1.

Arcaba vs Tabancura

Deed of Donation || Article 87 FC

Francisco Comille and Zosima has a lot in Dipolog, Zamboanga Del Norte.
Francisco created a deed of donation (a parcel of land) to Cirila, for her loyalty for 10 years as a house helper/ care giver.
Nieces (respondents) the descendants filed for petition, that the deed of donation was not valid because Francisco and Cirilo
cohabited with each other.
She denied that they had sexual intercourse. But document showed that she used the last name of Francisco whenshe applied
for Business and Sanitary Permits and she even signed Cirila Commille in the Death Certificate.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of the Respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor was valid.

HELD:

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was
based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of Cirila Comille such as application for
business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her
wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in
sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as
such.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

2. San Luis vs San Luis

Article 26 Family Code, Article 140 (CPG) and 148 (Coownership)

Felicimo had 3 marriages. 1st marriage he had 6 children, she died and after 5 years he remarried Mary Lee, a US Citizen, in
Hawaii. They had one son. Mary lee filed a divorce and was finalized in 1973.
After a year he married Felicidad Sagalongos in US. They lived in Alabang, Muntinlupa City. He was the elected Governor in
the Province of Laguna.
He died after 18 years. Felicidad executed a letter of administration and respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. She filed the petition in the RTC of Makati City.
Children by 1st marriage filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of :
o Improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death.
o He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the
petition and that venue was properly laid. Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. Thus, a new
trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration.
o It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
o It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and
did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
o Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
o Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr (Genesis of Article 26 par2 of the FC)

ISSUES:

(1) Whether venue was properly laid

(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

RULING:

(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. While petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he
also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo
was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the Van Dorn
case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with
the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

(3) Yes. Respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

3. Uy vs. CA , November 29, 2000

Article 124 of FC||

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be
allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically
incapacitated to discharge his functions.
 She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot
4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities.
RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are
governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made by her mother was
essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in
accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the rules governing special proceedings
in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
merits.
He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife
contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in
their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA
reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor
and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with
improvements.

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is
incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.

In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides
that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who
desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards
estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity
of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

4. Tarrosa , DeLeon v. De Leon, July 23, 2009

FACTS:

On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered
into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City.
On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and Vilma.
On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT
was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, single.
On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did
not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit
allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands.
Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property because he was still single when he
acquired it from PHHC. They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the
time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the marriage although some installments were paid during the
marriage would be considered conjugal property
HELD:

Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the
marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on
June 22, 1970. This full payment was made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property
was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence, ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership.

5. Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz 130 Phil 324

Article 178 and Article 127 of the Family Code

178 of the new Civil Code which read: "The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the
conjugal partnership, except that . . . if the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition
the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property, or separation of property".

FACTS:

The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938, with 6 children. During their coverture they
acquired properties, varied business ventures which all are registered under their names. They are indebted to Philippine
National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines.
The plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint on July 22, 1958 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
alleging in essence that her husband, the defendant Severino de la Cruz, had not only abandoned her but as well was
mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties, and praying for (1) separation of property, (2) monthly support of
P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and (3) payment of P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs.
Defendant argued that he did not abandon his wife but admitted they live separately when he transferred his
sleeping quarters to his office, his intention was not, as it never has been, to abandon his wife and children, but only to
teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. From the time he started living
separately in Mandalagan up to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff herself furnished him food and took care of his
laundry, and that he never maintained a mistress. He has also never failed to give them financial support. Defendant
channeled devoted his time to the management of their properties.
Trial court rendered judgment ordering separation and division of the conjugal assets. CA certified the case to SC with
conjugal asset over 500,000.

ISSUES:

1. Did the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal
partnership properties

2. Was the defendant's failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his
powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of the matrimonial assets?

RULING:

1. No. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return
to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights.

2. No. For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he
commits acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes
willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial
to the latter. If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving the
conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did
prior to the separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to grant the
wife's petition for separation of property.

Decree on separation of the conjugal properties, is reversed and set aside.