marcelino Ruiz Nimuan is found guilty of murder as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Dr. Jose
Villanueva P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P56,150.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P622,453.95 as indemnification for loss of earning capacity.