ARTICLE 6: THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Constitutional limitations. The power of present and future
Section 1: The Legislative Power
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision of initiative and referendum.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal
them.
Bicameralism
1. Allows for a body with national perspective to check the
parochial tendency of representatives elected by district.
2. Allows for a more careful study of legislation
3. Legislature is less susceptible to control by the Executive4.
Serves as training ground for national leaders
Unicameralism
1. Simplicity of organization resulting in economy and efficiency
2. Facility in pinpointing responsibility for legislation
3. 3. Avoidance of duplication.
Kinds of Legislative Power:
1. Original Legislative Power possessed by sovereign people2.
Derivative Legislative Power delegated by the sovereign people to
legislative bodies3. Constituent power to amend or revise the
Constitution4. Ordinary power to pass ordinary laws
Limits on Legislative Power1. Substantive limits / curtails the
contents of a law2. Procedural limits / curtails the manner of
passing laws
Legislative power of Congress is plenary
Congress may legislate on any subject matter, subject only to
legislations must remain plenary. Congress may not pass
irrepealable laws as this would curtail the plenary power of future
Congress.
Examples of Constitutional limitations are:- A law passed by
Congress cannot violate the Constitution.- Congress cannot pass a
law that amounts to a usurpation of executive or judicial
prerogatives.- Congress cannot pass a law that allows it to appoint
officials in the executive department.- The Senate cannot initiate
appropriation and tariff bills.
Non-delegability of Legislative Power
Legislative power is generally non-delegable under the principle of
delegata potestas non potest delegari. Legislative power must
remain where the people have lodged it. Congress, therefore,
cannot abdicate itself of this mandate by further delegating this
power to another body.
This principle however admits several exceptions in our jurisdiction:
1. Delegation of legislative power to local governments2. Delegation
of rule-making power (not legislative / law-making power) to
administrative bodies
3. Constitutionally recognized exceptions Congress may, by law,
grant the President necessary powers during times of war and
national emergencies for a limited period and subject to restrictions
as it may prescribe. This grant of power may include legislative
power. [Art. VI, Sec. 23(2)] The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government. [Art. VI, Sec. 28(2)]
Grant of Quasi-Legislative Power to LGUs and Administrative
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Bodies
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (1919)
Valid vs. Invalid delegation
The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
Discretion may be committed by the legislature to an executive
department or official. The legislature may make decisions of
executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of
fact. The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to
the necessity of the case.
Legislative delegation to local authorities
An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice,
permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to
local authorities.
Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
Necessity of delegating subordinate legislation
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the
constitutional landscape. In the face of the increasing complexity of
the task of the government and the increasing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to
administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has
become imperative, as here. (SJS v. DDB, 2008)
Requisites of a valid delegation of legislative power to administrative
agencies:
It must be made clear that legislative power cannot be delegated to
administrative agencies. What is delegated is only rule-making power
or law execution.
They are allowed to: Fill up the details of an already complete
statute throughimplementing rules and regulations; or Ascertain
facts necessary to bring a contingent law into actual operation
Tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test there must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative (Eastern
Shipping Lines v. POEA)
Elements of a Valid Delegation
1. Completeness:
- The law must be complete in itself It must set forth
therein the policy to be carried out or implemented by
the delegate.
- What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative
of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated
or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
(Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)
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2. The law must fix a sufficient standard
- Limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable
- Will guide the delegate in the performance of his
functions
- The standards formulated need not be in precise
language rather it can be drawn from the declared policy
of the law and from the totality of the delegating statute
Sufficient standards of delegation of legislative power
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as
sufficient standards public interest in People v. Rosenthal,
justice and equity in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, public
convenience and welfare in Calalang v. Williams, and simplicity,
economy and efficiency in Cervantes v. Auditor General, to
mention only a few cases. In the United States, the sense and
experience of men was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, and national security in Hirabayashi v. United
States. (Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)
Public Interest as a standard
[T]he term public interest is not without a settled meaning.
Appellant insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission
is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is
the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere
general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide
determinations, The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes,
and the context of the provision in question show the contrary.
(People v. Rosenthal, 1939)
A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be
gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged
because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject
as that of the challenged legislation. (Chiongbian v. Orbos, 1995)
Contingent Legislation
While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies,
details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of
such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the
existence of facts on which its operation depends, the rationale being
that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment
of legislation is not of itself a legislative function but is simply
anciliary to legislation. (ABAKADA v. Ermita, 2005)
Laws may be made effective on certain contingencies. The
legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself
rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power
which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the
taking into effect of a law. (People v. Vera)
Where the effectivity of the law is made dependent on the verification
by the executive of the existence of certain condition, it is not a
delegation of legislative power. This is called contingent legislation.
Congress provides the conditions required before a law takes effect;
the executive factually determines when those conditions exist.
(ABAKADA v. Ermita, 2005)
Filling in details
There is no undue delegation of legislative power when there is only
a grant of the power to fill up or provide the details of legislation
because Congress did not have the facility to provide them.
To a certain extent, matters of detail may be left to be filled in by
rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature
is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in
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the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. (People v.
Vera, 1937)
Undue Delegation
The legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the
benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the
entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. If
provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province,
all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for
the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of
legislative power to the provincial boards. (People v. Vera)
Legislative Veto of Implementing Rules and Regulations
After the enactment of a law, congressional oversight is limited to
scrutiny and investigation. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules
and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a right or power to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take effect. It is
unconstitutional. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an
overseer, may not pass upon the legality of IRRs by subjecting them
to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of
powers established by the Constitution. The discretion to approve or
disapprove Rules and Regulations is a judicial power. (Abakada v.
Purisima)
Rules and Regulations by Administrative Agencies may have the
force of penal laws if:
1. The delegating statute itself must specifically authorize the
promulgation of penal regulations
2. The penalty must not be left to the administrative agency but
provided by the statute itself3. The regulation must be published in
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation
- There should be designated limits of the penalty and it should not
be left to the discretion of the judge (penalty of imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court is invalid because it is not for the court to fix
the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature (People v. Dacuycuy).
GARCIA v. COMELEC
Petitioners: Enrique T. Garcia*
Respondent: COMELEC**
*as resident of Morong, Bataan
**because they were empowered to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum,
as stated in Section 2(1) C, Art 9 of the Constitution
Facts:
In Pambansang Kapasyahan (Resolution) Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of
Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) in
accordance with RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act)
Petitioner filed a petition with the SB of Morong to annul said
resolution, and change it into one that only allows the inclusion of
Morong as part of the SSEZ if certain conditions are followed
(separating certain parts of the SSEZ and giving it back to Bataan,
establishment of own SEZs in Morong, Hermosa, and Dinalupihan,
etc.)
Municipality of Morong did not take any action within 30 days after
the submission of such petition
Petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Signatures were solicited to cause the repeal of said resolution.
Hon. Edilberto M. De Leon, VM of the SB of Morong wrote a letter to
the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the
petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because it would
promote divisiveness, counter-productivity, and futility.
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 According to the letter, the SB of Morong already accommodated the
clamor of the petitioners in accordance with its limited powers over
the issues. They cannot afford to wait for amendments because it
would delay the development of Morong.
COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative because it was
based on a resolution and not an ordinance.
Issue:
W/N a resolution could be the subject of a local initiative
Held:
YES.
Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people.
Through the 1987 Constitution, the Filipinos were vested with the
power to amend the Constitution itself, or to enact or reject any act
or law by congress or the local legislative body through an initiative.
Respondents relied on the definition of a Local Initiative in the LGC
of 1991 which stated that it is a legal process where registered
voters may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.
Court rejects the literal reading of such provision.
The constitution includes not only ordinances, but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
This is found in Art 6, Sec 32 that states The Congress shall
provide for a system of initiative and referendum whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any
act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative
body
Black defines act as an expression of will or purpose and that it
may denote something done as a legislature, including
resolves (resolutions)
Therefore a resolution is considered an act
Court held that a law must be in harmony with the Constitution.
If the RA 7160 (The Local Govt Code) is unclear or ambiguous, the
interpretation that will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality
must be adopted/
RA 6735 (Sec 3a) explicitly states the inclusion of resolutions as a
subject of an initiative.
Court also held that the LGC does not limit the subject of initiatives
to ordinances alone. The provision cited by the respondents
merely defined what a local initiative is (a legal process)
Sec 124 of the same code states that initiatives shall extend to
subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the
Sanggunian to enact.
Court noted that resolutions are used by the legislature to express
an opinion with a temporary effect, while an ordinance
permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or
things in general.
The PK Blg 10 affects the people of Morong permanently, hence,
their say is important.
Petition is GRANTED, COMELEC Resolution ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v. PHILIPPINES OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT AUTHORITY (POEA)
Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was the Chief Officer of the MV Eastern Polaris
when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan.
His widow sued for damages under EO 797 (Charter for
POEA) and Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by POEA.
Petitioner argued that the complaint was under the jurisdiction
of the Social Security System, and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund.
POEA assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of Saco.
(Entitled to P180k for death benefits, and P12k for burial
expenses. Basis for such decision was the Memorandum
Circular 2 that prescribed a standard contract to be adopted
by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in hiring
Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
Petitioner claims that they did not enter such contract.
Court said that they nonetheless should have because it was
in the Memorandum.
Petitioner questions the validity of the memorandum and
claimed that it was violative of the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power because it had no authority (under its
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 charter) to promulgate such regulation, and even with such
authorization, the re regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which is not subject to delegation.
In its charter, POEA has "original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-
employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino contract workers, including
seamen."
Issue:
1. W/N Saco was an overseas worker
2. W/N Memorandum Circular No. 2 is violative of the principle
of non-delegation of legislative power
Held:
1. YES. The court took into consideration 2 acts that showed
how petitioner acknowledged Saco as an overseas worker:
a. Submission of shipping articles to POEA for processing,
formalization, and approval in the exercise of its
regulatory power over overseas employment under EO
797.
b. Payment of the contributions mandated by law and
regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers
(PD 1694 for the purpose of providing social and welfare
services to Filipino overseas workers)
- Court also took note of the fact that the receipt prepared
for Mrs. Sacos signature described Mr. Saco as
overseas contract worker Saco
2. NO. Court held that:
a. Authority to issue the said regulation is provided in Sec 4
of EO 797. shall promulgate necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of POEA.
b. Court took into consideration that only the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced may be
delegated, and not what the law shall be.
- Court stated 2 accepted tests to determine W/N there was
valid delegation of (subordinate) legislative powers:
i. Completeness Test- law must be complete in all
its terms and conditions, therefore leaving the
delegate with the duty to merely enforce it.
ii. Sufficient Standard Test- there must be
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegates
authority.
- Both tests intended to prevent total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate.
- Specialization in legislation necessary because of the
increasing complexity of the task of government.
- Legislature may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and specific solutions.
- This is left in the hands of supposed experts in the specific
field assigned to them; therefore authority to issue rules
to carry out the general provisions of the statute is
delegated to them. (With the guidance of such standards)
- Administrative bodies vested with the power to merely
implement the policies laid out by the statute by filling in
the details the Congress may not have the competence to
provide.
- The power of POEA in requiring the model contract is
not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding
the delegate in exercise of such authority (As stated in
EO 797, where POEA is mandated to protect the rights of
overseas Filipino workers to fair and equitable
employment practices)
Petition is DISMISSED, with costs against PETITIONER.
TABLARIN v. GUTIERREZ
Petitioners: in behalf of applicants for admission into Medical Colleges
during SY 1987-1988 & future applicants who have not taken or
successfully hurdled the NMAT
Respondent: RTC Judge
Facts:
Petitioners pray for a TRO to enjoin the Board of Medical
Education & Center for Educational Measurement:
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 o from enforcing Sec 5 of RA 2382 (Medical Act of
1959) and MECS Order no. 52,
o from requiring the taking and passing of NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admisision
o from accepting NMAT applications
o from administering the NMAT on April 26, 1987
RTC denied said petition.
The said RA is an act which created the Board of Medical
Education for purposes of providing for the standardization
and regulation of medical education by, among others, (a)
determining and prescribing requirements for admission into
a recognized college of medicine and (f) accepting
applications for certification for admission and collecting P25
from each applicant.
MECS Order No. 52 is an order by the Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports establishing a uniform admission test
called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility
for admission into the medical schools of the Philippines.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the abovementioned
acts and orders. Nonetheless, pursuant to the MECS Order,
the respondents conducted the NMAT for the school year
1987-1988. Hence, petitioners instituted this present petition.
Issue:
W/N RA 2383 is unconstitutional
Held:
NO. The court held that:
1. When the petitioners invoked Art 2 Secs 11, 13, & 17 and
Art 14 Secs 1 & 5(3), they were not able to show how the
law and the administrative order collided with the State
Policies and other provisions. Court stated that Section 1
and 5 of Article 14 should be read together as taking
appropriate steps to make medical education accessible
to all, all referring to those who meet the fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.
2. Petitioners state that Section 5 (a) and (f) violate the
constitutional principle that forbids undue delegation of
legislative powers.
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION v. MINISTER OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT
Facts:
The petitioners are asking to review the amendment caused
by BP Blg. 130 to Art. 264 of the Labor Code regarding strikes.
The provision grants the Minister of Labor and
Employment the power and/or discretion to assume
jurisdiction regarding strikes and compulsory arbitration
to the National Labor Relations Commission.
The petitioners are concerned how the amendment may be
contrary to the assurance of the State to workers right to self-
organization and collective bargaining.
On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike filed
with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices stating
the grounds 1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of
Code of Conduct 2) Illegal terminations and suspensions
of the employees officers and members as a result of the
Code of Conduct 3) Unconfirmation (sic) of sick leaves
treating the said leave as Absence Without Official Leave
of Absence (AWOL).
The petitioners want to revise the Code of Conduct so that it
will be fair to the ones concerned and that said Code should
be suspended for the meantime. On September 25, 1981, the
NLRC certified the strike and the said issue is pursued under
the said agency for compulsory arbitration. The workers are
also enjoined from strike in any private establishment.
Petitioners assail that BP Blg. 130 amends Article 264 of the
Labor Code which delegates to the Honorable Minister of
Labor and Employment the power and discretion to assume
jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to
the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make
or unmake the law on free collective bargaining. They believe
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 that there is an undue delegation of legislative powers. There
is likewise the assertion that such conferment of authority
"may also ran contrary to the assurance of the State to the
workers' right to self-organization and collective bargaining.
Issue:
Whether BP Blg. 130 unduly delegates legislative power.
Held:
NO.
The court first recognizes that the authority exercised by the minister
is executive and that the question is whether or not this is an
encroaching of the power of legislation. The Minister is an official of
the executive branch, hence, his actions are presumed to be that of
the President/Chief Executive
The court said that there was no undue delegation of legislative power.
In Edu v. Ericta, it is said that What cannot be delegated is the power
to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature.
The legislature designates who does a certain task and what
should be done. It also entails the scope of power of the person
as well as the discretion to its execution in accordance with the
law. The executive also in pursuance of the guidelines provided by the
law may promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The case at
hand shows that BP Blg. 130 is constitutional as it empowers the
Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or
likely to cause adverse effects to national interests and thereafter
decide it or certify the same the National Labor Relations Commission
is not on its face value unconstitutional and contravenes self-
organization and free collective bargaining. There is no unduie
delegation of powers because such law sets out the standards (what
job is done, who does it, and what are the limits of authority.)
Principle of non-delegation has been made to adopt to the
complexities of government, the multiplication of subjects, and
difficulty of administering them (Justice Laurel). All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and should not contradict the standards of
the law prescribes.
Court reiterates that there is no ruling as to w/n such law is
unconstitutional, since the matter is not ripe for judicial determination.
It is held, however, that the there is no undue delegation of legislative
powers and that while the Minister upholds such duty, it must be free
from the taint of unconstitutionality and must be exercised in
accordance to the constitutional mandate of protection to the rights of
the workers to self-organization, self-bargaining, security of tenure,
and just and humane work conditions.
Petitions DISMISSED for lack of Merit
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. v. DRILON (Dole Sec)
Facts:
Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu
Oxygen, Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees
Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) covering the years 1986 to 1988. Pursuant
thereto, the management gave salary increases wherein it
was agreed that: on the first year of the AGREEMENT, each
employee will get a P200 increase. On the second year, each
employee will get P200. On the third year, each employee will
get P300. It was also stated that if the wage adjustment of
allowance increases decreed by law, legislation or
presidential edict in any particular year shall be higher
than the foregoing increases in that particular year, then
the company shall pay the difference.
RA No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage. The
Secretary of Labor then issued the pertinent rules
implementing the provisions of RA No. 6640. Under Section 8
(Wage Increase Under Individual/Collective Agreements) of
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 the implementing rule, it prohibits the employer from
crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a
collective bargaining agreement against such wage
increases mandated by RA No. 6640.
Accordingly, petitioner credited the first year increase of
P200.00 under the CBA and added the difference of P61.66
(rounded to P62.00) and P31.00 to the monthly salary and the
13th month pay, respectively, of its employees from the
effectivity of RA No. 6640 on December 14, 1987 to February
15, 1988.
A Labor and Employment Development Officer, pursuant to
his Inspection Authority, commenced a routine inspection of
petitioner's establishment. He found out that based on
payrolls and other records petitioner committed violations of
the law by under paying his employees under RA No. 6640
covering the period of two (2) months representing 208
employees who are not receiving wages above P100/day prior
to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 and under payment of 13th
month pay for the year 1987, representing 208 employees
who are not receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6640.
Petitioner contends that the anniversary wage increases
under the CBA can be credited against the wage increase
mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. Hence, petition
contended that inasmuch as it had credited the first year
increase negotiated under the CBA, it was liable only for
salary differential of P 62.00 and a 13th month pay differential
of P31.00. Petitioner argued that the payment of the
differentials constitutes full compliance with Republic Act No.
6640. Petitioner also believes that Section 8 of the rules
implementing the provisions of Republic Act No. 6640
particularly the provision excluding anniversary wage
increases from being credited to the wage increase
provided by said law is null and void on the ground that
the same unduly expands the provisions of the said law.
Issue:
Whether the Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated
by the law it seeks to implement.
Held:
No. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the
crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of
compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules
cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the
law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such
regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress.
Thus petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it
pursuant to the existing CBA including anniversary wage increases
should be considered in determining compliance with the wage
increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct.
Petitioner therefor correctly credited its employees P62.00 for the
differential of two (2) months increase and P31.00 each for the
differential in 13th month pay, after deducting the P200.00 anniversary
wage increase for 1987 under the CBA. Indeed, it is stipulated in the
CBA that in case any wage adjustment or allowance increase decreed
by law, legislation or presidential edict in any particular year shall be
higher than the foregoing increase in that particular year, then the
company (petitioner) shall pay the difference.
TATAD v SEC of DEPARTMENT of ENERGY
Facts:
In 1984, President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 1956, created the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price
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 of oil caused by exchange rate adjustments or increase in the
world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products. The fund is used (1) to reimburse the oil companies
for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum
products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or
increase in world market prices of crude oil, and (2) to
reimburse oil companies for cost underrecovery incurred as a
result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum
products.
The OPSF is sourced from (1) tax or customs duty imposed
on petroleum products; (2) tax collection as a result of the
lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations; (3) any
additional amount gathered from companies importing,
manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products; or (4)
any resulting peso costs differentials in case the actual peso
costs paid by oil companies in the importation of crude oil and
petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed
using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the
Board of Energy.
Congress on the other hand enacted RA 8180 that provides
for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry (Oil
Deregulation Law). The deregulation process has two phases:
the transition phase and the full deregulation phase.
During the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing
aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The following were
to be accomplished: (1) liberalization of oil importation,
exportation, manufacturing, marketing and distribution, (2)
implementation of an automatic pricing mechanism, (3)
implementation of an automatic formula to set margins of
dealers and rates of haulers, water transport operators and
pipeline concessionaires, and (4) restructuring of oil taxes.
Upon full deregulation, controls on the price of oil and the
foreign exchange cover were to be lifted and the OPSF was
to be abolished.
Petitioner contend that Section 15 of E.O. 392 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the
Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive
Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation
of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the
law does not define when it is practicable for the Secretary of
Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry or when the President may
consider it practicable to declare full deregulation. Also, the
law does not provide any specific standard to determine when
the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to
be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the
US dollar is considered stable.
Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation Pursuant to
section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon
approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far
as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso
in relation to the US dollar is stable
On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full
deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through EO
372.
Issues:
1. W/N Section 15 of RA 8180 is unconstitutional
2. W/N EO 392 misapplied RA 8180
Held:
1. NO. (IN TERMS OF DELEGATION)
- It has been held in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS.
POEA that there are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test.
- Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of
petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of
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 undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper.
Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that
Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that
full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997,
regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full
deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory
and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for
any purported reason.
- Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final
date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the
President is to advance the date of full deregulation
before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down
the standard to guide the judgment of the President
he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices
of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
- Petitioners contend that as far as practicable,"
"declining" and "stable" should have been defined in
R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or
determinable standards. The stubborn submission
deserves scant consideration. The dictionary
meanings of these words are well settled and cannot
confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster
defines "practicable" as meaning possible to practice
or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a downward
direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly established.
YES (IN TERMS OF TARRIFS)
- Petitioners argue that Section 5(b) (regarding
tariff duty) and Section 9(b) (prohibits selling of
such products below industry average) are
unconstitutional because it allows monopolies
(Shell, Caltex, Petron) contrary to Article 12
Section 19 that requires the state to
regulate/prohibit monopolies. Since the
provisions mentioned by the petitioners are the
core of the RA, the whole RA must be struck
down as unconstitutional.
2. YES.
- E.O. 392 sourced its power from RA 8180 but claimed
that the President can consider the depletion of the
OPSF fund as a factor in fully deregulating the
downstream oil industry last February 1997.
- A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily
reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be
considered by the Department of Energy and the
Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining, and (2) the time when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar
is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of
the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the
Executive before ordering full deregulation.
- We therefore hold that the Executive department
failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No.
8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of
depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of
this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that
the Executive department considered anyway the
stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market
and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to
the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten
full deregulation, the Executive department
rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The
Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by
subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No.
8180 for it has no power to make laws.
- In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the
factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors
of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market
and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the
basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to
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 determine the weight given by the Executive
department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could
well be the principal consideration for the early
deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal
significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of
this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation
under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a MISAPPLICATION
of R.A. No. 8180.
Petiotion GRANTED; RA 8180 declared UNCONSTI, EO 329 declared
VOID.
MELO; DISSENTING
Melo stated that there is no undue delegation of legislative powers in
RA 8180 or EO 329. He states that both the RA and the Eo passes
the completeness test and the sufficient standards test. All the
executive has to do, as a delegate, is implement it. The EO simply
showed how the Chief Executive exercised his delegated authority to
ascertain and recognize events that prompted him to advance the
deregulation to a date earlier that March 1997. RA did not prohibit him
from doing so, as long as the standards were met.
PEOPLE v. DACUYCUY (Judge)
Facts:
Private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval
and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were
charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for violation
of RA No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). After
their motion to dismiss was quashed by the municipal court, they
filed for a reconsideration alleging that Section 32 of RA No. 4670
is null and void for being unconstitutional. RA No. 4670 Section 32
provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall wilfully interfere
with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights
guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit
any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment,
in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied).
They claim that Section 32 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment
being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were
the legislative department of the Government.
Respondent judge Dacuycuy in his decision ruled that RA No.
4670 is valid and constitutional. He claims that: principle of
separation of powers is not violated by vesting incourts discretion
as to the length of sentence or amount of fine between designated
limits in sentencing persons onvicted of crime. In such instance,
the exercise of judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt to
use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law"
Issue:
W/N RA 4670 is unconstitutional.
Held:
NO. (In terms of cruel and unusual punishments because of the
indefinite penalty of imprisonment)
- Court held that in the constitutional provision that
directs that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted looks at the
form or character of the punishment, and not its
severity.
- Laws are not declared unconstitutional for excessive
penalties, however, courts are advised to recommend
clemency or reduction of penalty to the chief
executive.
(In terms of undue delegation of legislative powers)
- Two alternative and distinct penalties are
consequently imposed under Section 32 of RA 4670
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 to wit: (a) a fine ranging from P100.00 to P1,000.00;
or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no
prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of
imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum
amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no
equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment,
although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in
the discretion of the court.
- In the case under consideration, the respondent judge
erronneously assumed that since the penalty of
imprisonment has been provided for by the
legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to
ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We
cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts
to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of
reference have been provided by the legislature.
What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is
an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of
a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed
within specific or designated limits provided by law,
the absence of which designated limits well constitute
such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an
outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative
power.
- Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an
indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a
minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by
the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a
wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of
imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard.
CHIONGBIAN (Congressmen) v. ORBOS
Facts:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region.
The provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-
Tawi, which voted for the creation of such region were later
on known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Consistent with the authority granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of
RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the
existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O
No. 429 providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative
Regions in Mindanao.
Petitioners contend that Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No.
6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly
delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him
to merge by administrative determination the existing regions or
at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the
power delegated and that the power granted is
not expressed in the title of the law.
They also challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that
the power granted by RA 6734 to the President is only to merge
regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative
regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional
center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
Issue:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard
to guide the Presidents discretion.
Held:
NO. In conferring on the President the power to merge by
administrative determination the existing regions following the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating
back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972.
The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division
of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the
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administration of local governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have regional offices.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of
the power of general supervision over local governments.
(Abbas v. COMELEC)
The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions
like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The
power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust
municipal boundaries which has been described as "administrative in
nature. (Pelaez v. Auditor General)
Thus, the regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than
are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative
regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of
local government units by the President and insuring the efficient
delivery of essential services
Petitions DISMISSED.
EMPLOYERS CONFEDERATION OF THE PH v. NATIONAL
WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION
Facts:
Employers Confederation of the Philippines questioned the
validity of Wage Order No. NCR-01-1-A dated October 23,
1990 pursuant to RA 6727 or the Wage Rationalization Act. It
provides, among other things, for various Regional Tripartite
Wages and Productivity Boards in charge of prescribing the
minimum wage rates for all workers in the various regions and
for a National Wages and Productivity Commission to
review, among other functions, wage levels determined by the
boards.
NCR-01-1 only called for the increase of minimum wage in
NCR by 17 pesos daily but NCR-01-1-A which amended it to
17 pesos daily only for minimum wages rates up to 125 pesos
per day which made effectively determined salary ceilings.
ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity
Commission but was dismissed for lack of merit and was
denied reconsideration, thus the petition.
Issue:
W/N the National Wages and Productivity Commission
committed an unlawful act of legislation through wage-fixing
Holding:
No. In the Courts opinion, if RA 6727 intended the boards alone
to set floor wages, the Act would have no need for a board but an
accountant to keep track of the latest consumer price index, or better,
would have Congress done it as the need arises, as the legislature
prior to the Act, has done for years. Congress has delegated the power
to fix rates, provided that sufficient standards are established. Art. 124
of the Act provides Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing. The
Congress is not by, any means, passing the buck but merely leaves
the question of wages to the expertise of the experts. As Justice Cruz
observed with the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the power of
subordinate legislation as it is called.
The concept of minimum wage is also different from wage. It
is more than setting a floor wage to upgrade existing wages as ECOP
thinks. It underlies the effort of the State to promote productivity-
improvement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent standard
of living for the workers and their families, etc. The state is concerned
with the even distribution of wages.
Furthermore, the concept of salary-ceiling method is not new as it has
been used in eleven issuances mandating the grant of cost-of-living
allowances and there has been a shift to this method since there are
labor disputes arising from wage distortions. While collective
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bargaining and grievance procedures are appropriate, the
Commission observed that bargaining has helped very little in
correcting wage distortions.
Petition DENIED.
RUBI v PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
Facts:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and
other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the
Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are
said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having
run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board
thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their
habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected
by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board.
The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Section 2145
of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites
selected by provincial governor. With the prior approval of
the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province
in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized,
when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected
by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code.
Issue:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an
unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature
to a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it
unconstitutional?
Held:
NO. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the
Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and
the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or
not, the distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by
the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature
may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official
thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final
on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Normally the power to legislate is conferred in the legislature but it can
permit local administers to pass administrative legislation in their area
esp. for the purpose of maintaining law and order that will protect the
citizens in their area.
The court cited Judge Ranney saying that the delegation of law is
constitutional in the case at hand since it is a conferring of power rather
than the capacity of determining what is shall be (Difference of
executive on the former with legislative on the latter). The executive
branch in the guise of LGU is not determining a law but enforcing it.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the
Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the
approval of the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary
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since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge when
such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order.
As officials charged with the administration of the province and the
protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which
have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have
the misfortune of being in a backward state.
In the case of Rubi et al, such delegation is allowed given that the local
government acted in good faith when they mentioned in the records
that the LGU previously attempted to help Rubi et al. but all efforts
were futile. Given that there is a need for the local government to
implement the laws that would help the backward people in Mindoro,
they are then compelled by law to implement Admin Code Sec. 2145.
Additionally, the LGU was compelled to enforce the law given that they
wanted to prevent harmful activity of the Mindoro people when they
cited cases of environmental destruction done through kaingin.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an
unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature
to provincial official and a department head.
SEC v. INTERPORT
Facts:
The board of directors of Interport Resources Corporation (IRC)
approved an agreement between Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB)
to acquire their Ganda Energy Holdings Inc. (GEHI), which was
97% complete at that time. IRC on the other hand will issue 55%
of its expanded capital stock. Additionally, GHB will help IRC to
acquire 67% of the capital stock of Philippine Racing Club (PCRI)
by arranging a loan from an international source.
On 1994 of August, IRC alleged that it issued a press release of
the approval of its agreements but the SEC claims that it did not
receive any of it. The SEC claims that IRC failed to report its
business developments and its directors heavily traded IRC
stocks given the material of its information. SEC afterwards
conducted a hearing and found out that IRC and its directors
violated the Rules of Material Facts and Sections 30 and 36 of
Revised Securities Act. There is also an allegation that GHB and
that some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC
shares utilizing this material insider information. The respondents
filed an Omnibus Motion that the SEC had not authority to
investigate since the power is within the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department of SEC. The SEC continued to create
special panel to investigate the case despite the issuance of
respondent of injunction. The injunction was soon granted by the
Court of Appeals. The SEC filed a motion for leave to quash SEC
Omnibus to continue investigation.
The court stated that there were no implementing rules and
regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading and the
provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents
violated.
There is also no statutory authority for SEC to file a suit for it will
be a violation of the respondents right to due process and equal
protection. While pending, RA 8799 (Securities Regulation Code)
took effect on Aug. 8, 2000 which repealed Sec 8 of PD no. 902-
A which created the PED. This took the place of the Revised
Securities Act.
Issues:
Whether the CA erred when it ruled that there is no Statutory Authority
for petitioner to file any suit against respondent with respect to
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Security Act
Held:
Yes. This Court rules that no implementing rules were needed to
render effective Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act;
nor was the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure invalid, prior to the
enactment of the Securities Regulations Code, for failure to provide
parties with the right to cross- examine the witnesses presented
against them. Thus, the respondents may be investigated by the
appropriate authority under the proper rules of procedure of the
Securities Regulations Code for
violations of Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act.
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The court upholds these provisions as legal and binding even without
constitutional or statutory infirmity. Unless a specific provision of the
law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and
binding. The presumption of the validity of laws is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers, to respect the acts of each
department. It is impracticable for lawmakers to provide general
regulations for various details of management. The court does
not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in Sections 30 and 36 of
the Revised Securities Act. The broadness of the anti-fraud
provisions is to embrace the infinite variety of deceptive conduct.
Section 30:Explains in simple terms the insiders misuse of non- public
and undisclosed information is the gravamen of illegal conduct. To
protect investors from fraud when an insider takes advantage of an
uninformed investor using secret information. Insiders are obligated to
disclose information or abstain from trading shares of his corporation.
INSIDERS persons whose relationship or former relationship to the
issuer gives them access to a fact of special significance about the
issuer or security generally not available or one who learns such a fact
from an insider.
FACT OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE
Material fact affect the market price of a security which the insider
would be required to disclose
Reasonable person average man on the street; a reasonable
person would consider important in determining his course of action
with regard to shares of stock
Nature and reliability reliability in light of the nature and source and
circumstances of the information
Materiality concept balancing bot the indicated probability that the
event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the even in light of
the totality of the company activity; determined on a caseby case
basis
Generally available found in a newspaper, magazine, social media
widely used Section 36
Directors, officers and principal stockholders Every person who
is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten per
centum of any [class] of any equity security which is registered
pursuant to this Act, or who is [a] director or an officer of the issuer of
such security.
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted to
promote full disclosure in the securities market and prevent
unscrupulous individuals, who by their positions obtain non-public
information, from taking advantage of an uninformed public. No
individual would invest in a market which can be manipulated by a
limited number of corporate insiders. Such reaction would stifle, if not
stunt, the growth of the securities market. To avert the occurrence of
such an event, Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act prevented the
unfair use of non-public information in securities transactions, while
Section 36 allowed the SEC to monitor the transactions entered into
by corporate officers and directors as regards the securities of their
companies.
PEOPLE v. ROSENTHAL
Facts:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and
shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. Later, Rosenthal and
Osmea were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals
without actual tangible assets. Their shares were merely
based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of
Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581.
Section 2 provides that every person, partnership,
association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the
Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character
whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the
Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers
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 enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-
pesos.
Section 5, on the other hand, provides that whenever the said
Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or
without the examination herein provided, that any person,
partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right
to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale
in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person,
partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit
reciting that such person, partnership, association or
corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and
that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its
brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in
said certificate or permit for sale; that said Treasurer shall
furthermore have authority, whenever in his judgment it is in
the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit, and
that an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may
be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of
Finance.
Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because
no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said
official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit
ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole
criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that,
legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular
Treasurer.
Issue:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal
Treasurer.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act furnishes a sufficient
standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision
regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The
certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the
person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor has
complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement,
construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a
certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the
provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other
hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or
permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation
is in the public interest.
In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the
public against speculative schemes which have no more basis than
so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night
concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like
fraudulent exploitations, the SC held that public interest in this
case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in
reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or
cancellation of certificates or permits.
Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is
invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the
public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general
reference to public welfare without any standard to guide
determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes,
and the context of the provision in question show the contrary
ABAKADA v. ERMITA
Facts:
Recit-Ready:
RA 9337 or the VAT Reform Act is a law that came about because of
the amounting budget deficits that is coupled by the realization of
shortages in allocation in key areas of government like health and
education. RA 9337 is sourced from consolidating 3 bills and upon
passing as a law, was immediately issued a TRO by the court because
of the confusion in its implementation.
The confusion came when sectors are claiming that the said RA gives
10% additional expense to their products when in fact it was clarified
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that there were exceptions and that implementation varies from
industry to industry as the RA interacts in different ways to other
existing laws and that the exceptions to some laws should suffice
enough not to exceed or even reach the said 10% increase in prices.
However, upon looking at the provisions of the law, the petitioners
contend that Section 4, 5, and 6 of the RA 9337 amend section 106,
107, and 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Section 4
imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5
imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes
a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties.
The said provision also grants the President, upon the
recommendation of Secretary of Finance, to increase the tax to 12%
effective on 2006 as long as certain set of condition are set which are:
1) if the national deficit as a percentage of GDP from last year
exceeds by 1 and 12 and 2) that the VAT as percentage of GDP
increases beyond 2 and 4/5% from the previous year. They
contend that the Secretary of Finance does not have clear
prerogatives on how he could determine the increase of tax also.
Issue:
Whether RA 9337s granting of stand-by authority in abeyance of
Secretary of Finances decision is an undue delegation of power of
taxation that the legislative has and the President is bereft.
Held:
No. The court recognizes that the legislative under Section 28(2) of
Article VI has clear mandate to authorize the President to fix, within
specified limits, or impose tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage, and wharfage dues and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the govt.
The petitioners argue since VAT is a tax on sale, barter, or exchange
of goods and properties as well, the said VAT is in no way come into
the purview of those mentioned. They also mention since the
Secretary of Finance is a mere alter ego, the President in total
determines the tax.
Under the general rule, the exception in delegation of legislative
powers is subject to the following recognized limitations:
- delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
- delegation of emergency powers to President under
Constitution
- delegation to the people at large
- delegation to local governments
- delegation to administrative bodies
The case at hand is not a delegation of legislative power but more
of an ascertainment of facts. The power to impose the 12% VAT
is contingent of set of specified facts or conditions that are
outside the control of the executive. The use of the word shall also
should be noted as the word is a legislative order that binds the
president to enact the said increase of 12% VAT in accordance to the
order of legislative if certain conditions are met. The said shall
removes the doubt in power of the President to impose taxes at his
own discretion. There is no persuasive argument also of Pimentel
when he says that may is the actual implication of shall. In the present
case also, the Secretary of Finance is not acting for the President but
as an agent of the legislative department as he anticipates the
conditions set for him to recommend the increase of tax. The Sec. of
Finance acts as an agent of legislative that has the mandate to confirm
the facts by the use of data and analysis.
Petitioners argued that that the grant to the President of a standby
authority to increase the VAT rate was a virtual abdication by
Congress of its exclusive power to tax, because the VAT was not
within the purview of tariffs. They further contended that the delegation
to the Chief Executive of the legislative power to tax was contrary to
the principle of republicanism; and that the President has ample
powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by the
law to bring about either or both conditions precedent. Petitioners
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Escudero et al. added that to subject the imposition of the 12 percent
VAT rate to the whim of the finance secretary, an unelected
bureaucrat, was contrary to the principle of no taxation without
representation. After a brief discourse on the principle of non-
delegation of powers, the Supreme Court pointed out that the general
rule barring the delegation of legislative powers was subject to certain
recognized limitations or exceptions. In every case of permissible
delegation, it said, there must be a showing that the delegation itself
[was] valid; that is, (a) the law was complete in itself -- it spelled out
the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) the law fixed a standard to which the performance of a
delegates functions must conform a standard whose limits were
sufficiently determinate and determinable.
Citing People v. Vera and Edu v. Ericta, the Court then declared that
[w]hile the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies,
details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such
power may be left to them, including the power to determine the
existence of facts on which its operation depends.
Here, the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6 of RA 9337 involved
simply a delegation of the ascertainment of facts upon which the
operation of the 12 percent VAT rate effective January 1, 2006, would
be made contingent. There was no discretion to be exercised by the
President, as may be gleaned from the use of the word shall.
The Court held that in making recommendations to the President on
the existence of either of the two specified conditions, the finance
secretary was not acting as the Chief Executives alter ego or even
subordinate. Rather, the finance chief was acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which
its expressed will is to take effect. This being so, the findings of the
secretary could not be altered, modified, nullified or set aside by the
President; much less could the judgment of the former be substituted
for that of the latter.
Opinions:
PUNO, CJ:
As he had argued in Tolentino, the powers of the BCC were limited,
for which reason it cannot be allowed to act as if it were a third house
of Congress.
Under the clear rules of both the Senate and the House, the BCC could
go no further than settling differences in their bills or joint resolutions.
Neither could the Committee, on its own, settle differences that were
substantial in character. In the latter situation, it had to go back to the
chamber that had created it for the latters appropriate action. Thus,
it could not create a new law, i.e., that which has never been
discussed in either chamber of Congress.
Constituting grave abuse of discretion that amounted to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and that should be struck down as unconstitutional,
were the following acts of the BCC:
a. Its deletion of the pro poor no pass on provision which is
common in both Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No.
3705. x x x
b. The insertion of added restrictions on local governments use
of incremental revenue from the VAT in Section 21 of R.A. No.
9337, which were not present in the Senate or House Bills,
which did not harmonize conflicting provisions between the
constituent bills of R.A. No. 9337 but are entirely new and
extraneous concepts.
The test of germaneness was overly broad. It allowed the BCC to
change provisions in the bills of the House and the Senate, even when
not in disagreement. Worse still, it enables the Committee to
introduce amendments which are entirely new and have not previously
passed through the coils of scrutiny of the members of both Houses.
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PANGANIBAN, J: Separate
I voted to grant the Petitions partially; and to declare Sections 1, 2,
and 3 of RA 9337 unconstitutional, insofar as they (a) amended the
rates of income tax on domestic, resident foreign, and nonresident
foreign corporations; (b) amended the tax credit against taxes due on
intercorporate dividends from nonresident foreign corporations; and
(c) reduced the allowable deduction for interest expense. As to the
other provisions, I submitted that they were constitutional.
At the outset, I pointed out the non-absolute character of the enrolled
bill doctrine, which held that an enrolled bill was conclusive not only
as to the provisions of a law, but also as to its due enactment. I said
that the doctrine applied mainly to the internal rules and processes
followed by Congress in its principal duty of lawmaking. Such doctrine
must yield to mandatory provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the
Court had the power and duty to strike down any provision of a law
that in its enactment would violate conditions, restrictions
or limitations imposed by the Constitution.
Being a mere creation of Congress, the BCC may resolve differences
only in conflicting provisions of congressional bills referred to it; and
only on the condition that the resolution would not violate the
origination, the three-reading, and the no-amendment rules of the factual bases for making the increase in VAT rate operative. Indeed,
Constitution.
First, it was my position that the origination or germaneness principles
were not violated by the BCC when it crafted changes to reconcile the
conflicting provisions of the Senate and the House bills. In particular,
those changes were the 70 percent cap and the 5 percent final
withholding VAT; percentage taxes on domestic carriers, keepers of
garages and international carriers; franchise taxes; amusement taxes;
excise taxes on manufactured oils and other fuels; registration
requirements; the issuance of receipts, sales or commercial invoices;
and the disposition of incremental revenues. All of those modifications
were within the powers of the BCC.
Second, there was no undue delegation of legislative power in the
standby authority given by Congress to the President, because the law
was complete and the standards were fixed. Once either the factual or
the mathematical events provided in the law took place, the President
would have no choice but to implement the increase of the VAT rate
to 12 percent. Thus, the Chief Executive was given merely the power
to ascertain the facts to bring the law into operation -- clearly an
administrative, not a legislative, function.
I disagreed with the majority, however, when it averred that the finance
secretary would
become an agent of Congress in determining and declaring the event
upon which its expressed will was to take effect; and that the
secretarys personality was in reality but a projection of that of
Congress. Maintaining that the finance secretary remained the Chief
Executives alter ego, I argued thus:
The mandate given by RA 9337 to the secretary is not equipollent to
an authority to make laws. In passing this law, Congress did not restrict
or curtail the constitutional power of the President to retain control and
supervision over the entire Executive Department. The law should be
construed to be merely asking the President, with a recommendation
from the Presidents alter ego in finance matters, to determine the
as I have mentioned earlier, the fact-finding condition is a mere
administrative, not legislative, function.
Third, I opined that the BCC had exercised its prerogative to delete
the no-pass-on provisions, which were in conflict. Its authority to make
amendments implied the power to make not only insertions, but also
deletions, in order to resolve conflicting provisions. But the BCC
blatantly violated the origination and the germaneness principles when
it inserted provisions not found in the House versions of the E-VAT
Law: those (1) increasing the tax rates on domestic, resident foreign
and nonresident foreign corporations; (2) raising the tax credit against
taxes due on intercorporate dividends from nonresident foreign
corporations; and (3) reducing the allowable deduction for interest
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
expense. The amendments regarding income taxes were not legally
germane to the subject matter of the House bills.Lastly, I maintained
that the advantages and the disadvantages of the E-VAT Law, as
well as its long-term effects on the economy, were beyond the reach
of judicial review.
GUTIERREZ, J:
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez said that it was high time to re-
examine the test of germaneness proffered in Tolentino; that the BCC
cannot exercise its unbridled discretion and create a new law; and intermediaries and excise taxes.
that the deletion of the no-pass-on provision, common to both SB 1950
and HB 3705, was unconstitutional. She further explained:
(1) Sections 4 to 6 of RA 9337 were patently unconstitutional as they
violated the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. The
delegation did not fall under any of the excepted instances. Moreover,
while the two conditions upon which the President may increase the
VAT rate to 12% may appear to be definite standards sufficient to
guide the President, they were ineffectual and malleable as they gave
the President ample opportunity to exercise her authority in arbitrary
and discretionary fashion.
(2) No doubt, RA 9337 was enacted pursuant to a valid governmental
objective, which is to raise revenues for the government. However, the
means employed to accomplish such objective -- particularly Sections
4, 5 and 6 of RA 9337 -- were arbitrary
and unduly oppressive. For that matter, she questioned the grant of
the standby authority to the President to increase the VAT rate on the
premise alone that she deserves an incentive or reward for
satisfactory VAT collection. Neither an excess nor a deficiency of
revenue vis--vis the needs of government would be in keeping with
the principle of fiscal adequacy.
(3) A perusal of the legislative history of RA 9337 showed that it did
not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives primarily
because SB 1950 was not based on any bill passed by the House of
Representatives.
(4) The rule on germaneness requires that the Senate bill must be
related to the bill originally passed by the House of Representatives.
As it was very apparent that HB 3555 and 3705 merely intended to
amend Sections of the NIRC pertaining to the VAT provisions, the
Senate could not, without violating the germaneness rule and the
principle of exclusive origination, propose the tax matters in SB Bill
1950, which referred to matters outside of VAT, such as income tax,
percentage tax, franchise tax, taxes on banks and other financial
PEOPLE v. VERA
Facts:
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case
filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The
matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office which
recommended the denial of Cu Unjiengs petition for
probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning
the petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the
petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the
Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of
Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no
jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation
because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law),
probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with
probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and
that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no
designated probation officer hence, a Manila court cannot
grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter
alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the
constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws.
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
 HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of
provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law if a
province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will
appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation
officer will be appointed hence, that makes it violative of the
equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue
delegation of power because it gave the option to the
provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law
however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to be
followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an
encroachment of the executives power to grant pardon. They
say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had
in effect encroached upon the executives power to grant
pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the issues
raised by HSBC ironic because their main stance was the
non-applicability of the probation law only in Manila while
recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that,
the Prosecution, representing the State as well as the People
of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like
Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng
also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the
Probation Law in the past without question but is now
questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).
Issue:
W/N Act. No 4221 is constitutional.
Held:
NO.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note.
There is violation of the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221,
provinces were given the option to apply the law by simply providing
for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation
officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived
of the provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that
it shall only apply to provinces where the respective provincial boards
have provided for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it
state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial
boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law
in their province. This only creates a roving commission which will act
arbitrarily according to its whims.
---
Act No. 4221, Sec. 11 reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of
the Probation Office
In order to test whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power or not, it is usual to see whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature. For the purpose of Probation
Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies
endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in
their respective provinces.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized
the power of Congress to provide for probation. Probation does not
encroach upon the Presidents power to grant pardon. Probation is not
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties while
pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties.
PEOPLE v. MACEREN
Facts:
Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes,
Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a
Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order
No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused
in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in
the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using a
somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a
bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was
attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these
devices or equipment catch fish thru electric current, which
destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the
detriment and prejudice of the populace"
The trial court dismissed the case as under Sec 11 the law
punishes: "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance"
in fishing. It is noteworthy since the Fisheries Law does not
expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the silence
of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner
of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No.
84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine
waters.
Issues:
Whether electro fishing in fresh water is punished by Admin Order No.
84-1 and Administrative Order No. 84.
Held:
NO. We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1
and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit
electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other
words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing
electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and
administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural
Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he
exceeded his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an
administrative order. Although administrative officials are given such
rule-
making power, their power is limited only to those that are germane to
the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the
standards that the law prescribes. By such regulations, of course,
the law itself cannot be extended.
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
DAGAN v. PRC
Facts:
The controversy stemmed from the 11 August 2004 directive
issued by the Philippine Racing Commission (Philracom)
directing the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine
Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) to immediately come up with their
respective Clubs House Rule to address Equine Infectious
Anemia (EIA) problem and to rid their facilities of horses
infected with EIA. Said directive was issued pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 5 dated 28 March 1994 by the
Department of Agriculture declaring it unlawful for any person,
firm or corporation to ship, drive, or transport horses from any
locality or place except when accompanied by a certificate
issued by the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry (BAI). In compliance with the directive, MJCI and
PRCI ordered the owners of racehorses stable in their
establishments to submit the horses to blood sampling and
administration of the Coggins Test to determine whether they
are afflicted with the EIA virus.
Petitioners and racehorse owners William Dagan (Dagan) et
al. refused to comply with the directive. First, they alleged that
there had been no prior consultation with horse owners.
Second, they claimed that neither official guidelines nor
regulations had been issued relative to the taking of blood
samples. And third, they asserted that no documented case
of EIA had been presented to justify the undertaking. Despite
resistance from petitioners, the blood testing proceeded. The
horses, whose owners refused to comply were banned from
the races, were removed from the actual day of race,
prohibited from renewing their licenses or evicted from their
stables.
When their complaint went unheeded, the racehorse owners
lodged a complaint before the Office of the President (OP).
Petitioners maintain that the assailed guidelines do not
comply with due process requirements. Petitioners insist that
racehorses already in the MJCI stables were allowed to be so
quartered because the individual horse owners had already
complied with the Philracom regulation that horses should not
bear any disease. There was neither a directive nor a rule that
racehorses already lodged in the stables of the racing clubs
should again be subjected to the collection of blood samples
preparatory to the conduct of the EIA tests. Thus it came to
them as a surprise that Philracom demanded a Coggins Test.
Issue:
Whether respondents had acted with whim and caprice in the
implementation of the contested guideline.
Held:
No. The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed
guidelines, hinges on compliance with the following requisites: (1) Its
promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; (2) It must be
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; (3) It must
be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; (4) It must
be reasonable. All the prescribed requisites are met with regard
to the questioned issuances.
The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as
expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest.
This rule however admits of recognized exceptions such as the grant
of rule-making power to administrative agencies. Delegated rule-
making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due
to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However,
there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid
only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes
a standardthe limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable.
In this case, Philracom was created for the purpose
of carrying out the declared policy in Section 1 which
is "to promote and direct the accelerated development and continued
growth of horse racing
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
not only in pursuance of the sports development
program but also in order to insure the full exploitation of the sport as
a source of revenue and employment." Furthermore, Philracom was
granted exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the
conduct of horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of races,
the construction and safety of race tracks, and the security of racing.
P.D. No. 420 is already complete in itself.
Section 9 (Specific Powers) of the law fixes the standards and
limitations to which Philracom must conform in the performance of its
functions. Among them is the power to enforce and prescribe rules
regarding horse-racing. Clearly, there is a proper legislative delegation
of rule-making power to Philracom. Clearly too, for its part Philracom
has exercised its rule-making power in a proper and reasonable
manner. More specifically, its discretion to rid the facilities of MJCI and
PRCI of horses afflicted with EIA is aimed at preserving the security
and integrity of horse races.
There is no delegation of power to speak of between Philracom, as
the delegator and MJCI and PRCI as delegates. The Philracom
DIRECTIVE is merely instructive in character. Philracom had
instructed PRCI and MJCI to "immediately come up with Clubs House
Rule to address the problem and rid their facilities of horses infected
with EIA." PRCI and MJCI followed-up when they ordered the
racehorse owners to submit blood samples and subject their race
horses to blood testing.
PICHAY JR. v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
Facts:
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-
established Investigative andA djudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima
filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave
misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees,
namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M.
Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the
LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy
Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents
to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In
compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol,
et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-
I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an
administrative office a quasi-judicial function through and E.O. and not
through legislative enactment by Congress
Held:
NO.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive
Department under E.O. 292. In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB
v. Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out
a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department
is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of Section 31, Book III,
E.O. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to
the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President."
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring
need of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity,
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve
center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the
Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped
by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives
and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post
of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated
legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his
power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section
31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize
offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the
Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from
the Office of the President to Departments or gencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under
Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other
is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also
insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is,
whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations
prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O.
12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who
held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was
placed directly "under the Office of the President."10 On the other
hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now
been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President
Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the
President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC
and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under
Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
What actions does reorganization include?
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate
and Distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new,
additional and distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained
to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA,
which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper.
The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the
administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of
a third division the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division through
which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been
tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing
structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of
control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not
vested with quasi-judicial powers.
while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-
ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to
the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission
of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-
ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints against
all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
and recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-
finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the
power to settlecontroversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled
in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, and later reiterated in
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi- judicial agency or office.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as
such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions
in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject
to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties
of the Ombudsman.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach
upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction when it took cognizance
of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier
filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges
and allegations before the Office of the Ombudsman. The primary
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases
refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to
administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation
being conducted by another investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of
R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the
existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a
criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is
limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and
recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President.
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform
its duties as an impartial tribunal, contending that both the IAD-
ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the
President. The mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate
the actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not equivalent to
proof. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed. Petitioner must present
substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably
sided against him in the conduct of the investigation. No such
evidence has been presented as to defeat the presumption of
regularity m the performance of the fact-finding investigator's duties.
The assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39 Petitioner
has failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13,
which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the President's continuing
authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
ARROYO v. DOJ
Facts:
Due to allegations of massive electoral fraud and manipulation of
election results in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections, on August 2,
2011, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation
of a committee jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On August 4, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department
Order No. 640 naming three (3) of its prosecutors to the Joint
Committee.
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order
No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases with the mandate to
conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the
evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding
Team created and referred.
The Fact-Finding Team, on the other hand, was created for the
purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial
evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 | Atty. Chan-Gonzaga
Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
be conducted by the Joint Committee.
The members of the Fact-Finding Team unanimously agreed that
the subject of the Initial Report would be the electoral fraud and
manipulation of election results allegedly committed during the
May 14, 2007 elections. Thus, in its Initial Report dated October 20,
2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of
North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed
perpetrated.
The Fact-Finding Team recommended that petitioner Abalos and
ten (10) others be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in
North and South Cotabato. Twenty-six (26) persons, including
petitioners GMA and Abalos, were likewise recommended for
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for manipulating
the election results in Maguindanao. Several persons were also
recommended to be charged administratively, while others, including
petitioner Mike Arroyo, were recommended to be subjected to
further investigation. The case resulting from the investigation of the
Fact-Finding Team was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-
2011.
Petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel. The petitions were eventually
consolidated.
GMA filed before the Joint Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad
Cautelam to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her with documents
referred to in his complaint-affidavit and for the production of election
documents as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA
contended that for the crime of electoral sabotage to be established,
there is a need to present election documents allegedly tampered
which resulted in the increase or decrease in the number of votes
of local and national candidates. The Joint Committee denied the
aforesaid motion. GMA subsequently filed a motion for
reconsideration.
On November 18, 2011, after conducting a special session, the
Comelec en banc issued a Resolution approving and adopting the
Joint Resolution of the Joint Committee subject to modifications. The
dispositive portion of the Comelec Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the
Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee in
DOJ-COMELEC Case No. 001-2011 and DOJ-COMELEC
Case No. 002-2011, upon the recommendation of the
COMELECs own representatives in the Committee, is hereby
APPROVED and ADOPTED, subject to the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. That information/s for the crime of ELECTORAL SABOTAGE
be filed against GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, BENJAMIN
ABALOS, SR., LINTANG H. BEDOL, DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN,
SR. and PETER REYES; xxx
3. That the charges against JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, BONG
SERRANO, ALBERTO AGRA, ANDREI BON TAGUM, GABBY
CLAUDIO, ROMY DAYDAY, JEREMY JAVIER, JOHN DOE a.k.a
BUTCH, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence to establish
probable cause;
xxx
On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelecs
Law Department filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay
City, an Information against petitioner GMA, Governor Andal
Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H. Bedol. The case was raffled to
Branch 112 and the corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued
which was served on GMA on the same day.
On November 18, 2011, petitioner GMA filed with the RTC an
Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam with leave to allow the Joint
Committee to resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by GMA,
to defer issuance of a warrant of arrest and a Hold Departure Order,
and to proceed to judicial determination of probable cause. She,
likewise, filed with the Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam
praying that its Resolution be vacated for being null and void. The
RTC nonetheless issued a warrant for her arrest which was duly
served. GMA thereafter filed a Motion for Bail which was granted.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 "Creating and Constituting
a Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee and
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections Electoral
Fraud and Manipulation Cases" is constitutional in light of the
following:
due process clause YES, it is constitutional
equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution- YES, it is
constitutional
the principle of separation of powers- YES, it is constitutional
the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body-
YES, it is constitutional
2. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law to
conduct preliminary investigation jointly with the DOJ.- YES
3. Whether or not due process was observed by the Joint DOJ-
COMELEC Fact-Finding Team and Preliminary Investigation
Committee, and and the COMELEC in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and approval of the Joint Panels Resolution.
Held:
Jurisdiction over the validity of theconduct of the preliminary
investigation
Substantive IssuesBases for the Creation of theFact-Finding
Team and Joint Committee
Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the
powers and functions of the Comelec. Paragraph (6) thereof vests
in the Comelec the power to: (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or
on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute
election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and
administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec
to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest
conduct of elections. The failure of the Comelec to exercise this
power could result in the frustration of the true will of the people and
make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was
reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code, to wit: Section 265.
Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized
legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code,
and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any
complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file
the complaint with the office of the fiscal [public prosecutor], or with
the Ministry Department of Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter,
however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to
avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants are
given continuing authority as deputies to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election offenses under
election laws and to prosecute the same. The complaints may be
filed directly with them or may be indorsed to them by the petitioner
or its duly authorized representatives.
Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged
with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary
investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given
by the Comelec. The reason for this delegation of authority has been
explained in Commission on Elections v. Espaol: The deputation of
the Provincial and City Prosecutors is necessitated by the need for
prompt investigation and dispensation of election cases as an
indispensable part of the task of securing fine, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. Enfeebled by lack of funds and the
magnitude of its workload, the petitioner does not have a sufficient
number of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to
prosecute such cases.
Section 43 of R.A. No. 9369 reads:
Section 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its
duly authorized legal officers, have the power, concurrent with
the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
72
under this Code, and to prosecute the same.
As clearly set forth above, instead of a mere delegated authority, the
other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now
exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the
same.
It is, therefore, not only the power but the duty of both the
Comelec and the DOJ to perform any act necessary to ensure
the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election
offenses. Pursuant to the above constitutional and statutory
provisions, and as will be explained further below, we find no
impediment for the Comelec and the DOJ to create the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team for the purpose of
conducting a thorough investigation of the alleged massive
electoral fraud and the manipulation of election results in the
2004 and 2007 national elections relating in particular to the
presidential and senatorial elections.
Constitutionality of Joint-Order No. 001-2011
Equal Protection Clause
Unlike the matter addressed by the Courts ruling in Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, Joint Order No. 001-2011
cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles out the officials of
the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it infringes the equal
protection clause.
The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 was expressly created for
the purpose of investigating alleged graft and corruption during the
Arroyo Administration since Executive Order No. 1 specifically
referred to the "previous administration"; while the Joint
Committee was created for the purpose of conducting
preliminary investigation of election offenses during the 2004
and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among
those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents
therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were
investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance
of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the
investigation by the Joint Committee.
As the constitutional body granted with the broad power of enforcing
and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, and tasked
to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, the
Comelec has the authority to determine how best to perform such
constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the Comelec
issues various resolutions prior to every local or national elections
setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the conduct of the
elections. This shows that every election is distinct and requires
different guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to
respond to existing circumstances.
Moreover, as has been practiced in the past, complaints for
violations of election laws may be filed either with the Comelec or
with the DOJ. The Comelec may even initiate, motu proprio,
complaints for election offenses.
Pursuant to law and the Comelecs own Rules, investigations
may be conducted either by the Comelec itself through its law
department or through the prosecutors of the DOJ. These
varying procedures and treatment do not, however, mean that
respondents are not treated alike. Thus, petitioners insistence of
infringement of their constitutional right to equal protection of the law
is misplaced.
Due Process
It is settled that the conduct of preliminary investigation is, like court
proceedings, subject to the requirements of both substantive and
procedural due process. Preliminary investigation is considered as
a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer,
by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. The
authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to
preside over or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than
that of a municipal judge or even an RTC Judge.
It must also be emphasized that Joint Order No. 001-2011 created
two bodies, namely: (1) the Fact-Finding Team tasked to gather real,
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
 documentary and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the
preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee;
and (2) the Joint Committee mandated to conduct preliminary
investigation. It is, therefore, inaccurate to say that there is only one
body which acted as evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge.
Separation of powers
Petitioners claim that the Joint Panel is a new public office as shown
by its composition, the creation of its own Rules of Procedure, and
the source of funding for its operation. It is their position that the
power of the DOJ to investigate the commission of crimes and the
Comelecs constitutional mandate to investigate and prosecute
violations of election laws do not include the power to create a new
public office in the guise of a joint committee. Thus, in creating the
Joint Panel, the DOJ and the Comelec encroached upon the power
of the Legislature to create public office.
As clearly explained above, the Comelec is granted the power to
investigate, and where appropriate, prosecute cases of election
offenses. This is necessary in ensuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. On the other hand, the DOJ is
mandated to administer the criminal justice system in accordance
with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation
of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the
correctional system. It is specifically empowered to "investigate the
commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system." Also, the provincial or city
prosecutors and their assistants, as well as the national and regional
state prosecutors, are specifically named as the officers authorized
to conduct preliminary investigation. Recently, the Comelec, through
its duly authorized legal offices, is given the power, concurrent with
the other prosecuting arms of the government such as the DOJ, to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses.
Undoubtedly, it is the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of Court
and not the assailed Joint Order which give the DOJ and the
Comelec the power to conduct preliminary investigation. No new
power is given to them by virtue of the assailed order. As to the
members of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, they
perform such functions that they already perform by virtue of their
current positions as prosecutors of the DOJ and legal officers of the
Comelec. Thus, in no way can we consider the Joint Committee as
a new public office.
Independence of the Comelec
Petitioners claim that in creating the Joint Panel, the Comelec has
effectively abdicated its constitutional mandate to investigate and,
where appropriate, to prosecute cases of violation of election laws
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices in favor of the Executive Department acting
through the DOJ Secretary. Under the set- up, the Comelec
personnel is placed under the supervision and control of the DOJ.
The chairperson is a DOJ official. Thus, the Comelec has willingly
surrendered its independence to the DOJ and has acceded to share
its exercise of judgment and discretion with the Executive Branch.
Prior to the amendment of Section 265 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the Comelec had the exclusive authority to investigate and
prosecute election offenses. In the discharge of this exclusive
power, the Comelec was given the right to avail and, in fact, availed
of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government such
as the prosecutors of the DOJ. By virtue of this continuing authority,
the state prosecutors and the provincial or city prosecutors were
authorized to receive the complaint for election offense and delegate
the conduct of investigation to any of their assistants. The
investigating prosecutor, in turn, would make a recommendation
either to dismiss the complaint or to file the information. This
recommendation is subject to the approval of the state, provincial or
city prosecutor, who himself may file the information with the proper
court if he finds sufficient cause to do so, subject, however, to the
accuseds right to appeal to the Comelec.
Clearly, the Comelec recognizes the need to delegate to the
prosecutors the power to conduct preliminary investigation.
Otherwise, the prompt resolution of alleged election offenses will not
be attained. This delegation of power, otherwise known as
deputation, has long been recognized and, in fact, been utilized as
an effective means of disposing of various election offense cases.
Apparently, as mere deputies, the prosecutors played a vital role in
the conduct of preliminary investigation, in the resolution of
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
 complaints filed before them, and in the filing of the informations with
the proper court.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no impediment for the
creation of a Joint Committee. While the composition of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team is dominated by DOJ officials, it
does not necessarily follow that the Comelec is inferior. Under the
Joint Order, resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable
cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in
accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. This shows that
the Comelec, though it acts jointly with the DOJ, remains in control
of the proceedings. In no way can we say that the Comelec has
thereby abdicated its independence to the executive department.
Validity of the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation
In questioning the propriety of the conduct of the preliminary
investigation in her Supplemental Petition, GMA only raises her
continuing objection to the exercise of jurisdiction of the Joint
Committee and the Comelec. There is, therefore, no impediment for
the Court to rule on the validity of the conduct of preliminary
investigation.
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being
bound for trial and before being exposed to the risk of incarceration
and penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive
right. To deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation is
to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.
In a preliminary investigation, the Rules of Court guarantee the
petitioners basic due process rights such as the right to be furnished
a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting
documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits, and other
supporting documents in her defense.
Admittedly, GMA received the notice requiring her to submit her
counter-affidavit. Yet, she did not comply, allegedly because she
could not prepare her counter-affidavit. She claimed that she was
not furnished by Senator Pimentel pertinent documents that she
needed to adequately prepare her counter-affidavit.
The Joint Committee, however, denied GMAs motion which carried
with it the denial to extend the filing of her counter-affidavit.
Consequently, the cases were submitted for resolution sans GMAs
and the other petitioners counter-affidavits. This, according to GMA,
violates her right to due process of law.
The subpoena issued against respondent therein should be
accompanied by a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents. GMA also has the right to examine
documents but such right of examination is limited only to the
documents or evidence submitted by the complainants (Senator
Pimentel and the Fact-Finding Team) which she may not have been
furnished and to copy them at her expense.
While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election
documents which served as bases in the allegations of significant
findings specific to the protested municipalities involved, there were
no annexes or attachments to the complaint filed. As stated in
the Joint Committees Order dated November 15, 2011 denying
GMAs Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was
.
ordered to furnish petitioners with all the supporting evidence
However, Senator Pimentel manifested that he was adopting all
the affidavits attached to the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report.
Therefore, when GMA was furnished with the documents
attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the right
to examine as guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure
and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Those were the only
documents submitted by the complainants to the Committee.
We must, however, emphasize at this point that during the
preliminary investigation, the complainants are not obliged to prove
their cause beyond reasonable doubt. It would be unfair to expect
them to present the entire evidence needed to secure the conviction
of the accused prior to the filing of information. A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of the parties respective evidence but the presentation only of such
evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. Precisely there is a trial to allow the
reception of evidence for the prosecution in support of the charge.
With the denial of GMAs motion to be furnished with and examine
the documents referred to in Senator Pimentels complaint, GMAs
motion to extend the filing of her counter-affidavit and countervailing
evidence was consequently denied. Indeed, considering the nature
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
 of the crime for which GMA was subjected to preliminary
investigation and the documents attached to the complaint, it is
incumbent upon the Joint Committee to afford her ample time to
examine the documents submitted to the Joint Committee in order
that she would be able to prepare her counter-affidavit. She cannot,
however, insist to examine documents not in the possession
and custody of the Joint Committee nor submitted by the
complainants. Otherwise, it might cause undue and unnecessary
delay in the disposition of the cases. The constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and
quasi-judicial hearings. Any party to a case has the right to demand
on all officials tasked with the administration of justice to expedite its
disposition.
To recapitulate, we find and so hold that petitioners failed to establish
any constitutional or legal impediment to the creation of the Joint DOJ-
Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee and Fact-Finding
Team.
First, while GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to
preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to
GMA; thus, Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Second, the due process clause is likewise not infringed upon by the
alleged prejudgment of the case as petitioners failed to prove that
the Joint Panel itself showed such bias and partiality against them.
Neither was it shown that the Justice Secretary herself actually
intervened in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. More
importantly, considering that the Comelec is a collegial body, the
perceived prejudgment of Chairman Brillantes as head of the
Comelec cannot be considered an act of the body itself.
Third, the assailed Joint Order did not create new offices because
the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team perform functions that
they already perform by virtue of the Constitution, the statutes, and
the Rules of Court.
Fourth, in acting jointly with the DOJ, the Comelec cannot be
considered to have abdicated its independence in favor of the
executive branch of government. Resolution No. 9266 was validly
issued by the Comelec as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the
prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an
adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections. The role of the DOJ in the conduct of
preliminary investigation of election offenses has long been
recognized by the Comelec because of its lack of funds and legal
officers to conduct investigations and to prosecute such cases on its
own. This is especially true after R.A. No. 9369 vested in the
Comelec and the DOJ the concurrent jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses. While we uphold
the validity of Comelec Resolution No. 9266 and Joint Order No.
001-2011, we declare the Joint Committees Rules of Procedure
infirm for failure to comply with the publication requirement.
Consequently, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the
1993 Comelec Rules of Procedure govern.
Fifth, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. They were
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other
supporting documents submitted to the Joint Committee and they
were required to submit their counter-affidavit and countervailing
evidence. As to petitioners Mike Arroyo and Abalos, the pendency
of the cases before the Court does not automatically suspend the
proceedings before the Joint Committee nor excuse them from their
failure to file the required counter-affidavits. With the foregoing
disquisitions, we find no reason to nullify the proceedings
undertaken by the Joint Committee and the Comelec in the electoral
sabotage cases against petitioners.
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Albano, JLDA 1C 2021
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 | Atty. Chan-Gonzaga
Albano, JLDA 1C 2021