MANDATE, JUNE 2009, Prescott v. State of Florida, 343 Fed. Appx. 395 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2009)

6/26/2010 JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, JOR…
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Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. D. C. Docket
No. 08-00364-CV-FTM-29-SPC.
DISPOSITION:
AFFIRMED.
COUNSEL: Jennifer Franklin Prescott, Appellant, Pro se, PALM BEACH, FL.
Jorg Busse, Appellant, Pro se, NAPLES, FL.
For Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust, State of Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, Division of Recreation and parks, Appellees: Reagan Kathleen
Russell, FL Dept. of Environmental Protection, TALLAHASSEE, FL.
For Ken Wilkinson, Appellee: Sherri L. Johnson, Dent & Johnson, Chartered, SARASOTA, FL.
Reagan Russell, Appellee, Pro se, TALLAHASSEE, FL.
lexisone.com/lx1/caselaw/freecaselaw… 1/6
For Lee County, Appellee: Jack N. Peterson, Lee County Attorney's Office, FORT MYERS, FL.
JUDGES: Before BLACK, HULL and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Jennifer Franklin Prescott and Jorg Busse ("the Appellants"), proceeding pro se, appeal the
district court's: (1) dismissal without prejudice of their pro se civil rights complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim and (2) denial of their motion for the
district court judge to recuse himself. Appellee Ken Wilkinson cross-appeals the district court's
denial of his motion for sanctions against the Appellants. [*2] After review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Current Action
The Appellants are owners of Lot 15A in the Cayo Costa subdivision in Lee County, Florida. On
May 5, 2008, the Appellants filed the present pro se complaint against numerous state and
county officials n1 alleging that they had violated the Appellants' constitutional rights with
respect to their Cayo Costa property. Most of the allegations in the complaint concern the 1969
Lee County Resolution 569/875, which claimed the undesignated areas on the east and west
side of the Cayo Costa subdivision plat and all accretions thereto as public land to be used for
public purposes. The Appellants' Lot 15A is on the west side of the Cayo Costa subdivision on
the Gulf of Mexico and is adjacent to land that was claimed through Resolution 569/875 to
create the Cayo Costa State Park.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1
The complaint named the following defendants (herein collectively "the Appellees"): (1) the
State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund; (2) the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection, Division of Recreation and Parks; (3) Lee County,
Florida; (4) the Board of Lee County Commissioners; (5) Jack N. Peterson, Lee County
Attorneys [*3] Jack Peterson, Donna Marie Collins, and David Owen; (6) Lee County property
appraisers Kenneth M. Wilkinson and Sherri L. Johnson; and (7) Cayo Costa State Park
employees Reginald Norman, Harold Vielhauerin, Linda Funchess, Reagan Russell, and Tom
Beason.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Appellants' complaint alleged that the Appellees: (1) passed an invalid resolution that
resulted in the unconstitutional taking of their land without just compensation, the operation of a
state park on their land, and the destruction of their land through the failure to prevent fires on
their property during a drought, all in violation of the Takings and Due Process Clauses; (2)
enacted Lee County Resolution 569/875 without notice and a hearing in violation of the Due
Process Clause; and (3) treated certain individuals differently in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. The Appellants alleged numerous bases for federal jurisdiction. n2 The
complaint also alleged several state law violations, including allegations that the Appellees
recklessly destroyed their property during fires in April 2008, trespassed on their land, and
conspired to defraud and defrauded them of their land. The Appellants requested various
injunctive, declaratory, [*4] punitive, and compensatory relief.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -2
The Appellants alleged that there was federal jurisdiction for their complaint under: (1) 42
U.S.C. § 1983; (2) 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343; (3) Articles III and IV of the U.S. Constitution;
(4) the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) the federal common law doctrines of accretion
and erosion; (6) the Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice, and 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3351; (7) the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2201; and (8) the 1862 Homestead Act.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B. Prior Similar Action
This is the second federal complaint of this nature that has been filed regarding Appellants' Lot
15A. In January 2008, Appellant Busse filed a complaint that made near identical allegations to
the instant complaint, with the exception of the allegations regarding the April 2008 fire.
Appellant Prescott was not a party in the previous case.
On May 5, 2008, the district court dismissed the first complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction
because Busse had not yet pursued available state court remedies and the Takings Clause
claim therefore [*5] was not ripe for review. To the extent that Busse's complaint alleged that
the taking of his property raised a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the district court concluded that there was no independent substantive due
process claim concerning takings and that property rights were not fundamental rights that
would support a substantive due process claim. The district court dismissed Busse's
procedural due process claims regarding Lee County Resolution 569/875 because the
Resolution was a legislative act that was not subject to a procedural due process claim and,
even if it was not, Busse still had not alleged that Florida's post-deprivation remedy was
inadequate. The district court also found that Busse had not stated an equal protection claim
because he had not alleged that there was a similarly situated person for comparison and the
state could not be a comparator.
The district court analyzed the other alleged bases for federal jurisdiction and found that they
were all inadequate. n3 After dismissing Busse's federal claims, the district court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Accordingly, the district court
dismissed [*6] Busse's first complaint without prejudice. n4 Busse appealed the district
court's dismissal of his first complaint, and this Court affirmed. Busse v. Lee County, Florida,
No. 08-13170, 317 Fed. Appx. 968, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5055, 2009 WL 549782 (11th Cir.
Mar 5, 2009) (unpublished).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -3
Specifically, the district court found that: (1) Articles III and IV of the U.S. Constitution did not
provide a basis for federal jurisdiction; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1343 was not a basis for federal
jurisdiction because there were no federal civil rights claims before the court; (3) the 1899
Rivers and Harbors Act was inapplicable; (4) the 1862 Homestead Act had been repealed; (5) if
the federal common law doctrines of accretion and erosion existed, they did not provide a basis
for federal jurisdiction; and (6) the Federal Appraisal Standards were inapplicable.4
The Appellants filed the complaint in the present case on the same day that the district court
dismissed the first complaint.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
C. Dismissal of Current Action
The Appellees moved to dismiss the Appellants' second complaint for the same reasons
outlined in the orders from the district court and this Court in the first case. The district court
ordered the Appellants to show cause why the complaint should [*7] not be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court stated that the complaint was nearly identical to
the previous complaint filed by Busse that was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and that the Appellants had not cured the deficiencies noted in the first dismissal order.
After receiving the Appellants' responses, the district court granted the Appellees' motions to
dismiss. The district court determined that the Appellants' complaint was nearly identical to
Busse's complaint in the previous case. The district court stated that it previously had
explained its reasoning for dismissing Busse's claims and adopted the reasoning from its order
in the first case.
The district court also denied the Appellants' multiple motions for the district court judge to
recuse himself. The Appellants had requested that the district court judge recuse himself
because he had ruled against Busse in the previous lawsuit and because the district court's
refusal to find that Resolution 569/875 was invalid showed that the judge was biased. The
district court determined that the Appellants had not asserted any reasonable basis for recusal.
Finally, one of the Appellees, [*8] Wilkinson, moved for sanctions against the Appellants
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c). Wilkinson alleged that (1) the Appellants knew
the district court did not have jurisdiction over their complaint because the court previously had
dismissed an identical complaint and (2) the complaint was filed in bad faith to harass the
Appellees. Appellee Wilkinson requested that the district court award him attorney's fees and
issue an injunction preventing Busse from representing himself in the case and filing further
lawsuits in the court. The district court denied Wilkinson's motion, but warned the Appellants
that they may be sanctioned in the future if they were to file another complaint with similar
allegations, file the same document numerous times, or improperly designate a motion as an
emergency.
The Appellants appeal the district court's dismissal of their instant complaint and denial of their
motion for recusal. n5 Appellee Wilkinson cross-appeals the district court's denial of his motion
for sanctions. n6
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -5
We review de novo questions concerning our subject matter jurisdiction, including ripeness.
See Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2006). We review de novo a [*9] grant
of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "accepting the allegations in the complaint as
true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Swann v. S. Health
Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 2004). "Courts must construe pro se complaints
more liberally than they would formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Brown v. Crawford, 906
F.2d 667, 673 (11th Cir. 1990).
We review for abuse of discretion a district judge's recusal decision. Thomas v. Tenneco
Packaging Co., Inc., 293 F.3d 1306, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2002).6
We review the denial of a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 for an abuse of discretion. Beck
v. Prupis, 162 F.3d 1090, 1100 (11th Cir. 1998).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
II. DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim
Both the district court and this Court addressed the Appellants' takings, procedural and
substantive due process, and equal protection claims in detail in the previous case concerning
the Appellants' property. See Busse, No. 08-13170, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5055, 2009 WL
549782, at *2-4. The Appellants' present complaint raises nearly identical allegations and
Appellants have not remedied the pleading deficiencies that resulted in the first [*10]
dismissal. n7 The district court dismissed the Appellants' present complaint for the same
reasons stated in its dismissal order in the first case. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
dismissal for the same reasons stated in our opinion in the first case. See id. We repeat our
reasoning briefly here.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -7
The claims in the present complaint are not precluded under res judicata, collateral estoppel, or
the law of the case doctrine because this litigation involves slightly different parties and the first
complaint was not decided on the merits. Nevertheless, the analysis by the district court and
this Court in the first case applies equally here because the present complaint contains
essentially the same allegations as the first complaint.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
First, the district court properly dismissed the Appellants' Taking Clause claim for lack of
jurisdiction because it was not ripe. A just compensation claim is not ripe "until the landowner
has pursued the available state procedures to obtain just compensation." Eide v. Sarasota
County, 908 F.2d 716, 721 (11th Cir. 1990). Florida courts have recognized a reverse
condemnation remedy, see Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994),
and [*11] the Appellants have not alleged that they pursued this remedy. This requirement
applies even though the reverse condemnation remedy was not recognized until after the
alleged taking occurred. Id. ("[A] Florida property owner must pursue a reverse condemnation
remedy in state court before his federal takings claim will be ripe, even where that remedy was
recognized after the alleged taking occurred.").
Second, the district court properly dismissed the Appellants' procedural due process claim
because they failed to allege that Florida's post-deprivation remedies were inadequate. Tinney
v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996).
Third, the district court properly determined that the Appellants failed to state a substantive due
process claim. To the extent that the Appellants' substantive due process claim was predicated
on the denial of a state-defined property right, they did not state a viable substantive due
process claim. Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262
(11th Cir. 2003) (stating that substantive due process protects fundamental rights protected by
the Constitution, which does not include state-created property interests). Even if the alleged
[*12] deprivation was the result of a legislative act, as opposed to an executive act, the
Appellants did not allege that there is a property right at stake that is not already protected by
the Takings Clause. Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 615 (11th
Cir. 1997) ("There is no substantive due process 'takings' claim that would protect a specific
property right not already protected by the Takings Clause.").
Fourth, the district court properly determined that the Appellants' conclusory allegations failed
to state an equal protection claim because, inter alia, they did not allege that similarly situated
persons had been treated disparately. Thigpen v. Bibb County, 223 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th
Cir. 2000) ("[T]o properly plead an equal protection claim, a plaintiff need only allege that
through state action, similarly situated persons have been treated disparately."), abrogated on
other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153
L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002).
For the reasons above, and those articulated in our opinion affirming the dismissal in Busse's
first complaint, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the Appellants' complaint. n8
Furthermore, because [*13] the district court correctly dismissed the Appellants' federal
claims for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their remaining state law
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th
Cir. 2004).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -8
As stated in our opinion in the first case, we agree with the district court's analysis of the other
bases for jurisdiction asserted in the Appellants' complaint and conclude that none of them
could serve as a jurisdictional basis for Busse's claims. See Busse, No. 08-13170, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5055, 2009 WL 549782, at *2 n.2. To the extent that the Appellants raised claims
in their complaint that are not addressed in their brief, those claims are abandoned on appeal.
See Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002). To the extent that the
Appellants attempt to raise a Fourth Amendment claim or any other claim for the first time on
appeal, we will not consider them because they were not raised in the district court. Access
Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2004).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B. Motion for the District Court to Recuse
The [*14] district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Appellants' motion for
recusal. The district court's rulings in Busse's first case are not a sufficient basis to question
the district court's impartiality in the present case so as to warrant recusal. Thomas v.
Tenneco Packaging Co., Inc., 293 F.3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating the general rule
that "bias sufficient to disqualify a judge must stem from extrajudicial sources" (quotation
marks omitted)); United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 884 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[A] motion
for disqualification may not ordinarily be based on the judge's rulings in the same case."). The
Appellants have not alleged, much less shown, that the district court made any remarks that
demonstrated a bias or prejudice against the Appellants. See Thomas, 293 F.3d at 1329
(stating an exception to the general rule that bias must stem from extrajudicial sources "when
a judge's remarks in a judicial context demonstrate such pervasive bias and prejudice that it
constitutes bias against a party" (quotation marks omitted)).
C. Rule 11 Sanctions
Although this issue is closer, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in
denying Appellee [*15] Wilkinson's motion for sanctions. The district court was intimately
familiar with the Appellees' claims in both complaints and their conduct throughout the litigation
and was thus in the best position to determine whether Rule 11 sanctions were appropriate.
We note that the district court has now warned the Appellees that their conduct may warrant
sanctions in the future if continued.
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore, we affirm the district court's orders dismissing the Appellants' complaint, denying the
Appellants' motion for recusal, and denying the Appellees' motion for sanctions.
AFFIRMED.
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Case 2:08-cv-00364-JES-SPC Document 158 Filed 06/19/09 Page 1 of 13
Crooked Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell
http://www.scribd.com/Judicial%20Fraud
“DESCRIPTION”
OF HORSESHIT:
CASE NO. 08-13170-B
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
JORG BUSSE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEE

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; LEE COUNTY
PROPERTY APPRAISER; STATE OF FLORIDA
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL
IMPROVEMENT FUND, STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________________/
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT COURT OF FLORIDA, FORT MYERS DIVISION
_________________________________________________________________
ANSWER BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA and BOARD of LEE
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
DAVID M. OWEN
LEE COUNTY ATTORNEY
2115 Second Street
Post Office Box 398
Fort Myers, Florida 33902
(239) 533-2236
(239) 485-2118 FAX
JACK N. PETERSON
Assistant County Attorney
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Public records confirm that Busse owns a lot in a platted subdivision located
in Lee County. This lot (50' x 130') abuts a platted 60 foot wide street. At some point
westward of the street is the Gulf of Mexico Since the subdivision was platted in
1912, considerable accretion has occurred on land bordering the Gulf of Mexico
westward of Busse’s lot. Appellant claims riparian rights. Lee County has claimed
said accreted lands for public park purposes.
4
JUDICIAL TRASH
DOC. # 213
2:09-cv-00791-CEH-SPC
Prescott, et al., v. State of Florida, et al., 343 Fed. Appx. 395, 396-97 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2009):
“I. BACKGROUND
A. Current Action
The Appellants are owners of Lot 15A in the Cayo Costa subdivision
in Lee County, Florida. On May 5, 2008, the Appellants filed the present
pro se complaint against numerous state and county officials n1 alleging
that they had violated the Appellants' constitutional rights with respect to
their Cayo Costa property. Most of the allegations in the complaint
concern the 1969 Lee County Resolution 569/875, which claimed the
undesignated areas on the east and west side of the Cayo Costa
subdivision plat and all accretions thereto as public land to be used for
public purposes. The Appellants' Lot 15A is on the west side of the
Cayo Costa subdivision on the Gulf of Mexico and is adjacent to
land that was claimed through Resolution 569/875 to create the
Cayo Costa State Park.”
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
The complaint named the following defendants (herein collectively "the Appellees"): (1) the State of
Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund; (2) the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, Division of Recreation and Parks; (3) Lee County, Florida; (4) the Board of
Lee County Commissioners; (5) Jack N. Peterson, Lee County Attorneys [*3] Jack Peterson, Donna
Marie Collins, and David Owen; (6) Lee County property appraisers Kenneth M. Wilkinson and Sherri L.
Johnson; and (7) Cayo Costa State Park employees Reginald Norman, Harold Vielhauerin, Linda
Funchess, Reagan Russell, and Tom Beason.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Suit
Appellant Busse claims to own and public records confirm his ownership of a
50' x 130' lot bordering a platted 60' street on a barrier island in Lee County named
Cayo Costa. Busse claims riparian rights. The State, the County and the Property
Appraiser deny his claim of riparian rights.
2. Course of Proceedings
Busse’s various attempts to frame a complaint (Dkt. Nos. 1, 25, 102, 282,
288) were dismissed by the Court (Dkt. Nos. 87, 267, 338). Between these events,
Busse, in what can only be termed as vexatiously, filed a barrage of “motions” (e.g.
Dkt. No. 65: “emergency motion for criminal prosecution of defendants’ lawyers”;
Dkt. No. 68: “plaintiff’s motion for emergency hearing on the issue of defendants’
1969 bogus resolution”; Dkt. No. 70:, inter alia, “motion to restrain defendants...from
use of deadly weapons in the private Cayo Costa subdivision”) and other pleadings
variously termed “notices” (e.g. Dkt.Nos. 48, 62, 63, 92, 221), “responses”,
“exhibits”, “evidence”, “interrogatories”, “affidavits”, “memorandums”, etc. The
docket below stands res ipsa loquitur.
Busse, apparently as a litigation tactic, also filed formal complaints with the
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

1. Nature of the Suit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Course of Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Disposition Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. The District Court properly dismissed the complaint for lack of
federal subject matter jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
i
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August ____, 2008, I sent two true and correct
copies of the foregoing to: Jorg Busse, Post Office Box 1126, Naples, FL 34106-
1126; and one copy each to the following: Harold G. Vielhauer, Esq., L. Kathryn
Funchess, Esq. and Reagan K. Russell, Esq., Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., M.S. 35, Tallahassee, FL 32399 and Sherri
L. Johnson, Dent & Johnson, Chartered, 3415 Magic Oak Lane, Post Office Box
3259, Sarasota, FL 34230.
DAVID M. OWEN
LEE COUNT ATTORNEY
2115 SECOND STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 398
FORT MYERS, FLORIDA 33902
(239) 533-2236
By:________________________
JACK N. PETERSON
Assistant County Attorney
Florida Bar No. 0832774
11
JUDICIAL TRASH
DOC. # 213, PAGE 5
CORRUPT BUNGLING JUDGE
CHARLENE EDWARDS HONEYWELL
“I. BACKGROUND 4
Plaintiffs allege that they are the owners of Lot 15A in the Cayo Costa
Subdivision of Lee County, Florida (Dkt. 1, ¶1; Dkt. 5, ¶1). In a resolution
adopted in December 1969 by the Board of Commissioners of Lee County,
Florida, Lot 15A, among other property, was claimed as public land (“Resolution
569/875") (Dkt 5, Ex. 3, p. 9). See Prescott, et al., v. State of Florida, et al., 343
Fed. Appx. 395, 396-97 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2009); Busse, et al. v. Lee County,
Florida, et al., 317 Fed. Appx. 968, 970 (11th Cir. Mar 5, 2009).”
PUBLIC PROPERTY TAX RECORDS:
PLAINTIFFS PAID PROPERTY TAXES:
LAND PARCEL “12-44-20-01-00015.015A”
“LEGAL DESCRIPTION:
CAYO COSTA PB 3 PG 25 LOT 15A”
“PAID”
By
Jennifer Franklin Prescott,
Dr. Jorg Busse,
Record Unimpeachable Landowners
CORRUPT HONEYWELL STRUCK AGAIN:

Fixed Latest Case & “Dismissed”
UN-FILED Allegations & Evidence
against Defendant(s), e.g.:
Johnson Engineering, Inc.
Lee County, Florida
Lee County Value Adjustment Board
State of Florida Attorney General
Janes
Bigelow
Pivacek
Mann
Siebens
Hayes
Rutland
Scott
Peterson Bernard
Judah
Quillen
Carta
Hall
Gilbertson
Martin
THE COURT ONLY FILED

COMPLAINT PAGES 1-100,
AND 179,180.
THE COURT NEVER FILED

PAGES 101-178 AND EXHIBITS:
See Doc. # 1.
Page Defendant(s)
9 State of Florida
26 Stevens
32 Lach
34 Russell
38 Alejo
49 Peterson
56 Wilkinson
73 Green
79 Hawes
81 Desjarlais
94-113 (U.S. Attorneys)
Face of Real Estate Fraud:
• Fake “lot” and “block” numbers such as,
e.g.:
o “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0”;
o “07-44-21-01-00001.0000”;
Neither fake “lot” “00A0” nor “block”
“00001”ever existed.
• Fake “Government ownership” claims;
• Fake “transaction(s)” such as, e.g., “O.R.
569/875”;
• Fake “resolution” and “law” “claims”;
• Fake “land” “parcels”;
• Fake “frivolity” “defenses”;
• Fake “vexatiousness” contentions;
• Fake “legal descriptions”:
http://www.reportpubliccorruption.org/
http://www.reportpubliccorruption.org/
Case 2:09-cv-00791-CEH-SPC Document 213 Filed 06/23/10 Page 1 of 23
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FT. MYERS DIVISION
JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT,

DR. JORG BUSSE,
Plaintiffs,
v. CASE NO. 2: 09-CV-791-FtM-36SPC
ROGER ALEJO; KENNETH M. WILKINSON;

JACK N. PETERSON; ROGER DESJARLAIS;
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; LEE COUNTY
VALUE ADJUSTMENT BOARD; LORI L.
RUTLAND; STATE OF FLORIDA, BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT
TRUST FUND; STATE OF FLORIDA,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION; CHAD LACH; CHARLES "BARRY"
STEVENS; REAGAN KATHLEEN RUSSELL;
KAREN B. HAWES; CHARLIE GREEN; BOB JANES;
BRIAN BIGELOW; RAY JUDAH; TAMMY HALL;
FRANK MANN; UNITED STATES ATTORNEY(S);
SEAN P. FLYNN; E. KENNETH STEGEBY; DAVID
P. RHODES; A. BRIAN ALBRITTON; CYNTHIA A.
PIVACEK; JOHNSON ENGINEERING, INC.; STEVEN
CARTA; MIKE SCOTT; HUGH D. HAYES; GERALD
D. SIEBENS; STATE OF FLORIDA ATTORNEY
GENERAL; WILLIAM M. MARTIN; PETERSON
BERNARD; SKIP QUILLEN; TOM GILBERTSON,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on five motions to dismiss: 1) Defendants A. Brian
Albritton, Sean P. Flynn, E. Kenneth Stegeby, and David P. Rhodes filed their Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Injunctive Relief on February 26, 2010 (Dkt. 69);1 2) Defendants Kenneth W.
Wilkinson, Roger Alejo, Roger Desjarlais, Jack N. Peterson, Lee County, Florida, Karen B. Hawes,
Charlie Green, Bob Janes, Brian Bigelow, Ray Judah, Tammy Hall, and Frank Mann filed their
Motion to Dismiss on March 30, 2010 (Dkt. 115);2 3) Defendants The Honorable Hugh D. Hayes
and The Honorable Cynthia A. Pivacek filed their Motion to Dismiss on April 12, 2010 (Dkt. 148);
4) Defendant Mike Scott filed his Motion to Dismiss on April 20, 2010 (Dkt. 158); and Defendant
Johnson Engineering, Inc. filed its Motion to Dismiss on May 24, 2010 (Dkt. 179).
In addition, Plaintiffs have filed several motions: 1) Emergency Motion to Enjoin Fraudulent
Judgments and Execution of Fraudulent Judgments in Case No. 2:07-CV-228 filed on December 4,
2009 (Dkt. 5); 2) Emergency Motion for Judicial Notice of Appeal and Payment of Appeal Fees in
U.S. District Court, Case # 2:07-CV-00228-Fort Myers-JES-SPC, Doc. # 428, Appeal From
Governmental Corruption, Fraud, and Fraud on the Court filed on March 29, 2010 (Dkt. 118); 3)
Motion for Summary Judgment Against U.S. Attorneys filed on March 29, 2010 (Dkt. 119); 4)
Motion for Sanctions After Expiration of 21 Days, and Memorandum, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 filed on
March 29, 2010 (Dkt. 121); 5) Motion for Change of Venue Because of Record Corruption,
Concealment, Fraud on the Court, and Obstruction of Justice filed on March 29, 2010 (Dkt. 123);
6) Motion for Relief from Defendants’ Fraud on the Court, and Memorandum in Support of
Defendants’ Fraud on the Court and Fraudulent Pleadings, Doc. # 69, and 70, and Plaintiffs’ Direct
1
These Defendants also filed a motion for injunctive relief (Dkt. 97) and a motion for
sanctions against Plaintiffs (Dkt. 149).
2
These Defendants also adopted co-Defendants Albritton, Flynn, Stegeby and Rhodes’
Motion (Dkt. 69) as to “Background,” Argument, and Injunctive Relief in their Motion to
Dismiss.
-2-
Attack Upon Any and All Previous Orders & Judgments, Which Were Procured Through Fraud &
Fraudulent Pretenses filed on March 29, 2010 (Dkt. 124); 7) Motions for Corrections of Docket and
Filing of Entire Complaint filed on April 7, 2010 (Dkt. 135);3 8) Emergency Motions to Enjoin
Fraudulent Concealment of Governmental Forgeries by Crooked Defendant Assistant Attorney Jack
N. Peterson, and Strike His Purported “Motion to Dismiss” for Idiotic Name Calling Such As, E.G.,
“Vexatious and/or Bothersome Litigant” to Criminally Coerce the Plaintiffs to Refrain from
Litigation filed on April 9, 2010 (Dkt. 143); 9) Emergency Motion for Recusal of “Judicial
Prostitute” Chappell Who Accepted Defendants’ Bribes in Exchange for Case Fixing, See “Order,”
Doc. # 127, 04/01/2010 and for Judicial Notice of Nazi-Style Judicial and Governmental Record
Bullying & Coercion to Cover Up Governmental Forgeries filed on April 12, 2010 (Dkt. 144); 10)
Emergency Motions for Judicial Notice of Governmental Terror by Vexatious Defendants and of
Appeal Number 10-10967-I as “Docketed on March 5, 2010" filed on April 9, 2010 (Dkt. 146);11)
Emergency Motion to ‘Enjoin’ Nazi-Style Governmental Tactics of Terror, Oppression, Retaliation,
Fraud on the Court, Doc. # 149, and Criminal Concealment of Forgeries “O.R. 569/875" filed on
April 16, 2010 (Dkt. 152); 12) Emergency Motions for Judgment(s) on the Merits Against
Defendants Lee County and Sanctions Against Said Defendants for Criminal Concealment of Fake
“Law,” “O.R. 569/875,” which Had No Legal Effect, Because Law Prohibited “Legislative
Adjudication” of Fundamental Property Rights & Plaintiffs’ Record Ownership filed on April 23,
2010 (Dkt. 160); 13) Emergency Motions for Judgment(s) on the Merits Against “Federal
3
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, that was transferred from the West Palm Beach Division of the
Southern District of Florida, contains 103 pages. However, the last two pages of the Complaint
are numbered 179 and 180. Pages 101-178 are not included in the instant Complaint. The Court
has confirmed, through inquiry of the Clerk of the Southern District of Florida, that Plaintiffs’
Complaint was filed without pages 101 - 178 and without any exhibits.
-3-
Defendants” and Sanctions Against Said Defendants, and “Legal Whore” Corinis, for Criminal
Concealment of Fake “Law,” E.G. Doc. #159, 04/21/2010, filed on April 23, 2010 (Dkt. 161); 14)
Emergency Motion to Cease and Desist Case Fixing & Adjudicate Pro Se Plaintiffs’ Claims in Their
Favor Under the Law filed on April 23, 2010 (Dkt. 162);15) Emergency Motion to Enjoin Reverse
Discrimination & Fraud by Afro American Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell Against the Pro Se
Caucasian Plaintiffs filed on April 23, 2010 (Dkt. 163); 16) Emergency Motion to Enjoin Hate Mail
& Threats by Defendant Psychopath Jack N. Peterson filed on April 23, 2010 (Dkt. 164); 17)
Emergency Motion to Comply with Fed. R. Evidence and to Enjoin “Final Solution” of “Frivolity”
and Hate Crimes against Pro Se Plaintiffs filed on April 23, 2010 (Dkt. 165); 18) Motion for
Sanctions Against Defendant Judges Who Concealed Criminal Invasion of Private Property Rights
Under Fraudulent Pretenses of “Frivolity” Doc. # 148 “04/12/2010" filed on April 23, 2010 (Dkt.
166); 19) Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 1, 2010 (Dkt. 182); 20) Motion for
Reconsideration of Order filed on June 1, 2010 (Dkt. 183); 21) Emergency Motion to Enjoin Record
Crimes & “Public Sale” Scam Perpetrated by Defendant Corrupt Official Kenneth M. Wilkinson,
Emergency Motion to Enjoin Record Crimes and “Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property,”
by Defendant Corrupt Official Kenneth M. Wilkinson, Doc. # 432-3, 5/21/10, Public Notice of Prima
Facie Criminality of “Wilkinson’s Motion for Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property
and Incorporated Memorandum of Law,” Doc. # 432, 05/21/2010, and Cover Up of Corruption under
Fraudulent Pretenses of “Frivolity” filed on June 4, 2010 (Dkt. 184); 22) Emergency Motion for
Relief from Fraud on the Court, Rule 60(b), Judicial Corruption, Bribery, and Criminal Concealment
of Record Absence of Any “Lee County” Title or Ownership of Facially Forged Parcels “12-44-20-
01-00000.00A0" & 07-44-21-01-00001.0000 filed on June 17, 2010 (Dkt. 191); 23) Emergency
-4-
Motions for Change of Venue Because of Proven Judicial Corruption, Bribery, and Criminal
Concealment of Record Absence of Any “Lee County” Title or Ownership of Facially Forged Parcels
“12-44-20-01-00000.00A0" & 07-44-21-01-00001.0000 filed on June 17, 2010 (Dkt. 192); 24)
Emergency Motion for Recusal of Defendant Crooked Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell, 28
U.S.C. § 455, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 filed on June 17, 2010 (Dkt. 193); and 25) Emergency Motion
for Order to Show Good Cause Why Crooked Judge C.E. Honeywell is Not Conspiring to Criminally
Conceal Governmental Forgery of Non-Existent Sham “Parcel” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0" as
Evidenced by 1912 Plat in Lee County Plat Book 3, Page 25, and Transcript of 11/07/2007 Court
Hearing Before Crooked Chappell filed on June 17, 2010 (Dkt. 194).
I. BACKGROUND4
Plaintiffs allege that they are the owners of Lot 15A in the Cayo Costa Subdivision of Lee
County, Florida (Dkt. 1, ¶1; Dkt. 5, ¶1). In a resolution adopted in December 1969 by the Board of
Commissioners of Lee County, Florida, Lot 15A, among other property, was claimed as public land
(“Resolution 569/875") (Dkt 5, Ex. 3, p. 9). See Prescott, et al., v. State of Florida, et al., 343 Fed.
Appx. 395, 396-97 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2009); Busse, et al. v. Lee County, Florida, et al., 317 Fed.
Appx. 968, 970 (11th Cir. Mar 5, 2009).
On November 17, 2009, Plaintiff Busse appeared for a “quasi-judicial proceeding[]” before
a Special Magistrate of the Value Adjustment Board of Lee County, Florida (Dkt. 1, p. 2; Dkt. 64,
Ex. 1). Busse appealed a denial of agricultural classification of Lot 15A (Dkt. 64, Ex. 1, p. 38).
Special Magistrate Lori Rutland noted that although he appealed a denial of the agricultural
4
Plaintiffs’ Complaint is over one hundred (100) pages and does not clearly explain or
designate the factual bases of the underlying causes of action. Based on multiple reviews of the
Complaint, in addition to the opinions written by the Eleventh Circuit, this Court attempts to
summarize the bases of Plaintiffs’ claims.
-5-
classification5 of Lot 15A, Busse “directed his testimony and argument to issues involving a
boundary dispute that he had with the Property Appraiser and Lee County” (Dkt. 64, Ex. 1, p. 38).
Special Magistrate Rutland further noted that she made “no findings concerning [Busse’s] argument
regarding a boundary dispute with the County and the Property Appraiser as that [was] not the issue
on appeal. The only issue [was] whether this property [was] entitled to an agricultural classification”
(Dkt. 64, Ex. 1, p. 38). Besides this hearing before the Special Magistrate, there is no indication or
record of a state court proceeding addressing the property dispute that Plaintiffs continue to pursue
in federal court.
A. Previous Cases
A total of nine cases have been filed in or transferred to the Middle District of Florida
relating to Plaintiffs’ property dispute.
1. Case Number 2:07-CV-228
The first case was filed by Plaintiff Busse against Defendants Lee County, et al. Busse
asserted that Defendants deprived him of ownership and riparian rights as to Lot 15A of the Cayo
Costa Subdivision. Busse further claimed that Resolution 569/875 violated his property rights in the
specified lot. Judge John Steele previously found that there was no jurisdiction over the Takings
Clause claim, no procedural due process claim stated, no equal protection claim stated, and no other
basis for exercising federal jurisdiction. On May 5, 2008, Judge Steele issued an Opinion and Order
dismissing Busse’s Third Amended Complaint without prejudice as to all of the defendants (2:07-
CV-228, Dkt. 338), and a judgment was entered the following day (2:07-CV-228, Dkt. 339).
5
On August 30, 2006, Busse filed an application for agricultural classification of the
property based on the alleged use of bee boxes. The Property Appraiser denied the application
because the property was not being used for a bona fide agricultural purpose when the Appraiser
made a physical inspection of the property on September 15, 2006.
-6-
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that Busse did not state a valid claim for procedural
due process, equal protection, or substantive due process (2:07-CV-228, Dkt. 365, p. 10-12); Busse,
et al. v. Lee County, Florida, et al., 317 Fed. Appx. 968, 974 (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2009), reh’g denied,
347 Fed. Appx. 555 (11th Cir. May 27, 2009). As for the Takings Clause claim, the Eleventh Circuit
held that Busse “ha[d] not alleged that he sought and was denied compensation through available
state procedures,” and therefore, “his Takings Clause claim [was] not . . . ripe for review” (2:07-CV-
228, Dkt. 365, p. 9). Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal
(2:07-CV-228, Dkt. 365).6
In light of the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmation, Busse filed several notices of appeal in July
2009, seeking review of the same motions and demands that had previously been dismissed by the
Eleventh Circuit. All of these notices were dismissed for lack of prosecution because Busse did not
pay the filing fees.
Despite previous court orders, Busse continued to file repetitive motions for relief from the
judgment (2:07-CV-228, Dkt. 381-83), which were denied as moot (2:07-CV-228, Dkt. 384). On
November 30, 2009, Defendant Wilkinson filed a Motion for Writ of Execution (2:07-CV-228, Dkt.
386). Busse then filed several emergency motions for relief from the “fraudulent” judgment, in
addition to several notices of appeal (2:07-CV-228, Dkt. 388-415). Again, the notices of appeal
were dismissed for lack of prosecution, and an order was issued on January 26, 2010 denying all of
Busse’s pending notices of appeal and emergency motions for relief and recusal (2:07-CV-228, Dkt.
422). Notably, the Order directed the Clerk to no longer accept any filing, related or unrelated to this
6
Busse also filed a notice of appeal claiming case-fixing, bribery, corruption,
conspiracy under false pretenses, etc. on May 4, 2009. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the
Notice of Appeal sua sponte because Busse did not file it within 30 days of the District Court’s
order, thus making his demands moot (Dkt. 366, p. 2).
-7-
specific case, by Plaintiff Prescott or Plaintiff Busse, for filing in the case was closed, except for a
single notice of appeal as to the Order.
On February 1, 2010, the Magistrate Judge issued an order granting Defendant Wilkinson’s
Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution (2:07-CV-228, Dkt. 424). The Writ of Execution issued
on February 2, 2010 (2:07-CV-228, Dkt. 425).
2. Case No. 2:08-CV-364
In the midst of the initial case, Plaintiffs filed a second complaint on May 5, 2008, which was
the same day that Judge Steele dismissed Plaintiff Busse’s complaint in Case No. 2:07-CV-228.
On July 15, 2008, the Court issued an order emphasizing that the allegations in the complaint were
nearly identical to those in 2:07-CV-228 (2:08-CV-364, Dkt. 56). Because the Court previously
found no basis for federal jurisdiction over Busse’s claims, it directed Plaintiffs to show cause as to
why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On July 24, 2008, the
Court issued an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice for the same reasons as previously
stated in the related case, 2:07-CV-228 (2:08-CV-364, Dkt. 70).7
3. Case No. 2:08-CV-899
On December 8, 2008, while 2:07-CV-228 was pending and after 2:08-CV-364 was
dismissed, Plaintiffs filed a third complaint. In this case, Plaintiffs alleged claims against various
state and federal judges, including Judge Steele, Magistrate Judge Sheri Chappell, and state entities,
alleging that Plaintiffs held “perfect exclusive unencumbered legal title” to Lot 15A, which was the
basis of the two previous cases (2:08-CV-899, Dkt. 2, ¶2). Because the previous complaints were
7
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Prescott, et al. v. State
of Florida, et al., 343 Fed. Appx. 395 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2009).
-8-
dismissed, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants were corrupt and denied their rights. The judges in the
Fort Myers Division of the Middle District of Florida recused themselves from presiding over this
case (2:08-CV-899, Dkt. 7). Consequently, Judge Richard Lazzara and Magistrate Judge Mark Pizzo
of the Tampa Division presided over the case.
On December 30, 2008, Magistrate Judge Pizzo entered an order directing Plaintiffs to show
cause as to why the case should not be dismissed based on the Opinion and Order entered in 2:07-
CV-228 (2:08-CV-899, Dkt. 52). The Order also established certain restrictions on Plaintiffs’ filings
and contact with parties. Upon finding violations of the Order, Magistrate Judge Pizzo set a hearing
for which Plaintiffs failed to appear (2:08-CV-899, Dkt. 75). After their failure to appear, Magistrate
Judge Pizzo entered another order directing Plaintiffs to appear before Judge Lazzara to show cause
as to why they should not be adjudged in contempt (2:08-CV-899, Dkt. 76). Magistrate Judge Pizzo
also issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Complaint be dismissed with
prejudice (2:08-CV-899, Dkt. 121).
On the date of the second hearing, January 20, 2009, Plaintiffs once again failed to appear
in spite of notice that they would be subject to sanctions if they did not appear as directed (2:08-CV-
899, Dkt. 147-48). On February 4, 2009, the Report and Recommendation was adopted, the case
was dismissed with prejudice, and further filings in the case were restricted (2:08-CV-899, Dkt.
186). The numerous and non-consolidated appeals were dismissed by the Eleventh Circuit because
the orders appealed were not appealable, the notices of appeal were untimely, or the appeals were
not prosecuted.
4. Case No. 2:09-CV-41
On January 23, 2009, while 2:07-CV-228 was being appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, after
-9-
2:08-CV-364 was dismissed and before 2:08-CV-899 was dismissed, Plaintiffs filed a fourth
complaint again alleging conspiracy, “case-fixing,” corruption, and fraud by various federal and state
judges, including Judge Steele, Magistrate Judge Chappell, and other state entities with regard to the
same property. As done previously, the judges in the Fort Myers Division of the Middle District of
Florida recused themselves from presiding over this case (2:09-CV-41, Dkt. 7). On January 30,
2009, Judge Lazzara issued an order directing Plaintiffs to show cause as to why the case should not
be dismissed with prejudice and without notice (2:09-CV-41, Dkt. 8). On February 10, 2009, finding
only “a barrage of motions, objections, and miscellaneous pleadings which were prolix in nature and
incomprehensible and unintelligible in content,” Judge Lazzara dismissed the complaint with
prejudice and directed that no further filings in the case would be accepted except for a single notice
of appeal (2:09-CV-41, Dkt. 75).8 On September 10, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit summarily affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint and four days later dismissed the additional appeals for want of
prosecution (2:09-CV-41, Dkt. 133-34).
5. Case No. 2:09-CV-341
On May 26, 2009, after having two complaints dismissed without prejudice and two
complaints dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiffs filed a fifth complaint alleging, yet again, claims
against federal judges, the Clerk of Court, various state entities and counsel who appeared on behalf
of named Defendants. Plaintiffs alleged several nefarious acts relating to the same property. Judge
Lazzara issued an order directing Plaintiffs to show cause as to why the complaint should not be
dismissed as frivolous (2:09-CV-341, Dkt. 7). On June 4, 2009, Judge Lazzara dismissed the case
with prejudice after finding no intelligent response to the previous Order and determining that the
8
Judge Lazzara previously reminded Plaintiffs of the Court’s obligation to respond to
copious and almost daily emergency filings (See, e.g. 2:09-CV-41, Dkt. 31).
- 10 -
complaint was patently frivolous (2:09-CV-341, Dkt. 17). Plaintiffs’ filings were again restricted
based on their consistent pattern of frivolous filings of motions and notices. The numerous appeals
were dismissed as frivolous or for want of prosecution.
6. Case No. 2:09-CV-602
On September 11, 2009, after the previous five cases were dismissed, Plaintiffs filed a sixth
complaint relating to the same property. As before, Plaintiffs filed complaints alleging nefarious
acts against federal judges, state judges, state entities, counsel representing Defendants, and even the
United States of America. After several motions were filed by Plaintiffs for recusal, summary
judgment, and other judicial actions, Judge Lazzara issued an order on November 11, 2009
dismissing the case with prejudice (2:09-CV-602, Dkt. 148). Judge Lazzara further directed the
Clerk not to accept any filings from Plaintiffs in this case with the exception of a single notice of
appeal from the Order. Judge Lazzara also warned that if Plaintiffs instituted another baseless action
that the Court would look favorably on imposing an injunction and sanctions.
7. Case No. 2:10-CV-89
On February 9, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their eighth complaint about the same property. Again,
Plaintiffs filed claims against federal judges, state judges, state entities, and counsel representing
Defendants. This case has been reassigned to this Court.
8. Case No. 2:10-CV-390
On June 21, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their ninth complaint about the same property and court
proceedings that have occurred in prior lawsuits. Plaintiffs filed claims against federal judges and
attorneys. This case has been assigned to Judge John Steele.
- 11 -
B. Current Case
Despite having a total of six dismissed complaints and being warned of instituting another
action pertaining to Lot 15A against the same and similar Defendants, Plaintiffs filed their present
complaint on December 1, 2009 in the West Palm Beach Division of the Southern District of
Florida9 (Dkt. 1). Yet again, Plaintiffs assert virtually the same allegations of corruption, fraud, and
bribery against state judges, state entities, and counsel for Defendants among others. Despite titling
their Complaint as an “Independent Action for Relief from Fraud on the Courts,” it is apparent that
the present complaint relates to the same property, Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa Subdivision. In their
Complaint, which totals in excess of 230 numbered paragraphs, Plaintiffs continue to allege
Constitutional violations relating to this property and the litigation surrounding it. As outlined
previously, Plaintiffs have filed a litany of motions and notices, most of which are convoluted and
incomprehensible.
Plaintiffs allege claims in this case against several Defendants from previous litigation.
Plaintiffs claim violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments (Dkt. 1,
¶229). They also state that there is federal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985, 1988. Id. These claims are in addition to several alleged state law claims.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Failure to State a Claim
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, [ ] a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’
9
The case was transferred to the Fort Myers Division of the Middle District of Florida on
December 4, 2009 (Dkt. 3).
- 12 -
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007)(citations omitted). A plaintiff must plead enough facts to state a plausible basis for the claim.
Id.(emphasis added). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d
1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)(citing Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1477, 1491 (11th Cir.
1991)).
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1988,10 in addition to
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. Even assuming that a
federal question is present, this case must be dismissed for failure to adequately state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to state a cause of action in “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” There is a
higher pleading requirement for Section 1983 cases in the Eleventh Circuit to “weed out
10
42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) reads:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district

courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised
Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced
in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws
are suitable to carry the same into effect . . . .
The Court is unclear what claim Plaintiffs attempt to allege under this particular statute.
Generally, this statute has been cited as it applies to attorney and expert fees. 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b), (c). Seeing that neither appears to be applicable to this case, the Court will not analyze
this alleged claim.
- 13 -
nonmeritorious claims.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir.
1998). “Thus a plaintiff must allege some factual detail as the basis for a § 1983 claim.” Keating
v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 763 (11th Cir. 2010)(citation omitted). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868
(2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007)).
The Court will now address Plaintiffs’ Constitutional claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
a. First Amendment Claim
“The First Amendment itself expressly provides that ‘Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.” Amnesty Int’l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1186
(11th Cir. 2009)(citing U.S. Const. Amend. I). “The First Amendment right to petition the
government for a redress of grievances includes a right of access to the courts.” Bank of Jackson
County v. Cherry, 980 F.2d 1362, 1370 (11th Cir. 1993)(citations omitted). However, “[t]he right
of access to the courts ‘is neither absolute nor unconditional.’” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091,
1096 (11th Cir. 2008)(citing Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 516 (11th Cir. 1991)).
“Conditions and restrictions on each person’s access are necessary to preserve the judicial resource
for all other persons. Frivolous and vexatious law suits threaten the availability of a well-functioning
judiciary to all litigants.” Id.
Plaintiffs claim that their First Amendment rights were violated because there was an
“obstruction of redress of Governmental grievances” (Dkt. 1, p. 7). Plaintiffs do not allege facts to
- 14 -
support this statement. The Complaint contains incoherent and rambling claims of alleged
wrongdoing. The Court could assume that Plaintiffs are referring to the restrictions placed on their
abilities to file pleadings. However, as shown in the Background section of this Order, Plaintiffs
have access to the courts and can file their complaints and motions. Indeed, they have filed
repetitious pleadings, motions, and notices. Although they have been previously told by the Eleventh
Circuit that they must proceed in state court prior to bringing suit in federal court for several of their
claims, Plaintiffs refuse to do so and continue to re-file their complaints with additional Defendants
and claims all surrounding the same property dispute. Because insufficient facts are alleged to
support this claim, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and dismisses their First Amendment claim.
b. Fourth Amendment Claim
“The Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures in the civil context and may serve
to resolve the legality of . . . governmental actions without reference to other constitutional
provisions.” U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 51, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126
L.Ed.2d.490 (1993). However, when the challenged governmental action goes beyond the traditional
meaning of search and seizure, which is in the criminal context, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments are controlling. See id. at 52 (When “the Government seized property
not to preserve evidence of wrongdoing, but to assert ownership and control over the property itself
. . . . [o]ur cases establish that government action of this consequence must comply with the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
“[T]he seizure of real property . . . violates fifth amendment due process if the property owner
is not afforded notice and a hearing prior to the seizure.” United States v. 2751 Peyton Wood Trail,
- 15 -
S.W., 66 F.3d 1164, 1166 (11th Cir. 1995)(citing James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 53).
“Unless exigent circumstances are present, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to
afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real property . . . .” Id.11
Here, Plaintiffs claim that the seizure of Lot 15A violated the Fourth Amendment (Dkt. 1,
p. 7; ¶ 163). However, the Fifth Amendment controls, as opposed to the Fourth Amendment,
because the seizure was not within the traditional meaning of a “seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 52. Therefore, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and dismisses their Fourth
Amendment claim.
c. Fifth Amendment Claim
“The Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of private property ‘for public use, without just
compensation’ - a condition made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Busse,
317 Fed. Appx. at 971 (citing U.S. Const. Amend. V; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617,
121 S.Ct. 2448, 2457, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001)). A plaintiff may bring a federal takings claim “only
if he can show that he did not receive just compensation in return for the taking of his property.” Id.
at 971-72 (citing Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 720 (11th Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff must
demonstrate to the court that he has pursued the available state procedures to obtain just
compensation for the property he alleges was taken for public use before filing suit in federal court.
Id. at 972.
11
The Court notes that the cited case involves a seizure of real property in a civil
forfeiture action.
- 16 -
Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe for review because they have not shown that they attempted
to obtain or secure relief under established Florida state procedures. The proceeding before the
Special Magistrate of the Value Adjustment Board is wholly unrelated to Plaintiffs’ dispute in this
case because it only addressed the denial of the agricultural classification of the property in 2006.
Because they have not alleged or demonstrated that they have sought compensation for Lot 15A and
were denied such compensation through available state procedures, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and dismisses their Fifth Amendment
Takings claim.
In conclusion, Plaintiffs failed to state any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court will
now address the remaining federal claims in Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Claim
“42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides a cause of action where two or more people conspire ‘for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . .’” Montford v.
Moreno, No. 04-12909, 2005 WL 1369563, at *7 (11th Cir. June 9, 2005)(quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3)). To state such a claim, the plaintiff must allege: “‘(1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States.’” Id. (quoting Trawinski v. United Techs., 313 F.3d
1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002)). The plaintiff must also allege “invidious discriminatory intent” on the
part of each defendant. Id. (citation omitted). “‘[C]onclusory, vague, and general allegations of
- 17 -
conspiracy may justify dismissal of a complaint.’” Id. (quoting Kearson v. S. Bell. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
763 F.3d 405, 407 (11th Cir. 1985)).
In this case, Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants conspired to deprive them of their alleged
property rights in Lot 15A. Plaintiffs repeatedly state that various judicial officers accepted bribes
to deprive them of this alleged property interest. However, these statements are merely conclusory,
and Plaintiffs provide no factual basis to support a conspiracy among Defendants. Additionally,
Plaintiffs have not alleged the elements of a claim brought under § 1985(3). As such, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and dismisses their claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1985.
3. Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial Claim
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(a) states that “[t]he right to a jury trial as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution . . . shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.” Here,
Plaintiffs allege that they have been denied the right to a jury trial. Plaintiffs, again, have not alleged
facts to support this claim. The Background section of this Order demonstrates that Plaintiffs have
been repeatedly dismissed from federal court not on the merits of their claims but on repeated
procedural deficiencies. They have not exhausted the necessary state procedures to address their
dispute prior to filing in federal court. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted and dismisses their Seventh Amendment claim.
4. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claim
“A plaintiff could make a procedural due process claim by challenging the procedures by
which a regulation was adopted, including the failure to provide pre-deprivation notice and hearing”
Busse, 317 Fed. Appx. at 972 (citing Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610,
- 18 -
6115 (11th Cir. 1997); Zipper v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995)). The
plaintiff must allege that state law failed to provide him with an adequate post-deprivation remedy.
Busse, 317 Fed. Appx. at 972 (citing Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Here, Plaintiffs make no argument that Florida failed to provide them with an adequate post-
deprivation remedy. “Since alleged problems with the adoption of [the Resolution] cannot serve as
the basis for a procedural due process claim,” Plaintiffs cannot rely on them to support such a claim.
Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and dismisses their Procedural Due Process claim.
5. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim
“The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from ‘deny[ing] to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’” Busse, 317 Fed. Appx. at 973 (quoting U.S. Const.
Amend. XIV, § 1). “‘[T]o properly plead an equal protection claim, a plaintiff need only allege that
through state action, similarly situated persons have been treated disparately.’” Id. (quoting Thigpen
v. Bibb County, 223 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 102 (2002)).
In this case, Plaintiffs claim that they were denied equal protection of the laws by Defendants
in relation to Lot 15A. As a general matter, Florida counties may exercise eminent domain over
property not owned by the state or federal government. Fla. Stat. § 127.01(1)(a); id. “Since a state
landowner would not be subject to eminent domain power but [Plaintiffs], as . . . [alleged] private
landowner[s], would be,” Plaintiffs cannot be similarly situated to a state landowner. Busse, 317
Fed. Appx. at 973. Plaintiffs, “therefore cannot rely on [their] disparate eminent domain treatment
vis-a-vis state landowners as the basis for an equal protection claim.” Id. Consequently, the Court
- 19 -
finds that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and dismisses their Equal
Protection claim.
6. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim
“Substantive due process protects only those rights that are ‘fundamental,’ a description that
applies only to those rights created by the United States Constitution.” Id. (citing Greenbriar
Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003)). “Property rights
would not be fundamental rights since they are based on state law.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs claim that they have been denied their alleged property rights in Lot 15A.
These property rights are defined by state law. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and dismisses their Substantive Due Process Claim.
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 - Conspiracy Against Rights Claim
“If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any
State . . . in the free exercise of enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same . . . [t]hey
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not more than ten years, or both . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 241.
Furthermore, “[w]hoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any person in any State . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 242.
Plaintiffs cannot bring an action under these statutes because they are only brought in
criminal proceedings. U.S. v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1980)(noting that
the United States initiates criminal prosecutions under these statutes, and there are other adequate
- 20 -
remedies to seek alleged violations of Constitutional rights, such as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985). Because there are civil statutes to address Plaintiffs’ alleged Constitutional violations, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and dismisses their
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§241, 242.
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction
“The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state claims rests within
the discretion of the district court.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir.
2004). Once a district court dismisses all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, it may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). This Court, therefore, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
remaining state claims.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim in their Complaint
upon which relief can be granted in federal court. Accordingly, the federal claims in the Complaint
are dismissed.12 With its discretionary authority, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state claims.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Injunctive Relief of Defendants Albritton,
12
The Court notes that Defendants Albritton, Flynn, Stegeby, and Rhodes alleged that
they are entitled to immunity (Dkts. 69, 119). Additionally, Defendants Hayes and Pivacek also
argue that they are entitled to qualified and judicial immunity (Dkt. 148). Because the Court
finds that Plaintiffs failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted, it does not address the
arguments of immunity in this Order. The Complaint does not allege sufficient facts for the
Court to determine the issue of immunity.
- 21 -
Flynn, Stegeby, and Rhodes (Dkt. 69) is GRANTED in part. The Court dismisses
this action without prejudice. Additionally, the Court will reserve ruling on the
Motion for Injunctive Relief until after the Show Cause Hearing scheduled in this
case for June 22, 2010.
2. The Motion for Injunctive Relief of Defendants Albritton, U.S. Attorney for the
Middle District of Florida, Rhodes, Flynn, Stegeby, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys for
the Middle District of Florida (Dkt. 97) is DENIED as moot.
3. The Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Injunctive Relief of Defendants Wilkinson,
Alejo, Desjarlais, Peterson, Lee County, Florida, Hawes, Green, Janes, Bigelow,
Judah, Hall, and Mann (Dkt. 115) is GRANTED in part. The Court dismisses this
action without prejudice. Additionally, the Court will reserve ruling on the Motion
for Injunctive Relief until after the Show Cause Hearing scheduled in this case for
June 22, 2010.
4. The Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Hayes and Pivacek (Dkt. 148) is GRANTED
in part. The Court dismisses this action without prejudice.
5. The Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Scott (Dkt. 158) is GRANTED in part. The
Court dismisses this action without prejudice.
6. The Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Johnson Engineering (Dkt. 179) is GRANTED.
7. Of Plaintiffs’ pending motions, fifteen (15) are labeled “Emergency Motion” (Dkt.
5, 118, 143, 152, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 184, 191, 192, 194 and 209). None
of these motions present an emergency. They are repetitious, rambling,
incomprehensible and frivolous. In its March 31, 2010 (Dkt. 126) Order To Show
- 22 -
Cause, the Court cautioned Plaintiffs about the unwarranted designation of a motion
as an emergency motion. The Court retains jurisdiction to impose sanctions.
8. Plaintiffs’ pending Motions (Dkt. 5, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 134, 135,143, 146, 152,
160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 182, 183, 184, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, and 209)
are DENIED as moot.
9. Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Dkt. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice.
10. The Clerk is directed to terminate all pending motions, except the Motion for Pre-
filing Injunction and Sanctions (Dkt. 149), enter judgment accordingly and CLOSE
this case.
11. The Court retains jurisdiction to impose sanctions.
DONE AND ORDERED at Ft. Myers, Florida, on June 23, 2010.
COPIES TO:
COUNSEL OF RECORD AND UNREPRESENTED PARTIES
- 23 -

MANDATE, JUNE 2009, Prescott v. State of Florida, 343 Fed. Appx. 395 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2009)

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MANDATE, JUNE 2009, Prescott v. State of Florida, 343 Fed. Appx. 395 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2009)

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6/26/2010 JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, JOR…

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Jorg Busse, Appellant, Pro se, NAPLES, FL.

Reagan Russell, Appellee, Pro se, TALLAHASSEE, FL.

JUDGES: Before BLACK, HULL and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

B. Prior Similar Action

C. Dismissal of Current Action

A. Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim

B. Motion for the District Court to Recuse

Terms & Conditions Privacy & Security Copyright

LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEE

said accreted lands for public park purposes.

1. Nature of the Suit

Appraiser deny his claim of riparian rights.

“exhibits”, “evidence”, “interrogatories”, “affidavits”, “memorandums”, etc. The

docket below stands res ipsa loquitur.

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Funchess, Esq. and Reagan K. Russell, Esq., Florida Department of Environmental

3259, Sarasota, FL 34230.

PUBLIC PROPERTY TAX RECORDS:

PLAINTIFFS PAID PROPERTY TAXES:

LAND PARCEL “12-44-20-01-00015.015A”

Dr. Jorg Busse,

Record Unimpeachable Landowners

CORRUPT HONEYWELL STRUCK AGAIN:

THE COURT ONLY FILED

THE COURT NEVER FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT,

v. CASE NO. 2: 09-CV-791-FtM-36SPC

ROGER ALEJO; KENNETH M. WILKINSON;

Fraudulent Concealment of Governmental Forgeries by Crooked Defendant Assistant Attorney Jack

Emergency Motion to ‘Enjoin’ Nazi-Style Governmental Tactics of Terror, Oppression, Retaliation,

Conceal Governmental Forgery of Non-Existent Sham “Parcel” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0" as

Appx. 968, 970 (11th Cir. Mar 5, 2009).

relating to Plaintiffs’ property dispute.

1. Case Number 2:07-CV-228

(2:07-CV-228, Dkt. 365).6

pay the filing fees.

single notice of appeal as to the Order.

on February 2, 2010 (2:07-CV-228, Dkt. 425).

2. Case No. 2:08-CV-364

stated in the related case, 2:07-CV-228 (2:08-CV-364, Dkt. 70).7

3. Case No. 2:08-CV-899

of the Tampa Division presided over the case.

prejudice (2:08-CV-899, Dkt. 121).

4. Case No. 2:09-CV-41

prosecution (2:09-CV-41, Dkt. 133-34).

5. Case No. 2:09-CV-341

were dismissed as frivolous or for want of prosecution.

6. Case No. 2:09-CV-602

7. Case No. 2:10-CV-89