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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Sangcheol Song
1 Introduction
S. Song (&)
College of Business, Saint Josephs University, Philadelphia, USA
e-mail: ssong@sju.edu
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2 S. Song
lack the same level of flexibility (Allen and Pantzalis 1996; Chung et al. 2010; Fisch
and Zschoche 2011, 2012; Lee and Song 2012).
The literature on multinational operational flexibility, therefore, focuses on
flexible management to cope with surging uncertainty. It argues that, particularly in
times of uncertainty, MNCs benefit from the ability to adjust their value-chain
activities, which include production and sales among affiliated firms located in
different countries (Cohen et al. 1989; Cohen and Lee 1989; Chung et al. 2010;
Hodder and Jucker 1985; Huchzermeier and Cohen 1996; Pantzalis et al. 2001). In
other words, MNCs with operations in multiple countries are better able to respond
to unexpected changes in their investment countries macro-economic conditions by
exploiting cost differentials on a global scale and coordinating their productions
within the subsidiary network (Allen and Pantzalis 1996; Cohen et al. 1989; Cohen
and Lee 1989; Huchzermeier and Cohen 1996; Tang and Tikoo 1999). These
arguments are similar to the real options argument that MNCs can preserve upside
potentials and curb downside risks with the help of flexible responses to favorable
and unfavorable changes in macro-economic conditions of their investment
countries (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994; Lee and Song 2012; Pantzalis et al. 2001).
However, in spite of increasing interest in this topic, few empirical studies
directly test MNCs operational flexibility. We argue that without directly
examining how MNCs transfer resources or relocate their value-chain activities
among affiliated firms, it would be difficult to determine whether MNCs actually
exercise multinational operational flexibility using their portfolio of subsidiaries.
Additionally, few studies examine how MNCs operational flexibility is realized at
the subsidiary level. Thus, we address the following question: How do MNCs
foreign subsidiaries respond flexibly to uncontrollable changes in macro-economic
factors in their host countries and take advantage of their parent companys
operational flexibility?
To answer this question, we first examine the impact of a host countrys currency
depreciation on a foreign subsidiarys intra-firm product sales to its affiliates in
other countries undergoing a currency appreciation. We also examine environmen-
tal and organizational factors that help foreign subsidiaries exploit their parent
MNCs operational flexibility. One way to analyze MNCs operational flexibility is
to examine intra-firm trade flows within the MNC subsidiary network. In this paper,
intra-firm trade refers to the sales and purchase of products among affiliated firms
within the same MNCs network; it also indicates how closely the firms are
operationally linked via cross-border product shifts (Kiyota et al. 2008; Makhija
et al. 1997; Rangan 1998). Thus, we expect that a subsidiarys intra-firm sales to its
affiliates in other countries will be affected by contingent factors arising in both its
host country and other countries. Specifically, its intra-firm sales out of its host
country will be affected by the host countrys labor costs as another production
factor and its own ownership-based control over its operations. The cross-border
product shifts will also be affected by other countries conditions, including the
number of affiliated firms with opposite directional exchange rate changes (i.e.,
currency appreciation) and the transportation costs of cross-border product shifts via
intra-firm trade.
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Inter-Country Exchange Rates and Intra-Firm 3
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4 S. Song
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Inter-Country Exchange Rates and Intra-Firm 5
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6 S. Song
intra-firm trade increases with the number of counterpart subsidiaries having the
same product and opposite directional currency change (Caves 1996; Willmore
1992).
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2: A subsidiarys cross-border intra-firm sales in a host country
whose currency has depreciated is positively moderated by the number of its
affiliates in countries where the currency has appreciated.
A foreign subsidiarys production and sales associated with its product price
competitiveness are affected by labor costs as well as currency changes in its host
country. Labor cost is considered another important production factor (Belderbos
and Zou 2009; Fisch and Zschoche 2011, 2012). If a subsidiary experiences rising
labor cost in its host country, its production costs also increase, and thus, the price
competitiveness of its output is lost. Subsequently, its export of a product out of its
host country will be negatively affected. In that situation, the positive impact of
currency depreciation on its cross-border sales will be offset by the negative impact
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Inter-Country Exchange Rates and Intra-Firm 7
of rising labor costs. In other words, host country currency depreciation is expected
to promote cross-border intra-firm sales, whereas its rising labor cost is expected to
hold cross-border intra-firm sales back.
On the other hand, if labor costs were consistent or decreased, the impact of
currency changes would be more obvious and affect a subsidiarys cross-border
intra-firm trade as expected above, leading us to our fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The cross-border intra-firm sales of a subsidiary in a host
country whose currency has depreciated will be positively moderated by the
lower labor cost growth of the host country.
A subsidiarys ownership reflects its management control over its operation in its
host country. The decision to make intra-firm sales to its affiliates in other
countries out of its host country is an important one from the standpoint of both
the subsidiary itself and its parent MNC. The cross-border shifts of products
require timely and effective decision making, and a subsidiary with high levels of
ownership has the ability to quickly and expeditiously make intra-firm trade
decisions (Pan 2002). On the other hand, a subsidiary lacking decision-making
authority cannot take advantage of its parent MNCs operational flexibility. For
instance, partially owned or joint venture subsidiaries have to achieve consensus
with their partners. Co-ownership sometimes requires that a great deal of time and
effort be put into coordinating and orchestrating different views on cross-border
intra-firm trade decisions (Rycroft 2003; Tong and Reuer 2007). Further, such
decisions may sometimes be hindered or rejected by a partners objections. From
their parent MNCs standpoint, this condition applies likewise to a subsidiarys
counterpart affiliates, since cross-border intra-firm trade takes place between two
subsidiary parties within the same MNC network (Pan 2002; Tang 2003). In the
case that each counterpart affiliate in a host country having currency depreciation
enjoys high levels of ownership control, each can help its counterparts in countries
undergoing currency appreciation via intra-firm product sales.
In sum, a portfolios ownership status will reflect the managerial control over
cross-border intra-firm trade. Higher ownership levels of both a subsidiary and its
counterpart affiliate will positively facilitate product shifts across the border. Hence,
we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 5: The cross-border intra-firm sales of a subsidiary in a host
country whose currency has depreciated will be positively moderated by a
higher level of ownership-based control over the subsidiarys operation.
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3 Research Methodology
3.1 Data
Intra-firm trade indicates purchase and sales of products among sister companies
within the same MNC network (Kiyota et al. 2008; Lee and Makhija 2009a). This
intra-firm trade information allows us to examine whether or not an MNC actually
shift their resources or relocate their production and sales activities using its
international subsidiary network under differing macro-economic conditions. In
order to examine whether currency depreciation in a subsidiarys host country
triggers more exports of the subsidiarys product via intra-firm sales to its affiliated
subsidiaries in other countries with currency appreciation, we count the ratio of the
subsidiarys volume of intra-firm sales of the same type products to other affiliates
having lower price competitiveness associated with currency appreciation out of its
total sales volume. For the information of Korean MNCs intra-firm trade, we
referred to annual audit reports provided by Retrieval and Transfer System (DART),
Korean electronic disclosure system, and TS2000 Warehouse database of the Korea
Listed Companies Association (KLCA).
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Inter-Country Exchange Rates and Intra-Firm 9
percentage change in each country currency. The currencies for each country year
by year are obtained from the International Monetary Fund.
The Number of Affiliates with Currency Depreciation We counted the number
of a subsidiarys affiliated companies (1) whose countries are appreciated against
the subsidiarys host countrys currency, and (2) which are in the same industry to a
focal subsidiary. We expect that the more subsidiaries with opposite directional
currency change, the more a subsidiary is likely to shift its product to those affiliates
in other countries. Considering that this measure captures the directionality of both
intra-firm trade and relevant countries exchange rate changes, we believe it is a
better measure than a traditional one for FDI breadth used in other studies which
measure FDI breadth as the number of countries only that at least a foreign
subsidiary operates (e.g., Allen and Pantzalis 1996; Lee and Makhija 2009b; Tang
and Tikoo 1999).
Transportation Costs of Product Shifts To examine the impact of cost of
transporting a subsidiarys product to other countries, we measured transportation
cost as the averaged ratios of weight to value of shipments by industry segment
between a focal subsidiary and each of its counterpart affiliates (Mauri and Phatak
2001). We took the negatives of the original ratios to examine the impact of lower
transportation costs. We followed Mauri and Phataks (2001) measure and located
the ratio of weight to value of shipments by industry segment from the Census of
Transportation. We believe this measure is more product-specific and time-varying
than geographic-distance based one (Clark 2007; Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-
Lehmann 2007).
Host Countrys Labor Costs By incorporating growth rates of its host countrys
labor cost, we examined potentially counter-veiling impact of rising labor costs in a
subsidiarys host country on the positive impact of its host countrys currency
depreciation on its product export to other countries. We measured it as the annual
percentage in unit labor costs in manufacturing in its host country. For empirical
testing, we used the negative value of the original sum in order to examine the
impact of lower labor cost growth rates. We located the data of labor costs from the
International Labor Organization website.
Portfolio Ownership Control In order to check how much peer affiliates are
able to control for their cross-border intra-firm trade, we measure portfolio
ownership level as the ratio of the number of cases that both a focal subsidiary and
its counterpart affiliate possesses more than 50 % ownership in each operation out
of all available two-country pairs between the focal subsidiary and each of
counterpart subsidiaries. For example assuming that a focal subsidiary (A) has three
subsidiaries (B, C, D) in other countries subject to currency depreciation and A, B,
C have majority ownership positions, the ratio would be 0.67 (two country pairs (A
B, AC) out of three country pairs (AB, AC, AD). We expect the higher control
over cross-border intra-firm trade, the more easily relevant affiliates will be able to
conduct their cross-border intra-firm product shifts for their own benefits.
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10 S. Song
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Inter-Country Exchange Rates and Intra-Firm 11
dummy variables based on the Korean Standard Industry Code two-digit level
industry classifications. We also included country dummies in order to take into
consideration unobserved differences country by country.
Table 1 presents the definitions, measures, and data sources of all variables.
Considering the endogeneity issue associated with each subsidiary intra-firm trade
engagement, we used the Heckmans two stage model. In the first stage, we run a
probit model to regress intra-firm trade choice on relevant predictors. We used
subsidiary size and age, and parent MNCs size and international experience, and
Chaebol (Korean Conglomerate) membership as the predictors for intra-firm trade
choice as the dependent variable. From the first regression, we obtained the Inverse
Mills Ratio as the correction factor for potential endogeneity and included it into the
second stage.
In the second stage, we used a STATAs xtgls command and ran a feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) model addressing the three potential problems
relating to panel data: panel heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, and
serial correlation. FGLS allows us to examine the time-series component of the
analysis as well as maximize the degrees of freedom (Lee et al. 2008) by producing
the residuals used to estimate the unit-specific serial correction of the errors before
transforming the model into one with serially independent errors (Beck and Katz
1995). We also add the STATA option, force corr(psar1), to xtgls in order to
address potential problems related to unequally-distributed observations or repeated
units over time.
4 Results
Table 2 presents the mean and standard deviation for each variable and the
correlation coefficients among variables. In order to check for potential multicol-
linearity problems we use variance inflation factors (VIF) to see how much a given
predictor affects other coefficients variances (Hamilton 2006). The highest VIF in
this sample is 1.97, lower than the commonly-used cut-off point of 10 or 4 as the
more conservative one. This index means that multicollinearity is not a significant
concern in our sample.
Table 3 contains the results of the FGLS model relating to the degree of intra-firm
sales of a foreign subsidiary exposed to its host countrys currency depreciation.
Model 1 only includes the control variables, Model 2 adds five primary independent
variables, Model 3 through 6 present coefficients and significance of two-way
interaction terms between currency appreciation and each of independent variables.
Model 7 incorporates all interactions terms. Wald Chi square test statistics show that
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Table 1 Summary of variables
12
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Dependent variables
Intra-firm sales Annual percentage change in intra-firm sales to subsidiaries exposed to Annual audit report provided by Retrieval and Transfer System
currency appreciation) (DART)
Independent variables
Host country currency Annual percentage change in host country currency Exchange rate statistics of International Monetary Fund
depreciation
The number of Negative averaged values of annual percentage changes in GDP growth
subsidiaries with rates for past 3 years
currency
appreciation
Lower transportation Negative averaged ratios of weight to value of shipments by industry The Census of Transportation
costs segment
Lower labor cost Annual percentage in unit labor costs in manufacturing in its host country Labor cost statistics from the International Labor Organization
growth rate
Subsidiary ownership Ratio of the number of cases that both a focal subsidiary and its The Bank of Korea, The Export and Import Bank of Korea, Korea
counterpart affiliate possesses more than 50 % ownership in each Trade Investment Promotion Agency, The Korea Listed
operation out of all available two-country pairs between the focal Companies Association
subsidiary and each of counterpart subsidiaries
Controls
Subsidiary Return on asset The Bank of Korea, The Export and Import Bank of Korea, Korea
performance Trade Investment Promotion Agency, The Korea Listed
Subsidiary age Subsidiarys total operating years Companies Association
Subsidiary size Log of subsidiarys total assets
Imported input ratio Imported inputs/total inputs Annual audit report provided by Retrieval and Transfer System
(DART)
Currency appreciation Negative values of annual percentage change in host country currency Exchange rate statistics of International Monetary Fund
GDP per capita GDP per capita difference between currency depreciation and appreciation GDP statistics from the Organization of Economic Cooperation
differences country (in one thousand US Dollar) and Development (OECD) and World Bank websites
S. Song
Table 1 continued
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1 0.07 0.12 1.00
2 0.04 2.14 1.00 0.02 1.00
3 5.45 7.91 1.02 0.02 0.01 1.00
4 15.9 2.53 1.20 0.03 0.00 0.10 1.00
5 0.16 0.21 1.86 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 1.00
6 0.04 0.06 1.48 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.05 1.00
7 2.78 4.20 1.54 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.00 1.00
8 0.42 0.29 1.28 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07* -0.01 -0.02 0.02 1.00
9 5.07 3.88 1.24 -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.00 -0.17* 1.00
10 20.6 1.94 1.70 0.08* -0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.22* 0.02 1.00
11 2.13 1.35 1.86 0.04 -0.02 -0.16* 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.33* 0.08 -0.00 1.00
12 0.02 0.10 1.12 0.07* -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00 1.00
13 2.41 5.67 1.20 0.08* 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.00 1.00
14 -0.14 0.34 1.62 0.06 -0.01 0.07* -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 1.00
15 -0.08 -0.12 1.20 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.01 1.00
16 0.66 0.40 1.74 0.10* -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.07* 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.01 1.00
1: Intra-firm sales, 2: Subsidiary performance, 3: Subsidiary age, 4: Subsidiary size (in million US dollar), 5: Imported input ratio, 6: Currency appreciation, 7: GDP per
capita difference between currency depreciation and appreciation country (in one thousand US Dollar), 8: GDP growth rate differences between currency depreciation and
appreciation country, 9: Host Country risk, 10: Parent firm size (in one million US dollar), 11: Parent firms international experience, 12: Host country currency
depreciation, 13: The number of subsidiaries with currency appreciation, 14: Lower transportation cost 15: Lower labor cost growth rate, 16: Subsidiary ownership
* p \ 0.05: A STATA option, sidak sig, is used for controlling for multiple comparison fallacy in Pearson correlation. It identifies the handful that is significant at the
0.05 level (Hamilton 2006)
S. Song
Table 3 Results for hypotheses testing
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Subsidiary performance 0.28 (0.88) 0.24 (0.74) 0.22 (0.72) 0.24 (0.76) 0.22 (0.74) 0.24 (0.86) 0.28 (0.92)
Subsidiary age 0.07 (0.85) 0.09 (1.09) 0.10 (0.51) 0.11 (1.23) 0.09 (1.09) 0.05 (0.57) 0.07 (0.66)
Subsidiary size 0.82 (2.48)** 0.94 (2.44)** 0.92 (2.38)* 1.04 (2.44)** 0.98 (2.40)** 1.02 (2.18)* 1.04 (2.30)**
Imported input ratio -0.12 (1.78) -0.10 (1.76) -0.10 (1.78) -0.11 (1.80) -0.12 (1.76) -0.10 (1.78) -0.10 (1.76)
Currency appreciation -0.24 (2.04)* -0.22 (2.02)* -0.22 (1.98)* -0.24 (2.00)* -0.22 (2.02)* -0.20 (2.00)* -0.18 (2.04)*
GDP per capita difference -0.03 (0.86) -0.04 (0.90) -0.04 (0.92) -0.04 (0.88) -0.04 (0.90) -0.04 (0.88) -0.06 (0.94)
GDP growth rate difference -0.06 (1.88) -0.06 (1.86) -0.06 (1.86) -0.06 (1.88) -0.07 (1.92) -0.06 (1.88) -0.06 (1.86)
Country risk -0.04 (1.04) -0.04 (1.09) -0.04 (1.08) -0.05 (1.09) -0.05 (1.09) -0.06 (1.06) -0.07 (1.02)
Parent size 0.10 (1.96)* 0.12 (1.94)* 0.10 (1.94)* 0.10 (1.98)* 0.10 (1.98)* 0.10 (1.96)* 0.11 (2.00)*
International experience 0.06 (0.30) 0.08 (0.56) 0.10 (0.88) 0.10 (0.94) 0.12 (1.10) 0.14 (1.14) 0.16 (1.10)
Inter-Country Exchange Rates and Intra-Firm
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16 S. Song
all models are highly significant and the models with the added variables show
better fits.
Hypothesis 1 posits that under the influence of currency depreciation in its
host country a foreign subsidiary is more likely to increase its intra-firm product
sales to its affiliates in other countries experiencing currency appreciation. The
empirical results show that the variable is positively associated with increase in
intra-firm sales of the focal subsidiarys product to other subsidiaries exposed to
currency appreciation at the 10 % significance level (Model 2: b = 1.82,
p \ 0.05, Model 7: b = 1.84, p \ 0.10). Therefore Hypothesis 1 is marginally
supported.
Hypothesis 2 expects a positive moderating impact of more subsidiaries in other
countries with currency appreciation. Under that situation, a foreign subsidiarys
intra-firm sales to those subsidiaries are expected to increase. This two-way
interaction term shows expected positive sign and is significant (Model 3: b = 3.78,
p \ 0.01, Model 7: b = 4.56, p \ 0.001) in Table 2.
Hypothesis 3 is about the positive moderating effect of lower transportation costs
associated with a subsidiarys sales of its product to other affiliates suffering from
currency appreciation. This hypothesis is also supported at the 5 % (Model 4:
b = 2.28, p \ 0.05) or 1 % (Model 7: b = 2.18, p \ 0.01) level.
Hypothesis 4 argues for positively interactive relationship between currency
depreciation and lower labor cost growth rate in a subsidiarys host country. We
expect that rising labor cost growth rates in its host country may offset the positive
impact of currency depreciation on a subsidiarys intra-firm sales to other country
subsidiaries. This variable has a positive sign in the 5 % significance level (Model
5: b = 1.96, p \ 0.05, Model 7: b = 2.16, p \ 0.05).
Hypothesis 5 supports the positive impact of a subsidiarys high ownership-based
control for its cross-border intra-firm trade in cases that its host country has
depreciated currency while other affiliates countries have appreciated currencies.
This relationship is also supported and significance in terms of its interactive impact
on increase in the subsidiarys intra-firm sales across the border (Model 6: b = 3.12,
p \ 0.01, Model 7: b = 3.62, p \ 0.01).
In order to confirm that our measurements of primary variables are robust with
respect to alternative measurements, we conduct several robustness checks.
Host Countrys Currency Depreciation To examine not only the magnitude of
exchange change but also the volatility of the exchange rate, we rerun the regression
models using two other measures: one is the average of monthly exchange rates, and
the other is the conditional variances of the monthly exchange rates from a
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model follow-
ing Lee and Makhija (2009a, b). Using the conditional variances, we additionally
conduct cross-derivative tests for the interaction term between annual percentage
change and exchange rate volatility between two split samples of all contingent
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Inter-Country Exchange Rates and Intra-Firm 17
variables.1 Similar to our primary results, these two measures support that favorable
currency changes in host countries are positively associated with increases in intra-
firm sales.
The Number of Affiliated Firms with Currency Appreciation In addition to the
number of a subsidiarys affiliated companies whose countries currencies are
appreciated relative to the subsidiarys host countrys currency, we consider the
relative changes in currencies. We use the weighted annual percentage change in
each appreciated currency by the actual export volume to each currency country. For
example, assume that three countries currencies are appreciated against a focal host
by 30, 20, and 15 % respectively, and that export volumes to those three countries
were 10, 5, 3). The sum would be (-0.45 = -0.3 9 10 ? (-0.2 9 5) ?
(-0.15 9 3)). This new measure does not affect our results significantly.
Labor Cost For each countrys longitudinal labor cost data, we referred to
Freeman and Ostendorps Occupational Wages around the World (OWW) database.
The OWW dataset covers country labor costs industry by industry. We also located
each countrys longitudinal labor cost data from homepages of the International
Labor Organization (ILO), the OECD, and the United States Department of Labor.
Ownership Level In addition to 50 % as a cut-off for effective control by each
subsidiary, we tested with 80 or 95 % which is often used to differentiate joint
ventures from wholly-owned subsidiaries. Three cut-offs produce qualitatively same
results presumably because parent MNCs control over their foreign subsidiaries
based upon majority ownership positions account of a large portion of Korean FDI.
1
The split sample method does not assume identical unexplained variance between the two split groups
(Belderbos and Zou 2009; Hoetker 2007 and thus is considered a more general test for comparing inter-
group coefficients. Relevantly, a cross-derivative test allows us to examine whether the moderating effect
was positive or negative for all observations, as well as what percentage of the observations was
significant (Belderbos and Zou 2009).
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18 S. Song
In empirical testing, we find that when more subsidiaries are exposed to currency
appreciation in their investment countries, a subsidiary exposed to currency
depreciation in its own country carries out intra-firm sales of its product to those
subsidiaries. Our finding confirms that under a currency change, an MNC subsidiary
configuration conducive to operational flexibility such as high FDI breadth is
associated with an increase in intra-firm trade. MNCs that are ready for uncertainty
through their subsidiary network structure (i.e., high FDI breadth) may have an
easier time engaging in intra-firm trade when it is most needed. This ability to adjust
production and sales activities across their investing countries provides these MNCs
with a ready-to-go structure that allows them to both gain and sustain competitive
advantages during times of uncertainty when other MNCs are struggling. However,
our measure of FDI breadth as a favorable condition for multinational operational
flexibility allows us to consider both the directionality of currency changes across
countries and intra-firm trade among subsidiaries. On the other hand, the traditional
index for multinationality or FDI breadth (i.e., the number of countries where a
foreign subsidiary at least operates) used in some prior studies (e.g., Allen and
Pantzalis 1996; Reuer and Leiblein 2000; Lee and Makhija 2009b; Tong and Reuer
2007) is too broad to capture those directionalities.
In addition to suggesting direct evidence of multinational operational flexibility
via intra-firm shifts of products across countries, this study empirically tests the
contingencies where intra-firm trades take place, from production sites under
favorable conditions to those under unfavorable conditions. Specifically, this study
examines host market conditions such as labor costs besides the important
production factors with respect to currency changes. Meanwhile, past studies
examined two factors separately. For example, Lee and Song (2012) studied the
impact of favorable currency change in a host country on the adjustment of
production volumes in other subsidiaries experiencing unfavorable currency change.
(Fisch and Zschoche 2011) examined the impact of rising labor costs in a host
country on employment shifts to other countries with lower labor costs.
This study also tests the level of ownership-based control necessary for cross-
border intra-firm trade. Concerning the impact of higher ownership on downside
risks associated with multinationality, Tong and Reuer (2007) examined the impact
of higher ownership level at an MNC portfolio level and found no significant
influence on curving downside risks owing to high control and coordination of
dispersed operations across countries. Meanwhile, this study examines the impact of
subsidiary-level ownership-based control over cross-border intra-firm trade among
subsidiaries. We find that subsidiaries with higher ownership are better able to
increase their intra-firm sales to other country subsidiaries that need the same
product for their sales in their host countries when there is currency appreciation.
This implies that we need to compare the impact of ownership as the main control
tool at each subsidiary level with that at the MNC level.
Our main arguments and findings in this paper provide some managerial
implications. First, managers in charge of global businesses should carefully
consider real options views related to their geographic configuration and coordi-
nation when it comes to their global production. If they focus on growth
opportunities in specific countries only, they might be exposed to abrupt changes in
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Inter-Country Exchange Rates and Intra-Firm 19
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