Professional Documents
Culture Documents
&
Conflict Policies
Hugh Miall
Anna Orrnert
Dogus Simsek
University of Kent
Conflict Analysis Research Centre
With contributions by
Kosovo Young Lawyers
(Flutura Kusari, Armend Bekaj,
& Liridon Shurdhani)
Grant Agreement number: 210615
Project acronym: INFOCON
Project title: International Civil Society Forum on Conflicts
Funding Scheme: Research for the Benefit of Specific Groups
Research for Civil Society Organisations
Disclaimer 1
The research leading to these results has received funding from
the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme
(FP7 / 2007–2011) under grant agreement Nr. 210615.
Disclaimer 2
The views expressed in this document are purely those of the authors
and may not in any circumstance be regarded as stating the official
position of all partners in the INFOCON consortium.
Table of Contents
List of tables · 7
1. Introduction · 9
1.1. Objectives of the Study · 9
1.2. Overview · 9
1.3. The Role of Transnational Communities in Conflict · 9
1.3.1. Diasporas as Fullers of Conflict · 10
1.3.2. Diasporas as Peace-Builders · 11
1.3.3. Diasporas as Sites of Competing
Political Processes · 11
1.3.4. Diasporas and Conflict Transformation · 12
1.3.6. Diasporas and Asymmetric Conflicts · 13
1.4. The Context of Conflicts in Kosovo, the Great Lakes and
Turkey · 15
1.5. The Role of Civil Society Organizations · 15
1.6. Involvement of Civil Society Organizations in Four
European Cities in Homeland Conflicts: Summary of
Findings from Work Package 2 · 15
1.7. Influence of Transnational Communities in Countries of
Origin · 16
1.7.1. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs · 16
1.7.2. Turks and Kurds · 17
1.7.3. Great Lakes · 17
1.8. Involvement of Transnational Communities in
Peace‑Building · 17
1.8.1. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs · 17
1.8.2. Turks and Kurds · 17
1.8.3. Great Lakes · 18
1.9. Involvement of Transnational Communities in
Lobbying · 18
1.9.1. Kosovo · 18
1.9.2. Turks and Kurds · 18
1.9.3. Great Lakes · 18
1.10. Involvement of CSOs in Dialogue and Peace‑Building · 19
1.10.1. Great Lakes · 19
1.10.2. Kosovo · 19
1.10.2. Turks and Kurds · 19
T
he overall objective of the infocon is to create a better understanding of how Civil
Society Organizations (CSOs) representing Transnational Communities (TCs) can help in
preventing and resolving conflicts in Europe and the world. The research aims to verify past
research on TCs and their role in conflict, produce new insights into the dynamics and current
role of CSOs, and provide conflict-sensitive policy recommendations. The objective of Work Pack-
age 3 is to assess the scope and influence of CSOs from TCs in preventing, managing and resolving
violent conflicts in their countries of origin.
1.2. Overview
This report reports on research on the roles of transnational communities from Kosovo, Turkey
and the Great Lakes, based on surveys and interviews with representatives of CSOs in London,
Brussels, Randstad and Berlin, and in the countries of origin, case studies of the three conflicts and
the four cities of settlement, and a report commissioned from Kosovo Young Lawyers on the role
of civil society and diasporas in Kosovo.
Diasporas from these conflicts are perceived to have played a critically important political role
in conflict in the past. However, our research suggests that at present civil society organizations
representing these transnational communities play a limited role in efforts to resolve or prevent
conflicts in their homelands, although they are active in advocacy in the countries of settlement.
We found more evidence of active engagement in dialogue and peace-building efforts among CSOs
in the countries of origin than in the countries of settlement. A survey of peace-building initiatives
by civil society groups underway in Kosovo showed that the initiatives come from within Kosovo
not from the transnational community. This suggests that, while transnational communities are
important in economic support to their home countries, reliance on transnational communities
to promote peace-building at the post-conflict stage may be less effective than initiatives in the
countries of origin. We found most evidence of interaction and engagement in dialogue among the
Great Lakes diaspora communities, with more activity among the Burundian community than the
Rwandan.
The report starts by placing the study in the context of contemporary trends affecting migration
and conflict. We then review the academic debate about the role that diasporas play in conflict and
conflict resolution. The report goes on to analyse the survey of CSOs in both the countries of set-
tlement and the countries of origin as they relate to engagement in conflicts in the homeland. The
final section draws conclusions and discusses implications for policy.
1.9.1. Kosovo
In London, respondents referred to lobbying of MPs, the All Parliamentary Group for Serbia, na-
tional and international NGOs and the US and uk governments. In Ranstad, respondents referred
to lobbying of the Dutch government, NATO and the media. In Berlin, however, most respondents
said that their community had not been active in this way. Three quarters of Kosovo Albanian
respondents in Kosovo believed that the diaspora had influenced international actors. No Kosovo
Serbs believed that their community in Europe had an influence.
1.10.2. Kosovo
In London and Randstad about half the CSOs said they were involved in activities of some kind:
mostly advocacy work. In Berlin, most CSOs said they were not involved. In Kosovo only two of
the 14 Kosovo Albanian CSOs interviewed had cooperated with European partner CSOs; on the
Kosovo Serb side, there were none.
1.11.1. Kosovo
Five of the 12 Kosovo Albanian respondents thought there was potential here, though the Kosovo
Serbs saw none.
1.11.2. Turkey
In Turkey, very few respondents were positive about the potential.
1.12.2. Kosovo
In London, no such dialogue had taken place; for Albanians, it would ‘depend on Serb recognition
of Kosovo.’ In Randstad, a number of respondents cite TV debates and workshops. In Berlin no
dialogue was reported.
1.13. Analysis
The survey showed that, contrary to the impression sometimes given in the literature, most CSOs
and most members of the transnational community are not strongly involved in homeland con-
flicts. There are also clear differences by phase of conflict. We find, as one might expect, that lob-
bying and advocacy are greater while the conflict is acute. In the post-conflict stage, lobbying and
advocacy activities seem to take second place to survival and adjustment to the host society.
Several conclusions stand out from this mixed set of results. First, there are significant differ-
ences between the conflicts. The Great Lakes respondents in general see much more scope for
transnational community involvement than do those from Kosovo or Turkey. Respondents from
within the countries of origin are generally more positive about the prospects for conflict mitiga-
tion, and in some cases report more involvement in mitigation activities, than do respondents in
the European cities. In all cases, lobbying and advocacy is the major form of activity in relation to
conflict. We interpret these results through the lens of the perceptions of parties in different set-
tings. In certain cases, reconciliation and dialogue projects are seen to favour a particular party
in conflict, given the setting. For example, in the Great Lakes, the governments have been active
in promoting reconciliation, and what reconciliation or ‘peace and justice’ mean is seen to have a
political loading. Different parties may thus have different projects and outcomes in mind, while
nevertheless accepting a common aspiration to reconciliation. In Kosovo, peace-building, refugee
return and reconciliation are seen by the Serbs to be on the terms of the Kosovo Albanians, and
it is difficult to find a shared interpretation of what they mean. In Turkey, in contrast, a common
E
xisting literature on the Kosovo Serb diaspora appears to be scant. This may be due
to this community’s small number of refugees abroad (the majority of Serbs who fled Kosovo
after the NATO airstrikes went to Serbia, where they were classified as IDPs by a regime who
still considered Kosovo a part of Serbia) as well as, what appears to be, their lack of formal organi-
zation as a group separate from the Serbian diaspora. Some research has been done on Kosovo
Serb communities in refugee camps in Serbia, although seemingly less attention has been given to
them compared with the relatively diverse literature that exist on Kosovo Albanian refugee com-
munities around the world.
The Serbian diaspora more generally has been vocal about the conflict in Kosovo and politics
in the Balkan region. Any discussion of the role of the diaspora in the Kosovo conflict and its
resolution would be incomplete without at least a brief overview of this group. Although there
are several books on the Serbian diaspora written in the Serbian language (for example, Belgrade-
based Marko Lopusina’s 2001 book on Serbs in America), there seems to exist only a limited body
of academic research written on the Serbian diaspora written in English.1 Research has started on
Serbian remittances (for example, Lerch, Dahinder and Wanner 2007; De Luna Martinez, Endo
and Barberis 2006; Petree, and Baruah 2008). Articles can be found on websites such as Serbian
Network and Serbian Unity Congress,2 but it is difficult to ascertain their accuracy and objectivity.
There is more research available on the Kosovo Albanian diaspora. Older literature focuses on
the emergence of the LDK and the KLA and the diaspora’s support to Kosovo during the parallel
system and war. More recently studies have examined the role of the Kosovo Albanian diaspora
within the context of the migration and development debate, and emerging literature reflects this
(Haxhikadrija 2009; Mustafa 2007; ESI 2006). Less attention has been paid to the diasporas’ role
in resolving remaining conflict and building peace in Kosovo.
The following sections draw on the existing literature and infocon interviews to sketch the
characteristics, dynamics and activities of the Kosovo Serb and Albanian diasporas with regard
to the conflict in Kosovo and their potential contributions to peace-building. It must be high-
lighted that infocon’s remit focuses specifically on the conflict between Albanians and Serbs
in Kosovo, and was not designed to investigate other non-Serb minorities, though they have also
been adversely affected throughout the conflict. This is particularly true for the case of the Roma
communities who were targeted by both sides at different periods and continue to suffer as a result.
2.1.1. The Kosovo-Serb Diaspora: IDPs in Serbia and Refugees Further Afield
The migration of Serbs from Kosovo happened in two main waves. The first wave was after the end
of the NATO air campaign in 1999, when the majority of Serbs left Kosovo due to fear of revenge
1. Pryke states: ‘There has been no ethnographic research on British Serbs in contrast to the larger groups of Ukranians and
Poles who also came to Britain after World War II in similar circumstances… There are only three published pieces of re-
search in English on the Serbian diaspora: an anthropological examination of the Milwaukee community by Padgett (1989), a
study of the politics of the British Serb Lobby by Hodge (1999) and a more recent ethnography of Australian Serbs, focusing
on mental health issues, by Proctor (2001)’ (Pryke 2003: 153).
2. http://www.srpska-mreza.com http://www.serbianunity.net/sucinfo/
many IDPs (were) still looking for food and non-food basics on a daily basis. Many IDP fam-
ilies also (had) family members who (were) missing, a situation which only (compounded)
their economic, social and emotional vulnerability. (IDP Working Group 2004)
It seems that the Kosovo Serbs, in Serbia were too focused on daily survival to engage in any sig-
nificant organised political activity with regards to Kosovo. At the same time, the total number of
3. This was in contrast to the refugee status given to Bosnian and Croatian Serbs that arrived in Serbian camps.
4. Global Balkans Network states that refugee / IDP camps are either Serb or Roma. Kosovo Serb IDPs often live in shelters
in provisionally organized collective centres (abandoned schools or other formerly state-owned buildings) on the fringe of
urban areas. Roma camps are primarily informal, with entire families squeezed into shelters built of nylon tents or metal
shipping containers measuring 2.8x3m or 3x5m.
With regards to the conflict in Kosovo, infocon’s research suggests that whilst representatives
of Serbian CSOs might express discomfort with aspects of historic and contemporary political
regimes in Former Yugoslavia and Serbia, this did not (at least at an organisational level) challenge
public identification with the stance of the Serbian government vis-à-vis Kosovo. This may suggest
the possibility that the CSOs interviewed tended to represent more conservative positions and
possibly excluded, by default, those whose views differ.
Amongst the few Serbs spoken to in London, the narratives of the causes of the Kosovo conflict
pivoted upon the figure of the former Yugoslav leader Tito. According to one respondent, the na-
ture of politics post-Tito and post-communism politics was to blame for the appeal to voters for
solidarity on a ‘nationalistic card’. This respondent added that Serbia had the ‘wrong politicians’.
Another view was that Tito’s immigration policies of the 1950s were to blame: ‘Tito’s immigration
policy of the 1950s importing Albanians [to Kosovo]’, together with the ‘Albanians’ high fertility
rate’ and ‘Serbs selling up their homesteads and land to Albanians in the 1970s onwards’ had all
led to a ‘tipping point’. One respondent said that Milosevic’s speech in 1989, ‘was provocative, but
there had been previous provocations to it’. In both these narratives, international actors figured
as having worsened the situation. One respondent described USA and NATO involvement as ‘trig-
gers to an intractable worsening of the situation’. Amongst the few Serbian CSOs contacted, there
was a great and urgent sense of political grievance, although no clear evidence of active interven-
tion in conflict in Kosovo or mobilisation to this end.
1. 1960 to 1988. Prior to the 1960s many Kosovo Albanians fled to Turkey during the first years
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Haxhikadrija 2009). From the 1960s – 1980s,
migrants were mainly poor and unskilled guest workers with low levels of education, re-
cruited to Germany and Switzerland from rural areas, and accompanied by their families.
These guest workers included ethnic Albanians, Serbs, Bosnians and Croats who all initially
belonged to the same Yugoslavian social and cultural organisations in their countries of
settlement. It was only during the 1990s, with the outbreak of war in the Balkans, that the
diaspora communities began to divide along ethnic lines.
2. 1989 to 1997. During this phase of growing conflict, when most Kosovo Albanians were
dismissed from their jobs, the primary motive for migration was economic. Young men also
left to avoid army service in the Yugoslav wars (particularly between 1992–1995). During this
period, the United Kingdom became a new destination for Kosovo Albanians. These emi-
Several authors have noted the difficulty in providing accurate estimates of the total number of
Kosovo Albanians abroad (iom 2004; ESI 2006; Korovilas 2006; Haxhikadrija 2009). This is partly
due to the lack of accurate census data on migration in Kosovo, and partly because of the way im-
migration data has been recorded in host countries. For many decades separate data for Kosovars,
or data disaggregated by ethnicity, was not gathered, as most host countries recorded country of
origin simply as Yugoslavia or, later, Serbia. A ‘common yet disputed estimate’ of Kosovo Albani-
ans abroad is 800,000 (Haxhikadrija 2009).
4. 1999 to 2008. The iom Mission in Kosovo has estimated that approximately 190,000 people
returned to Kosovo during this period. From 1999 onwards, many host countries no longer
welcomed new migrants and many actively encouraged a policy of return.7 Moreover, during
the 1990s many of the political asylum seekers who arrived in Germany had their claims for
asylum rejected and were instead granted ‘toleration permits’ (duldung). These permits al-
lowed them to remain in Germany on condition they would return to Kosovo once the situ-
ation there had stabilized. In 1999, following the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo,
the German authorities announced that 180,000 Kosovo Albanians had lost their legal sta-
tus and must return home. Since then, many of the émigrés who arrived in Germany during
the 1990s have returned home through assisted voluntary return programmes, deportation
or unassisted. Those who remained abroad did so by finding ways to extend their residence,
for example through education. In Switzerland, where immigration rules remained more
liberal, migrants who had been in the country long enough gained permanent residence
permits, and were able to bring their families over. From 2000 onwards, family unification
accounted for the majority of new arrivals. Although it is difficult to establish exact num-
bers, it is believed that over half million Kosovars still reside abroad.
While a significant number of migrants have returned to Kosovo following the cessation of hostili-
ties, outward migration is still happening, primarily due to the high unemployment and low sala-
ries in Kosovo. Research has indicated that approximately half of Kosovo’s youth would prefer to
migrate, if possible, due to the poor economic climate in Kosovo. Despite this, economically driven
migration is more limited than before.
A number of sources have documented the darker side of population movement from, through
and even to Kosovo, human trafficking. Kosovo was initially a transit route for traffickers but – due
to the post-conflict economy, organized crime and problematic border controls – has more re-
cently also become a destination for victims of trafficking (Limanowska 2002).
The following table gives the approximate distribution of the Kosovan TC according to Mustafa
(2007). As the historical main destinations for guest workers under Tito’s Yugoslavia, Germany and
7. As a result of the large numbers of returnees from Western Europe after 1999 (assisted by UNMIK, iom and other humani-
tarian organisations), Germany and Switzerland set up liaison offices in Pristina to assist with the return process. They also
provided assistance to returnees in the form of housing assistance, emergency subsistence payments and job training.
The following sections highlight some of the key characteristics of the Kosovo Albanian TCs in of
some of these countries, based on infocon research and other sources.
Germany
Approximately 300,000 Kosovo Albanians currently reside in Germany (Haxhikadrija 2009), which
was a key destination for Kosovo Albanians even before the war began. The Kosovo Albanian gov-
ernment-in-exile moved from Slovenia to Stuttgart in the early 1990s. From there it also operated
a network of hundreds of LDK branch offices and the Fund for the Republic of Kosovo (the official
treasury of the state in exile, also known as the Three Percent Fund). This Fund, which a majority
of the diaspora contributed to (reportedly without coercion), paid for the parallel education, health
and social welfare structures, and the exiled government’s political activities. Kosovo Albanians
in Germany were later instrumental in providing funding through the Homeland Calling Fund
(which was set up specficially to collect money for the armed struggle in Kosovo8) as well as fight-
ers for the Kosovo Liberation Army. Once the government’s nonviolent strategy was perceived to
have failed, Bukoshi tried to set up the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK). This was
perceived by some to be in direct competition with the KLA and Bukoshi’s efforts to reconcile the
two ultimately failed (Hockenos 2003).
Switzerland
Estimates of Albanian-speaking migrants in Switzerland vary from between 95,000 – 200,000, of
which a third are believed to be Albanians from Kosovo (Dahinden 2005; Haxhikadrija 2009).
Many of these were labour migrants, families and – later – refugees and asylum seekers. Haxhi-
kadrija observed that this last group, in particular, was low-skilled with low education levels. Swit-
zerland became a bastion of more radical Kosovo Albanian opposition activist groups (some which
reportedly also had links with the criminal underworld9). Opposed to their nonviolent approach,
8. According to Hockenos (2003) contributions to Homeland Calling were reportedly often coerced.
9. Hockenos (2003) provides some insights into these relationships.
Italy
As the West European country closest to Kosovo, Italy became one of the first destinations for ref-
ugees fleeing the war. Research by De Sario et al. (2000) highlighted that many Kosovar refugees
(primarily Albanians and Roma) that ended up in Italy had hoped to reach friends or relatives in
Germany or Belgium. Because of European law, they were forced to stay (or were returned if they
tried to leave) to the first country they entered in Europe. Many lived in poor and destitute condi-
tions in asylum holding centres, faced with racism and discrimination from their Italian hosts. De
Sario et al. noted that the social conditions of Kosovar refugees in Italy depended to a great extent
on which part of the country they ended up in. Refugees in Northern Italy were able to secure work
permits and developed social networks to help each other, while those in the south held residence
permits granting the right to ‘humanitarian asylum’. These permits did not permit refugees to
work and there was no social welfare system to support them. (De Sario et al. 2000).
United Kingdom
During the early 1990s, more educated, highly skilled and economically well-off migrants from ur-
ban areas of Kosovo also left Kosovo (many fleeing military conscription). Many settled in the uk
and intended to return to Kosovo once the political situation had stabilized. In 2000, the House of
Commons claimed that there were approximately 17,000 Kosovo Albanians in London. . A second
government-in-exile fund for Kosovo (called Everything for an Independent Kosovo), was set up
in London to collect money for military engagement. This reportedly collected approximately $ 30
million (Hockenos 2003). More information on the Kosovo Albanian TC in the United Kingdom
follows below.
United States
Although there were a handful of Kosovo Albanians in the United States during the 1960s and
1970s, they did not begin to arrive en masse until the 1980s. By the end of the 1990s, there were
more than 200,000 Albanians from the former Yugoslavia in the US and the majority of these were
Kosovars (Hockenos 2003). Though not as active as its counterparts in Europe in contributing to
the Three Percent Fund or providing the KLA with fighters, the Kosovo Albanian TC in the United
States proved invaluable in political lobbying of American politicians to further the Kosovo Alba-
nian cause. Some Albanian Americans (part of the Atlantic Brigade) also went over to Kosovo to
fight with the KLA. Many of these returned to the United States once the war had ended.
2.2.6. Canada
Kosovars first came to Canada in 1999 as a result of UNHCR’s efforts at alleviating pressures on
the refugee camps in Macedonia. The Kosovars who arrived as a part of this programme were
(unlike many other asylum seekers) immediately granted legal refugee status (Sherrell and Hynd-
man 2006).10 More than 7,000 Kosovars (mostly Albanians but also some Roma) came to Canada
during this time (Abu-Laban et al. 2001) Very few Kosovars lived in Canada prior to 1999, and the
lack of pre-existing networks established by predecessor migrant groups meant that new arrivals
10. Given its somewhat remote geographic location, Canada does not have a prior history of receiving large volumes of asylum
seekers and does not have a policy of temporary asylum.
Other
infocon research has also identified approximately 40,000 Kosovo Albanians in Belgium and
10,000 in the Netherlands (the majority which arrived as a result of the conflict in Kosovo). Neither
grouping is currently very politically active with regards to events in Kosovo, although Belgium
also has a historic Albanian community, which has been active and absorbed many of the Albani-
ans that arrived from Kosovo.
11. Haxhikadrija (2009) reports that there are plans for extending this office with new staff.
12. KFOS and UNDP run the Capacity Building Facility (CPF) which provides incentives for diaspora experts to return to
Kosovo and take up employment in government institutions. Haxhikadrija states that between 2004–2007, however, only a
handful of experts were actually recruited into such positions.
Whereas the first generation of migrants invests in infrastructure at home (houses, etc.)
and has a more or less nationalistic orientation, the second generation is more interested in
know-how-transfer and adopts a much more critical perspective. The idea of second gen-
eration migrants is to organize themselves and make their knowledge accessible to either
other nationals with integration problems or for the development of their country of origin.
Student associations are an example of such an association… Another example is young
people who are motivated to make their knowledge accessible for building up enterprises in
their region of origin. However… these ideas are until now still more of theoretical charac-
ter than that they have been put into practice. (Haxhikadrija 2009, paraphrasing Dahinden
and Moret 2008)
2.2.3. Civil Society Peace Building Activities and Involvement of the Diaspora
To determine the degree to which the Kosovo Albanian diaspora is involved in conflict mitigation,
reconciliation and peace-building in Kosovo, we commissioned a survey of current peace-building
initiatives by civil society actors in Kosovo (Kosovo Young Lawyers, 2010).
Civil society developed in Kosovo in the period of ‘parallel institutions’, and took on a range of
responsibilities from medical care to poverty relief to human rights. It played an autonomous role
in this period, mediating between citizens and government. Following the conflict in 1999 however,
with the arrival of international donor organizations, authentic CSOs found it difficult to maintain
their autonomy and identity in the face of donors’ programmatic agendas. The gradual decrease of
donor funds has made the CSO sector’s financial sustainability uncertain.
Since 1999, there have been numerous attempts at peace-building and reconciliation between
the ethnic communities residing in Kosovo. Many such initiatives have been supported by inter-
national donors. A handful of local NGOs have successfully bridged the ethnic divide between
Albanians and Serbs. Examples are the Youth Initiative for Human Rights and the Humanitarian
A
small body of research exists on the Burundian diaspora. Notable ethnographic work
by has been carried out in refugee camps in Tanzania by Liisa Malkki and Simon Turner.
Turner has also conducted in depth research with the Burundian diaspora in Belgium. The
iom and the UN have also carried out studies on migration patterns of Burundians, particularly
during and after the civil war. In addition, there is a small emerging body of work on remittances
back to Burundi (see for example, de Bruyn and Wets, ND) Some project documentation is also
available on conflict resolution initiatives involving the diaspora. An overview of the Burundian
diaspora is presented below, drawing on these sources and on a handful of interviews conducted
with members of the Burundian TC in London and the West Midlands.
A detailed analysis of historical events in Burundi, their impact on ethnic relations and, subse-
quently, migration, is beyond the scope of this paper and can be found elsewhere (see, for example
Malkki 1995) It has been noted that traditional power relations were less institutionalized and
social relationships more complex in Burundi than in Rwanda, which resulted in a slower process
of ethnic polarization. Nevertheless, since Burundi’s independence in 1962 the country was char-
acterised by tension between the dominant Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority. Events in neig-
bhouring Rwanda (including the Hutu revolution and subsequent influx of Tutsi refugees in 1959)
played a key role in strengthening ethnic divisions and increasing tension between the Hutus and
Tutsis in Burundi. This came to a climax in a violent civil conflict in 1994. A peace process began
in 2000 with the signing of the Arusha accords, but the country continues to face challenges in
building national unity and strengthening the war-battered economy.
While it is difficult to know exactly how many Burundians reside outside of Burundi, a range of
sources suggests that the diaspora comprised hundreds of thousands of Burundians in neighbour-
ing countries and tens of thousands in Europe and North America during the twelve year civil
war. Work by the World Bank suggests that the main destination countries for Burundians were
Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Canada, Belgium, United Kingdom, France, United States, Italy and
Germany (Ratha and Xu ND). According to the Human Development Index (UNDP 2009) more
than 90% of Burundian migrants went to other African countries. iom figures (2007) gathered by
the Banque de Crédit de Bujumbura (BCB), suggesting that about 10,000 Burundians live in the
European Union, 3,000 in North America (United States and Canada), and about 300 in Asia. The
primary destination countries in Europe include Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Switzer-
land, and the biggest Burundian diaspora community in Europe is believed to be in Belgium. Refu-
gee Rights (2008) suggests that between 2002 and 2007, an estimated 378,800 Burundian refugees
were repatriated from around the region.
The role of the Burundian diaspora has long been to express what was impossible to say
inside the country for fear of political retribution by the regime in place. However, as the
political space in Burundi has expanded with the recent political reforms, the role of the
diaspora has diminished or at least changed. Burundians in exile no longer need to play the
Nevertheless, the political leadership at home (many of them former members of the diaspora)
continues to take seriously the perceived power of the more radical exiled community and main-
tains regular contact with the diaspora in Europe – holding meetings and dialogue with them
(Turner 2008).
It is doubtful whether such a non-ethnic, Muslim business community actually exists. But
the idea that it does is prevalent, and it could be a potential space of respite from the ethni-
cized and politicized space of the Burundian diaspora in Belgium. (Turner 2008b)
The third arena – ‘recontres’ – are a distinct space for political discussion among a small group of
exiles where ‘tout le monde se connait.’ These ‘recontres’ provide a space to meet and debate the
trustworthiness of the political transition process in Burundi. Turner observes that ‘during the
breaks, they drink beer and chat before going back to arguing’ (Turner 2008b).
The tendency of Burundians in exile to maintain conflict-enforcing views has been acknowl-
edged by US-based INGO Search for Common Ground. To counter this, the organisation recently
extended to the diaspora, its conflict resolution radio programme Studio Ijambo, which claims to
have reduced tensions between Hutu and Tutsi and created dialogue in Burundi (Search for Com-
mon Ground 2002).
14. In infocon’s interviews in the uk, all the respondents interviewed, as well as this researcher, assert that what occurred
in Rwanda between April and July 1994 was a genocide, in which (estimates vary between different respondents) between
500,000 to one million Rwandan Tutsi were killed. Hutu respondents were keen to also highlight the death of Hutu, both
during the genocide and at the hands of the RPF.
15. Conducted predominantly with CSO leaders and opinion leaders, but also a few ‘ordinary’ Rwandans as well as embassy staff.
This research thus highlights some of the multiple viewpoints and understandings that exist in
the Rwandan TC and does not claim to represent them all comprehensively. As before, we cannot
be sure of how representative the leaders of CSOs are of Rwandan opinion in the diaspora. Some
preferred not to be interviewed. In some cases ‘hidden discourses’ (Eltringham 2003) may not have
been openly expressed. Nevertheless, this research, like Eltringham’s, highlights the diverse public
discourses We also note that the remit was to explore Hutu and Tutsi views and if there is a Twa
voice in the diaspora, this has not been captured.
16. An outline of the emergence of Republican Rally for Democracy in Eastern Congo’s refugee camps is given in (Ndahiro, 2008).
17. Due to a long history of policies in the Netherlands targeted at preventing one city from becoming too powerful (OECD
2007) metropolitan functions (that are in other countries focused in one capital city) are spread over a polycentric urban
areas that includes the country’s four largest cities: Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam and the Hague. Together they behave as
one metropole. This area is called the ‘Randstad’ (Van Nimwegen and Esveldt 2006). The ‘Randstad’ was chosen as the urban
case study in Holland in order to be comparable with the metropoles in infocon’s other case study cities. (van Houte in
infocon 2009)
18. There are two predominant views on ethnicity in Rwanda. The first, that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were artificially created con-
structs by colonial powers bent on dividing and conquering the Rwandan people; and the second, that the different groups
are ethnically different, stemming from different geographic origins.
19. Interview in the uk 1 April 2010
3.2.6. Conflict Resolution and Peace‑Building Initiatives: Perceptions from the TC in the uk
A member of one of the (mainly) Tutsi community groups in the TC highlighted that the current
Rwandan government is made up mainly of returning members of the Rwandan diaspora from
Uganda and, as a result, recognizes the potential of the diaspora to contribute to rebuilding the
country. The respondent stated that the diaspora is often referred to one of Rwanda’s provinces.22
The Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation’s Diaspora General Directorate23 web-
site states that
The government of Rwanda has realized the evolving important role of Rwandan Diaspora
in the national development of the country. This importance is envisaged in the diverse sec-
tors of Rwanda such as; Education, Health, Private Sector Development, Trade and Invest-
ment, Knowledge transfers, Image building, Culture development, Unit (sic) and Reconcili-
ation, Community development, Remittances, etc.
The Rwandan diaspora’s contribution to remittances and investment is seen as critical to Rwanda’s
economic development. Little has been written about the Rwandan diaspora’s potential to con-
tribute to post-conflict reconstruction (Davies 2008). Nevertheless, despite the Government of
Rwana’s explicit emphasis on unity and reconciliation as an area of diaspora contribution, the ac-
tual involvement of the TC in appears, at least to date, to be limited. Rwanda’s National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission’s website makes no specific mention of diaspora. Interviews with Tutsi
The international community needs to understand that Rwandan’s aren’t deaf… we hear the
criticisms. Rwandans know what is good for them [human rights and good governance] but
these things won’t happen just because the international community [wills it]. The Rwan-
dan government is willing to act on these issues – but it takes time.
The respondent highlighted that Rwanda’s own democratic systems were destroyed under coloni-
alism. Others also take the view Rwanda’s space for political debate is limited. Some consciously
choose not to engage in political activities – although they attended social and cultural events and
support church-sponsored activities to help other Rwandans living in need in the TC.
3.2.7.2. Dialogue
arriving at a common interpretation doesn’t mean that the parties involved in the dialogue
always have to agree with each other; rather, they need to have the same interpretation
of the matter they disagree on… Dialogue differs from reconciliation because the latter
implies re-establishing harmony among the people who have previously been divided by
conflict, harmony that has been regained by asking for and granting forgiveness.31
Participants included Hutu and Tutsi individuals from political parties and Rwandan civil or-
ganisations from the diaspora in Belgium, Canada, France, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, and the
United States of America. It was emphasised that the dialogue was an ‘Intra-Rwandan’, not an
Inter-Rwandan Dialogue as not all elements of Rwandan society were represented. Participants
were invited as private individuals and included both Hutu and Tutsi from different regions and
organisations. The participants agreed to: (1) analyse the root causes of ‘the Rwandan plight’, (2)
analyse the present situation; and (3) suggest ways and means to solve the plight as it had been
defined by the participants. Although agreement was not reached on all the issues discussed, the
discussion ‘unfolded in a calm and peaceful atmosphere. Discussions were held in an open and
frank way, and no issue was regarded as taboo’ (ibid) and the initiative was heralded as the start of
genuine dialogue between the diverse participants.
After a second meeting in Barcelona in 2006, one of the recommendations drawn up by the par-
ticipants was to expand this dialogue to ‘all sections of the Rwandan population’ (Intra-Rwandan
Dialogue 2010) in order to make it an Inter-Rwandan Dialogue. Subsequent dialogues were in
2007 in North America (attended by Rwandans living in USA and Canada) and Europe (attended
by Rwandans living inBelgium, Holland, Germany, France and Italy). Participants in Intra / Inter-
Rwandan Dialogue also agreed that the conflict in eastern DRC undermines peaceful coexistence
and socio-economic exchange between Rwandan and Congolese people, and that Rwanda plays a
31. Ibid
After exploring all problems that led Rwanda into cyclical conflicts in the past five decades
and looking at the current situation in Rwanda where many signs and conditions that led
to previous conflicts including genocide still prevail, the DIR group has committed itself
to call upon Rwandans and friends of Rwanda to do everything necessary to diffuse and
prevent any new conflict through a Highly Inclusive Inter-Rwandan Dialogue (HIIRD) in
which would participate the different representatives of all Rwandans including the Civil
Society and all Political Parties from inside and outside Rwanda. This is the only adequate
framework for establishing a fresh environment of trust between the ethnic groups along
with any other division, essential to Truth and effective reconciliation, peace and sustain-
able development in Rwanda and subsequently in the Great Lakes region of Africa.
In December 2009, the United Nations published a report on the situation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo by their Congo Experts Group, which was mandated ‘to monitor implementa-
tion of the arms embargo imposed on non-governmental armed groups operating in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo and, in particular, to investigate the financial and material
support such groups enjoy.’32 The report highlighted ‘diaspora support for local FDLR command-
ers, documenting the overall supreme leadership of the group’s military commanders in Europe,
North America and some parts of Africa and its monetary support to them.’ The report also al-
leged links between some the Inter-Rwandan Dialogue participants and members of the FDLR.
The Inter-Rwandan Dialogue has vehemently denied any links with the FDLR and filed a formal
written complaint to the UN citing such allegations as false.33
Rwandans who are not involved in this initiative responded differently to questions about it.
One Tutsi survivor seemed reluctant to discuss it, while a Tutsi member of the TC expressed scep-
ticism about the initiative suggesting it was being driven by the FDLR.
The Rwandans outsourced what they are fighting for so it loses meaning. I never under-
stood what the aims of Inter-Rwandan Dialogue were – nobody ever sat down and explained
them to me… Why is it being pushed by people with questionable aims?… Inter-Rwandan
Dialogue was perhaps hijacked by these people, which killed it before it was properly under-
stood. Now it’s being used as a stick to beat the current government. Who knows, it might
otherwise have been a good idea.34
Participation in Inter-Rwandan Dialogue has grown significantly since its first meeting in 2004,
with the group of participants expanding to more than 120 Rwandans from different backgrounds
and experiences.35 The dialogue has been endorsed by H.E. Abdoulaye Wade (the President of
Senegal) and 1980 Nobel peace prize winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel. In 2007 a group of Spanish
32. UN Press conference on Final Report of Democratic Republic of Congo Experts Group http://www.un.org/News/briefings/
docs/2009/091207_Mahtani.doc.htm
33. Meeting with representatives of the Inter-Rwandan Dialogue in Brussels 16 April 2010
34. Interview in Brussels 19 April 2010
35. Rwanda Dialogue website: http://www.rwandadialogue.org/
The Rwandan government and the RPF have strongly resisted any political opposition or
broader challenge of their policies by civil society. On several occasions, the government
has used accusations of participation in the genocide, or ‘genocide ideology,’ as a way of
targeting and discrediting its critics. The current RPF-dominated government has been in
power in Rwanda since the end of the 1994 genocide. (Human Rights Watch 2010)
A Tutsi respondent noted that while Rwandans living in the uk tend to identify with the RPF, there
are ‘silent people’ in Rwanda who are unhappy with the current system but have to ‘go along with
it’ because there are no viable alternatives. ‘It is about survival.’
36. The Socialist Party, Popular Party, Catalonian Party, ERC Party, Basque Party, Izquierda Verde, Canary Coalition and Mixed
Party
37. Joint Senate Resolution, Montpelier, Vermont http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2010/resolutn/JRS056.pdf
38. Pax Christi International website http://www.paxchristi.net/international/eng/about_cont.php?wat=basic
Victoire Ingabire, president of the FDU-Inkingi, has faced an intensive campaign of public
vilification since she returned from exile in the Netherlands in January 2010. She has been
widely condemned in official and quasi-official media and described as a ‘negationist’ of the
genocide for stating publicly that crimes committed against Hutu citizens by the RPF and
the Rwandan army should be investigated and those responsible brought to justice. (Hu-
man Rights Watch 2010)
As a diaspora-initiated party UDF Inkingi appears to have support amongst the TCs, although it
is not possible to quantify this. One Hutu respondent stated that there is no official membership,
and that the party relies on ‘supporters’ rather than ‘members’. Due to fear of reprisals, some mem-
bers of the TC are reluctant to openly show their support – but they contribute financially and by
sending messages of support via email. The Internet has been an important tool for mobilizing
political support and communicating UDF Inkingi’s message – amongst members of the Rwandan
TC residing in different countries as well as in Rwanda. Supporters seem to be mainly, but not
only, Hutus in the diaspora. There are also critics of UDF Inkingi in the TC. One Tutsi respondent
suggested that Mrs. Ingabire is an ‘opportunist’ who does not understand the situation in Rwanda,
that she is ‘using the ethnic card.’ This respondent reflected that due to the still fragile political
situation in Rwanda the government will not permit talk of ethnicity which is deemed potentially
destabilising.
T
he conflict between Turks and Kurds in Turkey has a long history, spanning the past
50 years. It intensified in the 1980s after the military coup in Turkey. According to Mesut
Yegen (2007) this was because
[t]he left-wing opposition in Turkey, including that of the Kurds, was soon annihilated. An
armed opposition led by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) resumed in the mid‒1980s and
lasted for fifteen years, with some thirty thousand causalities. (Yegen 2007:135)
A second factor that intensified the conflict was Turkey’s new role in the international division of
labour as the traditional import substitution-based economy was replaced by an export-substitu-
tion economy. This meant that the huge social and economic transformation in Turkey accelerated
social differentiation and increased social inequality between Turks and Kurds. In 1984, the war
between the Turkish state and PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) began in earnest (Icduygu, Romano
and Sirkeci: 1999), and alienation between Kurds and the state increased during the 1990s (Yegen,
2007).
During this period, Kurds migrated en masse to Turkish cities which had opportunities in the
tourism, industry and finance sector, such as Istanbul, Bursa, Mersin, Adana, Antalya (Saracoglu,
2009). Many Kurds also migrated abroad, especially to Germany, the United Kingdom, the Neth-
erlands and Austria. The main reasons for their migration were discrimination, social inequalities,
economic conditions and the forced assimilation policies of the Turkish state.
Living in Turkey became more difficult for many Kurds during the 1980s and 1990s. The use of
the Kurdish language was banned by the Turkish state in different spheres of social life after the
military coup until 1991, based on the claim that the use of ethnic languages could harm national
unity (Saracoglu, 2009:648). As a result, Kurds whose mother language was Kurdish felt alienated
from the state. Unable even to give Kurdish names to their children, they felt discriminated against.
In addition to the assimilation policies of the Turkish state, Kurds cite economic inequality
and anti-Kurdish sentiments in the popular media as reasons for leaving (Saracoglu 2009). While
some Kurds continued to live as they had before, suppressing their ethnic identity and choosing to
accept a Turkish national identity, others rejected Turkish identity, strengthened their own ethnic
identity, and constructed social networks that connected Kurds abroad and in Turkey.
There is tension between Turks and Kurds living in London. Whatever conflict happens in
Turkey, it has reflected to London and Europe. Turks and Kurds in London do not get along.
When I say Turks, I mean nationalist Turks. I have many Turkish friends who are not na-
tionalist. The nationalist Turks use violence against Kurds in London. Kurdish people also
attack Turks. (Interview in February 2009 at Halkevi).
In 2008 Turks in London organised a protest against Kurds in London as reflection of the conflict
in Turkey. A representative of Komkar (Kurdish Advice center) also stated that ‘whatever hap-
pens in Turkey is reflected on Turkish and Kurdish migrants in London and this creates tension
between these two communities.’ (Interview in January 2009). A representative of Daymer also
stated that:
When I first came to this country in 90s, Kurds and Turks socialised and worked with each
other. They used to have same organisations. But now nationalism and racism is increased
within the communities and Turkish people take a stand with nationalist Turks. There is
tension between Turks and Kurds. It is an evidence of separation between Turks and Kurds
in London (Interview in March 2009 in Daymer).
It is important to emphasise that the Turkish community in London is not homogenous and com-
prises both nationalist and leftist Turks. While some leftist Turks are members of Kurdish or-
ganisations, other Turks attend nationalist organisations. Organisations such as Halkevi, Daymer,
Komkar and Gikder include both Kurdish and Turkish members, but their Turkish members are
mainly political migrants. Many of them migrated after the military coup in Turkey in 1980.
There are also nationalist Turkish organisations in London. Turkish community representatives
and individuals also refer to the tension between Turks and Kurds. The representative of Federa-
tion of Turkish organisations stated that they can experience the tension in everyday life. She said:
It is reflected and we feel it very strong here. When I go to Turkey, people are not inside the
situation and it does not affect their lives. In London, when we go to a restaurant or in par-
liament we meet people related to PKK. People in Halkevi started Kurdish nationalism and
get close to PKK and at this stage we stay away from them. (Interview in March 2009)
Both Turkish and Kurdish migrants mention awareness of the tension in everyday life, but differ-
ent respondents try to solve the problem in their own way, reflecting to their particular political
standpoints. The representation of Gikder (Refugee Workers Association) stated:
What we actually do from time to time and when these provocations take place by the Turk-
ish state, we try to raise awareness and when there are massacres in Turkey by the Turkish
state to Kurdish people or any other part of the communities that live in Turkey, no matter
whether they are Turkish, Kurdish, Azeri, Gurci, Laz, Cerkez or whatever, we tend to take
streets and protest against it. (Interview in January 2009 in Gikder)
As a Turkish journalist, I would not call it as a war and peace, but a Kurdish journalist would
call it as a war. Turkish people in London think that there is no way to sit down and discuss
the situation with Kurdish people. I also do not think we could negotiate with Kurds. (In-
terview, January 2009)
Representatives and elites of both Turkish and Kurdish communities share a sense of inability to
discuss the situation together. While they do not want to come together and negotiate, at the same
time many nevertheless express an aspiration to solve the tension and problems between them.
We wanted to do something in Europe to stop the war and bring peace. We had to have
same kind of organisation in Europe, not just in Turkey. If there is a war in Turkey, the
conflict, tension is also reflected to Europe. There are organisations and individuals based
in London as a representative of Turkish state. They have some activities and stay close to
the state. There are also diverse organisations as well. There are conflicts and separation
between these organisations and whatever happens in Turkey between Turks and Kurds
have been reflected to Europe. The state has supported this separation between Turks and
Kurds and thought that it is unnecessary to speak with Kurdish organisations and leftist
organisations. There are many things to be done regarding to peace building, but this is
very difficult to solve. Two sides should be in this association. This is difficult at the moment
(Interview in March 2009).
While both sides want to peace but theory, they have not been active in pursuing it in practice. The
very few peace building activities that exist aim to create dialogues between Turkish and Kurd-
O
ur survey and interviews of civil society organizations from transnational communi-
ties from Kosovo, Turkey and the Great Lakes reveal very different patterns of engagement
with homeland conflicts. Each diaspora is made up of different waves of migrants, and
migrants often come from different backgrounds in their home society. We should not expect
diasporas to be cohesive actors, and our findings confirmed this picture. There is rarely a single
diaspora view. It is misleading to see diasporas as collective political actors, either fuelling conflict
or making peace.
Precisely because they are open and leaderless structures, transnational communities offer an
important space for participants to engage with contemporary conflicts. It is possible to for initia-
tives to develop in transnational communities that might not be possible in the home environment.
In principle the situation of diasporas allows for new ways to frame situations and new forms of
collective action.
The evidence of the survey suggests that views of transnational communities themselves are
mixed about the scope for influence in the home country. In the case of Turkey, we found little
optimism about the prospects – this reflects the Kurdish community’s frustration with making
progress and the Turkish government’s unwillingness to recognize Kurds as a minority. Similarly
there was little evidence of involvement in conflict mitigation activities. There was, however, a
considerable engagement on the Kurdish side in advocacy, lobbying, and efforts to influence the
situation indirectly through the EU or the European Parliament, and counter-demonstrations by
members of the Turkish diaspora. Lobbying and advocacy sometimes takes peaceful, constructive
forms, but there is also evidence that the rival claims of the communities contribute to polariza-
tion and tensions and some evidence that the conflicts were taking new forms in the European
cities (‘autonomisation’). The political space for moderate activity, pursuit of reforms and minority
rights will depends to an extent on the course of relations between the Europe and Turkey, and
there is evidence of Turkish and Kurdish migrants working together, though generally in organiza-
tions which have a radical political agenda.
In the case of Kosovo, the general perception was that the Kosovo Albanian diaspora had played
a crucial historical role in the struggle for independence, but the communities in European cities
regard their scope for influence now as limited. We found little evidence of participation in con-
flict mitigation or peace-building activities from Europe. A survey carried out by Kosovo Young
Lawyers showed that while there is a good deal of cross-community reconciliation and peace-
building underway in Kosovo, the European diaspora communities play little role in it; if anything,
initiatives in Kosovo reach out to the diaspora. There was a great deal of involvement in advocacy,
lobbying, and efforts to influence international actors. Again, this can be seen as a peaceful and
constructive form of activity, although lobbying and counter-lobbying generates some tensions,
though no direct conflict, between the rather polarized Albanian and Serb communities. There
was little evidence of involvement or influence on the part of the very much smaller Kosovo Serb
communities in European cities.
Perhaps surprisingly, the conflicts in the Great Lakes, which are recent and still on-going in
the DRC, showed most evidence of diaspora involvement in peace-building and reconciliation.
Although most respondents in European cities saw the influence of their community in the home-
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