SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 182358. February 20, 2013.]

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and

MA. MARGARITA M. GALON, petitioners, vs. PHIL
PHARMAWEALTH, INC., respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J : p

The state may not be sued without its consent. Likewise, public ocials may not
be sued for acts done in the performance of their ocial functions or within the
scope of their authority.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the October 25, 2007 Decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85670, and its March 31, 2008
Resolution 3 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 4
Factual Antecedents
On December 22, 1998, Administrative Order (AO) No. 27 series of 1998 5 was
issued by then Department of Health (DOH) Secretary Alfredo G. Romualdez
(Romualdez). AO 27 set the guidelines and procedure for accreditation of
government suppliers of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the
public, such accreditation to be valid for three years but subject to annual review.
On January 25, 2000, Secretary Romualdez issued AO 10 series of 2000 6 which
amended AO 27. Under Section VII 7 of AO 10, the accreditation period for
government suppliers of pharmaceutical products was reduced to two years.
Moreover, such accreditation may be recalled, suspended or revoked after due
deliberation and proper notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its
Chairman.
Section VII of AO 10 was later amended by AO 66 series of 2000, 8 which
provided that the two-year accreditation period may be recalled, suspended or
revoked only after due deliberation, hearing and notice by the DOH Accreditation
Committee, through its Chairman. HDTSIE

On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C 9 which provided
for a list and category of sanctions to be imposed on accredited government
suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of adverse ndings regarding their
products (e.g., substandard, fake, or misbranded) or violations committed by
them during their accreditation.
In line with Memorandum No. 171-C, the DOH, through former Undersecretary
Ma. Margarita M. Galon (Galon), issued Memorandum No. 209 series of 2000, 10
inviting representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including herein
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 respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting on October 27, 2000.
During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of a document
entitled "Report on Violative Products" 11 issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs
12 (BFAD), which detailed violations or adverse ndings relative to these
accredited drug companies' products. Specically, the BFAD found that PPI's
products which were being sold to the public were unt for human consumption.
During the October 27, 2000 meeting, the 24 drug companies were directed to
submit within 10 days, or until November 6, 2000, their respective explanations
on the adverse ndings covering their respective products contained in the
Report on Violative Products.
Instead of submitting its written explanation within the 10-day period as
required, PPI belatedly sent a letter 13 dated November 13, 2000 addressed to
Undersecretary Galon, informing her that PPI has referred the Report on Violative
Products to its lawyers with instructions to prepare the corresponding reply.
However, PPI did not indicate when its reply would be submitted; nor did it seek
an extension of the 10-day period, which had previously expired on November 6,
2000, much less oer any explanation for its failure to timely submit its reply.
PPI's November 13, 2000 letter states: HcSCED

Madam,

This refers to your directive on 27 October 2000, on the occasion of the

meeting with selected accredited suppliers, during which you made
known to the attendees of your requirement for them to submit their
individual comments on the Report on Violative Products (the "Report")
compiled by your oce and disseminated on that date.

In this connection, we inform you that we have already instructed our

lawyers to prepare on our behalf the appropriate reply to the Report
furnished to us. Our lawyers in time shall revert to you and furnish you
the said reply.

Please be guided accordingly.

Very truly yours,

(signed)
ATTY. ALAN A.B. ALAMBRA
Vice-President for Legal and Administrative
Aairs 14

In a letter-reply 15 dated November 23, 2000 Undersecretary Galon found

"untenable" PPI's November 13, 2000 letter and therein informed PPI that,
eective immediately, its accreditation has been suspended for two years
pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C.
In another December 14, 2000 letter 16 addressed to Undersecretary Galon, PPI
through counsel questioned the suspension of its accreditation, saying that the
same was made pursuant to Section VII of AO 10 which it claimed was patently
illegal and null and void because it arrogated unto the DOH Accreditation
Committee powers and functions which were granted to the BFAD under
Republic Act (RA) No. 3720 17 and Executive Order (EO) No. 175. 18 PPI added
that its accreditation was suspended without the benet of notice and hearing, in
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 violation of its right to substantive and administrative due process. It thus
demanded that the DOH desist from implementing the suspension of its
accreditation, under pain of legal redress.
On December 28, 2000, PPI led before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a
Complaint 19 seeking to declare null and void certain DOH administrative
issuances, with prayer for damages and injunction against the DOH, former
Secretary Romualdez and DOH Undersecretary Galon. Docketed as Civil Case No.
68200, the case was raed to Branch 160. On February 8, 2002, PPI led an
Amended and Supplemental Complaint, 20 this time impleading DOH Secretary
Manuel Dayrit (Dayrit). PPI claimed that AO 10, Memorandum No. 171-C,
Undersecretary Galon's suspension order contained in her November 23, 2000
letter, and AO 14 series of 2001 21 are null and void for being in contravention of
Section 26 (d) of RA 3720 as amended by EO 175, which states as follows: CcTIDH

SEC. 26.. . .

(d)When it appears to the Director [of the BFAD] that the report of the
Bureau that any article of food or any drug, device, or cosmetic secured
pursuant to Section twenty-eight of this Act is adulterated, misbranded,
or not registered, he shall cause notice thereof to be given to the person
or persons concerned and such person or persons shall be given an
opportunity to be heard before the Bureau and to submit evidence
impeaching the correctness of the nding or charge in question.

For what it claims was an undue suspension of its accreditation, PPI prayed that
AO 10, Memorandum No. 171-C, Undersecretary Galon's suspension order
contained in her November 23, 2000 letter, and AO 14 be declared null and void,
and that it be awarded moral damages of P5 million, exemplary damages of P1
million, attorney's fees of P1 million, and costs of suit. PPI likewise prayed for the
issuance of temporary and permanent injunctive relief. cIHDaE

In their Amended Answer, 22 the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez, then

Secretary Dayrit, and Undersecretary Galon sought the dismissal of the
Complaint, stressing that PPI's accreditation was suspended because most of the
drugs it was importing and distributing/selling to the public were found by the
BFAD to be substandard for human consumption. They added that the DOH is
primarily responsible for the formulation, planning, implementation, and
coordination of policies and programs in the eld of health; it is vested with the
comprehensive power to make essential health services and goods available to
the people, including accreditation of drug suppliers and regulation of
importation and distribution of basic medicines for the public.
Petitioners added that, contrary to PPI's claim, it was given the opportunity to
present its side within the 10-day period or until November 6, 2000, but it failed
to submit the required comment/reply. Instead, it belatedly submitted a
November 13, 2000 letter which did not even constitute a reply, as it merely
informed petitioners that the matter had been referred by PPI to its lawyer.
Petitioners argued that due process was aorded PPI, but because it did not
timely avail of the opportunity to explain its side, the DOH had to act
immediately by suspending PPI's accreditation to stop the distribution and
sale of substandard drug products which posed a serious health risk to the public.
By exercising DOH's mandate to promote health, it cannot be said that
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 petitioners committed grave abuse of discretion.
In a January 8, 2001 Order, 23 the trial court partially granted PPI's prayer for a
temporary restraining order, but only covering PPI's products which were not
included in the list of violative products or drugs as found by the BFAD.
In a Manifestation and Motion 24 dated July 8, 2003, petitioners moved for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 68200, claiming that the case was one against the
State; that the Complaint was improperly veried; and lack of authority of the
corporate ocer to commence the suit, as the requisite resolution of PPI's board
of directors granting to the commencing ocer PPI's Vice President for Legal
and Administrative Aairs, Alan Alambra, the authority to le Civil Case No.
68200 was lacking. To this, PPI led its Comment/Opposition. 25
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In a June 14, 2004 Order, 26 the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 68200,
declaring the case to be one instituted against the State, in which case the
principle of state immunity from suit is applicable.
PPI moved for reconsideration, 27 but the trial court remained steadfast. 28 PPI
appealed to the CA. ISaTCD

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85670, PPI's appeal centered on the issue of whether
it was proper for the trial court to dismiss Civil Case No. 68200.
The CA, in the herein assailed Decision, 29 reversed the trial court ruling and
ordered the remand of the case for the conduct of further proceedings. The CA
concluded that it was premature for the trial court to have dismissed the
Complaint. Examining the Complaint, the CA found that a cause of action was
suciently alleged that due to defendants' (petitioners') acts which were
beyond the scope of their authority, PPI's accreditation as a government supplier
of pharmaceutical products was suspended without the required notice and
hearing as required by Section 26 (d) of RA 3720 as amended by EO 175.
Moreover, the CA held that by ling a motion to dismiss, petitioners were
deemed to have hypothetically admitted the allegations in the Complaint
which state that petitioners were being sued in their individual and personal
capacities thus negating their claim that Civil Case No. 68200 is an
unauthorized suit against the State.
The CA further held that instead of dismissing the case, the trial court should
have deferred the hearing and resolution of the motion to dismiss and proceeded
to trial. It added that it was apparent from the Complaint that petitioners were
being sued in their private and personal capacities for acts done beyond the scope
of their ocial functions. Thus, the issue of whether the suit is against the State
could best be threshed out during trial on the merits, rather than in proceedings
covering a motion to dismiss.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Order dated June 14,
2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, is hereby
REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. ACCORDINGLY, this case is REMANDED to
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 the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED. 30

Petitioners sought, but failed, to obtain a reconsideration of the Decision. Hence,

they led the present Petition.
Issue
Petitioners now raise the following lone issue for the Court's resolution:
Should Civil Case No. 68200 be dismissed for being a suit against the
State? 31

Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners submit that because PPI's Complaint prays for the award of damages
against the DOH, Civil Case No. 68200 should be considered a suit against the
State, for it would require the appropriation of the needed amount to satisfy
PPI's claim, should it win the case. Since the State did not give its consent to be
sued, Civil Case No. 68200 must be dismissed. They add that in issuing and
implementing the questioned issuances, individual petitioners acted ocially and
within their authority, for which reason they should not be held to account
individually. CAIaHS

Respondent's Arguments
Apart from echoing the pronouncement of the CA, respondent insists that Civil
Case No. 68200 is a suit against the petitioners in their personal capacity for acts
committed outside the scope of their authority.
Our Ruling
The Petition is granted.
The doctrine of non-suability.
The discussion of this Court in Department of Agriculture v. National Labor
Relations Commission 32 on the doctrine of non-suability is enlightening.
The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that '(t)he State may not
be sued without its consent,' reects nothing less than a recognition of
the sovereign character of the State and an express armation of the
unwritten rule eectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is
based on the very essence of sovereignty. . . . [A] sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but
on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called 'the royal
prerogative of dishonesty' because it grants the state the prerogative to
defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.
We have had occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored,
for the loss of governmental eciency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity
than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such
fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial
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 remedy is not to be accordingly restricted.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the
state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as
correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, 'the state may not be sued
without its consent;' its clear import then is that the State may at times be
sued. The State's consent may be given either expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. . . .
Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it
enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to
have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, . . . is not, however,
without qualication. Not all contracts entered into by the government
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made
between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function
and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. 33 aTcIEH

As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either

expressly or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit. 34 There is express
consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand,
there is implied consent when the state "enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation." 35 However, it must be claried that when a state enters
into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-
suability. 36 The State "will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability
[only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
[However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,]
. . . no such waiver may be implied." 37 "Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate
immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in
derogation of sovereignty." 38 DHSCEc

The DOH can validly invoke state immunity.

a) DOH is an unincorporated agency which
performs sovereign or governmental functions.
In this case, the DOH, being an "unincorporated agency of the government" 39
can validly invoke the defense of immunity from suit because it has not
consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued. Signicantly, the DOH is an
unincorporated agency which performs functions of governmental character.
The ruling in Air Transportation Oce v. Ramos 40 is relevant, viz.:
An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical
personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested
with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages
against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an
unincorporated government agency performing governmental function
and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has
been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental
or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter
whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government
but was essentially a business. 41 DSHcTC

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 b) The Complaint seeks to hold the DOH solidarily
and jointly liable with the other defendants for
damages which constitutes a charge or nancial
liability against the state.
Moreover, it is settled that if a Complaint seeks to "impose a charge or nancial
liability against the state," 42 the defense of non-suability may be properly
invoked. In this case, PPI specically prayed, in its Complaint and Amended and
Supplemental Complaint, for the DOH, together with Secretaries Romualdez and
Dayrit as well as Undersecretary Galon, to be held jointly and severally liable for
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. 43
Undoubtedly, in the event that PPI succeeds in its suit, the government or the
state through the DOH would become vulnerable to an imposition or nancial
charge in the form of damages. This would require an appropriation from the
national treasury which is precisely the situation which the doctrine of state
immunity aims to protect the state from.
The mantle of non-suability extends to
complaints led against public ocials for
acts done in the performance of their ocial
functions.
As regards the other petitioners, to wit, Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, and
Undersecretary Galon, it must be stressed that the doctrine of state immunity
extends its protective mantle also to complaints led against state ocials for
acts done in the discharge and performance of their duties. 44 "The suability of a
government ocial depends on whether the ocial concerned was acting within
his ocial or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the
performance of ocial functions will result in a charge or nancial liability
against the government." 45 Otherwise stated, "public ocials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection
with ocial duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing
of bad faith." 46 Moreover, "[t]he rule is that if the judgment against such
ocials will require the state itself to perform an armative act to satisfy the
same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state . . . . In
such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the [C]omplaint on the ground
that it has been led without its consent." 47 AaDSTH

It is beyond doubt that the acts imputed against Secretaries Romualdez and
Dayrit, as well as Undersecretary Galon, were done while in the performance and
discharge of their ocial functions or in their ocial capacities, and not in their
personal or individual capacities. Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit were being
charged with the issuance of the assailed orders. On the other hand,
Undersecretary Galon was being charged with implementing the assailed
issuances. By no stretch of imagination could the same be categorized as ultra
vires simply because the said acts are well within the scope of their authority.
Section 4 of RA 3720 specically provides that the BFAD is an oce under the
Oce of the Health Secretary. Also, the Health Secretary is authorized to issue
rules and regulations as may be necessary to eectively enforce the provisions
of RA 3720. 48 As regards Undersecretary Galon, she is authorized by law to
supervise the oces under the DOH's authority, 49 such as the BFAD. Moreover,
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 there was also no showing of bad faith on their part. The assailed issuances were
not directed only against PPI. The suspension of PPI's accreditation only came
about after it failed to submit its comment as directed by Undersecretary Galon.
It is also beyond dispute that if found wanting, a nancial charge will be imposed
upon them which will require an appropriation from the state of the needed
amount. Thus, based on the foregoing considerations, the Complaint against
them should likewise be dismissed for being a suit against the state which
absolutely did not give its consent to be sued.
Based on the foregoing considerations, and regardless of the merits of PPI's case,
this case deserves a dismissal. Evidently, the very foundation of Civil Case No.
68200 has crumbled at this initial juncture.
PPI was not denied due process.
However, we cannot end without a discussion of PPI's contention that it was
denied due process when its accreditation was suspended "without due notice
and hearing." It is undisputed that during the October 27, 2000 meeting,
Undersecretary Galon directed representatives of pharmaceutical companies, PPI
included, to submit their comment and/or reactions to the Report on Violative
Products furnished them within a period of 10 days. PPI, instead of submitting its
comment or explanation, wrote a letter addressed to Undersecretary Galon
informing her that the matter had already been referred to its lawyer for the
drafting of an appropriate reply. Aside from the fact that the said letter was
belatedly submitted, it also failed to specically mention when such reply would
be forthcoming. Finding the foregoing explanation to be unmeritorious,
Undersecretary Galon ordered the suspension of PPI's accreditation for two years.
Clearly these facts show that PPI was not denied due process. It was given the
opportunity to explain its side. Prior to the suspension of its accreditation, PPI
had the chance to rebut, explain, or comment on the ndings contained in the
Report on Violative Products that several of PPI's products are not t for human
consumption. However, PPI squandered its opportunity to explain. Instead of
complying with the directive of the DOH Undersecretary within the time allotted,
it instead haughtily informed Undersecretary Galon that the matter had been
referred to its lawyers. Worse, it impliedly told Undersecretary Galon to just wait
until its lawyers shall have prepared the appropriate reply. PPI however failed to
mention when it will submit its "appropriate reply" or how long Undersecretary
Galon should wait. In the meantime, PPI's drugs which are included in the Report
on Violative Products are out and being sold in the market. Based on the
foregoing, we nd PPI's contention of denial of due process totally unfair and
absolutely lacking in basis. At this juncture, it would be trite to mention that
"[t]he essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered, the demands of due process are suciently met. What is oensive to
due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that parties who chose not to avail themselves of the
opportunity to answer charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due
process." 50 cEaACD

Incidentally, we nd it interesting that in the earlier case of Department of

Health v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. 51 respondent led a Complaint against DOH
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 anchored on the same issuances which it assails in the present case. In the
earlier case of Department of Health v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc., 52 PPI submitted
to the DOH a request for the inclusion of its products in the list of accredited
drugs as required by AO 27 series of 1998 which was later amended by AO
10 series of 2000. In the instant case, however, PPI interestingly claims that
these issuances are null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No.
68200 is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Peralta * and Perez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

*Per Rae dated February 4, 2013.

1.Rollo, pp. 27-44.

2.Id. at 7-21; penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa and concurred in

by Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Edgardo F.
Sundiam.
3.Id. at 22-23.

4.CA rollo, pp. 156-164.

5.Records, pp. 16-17.
6.Id. at 19-25.
7.Id. at 24.
8.Id. at 26.

9.Id. at 111.
10.Id. at 27.
11.Id. at 28-40.
12.Per Republic Act No. 9711 or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Act of 2009
which was signed by the President on August 18, 2009, the Bureau of Food
and Drugs (BFAD) was renamed and is now called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).

13.Records, p. 41.
14.Id.
15.Id. at 42.
16.Id. at 43-44.

17.FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT. June 22, 1963.

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 18.FURTHER AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3720, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO ENSURE
THE SAFETY AND PURITY OF FOODS, DRUGS, AND COSMETICS BEING MADE
AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC BY CREATING THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION WHICH SHALL ADMINISTER AND ENFORCE THE LAWS
PERTAINING THERETO", AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. May 22,
1987.

19.Records, pp. 2-15.

20.Id. at 400-424.
21.Id. at 454-457. Administrative Order No. 14 was a later issuance by DOH
Secretary Dayrit which was subsequently included in PPI's amended and
supplemental complaint as one of the issuances sought to be nullied. It
provided for new accreditation guidelines and granted the Accreditation
Committee the power to suspend or revoke a supplier's accreditation after
deliberation and notice, and without need of a hearing.
22.Id. at 489-505.
23.Id. at 124.
24.Id. at 500-513.
25.Id. at 532-541.

26.Id. at 555-561; penned by Judge Amelia A. Fabros.

27.Id. at 562-569.
28.See Order dated April 19, 2005, id. at 593.
29.Rollo, pp. 7-21.

30.Id. at 21. Emphases in the original.

31.Id. at 730.
32.G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 693.
33.Id. at 698-699. Citations omitted.
34.United States of America v. Judge Guinto, 261 Phil. 777, 790 (1990).

35.Id. at 792.
36.Id. at 793.
37.Id. at 795.
38.Equitable Insurance and Casualty Co., Inc. v. Smith, Bell & Co. (Phils.), Inc. , 127
Phil. 547, 549 (1967).
39.Department of Health v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. , 547 Phil. 148, 154 (2007).
40.G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 36.

41.Id. at 42-43. Citations omitted.

42.Department of Health v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc., supra at 154.

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 43.See Complaint, pp. 12-13 records, pp. 13-14; Amended and Supplemental
Complaint, p. 13, records, p. 422.
44.United States of America v. Judge Guinto, supra note 34 at 791.
45.Department of Health v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc., supra note 39 at 153.
46.M. H. Wylie v. Rarang, G.R. No. 74135, May 28, 1992, 209 SCRA 357, 368. Citation
omitted. See also United States of America v. Reyes, G.R. No. 79253, March 1,
1993, 219 SCRA 192, 209 where the Court held:
. . . [T]he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public ocial is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection aorded the ocers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.
This situation usually arises where the public ocial acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a
public ocial may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage
he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Citations omitted)
47.United States of America v. Judge Guinto, supra note 34 at 791-792. See also
Department of Health v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc., supra note 39 at 155.
48.See Section 26, Republic Act No. 3720.
49.See Section 12, Chapter 3, Title IX, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987.
50.Flores v. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 396, 406-407.
Citations omitted.
51.Supra note 39.

52.Id.

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