MADRAS THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY & COLLEGE

TOPIC: The Nyaya Philosophy

SUBJECT: Introduction to Indian Philosophy
SUBMITTED TO: Rev.Solomon
SUMITTED BY: Jayakumar J

INTRODUCTION:
The Nyaya system is the work of the great sage Gautama. It is a
realistic philosophy based mainly on logical grounds. It admits four separate sources
oftrue knowledge, viz. perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), comparison
(upatmana) and testimony (sabda). Perception is the direct knowledge of objectsproduced
by their relation to our senses. It may be external (bahya) or internal (antara), according
as thesense concerned is external, like the eye and the ear, or internal, like the mind
(manas). Inference is the knowledge of objects, not through perception, but through the
apprehension of some mark (linga) which is invariably related to the inferred objects
(sadhya). The invariable relation between the two is called vyapti. In inference there are
at least three propositions and at most three terms, viz. the paksa or minor term about
which we infer something, the sadhya or major term which is the inferred object, and the
lingaor sadhana or middle term which is invariably related to the major, and is present in
the minor. To illustrate : "The hill is fiery, because it smokes ; and whatever smokes is
fiery Comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a name and things so named,
on the basis of a given description of their similarity to some familiar object. A man is
told that a gavaya is like a cow. Then he finds an animal in the forest, which strikingly
resembles the cow, and comes to know that the animal must be a gavaya. Such
knowledge is derived from upamana or comparison. Sabda or verbal testimony is the
knowledge about anything derived from the statements of authoritative persons. A
scientist tells us that water is a compound of hydrogen and oxygen in a certain
proportion. Although we may not have verified the truth ourselves, we know it on the
authority of the scientist. Here our knowledge is derived from sabda or testimony. All
other sources of knowledge have been reduced by the Naiyahikas to these four.

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The Theory of Knowledge:
The Objects of knowledge, according to the Nyaya, are the self, the
body, the senses and their objects, cognition (buddhi, mind (manas), activity (pravrtti),
mental defects (dosa), rebirth (pretyabhava), the feelings of pleasure and pain (phala),
suffering(duhkha) and, freedom from suffering (apavarga). The Nyaya, like many other
systems of Indian philosophy, seeks to deliver the self from its bondage to the body, the
senses and their objects. According to it, the self is distinct from the body and the mind.
The body is only a composite substance made of matter. The mind (manas) is a subtle,
indivisible and eternal substance (anu). It serves the soul as an instrument for the
perception of psychic qualities like pleasure, pain, etc. It is, therefore, called an internal
sense. The self (atman) is another substance which is quite distinct, from the mind and
the body. It acquires the attribute of consciousness when it is related to any object
through the senses. But consciousness is not an essential quality of the self. It is an
accidental or adventitious quality which ceases to qualify the self in the state of mukti or
liberation. While the mind (manas) is infinitesimal like an atom, the self is all pervading
(vibhu), indestructible and eternal. It is an agent which likes and dislikes objects and tries
to obtain or avoid them and enjoys or suffers the consequences of its actions. It is
ignorance of the truth (mithya-jnana) and the consequent faults of desire, aversion and
infatuation (raga, dvesa, and moha) that impel the self to act for good and bad ends and
plunge it into the world of sin and suffering, birth and death. Liberation (apavarga) means
the absolute cessation of all pain and suffering owing to the right knowledge of reality
(tattva-jnana). Some people think that it is a state of happiness. But this is entirely wrong,
for there is no pleasure without pain, just as there is no light without shade. So liberation
is only release from pain and not pleasure or happiness.

The Nature of Physical World:

The existenoe of God is proved by the Naiyayikas by several
arguments. God is the ulimate cause of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the
world. He did not create the world out of nothing, but out of eternal atoms, space, time,
ether, minds and souls. This world has been created in order that individual souls (jivas)
might enjoy pleasure or suffer pain according to the merit or demerit of their actions in
other lives and in other worlds. The most popular argument for God's existence is: "All
things of the world like mountains and seas, the sun and the moon, are effects, because
they are made up of parts. Therefore, they must have a maker (karta)." The individual
selves cannot be the maker or creator of the world, because they are limited in power and
knowledge, and so cannot deal with such subtle and imperceptible entities as atoms, of
which all physical things are composed. The creator of the world must be an intelligent
spirit with unlimited power and wisdom, and capable of maintaining the moral order of
the universe. God created the world not for any end of His own, but for the good of all

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living beings. This, however, does not mean that there must be only happiness and no
misery in the world. If individual selves have any freedom of will in them, they would act
for good or bad ends and thereby bring happiness or misery on themselves. But under the
loving care and wise guidance of the Divine Being, all individuals can sooner or later
attain right knowledge about themselves and the world, and thereby final release from all
suffering (mukti).

THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY:

The Nyaya philosophy was founded by the great sage Gotama who
was also known as Gautama and Aksapada. Accordingly, the Nyaya is also known asthe
Aksapada system. This philosophy is primarily concerned with the conditions of correct
thinking and the means of acquiring a true knowledge of reality. It is very useful in
developing the powers of logical thinking and rigorous criticism in its students. So we
have such other names for the Nyaya philosophy as Nyayavidya, Tarkasastra (i.e. the
science of reasoning), and Anviksiki (i.e. the science of critical study).
But the logical problem as to the methods and conditions of true knowledge or the canons
of logical criticism is not the sole or the ultimate end of the Nyaya philosophy.The first
work of the Nyaya philosophy is the Nyaya-sutra of Gotama. It is divided into five
adhyayas or books, each containing two ahnikas or sections. The subsequent works of the
Nyaya system, such as Vatsyayana's Nyaya-bhasya, Uddyotakara's Nyaya-varttika,
Udayana's Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-parisuddhi and Kusumanjali,Jayanta'sNyayamanjari,
etc., explain and develop the ideas contained in the Nyaya-sutra, and also defend them
against the attacks of hostile critics.

Divisions of Nyaya system:

The whole of the Nyaya philosophy may be conveniently divided
into four parts, namely the theory of knowledge, the theory of the physical world, the
theory of the individual self and its liberation, and the theory of God. It should, however,
be observed here that the Nyaya system is in itself an elaboration of sixteen philosophical
topics (padartha). These are: pramana, prameya, samsaya, prayojana, drstanta, siddhanta,
avayava, tarka, nirnaya, vada, jalpa, vitanda, hetvabhasa, chala, jati and nigrahasthana.
Pramana is the way of knowing anything truly. It gives us true knowledge and nothing
but true knowledge. It thus includes all the sources or methods of knowledge.

Prameya literally means a knowable or an object of true knowledge, i.e. reality. The
objects of such knowledge, according to the Nyaya, are (a) the self (atma); (b) the
body (sarira) which is the seat of organic activities, the senses and the feelings of
pleasure and pain; (c) the senses (indriya) of smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing; (d)

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 their objects (artha), i.e. the sensible qualities of smell, taste, colour, touch and sound;
(e) cognition (buddhi) which is the same thing as knowledge (jnana) and apprehension
(upalabdhi); (f) mind (manas) which is the internal sense concerned in the internal
perceptions of pleasure, pain, etc., (g) activity (pravrtti) which may be good or bad,
and is of three kinds, namely, vocal, mental and bodily; (h) mental defects (dosa) such
as attachment (raga), hatred (dvesa) and infatuation (moha) which are at the root of
our activities, good or bad; (i) rebirth after death (pretyabhava) which is brought about
by our good or bad actions; (j) the experiences of pleasure and pain (phala) which
result from the activities due to mental (defects); (k) suffering (duhkha) which as a
bitter and painful experience is known to everybody; (l) liberation or freedom from
suffering (apavarga) which means the absolute cessation of all suffering without any
possibility of its recurrence.

Samsaya or doubt is a state of uncertainty. It represents the mind's wavering between

different conflicting views with regard to the same object. Doubt arises when with
regard to the same thing there is the suggestion of different alternative views but no
definite cognition of any different to decide between them.

Prayojana or an end-in-view is the object for which or to avoid which one acts. We
act either to obtain desirable objects or to get rid of undesirable ones. Both these kinds
of objects constitute the end of our activities and are, therefore, included within
prayojana.

Drstanta or an example is an undisputed fact which illustratesa general rule. It is a

very useful and necessary part of any discussion or reasoning, and it should be such
that both the parties in the discussion may accept it without dispute or difference of
opinion.

Siddhanta or a doctrine is what is taught and accepted as true in a system or school. A

view that a certain thing is or is such-and-such, if accepted as true in a system, will be
a doctrine of that system, e.g. the Nyaya doctrine that the soul is a substance of which
consciousness is a separable attribute.

Avayava or a member of the syllogism is any of the five propositions in which

syllogistic inference requires to be stated if it is to prove or demonstrate a doctrine. It
may be one of the premises or the conclusion of the syllogism, but never any
proposition that is not a part of any syllogism.

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 Tarka or a hypothetical argument 'is an indirect way of justifying a certain conclusion
by exposing the absurdity of its contradictory. It is a form of supposition (uha), but is
an aid to the attainment of valid knowledge.

Nirnaya is certain knowledge about anything, attained by means of any of the

legitimate methods of knowledge. It is usually preceded by doubt and requires a
consideration of all the arguments for and against a certain view or doctrine.

Vada is a discussion which is conducted according to logical rules and aims only at
finding out the truth of the matter discussed. In it each of the parties, the exponent
(vadi) and the opponent (prativadi), tries to establish his own position and refute that
of the other, but both try to arrive at truth. This is very well illustrated by a
philosophical discussion between the teacher and his student provided both of them
are honest seekers after truth.
Jalpa is mere wrangling in which the parties aim only at victory over each other, but
do not make an honest attempt to come to truth. It has all other characteristics of a
discussion than that of aiming at truth.

Vitanda is a kind of debate in which the opponent does not establish his own position
but only tries to refute that of the exponent.

Hetvabhasa literally means a hetu or reason which appears as, but really is not, a valid
reason. It is generally taken to mean the fallacies of inference.

Chala is a kind of unfair reply in which an attempt is made to contradict a statement

by taking it in a sense other than the intended one. It is a questionable device for
getting out of a difficulty in an argument.

The word jati is here used in a technical sense to mean an unfair reply based on false
analogy. It consists in basing a futile argument on any kind of similarity or
dissimilarity between two things to controvert another sound argument.

Nigrahasthana literally means a grounds of such defeat in debate. There are two
primary grounds of such defeat, namely, misunderstanding or wrong understanding
and waut of understanding. If any party in a debate misunderstands or fails to
understand his own or the other party's statement and its implication, he is brought to
the point at which he has to admit defeat.

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Conclusion:
The value of the Nyaya system lies especially in its methodology or theory
of knowledge on which it builds its philosophy. One of the charges against Indian
philosophy is that it is based on religious authority and is, therefore, dogmatic and not
critical. The Nyaya philosophy is a standing repudiation of this charge. The theory of
knowledge, formulated by the Nyaya, is made the basis not only of the Nyaya-
Vaisesika, but also of other Indian system, with slight modifications. The Nyaya
applies the method of logical criticism to solve the problems of life and reality. It is
by means of a sound logic that it finds out the truth and defends it against hostile
criticism. But the Nyaya theory of pluralistic realism is not as satisfying as its logic.
Here we have a common-sense view of the world as a system of many independent
realities, like material atoms, minds, individual souls and God, which are externally
related to one another in space, time and akasa. It does not give us a systematic
philosophy of the world as a whole in the light of one universal absolute principle.
The philosophical position of the Nyaya is said to be lower than that of the Sankhya
or the Vedanta. This becomes manifest when we consider its theory of the individual
self and God. According to it, the individual self is a substance which is not
essentially conscious and intelligent, but is accidentally qualified by consciousness
when associated with a body. But such a view of the self is contradicted by the
evidence of our direct experience which reveals the self as an essentially conscious
subject and not as a thing with the quality of consciousness. Still, as a philosophy of
life, the Nyaya theism is no less edifying and assuring than other forms of it.

Bibliography:
Chatterjee, Satischandra. An introduction to Indian philosophy (Rupa publications: New delhi, 2007)