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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 7081 September 7, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TAN TENG, defendant-appellant.
Chas A. McDonough, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. The complaint alleged:
That on or about September 15, 1910, and before the filing of this complaint, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Tan Teng did willfully, unlawfully and criminally, and employing force, lie
and have carnal intercourse with a certain Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age.
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found the defendant guilty of the
offense of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, and
sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prision correccional, and
to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error in this court:
I. The lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain
substance from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail and regarding the chemical
analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the physical condition of the accused with
reference to a venereal disease.
II. The lower court erred in holding that the complainant was suffering from a venereal disease
produced by contact with a sick man.
III. The court erred in holding that the accused was suffering from a venereal disease.
IV. The court erred in finding the accused guilty from the evidence.
From an examination of the record it appears that the offended party, Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of
age, was, on the 15th day of September , 1910, staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang
Street, in the city of Manila; that on said day a number of Chinamen were gambling had been in the habit of
visiting the house of the sister of the offended party; that Oliva Pacomio, on the day in question, after
having taken a bath, returned to her room; that the defendant followed her into her room and asked her for
some face powder, which she gave him; that after using some of the face powder upon his private parts he
threw the said Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in that position for
some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the
latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that
Oliva related to her sister what happened upon the morning of the 15th of September. The sister at once
put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva
was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not present at first. later he
arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to violate her.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his
clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease
known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the
defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made
of the same. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the testimony of Oliva, on the ground
that because of her tender years her testimony should not be given credit. The lower court, after carefully
examining her with reference to her ability to understand the nature of an oath, held that she had sufficient
intelligence and discernment to justify the court in accepting her testimony with full faith and credit. With the
conclusion of the lower court, after reading her declaration, we fully concur. The defense in the lower court
attempted to show that the venereal disease of gonorrhea might be communicated in ways other than by
contact such as is described in the present case, and called medical witnesses for the purpose of
supporting the contention. Judge Lobingier, in discussing that question said:
We shall not pursue the refinement of speculation as to whether or not this disease might, in
exceptional cases, arise from other carnal contact. The medical experts, as well as the books,
agree that in ordinary cases it arises from that cause, and if this was an exceptional one, we think it
was incumbent upon the defense to bring it within the exception.
The offended party testified that the defendant had rested his private parts upon hers for some moments.
The defendant was found to be suffering from gonorrhea. The medical experts who testified agreed that
this disease could have been communicated from him to her by the contact described. Believing as we do
the story told by Oliva, we are forced to the conclusion that the disease with which Oliva was suffering was
the result of the illegal and brutal conduct of the defendant. Proof, however, that Oliva constructed said
obnoxious disease from the defendant is not necessary to show that he is guilty of the crime. It is only
corroborative of the truth of Oliva's declaration.
The defendant attempted to prove in the lower court that the prosecution was brought for the purpose of
compelling him to pay to the sister of Oliva a certain sum of money.
The defendant testifed and brought other Chinamen to support his declaration, that the sister of Oliva
threatened to have him prosecuted if he did not pay her the sum of P60. It seems impossible to believe that
the sister, after having become convinced that Oliva had been outraged in the manner described above,
would consider for a moment a settlement for the paltry sum of P60. Honest women do not consent to the
violation of their bodies nor those of their near relatives, for the filthy consideration of mere money.
In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau
of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible
in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to
compel the defendant to testify against himself. Judge Lobingier, in discussing that question in his
sentence, said:
The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions, and the mere
fact that an object found on his person was examined: seems no more to infringe the rule invoked,
than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.
The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection, the examination was made
by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease.
As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found with stolen property upon his person,
there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using
the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or
otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no
objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting
that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from the defendant, could not be used
against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony
against himself.
The question presented by the defendant below and repeated in his first assignment of error is not a new
question, either to the courts or authors. In the case of Holt vs. U.S. (218 U.S., 245), Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the court upon this question, said:
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is
a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in principle, would forbid
a jury (court) to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we
are not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is
exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is
competent.
The question which we are discussing was also discussed by the supreme court of the State of New
Jersey, in the case of State vs. Miller (71 N.J. law Reports, 527). In that case the court said, speaking
through its chancellor:
It was not erroneous to permit the physician of the jail in which the accused was confined, to testify
to wounds observed by him on the back of the hands of the accused, although he also testified that
he had the accused removed to a room in another part of the jail and divested of his clothing. The
observation made by the witness of the wounds on the hands and testified to by him, was in no
sense a compelling of the accused to be a witness against himself. If the removal of the clothes had
been forcible and the wounds had been thus exposed, it seems that the evidence of their character
and appearance would not have been objectionable.
In that case also (State vs. Miller) the defendant was required to place his hand upon the wall of the house
where the crime was committed, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not his hand would have
produced the bloody print. The court said, in discussing that question:
It was not erroneous to permit evidence of the coincidence between the hand of the accused and
the bloody prints of a hand upon the wall of the house where the crime was committed, the hand of
the accused having been placed thereon at the request of persons who were with him in the house.
It may be added that a section of the wall containing the blood prints was produced before the jury and the
testimony of such comparison was like that held to be proper in another case decided by the supreme court
of New Jersey in the case of Johnson vs. State (30 Vroom, N.J. Law Reports, 271). The defendant caused
the prints of the shoes to be made in the sand before the jury, and the witnesses who had observed shoe
prints in the sand at the place of the commission of the crime were permitted to compare them with what
the had observed at that place.
In that case also the clothing of the defendant was used as evidence against him.
To admit the doctrine contended for by the appellant might exclude the testimony of a physician or a
medical expert who had been appointed to make observations of a person who plead insanity as a
defense, where such medical testimony was against necessarily use the person of the defendant for the
purpose of making such examination. (People vs. Agustin, 199 N.Y., 446.) The doctrine contended for by
the appellants would also prevent the courts from making an examination of the body of the defendant
where serious personal injuries were alleged to have been received by him. The right of the courts in such
cases to require an exhibit of the injured parts of the body has been established by a long line of decisions.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a
witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own
lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in discussing the question before us, said:
If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control] in whatever form
exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the
tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that
might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the
evidential articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that
is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec. 2263.)
The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of
prisonersbefore trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations
implicating them in the commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)
The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant even,
for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the prohibition under discussion certainly
could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, can not
violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused as a
witness it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that
evidence obtained in this way from the accused, is not testimony but his body his body itself.
As was said by Judge Lobingier:
The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere
fact that an object found upon his body was examined seems no more to infringe the rule invoked
than would the introduction of stolen property taken from the person of a thief.
The doctrine contended for by the appellant would also prohibit the sanitary department of the Government
from examining the body of persons who are supposed to have some contagious disease.
We believe that the evidence clearly shows that the defendant was suffering from the venereal disease, as
above stated, and that through his brutal conduct said disease was communicated to Oliva Pacomio. In a
case like the present it is always difficult to secure positive and direct proof. Such crimes as the present are
generally proved by circumstantial evidence. In cases of rape the courts of law require corroborative proof,
for the reason that such crimes are generally committed in secret. In the present case, taking into account
the number and credibility of the witnesses, their interest and attitude on the witness stand, their manner of
testifying and the general circumstances surrounding the witnesses, including the fact that both parties
were found to be suffering from a common disease, we are of the opinion that the defendant did, on or
about the 15th of September, 1910, have such relations as above described with the said Oliva Pacomio,
which under the provisions of article 439 of the Penal Code makes him guilty of the crime of "abusos
deshonestos," and taking into consideration the fact that the crime which the defendant committed was
done in the house where Oliva Pacomio was living, we are of the opinion that the maximum penalty of the
law should be imposed. The maximum penalty provided for by law is six years of prision correccional.
Therefore let a judgment be entered modifying the sentence of the lower court and sentencing the
defendant to be imprisoned for a period of six years of prision correccional, and to pay the costs. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2154 April 26, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO OTADORA, ET AL., defendants.
HILARIA CARREON, appellant.
Victorino C. Teleron for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres for
appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
In August, 1947 in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Antonio Otadora and Hilaria Carreon were charged
with the murder of the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon. Otadora pleaded guilty, and was
sentenced to life imprisonment. Denying her guilt, Hilaria Carreon was tried, found guilty and sentenced to
death and other accessory penalties. The court declared that with promises of monetary reward, she had
induced Antonio Otadora to do the killing. Motive for the instigation was the grudge she bore against the
deceased spouse on account of disputes with them over inherited property. This woman convict appealed
in due time.
Her attorney filed here a voluminous brief wherein he attempted painstakingly to break down the position of
the prosecution and to expound the theory that Antonio Otadora is the only person responsible for the
slaying, and that Hilaria Carreon is just "the unfortunate victim of a vicious frame-up concocted against
her." She necessarily had to offer a satisfactory explanation for the conduct of Otadora, who has pleaded
guilty and has declared for the prosecution against her, explaining the circumstances under which she had
promised to him compensation for liquidating the unfortunate couple.
There is no question about these facts:
Early in the morning of June 16, 1947, Leon Castro and his wife Apolonia Carreon were shot dead in their
house in the City of Ormoc, Leyte. In the afternoon of June 21, 1947, Antonio Otadora was arrested in
Ormoc City while preparing to escape to Camotes Island, Cebu. The next day he confessed in an extra-
judicial statement (Exhibit 1) wherein he implicated the herein accused and appellant Hilaria Carreon
asserting that, with offers of pecuniary gain, the latter had induced him to commit the crime. On June 25,
1947, a complaint for double murder was filed against both defendants in the justice of the peace court of
Ormoc, Leyte. Preliminary investigation was waived and the record was forwarded to the court of first
instance, where on September 3, 1947, Otadora pleaded guilty with the assistance of counsel. Hilaria
Carreon pleaded not guilty, and asked for a separate trial, which was immediately held, with Otadora as the
first witness for the prosecution.
The evidence presented on behalf of the People proved that:
(1) Apolonia Carreon was the sister of Hilaria. Due to a family quarrel, Apolonia filed in August, 1946, a
criminal complaint for serious threats against Hilaria and her husband Francisco Galos (Exhibit P-1). These
were arrested and had to file a bond. The case was later withdrawn by Apolonia upon the advice of friendly
mediators.
In December of 1946, Leon Castro as guardian ad litem of some minors surnamed Carreon filed a civil
complaint for partition of real property and damages against Hilaria Carreon. This suit was set for hearing
on June 24, 1947.
(2) Antonio Otadora met Hilaria Carreon sometime in April, 1947, through Amando Garbo. Thereafter they
converse on several occasions. In the early part of May, 1947, she saw him going to barrio Matica-a and
then she told him that if he would liquidate the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon she would give
him P3,000. He did not agree. In the last week of May he was invited to Hilaria's house. The proposal was
renewed, better conditions being offered. (1/3 of P10,000 plus carabaos, plus P300.) He must have
demurred alleging that he had no adequate weapon, Hilaria is reported to have engaged to supply it.
(3) Around the first week of June, 1947, Hilaria Carreon sent for Otadora. She gave him the revolver Exhibit
A; but the revolver turned out to be defective so he handed it back to Hilaria. The latter ordered it repaired
by Benigno Baltonado who had previously sold it to her. Three days later, Baltonado returned the gun in
good condition with more than ten bullets, and appellant in turn delivered the weapon to Otadora who was
then in her house, advising him at the same time to carry out soon their plan so that Leon Castro may not
attend the hearing of the civil case. Appellant also gave Otadora the bolo Exhibit B, a pair of trousers of her
husband Francisco Galos (Exhibit C), a hat Exhibit D and a flashlight Exhibit E.
(4) Otadora set out to do his part in the morning of June 16; but Apolonia was not in her residence. He
reported to appellant the next day and the latter urged him to execute it that day, giving him P6.50 for
transportation. That night, at about one o'clock, Antonio climbed up the house of the Castros, passing
through the window. He saw them sleeping side by side. He opened the door to the kitchen to prepare his
exit. Returning to the place where the couple lay, he stumbled on Leon Castro, who exclaimed, "who are
you?". Otadora replied, "I am" "I don't have any purpose except you, get up and fight." As Castro was about
to stand up, Otadora fired. Apolonia was awakened, and embraced her husband who meantime had fallen.
Otadora shot her too. The couple died immediately of shock and hemorrhage.
(5) After committing the murders, Otadora returned to barrio Matica-a intending to go to Hilaria's home; but
as he was nearing the kitchen, Francisco Galos signalled him to go away. (He was seen, crossing the
cornfield near Hilaria Carreon's house by Juanita Garbo, who so testified in court.) Otadora went to his
home in Sitio Hubas. On June 20, at a dance, he received word from Hilaria through her husband Galos,
that he was wanted by the police, and that he should decamp. the next morning he passed by the
residence of Hilaria, and the latter gave him P5, plus two packages of cigarettes, adding that he should not
attempt to visit her further, because she was being watched. The next day, she again sent him P45 through
Amando Garbo, who delivered the money at the back of the house of Menes Tahur in Canangca-an. After
receiving the money, Otadora prepared to escape to Camotes Islands. But he was caught before he could
run away.
The above statement of principal facts is a condensation of the testimonies of Antonio Otadora, Benigno
Baltonado, Amando Garbo, Alejandro Bensig, Macario Bensig, Juanita Garbo, and others. It is substantially
in accord with the findings of His Honor, the trial judge. Of course it is founded mainly upon the declarations
of Antonio Otadora that necessarily are persuasive inasmuch as he himself admits his direct participation
and his assertions are fully corroborated by a series of circumstances competently established.
Hilaria denied connection with the assassination. And naturally the defense exerted effort to discredit
Otadora's version, by submitting the following theory:
Antonio Otadora planned a revenge upon Castro because the latter as a spy caused the death of his father
Sergio Otadora at the hands of the Japanese. He, however, found himself in the necessity of eliminating
Apolonia Carreon because the latter was a witness to his deed. On the other hand, Antonio Otadora (and
the other witnesses who are his relatives) also desire to take revenge upon Hilaria Carreon because the
latter, during the Japanese occupation, saved Leon Castro from death at the hands of the guerrillas. The
defense says that to those who had been prejudiced by the espionage activities of Leon Castro, Hilaria
Carreon appears to be just as responsible as Leon Castro.
The theory can not be lawfully accepted. Firstly, Otadora denies that his father died at the hands of the
Japanese. Secondly, the alleged "saving" of Leon Castro was not sufficiently established. Loreto Micabel,
the superior officer of the guerrillas, who ordered the release of Leon Castro, did not mention Hilaria as one
of those who interceded for the prisoner (p. 286, stenographic notes). Thirdly, nobody in his right senses
holds Pedro criminally responsible for the crime of Juan simply because a few days before the crime Pedro
saved Juan from drowning.
On the other hand, the grudge which Otadora supposedly held against Castro, readily explains why for a
consideration he undertook to kill. It is likewise probable that knowing such desire for vengeance, Hilaria
selected him to carry out the dangerous and delicate job. And if it is true that Hilaria saved Leon Castro
during the Japanese occupation, it is very likely that she hated her "ungrateful" brother-in-law and sister,
(who on two subsequent occasions brought her to court), so much that she hired Otadora to eliminate
them.
The assertions of Otadora are decisively ratified by Benigno Baltonado who swore that it was Hilaria who
had purchased the murderous gun from him for P55, and who ordered him to fix it; that on the third day he
returned the gun to her in her home with rounds of ammunition; and that Otadora was there on that
occasion. The remarks and arguments of counsel on pages 87-92 of his brief do not, in our opinion, destroy
Baltonado's credibility.
Then there is the witness Amando Garbo, whose brother Esteban is married to the sister of Hilaria, and
whose sister married a younger brother of Hilaria. Amando Garbo declared that he was on friendly terms
with Hilaria, taking care of her fighting cock; that in December, 1946 in the fiesta of Palompon, she tried to
persuade him to kill the spouses Castro; that he declined; that she asked him to look for another for
another whom she could hire; that he introduced Hilaria to Antonio Otadora; that it was he who, at the
request of Hilaria, secretly delivered P45 in paper bills of different denominations to Antonio Otadora after
the crime was committed.
And Juanita Garbo, niece of Hilaria Carreon, confirmed the various meetings of Otadora and Hilaria in the
latter's house. And there is the witness Macario Bensig who swore that in May, 1947, at Tabogocon, Ormoc
City, during the wedding of his brother Benito with Luisa Pilapil in May, 1947, Hilaria Carreon told him that if
he would kill Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon he would be given money as a reward.
Again there is the witness Sgt. Tomada who said that when the accused Hilaria Carreon was arrested on
June 25, 1947, she was committed to his custody because there was no adequate place in the municipal
jail for her; that she requested him confidentially to get a lock of hair of Antonio Otadora explaining to him
that if that hair is burned Otadora would become insane, and therefore would not be able to declare against
her.
Further corroboration of appellant's criminal connection with the bloody affair is the undisputed possession
by Otadora of the pants of Francisco Galos (Exhibit C) and his hat Exhibit D. It appears that when
Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered to put it on; and the judge found that it
fitted him perfectly. This incident gave the defense opportunity for extended argument that the constitutional
protection against self-incrimination had been erroneously disregarded. But we discover in the record no
timely objection upon that specific ground. And it is to be doubted whether the accused could benefit from
the error, if any. Furthermore, and this is conclusive, "measuring or photographing the party is not within the
privilege" (against self-incrimination). "Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is
the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done." (Wigmore on
Evidence, Vol. 4, p. 878, quoted in Beltran vs. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil., 570, 576).
In conclusion, we are fully satisfied from a reading of the whole expediente that the appellant induced
Antonio Otadora to commit the double murder, and furnished him with the deadly firearm. She is just as
guilty as if she herself had perpetrated the murderous assaults. The slaying is qualified by the circumstance
of treachery. It is aggravated by evident premeditation; but for lack of sufficient votes the appellant is
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment for each murder, (not exceeding 40 years, art. 70, Rev. Penal Code),
and to indemnify the heirs of the Castros in the sum of P4,000. The appealed judgment will be thus
modified.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Prec. Rec. No. 714-A July 26, 1937
MARIA BERMUDEZ, complainant,
vs.
LEODEGARIO D. CASTILLO, respondent.
G. Viola Fernando for complainant.
Office of the Solicitor-General hilado for the Government.
The respondent in his own behalf.
DIAZ, J.:
In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the Solicitor-General against
the respondent, in connection with this administrative case, said respondent filed, in addition to other
evidence in support of this defense, the six letters which, for purposes of identification, were marked as
Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and 37. He then contended, as he now continues to contend, that said six letters are
the complainant's, but the latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal. she admitted,
however, that the letters marked as Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 were in her own handwriting.
As the respondent believed that the three letters admitted by the complainant to be hers were insufficient
for purposes of comparison with those questioned in this case and as he was determined to show that said
Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 were the complainant's, he required her to copy them in her own handwriting in the
presence of the investigator. The complainant, upon advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial to
which it was desired to subject her, invoking her right not to incriminate herself and alleging that Exhibits
38, 39 and 40 and the other letters already in the respondent's possession, were more than sufficient for
what he proposed to do. The investigator, upholding the complainant, did not compel her to submit to the
trial required, thereby denying the respondent's petition. As respondent did not agree to this decision of the
investigator, he instituted these proceedings praying that the investigator and the Solicitor-General in
whose representation he acted, be ordered to require and compel the complainant to furnish new
specimens of her handwriting by copying said Exhibits 32 to 37 for that purpose.
The question raised before this court is not new. In the case of Beltran vs. Samson and Jose ([1929], 53
Phil., 570), a similar question was raised before this court. The respondents therein desired to compel the
petitioner to write by hand what was then dictated to him. The petitioner, invoking the constitutional
provision contained in section 3, paragraph 3, of the Jones Law which reads: ". . . nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to witness against himself", refused to write and instituted prohibition proceedings
against the therein respondents. This court granted the petition and ordered the respondents to desist and
abstain absolutely from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation by hand for the purpose of
comparing his handwriting. The reasons then adduced therein can and must be adduced in this case to
decide the same question; and all the more so because Article III, section 1, No. 18, of the Constitution of
the Philippines is worded in such a way that the protection referred to therein extends to all cases, be they
criminal, civil or administrative. The constitution provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." It should be noted that before it was attempted to require the complainant to copy the six
documents above-stated, she had sworn to tell the truth before the investigator authorized to receive
statements under oath, and under said oath she asserted that the documents in question had not been
written by her. Were she compelled to write and were it proven by means of what she might write later that
said documents had really been written by her, it would be impossible for her to evade prosecution for
perjury, inasmuch as it would be warranted by article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an
affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made a lieu of an oath shall commit any of the
falsehoods mentioned in this and the preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective
penalties provided therein.
The respondent invokes in his support the doctrine laid sown in Ex Parte Crow (14 Pac. [2d series], 918), to
the effect that ". . . a witness may not arbitrarily refuse to answer a question on the ground that his answer
might incriminate him when the court can determine as a matter of law that 'no direct answer which the
witness may make can tend to criminate him.'" It must be taken into account that the question asked the
petitioner in said case, as stated by the prosecuting attorney, was only a preliminary question, as it was
simply attempted to learn from her who was with her on a certain occasion, and on what date, to the best of
her recollection, had she visited Dr. Groose. She refused to answer said questions alleging that her answer
might incriminate her. The court upheld her saying:
We are therefore of the opinion that the trial court erred when it determined as a matter of law that
petitioners answer to the questions propounded could have no tendency to incriminate her. They
clearly might have such tendency, and it was petitioners right and privilege to decline to answer any
of the above-mentioned questions upon the ground stated. We fully realize the difficulty
encountered in the prosecution of cases under section 274 of the Penal Code when those present
and capable of establishing the facts are unwilling to testify because of fear of subjecting
themselves to prosecution. But the constitutional and statutory guaranties accorded to petitioner
cannot be swept aside merely because they may result in making difficult, or even impossible, the
conviction of the accused.
The respondent likewise invokes in his support doctrine laid down in re Mackenzie (100 Vt. Rep., 325). This
court is of the opinion that what had been said in the above-cited case is not applicable to the case under
consideration. The petitioner Mackenzie, upon being required after he had pleaded guilty of intoxication to
disclose the person or persons who had furnished him the liquor, said that they were stranger to him, whom
he met late in the evening in Barre. The court, considering his alleged disclosure unsatisfactory, ordered
him committed to jail until he should tell the truth or until further orders. He instituted habeas
corpus proceedings in his favor alleging in his pleading that as he had already made a truthful disclosure,
the result of his commitment would be to compel him to deny his former statements and make others which
would make him guilty of perjury. The court, deciding the question, said:
The privilege against self-crimination is a personal one. . . . But the privilege is an option of refusal,
not a prohibition of inquiry. Hence, when an ordinary witness is on the stand, and self-criminating
act relevant to the issue is desired to be shown by him, the question may be asked, and then it is
for the witness to say whether he will answer it or claim its privilege, for it cannot be known
beforehand what he will do.
It further state that "the proper place in which to claim the privilege is in the trial court, when the question is
propounded, not here." This is exactly the case of the herein complainant. She opportunely invoked the
privilege when it was desired to subject her to trial by copying the six letters in question, which Mackenzie
failed to do.
It is true that in said case of Mackenzie, it was likewise stated that "No reason appears why the
examination on disclosure should not be subject to the ordinary rule of cross-examination. The person
making the disclosure is in the petition of a witness called by the State, and is subject to the rule permitting
the impeachment of such a witness. It is no invasion of the constitutional guaranty against self-crimination
to compel the witness to answer questions relating to the truthfulness of his previous testimony." This court,
however, is of the opinion that the foregoing is not applicable to the case of the herein complainant, firstly,
because she has made no disclosure; she confined herself to denying the letters in question were hers
when the respondent, appressing in court with them, said rather than insinuated, that they were hers,
presenting in support of his statement, other letters which, by reason of the handwriting, were to all
appearances similar thereto; and secondly, because her testimony, denying that she was the author of the
letters in question, may be attacked by means of other evidence in the possession of the respondent, which
is not precisely that coming from the complaint herself.
The reason for the privilege appears evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby
the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or
any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then the
evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he
must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should
be asked, one for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is the opinion
that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not
a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.
In view of the foregoing consideration and holding, as it is hereby held, that the complainant is perfectly
entitled to the privilege invoked by her, the respondent's petition is denied. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion in this case.
The principle expressed in the legal maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare has a historical background
too long to narrate. Suffice it to say that the principle which later found expression in constitutional charter
was aimed at the unjust inquisitorial practices which prevailed in Continental Europe, and even in England
and in the American colonies in the early days. (See U. S. vs. Navarro, 3 Phil., 143, 152;
Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil., 62; Brown vs.Walker, 161 U. S., 591; 16 S. Ct., 644; 40 Law. ed., 821.)
The privilege against self-incrimination is guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitutional
and in the great majority of the state constitutions of the United State. In the Philippine, the same principle
obtains as a direct result of American influence. At first, the provision in our organic laws was similar to that
found in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and was as follows: "That no person
shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." (President's Instructions to the
Philippine Commission; Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902, sec. 5, par. 3; Jones Law, Act of Congress of August
29, 1916, sec. 3, par. 3.) Although the provision makes reference only to criminal cases, the privilege has
consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment
is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not (70 C. J., sec. 875, p. 722). Prof. Wigmore
states these principles clearly in his valuable work on Evidence (vol. IV, sec. 2252, pp. 834, 835), in the
following language:
This variety of phrasing, then, neither enlarges nor narrows the scope of the privilege as already
accepted, understood, and judicially developed in the common law. The detailed rules are to be
determined by the logical requirements of the principle, regardless of the particular word, of a
particular constitution. This doctrine which has universal judicial acceptance, leads to several
important consequences: (a) A clause exempting a person from being "a witness against himself"
protects as well a witness as a party accused in the cause; that is, it is immaterial whether the
prosecution is then and there "against himself" or not. So also a clause exempting "the accused"
protects equally a mere witness.
(b) A clause exempting from self-criminating testimony "in criminal cases" protects equally in civil
cases, when the fact asked for is a criminal one.
(c) The protection, under all clauses, extends to all manner of proceedings in which testimony is to
be taken, whether litigious or not, and whether "ex parte" or otherwise. It therefore applies in all
kinds of courts . . . in all methods of interrogation before a court, . . . and in investigations by a
legislature or a body having legislative functions.
When the Constitution of the Philippines was drafted, the phraseology in the previous organic acts was
altered by omitting the phrase "in any criminal case" to make the letter conform with the evident spirit of the
provision. The Constitution provides that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
(Article III, sec. 1. subsec. 18.) Similar provisions are to be found in our statutes (G. R. No. 58, sec. 15,
subsec. 4; Act No. 194 as amended, sec. 2; Act No. 2711, secs. 1687 and 2465; Act No. 3108, sec. 26).
This court has had occasion to rule that the constitutional provision relates solely to testimonial compulsion
(U. S.vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil, 145, U. S. vs. Salas. 25 Phil., 337 U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil., 735;
Villaflor vs.Summers, 41 Phil., 62). In the case of Beltran vs. Samson and Jose (53 Phil., 570, cited in 70 C.
J., sec. 887, p. 727), however, this court enlarged the application of the provisions by holding of his person
may not be compelled to produce specimens of his handwriting for purposes of confrontation with certain
documents supposed to have been falsified by him. It was there said that "writing is something more than
moving the body, or hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the
application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to
furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal
clearly states. (Pages 576, 577.)
It must be admitted that the case before us is one indifferences of opinion may, reasonably be expected;
and in other jurisdictions conflict of opinion is clearly noticeable. In some jurisdictions it is ruled that a
person who denies during his examination in chief the authenticity of handwriting purporting to be his may
be asked to write specimens of his handwriting for the purposes of comparison, while in other jurisdictions
and under practically the same circumstances, a directly opposite view is reached. The reason for this is
not far to seek. One vainly looks at the naked text of the constitutional provision for unalterable rules
applicable in particular cases. Courts have to deal with cases as they arise and while agreeing on the
principle they do not and can not unite on the application. But I vote to sustain the objection of the witness
for the following reasons:
(1) As between two possible and equally rational constructions, that should prevail which is more in
consonance with the purpose intended to be carried out by the Constitution. The provision, as
doubtless it was designed, should be construed with the utmost liberality in or of the right of the
individual intended to be secured. (Boyd vs. United States, 116 U. S., 616; 6 S. Ct., 524; 29 Law.
ed., 746; Counselman vs.Hitchcock, 142 U. S., 562; 12 S. Ct., 195;35 Law. ed., 1110;
Brown vs. Walker, 161 U. S., 596; 16 S. Ct., 644; 40 Law. ed., 819 Interstate Commerce
Commission vs. Baird, 194 U. S., 45; 5 S. Gt., 563; 48 Law. ed., 860; Gouled vs. United States, 255
U. S., 298; 41 S. Ct., 261;65 Law. ed., 647; In re Machman, 114 Fed., 995; U. S. vs. Wetmore, 218
Fed., 227; People vs. Hackley, 24 N. Y., 74; 24 How. Pr., 369, 372 [Off. 12 Abb. Pr., 150; 21 How.
Pr., 54]; People vs. Cassidy, 213 N. Y., 388, 107 N. E., 713; Ann. Cas. [1916C], 1009;
People vs. Forbes 38 N. E., 303; 143 N. Y., 219; People vs. Spain, 138 N. E., 614; 307 Ill., 283;
People vs. Newmark, 144 N. E., 388; 312 Ill, 625; Gillespie vs. State, 5 Okla. Crim., 546; 115 Pac.,
620; Ann. Cas. [1912D], 259; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1171; Ward vs. State, 228 Pac., 498; 27 Okla.
Crim., 362; Thornton vs. State, 117 Wis., 338; 93 N. W., 1107; 98 A. S. R., 924;
People vs. Danziger, 213 N. W., 448; 238 Mich., 39; 52 A. L. R., 136; Underwood vs. State, 78 S.
E., 1103; 13 Ga. App., 206.) Justice Bradley of the Supreme Court of the United States once said
that "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that
constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A
close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy and leads to gradual depreciation
of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their
motto should be obsta principiis." (Boyd vs. United States, supra.) An equally liberal interpretation
should be given to similar provisions found in our statutes. (People vs. Forbes supra.)
(2) I am averse to the enlargement of the rule allegedly calculated to gauge more fully the credibility
of a witness if the witness would thereby be forced to punish the means for his own destruction.
Unless the evidence is voluntarily given, the policy of the constitutional is one of protection on
humanitarian considerations and grounds of public policy (see U. S. vs. Navarro, 3 Phil., 143). This
is not saying that the constitutional privilege was intended to shield the witness from the personal
disgrace or opprobrium resulting from the exposure of crime. It was only intended to prevent the
disclosure of evidence that may tend to render the witness liable to prosecution in a criminal case.
(70 C. J., sec. 880, p. 729.)
(3) The privilege should not be disregarded merely because it often affords a shelter to the guilty
and may prevent the disclosure of wrongdoing. Courts can not under the guise of protecting the
public interest and furthering the excrescence in the Constitution.
(4) It is true that the privilege afforded by the constitution is purely personal to the witness and may
be waived by him (U. S. vs. Cofradia, 4 Phil., 154; U. S. vs. Rota, 9 Phil., 426; U. S. vs. Grant and
Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122;U. S. vs. Binayoh, 35 Phil., 23) either by a failure to claim the privilege on
time or by testifying without objection; and a witness who has waived the privilege is not permitted
to stop but must go on and make a full disclosure of all matters material to the case
(Fitzpatrick vs. United States, 178 U. S., 304; 20 S. Ct., 944; 44 Law. ed., 1078: Reagan vs. United
States, 157 U. S., 301; 15 S. Ct., 610; 39 Law. ed., 709; Sawyer vs. United States, 202 U.S.,
150;26 S. Ct., 575: 50 Law. ed., 972, Powers vs. United States, 223 U.S., 303; 32 S. Ct., 281; 56
Law. ed., 448). But in the case before us there has not been a waiver. The privilege was invoked on
time. The objection to the question of respondent's counsel was raised upon the asking of the
question which would subject the witness to the danger of committing perjury. This the witness had
a right to do. (State vs. Blake, 25 Me., 350; Friess vs. New York Cent., etc. R. Co., 22 N. Y. S., 104;
67 Hun., 205, aff. 55 N, E., 892; 140 N. Y., 639.)
(5) It was not the complainant but the respondent who offered the letters (Exhibits 32 to 37) in
evidence. The complainant was presented in rebuttal and she simply denied having written the
letters. She should not be made to furnish the other party evidence by which to destroy her own
testimony under circumstances which tend to incriminate her. She was not even presented by the
respondent as his own witness.
(6) There are already in evidence letters written by the complainant and admitted by her to be
genuine. The purpose then of respondent's counsel can be attained without extracting from the
witness herself evidence which would subject her to punishment for a felony.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
I am unable to concur in the opinion of the court in this case, because the doctrine it lays down is, in my
judgment, not only unsound but in conflict with the great weight of competent authority on the subject. We
are called upon to determine for the first time the scope and application of an important provision of the
Constitution and it goes without saying that the matter requires careful consideration, since our decision is
bound to have a far-reaching effect.
The Constitution provides that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." (Article 111,
section 1, cl. 18.) This provision has been derived from that clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States which declares that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself." While the omission of the words "in any criminal case" from the Philippine
version may seem important, the truth is that such a change in phraseology carries no legal significance
whatever, inasmuch as the Supreme Court of the United States had construed the provision in the Federal
Constitution to mean that the privilege against self-incrimination is not confined to the accused; and that it
is also available to witnesses both in criminal and civil cases; and that it may invoked in court, before
legislative committees, grand juries, and other tribunals. (McCarthy vs. Arndstein, 266 U. S., 34; Law. ed.,
158.)
The origin of this constitutional inhibition is related by the Supreme Court of the United States as follows:
"The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and
manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the continental
system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional
barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, was not uncommon even in
England. While the admissions of confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have
always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his
apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may
assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid
or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully
evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the
Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the
English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion,
but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it
has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American, jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities
of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states, with
one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so
that a maxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence became clothed in this country with he
impregnability of a constitutional enactment." (Brown vs. Walker, 161 U. S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed., 821.)
While the courts have guarded the privilege with great care and liberally extended the mantle of its
protection in appropriate cases, they have at the same time insisted that the constitutional provision
embodying it "should be construed, as it was doubtless designed, to effect a practical and beneficent
purpose not necessarily to protect witnesses against every possible detriment which might happen to
them from their testimony, nor to unduly impede, hinder, or obstruct the administration of criminal justice."
(Brown vs. Walker, supra.) It has been held that the privilege against self-incrimination, like any other
privilege is one which may be waived. It may be waived by voluntarily answering questions, or by
voluntarily taking the stand, or by failure to claim the privilege. (People vs.Nachowicz, 340 Ill., 480; 172 N.
E., 812; Salibo vs. United States, 46 Fed. [2], 790; United States vs. Murdock, 284 U. S., 141; 76 Law. ed.,
210.) A party who voluntarily takes the stand in his own behalf, thereby waiving his privilege, may be
subjected to a cross-examination covering his statement.
In Fitzpatrick vs. United States (178 U. S., 304; 44 Law. ed., 1078, 1083), the Supreme Court of the United
States said: "where an accused party waives his constitutional privilege of silence, takes the stand in his
own behalf and makes his own statement, it is clear that the prosecution has a right to cross-examine upon
such statement with the same latitude as would be exercised in the case of an ordinary witness, as to the
circumstances connecting him with the alleged crime. While no inference of guilt can be drawn from his
refusal to avail himself of the privilege of testifying, he has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which
tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts. The witness having
sworn to an alibi, it was perfectly competent for the government to cross-examine him as to every fact
which had a bearing upon his whereabouts upon the night of the murder, and as to what he did and the
persons with whom he associated that night. Indeed, we know of no reason why an accused person who
takes the stand as a witness should not be subject to cross-examination as other witnesses are. Had
another witness been placed upon the stand by the defense, and sworn that he was with the prisoner at
Clancy's and Kennedy's that night, it would clearly have been competent to ask what the prisoner wore,
and whether the witness saw Corbett the same night or the night before, and whether they were fellow
occupants of the same room."
It is well-settled that the right to cross-examine witnesses of the adverse party, being absolute, should not
be unduly restricted, especially when the witness is the opposite party and is testifying to make out his own
case. (70 C. J., 615.) And while there is some conflict of authorities, the better view appears to be that
when a witness has denied what purports to be his handwriting, he may on cross-examination be called
upon to write in order that such writing may be compared with the disputed writing for the purpose of
contradicting him. (22 C. J., 785.)
The petitioner in this case having waived her privilege against self-incrimination by voluntarily taking the
stand and testifying, it was legitimate cross-examination to call on her to write in order that such writing
may be compared with the disputed writing for the purpose of contradicting her, and the investigating officer
erred in sustaining her objection on the ground that she might incriminate herself.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929
FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of
Isabela, respondents.
Gregorio P. Formoso and Vicente Formoso for petitioner.
The respondents in their own behalf.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge
ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting
and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings; but the respondents
contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the
provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and again which the instant action was brought, is
based on the provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative Code and on the doctrine laid down in the
cases of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718); United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145); United States vs.
Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), cited by counsel for the respondents, and in the case of Villaflor vs.
Summers (41 Phil., 62) cited by the judge in the order in question.
Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of
the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this
power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.
And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional
provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.
Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether the constitutional provision invoked
by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what is enjoined upon him by the order against which
these proceedings were taken.
Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le
obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated in our Criminal
Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4 ) and section 56.
As to the extent of the privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English text of the Jones Law, which
is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."
This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." Moreover, as we are concerned with a
principle contained both in the Federal constitution and in the constitutions of several states of the United
States, but expressed differently, we should take it that these various phrasings have a common
conception.
In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the variations of wording in the
constitutional clauses; this much is conceded (ante, par. 2252). It is therefore immaterial that the
witness is protected by one constitution from 'testifying', or by another from 'furnishing evidence', or
by another from 'giving evidence,' or by still another from 'being a witness.' These various phrasings
have a common conception, in respect to the form of the protected disclosure. What is that
conception? (4 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 863, 1923 ed.)
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
evidence.
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their
relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that is the duty
of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any
steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the
constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the
furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact
which the accused has a right to hold secret. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 20, page 434 and notes.)
(Emphasis ours.)
The question, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the
petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of
the constitutional provision under examination.
Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or
signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-examination be compelled to write in open court in order that
the jury maybe able to compare his handwriting with the one in question.
It was so held in the case of Bradford vs. People (43 Pacific Reporter, 1013) inasmuch as the defendant, in
offering himself as witness in his own behalf, waived his personal privileges.
Of like character is the case of Sprouse vs. Com. (81 Va., 374,378), where the judge asked the defendant
to write his name during the hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.
But the cases so resolved cannot be compared to the one now before us. We are not concerned here with
the defendant, for it does not appear that any information was filed against the petitioner for the supposed
falsification, and still less as it a question of the defendant on trial testifying and under cross-examination.
This is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it. And let it further be noted
that in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant performed the act voluntarily.
We have also come upon a case wherein the handwriting or the form of writing of the defendant was
obtained before the criminal action was instituted against him. We refer to the case of People vs. Molineux
(61 Northeastern Reporter, 286).
Neither may it be applied to the instant case, because there, as in the aforesaid case of Sprouse vs.
Com., the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting.
We cite this case particularly because the court there gives prominence to the defendant's right to decline
to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. The following appears in the body of said decision referred
to (page 307 of the volume cited):
The defendant had the legal right to refuse to write for Kinsley. He preferred to accede to the latter's
request, and we can discover no ground upon which the writings thus produced can be excluded
from the case. (Emphasis ours.)
For the reason it was held in the case of First National Bank vs. Robert (41 Mich., 709; 3 N. W., 199), that
the defendant could not be compelled to write his name, the doctrine being stated as follows:
The defendant being sworn in his own behalf denied the endorsement.
He was then cross-examined the question in regard to his having signed papers not in the case,
and was asked in particular whether he would not produce signatures made prior to the note in suit,
and whether he would not write his name there in the court. The judge excluded all these inquiries,
on objection, and it is of these rulings that complaint is made. The object of the questions was to
bring into the case extrinsic signatures, for the purpose of comparison by the jury, and we think that
the judge was correct in ruling against it.
It is true that the eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited (volume 4, page 878), says:
Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor it is
the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move
his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. Requiring him to make specimens of
handwriting is no more than requiring him to move his body . . ." but he cites no case in support of
his last assertion on specimens of handwriting. We note that in the same paragraph 2265, where
said authors treats of "Bodily Exhibition." and under preposition "1. A great variety of concrete
illustrations have been ruled upon," he cites many cases, among them that of People vs. Molineux
(61 N. E., 286) which, as we have seen, has no application to the case at bar because there the
defendant voluntary gave specimens of his handwriting, while here the petitioner refuses to do so
and has even instituted these prohibition proceedings that he may not be compelled to do so.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the
fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more
serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's
possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels. which to our mind is not so serious as the
case now before us, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864):
. . . 2264. Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. 1. It follows that the production of
documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a
subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form of process treating him as a witness (
i.e. as a person appearing before a tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for
truthtelling), may be refused under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded.
(And he cites the case of People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119; 38 N.E., 1003)
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is
compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for
in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or
chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing,
evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. And for this reason the same
eminent author, Professor Wigmore, explaining the matter of the production of documents and chattels, in
the passage cited, adds:
For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though the documents or chattels be
already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by testimonial act or utterance of
the person in response to the process, still no line can be drawn short of any process which treats
him as a witness; because in virtue it would be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or
authenticity or origin of the articles produced. (Ibid., pp. 864-865.) (Emphasis ours.)
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the
petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a
personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in
evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the
privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited on behalf of the respondents, it should be
remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants
and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not refuse to answer,
they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege, as they could certainly do.
The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, maybe waived
by any one entitled to invoke it. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 29, page 442, and cases noted.)
The same holds good in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145), were the defendant did not
oppose the extraction from his body of the substance later used as evidence against him.
In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly stated that the court preferred to rest its
decision on the reason of the case rather than on blind adherence to tradition. The said reason of the case
there consisted in that it was the case of the examination of the body by physicians, which could be and
doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion of the petitioner therein to furnish evidence
by means of testimonial act. In reality she was not compelled to execute any positive act, much less a
testimonial act; she was only enjoined from something preventing the examination; all of which is very
different from what is required of the petitioner of the present case, where it is sought to compel him to
perform a positive, testimonial act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of
comparison. Besides, in the case of Villamor vs. Summers, it was sought to exhibit something already in
existence, while in the case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence, and it is
precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence not yet in
existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously incriminate him.
Similar considerations suggest themselves to us with regard to the case of United States vs. Ong Siu Hong
(36 Phil., 735), wherein the defendant was not compelled to perform any testimonial act, but to take out of
his mouth the morphine he had there. It was not compelling him to testify or to be a witness or to furnish,
much less make, prepare, or create through a testimonial act, evidence for his own condemnation.
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and those under
their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation
in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
Without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 125687 December 9, 1999


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DELFIN RONDERO, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
When an accused appeals from the judgment of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open for review of the appellate court, which is then
called to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable. 1 With this
precept in mind, this Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice, will not hesitate to render the proper imposable
penalty, whenever it sees fit, even the supreme penalty of death.
Before us is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41,
sentencing herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
the crime of homicide.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that
his nine year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister's
whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor,
Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a
Barangay Captain to ask for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan to
look for Mylene.
The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of March 26, 1994. They
scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the
school and inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way
home. When he was about five (5) meters away from his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a
flashlight, saw herein accused-appellant Delfin Rondero pumping the artesian well about one (1) meter
away. Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. 2
Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing
that the person he saw was the latter's own
son. 3 Maximo and Andong continued their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men decided to
go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to search anew for her daughter. He again sought the help
of Andong and the barangay secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found
Mylene's lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. 4 Her right hand was raised above her
head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the
waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right
hand were some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body
while the other slipper was found behind her back.
Half an hour later, five (5) policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They found a
pair of shorts 5 under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the
policemen to the artesian well where he had seen accused-appellant earlier washing his hands. The policemen
found that the artesian well was spattered with blood. 6 After the investigation, the policemen, together with
Maximo, went back to their headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found
Mylene's body, he saw accused-appellant washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well. 7 Acting on this
lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested accused-appellant.
An autopsy of the body of the victim conducted by the Assistant City Health Officer of Dagupan City, Dr.
Tomas G. Cornel, revealed the following injuries:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Contusion hematoma, anterior chest wall, along the midclavicular line,
level of the 2nd intercostal space, right.
2. Contusion hematoma, along the parasternal line, level of the 1st
intercostal space, left.
3. Contusion hematoma, posterior aspect, shoulder, left.
4. Contusion hematoma, anterior axillary line, level of the 3rd intercostal
space, left.
5. Contusion hematoma, anterior aspect, neck.
6. Contusion hematoma, lower jaw, mid portion.
7. Contusion hematoma, periorbital, right.
8. Lacerated wound, 1" x 1/2" x 1/2", maxillary area, right.
9. Contusion hematoma, temporal area, left.
10. Contusion hematoma, mid frontal area.
11. Lacerated wound 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/4", frontal area, left.
12. Contusion hematoma, occipital area, right.
13. Abrasion, medial anterior aspect, elbow, left.
14. Abrasion, lateral aspect, buttock, right.
15. Abrasion, antero lateral aspect, iliac crest, right.
16. Contusion hematoma, upper lip.
17. Avulsion, upper central and lateral incisors.
18. Fresh laceration of the hymen at 1:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 9:00
o'clock position. Fresh laceration of the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock and 9:00
o'clock position.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Massive intracranial hemorrhage with brain tissue injury. Fracture of the right occipital bone.
Note:
Vaginal smear was done at the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Prov'l Hosp. laboratory and the
result showed no sperm cell seen. (March 26, 1994)
Cause of death: Cardio Respiratory Arrest
Due to: Massive Intracranial Hemorrhage Traumatic 8
For Mylene's burial, her parents spent P5,043.00 during her wake, 9 P9,000.00 for funeral expenses 10 and
P850.00 for church services and entombment. 11
On March 28, 1994, the hair strands which were found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the
crime, together with hair specimens taken from the victim and accused-appellant, were sent to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination. 12
Meanwhile, on March 30, 1994, accused-appellant was formally charged with the special complex crime of
rape with homicide in an information which reads:
The undersigned 4th Assistant City Prosecutor accuses DELFIN RONDERO y Sigua, of
Pugaro District, Dagupan City, of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1994, in the city of Dagupan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused DELFIN RONDERO y Sigua, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, criminally and forcibly have carnal knowledge with one MYLENE
J. DORIA, a 9-year old girl, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with
intent to kill, criminally and unlawfully employed violence against her person,
thereby causing the death of said MYLENE J. DORIA, as evidenced by the
Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Asst. City Health Officer, this
city, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased,
MYLENE J. DORIA in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential
damages.
Contrary to Article 335 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. In the meantime, the NBI sent a fax message to
the Dagupan City Police Station saying that it could not conduct an examination on the hair strands
because the proper comparative specimens were not given. The NBI suggested that hair strands be pulled,
not cut, from the suspect and from the victim on the four regions of their heads so that all parts of the hair
strands, from root to tip, may be presented. 13 Thereupon, accused-appellant, who executed a "waiver of
detention" including a waiver of the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution on the rights of the
accused during custodial investigation, 14 was allegedly convinced by a certain Major Wendy Ocampo to give
sample hair strands. Another police officer went to the Doria's residence to get hair samples from Mylene, who
had not yet been interred. The hair strands taken from accused-appellant and the victim were later indorsed to
the NBI for laboratory testing. 15 Comparative micro-physical examination on the specimens showed that the
hair strands found on the right hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's,
while the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics to those of the
victim's. 16 Alicia P. Liberato, the NBI Senior Forensic Chemist who conducted the microscopic examination on
the hair samples, later reiterated the aforesaid findings in court. 17
At the trial, Dr. Cornel, the physician who conducted the autopsy on Mylene at around 9:30 o'clock in the
morning of March 26, 1994, testified that the victim's death probably occurred before 11:00 o'clock in the
evening of March 25, 1994 judging from the rigidity of her lower and upper extremities. He explained that
the contusions and hematoma found on Mylene's body were possibly caused by a blunt instrument, a
clenched fist or a piece of wood. 18 The lacerated wounds on her face may have been caused by a bladed
instrument, not necessarily sharp, or by hitting her head on a concrete wall with jagged edges. The abrasions on
her elbow, right buttock and upper hip may have been caused by a rough object that came in contact with her
skin. 19 Dr. Cornel also explained that the victim's upper and lateral incisors may have been avulsed by a
sudden blow in the mouth using a blunt instrument, stone or wood. He added that the fresh hymenal lacerations
at 1:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions and the fresh laceration of the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock
and 9:00 o'clock positions could have been caused either by sexual intercourse or by an object forcibly inserted
in Mylene's vagina. 20
Accused-appellant resolved not to testify at the trial, opting instead to present his wife and his father as
witnesses to account for his whereabouts on the night of the gruesome incident.
Christine Gonzales, wife of accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1994, at around 7:00 o'clock in
the evening, she had a quarrel with her husband. Accused-appellant was then slightly drunk and apparently
irked when supper was not yet ready. He slapped his wife and shouted invectives at her, causing a
disturbance in the neighborhood and prompting his father, who lived just a house away, to intervene. When
accused-appellant refused to be pacified, his father hit him in the nose, mouth and different parts of the
body. 21 His father left accused-appellant profusely bleeding. Accused-appellant then changed his blood-stained
clothes and went to bed with his wife. It was a little after 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
Christine woke up the next day at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning. She washed some clothes including
the blood-stained ones her husband wore the night before. After doing the laundry, she went out to pay her
father a visit. On her way back home, Christine was informed by a child that her husband was arrested by
the police. Christine rushed home and found some policemen taking the newly washed undershirt and
short pants of accused-appellant from the clothesline. The policemen brought Christine with them to the
police headquarters for questioning. When asked about the blood on her husband's clothes, Christine told
them about their quarrel the night before. 22
Accused-appellant's father, Leonardo Rondero, corroborated Christine's story. He testified that on the night
in question, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he was resting at home, located only a house away from
his son's, when he heard the latter having a heated discussion with Christine. Embarrassed at the scene
that his son was creating at such an hour, Leonardo went to the couple's house to pacify the slightly
inebriated accused-appellant. Accused-appellant ignored his father and continued shouting at his wife.
Leonardo then hit him several times causing his nose and mouth to bleed profusely that it stained
his sando and short pants. Startled at the injuries that his son sustained, Leonardo went home. Early the
next morning, March 26, 1994, at around 1:30 o'clock, Leonardo was awakened by his neighbor, Maximo
Doria, who sought his assistance to search for his missing nine-year old daughter Mylene. Leonardo
willingly obliged. Thus, Maximo, Leonardo and the barangay secretary searched the nearby houses for
hours but failed to find Mylene. 23
On October 13, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment 24 convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
murder and sentencing him to death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE:
For the crime you had wilfully and deliberately committed, this court finds you guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and punished by Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 7659, in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, together with all its attendant
aggravating circumstances without any mitigating circumstance of whatever nature.
You, Delfin Rondero, are hereby therefore sentenced to die by electrocution pursuant to
Article 81 of Republic Act No. 7659, for your heinous crime as charged in the information as
a punishment and as an example to future offenders.
You are hereby further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim by paying to them an
amount of P60,000.00 for the loss of life of Mylene J. Doria; P15,000.00 for consequential
damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
May God have mercy on your soul.
SO ORDERED. 25
Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration. On November 10, 1995, the trial court issued an order
modifying its earlier decision, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act. No.
7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age. 26
In this appeal, accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AMENDED TO HOMICIDE AND
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER LIFE IMPRISONMENT (sic) AND TO
INDEMNIFY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN THE AMOUNT OF P175,000.00
BASED ONLY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED OF HOMICIDE.
III. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING
ACCUSED GUILTY TO (sic) THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE DESPITE
ILLEGAL ARREST AND ILLEGAL DETENTION OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT. 27
The appeal has no merit.
Accused-appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is not strong
enough to sustain his conviction, asserting that Maximo Doria's testimony that he saw him about a meter
away washing his bloodied hands at an artesian well was highly improbable inasmuch as it was dark at that
time. Accused-appellant also considered it strange that when Maximo saw him, he did not bother to ask if
he had seen Mylene. Finally, accused-appellant alleges that the slippers presented in court as evidence are
not the same ones which were recovered at the scene of the crime since the pictures presented in court did
not show the leaf painted in red on the left slipper.
Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue
may be established by inference. 28 Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and
coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be
proved. 29 Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction in criminal cases when there is more than one
circumstance, derived from facts duly given and the combination of all is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The test for accepting circumstantial evidence as proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is:
the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every
circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.
In the case at bar, the prosecution avers that there are several circumstances availing which, when pieced
together, point to accused-appellant as the author of the gruesome crime committed on the night of March
25, 1994, to wit:
1. A few hours after the victim's probable time of death, Maximo saw
accused-appellant, with an ice pick clenched in his mouth, washing his
bloodied hands at an artesian well. 30
2 A pair of slippers which Maximo identified as belonging to accused-appellant
was found at the scene of the crime. One was found beside the victim's body
while the other was under her buttocks. 31 Maximo positively pointed to
accused-appellant as the owner of the pair of slippers because of a
distinguishing mark of the painting of a red leaf on the left slipper. Maximo said
accused-appellant used to frequent their house wearing the same pair of
slippers for over a year. 32
3. The hair strands which were found on Mylene's right hand and the hair
strands taken from accused-appellant were shown to have similar characteristics
when subjected to microscopic
examination. 33
4. Accused-appellant's undershirt and short pants which he wore on the night of
March 25, 1994 had bloodstains. His wife admitted having washed the
undershirt and short pants in the early morning of March 26, 1994. 34
Contrary to the allegations of accused-appellant, the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to
sustain his conviction. Maximo stated on the witness stand that he was able to identify accused-appellant
because he focused his flashlight on him while he was washing his bloodstained hands at an artesian well
located only a meter away from where Maximo was standing. 35 Maximo considered it wise not to talk to
accused-appellant because at that time he had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and looked slightly drunk. As to
the allegation that the slippers presented in court were not the same ones recovered at the scene of the crime,
suffice it to say that the photographs taken of the crime scene were not focused only on the pair of slippers;
hence, the red leaf may be too minuscule to be noticed. In any case, the pair of slippers shown in the
photographs corroborate the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses that a pair of rubber slippers were indeed
recovered at the scene.
It might not be amiss to note that Maximo was not shown to have had any motive to impute so grave a
wrong on accused-appellant. Prior to the incident, accused-appellant used to frequent Maximo's house for
a visit. 36 On the night of the incident, Maximo even sought the help of accused-appellant's father to search for
Mylene.
On the other hand, the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense are incredulous, to say the least.
Leonardo Rondero, accused-appellant's father, testified that he mauled his son in an effort to pacify him
during a heated altercation with his wife, Christine. Leonardo said that he felt embarrassed because his son
was shouting invectives at Christine and was causing a scene in the neighborhood so he hit the accused-
appellant several times. Leonardo's curious way of pacifying his son resulted in bodily injuries on the latter.
Strangely, despite his sustained injuries and profuse bleeding, accused-appellant and his wife just went to
sleep after Leonardo left. 37We find it unnatural that a father, a barangay kagawad, would repeatedly hit his son
in an effort to pacify him in the middle of a marital spat. We find it even more unnatural that one who was
bleeding profusely would act so insouciant as to just go to sleep without attending to his injuries.
Accused-appellant alleges that while in the custody of police officers, some hair strands were taken from
him without his consent and submitted to the NBI for investigation, in violation of his right against self
incrimination. Aside from executing a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
accused-appellant executed a waiver of the provisions of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution regarding
the rights of an accused during custodial investigation. 38 It appears, however, that the waivers were executed
by the accused without the assistance of a counsel of his own choice.
The use of evidence against the accused obtained by virtue of his testimony or admission without the
assistance of counsel while under custodial investigation is proscribed under Sections 12 and 17, Article III
of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. No person shall he compelled to be a witness against himself.
The aforesaid rules are set forth in the Constitution as a recognition of the fact that the psychological if not
physical atmosphere of custodial investigations in the absence of procedural safeguards is inherently
coercive in nature. However, to paraphrase Justice Sanchez in the case of Chavez vs. Court of
Appeals, 39 "Compulsion does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of
unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and
rational choice or impair his capacity for making rational judgment would be sufficient. So is moral coercion
tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." Needless to say, the above-mentioned
provisions are an affirmation that "coercion can be mental as well as physical and that the blood of the accused
is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." 40
It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion
of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the
accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness 41 and morphine forced out
of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. 42 Consequently, although accused-
appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in
evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant's
wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the
clothesline without proper authority. 43 This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian
exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," evidence illegally obtained by the state should not
be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant's garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional right
against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.
Nevertheless, even without the admission of the bloodied garments of the accused as corroborative
evidence, the circumstances obtaining against accused-appellant are sufficient to establish his guilt.
Having disposed of the foregoing, we now come to the issue of whether accused-appellant should be
convicted of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
It is a jurisprudential rule that an appeal throws a whole case to review and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct such error as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are
made the subject of assigned errors or not. 44
The trial court dismissed the charge of rape holding that it has not been adequately proven due to the
absence of spermatozoa in the victim's private part. It is well settled that the absence of spermatozoa in the
victim's private part does not negate the commission of rape for the simple reason that the mere touching
of the pudenda by the male organ is already considered as consummated rape. Mylene Doria was naked
from waist down when she was found. Her private organ had hymenal lacerations at 1:00 o'clock, 6:00
o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions. There were fresh lacerations in the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock and 9:00
o'clock positions as well. The trial judge even noted that "it can be conclusively deduced that her sex organ
was subjected to a humiliating punishment." While the examining physician speculated that the lacerations
could have been caused by a piece of wood or rounded object, he did not rule out the possibility of forcible
sexual intercourse.
The presence of physical injuries on the victim strongly indicates the employment of force on her person.
Contusion was found on Mylene's face, arms and thighs. In rape cases, when a woman is forcibly made to
lie down, she will utilize her elbow as the fulcrum so that abrasions will be observed. In an attempt to stand,
the victim will flex her neck forward. The offender will then push her head backwards, causing hematoma at
the region of the occiput. To prevent penetration of the male organ, she will try to flex her thighs and the
offender will give a strong blow to the inner aspects of both thighs so that the victim will be compelled to
straighten them. 45
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, aside from the hymenal lacerations, the examining physician
testified that Mylene sustained abrasions on her left elbow, right buttock and right upper hip and contusion
hematoma at the occipital area, i.e., back part of the head, right side. 46 Indeed, the physical evidence
indubitably tells a harrowing crime committed against nine-year old Mylene Doria in a manner that no words can
sufficiently describe.
Anent accused-appellant's third assignment of error, it might be true that accused-appellant's warrantless
arrest was not lawful. The police officers who arrested him had no personal knowledge of facts indicating
that he was the perpetrator of the crime just committed. His warrantless arrest was not based on a personal
knowledge of the police officers indicating facts that he has committed the gruesome crime but solely on
Maximo's suspicion that he was involved in the slaying of Mylene since he was seen washing his bloodied
hands in the early morning of March 26, 1994. 47 Nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that any irregularity
attending the arrest of an accused is deemed waived when, instead of quashing the information for lack of
jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily submits himself to the court by entering a plea of guilty or not
guilty during the arraignment and participating in the proceedings.
Finally, we reiterate that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called to render judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable, and whether they are made the subject of assigned errors or not. This precept should be
borne in mind by every lawyer of an accused who unwittingly takes the risk involved when he decides to
appeal his sentence.
Accused-appellant's guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt for the rape and brutal slaying
of Mylene Doria, this Court has no other recourse but to impose the penalty of death upon accused-
appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, "when by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death." At this juncture, it should be stated that four justices of the court have continued to maintain the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to
the ruling of the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
The award of P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim is increased to P75,000.00 in line with our
ruling in People vs. Mahinay. 48 The award of moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00 is reduced to
P50,000.00. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the sum of P15,000.00 as consequential damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City finding accused-
appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y Sigua is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of special
complex crime of rape with homicide committed against Mylene J. Doria and is accordingly sentenced to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P15,000.00 as consequential
damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and
ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.
Conrado B. Enriquez for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor
Pedro A. Ramirez for respondent-appellant.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for intervenors-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause, 1 whenever appropriately invoked, has
been accorded due recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the Constitution. 2 Bermudez v.
Castillo,3decided in 1937, was quite categorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the opinion that in
order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead
letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it." As phrased by
Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The provision, as doubtless it was designed, would be construed
with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served." 4
Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan,5where
it was held that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law 6 cannot be required
to take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. So it must be in this case, where petitioner
was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the
complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. That was a
correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila
an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now
respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case 7 for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner-
appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through
counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness
against himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time
stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon
to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority.
Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of
Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional
right against self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture or
loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief
demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to testify as
witness for his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ of
preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition.
On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the
respondent Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative
case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a bond in the amount of
P500.00.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the
affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the
witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,"
precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board, therefore, denied that it acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in
the administrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee, asking that they be allowed to file an
answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on
March 23, 1965 sustaining the power of respondent Board, which for them is limited to compelling the
witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to compel a witness to
incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an
administrative hearing.
A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be
well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a
witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence this
appeal both by respondent Board and intervenors, the Gatbontons. As noted at the outset, we find for the
petitioner-appellee.
1. We affirm the lower court decision on appeal as it does manifest fealty to the principle announced by us
in Cabal v. Kapunan. 8 In that proceeding for certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Judge Kapunan,
it appeared that an administrative charge for unexplained wealth having been filed against petitioner under
the Anti-Graft Act,9the complainant requested the investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take
the witness stand, which request was granted. Upon petitioner's refusal to be sworn as such witness, a
charge for contempt was filed against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and
upon its denial, he initiated this proceeding. We found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled
principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but,
also, to take the witness stand."
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the matter referred to an a
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the Anti-Graft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever
property a public officer or employee may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other
lawful income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative
in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner
would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his
license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices to refer to an American
Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character. 10 In the language of Justice Douglas: "We
conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the
Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be
watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for
asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly
result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.
2. The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and intervenors-
appellants that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to allowing a
witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently
incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American decision, 11 is
the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a
criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is
then it becomes diluted.lawphi1.et

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to
declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption
of his guilt." 12 Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez, we
reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless
he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted
an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive
to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due
weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." 14
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this
right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental,
current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according
to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." 15 So also with the
observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy." 16 In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear
that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on
appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999


LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court
dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:
1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the
exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be
construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there
will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may
repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain,
whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present
Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability
been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the
judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its
power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the
repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing
the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the
law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature
and that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of
House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of
the House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-
imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the
position of the House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means
under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one
hundred thirteen (113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial
power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the
exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction
to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from
challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not
be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed
before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in
G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction
by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner.
For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of
Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated
January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that
the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its
jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously,
public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the
principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin
litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to
examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and
bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case
was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare
the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but
GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared
INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section
19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by
the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential,
hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and
counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing
Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately
amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.
Clerk of Court
By: (SGD) TERESITA G.
DIMAISIP
Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin
Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules
and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998,
Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the
said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the
Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not
unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are
invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was
not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of
judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired
Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case.
By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or
alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to
execute and enforce it. 3There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its
judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after
the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates
when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and
circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible. 5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by
the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v.
Judge of First Instance, 6 viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as
its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been
returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs
a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of
functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial
authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of
the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of
execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the
executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of
the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of
a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can
be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or
at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under
the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to
state this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms
that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction
of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought
to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to
order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing
the execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so
to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation,
whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the
inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and
justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court
or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically
pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the
execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in
Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of
a law enacted by Congress. 1wphi1.nt

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no
jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary.
Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce
their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments.
These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental
power to control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution,
satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should
be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our
Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without
independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor
as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it
enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was
subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re
Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to
the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average
of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This
Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed
law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now,
for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department,
that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the
case with the law in question." 12 The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate
power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress
on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by
giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary,
it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of
execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control
and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became
final and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on
December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br.
104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17,
1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or
announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when
requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice
beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however,
herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to
stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives
herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his
statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee
that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to
ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of
vital information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and
control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of
such Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No.
8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act
No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it
that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully
observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the
precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive
clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department)
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out
"without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot
grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain
(People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to
reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even
work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the
Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date at execution set by
the President would be earlier than that designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of
execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III
(Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development shall, be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may beprovided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules
by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the
right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information.
Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the
people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary
act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the
Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State
policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that
whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the
duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue
of the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En
Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535
[1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was
filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process
and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not
oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of
execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the
counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from
the public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to
grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having
become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an
executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of
the Constitution which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents.
The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons
and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the
President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses
collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict
who become insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed
by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from executing
the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death
sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve
though its effects is the same the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same
vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death
to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch
of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation
of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason
that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even
been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality
has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the
public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after
his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper
perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts.
Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He
invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of
1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal
of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that
clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by
thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have
publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also
sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35)
other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only
resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a
Special Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court
hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court
had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or
amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons
why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They
noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print
and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less
than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The
present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659)
and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations
lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3
p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints,
the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the
execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional
duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or
modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among
others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any
further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste
and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not
petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less
before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the
issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the
Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or
amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the
death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of
Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the
House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition
of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the
House of Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to
immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of
January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of
Representative with minor, the House of Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the
Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the
House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated
that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous
crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served
its legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment
had been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in
punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal
and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the
unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure,
any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate
deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to
tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully
hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution and particularly the Bill of
Rights to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has
yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we
can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be
ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in
rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is
momentarily the most hated by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order
issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with
applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and
Pardo, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;


Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my
brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the
Court of death sentences imposed by Regional Trial Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a
temporary restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to be
indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and
comity to a co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded,
that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the
accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is
further done except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end
to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the
final judgment conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the
petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any
event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled
exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. 1 Certainly, this
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at
stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite, 2 should be instructive.
Thus
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not change
or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according to
the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned
thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a
ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of
functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial
authority terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The particulars of
the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of
execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the
executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out the
penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of
a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can
be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that,
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or
at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under
the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to
state this principle of the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute terms
that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction
of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its
ministerial duty of ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if
however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, there is an imperative
duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement . . ..
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the
President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify
the law that could benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor
constitutionally incompatible and may each be exercised within their respective spheres and confines.
Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court would not prevent either the President from exercising his
pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to the adjudged
offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999,
"coeval with the duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no
repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General states that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events
(have) transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become
nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely 3 re-examination by Congress of
the death penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even
now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and
dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a
second look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death
penalty. In People vs. Masalihit, 4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination
of the death penalty law, I have said:
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the
law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the
Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the
imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous
crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the
death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let
alone, just because of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must
first be a marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the
statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively
inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty. Most importantly, the
circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so
exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity
in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of
judicial review given the circumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the
crime would become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the
victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape,
when the offended party is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The
indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow constrain courts to apply,
perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely
beyond what might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue
exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of victims and society.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so
hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who
continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an
issue that is fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty
and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else,
however, must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;


I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I
write only to explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its
current session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such
repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to
the imposition of the death penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof
prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling
reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting
Opinion in various death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this
matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on
February 7, 1997.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement
of law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and
therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law)
is likewise unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty
Law) is to implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court
that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be
implemented by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained
counsel, 2 the accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659,
the law reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration
filed by his previous counsel, 3this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by
this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death. 4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinouscrimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced toreclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973
or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already
imposed" toreclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the
penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of
the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or
reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly
recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased
to exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our
Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed, 6 "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision
regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from
the statute books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they
approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration
thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the
Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people. 8 In this light,
RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing
statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to
reimpose it on condition that it (Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The
language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is
not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:
1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling
reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to
restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death
penalty on certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death
penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article
therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the
special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble,
which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either
collectively for all the offenses or individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been
imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a
capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not
outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by
the Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The
answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to
"heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As
already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an
applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to
appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware of its
constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or "whereas"
clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of
what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without
adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by
which the presence of heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is
not a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being
crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or
purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its
text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum
imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death
prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified
bribery, 17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were
already to punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a
question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing
special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the
maximum penalty.
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with
death prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive
constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death
for these very same crimes, it would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the
stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make
its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not only from the language
of the Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment
introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he
and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the
honorable commissioners did not just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a
rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available information shows that,
when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already
existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:
1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality,
degree or level of perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or
"brutal" is added to show their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3. the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a
degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to
demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as
"heinous", in the same manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to
murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to
determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of
the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble
and inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and
should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the
characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime,
individually and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in
the future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and
the situation (during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific
reasons" requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in
answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23
MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker.
That is one.
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to
justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is
the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the
compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular "compelling reason," may we
know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly
elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not obtained
at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason should be
a supervening circumstances after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an
organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that the
penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of
the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which
would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that
justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense committed, was not
obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified
it?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions,
because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice demands
that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have committed heinous
crimes.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and
"justice". With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival
of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the
Philippine National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital
offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and
1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives
Garcia and Lagman:
MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.
Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime
of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.
MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us
the volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988.
Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty was
reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.
MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.
MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could
the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that the
volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926
or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading now from the
same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22
percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I
would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons
arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25
Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.
In 1987 this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped
to 2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still
decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are
concerned, the figure continued a downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this
time from, 1988 to 1991.
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its
reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data,
no sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship
between the prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission
thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition that
the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without
unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses can be argued
indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the
constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of
its death-prescribing power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of
Rights. As such, it should like any other guarantee in favor of the accused be zealously
protected, 29 and any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
people, particularly where the right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes
but capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the
people to enjoy life life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is
in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of
torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving
protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the
people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the state, and for
life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the
revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and even religion. But
the most basic and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in
their enjoyment, utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates
against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted
by the Free Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:
1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At
the end of 1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to
90; an average of seven (7) convicts per month; double the monthly average of capital
sentences imposed the prior year. From January to June 1996, the number of death penalty
convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly average
of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn between P200 to
P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to
P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent
(7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999,
seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to
P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one
percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately
two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five percent (5%) earning variable
income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the
government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the
official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and
P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; only one (1) earns
P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or
allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are unsure of their monthly income.
Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
4. In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or
workers in animal husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers.
Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31)
construction workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty
seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with
sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service
industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice
vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers,
tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks (janitors,
MERALCO employee and clerk) About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six
(6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals,
administrative employee and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent
(9%) are unemployed.
5. None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent
(44%), or slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or
about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand
Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a
foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
6. Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent
(47%) finished varying levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating
from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying
levels of high school, with more than half of them graduating from high school. Two (2)
convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that
RA 7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless in society those who cannot afford the legal
services necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation
are required. The best example to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the
crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and even before
this Court until the Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange,
incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and
damning. The net effect of having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the
impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy
nevertheless of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-
cited, are in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of
the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the
poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are
concerned, the law would still be complex and written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and
judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence)
or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me
that there will always be certain class or classes of people in our society who, by reason of their poverty,
lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working
and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as
themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices,
violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor
worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise, such law may even be said to help improve their
situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor
and the non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a
greater degree of protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the
State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be empowered to rise above themselves and their situation.
The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to better himself
and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an
entire people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are
faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and
disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so
irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place
in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or
prohibit its imposition.
(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the death penalty, which is
really a species of the right to life.
(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused because such a stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to
deny equal justice to the underprivileged.
(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside.
(5) Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:
a. First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the crime and itself. Congress
must explain why and how these circumstances define or characterize the crime as
"heinous".
b. Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose
after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears
repeating that these requirements are inseparable. They must both be present in view of the
specific constitutional mandate "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The
compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.
(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out
for each and every crime, and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign
Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our
people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits
such prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must
be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing the offender except in
cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . .
(which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death
penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above
even the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly
allows capital punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church
grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are
very rare and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its
constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-
defined "heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words
"DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes
mentioned in its text.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my
brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the
Court of death sentences imposed by Regional Trial Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a
temporary restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to be
indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and
comity to a co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded,
that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the
accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is
further done except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end
to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the
final judgment conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the
petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any
event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled
exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. 1 Certainly, this
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at
stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite, 2 should be instructive.
Thus
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not change
or after its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according to
the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned
thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a
ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of
functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial
authority terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The particulars of
the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of
execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the
executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out the
penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of
a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can
be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that,
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or
at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under
the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to
state this principle of the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute terms
that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction
of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its
ministerial duty of ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if
however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, there is an imperative
duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement . . ..
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the
President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify
the law that could benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor
constitutionally incompatible and may each be exercised within their respective spheres and confines.
Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court would not prevent either the President from exercising his
pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to the adjudged
offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999,
"coeval with the duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no
repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General states that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events
(have) transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become
nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely 3 re-examination by Congress of
the death penalty law, then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even
now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and
dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a
second look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death
penalty. In People vs. Masalihit, 4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination
of the death penalty law, I have said:
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the
law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the
Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the
imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous
crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the
death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let
alone, just because of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must
first be a marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the
statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively
inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty. Most importantly, the
circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so
exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity
in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of
judicial review given the circumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the
crime would become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the
victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape,
when the offended party is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The
indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow constrain courts to apply,
perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely
beyond what might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue
exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of victims and society.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so
hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who
continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an
issue that is fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty
and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else,
however, must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;


I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I
write only to explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its
current session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such
repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to
the imposition of the death penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof
prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling
reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting
Opinion in various death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this
matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on
February 7, 1997.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement
of law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and
therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law)
is likewise unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty
Law) is to implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court
that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be
implemented by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained
counsel, 2 the accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659,
the law reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration
filed by his previous counsel, 3this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by
this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death. 4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinouscrimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced toreclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973
or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already
imposed" toreclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the
penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of
the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or
reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly
recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased
to exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our
Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed, 6 "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision
regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from
the statute books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they
approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration
thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the
Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people. 8 In this light,
RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing
statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to
reimpose it on condition that it (Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The
language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is
not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:
1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling
reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to
restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death
penalty on certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA
7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal
Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the
special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble,
which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either
collectively for all the offenses or individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been
imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a
capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not
outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by
the Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The
answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to
"heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As
already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an
applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to
appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware of its
constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or "whereas"
clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of
what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without
adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by
which the presence of heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is
not a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being
crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or
purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its
text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum
imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death
prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified
bribery, 17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were
already to punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a
question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing
special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the
maximum penalty.
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with
death prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive
constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death
for these very same crimes, it would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the
stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make
its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not only from the language
of the Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment
introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he
and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the
honorable commissioners did not just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a
rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available information shows that,
when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already
existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:
1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality,
degree or level of perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or
"brutal" is added to show their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a
degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to
demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as
"heinous", in the same manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to
murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to
determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of
the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble
and inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and
should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the
characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime,
individually and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in
the future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and
the situation (during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific
reasons" requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in
answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23
MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker.
That is one.
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to
justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is
the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the
compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular "compelling reason," may we
know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly
elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not obtained
at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason should be
a supervening circumstances after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an
organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that the
penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of
the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which
would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that
justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense committed, was not
obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified
it?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions,
because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice demands
that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have committed heinous
crimes.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and
"justice". With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival
of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the
Philippine National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital
offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and
1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives
Garcia and Lagman:
MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.
Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime
of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.
MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us
the volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988.
Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty was
reduced from 21 percent to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.
MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.
MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could
the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that the
volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926
or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading now from the
same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22
percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I
would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons
arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25
Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.
In 1987 this was the year when the death penalty was abolished the persons arrested
in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still
decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are
concerned, the figure continued a downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this
time from, 1988 to 1991.
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its
reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data,
no sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship
between the prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission
thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition that
the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without
unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses can be argued
indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the
constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" limits of
its death-prescribing power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of
Rights. As such, it should like any other guarantee in favor of the accused be zealously
protected, 29 and any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
people, particularly where the right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes
but capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the
people to enjoy life life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is
in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of
torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving
protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the
people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the state, and for
life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the
revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and even religion. But
the most basic and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in
their enjoyment, utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates
against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted
by the Free Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:
1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At
the end of 1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to
90; an average of seven (7) convicts per month; double the monthly average of capital
sentences imposed the prior year. From January to June 1996, the number of death penalty
convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly average
of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn between P200 to
P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to
P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent
(7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999,
seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to
P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one
percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately
two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five percent (5%) earning variable
income. Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the
government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the
official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and
P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; only one (1) earns
P30.000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or
allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are unsure of their monthly income.
Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
4. In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or
workers in animal husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers.
Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31)
construction workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty
seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with
sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service
industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice
vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers,
tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks (janitors,
MERALCO employee and clerk) About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six
(6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals,
administrative employee and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent
(9%) are unemployed.
5. None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent
(44%), or slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or
about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand
Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a
foreign national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
6. Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent
(47%) finished varying levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating
from elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying
levels of high school, with more than half of them graduating from high school. Two (2)
convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that
RA 7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless in society those who cannot afford the legal
services necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation
are required. The best example to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the
crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and even before
this Court until the Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange,
incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and
damning. The net effect of having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the
impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy
nevertheless of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-
cited, are in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of
the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the
poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are
concerned, the law would still be complex and written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and
judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence)
or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me
that there will always be certain class or classes of people in our society who, by reason of their poverty,
lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working
and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as
themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices,
violence and crime. So from that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor
worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise, such law may even be said to help improve their
situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor
and the non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a
greater degree of protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the
State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be empowered to rise above themselves and their situation.
The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to better himself
and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an
entire people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are
faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and
disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so
irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place
in our legal, judicial and constitutional firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
1. The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely
suspend or prohibit its imposition.
2. The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the death penalty, which is
really a species of the right to life.
3. Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused because such a stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right
and tends to deny equal justice to the underprivileged.
4. Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated
or brushed aside.
5. Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:
a. First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the crime and itself. Congress
must explain why and how these circumstances define or characterize the crime as
"heinous".
Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose after the
effectivity of the Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these
requirements are inseparable. They must both be present in view of the specific constitutional mandate
"for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous
nature of the offense.
1. In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out
for each and every crime, and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign
Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our
people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits
such prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must
be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing the offender except in
cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . .
(which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death
penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above
even the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly
allows capital punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church
grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are
very rare and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its
constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-
defined "heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words
"DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes
mentioned in its text.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154037 April 30, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENJAMIN VERGARA, JONA
SARVIDA, MILAGROS MAJOREMOS, MAJORIE JALALON, MAY JOY MENDOZA (@ May Joy Sandi),
and JOY SABALLA (@ Josephine Saballa), MABELYN B. VERGARA, RIO SARVIDA, FRANCISCO
MAJOREMOS, in their respective behalves and in behalf of ROY JALALON, ROMMEL MENDOZA
and DELFIN SABALLA,petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc, Branch 12;
SPO3 ANGELO S. LLENOS and the CITY JAIL WARDEN OF ORMOC; and ELEUTERIA P.
BOLAO, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in Dr. A. Santos Ave., Paraaque City.
On December 24, 2001, they were arrested by Ormoc City policemen by authority of a Warrant of Arrest
dated November 19, 2001 issued by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 for Issuance of
Letters of Administration, Distribution and Partition pending before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City
(Branch 12).1
The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria P. Bolao, as Special
Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, praying that petitioners be held guilty of indirect
contempt for not complying with the probate court's order dated October 9, 1999 directing them to pay their
monthly rentals to respondent Bolao.2
It appears that pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Allers, respondent Bolao included the
property leased by Taripe to petitioners in the inventory of the estate. The probate court issued the assailed
Order dated October 5, 1999, portions of which read as follows:
1. SUBMITTED FOR RESOLUTION is an omnibus motion filed by the Petitioner-Administratrix,
informing among others, the submission of the Inventory of the Estate of the decedent, referred as
Motion-Annex 'A' thereof. The Inventory shows that the properties left by the deceased consists of
Real and Personal Properties, as well as Credits and Collectibles, itemized under letter heading A,
B, and C of the Inventory, respectively.
2. The Real Properties are occupied by some lessees, namely: Cargo Bridge Philippines
Corporation, represented by its President Mr. Bernhard Ashauer, Jr.; Mrs. Lea Amorcillo, Mrs.
Milagros Majoremos, Mr. Danilo Aguylo, Mrs. Marjorie Jalalon, Mrs. Jona Sarvida, Mrs. Analyn
Malunes, Mrs. Edna Rubi, Mrs. Josephine Saballa, Mr. Benjamin Vergara, Mr. Jerry Peligro, Mrs.
Mary Joy Sandi, and Mr. Jaime Cabarse, all inside the Allers' Property Compound at 8110 Dr. A.
Santos Ave., San Dionisio, Paraaque City.
xxx xxx xxx
5. It is further shown that all known intervenors, lessees and heirs were served of the motion and
notified of the hearing, with no opposition except intervenor Berlito P. Taripe, based on his claim
against the estate, which may be treated in due time for claims against the estate. However, the
motion under consideration refers to the return to the court of the true Inventory of the Estate of the
deceased within three (3) months as directed under Section 1, Rule 83 which sets a specific period
of time to submit, otherwise it is violated. The opposition is not tenable.
6. Finding the motion meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. As prayed for, the Inventory of
the Estate attached therewith as Motion-Annex 'A' (sic) and considered as a compliance of the
required return of the true Inventory of the estate of the decedent.
7. Further, the lessees above-cited and listed in the Inventory are directed to pay their respective
monthly rental regularly starting the month of August, 1999, including arrears if any, to the duly
appointed Special Administratrix Mrs. Eleuteria P. Bolao, until further notice.
xxx xxx xxx
Let copies of this Order together with the Inventory served to all above-cited.
SO ORDERED.3 (Emphasis Ours)
Copies of the order were sent on October 12, 1999 to petitioners via registered mail. 4
Five months later, on motion of respondent Bolao, as Special Administratrix, the probate court issued a
writ of execution on March 3, 2000 to enforce the aforesaid order dated October 5, 1999. The Sheriff
submitted a return dated August 10, 2000 stating that on June 5, 2000, he met with petitioners but failed to
collect the rentals due on the property as Taripe had already collected from them three months advance
rentals.5
On August 4, 2000, respondent Bolao filed a motion to require petitioners to explain why they should not
be cited in indirect contempt for disobeying the October 5, 1999 order of the probate court. 6 Petitioners
were served copies of the motion by registered mail. 7 The probate court granted the motion in its
Resolution dated September 7, 2000, portions of which read as follows:
The Motion to Exclude Certain Parcels of Land as part of the Estate of the decedent is also denied
for lack of merit. The properties sought to be excluded by intervenor Bertito P. Taripe are
titled/registered in the name of the decedent and therefore they should be included in the inventory
of the intestate estate of Anselma Allers. If intervenor has claims against the estate, he should file a
separate action against the Administratrix in accordance with Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of
Court. As it is, intervenor cannot claim ownership over properties registered in the name of the
decedent by mere motion.
The Return of the Deputy Sheriff of the Writ of Execution is noted.
Petitioner's motion to let the lessees explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
disobeying the Court's order is granted. All lessees listed on the Writ of Execution are hereby
ordered to explain within twenty (20) days from receipt of this order why they should not be cited for
indirect contempt of the Court for disobeying the Court's Order dated October 5, 1999, and the Writ
of Execution dated May 29, 2000.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis Ours)
Petitioners were furnished copies of the said Order on September 27, 2000 by registered mail. 8
Six months later, in a letter dated March 18, 2001, some of the petitioners, together with the other tenants
of the property, informed the probate court that they are "freezing" their monthly rentals as they are in a
quandary as to whom to pay the rentals.9
Respondent Bolao then filed on March 20, 2001, a motion to cite petitioners in contempt, which was set
for hearing on May 11, 2001.10 In its Order dated May 11, 2001, the probate court found petitioners guilty of
indirect contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to undergo imprisonment until
they comply with the probate court's order for them to pay rentals.11
Petitioners again wrote the probate court on June 11, 2001 asking that the indirect contempt "slapped"
against them be withdrawn. They stated that their failure to attend the May 11, 2001 hearing was due to
financial constraints, most of them working on construction sites, receiving minimum wages, and repeated
that the reason why they are freezing the monthly rentals is that they are uncertain as to whom to remit it. 12
Upon motion of respondent Bolao, the probate court, per its Order dated November 16, 2001, issued a
warrant of arrest on November 19, 2001. On December 24, 2001, petitioners were arrested.
On December 26, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.13 On January 3, 2002, the appellate court ordered the temporary release of
petitioners.14 After due proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on March 26, 2002 denying
the petition for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. This Court's resolution ordering the temporary release of the lessees is hereby
RECALLED. The lessees are ordered REMANDED to the custody of the Jail Warden of Ormoc City
until they have complied with the orders of the probate court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed herein petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, based on the following grounds:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 5,
1999 (ANNEX "E") PARTICULARLY THE PORTION THEREOF WHICH SUMMARILY DIRECTED
THE LESSEES TO TURNOVER THEIR MONTHLY RENTALS OF THE APARTMENTS OF
BERLITO P. TARIPE TO ELEUTERIA P. BOLAO AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX, IS
UNLAWFUL;
II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE MOTION FOR INDIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT FILED BY RESPONDENT ELEUTERIA P. BOLAO AGAINST THE
LESSEES IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY AND THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT A
QUO GRANTING SAID MOTION AND DECLARING THAT THE LESSEES ARE GUILTY OF
INDIRECT CONTEMPT IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT A
QUO TO ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST AND THE SAID WARRANT SO ISSUED AS WELL AS
THE ACTUAL ARREST OF SAID LESSEES IN COMPLIANCE THEREWITH, ARE UNLAWFUL;
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THE TEMPORARY RELEASE OF THE
LESSEES PERMANENT.16
The crux of petitioners' arguments is that they were not notified of the motion filed by respondent Special
Administratrix Bolao, submitting an inventory of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, which includes the
property occupied by them. Such being the case, petitioners contend that the order dated October 5, 1999
granting the motion and directing them to pay the rentals to Bolao is unlawful hence, their refusal to
comply with it is not contumacious. 17 They also assail the appointment of respondent Bolao as Special
Administratrix for having been made without the required bond, 18 and that she has no authority to file the
motion for indirect contempt, as her powers are limited.19
When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that the notice was served must
prove the fact of service. 20 The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. 21 In
civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13. In the
present case, as proof that petitioners were served with copies of the omnibus motion submitting an
inventory of the estate of deceased Allers, respondent Bolao presented photocopies of the motion with a
certification by counsel that service was made by registered mail, together with the registry
receipts.22 While the affidavit and the registry receipts proved that petitioners were served with copies of
the motion, it does not follow, however, that petitioners in fact received the motion. Respondent Bolao
failed to present the registry return cards showing that petitioners actually received the motion. 23 Receipts
for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves, they must be properly authenticated in
order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. 24 Respondent also failed to present a certification of the
postmaster that notice was duly issued and delivered to petitioners such that service by registered mail
may be deemed completed.25
Nonetheless, even in the absence of proof of actual receipt by the petitioners, the subject orders issued by
the probate court are valid and enforceable. Petitioners cannot deny the fact that they had actual
knowledge of the said orders. They have admitted in their letter dated March 18, 2001 addressed to the
probate court that they received the court's order dated October 5, 1999 "barely 2 months before," 26 or
sometime in January 2001. Instead of complying with the said order, they "froze" payment of their rentals
for the reason that they are caught in the middle of the dispute and are not sure to whom to give the
rentals. When respondent Bolao filed the motion to cite them in indirect contempt, setting the hearing on
May 11, 2001, again, records show that they had actual knowledge of the same. In their second letter,
dated June 11, 2001, addressed to the probate court, they acknowledged that they knew of the hearing set
on May 11, 2001, and the reason for their failure to attend was due to financial constraints. 27 They likewise
admitted in said letter that they knew of the court's order dated May 11, 2001 finding them guilty of indirect
contempt.28 Petitioners therefore cannot cry denial of due process as they were actually notified of the
proceedings before the probate court. Thus, under the circumstances, it is not imperative to require proof of
a formal notice. It would be an idle ceremony where an adverse party, as in this case, had actual
knowledge of the proceedings.29
When petitioners refused to remit the rentals to respondent Bolao per Order dated October 5, 1999, a
written charge of indirect contempt was duly filed before the trial court and hearing on the motion set on
May 11, 2001. As previously stated, petitioners did not attend said hearing despite knowledge thereof;
instead, they wrote the court on June 11, 2001 asking that the contempt findings against them be
withdrawn. Clearly, they were given the opportunity to be heard, and as aptly stated by the court, they were
given more than sufficient time to comply with the Order dated October 5, 1999. 30
Despite the foregoing, we find that the trial court's finding of contempt and the order directing the
imprisonment of petitioner to be unwarranted. The salutary rule is that the power to punish to contempt
must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory
idea of punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-
restraint.31
In Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations,32 the Court quoted the pronouncements of some American courts,
to wit:
Except where the fundamental power of the court to imprison for contempt has been restricted by
statute, and subject to constitutional prohibitions where a contemnor fails or refuses to obey an
order of the court for the payment of money he may be imprisoned to compel obedience to such
order. [Fla.Revell v. Dishong, 175 So. 905, 129 Fla. 9; Va. Branch v. Branch, 132 S.E. 303; 144
Va. 244]. (17 C.J.S. 287).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It has been said that imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purpose cannot
be resorted to until all other means fail [Mich.Atchison, etc. R. co. v. Jennison, 27 N.W. 6, 60 Mich.
232], but the court's power to order the contemnor's detension continues so long as the contumacy
persists [Ark.Lane v. Alexander, 271 S.W. 710, 168 Ark. 700] (17 C.J.S. 289).33
which we hereby adopt as proper guidelines in the determination of whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the order of the trial court finding petitioners guilty of indirect contempt of court and directing their
imprisonment for their contumacious refusal to pay the rentals to the administratrix.
In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no
person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising
from a criminal offense.34 It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or implied. 35 In the
present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the
probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the order for the
principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals because it
was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them. Clearly, the payment
of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court to wit:
SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission
to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order
of the court concerned until he performs it. (7a)
because herein subject order is not a special judgment enforceable, under Section 11, Rule 39, which
provides:
SEC. 11. Execution of special judgment. When a judgment requires the performance of any act
other than those mention in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of judgment shall be
attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom the
same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law to obey the same, and such
party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.
Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money, thus:
SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (a) Immediate payment on demand.
The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment
obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees.
The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or
any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper
receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of
payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall
turn over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that issued the writ.
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment, the
judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn
over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court of the
court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a fiduciary
account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial court of the locality.
The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the account of
the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver said payment to the judgment
obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment obligor
while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as provided by law. In no
case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be made payable to him.
(b) Satisfaction by levy. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash,
certified bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall
levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be
disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the
personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient
to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor
which has been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and
lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either
real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of
attachment.
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. The officer may levy on debts due the judgment obligor
and other credits, including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other
personal property not capable of manual delivery in the possession or control of third parties. Levy
shall be made by serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in his possession or
control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment shall cover only such
amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.
The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days from service of the notice
of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment obligor has sufficient funds or credits to satisfy
the amount of the judgment. If not, the report shall state how much funds or credits the garnishee
holds for the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or certified bank check issued in the
name of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the judgment obligee within ten (10)
working days from service of notice on said garnishee requiring such delivery, except the lawful
fees which shall be paid directly to the court.
In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits sufficient to satisfy the
judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall have the right to indicate the garnishee or
garnishees who shall be required to deliver the amount due; otherwise, the choice shall be made by
the judgment obligee.
The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a) with respect to
delivery of payment to the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a)
while Section 10 of the same Rule refers to execution of judgments for specific acts such as conveyance,
delivery of deeds or other specific acts vesting title; sale of real or personal property, delivery or restitution
of real property, removal of improvements on property subject of execution and delivery of personal
property.
The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9 as quoted above. Until and
unless all the means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed, imprisonment
for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted to by the courts. 36 In Sura vs.
Martin, Sr.,37 we held that:
Where an order for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of court (for failure to
satisfy a judgment for support on ground of insolvency) would, in effect, violate the Constitution.
Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued refusal to comply with the
probate court's order to pay rentals to the administratrix nor could they be held guilty of contempt for
disobeying the writ of execution issued by the probate court, which directs therein the Sheriff, thus:
Should lessees fail to pay the aforementioned amounts on rentals, then of the goods and chattels of
said lessees you may cause to be made the sum sufficient to cover the aforestated amounts, but if
no sufficient personal properties are found thereof to satisfy this execution, then of the real
properties you make the sums of money in the manner required by law and make return of your
proceeding under this writ within the reglementary period. 38
It was the sheriff's duty to enforce the writ.39
Under Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the execution calls for payment of money
and the obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode or
payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment
obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt
from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be
levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the
officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal
properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the
personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon. When there is more property
of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much
of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property,
stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal
property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.
The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff to collect from petitioners
the rentals due from the property, and should they fail to pay, from petitioners' personal/real properties
sufficient to cover the amounts sought to be collected. 40 It was not addressed to petitioners. It pertained to
the sheriff to whom the law entrusts the execution of judgments, 41 and it was due to the latter's failure that
the writ was not duly enforced.
In fine, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the Decision dated November 16,
2001 of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition for review on certiorari to be with merit, the decision dated March 26,
2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its Resolution dated January 3,
2002 ordering the temporary release of petitioners is made permanent. The Warrant of Arrest dated
November 19, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 12) in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0
is DEEMED RECALLED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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