1. People vs.

Agliday

2. US VS. TAEDO
G.R. No. L-5418 | February 12, 1910
(Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1910/feb1910/gr_l-5418_1910.html)

Facts: On January 26, 1909, CecilioTanedo, a land owner went with some workers to
work on the dam of his land, carrying with him his shotgun and a few shells. Upon
reaching the dam, the accused went on his way to hunt for wild chickens, meeting the
victim, Feliciano Sanchez, his mother and his uncle. The accused went into the forest
upon the recommendation of the deceased to continue his search for the elusive
chickens. Upon seeing one, Tanedo shot one, but simultaneously, he heard a human
dry out in pain. After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo run back to his works
and asked one Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they did by
putting it amidst the tall cogon grass and later burying it in an old well. Only one shot
was heard that morning and chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers
were found at the scene of the crime. The lower court found the accused guilty of
homicide.
Crime committed: The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and
one day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and costs. The defendant
appealed.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a
reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he
shall be entitled to an acquittal.

Article 1 of the Penal Code

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions
punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to
be voluntary unless the contrary shall appear.

Article 8, subdivision 8
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes
some injury by mere accident without liability or intention of
causing it.

Contention of the State: The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and the
accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens.That the accused shot the
deceased, Sanchez in the forest with premeditation, by planning to take the deceased
to the forest, there to kill him so that no one could see it and to bury him secretly in
order that the crime should remain unpunished.
Contention of the accused: Accused testified that he did not invite the deceased to go
hunting with him neither did the deceased go with him. That the incident was an
accident since only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by a
gunshot wound. Prior relations between the accused and the victim had been normal.
There was no enmity and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made
to show any. There appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission of the
crime. The Government has not attempted to show any. The only possible reason that
the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden
quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the
chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
Ruling of the Supreme Court: In this case there is absolutely no evidence of
negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there any question that he was
engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there
any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The
only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his
concealment and denial.
It was not foreseeable that the slug would recoil after hitting the chicken. Evidence of
misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide, which must
be submitted to the jury, and since a plea of misadventure is a denial of a criminal
intent, which constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a
conviction, it must be negated by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The court
held that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgement of conviction. The
judgement of conviction then is reversed; the accused is acquitted and discharged of
custody.
Killing by misadventureis the accidental killing of a person
while performing a lawful act. In a killing by misadventure,
the offense alleged will be unaccompanied by any criminal
carelessness or reckless conduct. For instance, an
excusable homicide occurring without the intention to do
harm and without proper precaution to avoid danger while
engaged in lawful act is a killing by misadventure.

Criminal homicide may be classified as murder,

manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide. A person
commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or with criminal negligence causes the death of
another person. Homicides that are neither justifiable nor
excusable are considered crimes.

Non-criminal homicides include killing in self-defense, an

accidental death like a hunting accident or automobile
collision without a violation of law like reckless driving, or
carrying out a sentence of execution.
Topic: Irresistible Force or Uncontrollable Fear

3. People v. Baldogo, 128106-07

Facts:

Julio Camacho Sr. and his family lived in a compound inside a penal colony in
Palawan. The accused was assigned as the domestic helper of their family along with a
co-inmate, Bermas alias Bunso. After the accused served dinner, Julio Sr. and Julie
went out to attend a bible study, leaving their 4 children at home. Julie went to the living
room to do her assignment when she heard Bermas called her the kitchen, claiming that
she was needed by her brother. She ignored him until she heard a sound akin to a yell,
and ran to the kitchen to find her brothers bloodied body sprawled on the ground. Over
the dead body, Bermas and accused-appellant were each holding a bolo. Julie ran but
accused-appellant was able to overtake her and tied her hands. They took Julie with
them and left her to fend for herself a few days later.

Contention of the State:

RTC found the accused guilty of murder with an aggravating circumstance of

taking advantage of superior strength, and of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

Contention of Accused:

Bermas approached the accused when the latter was about to sleep, armed with
a foot long bloodied bolo. Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt
Julie or deprive her of her liberty. Accused-appellant claims that he was acting under
duress because he was threatened by Bermas with death unless he did what Bermas
ordered him to do.

Ruling of the Court:

The prosecution adduced indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired with

Bermas not only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping and detaining Julie. Article 8 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy if two or more persons agree
to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be proved by direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony pointing to a joint purpose
and design and community of intent. It is not required that there be an agreement for an
appreciable period prior to the commission of a felony; rather, it is sufficient that at the
time of the commission of the offense, all the conspirators had the same purpose and
were united in its execution. In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. All the
accused are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their
participation. For a conspirator to be criminally liable of murder or homicide, it is not
necessary that he actually attacks or kills the victim. As long as all the conspirators
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably
indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim, all the
conspirators are criminally liable for the death of said victim. In these cases, the
prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accused-appellant indeed conspired with
Bermas to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie as shown by the following cogent facts and
circumstances:

1. When Julie responded to the repeated calls of Bermas for her to go to the kitchen
on his pretext that Jorge wanted to talk to her, Julie saw accused-appellant and
Bermas, each armed with a bolo, about half a meter from Jorge who was sprawled on
the ground, bloodied all over

2. Even as Julie fled from the kitchen for dear life to the sala of their house,
accused-appellant and Bermas ran after her. Accused-appellant tied the hands of Julie
with a piece of cloth and inserted a piece of cloth into her mouth to prevent her from
shouting for help from their neighbors.

3. With a flashlight on hand, accused-appellant then exited from the house, dragged
Julie towards the direction of the mountain while Bermas remained in the house to
rummage through the things in the bedroom of her brothers. Accused-appellant stopped
for a while for Bermas to join him.

4. Before the killing of Jorge, accused-appellant and Bermas placed their clothing
and personal belongings in a bag and buried the bag under a tree, and when accused-
appellant and Bermas were on their way to the mountain after killing Jorge, they
excavated and retrieved the bag from under the tree

5. Accused-appellant and Bermas brought with them to the mountain a kettle filled
with raw rice which they cooked in the forest

6. When Julie saw uniformed men who were looking for her and wanted to shout for
help, accused-appellant covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help

7. Even after Bermas had left accused-appellant and Julie in the forest in the
afternoon of February 23, 1991, accused-appellant continued detaining Julie in the
forest until February 27, 1996, when he abandoned Julie in the forest to fend for herself.

Accused-appellants insistence that he was forced by Bermas, under pain of death, to

cooperate with him in killing Jorge and kidnapping and detaining Julie is merely an
afterthought. For duress to exempt accused-appellant of the crimes charged, the fear
must be well-founded, and immediate and actual damages of death or great bodily harm
must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to accused for escape or interpose self-defense in equal combat. Accused-
appellant is burdened to prove by clear and convincing evidence his defense of duress.
He should not be shielded from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from,
or because of, a threat of a third person.

4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO

y PASCUAL, accused-appellant.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/apr99/127755.htm
[G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999]
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts:
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias Jun, Virgilio Santos alias Boy
Santos and John Doe alias Dodong were charged with special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old
businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot
and killed her but Ernesto Jun Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito
del Rosario was tried.
Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag. After taking
hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was
trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the
ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the
ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle
driven by the accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag.The armed
man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the
tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the
tricycle.He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police
headquarters and reported the incident.
Crime Committed: Robbery with homicide

Contention of the State:

The court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged and sentenced
him to death. He now contends in this automatic review that the court a quo erred in:

(1) Not finding the presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his
co-accused Virgilio Boy Santos, Ernesto Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya;
(2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy among co-
accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of
Robbery with Homicide;
(3) Not considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused; and,
(4) Not considering that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of
Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court
The trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative and remote, hence it could not
be considered uncontrollable and that a gun pointed at him did not constitute irresistible
force because it fall short of the test.

Contention of the Accused:

He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint
by his co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery
and killing, and was only forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime.
He was merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was
prevented at gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was ordered to help
them escape.
That he must be exempted from criminal liability because he acted under the
compulsion of irresistible force. He was threatened by Boy that he must not leave, or
else, he will be shot to death.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal
liability because he does not act with freedom.
Held:
A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her life
and property in the process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it will not
be accused Joselito del Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too
was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to
perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand, conspiracy between
him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the
prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting
accused JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and
sentencing him to death, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is
ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons
is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
Actus me invito factus non est meus actus.
-An act done by me against my will is not my act.
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
This term is applied to such an interposition of human agency, as is, from its nature and
power, absolutely uncontrollable; as the inroads of a hostile army
5. US v Vincentillo

19 Phil 118

Exempting Circumstances (RPC, Art 12). Insuperable or lawful case. Insuperable cause
- some motive which has lawfully, morally, or physically prevented a person to do what
the law commands. Elements 1: an act is required by law to be done, 2. person fails to
perform such act, 3. his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful insuperable
cause
Defendant in the case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal
and arbitrary detention" sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
Crime: Alleged unlawful detention
The arrested man was brought before a justice of the peace as soon as
practicable after his arrest.
Ruling: The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant
must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is
charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio.

A policeman charged cannot be held liable for illegal detention when after arresting his
victims, it took him three days to reach the nearest judge. The distance which required a
journey for three days was considered to be an insuperable cause.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1911/mar1911/gr_l-6082_1911.html

6. PEOPLE vs. BANDIAN (63 PHIL. 530)

FACTS:

In the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the
appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond
to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that
purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of
not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very
weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her
own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened to
her, the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone
with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who
lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the
hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five
brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket
where the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it
and latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether
the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in
the affirmative.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

Josefina Bandian charged with the crime of infanticide, was convicted and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the
suit. Dr. Nepumuceno, the physician in question, declared that the appellant gave birth
in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the
thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with
whom she had theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of
another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his
conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her
child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT:

The testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom stated that the
child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house after
the appellant had left the place. Appellant denied having made any admission to
Nepumuceno and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had
fever.There is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno
himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the
hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket
where it was found. The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing
her child's death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully,
consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death,
because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis
Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol she
considers him her husband as he considers her his wife began a year ago; as he so
testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the
beginning, affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the
appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly
waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed
of her pregnancy to Kirol.

HELD:

Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or

consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or
omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence,
the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment
of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held
liable.

As supported by the testimonies her illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly
caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth,
coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age,
and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties
usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol a mere
laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day is uneducated and could supplant
with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach her,
undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it
did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes
may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting
circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket where she
had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing
its life.

The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket,
according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever
for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving
birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence
or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident,
from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances.

Taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the
appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed
to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely
independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower
court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said
appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby
acquitted of the crime of which she had been accused and convicted, with costs de
oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is ordered that
she be released immediately.

7. PEOPLE VS LUA CHU

G.R. No. 34917September 7, 1931

Facts:

Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng were convicted of the illegal importation of opium. On
November, 1929, Tieng wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a
shipment of opium. Tieng went to Juan Samson's house and told him that the opium
shipment consisted of 3,000 tins for P2 atin, and that opium is in the vessel
Kolambugan, awaiting shipment direct to Cebu. When the vessel arrived, Tieng was told
that he must pay over the Php6000 before the opium be taken out. The next day,
Samson informed of what had taken place to Colonel Francisco, who then instructed the
Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson.
Samson also went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the same, and asked for
a stenographer to note his conversation with Tieng that night and in the presence of
Captain Buenconsejo. On December 17, 1929, Buenconsejo, Fernando, and the
stenographer went to Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain
made of strips of wood. Samson asked Tieng where the opium was, and the latter
answered that it was in the cases numbered 11 to18 -- a total of 3,252 tins. Tieng
returned later that night with Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole owner of the opium.
Samson then interrogated Chu on when the former was going to get the opium. As
Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay; Buenconsejo, who had
been hiding, appeared and arrested the two men. After the two to the Constabulary
headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Buenconsejo and Samson went to Chu's home to
search it and arrest him, and took him to the Constabulary headquarters, and then went
to the customhouse to examine the cases marked.

Contention of the accused: The accused principal defense was that they were
induced by Samson to import the opium in question.

Contention of the state: The state contends that the defendants do not deny their
participation in the act in question. Samson denied his connection with the offense for
purposes of gain; further contending that he smoothed the way for the introduction of
the prohibited drug, but he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful
issue, rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.

Issue:

Whether or not the Samson instigated the accused to import opium

Decision:

Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein accused to import the opium in
question,
but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs, Natividad; not to
gain the Php2000intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the better to
assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.
There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should
prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a
case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him,
but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal. The mere fact that the Samson pretended to
agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order
the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to
the prosecution and conviction of the latter. Decision against the accused is affirmed.

8. AQUILINA R. ARANETA, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents

Instigation a public officer or a private detective induces an innocent person to commit

a crime and would arrest him upon or after the commission of the crime by the latter. It
is an absolutory cause.

Entrapment entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal
prosecutions

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED

There is evidence of entrapment devised by members of the Philippine

Constabulary in Cabanatuan City as the police officer who arrested her for bribery,
allegedly rubbed the money, (two fifty peso bills) which were photographed and dusted
with ultra-violet powder, on her hand when she refused to take it, and simultaneously
announced that she was under arrest. Furthermore, criminal intent originated in the
mind of the entrapping person and for which reason, no conviction can be had against
her.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

The petitioner confuses entrapment with instigation. There is entrapment when

law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while
in the actual commission of the crime. On the other hand, there is instigation when the
accused was induced to commit the crime. Still it is no defense to the perpetrator of a
crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that
the criminal act was done at the decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose
the criminal

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

The complainant violated sec. 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission
as the same recites facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute the crimes of bribery
as defined and punished in Art. 387, in connection with Art. 383 of the Penal Code. The
petition for review was thereby dismissed for lack of merit. The petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bribery having asked the complainant to pay
her P100 to have the death compensation of her husband processed thereafter.
*It was also recommended that the petitioner either be granted executive clemency or
be given the privilege of probation if she is qualified as she is also the mother of four.

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1986/jul1986/gr_46638_1986.html

9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y

BOLADOGO, and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-
appellants.

[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm

FACTS:

A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police which caught accused Doria red-
handed of selling prohibited drugs and during the operation the police officers searched
for the marked bills that they used in buying said drugs which happened to be in the
house of Gaddao, according to Doria. When they reached her house, the police officers
came upon a box. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was
something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to
the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit
entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found
that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
They were both convicted feloniously selling, administering and giving away to another
11 plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops, in violation of R.A 6425, as
amended by RA 7659.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the
admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom was valid; WON she is liable.
HELD:
We hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful.
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule
113. Under Section 5 (a), a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant
Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended
in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized
but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. The warrantless arrest of appellant
Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of
marijuana and marked bills are different matters.

Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any
evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained there from may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; 2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-
bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was
not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no
occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in
"hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen
pounced on her.
This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of
marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized
was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot
be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by
its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the
package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of
a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The marijuana was not in plain view
and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the
Constitution. 135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and
never considered by the trial court.
The prosecution also failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with Doria in the sale of the
said drug. Thus, Gaddao is acquitted.
10. People vs. Del Rosario
11. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO B.
VENERACION, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995

FACTS:

The case arose from the conviction of two individuals by the respondent judge with the
crime of Rape with Homicide of seven-year old girl. The accused on the incident
also caused fatal injuries to theminor child by slashing her vagina, hitting her head with
a thick peace of wood and stabling her neck, which were all the direct cause of
her immediate death. Respondent-judge however, instead of imposing the
corresponding death penalty, imposed rather the reclusion perpetua to each accused.

The City Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the decision be
modified that the penalty be death instead of reclusion perpetua. Respondent-judge still
denied the motion citing religious convictions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent-judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excessof jurisdiction when he failed to attach the corresponding penalty of the
crime of Rape with Homicide.

HELD:

Yes, respondent-judge clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in the attaching the proper corresponding penalty of the crime
of Rape with Homicide. The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt,
the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by law on the accused
regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. Respondent-judge is duty bound to
emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or
propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as
penalty in specific and well defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by
law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but is a matter upon which judges
have no choice. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9, that
no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or
insufficiency of the laws.
Thus, the petition was granted, the Court remanded the case back to the respondent-
judge for the imposition of death penalty of the accused.
12. People vs Jaurigue
Nicolas Jaurigue (defendant) and Avelina Jaurigue (accused/appellant) were
prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which
Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide.
Contention of the Accused:
The accused, Avelina Jaurigue, argued that she unintentionally killed Amado Capina in
the defense of her honor.
Contention of the State:
The accused/appellant committed the crime of homicide. And that the offense was
committed by the defendant and appellant, with the aggravating circumstance that the
killing was done in a place dedicated to religious worship.
Held:
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her
aggressor, in the defense of her honor. And a woman, in defense of her honor, was
perfectly justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant.
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by someone
touching her arm, and, believing that some person was attempting to abuse her, she
asked who the intruder was and receiving no reply, attacked and killed the said person
with a pocket knife, it was held that, notwithstanding the woman's belief in the supposed
attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or aggression to justify her completely in using
deadly weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the beginning of an attempt
against her, she was not completely warranted in making such a deadly assault, as the
injured person, who turned out to be her own brother-in-law returning home with his
wife, did not do any other act which could be considered as an attempt against her
honor (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391).
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court
in this case, when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same
bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of
her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and
there were already several people, about ten of them, inside the chapel, including her
own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and under
the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. And
when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting
upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the
means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under
the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely
exempt from criminal liability.
But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and
unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having
stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house
shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant,
an agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the further
fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed
against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion
and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be considered as
mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People vs.
Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the
deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under the circumstances
above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide,
with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating
circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor; and, in
accordance with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled
to a reduction by one or two degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her. And
considering the circumstances of the instant case, the defendant and appellant should
be accorded the most liberal consideration possible under the law (United States vs.
Apego, 23 Phil., 391; United States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43
Phil., 950).
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado
Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment,
not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Defendant and appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive
imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered confiscated.
13. People vs. Narvaez
Topic: Incomplete Justification/Exemption

-Crime Committed: murder

-Contention of the State

There is the presence of aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation.

-Contention of the Accused

First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant
despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person; and
Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in convicting defendant-
appellant although he acted in defense of his rights
-Ruling of the Supreme Court

The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant admitted
having shot them from the window of his house with the shotgun which he surrendered
to the police authorities. He claims, however, that he did so in defense of his person and
of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability.
Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be appreciated, the following
requisites must occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Art. 11,
par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended).

WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation not

sufficiently established. The only evidence presented to prove this circumstance was
the testimony of Crisanto Ibaez.

The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying

circumstance of self-defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11,
Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his
two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his property. As a
matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first
and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. His
plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no
provocation at all.
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all
the elements for justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for
the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1983/apr1983/gr_l_33466_67_1983.html
14. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BERNARDO CORTEZANO and
JOEL CORTEZANO, appellants.
FACT:

Appellants Bernardo Cortezano and Joel Cortezano raped Leah C. Cortizano, 7 years
old, on May 6, 1990 and June 10, 1990. On the second information docketed, she
suffered damages.
On arraignment, the accused entered their plea of not guilty.

Bernardo admitted that he was charged with raping Leah Lou on April 21, 1994 and that
he pleaded guilty and testified that on March 28, 1990, he arrived in Bagadiong,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, to help his cousin, Alvin Reoval, to plow and harrow his rice
field and plant palay. He had lost his school bag, and his father, Santiago, had punished
him for it. He had nowhere to go except to his cousins house. Barangay Bagadiong was
adjacent to Barangay Busak, and one would take four and half-hours by carabao to
traverse Busak from Bagadiong. There were, however, many passenger jeepneys and
buses plying the Busak-Sipocot route. When Bernardo thought that his parents were no
longer mad at him, he returned to Sipocot on April 5, 1993. He received P3,150 for his
services. He met his sister-in-law Lourney only in 1994, when she charged him with the
rape of Leah Lou.

Joel Cortezano testified that he and his mother arrived in Manila on May 6, 1990 and
stayed in the house of his aunt Concordia Hernandez in San Andres, Manila. On May 9,
1990, he went to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for treatment of leukemia and
stayed there for three days. Thereafter, he was advised by the doctor not to leave the
hospital, as he needed blood transfusion. Joel stayed in the hospital for one week. Joel
was discharged from the hospital and stayed in the house of his aunt, Concordia
Hernandez, in San Andres, Manila, for about a month and helped the latter manage her
store. Every now and then, he returned to the hospital for check-ups and returned to
Sipocot, Camarines Sur in August 1990. Joel testified that he lost his medical certificate
same during a typhoon and he denied raping his niece Leah. However, a rebuttal from
Ms. Fe Baes shows that Joel was never confined at the PGH in 1990.

The two were found guilty. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE
WON Joel and Bernardo are guilty of the crime of rape as defined and punished under
Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

HELD:

From the evidence of the prosecution, it is clear that statutory rape was committed to
victim Leah Cedilla Cortezano for thirty six (36) times by accused Joel Cortezano and
Bernardo Cortezano, and the rapes were committed in the house of the paternal
grandparents of victim Leah Cedilla Cortezano located in Barangay Azucena, Sipocot,
Camarines Sur, from May 6, 1990, until June 10, 1990.
 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses. It is a settled rule that for an alibi to prevail, the
defense must establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, and not merely the accused was somewhere else.

For alibi to prosper, the following must be established with clear and convincing
evidence: (a) the presence of the appellant in another place at the time of the
commission of the offense; and, (b) physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of
the crime. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive, straightforward and spontaneous
testimony of the victim identifying the appellants as the malefactors and how they
consummated the crimes charged.

Both the appellants failed to prove their innocence on the matter.

In this case, the evidence on record shows beyond cavil that the appellants acted with
discernment when they raped the victim, thus: (a) they wetted the victims vagina before
they raped her; (b) one of them acted as a lookout while the other was raping the victim;
(c) they threatened to kill the victim if she divulged to her parents what they did to her;
(d) they forced Boyet to rape the victim; (e) they laughed as Boyet was raping the
victim; (f) they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel to look at their sister naked after the
appellants had raped her.

15. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MIGUEL REGATO

and JOSE SALCEDA, defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-36750 January 31, 1984

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

Accused-appellants Miguel Regato and Jose Salceda were imposed the death penalty
for the crime robbery with homicide. However, one of the suspects, Rito Ramirez,
remain at large. The accused killed Victor Flores and stole 870pesos from the victim
after pretending to buy cigarettes from the store of the victims wife.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

The defense is denial and alibi Appellant Miguel Regato claimed that on the night of
November 22, 1969 he was in Bo. Gacao Palo, Leyte attending to novena prayers for
his late father-in- law, Andres Dotado. He has witnesses which corroborated with his
statement. Regato was at the place from 7 pm until 11 pm. Appellant Jose Salceda
testified that in the morning of November 22, he was in to transport palay that was to be
harvested from the ricefield. Harvest was finished at 4 o'clock in the afternoon and they
actually left the ricefield an hour later for the house of Castaares where he was asked
to cook supper. After eating supper, the group five of them, indulged in a tuba
drinking spree until about 2 o'clock the following morning. Appellants contend that the
trial court erred (1) when it denied Salceda's motion for new trial and did not acquit him
of the crime charged; (2) in convicting Regato of robbery with homicide and not with
simple robbery; (3) in not considering in their favor the mitigating instance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, (4) in consider the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity against them; and (5) in failing to consider that the
aggravating circumstance of craft is absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity.

RESOLUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT:

The judgement was affirmed, but the penalty was changed to reclusion prepetua. In the
first place, Regato's submittal that he should have been convicted of simple robbery
with homicide, is an admission of his presence at the scene of the crime contrary to his
testimony that he was in his house that evening of November 22, 1969 attending to
novena prayers for his late father-in-law. Secondly, to established an alibi, it is not
enough to prove that appellants were at some other place when the crime was
committed but must, likewise, demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to
have been at the place of commission at such time. Appellants evidence on this point is
not sufficient to overcome the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses
Felicisima Flores and Godofredo Flores.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1984/jan1984/gr_l36750_1984.html

16. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO PUGAY y

BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

On or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the decided purpose
to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the
use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of
said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.

That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the
means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of
the body of Bayani Miranda.
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends.
Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening
of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris
wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and
Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they
were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started
making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly
took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents
on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in
the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire
making a human torch out of him. The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused
with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also poured sand on
the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame. The
body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other
police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon
inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around
spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof. The deceased
was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police
officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario
municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written
statements

CRIME COMMITTED:

Murder

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING
THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE
PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.

3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE

TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS
ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

 While it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were
mentioned and discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were
not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said
court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's
straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the
uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson"

There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had
some reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate
evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For
the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit
employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured
on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not
have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the
benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended
to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind
of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act
resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held
responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying

circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and
penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to
credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such
conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and
Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning

HELD:

the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the
accused-appellants.

17. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. INOCENCIO GONZALEZ,

JR., accused-appellant.

[G.R. No. 139542. June 21, 2001]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/jun2001/139542.htm

FACTS

In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m. both the families of the private
complainant Noel Andres and that of the accused-appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were
on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. The appellant was driving a white
Isuzu Esteem with his grandson and three housemaids, while the private complainant
was driving a maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his two year old
son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar Valdez. At the
intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while the accused-appellant Gonzalez
was turning left towards the exit and the complainant Noel Andres was headed straight
along the road to the exit their two vehicles almost collided. Noel Andres was able to
timely step on the brakes. The appellant continued driving along his way while Noel
Andres drove behind the appellants vehicle for some time and cut him off when he
found the opportunity to do so.[1] Noel Andres then got out of his vehicle and knocked on
the appellants car window.[2] This is as far as their versions of the incident coincide.

The prosecutions version of the incident is that Noel Andres calmly told the appellant to
be careful with his driving and informed the latter that he, Andres, is with his family and
to this Gonzalez allegedly replied, Accidents are accidents, whats your problem. Andres
stated that he saw the appellant turning red in anger so he decided to go back to his
vehicle when he was blocked by the appellants son who said, Anong problema mo sa
erpat ko. Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded his
vehicle, sat at the drivers seat, closed the door, and partially opened the car window just
wide enough to talk back to appellants son, Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers said
Binaril kami. He turned to his wife Feliber Andres and saw her bloodied and
unconscious. He turned around and saw his son Kenneth and nephew Kevin were also
wounded. Andres admitted in court that he and Dino were shouting at each other so that
he did not hear the shot. Andres then got out of his vehicle to warn the appellant not to
flee. He then took the wounded members of his family to the exit where there was an
ambulance standing by. The three were then taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital and
were later transferred to the Quezon City Medical Center.

The defenses version of the incident is that Andres cut the appellants path by
positioning his FX obliquely along the appellants lane from the latters left side. Andres
then got out of his vehicle, stood beside the appellants car window, and repeatedly
cursed the appellant, Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa
marunong magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo mo.[3] The appellant stayed inside his car and
allegedly replied, Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang. The
appellant Gonzalez and another witness for the defense, Quidic, testified that Noel
Andres went back to his vehicle to move it in such a way that it is straight in front of the
appellants car. Andres allegedly got out of his vehicle again and continued shouting and
cursing at the appellant.[4] Dino, the appellants son, who rode in another vehicle decided
to go back when he did not see his fathers car behind him. When Dino arrived at the
scene he confronted Andres and the two had an altercation. Both Dino and the
appellant stated that Andres remained outside his vehicle during the altercation with
Dino. When Andres suddenly reached for something inside his vehicle, Dino froze on
the spot where he stood. This prompted the appellant to get his gun from the glove
compartment and feeling that his son was threatened he got out of his car ready to
shoot. When he saw that Andres did not have a weapon he put down his hand holding
the gun.This is when the appellants daughter Trisha who was riding in Dinos car arrived
at the scene, walked past Dino and Andres, and pushed the appellant away. She
hugged her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried
to free his hand and with Trishas substantial body weight pushing against him the
appellant lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. The accused stated that he did
not know he shot somebody until the private complainants sister-in-law, Francar Valdez,
got out of the vehicle carrying a bloodied small boy. The defense claims that the
appellant did not try to flee and even told the complainants sister-in-law to take the
wounded to the hospital.

On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime of Murder, Double

Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder was filed against herein accused-appellant:

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

That on or about the 31st day of October 1998, in the city of Marikina, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and employ
personal violence by means of treachery and abuse of superior strength upon the
person of Noel Andres y Tomas, by then and there shooting him with a Glock cal. 9mm
pistol but instead hitting one Feliber Andres y Ordoo, on the left back portion of her
head, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wound which directly caused her
death, as well as hitting John Kenneth Andres y Ordoo and Kevin Valdez y
Ordoo physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused their death, thus performing
all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause or causes,
independent of their will, that is, the timely and able medical assistance rendered to
John Kenneth Andres y Ordoo and Kevin Valdez y Ordoo to their damage and prejudice
as well as to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Feliber Andres y Ordoo.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused Inocencio Gonzalez, Jr., y
Esquivel is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Murder with Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder penalized under Art. 248,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code and is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of Death by lethal injection.

18. People vs. Canete

APPELLEE: The People of the Philippines

APPELLANT: Percival Gonza

SUBJECT: Burden of proof

CRIME: Homicide (Modified, initially murder with conspiracy)

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Ruben, Alfredo, Sergio, Sotero and Trinidad Caete
opened fire at the victim, Leonaldo Tumayao, who was on his way home from a
wedding party. By Soteros (the fathers) order, Alfredo shot the already unconscious
Tumayao on the head.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Tumayao had started a fight (and thus showed
unlawful aggression) prior to the shooting by punching Ruben Caete while he was
looking for something to drink. Tumayao later initiated the shooting by declaring that he
was in combat with the accused while firing his pistol.

RULING: The Caete brothers were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder, the penalty for which was either death (the capital punishment) or reclusion
perpetua. However, the voluntary surrender of Alfredo which led to the immediate
vindication of a grave offense were appreciated as mitigating circumstances, which
lessened the penalty to reclusion perpetua, which was properly imposed by the trial
court.

19. PEOPLE v. PAGAL

G.R. No. L-32040-28, 79 SCRA 570
October 25, 1977
Concepcion, Jr. J.:

Facts:
Pedro Pagal and Jose Torcelino accused with the crim of robbery with homicide. That
on December 26, 1969, in Manila, these two took away from Gau Guan cash amounting
to P1,281.00; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling
them to take, steal and carry away the said amount, they stabbed him with an ice pick
and clubbing him with an iron pipe on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon
him mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of Gau Guans death.
The generic aggravating circumstances of (1) night time purposely sought to better
accomplish their criminal design; (2) evident premeditation; (3) in disregard of the
respect due the offended party; and (4) with abuse of confidence, the accused being
then employees of the offended party.

Contention of the accused:

The counsel for the accused informed said court of their intention to enter a plea of
guilty provided that they be allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding
the act, and that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion
and obfuscation. This means, by agreeing to the manifestation of pleading guilty, they
admitted the commission of the crime, despite the warning that the court might sentence
a death penalty of life imprisonment. Thereafter, contends that the trial court erred in
convicting him of the crime of robbery with homicide instead of declaring him liable only
for his individual acts, claiming that the record is bereft of any proof or evidence that he
and his co-appellant Jose Torcelino conspired to commit the crime of robbery with
homicide. Further, the appellants assail the trial court in not appreciating in their favor
the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation, and passion or obfuscation.

Contention of the state:

Pagals denial of conspiracy with his co-appellant Jose Torcelino cannot be given
credence in view of the clear and convincing confession of his guilt in his statement
signed by him before the police investigators several hours after the commission of the
crime. Besides, when he pleaded guilty to the charge, he is deemed to have admitted all
the material facts alleged in the information. By his plea, the appellant admitted not only
the commission of the crime but also the circumstances surrounding its commission,
including the allegations of conspiracy.

Ruling:
A plea of guilty when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a
conviction even for a capital offense without the introduction of further evidence, the
requisite proofs having been supplied by the accused himself. We find, therefore, that
the trial court did not commit any error in convicting the appellant Pedro Pagal of the
crime of robbery with homicide.

As well, since the alleged provocation which caused the obfuscation of the appellants
arose from the same incident, which is the alleged maltreatment and/or ill-treatment of
the appellants by the deceased, these two mitigating circumstances cannot be
considered as two distinct and separate circumstances but should be treated as one.
The circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which is
planned and calmly meditated before its execution. Thus, in People vs. Daos, 12 a case
of robbery with homicide, this Court rejected the claim of the appellants therein that
passion and obfuscation should have been estimated in their favor, because the death
of the victim therein took place on the occasion of a robbery, which, before its
execution, had been planned and calmly meditated by the appellants.

The maltreatment that appellants claim the victim to have committed against them
occurred much earlier than the date of the commission of the crime. Provocation in
order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately preceding the
act. We hold that the trial court did not commit any error in not appreciating the said
mitigating circumstances in favor of the appellants.

IN FAVOR OF THE STATE. Reclusion perpetua with costs against appellants.

Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1977/oct1977/gr_32040_1977.html

20. PEOPLE VS ESPINA 361 SCRA 701

FACTS:

In the afternoon of September 30, 1992, the members of an association locally known
as theripa-ripa went to the house of Eufornia Pagas in Bohol for their scheduled
contribution to fund intended for a wedding celebration. Among present thereat were
Romeo Bulicatin, Rogelio Espina and Samsung Abuloc who were having a drinking
spree and playing cards. Romeo Bulcatin asked Espina to buy 3 bottles of Kalafu wine
which he acceded. After they have emptied their wines, Bulcatin then asked Espina to
buy another 3 bottles again which the he refused to obey. Romeo Bulcatin
then proceeded to where Espina was playing card and without warning, urinated on the
latter and clipped him under his arms. Espina went home to avoid in any altercation.

At around 9:00 p.m. in the same evening, while they were still having a drinking spree at
the store of Eurofina Pagas, accused-appellant was outside saying Borgs, get out
because I have something to say. The trio came down from the house. Rogelio went
down first, followed by Samson and Romeo. When Rogelio reached the ground, Espina
told him to drop down while Samson also dropped himself to the ground when he saw
Espina about to draw his firearm.
Romeo ran away but he was chased by Espina who fired two (2) more shots at him.
Samson saw Romeo outside the house asking for help. Romeo was brought to the
hospital where he died.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

In convicting the accused-appellant, the trial court appreciated the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms, pursuant to R.A. 8294. Accused-appellant
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

The amendatory provision cannot be applied to the accused, lest it acquires the
character of an ex post facto law. Likewise, the court erred in treating alevosia merely
as a generic aggravating circumstance, more so in offsetting the same by the generic
mitigating circumstance of having committed the crime in immediate vindication of grave
offense.

HELD:
Accused is Guilty of the crime of murder, having his sentenced lowered to
an Indeterminate penalty of 8 years to 17 years, four months and one day. The court
correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of having acted in immediate
vindication of grave offense. The accused was urinated by the victim in front of
the guests. The act of the victim, Which undoubtedly insulted and humiliated the
accused, came within the purview of a grave offense. Thus, this mitigating
circumstance should be appreciated in favour of the accused

21. PEOPLE v BENITO

74 SCRA 271

FACTS:

Alberto Benito, a former employee of the Civil Service Commission, suspended

for "DISHONESTY". After 2 months, he was reinstated but was criminally charged for
QUALIFIED THEFT, MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS, ESTAFA and
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS and administratively charged for
"DISHONESTY" culminating in his dismissal from the Civil Service. According to Benito,
those criminal and administrative charges filed against him were allegedly instigated
and contrived by the victim, Pedro Moncayo, Jr and since the time of his dismissal, he
was allegedly jobless. On Dec. 11, 1969, Benito went to the Civil Service and requested
Moncayo to help him in his cases but the former allegedly uttered to the suspect
"UMALIS KA NGA DIYAN and when they met again, Moncayo allegedly remarked in the
presence of many people, "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO ANG MAGNANAKAW".
Benito, Course Outline in Criminal 1 Page 102 humiliated and incensed, left. At about
5:25 p.m. of that same day, Benito who was armed with an unlicensed black revolver
waited for the victim outside the Civil Service compound. The victim showed up and
drove his car. Benito followed him and when Moncayos car was at a full stop due to
heavy traffic, Benito without any warning or provocation, suddenly and treacherously
shot the victim 8 times on the head and different parts of the body.
 Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila after he
pleaded guilty to the charge of murder for having shot, with a .22 caliber revolver,
Moncayo, Jr. The killing was qualified by treachery and aggravated by premeditation
and disregard of rank. It was mitigated by plea of guilty.

Benito filed a motion for reconsideration.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

He contends that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate

vindication of a grave offense and that the aggravating circumstances of disregard of
rank should not be appreciated against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Benito is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate

vindication of offense.

HELD:

Assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, the see no justification
under the circumstances recited above for changing the prior opinion that the mitigating
circumstance of "haber ejecutado el hecho en vindicacion proxima de una ofensa grave,
causada al autor del delito," cannot be appreciated in Benito's favor. As aptly stated by
the ponente, Justice Esguerra, Benito "had more than sufficient time to suppress his
emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it." The 6-hour interval between the
alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo against Benito and the assassination was
more than sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using that
time to regain his composure, he evolved the plan of liquidating Moncayo after office
hours. Benito literally ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes after the victim had left the
office. He acted with treachery and evident premeditation in perpetrating the cold-
blooded murder. The facts of the case strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito
to assassinate Moncayo was not the latter's alleged defamatory remark that the Civil
Service Commission compound was a hangout for a thief or for thieves but the refusal
of Moncayo to change his report so as to favor Benito. Benito did not act primarily to
vindicate an alleged grave offense to himself but mainly to chastise Moncayo for having
exposed the alleged anomalies or defraudation committed by Benito and for obstinately
refusing to change his report.

22. People v Parana 64 Phil 331

IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE

PEOPLE v PARANA [63 Phil 331 (1937)]
Facts: Parana was convicted of the crime of murder with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The aggravating circumstances
that the appellant is a recidivist and that there was treachery must be taken into
consideration. Are mitigating
circumstances attendant?

Held: The fact that the accused was slapped by the deceased in the presence of many
persons a few hours before the former killed the latter, was considered a mitigating
circumstance that the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense. Although the grave offense (slapping of the accused by the deceased), which
engendered perturbation of mind, was not so immediate, it was held that the influence
thereof, by reason of its gravity and the circumstances under which it was inflicted,
lasted until the moment the crime was committed. The other mitigating circumstance
that the appellant had voluntarily surrendered himself to the agents of the authorities
must be considered. Cases of voluntary surrender. Surrender is not mitigating when
defendant was in fact arrested. But where a person, after committing the offense and
having opportunity to escape, voluntarily waited for the agents of the authorities and
voluntarily gave himself up, he is entitled to the benefit of this circumstance, even if he
was placed under arrest by a policeman then and there.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1937/mar1937/gr_l-45373_1937.html

23. People v. Rabanillo 307 SCRA 613

(Passion or Obfuscation)

Vicente Rabanillo was guilty of murder and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua to
death.
He and Ramil Morales were having a drinking spree. Willy Vito took a bath at the
artesian well nearby and jokingly doused Perfecto Suarez with water. After failing to
retaliate, Suarez ran after the others and splashed them with water. Rabanillo joined the
game and drenched Morales, although he was aiming for someone else. The latter
reprimanded the former because water got into his ear. A heated argument between the
two and started a fistfight. They were eventually pacified and ushered to their houses.
After half an hour
Prosecution version: While Morales, Suarez, and Mauro Pascua were having a convo in
Morales house, Rabanillo went out of his house, went straight to Morales, and hacked
him with a one meter samurai sword.
Defense version: Rabanillo heard Morales challenging him to come out, saying, "You
come out, Tanod Commander". Irked by the challenge, Rabanillo emerged from his
house with a bolo and attacked Morales, killing him in the process.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

Rabanillo's claim of the attenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation was not
considered. The trial court was not convinced that Morales had inflicted bodily injury
against Rabanillo; if ever the latter sustained injuries, they were incurred when Morales
and Rabanillo were engaged in a fisticuff. It noted that the fight was ignited by Rabanillo
when he poured water into the ear of Morales.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:
Rabanillo appealed the decision to this Court contending that the trial court erred (1) in
finding that the killing of MORALES was qualified by evident premeditation; and (2) in
not finding that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation,
intoxication, and voluntary surrender.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from lawful
feelings. The turmoil and unreason that naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not
be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or
offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The
excitement which is inherent in all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not
constitute obfuscation. In this case, 30 minutes intervened between the fistfight and the
killing of MORALES by RABANILLO. The attack cannot, therefore, be said to be the
result of a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury. Having been actuated
more by the spirit of revenge or by anger and resentment for having been publicly
berated by MORALES, RABANILLO cannot be credited with the extenuating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
The appealed decision is affirmed and modified: accused-appellant is guilty of homicide
and sentenced to 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
24. PEOPLE vs. GERMINA

FACTS

Accused-Appellant: Elpidio Germina

Victim: Raymundo Angeles

Elpidio Germina, armed with a revolver, arrived at the Angeles residence at Marulas,
Valenzuela lookingfor Raymund who was not there at that time.
A heated conversation took place between Raymunds relatives (parents, brothers
and sisters) and -appellant concerning a mauling incident that transpired earlier
between Germina's mentally retarded brother Rafael and Raymund.-Moments later,
Raymund arrived. Germina, upon spotting him, drew his gun which prompted
Raymundand his relatives to scamper for safety.
 Hardly had Raymund gained momentum in his retreat when he stumbled on a street
hump and fell on the ground face down.
Germina easily caught up with and then fired a single bullet on the back of
Raymunds neck.
Germina left the place immediately thereafter and voluntarily gave himself up to
SPO2 Henry Marteja.
Autopsy report states that Raymund succumbed to gunshot wound found at the back
right side of his buttock. Without any exit wound
CRIME COMMITTED: Murder

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

That on or about the 9th day of November, 1994 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
justifiable cause, with treachery, evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot (sic) with a
handgun one RAYMUNDO ANGELES Y VILLAMOR hitting him on the back of his body
thereby inflicting upon said victim serious physical injuries which directly caused his
death.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

Appellant asks to be convicted of homicide only. He claims that there is no treachery

even if it be conceded that he gunned down Raymund from behind.

HELD:

If he intended to murder the victim, he wouldnt have gone to the house of the victim nor
would he engage the victims relatives to a heated argument. Thus, the crime is
not attended by treachery. Moreover, passion cannot co-exist with treachery because in
passion, the offender loses his control and reason while in treachery, the means
employed are consciously adopted.
One who loses his reason and self-control could not deliberately engage a particular
means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. Passion existed as it
clearly arise from lawful sentiments or legitimate feelings.
The trial courts observation on this point is worth reiterating: x x x he [appellant]
committed the serious crime due to the maltreatment/physical injuries inflicted by the
victim on his mentally retarded brother, that triggered his anger which diminish/ weaken
the exercise of his power, x xx. Thus, without treachery, the mitigating circumstance of
passion as well as voluntary surrender may be appreciated. All told, appellant should be
convicted of the lesser crime of Homicide which, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, carries with it the penalty of reclusion temporal. Considering the presence of two
(2) mitigating circumstances and the absence of any aggravating circumstance, the
imposable penalty is prision mayor
.Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence
to be meted to the appellant should be within the range of prision correccional, and the
maximum thereof, within the range of prision mayor.
.
FULL CASE: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/120881.htm

25. People v Gelaver

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Surallah,
South Cotabato, finding Eduardo Gelaver, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Parricide
(Art. 246, Revised Penal Code) and sentencing him to "suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of his wife, Victoria Pacinabao, in the amount of
P30,000.00." (Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 28)

In the Information filed with the trial court and docketed as Criminal Case No. 643,
Eduardo Gelaver, was charged with Parricide committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of March, 1988 at 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, more or less, in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Sto. Nio,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said accused with intent to kill and being then armed
with a knife did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one VICTORIA GELAVER Y PACINABAO, his lawfully
wedded wife, with the use of the said knife hitting her and wounding her
on the different parts of her body and as a result thereof said Victoria
Gelaver y Pacinabao died instantly. (Rollo, p. 7)

Contention of the Accused: Appellant faults the trial court in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for the crime of parricide, instead of the penalty of destierro for
killing under exceptional circumstances pursuant to Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1)

Contention of the State: Appellant's contention is bereft of merit.

Before Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code can be operative, the following requisites
must be compresent:

1. That a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his

daughter, the latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person.

2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of
them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
 3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse. (II Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 12th Ed., pp. 452-53;
Emphasis supplied)

Ruling:

Implicit in this exceptional circumstance is that the death caused must be the proximate
result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse
in the act of infidelity (People v. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735 [1987]). In this case,
appellant wants this Court to believe that he caught his wife and her paramour in
sexual intercourse. However, his testimony is tainted with inconsistencies which
leads Us to believe otherwise. Also, the appellant failed to notify the police.

The trial court was correct in finding the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender to the authorities. Appellant, immediately after committing the
offense, voluntarily placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities as evidenced
by the entry in the official police blotter.
(Exh. "1")

However, the trial court erred in finding the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation "as a result of his (appellant's) wife leaving their home and their
children." (Rollo, p. 28) Before this circumstance may be taken into consideration, it is
necessary to establish the existence of an unlawful act sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind. The act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might have recovered his equanimity. (I Revised Penal Code, Aquino, 1987 ed., p. 267)
The crime was committed almost a year after the victim had abandoned the conjugal
dwelling.

The Judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED except with the MODIFICATION that the
indemnity, be increased to P50,000.00 (People v. Sison, 189 700 [1990]).

26. People vs. Ignas

412 SCRA 311
Link to full case: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/sep2003/140514_15.htm

CONTENTION OF THE STATE

In an amended decision, the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet found appellant June Ignas
guilty of murder aggravated especially by the use of an unlicensed firearm. Appellants
wife, Wilma Grace, confided in her close friend Romenda that she was having an affair
with Nemesio Lopate, the victim of this case. She instructed Romenda to reveal her
affair to appellant through letters she sent from Taiwan where she started working as a
domestic helper. When Romenda informed appellant about the extramarital affair
between Wilma Grace and Nemesio, appellant became furious and declared that he will
kill Nemesio. That same week, appellant killed Nemesio at the trading post with an
unlicensed firearm, shooting him in the face and shoulder at a distance of less than 3
feet. The RTC initially sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua, but on motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution, the penalty was upgraded to death by lethal
injection.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED

Among others, the appellant contended that assuming without admitting that he is guilty,
the lower court should have considered at least the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense as well as that of passion and obfuscation.
Appellant points out that the victims act of having an adulterous relationship with his
wife constituted a grave offense to his honor, and that even the mere sight of the victim
must have triggered an uncontrollable emotional outburst on appellants part, so that
even a chance meeting caused in him an irresistible impulse powerful enough to
overcome all reason and restraint.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court found the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation inexistent. For passion and obfuscation to be well founded, the following
requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not
far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his moral equianimity. To repeat, the period of 2
weeks which spanned the discovery of his wifes extramarital affair and the killing of her
lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off. Hence, the Supreme Court
modified the RTCs judgment as follows: appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide, there being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 10 years
and 1 year of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

27. PEOPLE v BATES,

400 SCRA 95

FACTS:

On November 28, 1995 at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Edgar and Simon Fuentes and
Jose Boholot left Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to deliver copra to a certain Fely
Rodado at Barangay Gren Valley, Ormoc City. After the delivery, the three men headed
back to Barangay Esperanza. While they were along the way, leading to the house of
Carlito Bates, the latter suddenly emerged from the thick banana plantation surrounding
the trail, aiming his firearm at Hose Boholot who was then walking ahead of his
companions. Jose grabbed Carlitos hand and try to wrest possession of the firearm.
The gun fired hitting Carlito who immediately fell to the ground. At that instant, Marcelo
Bates and his son, brother and nephew of Carlito, respectively emerged from the
banana plantation, each holding a bolo. They immediately hacked Jose several times.
Marcelo then returned to Simon and Edgar and shouted, huwes de kutsilyo,upon
hearing the same, Simon and Edgar ran.

Contention of the State:

The accused, Marcelo Bates, hacked Jose Bolohot after his borther Carlito Bates
fell due to a gun shot wound. Carlito Bates, aimed his firearm at the house of Jose
Bohoot who was walking with his companions, Edgar and Simon Fuenes. Jose grabbed
the accuseds hand and tried to wrestle with the firearm when the gun fired and hit
Carlito who immediately fell.

Contention of the Accused:

Marcelo Bates plead not guilty to the accusations to the crime claiming it was sef-
defense in nature and that there was nothing to indicate from the testimony of the
witness that would point out that the actions of Edgar and his son employed means and
methods to insure that they will be able to attack Jose without risking themselves from
any defense that Jose might take. There was also no evidence shown that they
purposely hidden in the thick banana plantation awaiting for the opportune time to attack
Jose with impunity.

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

Passion may not be properly appreciated in favour of the appellant. To be considered

as mitigating circumstances, passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments
and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the
case at bar, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing his brother Carlito shot by Jose,
however, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo hacked Jose
and the second that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo hacked Jose right after
seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant refrained from doing anything else
after that, he could have validly invoked the mitigating circumstances of passion and
obfuscation, but when, upon seeing his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to
Jose, who by then was already lying dead n the ground and hardly moving, hacking
Jose again was a clear case of someone aching out of danger in the spirit of revenge.
28. Danafrata vs. People
412 SCRA 95
This petition for review assails (1) the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated
November 26, 1999, in CA-G.R. CR No. 19732 as well as (2) its resolution,[2] dated April
18, 2000, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Both upheld the judgment[3] of
the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 74, in Criminal Case No. 15423-MN,
convicting petitioner of homicide.
In a charge sheet dated October 10, 1994, the Office of the City Prosecutor charged
herein petitioner as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of October 1994, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed
weapon, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with the said weapon one ALFREDO GONZALES Y LACSON, hitting
the victim on his left chest, thereby inflicting upon the victim stab wound which caused
his immediate death.

Contention of the accused:

For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General points out that neither the trial court nor
the Court of Appeals erred in giving great weight and credence to the testimony of
Reynaldo Francia, not only because it was corroborated by Benjamin Bautista but also
because petitioner had not ascribed any evil motive on the part of Francia to falsely
testify against him. The OSG points out that neither of the courts below may be faulted
for disbelieving Tambios testimony, given its inconsistency with the medico-legal
findings. The Solicitor General also stresses that the instant petition focuses on
questions of fact, which are not proper in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Hence, the petition should be dismissed,

Contention of the state:

He narrated on the witness stand that at around 5:00 p.m. of October 9, 1994, he was
carousing with his brother-in-law, Vergel Gaspar and one Jojo Tambio at the latters
house. Because Tambios house was very noisy, they decided to continue their drinking
spree at the petitioners house instead.

Issue:

the issue involves the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain the petitioners
conviction for homicide and the propriety of the penalty imposed on him.
Held:

The decision of the CA is affirmed.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/sep2003/143010.htm

29. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO MALLARI y ILAG

G.R. No. 145993
June 17, 2003
Facts:
Liza Galang testified that on 7 July 1996 at around 4:00 p.m., her common-law husband
Joseph admonished Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix Mallari not to drive fast while
passing by Josephs house. Rufino and his brothers, who were then hot-tempered,
challenged Joseph to a fight. The latter just ignored the challenge; and, instead he and
his own brothers Radi and Manny asked apology from Rufino.
Later that afternoon, while Joseph and Liza were watching a basketball game at the
barangay basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed
weapons, arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away.
When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck
parked near the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over
the latter, which caused his instantaneous death. Dr. Erwin Escal testified that the
cause of death of Joseph, as stated in the Medico-Legal Report,[6] was [c]rushing injury
on the head secondary to vehicular accident. Josephs head was deformed with multiple
skull fractures and lacerations and brain tissue evisceration. [7] The trial court gave full
credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Liza Galang and Edgar Bawar
that Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph.
Contention of the Accused:
Rufino testified that on 7 July 1996 at around 6:30 p.m., while he was driving a truck at
a speed of eighty kilometers per hour, with his wife Myrna seated on the passenger
side, he saw Joseph on the road about four meters away from him. Rufino, who was
then on his way to the garage to park the truck, blew thrice the horn. But Joseph went to
the middle of the road and threw stones, which went through the windshield and hit
Rufino on the chest. As a result thereof, Rufino lost control of the truck, and ran over
Joseph. Because of fear, Rufino did not alight from the truck; instead, he proceeded to
the municipal hall of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where he surrendered and was immediately
detained.[8] Myrna Mallari testified that prior to the incident in question, she saw Joseph
at the basketball court. He was apparently drunk and was carrying a balisong. Much to
her consternation, he gave a dagger look. Myrna reacted by simply crying and going
inside her house. She corroborated Rufinos testimony that while Rufino was driving the
truck, Joseph threw stones, which went through the windshield and hit the chest of
Rufino.[9] As a result of which, Rufino had chest pains and vomited blood while in
detention.
Issue:
Is the appellant entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
Held:
When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. In the present
case, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery which were
alleged in the information were not proved. What was proved was the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender through the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which
were not rebutted by the prosecution. The court have held that for voluntary surrender
to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary. A surrender is considered voluntary if it is spontaneous and shows the
intention of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities because he
either acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save the government the trouble and
expense necessarily included for his search and capture. All these requisites are
present in this case. In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the
presence of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the
penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
Adjudication: the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, of Bian,
Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 9621-B convicting appellant RUFINO MALLARI y ILAG of
the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. The penalty is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua;

2. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000 is reduced
to P25,000, and the awards of actual and moral damages are reduced to P9,200
and P50,000, respectively; and
3. Appellant Rufino Mallari y Ilag is further ordered to pay the heirs of Joseph
Galang an indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000.

30. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIONISIO VICENTE y QUINTO

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

Facts:

On appeal is the Decision[2] dated December 15, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 42, Dagupan City, in Criminal Case No. 98-02266-D finding Dionisio Q. Vicente,
appellant, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Manuel
C. Quinto, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P88,000.00 as actual
damages, P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, P50,000.00 as moral damages and costs of
suit.
In the Information dated July 15, 1998, appellant was charged with the crime of
murder committed as follows:
 That on or about May 30,1998 in the evening thereof, at barangay Gueguesangen,
municipality of Mangaldan, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed
weapon, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack and stab MANUEL C. QUINTO, JR., causing
his death shortly thereafter due to CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST SECONDARY
TO HYPOVOLEMIC SHOCK DUE TO A STAB WOUND as per Certificate of Death
issued by Dr. Ophelia Rivera, M.D., Rural Health Officer, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, to
the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased Manuel C. Quinto, Jr. and
other consequential damages relative thereto.
Contention of the Accused:

Appellant surrendered to Kagawad Fernandez who, in turn, brought him to the

police station.
Appellant argues that his claim of self-defense is buttressed by the fact that he
immediately surrendered to the authorities after the incident and that the victim
sustained only one stab wound. Also, he stresses that if a crime was indeed committed,
it is only homicide because the attack was frontal and that a heated altercation
preceded the stabbing. Lastly, he contends that since he sustained an injury in his
upper left arm, as confirmed by Dr. Rivera, it follows that he is not the unlawful
aggressor.
Contention of the State:

Significantly, the trial court should have appreciated in favor of appellant the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code. For voluntary surrender to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he
surrenders himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. Here,
appellant, after the commission of the crime, immediately placed himself in the
disposition of Kagawad Fernandez who, in turn, brought him to the police station. Under
Section 388 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), for purposes of the
Revised Penal Code, Kagawad Fernandez is a person in authority. Clearly, the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is present here.
Ruling:

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. Article 63 of the same Code provides that the lesser of the two
indivisible penalties shall be imposed, there being a mitigating circumstance attending
the commission of the crime and there being no aggravating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision finding appellant Dionisio Q. Vicente guilty of
the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that he is ordered to pay the
heirs of the late Manny C. Quinto, Jr. the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P36,0000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.

Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jun2003/137296.htm

31. JOEL LUCES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

On 1 September 1996 at around 10:30 in the morning, Sonia Pa-ay, a polio

victim nineteen (19) years old and a student of midwifery at the Cordillera College,
Buyagan, La Trinidad, Benguet was in Natuel, Buguias, Benguet, on her way to her
parents home in Tinoc, Ifugao, to get her allowance. As she was walking, she met
Eddie Basite who was headed towards the opposite direction. They passed by each
other. A few seconds later, Sonia heard footsteps behind her. When she looked back
she saw Eddie Basite following her. He reached her, held her by both hands and told
her to go down with him. Sonia resisted. But the accused Eddie Basite pulled out a knife
from his waistband thrust it at her neck and threatened to stab her if she continued to
resist. He ordered her to lie down on the ground and out of fear she obeyed. The
accused undressed himself and forcibly removed Sonias pants and underwear. He
placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina and made a push and
pull movement. Sonia felt pain in her vagina. She resisted but the accused threatened
to stab her. When he was through with the sexual assault, he warned her not to relate
the incident to anyone or else he would stab her. Sonia pleaded with the accused to
allow her to go home. Upon seeing that the accused had laid down his knife beside her
head while he was putting on his clothes, Sonia grabbed the knife and stabbed him on
the left shoulder. Wounded, the accused ran away.

Contention of the Respondent:

The contention is without merit. The affidavit of desistance relied upon by

petitioner as a means to exculpate himself from criminal liability was sufficiently
impeached by the testimonial evidence of the very same persons who allegedly
executed the affidavit. Dante Reginio declared that the signature appearing above his
type-written name on the affidavit of desistance was not his, while Nelson Magbanua
stated that he merely signed the affidavit out of pity for the petitioners wife. As between
the assailed affidavit of desistance and the sworn testimonies of the witnesses before
the court, the latter should prevail. An affidavit of desistance obtained as an afterthought
and through intimidation or undue pressure attains no probative value in light of the
affiants testimony to the contrary.

Contention of the Petitioner:

Petitioner contends that the statement in the said affidavit that the person who
stabbed the victim was not Joel Luces but it might be some other persons shows that
the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the culprit.

Held:

The Court finds the accused Joel Luces guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Homicide and in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance
to offset each other. The court sustains the conclusion of the trial court that petitioners
act of hiding from the authorities when he learned that he was a suspect in the killing of
the victim is inconsistent with his plea of innocence. Jurisprudence has held that the
flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance
from which an inference of guilt may be established "for a truly innocent person would
normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and to assert his
innocence.

Anent the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court of Appeals erred in
appreciating the same in favor of the petitioner. To benefit an accused, the following
requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2)
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance. In
People v. Viernes, we held that going to the police station to clear ones name does not
show any intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. "Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide.
Considering that there was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present in
the commission of the crime, the penalty has to be imposed in the medium period.

32. People vs Basite

412 SCRA 558
Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/150382.htm

Facts:
EDDIE BASITE was convicted by the trial court of simple rape of Sonia Pa-ay, a
polio victim, was at the time of the rape nineteen (19) years old and a student of
midwifery at the Cordillera College, Buyagan, La Trinidad, Benguet, sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay complaining witness P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Contention of the Accused:

The accused denied having raped Sonia. To support his defense, the accused
presented two (2) witnesses, Lidot Lacbao and Dr. Ronald Bandonill. Lidot Lacbao
recalled that in the early morning of 2 September 1996 he received complainant Sonia
Pa-ay in his home and offered her camote to eat. The girl was limping. She had
scratches on her arms and legs and her clothes were muddy. The girl told him that she
had slept in the forest and that she met a man who accosted her but that she stabbed
him. Lidot asked her if she had been raped.She replied that she had not been raped
since she stabbed the man and if she did not, he would have done something to her.
The accused presented Dr. Ronald Bandonill of the NBI-CAR, Baguio City, as an
expert witness to dispute the findings of prosecution witness Dr. Relante Raper. Based
on Dr. Rapers findings that there was no bleeding or scratches inside the genitalia and
that the injuries were only outside the genital area and on the upper and lower
extremities of Sonia, Dr. Bandonill opined that there was no insertion into the vagina
and there was no physical contact or sexual intercourse. Otherwise, the genital area
would have shown signs of trauma such as inflammation, redness, swelling and even
bleeding if the hymen was the type that was easily lacerated. Dr. Bandonill added that
the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by Dr. Raper was incomplete and incomprehensive
and not compatible with standard Medico-Legal Reports of the NBI in rape cases.
Contention of the State:
The prosecution presented Dr. Relante Raper of the Abatan Emergency Hospital
who testified on the medical findings he made upon examination of Sonia Pa-ay. When
Sonia presented herself for examination, Dr. Raper observed that her clothes were
muddy. He found mud on her right breast and on her pubic hair. There were multiple
healing scratches and contusions on her arms, legs and inner thighs which could have
been caused by the application of an external force or the impact of a fall. Internal
examination revealed that there were no lacerations, scratches or bleeding on the
perineal area and her hymen was intact. The vagina admitted one (1) finger with
difficulty. A whitish mucoid discharge found over the labia minora was sent to the
Lutheran Hospital for microscopy. Examination of the discharge yielded negative for
sperm. Dr. Raper clarified that it was possible, even for a married woman, to have an
intact hymen since there are some hymen that are very elastic.

Ruling:
As to the opinions of defense expert witness Dr. Bandonill, it is important to note
that the testimony of expert witnesses must be construed to have been presented not to
sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination
of the issue before it. It has been said of expert testimonies -

Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may
place whatever weight they may choose upon such testimonies in
accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency
of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to
decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions
upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which
he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for
whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative
opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he
testifies, and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is
to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in
the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion
may be given controlling effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert
witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the
trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of
abuse of discretion.

That the trial court considered Dr. Bandonills expert testimony to rule on the
sufficiency of the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by Dr. Raper does not mean that the
court a quo doubted accused-appellants guilt. The trial court merely used Dr. Bandonills
testimony to determine for itself if that Medico-Legal Certificate would satisfactorily show
the results of a complete and thorough physical examination of Sonia Pa-ay, consistent
with the physical examinations being conducted by the NBI and Dr. Bandonill.
Accused-appellant finally contends that the trial court should have considered the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor. He explains that he
voluntarily surrendered to then Barangay Captain Gilbert Sacla, and willingly went with
him and complainants relatives to the police station in Abatan. We are not persuaded.
A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture. If none of these two (2) reasons impelled the
accused to surrender, because his surrender was obviously motivated more by an
intention to insure his safety, his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not
spontaneous.[29]
The conduct of accused-appellant after the commission of the offense, of running
away after having been stabbed by private complainant and of fleeing from
complainants relatives when they tried to bring him to the authorities, do not show
voluntary surrender as contemplated under the law. It appears that accused-appellant
willingly went to the police authorities with Gilbert Sacla only to escape the wrath of
private complainants relatives who were pursuing him and who appeared to be thirsting
for his blood.
In the instant case, the guilt of accused-appellant Eddie Basite has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Paragraph 1 of Art. 335 of The Revised Penal
Code punishes with reclusion perpetua an accused who has carnal knowledge of a
woman with the use of force or intimidation. The use of a deadly weapon, which would
otherwise have qualified the crime, is not alleged in the Information, hence even if
proved, may not be appreciated against accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the court a quo finding accused-

appellant EDDIE BASITE guilty of simple rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and to pay complaining witness Sonia Pa-ay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-
appellant.
33. People vs. Daniela
401 SCRA 509
April 24, 2003

FACTS:

SC reviews the decision of Branch 18 of the RTC of Cebu City convicting appellants
Manuel Daniela and Jose Baylosis of robbery with homicide, sentencing them to death
and directing them to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim Ronito Enero,
the sum of P50,000 and to restitute to said heirs the cash and pieces of jewelry taken by
them.

Ronito Enero and his common-law wife Maria Fe Balo and their three children resided in
Sawang, Calero, Pasil, Cebu City. The couple eked out a living vending fish at the Pasil
public market near their house. They employed Leo Quilongquilong, the cousin of Maria
Fe, as helper in their business and Julifer Barrera, a tomboy as their househelp. Both
lived with the couple. Manuel Daniela had been a barkada of Ronito in Dansalam,
Davao City years back, while Imelda, Manuels wife, was Maria Fes friend and former
classmate.

On March 28, 1996, Manuel and Jose Baylosis arrived in Cebu City and stayed in the
house of Joel Colejara in Pardo. Manuel and Jose went to the market and met Maria
Fe. The latter informed Manuel where she and Ronito lived. Since then, Manuel and
Jose had been to the house of the couple and Manuel was able to borrow money from
them in the amount of P800.

At about 7:00 p.m. on March 30, 1996, Maria Fe was at the public market when she was
asked by Roland Pedrejas alias Potot whether Manuel was already in their house. She
replied that she did not know. Later that evening, Maria Fe, Ronito, Leo and Julifer had
just taken their dinner when Manuel and Jose arrived. Manuel told Ronito that he
wanted to borrow money from him and Maria Fe. The latter refused to lend Manuel the
money but she was prevailed upon by Ronito. Manuel, Jose and Ronito then had a
drinking spree in the sala. Maria Fe and Julifer went to sleep in the formers bedroom
while Leo slept in the sala.

At about midnight, Maria Fe woke up and told Ronito, Manuel and Jose to sleep
because she had to leave at one oclock early that morning. By then, Ronito was already
inebriated. She then spread mat in the sala for Manuel and Jose to sleep on. She and
Ronito then went to their room and slept.

At around 2:00 a.m. of March 31, 1996, Manuel, armed with a .38 caliber gun and
holding a flourescent lamp, entered the bedroom of Ronito and Maria Fe. He poked the
said gun on Maria Fe. She woke up and attempted to stand up but Manuel ordered her
to lie down. Jose, armed with a knife followed Manuel to the bedroom. The latter
ordered Jose to tie the hands of Maria Fe behind her back and put a tape on her mouth.
Jose complied. On orders of Manuel, Jose woke up Leo and brought him to the room.
Jose tied the hands of Leo behind his back. Jose and Manuel then divested Maria Fe of
her necklace, rings and earrings. Manuel demanded that she give them her money but
Maria Fe told them that she had used her money to pay her partners in the fish vending
business. Manuel and Jose did not believe Maria Fe. They ransacked the room but
failed to find money. Julifer woke up but Manuel and Jose threatened to kill her if she
shouted. The two tied Julifers hands at her back. Manuel then threatened to explode the
grenade tucked under his shirt and kill Maria Fe, her family and their househelps if she
refused to surrender her money. Petrified, Maria Fe took the money from her waist
pouch and gave the same to Manuel and Jose. Manuel took a blanket and ordered Jose
to kill Ronito with it. Jose went to the kitchen, got a knife, covered Ronito with the
blanket and sat on top of him then stabbed the latter several times. Manuel also
stabbed Ronito on different parts of his body. Ronito could only groan like a dying pig.
Manuel hit Ronito with the butt of his gun. Jose slit the throat of Ronito and took the
latters wristwatch and ring. Manuel then untied Julifer, removed her clothes and panties
and then raped her. She could do nothing but cry. Manuel and Jose stayed in the house
until 4:00 a.m. Before they left, Manuel and Jose told Maria Fe that they were acting on
orders of Rolando Pedrejas, Joel Colejara, Grace Pabulacion and Juliet Capuno. They
also warned her and Leo not to report the incident to the police authorities, otherwise
they will kill them and their family. Leo and Maria Fe managed to untie themselves and
reported the incident to Barangay Chairman Sergio Ocaa who conducted an on-the-spot
investigation of the incident.

When he testified, Manuel admitted having killed Ronito. He however claimed that
he stabbed Ronito in self-defense and in defense of Jose. He also said that he,
Potot, Ronito and Jojo, the younger brother of Maria Fe, had been engaged in robberies
in Davao City. Sometime in September 1995, the four robbed a person of P50,000.
However, Manuel failed to get his share of the loot while Ronito, Jojo and Potot got
theirs. Manuel was bitter. He later learned in December 1995 that Ronito and Maria Fe
had left Davao City and settled in Cebu City. On March 26, 1996, Manuel and Jose
arrived in Cebu City to contact Ronito and to get his share of the loot. Manuel met
Ronito on March 29, 1996 at the jai-alai. Ronito told Manuel to visit him where they can
talk. Manuel agreed. In the evening on March 30, 1996, Manuel and Jose arrived in the
house of Ronito. Manuel wanted to get his share of the loot from Ronito. Manuel, Jose
and Ronito had a drinking spree. However, at about two oclock at dawn, the next
morning, Manuel and Ronito had an altercation when Manuel demanded that Ronito
give him his share of the loot. Ronito was peeved and told Manuel that he had long
given him his share through a friend. Ronito whipped out a knife and stabbed Manuel.
The latter tried to wrest the knife from Ronito but failed. However, Jose grappled with
Ronito and managed to wrest possession of the knife. Jose then gave the knife to
Manuel who stabbed Ronito with it.

Manuel denied raping Julifer, and divesting Ronito and Maria Fe of their valuables. Jose
did not anymore testify. His counsel informed the trial court that the testimony of Jose
would only corroborate the testimony of Manuel.
The trial court declared that Manuel and Jose having pleaded guilty to the crime
charged in the information, the prosecution was deemed to have proven their
guilt of the crime charged, the remaining matter still to be ascertained was the
presence of any modifying circumstances.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

Appellants contend that their plea of guilty to the crime charged in the information was
improvidently made. When they pleaded guilty, they did so only for homicide but not for
robbery. Neither did appellant Manuel plead guilty to rape. They assert that their plea of
guilty to the crime charged in the information should be set aside.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: The trial court erred in convicting them of the charge
on the basis solely on their improvident plea of guilty. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) agrees with the contention of the appellants that their plea of guilty to the crime
charged in the information was improvidently made. Nevertheless, it contends that there
is no more need for the Court to still remand the case to the trial court as their
conviction for the crime charged is warranted by the evidence adduced by the
prosecution independent of their plea of guilty.

We agree with the appellants that their plea of guilty to the crime charged was
improvidently made. Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
reads:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequence of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may
also present evidence on his behalf.

The felony of robbery with homicide is a capital offense, the imposable penalty therefor
being reclusion perpetua to death.

The raison detre behind the rule is that courts must proceed with caution where the
punishable penalty is death for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is
irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded
guilty. Improvident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are
involved should be avoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and
thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully comprehended the meaning and
import and consequences of his plea. Under this rule, three things are enjoined upon
the trial court, namely:
(1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea, and the
accuseds full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require
the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present
evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

As explained by the Court in People v. Alicando, the searching questions must focus on
(1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (b) the full comprehension of the accused of the
consequences of the plea. As elaborated on by the Court in People v. Nadera, the trial
court -

The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short of the requirement that it must
make a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant understood fully the
import of his guilty plea. As has been said, a mere warning that the accused faces the
supreme penalty of death is insufficient. For more often than not, an accused pleads
guilty upon bad advice or because he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty.
The trial judge must erase such mistaken impressions. He must be completely
convinced that the guilty plea made by the accused was not made under duress or
promise of reward. The judge must ask the accused the manner the latter was arrested
or detained, and whether he was assisted by counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigation. In addition, the defense counsel should also be asked whether
he conferred with the accused and completely explained to him the meaning and the
consequences of a plea of guilt. Furthermore, since the age, educational attainment and
socio-economic status of the accused may reveal insights for a proper verdict in the
case, the trial court must ask questions concerning them. [13]

In this case, the certificate of arraignment on record states that when the case was
called for trial on February 4, 1997, the appellants were called by the trial court and
were informed of the nature of the charge against them. The trial court propounded
questions on the appellants and the latter answered the questions. Forthwith, the
appellants changed their former plea of not guilty to that of guilty. However, there is no
record of what questions were asked by the trial court, and what answers were given by
them, or whether the court explained to the appellants the nature of the crime with
which they were charged, and that they may be sentenced to death. It cannot be
determined whether the questions of the trial court were searching. The records do not
even show if the trial court explained to the appellants the meaning and legal effect of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, or if the
appellants were asked why they were changing their plea from not guilty to guilty.
Clearly then, the plea of guilty of the appellants was improvident; hence, inefficacious.
Their conviction for the crime charged cannot be based solely on their plea of guilty to
said crime.
The trial court convicted the appellants of robbery with homicide on the basis of their
plea of guilty during their rearraignment. Ordinarily, the case should be remanded to the
trial court for the prosecution and the appellants to adduce their respective evidences.
However, the records show that despite the plea of guilty of the appellants, the
prosecution adduced its evidence. The appellants likewise adduced their evidence to
prove their defenses. The Court will resolve the case on its merits independent of the
plea of guilty of the appellants rather than remand the case to the trial court.

HELD:

Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

34. PEOPLE VS. IBANEZ

407 SCRA 406

Facts:
Ibanez was charged with three counts of raping his own daughter under three pieces of
information before the RTC of Cavite. When arraigned he plead not guilty. On the 1st
charge, AAA testified she was at their home in Cavite and did not inform anyone of the
incident (June 1997). On the 2nd charge, AAA testified being raped 8 times from
January to December 1998. The 3rd rape happened sometime in April 1999 while her
mother was at work. After which, she told her cousin who brought her to the NBI, where
complaint affidavit was executed.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

Ibanez denied having raped his daughter with an alibi of being always away from
home.The dates of the commission of the rape be alleged in the information are not
precise.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

The allegation in the pieces of information that the appellant committed the rape
"sometime in June 1997 and "sometime in April 1999 was sufficient to inform appellant
that he was being charged of qualified rape committed against his daughter. The
allegation adequately afforded appellant an opportunity to prepare his defense. Thus,
appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.

Held:
NO. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and
the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime
is not an essential element of the crime charged. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the
material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the
time of its commission. The gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.
The precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore,
it is not essential that it be alleged in the information with ultimate precision.
It was also too late for appellant to question the sufficiency of the criminal pieces of
information since he had himself arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
of rape which is equivalent to waiving his right to object to the pieces of information on
the ground of an error as to the time of the alleged rape.

Appellant could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars before his arraignment or a
motion to quash on the ground that the pieces of information alleged erroneous dates
prior to his entry of plea.