Thailand is gonna bring China the goods finalizing a high-speed rail.

The Economist 15 (http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21665016-unelected-

dictatorship-thailands-government-finds-china-more-amenable-america-under, Under the
umbrella , September 19th 2015) NAR
PRAYUTH CHAN-OCHA, Thailands prime minister, sometimes resembles a ham actor ad-libbing his way through an
audition for a role as an unhinged dictator. You cannot oppose me. No one will let you do that! he told reporters this month,
before threatening to deal with critics by taping their mouths shut. His junta then briefly detained a well-known journalist for
publishing articles that could cause confusion (on release, he promptly quit his job). The regime the former army chief
installed in a coup last year is digging in. This month the draft produced by a committee it appointed to write a
new constitution was mysteriously rejected, delaying elections until 2017 at the earliest. Thailands lurch back into autocracy
complicates its relations with its long-standing ally, America, which has repeatedly called for the restoration of democracy.
China, however, has no such qualms. Its relations with Thailand have never been better. Some see
this as an acceleration of a long-term and irreversible trend across Asia. Chinas economic rise and growing military clout help it
gain diplomatic sway at Americas expense. In the words of Benjamin Zawacki, an American writer who is completing a book on
Thailands relations with the two countries, after half a century of being within the US sphere of influence (to varying degrees of
course), Thailand is moving into that of the Chinese. Certainly plenty of evidence can be found of mutual irritation between
America and Thailand, and of the burgeoning of Thailands links with China. But that need not imply that the country has to choose
one big powerful ally over the other. Besides deploring the coup, America imposed some sanctions, cutting aid to the army and
curtailing joint exercises and official visits. This year the State Departments annual Trafficking in Persons (TiP) report kept
Thailand in the category of countries where the problem is deemed to be worst. This was widely seen, despite American denials, as
a political punishment. Thai officials and politicians are sensitive to American slights. The relationship is old and close, reaching its
zenith during the Vietnam war, but also unequal. Thais often feel bullied and patronised. Resentment lingers at the lectures and
harsh economic medicine they had to swallow after the economy imploded in 1997. So too does gratitude for Chinas early offer of
help that year and for its habitual refusal to meddle in Thailands affairs by, for example, criticising coups. China is
Thailands biggest trading partner; of the nearly 25m tourists who visited last year 4.6m came from China, more
than from any other country. Ties would receive a further boost from the high-speed railway China is
planning from its south-western province of Yunnan, through Laos to Bangkok and
eventually Singapore. An even more epochal development would be the digging of a canal across the Thai-Malaysian
peninsula, at the Isthmus of Kra, which at its thinnest point is just 44km (28 miles) wide. This would be of great

strategic benefit to China. It would no longer depend on shipping through the Strait of
Malacca for vital imports a chokepoint that leaves it vulnerable to potential enemies, such as America. Such a canal
has been mooted for more than 300 years, but remains unbuilt because of the prohibitive difficulty and expense. The idea has
resurfaced this year, with reports in the Chinese media in May that an agreement had been signed to
construct it at a cost of $28 billion. Both countries were quick to deny this. But the news in July that Vietnam
intends to build a seaport at an island 17km off its southern tip prompted renewed
speculation that the investment was a bet on the canals being built and hence caused some
consternation in Malaysia and Singapore, whose ports benefit from its absence. That such an old pipe-dream is taken seriously
stems from a perception that Thailand is now in Chinas pocket. The same interpretation was given to Thailands
controversial decision in July to deport back to China 109 Uighursmembers of a largely Muslim, Turkic minority in Chinas western
region of Xinjiang. They had fled alleged Chinese repression, only to be detained in Thailand. Thai police this week blamed the
mysterious bombing at a famous shrine in Bangkok last month, in which 20 people were killed, on Uighurs. One of the two people
detained in connection with the attack, and three of the nine suspects still at large, are reported to be Chinese citizens. Playing
down any link with jihadist terrorism, the police suggested the attack was retaliation for their having broken up a people-smuggling
network. This close relationship with China, however, is neither new, nor a response to the Wests snootiness about military juntas.
Thailand has, since the 1970s, when China stopped supporting communist rebels there, been perhaps Chinas closest partner in
South-East Asia. Unlike some other countries, it has no territorial dispute with China. Nor has it a history of internal conflict
involving the millions of Thais of Chinese descent. The period of mutual hostility after the Chinese revolution, when Thailand
became a staunch American ally, was the exception not the rule.

Economics check
UPI 5 (2-9, Lexis)
The economic dimension of the China-U.S and India-China bilateral relationships militates
against any potential for war between the competitors. The volume of U.S.-China trade, and of U.S.
investments is enormous - and growing more so with each passing year. Simultaneously, the magnitude of Chinese support in
financing U.S. deficits completely rules out any inimical posture on the part of the United States. Likewise, India-China
trade is on an upward trajectory, and poised to grow further. In other words, it is in the economic self-
interest of both these countries to refrain from inimical moves against China.

Mutual interests check

Shihai 2 (Sun, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CASS, China-Indian Relations in the 21st Century, 9-7)
Firstly, The development of the Sino-Indian relations basically decided by their national
interests and their respect strategic preferences. For the foreseeable future, the utmost
national interests and the primary objective of the strategy of both China and India are to
develop their economy and to safeguard a favorable security environment. Both of them
want to maintain peace along their borders, stability and access to resources in Central Asia and a stable
Asian order. It is natural that a healthy and friendly Sino-Indian relations are necessary and
in the interest of both the countries. There is no doubt that development and security concerns of both sides
outweigh their aspirations for influence and power status. In the foreseeable future the possibility of
direct conflict does not exist.

Pakistan wants coop with Iran, not conflict

AP 6/4/15 Pakistan Rules Out Sharing Nukes With Saudis, Anyone Else
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/06/04/us/politics/ap-us-pakistan-nuclear.html?_r=0 (xo)
WASHINGTON Pakistan ruled out sharing its nuclear weapons with Saudi Arabia, insisting
Thursday that the atomic arsenal would continue serving solely for Pakistan's national defense even as world powers and Iran
near a possible nuclear agreement. Closing a wide-ranging trip to Washington, Foreign
Secretary Aizaz Ahmad
Chaudhry angrily rejected speculation that his country could sell or transfer nuclear
arms or advanced technology as "unfounded and baseless." Pakistan has long been among the
world's greatest proliferation threats, having shared weapons technology with Iran, Libya and North Korea. And American and
other intelligence services have been taking seriously the threat of Saudi Arabia or other Arab countries potentially seeking
the Muslim country's help in matching Iran's nuclear capabilities, even if the U.S. says there is no evidence of such action right
now. "Pakistan is not talking to Saudi Arabia on nuclear issues, period," Chaudhry
insisted. The arsenal, believed to be in excess of 100 weapons, is focused only on Pakistan's threat
perception from "the East," Chaudhry said, a clear reference to long-standing rival and
fellow nuclear power India. Chaudhry said his country has significantly cracked
down in recent years on proliferation, improving its export controls and providing U.N.
nuclear monitors with all necessary information. Pakistan also won't allow any weapons to reach terrorists, he
said. Pakistan detonated its first nuclear weapons in 1998, shortly after India did. At the same time, the father of Pakistan's
nuclear program, A.Q. Khan, was shopping advanced technology to many of the world's most distrusted governments. He sold
centrifuges for enriching bomb-making material to the Iranians, Libyans and North Koreans, and also shared designs for fitting
warheads on ballistic missiles. He was forced into retirement in 2001. Concerns now center on how the Sunni Arab
governments of the Middle East will respond if the U.S. and other governments clinch a nuclear deal with Shiite Iran by the end
of the month. Such questions inevitably lead to Pakistan, the only Muslim country in the nuclear club and one with historically
close ties to Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials, for their part, have repeatedly refused to rule out any steps to protect their country,
saying they will not negotiate their faith or their security. Chaudhry was in the American capital for a U.S.-Pakistan strategic
dialogue and meetings with several senior diplomatic and military officials. The State Department said Wednesday the
agenda included "international efforts to enhance nuclear security" as well as nonproliferation and export controls. It
described the discussions as "productive" and said the governments would work together to prevent the spread of weapons of
mass destruction. Speaking to reporters, Chaudhry
praised the progress thus far in the Iran
nuclear talks. He told reporters that a diplomatic success would have significant
economic benefits for Pakistan, allowing it to complete a long-sought gas pipeline
project with its neighbor to the west.
 China/India War Defense

China and India will cooperate theyre on the same side of all major issues
Jing 10 (Huang Jing - Professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, served as interlocutor the Dalai Lama and Chinese
authorities. India, China need each other to change the world, July 23, 2010, http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/jul/23/india-
china-need-each-other-to-change-the-world.htm)
Fundamental changes have taken place since the 1990s, and these changes have made cooperation the only
option for China and India to sustain their ascendancy. First and foremost, unlike previous powers whose rise was

preconditioned by the global reach of their military capability, China and India cannot rise through expansion
backed by military might in today's world. Rather, China and India are rising through integration
into the existing world system amidst globalisation; and, this world system is based on capitalism and is dominated by
developed countries. Thus, reform, not military power, has been the precondition for the rise of China

and India. Only by changing themselves first, in order to join the world, can a rising China and India help change the world. The
pursuit of a similar path in their ascendancy has resulted in common interests and
demands . Rising as status quo powers, India and China have a shared demand to reform the existing
world system, so that it can continuously facilitate, rather than hinder, their development. This explains why on
major global issues -- from environmental concerns to food security and from restructuring
the world financial system to trade policies -- India and China are naturally on the same
side.
Beneath these common interests lies the fact that India and China are facing the same
fundamental challenge in their endeavours for modernisation. Yet the established model to achieve this goal --
modernisation through industrialisation -- is unsustainable because the experience of the
developed countries shows that industrialisation means massive consumption of natural
resources and rampant urbanisation. Given the combined population of 2.5 billion people, western-style industrialisation in
India and China would bring doomsday. Thus, it is a joint mission for India and China to find an alternative
path and, moreover, to persuade the developed countries to support this mission and help pay up the environmental deficit that had been
accumulated in their modernisation process . Bilateral cooperation also serves the interests of India and
China on other more pressing issues . "Water shortage looms for China, India" -- this eye-catching Bloomberg
headline on May 31, 2010 indicates a looming crisis of water in India, China and all the Asian-continental countries, where the flowing water
bilateral cooperation
comes from the same place. As water has become a vital economic resource and an important strategic asset,
between the two big powers in Asia is the key to solve this problem. Confrontation will only make everyone the loser.
Nowadays , India and China also find convergent concern rather than divergent interest on
the Pakistan issue . Lingering instability, rapid expansion of fundamentalist influences, and persistent military dominance since the
the Afghan war have dramatically increased Pakistan's profile in China's security
start of
concerns, especially after the violent, explosive riot in Xinjiang on July 5, 2009. China and India will have to work
together to promote stability and development in Pakistan, with a military under solid civilian control and an
economy integrated regionally. Even on the thorny border issue, bilateral cooperation brings more benefits.
Beijing [ Images ] and New Delhi [ Images ] have keenly realised that the border dispute involves
strong nationalistic resentment because it roots deep in the injustice both nations had endured during the colonial period. Any
compromise on this issue -- even if necessary -- can provoke damaging backlashes in domestic politics. Thus, the bilateral approach

towards the border dispute, as indicated by the dialogue between National Security
Advisor M K Narayanan and State Councilor Dai Bingguo in August 2009, is to seek effective
management, rather than a premature solution. Obviously, it takes constant consultations to manage the dispute and
prevent explosive escalation. Indeed, bilateral cooperation demands a forward-looking vision. The explosive increase in Sino-
 India trade -- from merely $2 billion in 2000 to over $60 billion in 2009 -- is but a footnote of the unfolding
momentum in bilateral relations . It is true that Sino-India trade was less than 3 per cent of China's total trade volume --
bilateral trade -- if its annual increase keeps just half of the 50 per cent annual rate in the past decade --
$2007.2 billion -- in 2009. But
will be over $400 billion in 2020, which is larger than the present trade between China and
America. No doubt that there are conflicts of interest between the two rising powers. But this only highlights the importance and necessity of
bilateral cooperation, not just because common interests far outweigh conflictual ones, but because confrontation
would surely make both losers. It is high time for China and India to make a joint effort to promote bilateral exchanges and, specifically, to
institutionalise bilateral summits and high-level dialogues. An Asian Group of Two -- the institutionalised management of bilateral cooperation --
is necessary to promote and sustain a peaceful and constructive relationship between the two rising Asian powers, whose success is essential for
peace and prosperity in the entire region.

No China/India war
Kemp 10
Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan,
special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the
National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asias Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 223

However, conflict between China and India appears even less likely than war between India and
Pakistan, and economics is the reason. Bilateral trade increased from a paltry $2.3 billion in FY 2001 to
$25.7 billion in FY 2007.22 Furthermore, both nations recognize the need to maintain stability in order to
attract foreign investment. Since 1981, India and China have held thirtyone rounds of peace talks. In
April 2005 alone, India and China agreed on eleven new accords and agreed to a strategic partnership.
In 2006, called the Year of India-China Friendship, that partnership progressed as the two economic
powers agreed to secure oil resources and reopened the Nathu La border; in addition, the Chinese premier visited
India. Furthermore, recent discussions and confidence measures between India, China, and Pakistan
have decreased tensions over Kashmir. Nevertheless, low-level tension remains over the border dispute in Arunachal
Pradesh and the fact that India harbors Tibets government in exile.