CRIMPRO
G.R. No. 45815 May 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTAD LAGON and HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas
City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7362, charging private respondent
Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that the accused had allegedly
issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or
merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover
the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced.
The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of
its evidence. However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court
dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law
for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to impose. The judge
held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the
law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in
force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged
commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested
by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information was
filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been
amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder
increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the information without prejudice to its being
refiled in the proper court.
Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City
Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362 and that it had
erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case. Because the Petition for Review
was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City as counsel
for the People, the Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor
General for comment. Responding to the Court's resolution, the then acting
Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General,
having been previously consulted by the Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City,
agreed with the position taken by the latter that the City Court had jurisdiction
over the criminal case involved, and asked that the petition be given due
course.
After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that
petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed reversible error
in dismissing the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 7362 without
prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, the law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal and city
courts in criminal cases in 1975 and 1976, "[municipal judges in the capitals of
provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction
as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense within their
respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed
prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not
exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ." It appears that at the time of the
commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the penalty imposable for
the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the third sub-paragraph
of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; at that
time therefore, the offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court of
Roxas City.
At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the
penalty imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 had been
increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its
medium period.
It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in
criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the
commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time
of the commission of the offense charged. 1 Thus, in accordance with the above
rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of First
Instance of Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the
imposable penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-
in excess of the minimum penalty which a city court could impose.
The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-
settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying Presidential
Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity
of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have
retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, . . . " We do not believe so.
In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by
the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable
statute given the allegations of a criminal information. In People v. Purisima,2
the Court stressed that:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a
case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the
court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or
even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by
the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or
violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the
punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which
the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.
3 (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)
The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, 4 in the
following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what
may be meted out to the offender after trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or
even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial
(People v. Co Hick 62 Phil. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the law
imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis of the facts as
recited in the complaint or information (People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 347)
constitutive of the offense charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court
in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the evidence
proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information (People v. Mision,
48 O.G. 1330) 5 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable
under the statute is proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at
the trial. In such a case, that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court
(provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule above referred to)
even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an
inferior court.
In People v. Buissan, 6 the Court also said:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a
criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty
that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city
court as the evidence would warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the
Court of First Instance would be acting without jurisdiction if in a simple
seduction case, it would impose penalty of not more than six months of
imprisonment, if said case, for the reason already adverted to, be held to fall
under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal
court. 7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prison mayor in its medium period) is
obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the same offense originally
imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up to
prision correccional in its minimum period).
Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper
Regional Trial Court, that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon
private respondent Libertad Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the
offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the Regional Trial Court
would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the
(refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the
commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally
provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is
otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. In
other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be inapplicable to the
refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing subject-matter
jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of
merit. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding
Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, G.R. No. 149995 Petitioner,
Present: Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated: September 28, 2007
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879
dated September 17, 2001,[1] affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 91-5617
convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with violation of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an
Information which reads as follows:
That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or
draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos to apply on account or for the value the check
described below:
Check No. : 326317PR
Drawn Against : Asian Savings Bank
Paseo de Roxas Branch
In the amount of : P590,000.00
Postdated : February 15, 1988
Payable to : Dr. Alex B. Carlos
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face
amount of such check when presented for payment within (90) days from the
date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor,
the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or make
arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice.[2]
On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioners non-
apprehension despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.[3] On June 27,
1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and set aside[4] after petitioner posted
the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged.[5]
Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987,
petitioner and his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of
P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a postdated
check for the same amount in favor of the complainant.[6] However, when the
check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for
insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to
make good the said dishonored check.[7]
Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an
investment by the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the
subject check was not issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a
loan since his checking account was opened only on December 1, 1987.[8] He
claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor
allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership
with the necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was
issued sometime in February 1988,[9] complainant knew that the same was not
funded.[10]
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23,
1997 a Decision[11] finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty as
charged and sentences him to a prison term of Six (6) months and to indemnify
the private complainant the sum of P590,000.00 plus legal interest from filing of
this case until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the trial courts decision in toto.[12]
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued as
a guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioners investment theory. In
ruling against the existence of a partnership between them, the trial court noted
that the so-called partnership venture, Palanas General Merchandising, was
registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of petitioner.[13] The Court
of Appeals also held that the act of lending money does not necessarily amount
to an investment of capital.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE LOWER
COURT DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE ISSUANCE
OF THE SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A CONSIDERATION OR
FOR VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED WAS ONLY TRICKED BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS OF BINDING THE
ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN THE PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS
THEN SUFFERING FROM BUSINESS REVERSALS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME THE ACCUSED WAS
ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995 R.A. 7691 EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT.[14]
The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22; and 2) whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the
case.
Petitioners argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the Regional
Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without
merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action[15] and not during
the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging petitioner with
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the
governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129[16] which provides:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter
be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter.
xxxx
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or
amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30
days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00,
or both fine and imprisonment[17] at the discretion of the court. In the present
case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial Court properly
acquired jurisdiction over the case.[18] The Metropolitan Trial Court could not
acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for
offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, An Act Expanding
the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and
the Metropolitan Trial Court[19] on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the Regional
Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioners case. Where a court has already
obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute
expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on
actions pending before its enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains
retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication
can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal
cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.[20]
The jurisdiction of the RTC over the case attached upon the commencement of
the action by the filing of the Information and could not be ousted by the
passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the
application of which to criminal cases is prospective in nature.[21]
After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioners conviction
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P.
Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to
apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner
admitted that at the time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such
check. Consequently, when the check was presented for payment, it was
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he
received demand letters to pay the amount of the check from private
complainant but he did not comply with it.[22]
In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld private complainants claim that the
check was issued as a guaranty for the loan and rejected petitioners investment
theory. The issue as to whether the amount of the subject check represents the
amount of the money loaned by private complainant to petitioner or as an
investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question involving the
credibility of witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate court
will not generally disturb the findings of the lower court considering that it is in
a better position to settle that issue since it had the advantage of hearing the
witnesses and observing their conduct during the trial, which circumstances
carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In the present case, we see no
reason to reverse the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals that the amount of the subject check was a loan and not an
investment.[23]
Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration, which may
consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who
makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other side. Since it was established that petitioner received money from private
complainant in various amounts,[24] petitioner cannot now claim that the
checks were not issued for value.[25]
The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential suppliers is
not a valid defense. In Cueme v. People,[26] the Court held thus:
The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be shown
to prospective investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a defense.
The gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum
prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious
and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the
only inquiry is whether the law has been breached. Criminal intent becomes
unnecessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the
defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent are unavailing.
The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be encashed or
deposited in a bank, produce the same effect as ordinary checks. What the law
punishes is the issuance of a rubber check itself and not the purpose for which
the check was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This
is not without good reasons. To determine the purpose as well as the terms and
conditions for which checks are issued will greatly erode the faith the public
reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes,
and bring about havoc in the trading and banking communities. Besides, the law
does not make any distinction as to the kind of checks which are the subject of
its provisions, hence, no such distinction can be made by means of
interpretation or application. What is important is the fact that petitioner
deliberately issued the checks in question and those checks were dishonored
upon presentment for payment.
Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.[27]
The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check is likewise
immaterial. Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the
first delivery of the check.[28] In the case at bar, the Information alleged that
the check was postdated February 15, 1988 although issued in or about
September 1987. During trial, petitioner testified that the Checking Account was
opened only on December 1, 1987 and that the check was issued sometime in
February 1988.
The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof
adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and
prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.[29]
In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the issuance of the subject
check is material since it forms part of the second element of the offense that at
the time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of funds. However,
it cannot be said that petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was
surprised by it. Records show that petitioner knew at the time he issued the
check that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the amount of
the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the same would
only be shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid.
Moreover, there is no merit in petitioners allegation that private complainant
knew that the check is not funded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that the subject check was issued as guaranty for payment of the loan
hence, was intended to apply for account or for value. As such, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly covered when
presented for payment.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of fine may be
imposed in lieu of imprisonment considering that the prosecution failed to prove
or allege that petitioner is not a first-time offender.[30] Hence, in lieu of
imprisonment, a fine of P200,000.00 shall be imposed upon petitioner.[31]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
21879 dated September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO M.
PALANA guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay private complainant the amount of
P590,000.00, representing the value of the check, with six (6%) percent
interest from date of filing of the Information until the finality of the decision,
the amount of which, inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent
(12%) interest, from finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of
imprisonment, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00.
HECTOR TREAS, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. G. R. No. 195002 Promulgated: January 25, 2012
SERENO, J.:
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly
within the limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the
case and render judgment thereon.[1]
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision dated 9 July 2010[2] and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a
house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged
with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant
Hector Treas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee
and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latters
name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name
of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorneys fees,
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding
receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official
Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However,
when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake.
When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that
he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the
return of the money.
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of
Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of
P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.
When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding
repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant
case of Estafa was filed against him.[3]
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The
Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount
of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja,
with the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount
for expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the
said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his
own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorneys fees
and the said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to
the damage and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita
Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel,
entered a plea of Not Guilty. Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the
fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and
trial of the case.
On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] finding petitioner guilty of
the crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused
Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed
in the manner described in the aforementioned information. As a consequence
of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten
(10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four
(4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private
complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the
legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this case was filed until
the amount is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.[6]
We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treas and Trenas
in the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name
Treas, under which he was accused in the Information.
On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[7] which was
denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.[8]
On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.[9]
The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA
rendered a Decision[10] affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated 4 January 2011.[11]
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review on Certiorari[12] before this Court. He asked for a period of
15 days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court granted his
motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before
this Court, with the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A
PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT
OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;[13]
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by
the prosecution does it show that 150,000 was given to and received by
petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by
petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any indication
of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also
on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that
the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his
residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to
the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time
when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in
its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution
witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had
occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to
prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution
evidence.
As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually
belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she
not Elizabeth who was the offended party. Thus, the latters demand does not
satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended party in the offense of
estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been properly made by
Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of
P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by
petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be
that of petitioners.
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latters Comment on the Petition. On 27 July
2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of
60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was granted in a
Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a
Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29
September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.
In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting
petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the
factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery of P150,000 to him,
and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him and
Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed in
Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not
present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the
credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not
the case here.
With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of no valid
demand was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent
to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged in the
Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was adduced as to
the genuineness of petitioners signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the
demand letter.
The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for
executive clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Review of Factual Findings
While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires
a review of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which
they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid
down exceptions to this general rule, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension
of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on
record.[14]
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the
place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the
specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions
and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without
any finding as to where it was committed:
Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private
complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had
committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he
could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to him
for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.
As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had
obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts
purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent
purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with his
duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja
discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents.[15]
In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument
that it had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the
motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were based,
and by relying on conjecture, thus:
That the said amount was given to [Treas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly
established by the prosecution. Accused Treas, on the other hand, never
appeared in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is
suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere
what ifs. x x x
Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still
not warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it
cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private
complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning the money
must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for
paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence.
The records show that he did not even pay the taxes because the BIR receipts
he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his argumentation
in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.[16]
For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction in this wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is
offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the
formal offer of prosecutions evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He
failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received the amount of
P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hectors allegations cannot be given
evidentiary weight.
Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which
would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the
outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a
witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are
entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.[17]
The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of
the lower courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases,
venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v.
People,[18] this Court explained:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that
for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was
committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the
offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.
In Fukuzume v. People,[19] this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa,
wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the
offense took place within the trial courts jurisdiction. The Court ruled:
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to
establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him
with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises
of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x x

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with
and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which
are as follows: x x x
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati.
However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the
prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to
corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated
elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the
prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu
in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991,
P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was
given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications
purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum
scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were
given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu
established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in
Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in
Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires,
the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized
to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu
agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the
initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated
differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and
Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to
sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his
money.
xxx
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that
Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential
ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the
trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for
want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate
charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under
Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the
jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.
That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as
follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount
of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]
Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the
RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does
not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. It provides in
part:
4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY.
HECTOR TREAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY.
HECTOR TREAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex B,
5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the latter
failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA.
He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-related
expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREAS accomplished was only the preparation of
the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is
hereto attached as Annex C,
6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me
a check for refund of the sum given to him less the attorneys fee of P20,000.00
and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of
P120,000.00. x x x
7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-
Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for
the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x[21]
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was
presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements
was committed in Makati City.
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows:
(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the
offended party to the offender.[22]
There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution[23]
that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A
review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of
the place where the offense was allegedly committed:
Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treas to you, what happened
next?
A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to and
she will work for the Deed of Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?
A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q What was the amount quoted to you?
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorneys fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the
capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum
(sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.
Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he issue a receipt?
A Yes, sir.
Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during
the pre-trial as exhibit B. This appears to be a receipt dated December 22,
1999. Will you please go over this document and inform this court what relation
has this to the receipt which you said Atty. Treas issued to you?
A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treas.
Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty.
Treas by you, what happened next?
A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.[24]
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was
dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense
of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the
prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the
offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be
raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal.[25] Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in
a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express
waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in
the manner and form prescribed by law.[26]
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of
proper venue.[27] Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure of 2000 provides that [s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where
the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to
move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the
crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for
his witnesses and other evidence in another place.[28] This principle echoes
more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his
advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in
the charges against him.
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC
of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.[29]
As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional
Responsibility strongly militates against the petitioners conduct in handling the
funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those others kept by him.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular
purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office
expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was
spent.[30] If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or
to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize)
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[31]
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as
they fall due or upon demand.[32] His failure to return the client's money upon
demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own
use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the
client.[33] It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.[34]
In Cuizon v. Macalino,[35] this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which
were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates
a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there
be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds received by him in
trust, the recommendation should include an order to immediately return the
amount of 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the
time of demand until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the
Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is
DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of
Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.

[G.R. No. 119000. July 28, 1997]
ROSA UY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals[1] which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Br. 32,[2] finding the accused ROSA UY guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22 in
Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340, inclusive, and acquitting her of estafa
under Art. 315, par. 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code in Crim. Case No. 84-
32334.
Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned
by the husband of complaining witness Consolacion Leong. During Rosas
employment she was regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking
employee. On 15 March 1982, a few months before she was to give birth, Rosa
resigned. In the meantime, she helped her husband manage their lumber
business. The friendly relations between Rosa and Consolacion continued. The
two later agreed to form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional
capital for the expansion of Rosas lumber business and the latter as industrial
partner. Various sums of money amounting to P500,000.00 were claimed to
have been given by Consolacion for the business; however, because of the trust
they had for each other, no receipt was ever issued.
Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan,
with the funds contributed by Consolacion evidenced by various receipts. But,
unfortunately, the friendship between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when
the partnership documents were never processed. As a result, Consolacion
asked for the return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the
purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
The preceding events prompted Consolacion to file a complaint for estafa and
for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
On 10 December 1984 an Information for estafa[3] and several other
Informations[4] for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner. The
offenses were subsequently consolidated and tried jointly.
Through Consolacion Leong and Alexander D. Bangit the prosecution tried to
establish that petitioner Rosa Uy employed deceit in obtaining the amount of
P500,000.00 from complainant with respect to Crim. Case No. 84-32334. As
regards Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340, Alexander D. Bangit, manager
of the Commercial Bank of Manila, Malabon Branch, where Rosa Uy maintained
an account, testified on the following transactions with respect to the six (6)
checks referred to in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32840 which were
dishonored:
CHECK NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON FOR DISHONOR
(1) 068604 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. G)
(2) 068605 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. H)
(3) 068603 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. F)
(4) 068601 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. E)
(5) 043122 3 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. A)
(6) 068660 24 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund
(DAIF)/Payment Stopped (Exh. I)
For her part, petitioner and her witnesses Fernando Abad and Antonio Sy
maintained that no misrepresentation was committed and that the funds were
utilized to construct the building in Bulacan, Bulacan. With respect to the
issuance of the subject checks, petitioner did not deny their existence but
averred that these were issued to evidence the investment of complainant in the
proposed partnership between them.
After a joint trial, the Manila Regional Trial Court acquitted petitioner of estafa
but convicted her of the charges under B.P. Bldg. 22.[5]
On appeal, respondent appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner now raises the following issues before us in this petition for review on
certiorari: (a) whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations
of the Bouncing Checks Law, and (b) whether the checks had been issued on
account or for value.[6]
As regards the first issue, petitioner contends that the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the offenses under B.P. Blg. 22 and that assuming for the sake
of argument that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal to
respondent appellate court, still she cannot be estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.[7] Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information.[8] And once it is so shown, the court may validly
take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss
the action for want of jurisdiction.[9]
In the case at bar, the complaint for estafa and the various charges under B.P.
Blg. 22 were jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner
challenges the jurisdiction of the lower court stating that none of the essential
elements constitutive of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have been
committed in the City of Manila. She maintains that the evidence presented
established that (a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner was a
resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of the alleged partnership
was located in Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, (e)
the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati. Taken altogether,
petitioner concludes that the said evidence would only show that none of the
essential elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila. Respondent People of the
Philippines through the Solicitor General on the one hand argues that even if
there is no showing of any evidence that the essential ingredients took place or
the offense was committed in Manila, what is critical is the fact that the court
acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case because the same is the principal or
main case and that the cases for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law are
merely incidental to the estafa case.
We disagree with respondent. The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law are two (2) different offenses having different elements and,
necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients
of each crime has to be satisfied.
In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense
and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.[10] For
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit
and damage are neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg.
22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account
or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[11] Hence, it is
incorrect for respondent People to conclude that in as much as the Regional Trial
Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired
jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore
the essential ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied.
In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were
conducted in a restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to
petitioner; hence, the acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the
estafa case. The various charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a
different plain. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the
violation of B.P. Bldg. 22 had been acquired. On the contrary, all that the
evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of Makati; that petitioner is a
resident of Caloocan City; that the principal place of business of the alleged
partnership is located in Malabon; that the drawee bank is likewise located in
Malabon and that all the subject checks were deposited for collection in Makati.
Verily, no proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered,
dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are
essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over
the offense.
Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of the maker or
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing
eventuality whether the accused be within one territory or another, the same is
still without merit. It may be true that B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing
offense and such being the case the theory is that a person indicted with a
transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was
in part committed. We note however that knowledge by the maker or drawer of
the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient
funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. We again find no iota of
proof on the records that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant was in
Manila. As such, there would be no basis in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial
court over the offense.
In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over
the violations of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by
estoppel. Respondent posits that it took some five (5) years of trial before
petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction.
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that
the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds: x x x (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged or over the person of the accused. Moreover, under
Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure of the accused to assert
any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege
the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion
to quash, except the grounds of x x x lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged x x x as provided for in paragraph x x x (b) x x x of Section 3 of this
Rule.[12]
After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that petitioner timely
questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum[13] before the
Regional Trial Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. On this finding
alone, we cannot countenance the inadvertence committed by the court.
Clearly, from the above-quoted law, we can see that even if a party fails to file a
motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on.
Moreover, these objections may be raised or considered motu propio by the
court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.[14]
Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to question the
jurisdiction of the court and hence, on the basis of the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
case[15] in which respondent seeks refuge, the petitioner should be estopped.
We nonetheless find the jurisprudence of the Sibonghanoy case not in point.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez,[16] the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy
case is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court
stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches. The Court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified
the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonhanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the
time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.[17]
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered
the questioned ruling was held to be barred by laches. It was ruled that the lack
of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed
almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a
plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said
case, laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.[18]
The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case.
As a matter of fact, as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect,
she did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. They
questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum before the lower
court. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, we hold that
the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy does not control the present controversy.
Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioner is therefore not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.[19]
WHEREFORE, finding the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, to have no
jurisdiction over Crim. Case Nos. 84-32335 to 8432340, inclusive, the assailed
decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court
dated 24 September 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to
the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner with the court of competent
jurisdiction when warranted.
DAVID B. CAMPANANO, JR., Petitioner, -versus- JOSE ANTONIO A.
DATUIN,
Respondent.[1] G.R. No. 172142 Promulgated: October 17, 2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via the instant Petition for Review is the Court of Appeals Decision[2] of
December 9, 2005 which set aside the August 20, 2004 Resolution[3] of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing the petition for review filed by
respondent Jose Antonio Datuin.
On complaint for Estafa by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its
president-herein petitioner David B. Campanano, Jr.,[4] an Information for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed against respondent.
After trial, respondent was convicted of Estafa by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 71 of Pasig City by Decision of May 3, 1999.[5] Respondents appeal
before the Court of Appeals, and eventually with this Court, was dismissed and
the decision became final and executory[6] on October 24, 2003.
Later claiming that the complaint of Seishin International Corporation against
him was false, unfounded and malicious in light of newly discovered (by
respondent) evidence, respondent filed a complaint for Incriminating Against
Innocent Persons, punishable under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code,
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City against petitioner and a
certain Yasunobu Hirota.[7] The pertinent portions of respondents complaint-
affidavit read:
I, JOSE ANTONIO A. DATUIN, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence and
postal address at No. 1 Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, under
oath, depose and state:
xxxx
2. I was charged by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its
President, Mr. David Campanano, Jr. with the crime of Estafa before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, by virtue of a criminal information filed
against me by said prosecution office with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
xxx
xxxx
5. In a decision dated May 3, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71, rendered a Decision convicting me (accused-complainant) of estafa x
x x;
xxxx
13. Meanwhile, sometime in July 15, 2003, I had my office rented, vacated the
same, and had all of my things, including my attach case, all my records, and
other personal belongings, transferred and brought to my house; that while I
was sorting and classifying all my things, including the records, as well as those
in the attach case, I found the CASH VOUCHER evidencing my cash payment of
the two (2) roadrollers, Sakai brand, which I purchased from Mr. Yasonobu
Hirota, representing Seishin International Corporation, in the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos. The cash voucher was dated June 28,
1993, and it was signed by me and Mr. Hirota. A copy of the said cash voucher
is hereto attached as ANNEX H hereof;
14. In light of this newly discovered evidence, the complaint of Seishin
International Corporation[,] represented by Mr. David Campanano, Jr.[,] and
the testimony of the latter in support of the complaint are false, unfounded and
malicious because they imputed to me a crime of Estafa which in the first place
I did not commit, as evidenced by the fact that the subject two (2) units of
roadrollers, Sakai brand, subject of the criminal complaint before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasig City by the corporation through Mr. Campanano,
and the information filed in court, had been purchased by me in cash from the
said corporation and had already been paid on June 28, 1993.
While I testified also in court, my testimony arose from my having forgotten
that I have already fully paid for the said two units of roadrollers, especially that
I could not find the necessary document consisting of the cash voucher in
support of my defense. I could not say that I have fully paid for the said units of
roadrollers because at that time I was not in possession of any evidence or
document to support my claim.
15. In filing the complaint for Estafa fully knowing that it was baseless and
without factual or legal basis, Messrs. Campanano, Jr. and Mr. Hirota should be
criminally liable for the crime of Incriminating Innocent Persons punishable
under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x[8] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of January 20, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City[9] dismissed respondents complaint for incriminating innocent person in
this wise:
It appearing that the case of estafa was filed in Pasig City, and the testimony
given by respondent David Campaano, Jr. was also made in Pasig City, this
office has no jurisdiction on the above-entitled complainant.
Granting en arguendo that this office has jurisdiction over this case, the
undersigned investigating prosecutor finds no basis to indict the respondents of
the crime imputed to them for it is an established fact that the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City finds merit in the estafa case filed by Seishin International
Corporation, represented by its president, herein respondent David Campaano,
Jr. In fact, the petition for review, including the supplemental motion for
reconsideration filed by the herein complainant to [sic] the Honorable Supreme
Court was denied for lack of merit and with an order of Entry of Final Judgment.
As to the discovery of the alleged new evidence, the cash voucher, dated June
28, 1993[,] it is not this office that should determine the materiality or
immateriality of it.[10] (Underscoring supplied)
By petition for review, respondent elevated the case to the DOJ which dismissed
the petition outright by Resolution[11] of August 20, 2004, holding that [it]
found no such error committed by the prosecutor that would justify the reversal
of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the law and evidence on the
matter. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by DOJ
Resolution[12] of April 11, 2005.
The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the resolutions of the DOJ by Decision
of December 9, 2005, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course, and the assailed Resolutions of
the Department of Justice are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is directed to be
remanded to the City Prosecutors Office of Quezon City for further
investigation.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition, petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in the main:
. . . IN RULING THAT THE COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER DAVID B.
CAMPANANO EXECUTED IN QUEZON CITY ON NOVEMBER 30, 2003 AND NOT
THE AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT JOSE ANTONIO DATUIN
THAT [sic] IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY
PROSECUTORS OFFICE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE
COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT DATUIN AGAINST PETITIONER
INCRIMINATING AGAINST INNOCENT PERSONS.
xxxx
. . . IN RULING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF
RESPONDENT DATUIN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONSTITUTES AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION SINCE THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT APPEARS TO BE
MERITORIOUS.[14] (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element of
jurisdiction;[15] and that the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.[16]
For purposes of determining the place where the criminal action is to be
instituted, Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
of 2000 provides that [s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. This is a
fundamental principle, the purpose of which is not to compel the defendant to
move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the
crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for
his witnesses and other evidence in another place.[17]
The complaint-affidavit for incriminating innocent person filed by respondent
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on August 28, 2003 does
not allege that the crime charged or any of its essential ingredients was
committed in Quezon City. The only reference to Quezon City in the complaint-
affidavit is that it is where respondent resides.[18] Respondents complaint-
affidavit was thus properly dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for
lack of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals conclusion-basis of its reversal of the DOJ Resolutions that
since petitioners November 20, 2003 Counter-Affidavit[19] to respondents
complaint for incriminating innocent person was executed in Quezon City, the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City had acquired jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation of the case is thus erroneous.
In any event, the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not make out a clear
probable cause of incriminating innocent person under Article 363 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes [a]ny person who, by any act
not constituting perjury, shall directly incriminate or impute to an innocent
person the commission of a crime. The crime known as incriminating innocent
person has the following elements: (1) the offender performs an act; (2) by
such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the
commission of a crime; and (3) such act does not constitute perjury.[20]
The pertinent portion of respondents complaint-affidavit reads:
14. In light of this newly discovered evidence, the complaint of Seishin
International Corporation[,] represented by Mr. David Campanano, Jr.[,] and
the testimony of the latter in support of the complaint are false, unfounded and
malicious because they imputed to me a crime of Estafa which in the first place
I did not commit, as evidenced by the fact that the subject two (2) units of
roadrollers, Sakai brand, subject of the criminal complaint before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasig City by the corporation through Mr. Campanano,
and the information filed in court, had been purchased by me in cash from the
said corporation and had already been paid on June 28, 1993. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 363 does not, however, contemplate the idea of malicious prosecution
someone prosecuting or instigating a criminal charge in court.[21] It refers to
the acts of PLANTING evidence and the like, which do not in themselves
constitute false prosecution but tend directly to cause false prosecutions.[22]
Apropos is the following ruling of this Court in Ventura v. Bernabe:[23]
Appellants do not pretend, neither have they alleged in their complaint that
appellee has planted evidence against them. At the most, what appellee is
alleged to have done is that he had filed the criminal complaint above-quoted
against appellant Joaquina Ventura without justifiable cause or motive and had
caused the same to be prosecuted, with him (appellee) testifying falsely as
witness for the prosecution. These acts do not constitute incriminatory
machination, particularly, because Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code
punishing said crime expressly excludes perjury as a means of committing the
same.
Evidently, petitioner may not, under respondents complaint-affidavit, be
charged with the crime of incriminating innocent person under Article 363.
Parenthetically, respondents conviction bars even the filing of a criminal case for
false testimony against petitioner.[24]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of
December 9, 2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of respondent
for Incriminating Innocent Person filed against petitioner DAVID B.
CAMPANANO, JR. is DISMISSED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 192466 Appellee, - versus -
PERALTA,
ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR.,* and MENDOZA, JJ. ALEJO TAROY y TARNATE,
Appellant. Promulgated: September 7, 2011
ABAD, J.:
Apart from the question of credibility of testimonies in a prosecution for rape,
this case resolves the question of proof of the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court.
The Facts and the Case
The public prosecutor charged Alejo Taroy y Tarnate (Taroy) with two counts of
rape in Criminal Cases 02-CR-4671 and 02-CR-4672 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.[1]
DES[2] was the eldest daughter of MILA[3] by her first marriage. MILA married
Taroy in 1997 upon the death of her first husband.[4] The couple lived with
MILAs children in Pucsusan Barangay, Itogon, Benguet, at the boundary of
Baguio City.[5]
DES testified that she was alone in the house on August 10, 1997 doing some
cleaning since her mother was at work and her two siblings were outside
playing. When Taroy entered the house, he locked the door, closed the
windows, removed his clothes, and ordered DES to remove hers. When she
resisted, Taroy poked a knife at her head and forced her to submit to his bestial
desires. Taroy warned her afterwards not to tell anyone about it, lest MILA and
her siblings would suffer some harm. DES was 10 years old then.[6]
DES testified that Taroy sexually abused her again in September 1998. This
time, he entered her room, locked the door, closed the windows, undressed
himself, and ordered her to do the same. When she refused, Taroy pointed a
knife at her. This compelled her to yield to him.
Four years later or on November 1, 2002, when DES was 15, she told her aunt
and MILA about what had happened between Taroy and her. They accompanied
DES to the National Bureau of Investigation to complain.
MILA and a certain Alumno testified that they later accompanied DES to the
hospital for examination. MILA corroborated DES testimony regarding how she
revealed to her and an aunt the details of the rape incidents. The doctor who
examined DES testified that the latter had two narrow notches in her hymen at
three oclock and five oclock positions. She explained that these notches or V-
shaped or sharp indentions over the hymenal edges suggested a history of
previous blunt force or trauma possibly caused by the insertion of an erect male
penis.
For the defense, Taroy denied raping DES on the occasions mentioned. He
averred that the testimony was a fabrication made upon the prodding of her
aunt who disliked him.

The RTC found Taroy guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him to pay DES for each
count: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.[7] The RTC found the testimony of DES
credible and worthy of belief.
Taroy challenged the Benguet RTCs jurisdiction over the crimes charged, he
having testified that their residence when the alleged offenses took place was in
Pucsusan Barangay, Baguio City. The RTC held, however, that Taroys testimony
that their residence was in Baguio City did not strip the court of its jurisdiction
since he waived the jurisdictional requirement.
On January 19, 2010 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
RTC.[8] The CA gave weight to the RTCs assessment of DES credibility and
found no evil motive in her. The CA also held that the prosecution has
sufficiently established the jurisdiction of the RTC through the testimony of
MILA, DES, and Alumno. Taroy seeks his acquittal from this Court.
The Issues Presented
The issues presented to the Court are:
1. Whether or not the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the cases of rape against Taroy; and
2. Whether or not the prosecution has proved his guilt in the two cases beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Courts Rulings
One. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor
subjected to stipulation. The right venue must exist as a matter of law.[9] Thus,
for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be instituted and
tried in the proper court of the municipality, city, or province where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place.[10]
The Informations[11] filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the crimes
were committed in the victim and the offenders house in City Limit, Tuding,
Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet. This allegation conferred territorial
jurisdiction over the subject offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. The
testimonies of MILA and DES as well as the affidavit of arrest[12] point to this
fact. Clearly, Taroys uncorroborated assertion that the subject offenses took
place in Baguio City is not entitled to belief. Besides, he admitted during the
pre-trial in the case that it was the RTC of La Trinidad that had jurisdiction to
hear the case.[13] Taken altogether, that RTCs jurisdiction to hear the case is
beyond dispute.
Two. What is necessary for the prosecution to ensure conviction is not absolute
certainty but only moral certainty that the accused is guilty of the crime
charged.[14] Here, the prosecution has sufficiently proved the guilt of Taroy
beyond reasonable doubt. DES testimony is worthy of belief, she having no ill-
motive to fabricate what she said against her stepfather.
More, contrary to the claims of Taroy, there is nothing in the testimony of DES
that would elicit suspicion as to the veracity of her story. For one thing, the fact
that she did not shout for help or resist the sexual advances of Taroy does not
disprove the fact that he raped her. Women who experience traumatic and
terrifying experiences such as rape do not react in a uniform pattern of hysteria
and breakdown.
Lastly, there is nothing unusual for DES to remain in the family dwelling despite
the incidents that had happened to her. She was just a child. Where else would
she go except stay with her mother who happened to be married to the man
who abused her?
While we do affirm the guilt of Taroy for the crime of rape, we modify the award
of exemplary damages in accordance with People v. Araojo.[15] The prosecution
has sufficiently established the relationship of Taroy to the victim, as well as the
minority of DES necessitating the increase of the award of exemplary damages
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, this Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03510 dated January 19, 2010 with the
MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages be increased from
P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.
G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN PIANO PEDRO
PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO, CAMILO PATAO,
PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO
PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO PIANO, FERMIN PUGAL,
CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and EIGHTY-TWO (82)
JOHN DOES, respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed
by the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the order
of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
(respondent herein), dated 20 July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent
motion to transfer Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First
Instance, entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District; to direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such
transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesaid in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan, capital of the province.
In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons descended on barrio
Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to
various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio
Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were
likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and
in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the
authorities, the provincial fiscal, with several state prosecutors assigned by the
Department of Justice to collaborate with him, on 10 June 1970 filed in the
Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases
47-V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson) charging that the seventeen
private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons,
"confederating, conspiring, confabulating and helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to be burned several
residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied" and belonging to
certain persons named in the filed informations in barrios Ora Este and Ora
Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur (Petition, Annexes B and B-1). Accused Camilo Pilotin
and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared
before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial
was then set for 27, 28 and 29 July 1970.
It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice issued
Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, with official station at San
Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July
1970. Three days thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the Secretary further issued
Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest
of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by
Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of
cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative
Orders just mentioned and calling attention to the circumstance that they were
issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from
Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security
and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The accused vigorously
opposed such transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the respondent judge declined the
transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative Order No. 258 only provided
for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice
required it for the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases
involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed
transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should have been done right
at the very inception of these cases.
In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the
Circuit Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to Us for writs of certiorari and
mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying this Court to set aside the
order of denial of the transfer and to compel the respondent Court of First
Instance to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-
V) at either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact
that the Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but
did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit
Criminal Court, and likewise denied that the circumstances justified any such
transfer.
At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge Gutierrez from
proceeding with the trial of the cases until further orders.
We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the
Secretary of Justice power to determine what court should hear specific cases.
Any such power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of executive
affairs, trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the
Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts of their independence, it
would endanger the rights and immunities of the accused or civil party. It could
be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of
individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with the Administration's
preferences. The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal
Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of First
Instance, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be
filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected
individual cases to the circuit courts. Neither do Administrative Orders Nos. 258
and 274 evidence any such intention; particularly since Administrative Order No.
258, Series of 1968, in Section 2 of its Part V, as confirmed by Administrative
Order No. 274 of the same year, in Section 3 of Part III thereof, provides that
the transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of
First Instance should be effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify any
executive arbitration of what particular cases should be apportioned to either
tribunal. The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226, issued on 18 June
1970 by Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon by the petitioners, in merely
authorizing, and not directing, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V and 47-V (People vs.
Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District,
reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of imperatively
directing transfer of specified cases. Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in
construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory,
acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the
Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.
It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider Department
Administrative Order No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory
respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting
officers that the cases against private respondents herein should be transferred
to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District because a
miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution
witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their
lives would be endangered. This claim was buttressed by the affidavits of the
injured parties and prosecution witnesses, reaffirming their fear to appear in
Vigan to testify in cases 47-V and 48-V and expressing their willingness to
testify if the cases are heard outside of Ilocos Sur, where they can be free from
tension and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus expressed can not be
considered fanciful and unfounded when account is taken of the circumstances
that the informations filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur show that
of the one hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses at barrios
Ora Este and Ora Centro, Municipality of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are still
unidentified and at large; that one of the accused, private respondent Vincent
Crisologo, belongs to an influential family in the province, being concededly the
son of the Congressman for the first district of Ilocos Sur and of the lady
Governor that the reluctant witnesses are themselves the complainants in the
criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be made
to silence them; that it is not shown that the Executive branch is able or willing
to give these witnesses full security during the trial and for a reasonable time
thereafter, that even if armed security escorts were to be provided, the same
would be no guarantee against the possibility of murderous assault against the
affiant witnesses, as recent events have proved; that Constabulary reports
(Annex H) show that between 1 January and 31 May 1970 no less than 78
murders have been reported committed in said province, of which number only
21 were solved; and, finally, that the promotion and confirmation of respondent
Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of First Instance
of the Second Judicial District, Branch III, was actively supported by
Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent Crisologo
(Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2 to petitioner's supplemental memorandum).
This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining
witnesses, who had on a previous occasion freely given evidence before the
investigators in Manila, renders manifest the imperious necessity of transferring
the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially
inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is to
be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site can not be
made, because it is a long standing rule of criminal procedure in these Islands
that one who commits a crime is amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction
where the crime is committed, for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan,
26 Phil. 376, and People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665, that the jurisdiction of a
Court of First Instance in the Philippines is limited to certain well-defined
territory and they can not take jurisdiction of persons charged with one offense
committed outside of that limited territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section
14 (a), of the Revised Rules of Court providing that "in all criminal prosecutions
the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredient thereof took place."
It is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil.
149, 150, that the purpose of the rule invoked by accused respondents herein
was "not to compel the defendant to move to and appear in a different court
from that of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause
him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in
another place." Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the
prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is but logical that the court should have
power to decide where the balance of convenience or inconvenience lies, and to
determine the most suitable place of the trial according to the exigencies of
truth and impartial justice.
In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in
a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to
make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for
which courts have been established. Since the rigorous application of the
general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here in preventing a
fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the case, it must be admitted
that the exigencies of justice demand that the general rule relied upon by
accused respondents should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are
weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the
highest injustice "summum jus, summa in juria."
The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the trial to a site
where the prosecution's witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know would
be equivalent to railroading them into a conviction. Because regardless of the
place where its evidence is to be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The scales of justice
clearly lean in favor of the prosecution being given full opportunity to lay its
case before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal of the charges for lack of evidence
is a verdict that the prosecution can neither challenge nor appeal.
We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse of the kind
now before Us, are to confess themselves impotent to further the cause of
justice. The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court
and such inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13),
and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes
reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts "can
by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every
quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government"
(Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322).
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the
trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site,
whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a
miscarriage of justice, so demands. This authority was early recognized in
England as inhering in the courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth century.
The opinion in Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 21
Ann. Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, in
Rex vs. Cowle (Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759, said that, in this respect,
"the law is clear and uniform as far back as it can be traced."
And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was fully discussed, and all
the judges appear to have agreed as to the power of the court, Cramption, Jr.,
saying at page 525:
There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants and
prosecutors, ... that where it appears that either party cannot obtain a fair and
impartial trial in the proper county, then this court ... has jurisdiction to take the
case out of the proper county, as it is called, and to bring it into an indifferent
county ... This jurisdiction to change the venue ... has been exercised by this
court from a very early period. We have reported cases, where the doctrine is
laid down in emphatic language; we have the practice of the Court of Queen's
Bench in England independently of any practice of our own court ... The general
jurisdiction of the court, in a proper case, to change the venue from one county
to any other, cannot be the subject of doubt.
This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of justice, exercised
through writs of certiorari, has, according to the weight of authority, passed to
the State Supreme Courts of the American Union.1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs.
Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, at page 436, it was held that the power to transfer the
place of holding trials
became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long before the
independence of this country; and from that time forth, not only has the
practice prevailed in the courts of England, but the power is now exercised by
the Courts of very many if not all of our states, either by force of express
statute or the adoption of the common law in the jurisprudence of the same.
That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine courts
admits of no doubt, because they were organized on the American pattern with
the enactment of the first judicial organic law, Act 136, on 11 June 1901, by the
Philippine Commission, then composed by a majority of able American lawyers,
fully familiar with the institutions and traditions of the common law.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333, this Court stated:
And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine Reports, numbers of
cases might be cited wherein recourse has been had to the rules, principles and
doctrines of the common law in ascertaining the true meaning and scope of the
legislation enacted in and for the Philippine Islands since they passed under
American sovereignty.
Among the earliest measures of the Philippine Commission, after the
establishment of Civil Government under American sovereignty, was the
enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No. 136, "An Act providing for the
organization of courts in the Philippine Islands." This Act in express terms
abolished the then existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First
Instance, and substituted in their place the courts provided therein. It sets out
in general terms the jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and powers of the new
courts and their judges. The majority of the members of the body which
enacted it were able American lawyers. The spirit with which it is informed, and
indeed its very language and terminology would be unintelligible without some
knowledge of the judicial systems of England and the United States. Its manifest
purpose and object was to replace the old judicial system, with its incidents and
traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a new system modeled in all its
essential characteristics upon the judicial systems of the United States. It
cannot be doubted, therefore, that any incident of the former system which
conflicts with the essential principles and settled doctrines on which the new
system rests, must be held to be abrogated by the law organizing the new
system.
While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to believe that the
framers' intent was to deny, by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and particularly
upon this Supreme Court, the inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and
American courts under their common law heritage to transfer the place of trial
of cases in order to secure and promote the ends of justice, by providing fair
and impartial inquiry and adjudication.
Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or general authority from
liability in a civil action for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial
functions, upheld in the Alzua case as essentially inherent in the courts
established by Act 136, even if not expressly provided for, the power to transfer
the place of trials when so demanded by the interest of justice is equally
essential and possesses no inferior rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis, the
words of this Court in the Alzua case just cited:
The grounds of public policy and the reasoning upon which the doctrine is based
are not less forceful and imperative in these Islands than in the countries from
which the new judicial system was borrowed; and an examination of the
reasons assigned ... leaves no room for doubt that a failure to recognize it as an
incident to the new judicial system would materially impair its usefulness and
tend very strongly to defeat the ends for which it was established. (21 Phil. 333-
334)
Not only has there been since then no proof of any specific pronouncement, by
Constitution or Congress, against the exercise by our Courts of the power
discussed heretofore: on the contrary, the law establishing the Circuit Criminal
Courts, Republic Act No. 5179, in its Section 4, provides express legislative
recognition of its existence:
SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere within their
respective districts: Provided, however, that cases shall be heard within the
province where the crime subject of the offense was committed. And provided
further, that when the interest of justice so demands, with prior approval of the
Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province within the district
... (Emphasis supplied)
Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing of
the criminal case in question with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in
which province the offenses charged were committed, according to the
informations; since the holding of the trial in a particular place is more a matter
of venue, rather than jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice can not
be subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the
respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because its witnesses, for just and weighty
reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the respondent court, ignoring their
safety, has abusively denied the motion to have the case transferred to another
court, this Supreme Court, in the exercise of judicial power possessed by it
under the Constitution and the statutes, should decree that the trial of cases
47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or in Baguio City, at
the earlier available date. This arrangement would have the advantage that the
same trial judge could later be authorized to hear the defense witnesses in
Vigan, if circumstances so demanded. Furthermore, the adjudication of the case
by a judge other than respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in acquittal, would
remove any doubt or suspicion that the same was in any way influenced by the
trial Judge's being beholden to the Crisologo family.
The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by this Court in
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, where We said:
... The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives
opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the
court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in other
words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to
transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it.
The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter but to give it effective facility in righteous action.
It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged
against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's power
by technicalities that part of its authority effective for justice between the
parties is many times in inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of
procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application
of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not
constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants.
It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it
is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are
made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and
takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and
unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism. (Manila Railroad Co. v.
Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 529 [1911]. Emphasis and paragraphing
supplied.)
In resume, this Court holds, and so rules:
(1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not,
and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and
individual cases;
(2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by
the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power
and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a
Court of First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within
the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and
there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that
originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial
trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for
the transfer of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District, in the interest of truth and justice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs of certiorari and mandamus prayed for
are granted; the order of the respondent Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
dated 20 July 1970, is sustained in so far as it holds that the Administrative
Order No. 221 of the Department of Justice is not mandatory, but only
directory; nevertheless, said order is declared in grave abuse of discretion and
set aside in so far as it declines to transfer the trial of its cases Nos. 47-V and
48-V to another court within the district; and said respondent Court is
accordingly directed and ordered to remand the two criminal cases aforesaid to
the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District for hearing of the
evidence for the prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at the
earliest available date, and such other proceedings as the Circuit Criminal Court
may determine in the interest of justice.
The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer for their appearance at the
trial and sentence by the Circuit Criminal Court for the Second Judicial District,
in the same amount, and under the same terms and conditions as their present
bail bonds, which will be replaced by those herein ordered, all within fifteen (15)
days from finality of this decision.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-35377-78 July 31, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAMILO
PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING ABANO,
defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer
to the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or
Olivas, of the place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as sole defendant, is charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions.
As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were
to be confined in the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are
many political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity; some of the
adherents of the Crisologos had in fact been murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his
father, Congressman Floro Crisologo, was shot to death while hearing mass at
the Vigan cathedral.
Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting duck for a
gunwielder or grenade-thrower who wants to assassinate him. He could even be
lynched or shot to death on the specious pretext that he was trying to escape.
Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified his
conformity to the transfer of the venue of the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to
"order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice".
Here, what is involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal
safety of movant Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to
undergo trial in a place where his life would be imperilled.
Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a
justification for transfer of venue (See State vs. Siers, 136 S. E. 503, 103, W.
Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).1wph1.t
We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves not
merely the change of the place of hearing but also the transfer of the
expediente of Criminal Case No. 3949 to another court. According to Crisologo's
motion, the alleged evidence against him is in the custody of the authorities at
Camp Crame, Quezon City. The transfer of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City
Court of Quezon City and the holding of the trial at Camp Crame appear to be
the most convenient arrangement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer the record of
Criminal Case No. 3949 to the City Court of Quezon City where it should be re-
docketed and raffled to any Judge thereof. The case may be tried at Camp
Crame. The usual precautions and security measures should be adopted in
bringing defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the occasion of the hearing.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41313 November 6, 1975
ALIPIO MONDIGUING and ANDRES DUNUAN, petitioners, vs.
HON. FRANCISCO MEN ABAD, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Ifugao; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; MARIANO PACTIW, alias Bugbug;
DULMOG ABLUYEN and ANGELINA ABLUYEN, respondents..
AQUINO, J.:
Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten defendants accused of
double murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in Criminal Case No.
140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao Province (People vs. George Bayucca
et al.). That case was filed in connection with an ambuscade which was
perpetuated on July 23, 1970 at Baag, Banaue, Ifugao. As a result of that
incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao was wounded and his executive
assistant and his driver were killed. Up to this time the accused in that case
have not been arraigned. .
On September 4, 1975 Mondiguing and Dunuan filed in this Court a petition to
transfer the venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City. They claimed that
they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because Judge
Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First Instance of that province is a protege'
of Governor Lumauig and his brother, former Congressman Romulo Lumauig,
and because their witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of harassment
and reprisals. The petitioners further claimed that, as may be inferred from
previous incidents recounted in the petition, their lives and the lives of their
witnesses and lawyers would be in grave danger in Ifugao because of the
tensions and antagonisms spawned by the case and the political rivalry between
the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. (The accused, George Bayucca was killed
on October 28, 1970 and Alipio Mondiguing resigned as mayor of Banaue and
took refuge in Baguio City). .
The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the change of venue but
he invited the Court's attention to the suggestion of Governor Lumauig that the
case may be transferred to the proper court in Isabela in view of its proximity to
Ifugao. .
Respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad in his comment disputed the correctness
or truth of the grounds relied upon for the change of venue and prayed that the
petition be dismissed. He said that, if there would be bias on his part, he would
be biased in favor of the People of the Philippines. He said that the crime
charged was not "committed personally against" Governor Lumauig. That
statement is not correct since the governor is one of the victims mentioned in
the information. .
Judge Abad revealed that petitioner Dunuan sent to the court a letter dated
August 30, 1975 wherein he declined the services of Atty. Jose W. Diokno (who
filed the instant petition for transfer of venue). In view of that disclosure, the
petition herein should be regarded as having been filed only by Alipio
Mondiguing. .
The fact is that this Court in Paredes vs. Abad, L-36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56
SCRA 522, 534, disqualified Judge Abad from trying the electoral protests filed
by Crescencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against Gualberto Lumauig and John
Langbayan. In that case it was alleged that Judge Abad was a political leader of
Governor Lumauig and was recommended to his present position by the
Lumauig brothers. .
The issue is whether Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue is justified. A
change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical
or flimsy reasons. "The interests of the public require that, to secure the best
results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and
punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed
his crime" (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523, 562). .
This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a change of venue or
place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the
Constitution). It "possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the
trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred
to another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest
of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to
believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case
would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice"
(People vs. Gutierrez, L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172, 185). .
A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case where it was shown that
the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in the place where the trial was
originally scheduled to be held (People vs. Pilotin Vincent Crisologo, movant, L-
3537778, July 31, 1975).
After a careful consideration of the circumstances recited in Mondiguing's
petition to support his request for a change of the place of trial, we have
reached the conclusion that his petition is meritorious. .
In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice
and considering that his life would be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe,
Ifugao, he should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of Baguio. .
The other relief sought by Mondiguing, which is that he be transferred from the
Philippine Constabulary headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao to Camp Crame should
be submitted for the consideration of the Circuit Criminal Court. .
WHEREFORE, the petition of Alipio Mondiguing for the transfer of the venue of
Criminal Case No. 140 of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao is granted. The
said case should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District so that it may be heard in Baguio City. .
SO ORDERED. .
G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MAYOR PABLO SOLA,
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO (ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO
(CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN
FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER, OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD,
JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all
surnamed DOES respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of
venue to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in
the implementation of the right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which, even
if not so denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must have been
the zeal of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt
under the conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have led them to
devote less than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals. They
ignored the principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is
with the public officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions
raised, the need for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds,
necessitated that further action be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated
February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the petition, the Court required
the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private respondents, 4
the accused in six pending criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition
was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People
v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the
People of the Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor
General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are
instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will
not, therefore, improve their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the
legal point but instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the
setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan,
presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the
criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or
place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the
evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a search
warrant for the search and seizure of tile deceased bodies of seven persons
believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta.
Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980 armed
with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company
proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two
common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos,
Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido
Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial
commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder
against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven
Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names.
The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138,
4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary
examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the
municipal court found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued an
order for their a. rest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity
to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted
them the right to post bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola,
Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and
have since been released from detention. In a parallel development. the
witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the
trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10
kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of
the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have
been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large.
Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on
the families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged argue strongly for the
remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail
bonds.
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following
resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor
General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail
bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by
certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by
Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140, all entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue or
place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b)
[Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge
Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of
First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved
leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to
a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest
court station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on
the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public officials concerned
taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the
prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and
academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo
Baliscao on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and
respondent Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of the
cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as answers,
with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision.
The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents,
there being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be
heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail
being granted, must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be
cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio
for such hearing. So we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring
the place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The
Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue
or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Constitutional
Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of
People v. Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente vigorously and
categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us, to compel the
prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at
liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process,
and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established." 12 Why
a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor
General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional
power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for
their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from
Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of qqqts fear, they may
either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. 13 Respondent
Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a
court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia confined his
comment to the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo
Sola made clear that he had "no objection to the transfer. 15 It may be added
that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some
individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it
has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the
Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved
in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition
of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done
administratively. In this particular case, however, there is justification for the
procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the change of venue, the
cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justified. Bail
was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing
the prosecution That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in
People v. San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking for the
Court: "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was
deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of
the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the
course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to
introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the
criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should
be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on
that ground." 17 These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we
have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime
whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend.
Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that
could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and
inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But
justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of
fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the
balance true." 18 This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the
embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to
prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted
herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted
could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a
jurisdictional character. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to
private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and
effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of the
resolution of this Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the
petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard
on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents
is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
[G.R. No. L-20687. April 30, 1966.]
MAXIMINO VALDEPENAS, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF ACCUSED, HOW
ACQUIRED; WAIVER OF OBJECTION TO COURTS JURISDICTION; CASE AT BAR.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his
apprehension, with or without warrant. or his submission to the jurisdiction of
the court. In the case at bar, petitioner was brought before the bar of justice
first, before the justice of the peace court, then before the court of first
instance, later before the Court of Appeals, thereafter back before said court of
first instance. and then, again, before the Court of Appeals, and never, within
the period of six years that had transpired until the Court of Appeals rendered
its decision, had he questioned the judicial authority of any of these three courts
over his person. He is deemed, therefore, to have waived whatever objection he
might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to have
submitted himself to the Courts jurisdiction. What is more, his behavior and
every single one of the steps taken by him before said courts particularly the
motions therein filed by him implied, not merely a submission to the
jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority
thereof over his person.
2. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OVER CRIME OF ABDUCTION WITH CONSENT. It
is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action in this
case the crime of abduction with consent is and may be conferred only by
law; that the jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular
court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense; and
that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted
of abduction with consent.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR THE
EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION. The third paragraph of Art. 344 of the Revised
Penal Code does not determine the jurisdiction of the courts over the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness. It could not affect said
jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by
the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and
the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint required
in said Art. 344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper
authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has
been imposed "out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who
might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the
scandal of a public trial" (Samilin v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57
Phil., 298, 304.)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ABDUCTION INCLUDES
ABDUCTION WITH CONSENT. The complaint for forcible abduction includes
abduction with consent. The spirit of Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code is that
the assent of the offended party and her mother to undergo the scandal of the
public trial for forcible abduction necessarily connotes, also, their willingness to
face the scandal attendant to a public trial for abduction with consent.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIRGINITY AS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT OF ABDUCTION
WITH CONSENT. The virginity mentioned in Art 343 of the Revised Penal
Code as an essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, should
not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of
abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation (U.S. v. Casten, 34 Phil., 808,
811-812), because the essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the
woman, but the outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the
disappearance of one of its members." (U. S. v. Alvarez, 1 Phil., 351; U. S. v.
Reyes, 20 Phil., 510; U.S. v. Reyes, 28 Phil., 352.)
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE INCLUDES CHASTITY.
The presumption of innocence includes also that of morality and decency, and,
as a consequence, of chastity. (6 Moran, pp. 28-29. 1963 Edition, citing cases.)
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by petitioner Maximino Valdepenas from a decision of the Court of
Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, convicting him
of the crime of abduction with consent, and sentencing him to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from three (3) months and twenty-five (25) days of arresto
mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify Ester
Ulsano in the sum of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
The only question raised by petitioner is whether "the Court of Appeals erred in
not reversing the decision of the trial court, dated June 30, 1960, for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the action
for the offense of abduction with consent."
The pertinent facts are: On January 25, 1956, Ester Ulsano, assisted by her
mother, Consuelo Ulsano, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Piat,
Cagayan, a criminal complaint, 1 duly subscribed and sworn to by both,
charging petitioner Maximino Valdepenas with forcible abduction with rape of
Ester Ulsano. After due preliminary investigation, the second stage of which was
waived by Valdepenas, the justice of the peace of Piat found that there was
probable cause and forwarded the complaint to the court of first instance of
Cagayan 2 in which the corresponding information for forcible abduction with
rape 3 was filed 4. In due course, said court of first instance rendered judgment
5 finding petitioner guilty as charged and sentencing him accordingly. 6
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals 7 modified the decision of
the court of first instance, convicted him of abduction with consent and meted
out to him the penalty set forth in the opening paragraph of this decision.
A motion for reconsideration and new trial having been filed by petitioner
contesting the finding, made by the Court of Appeals, to the effect that
complainant was below 18 years of age at the time of the occurrence, said Court
8 granted the motion, set aside its aforementioned decision and remanded the
case to the court a quo for the reception of additional evidence on said issue.
After a retrial, the court of first instance rendered another decision 9 reiterating
said finding of the Court of Appeals, as well as its judgment 10 of conviction for
abduction with consent and the penalty imposed therein. Petitioner appealed
again to the Court of Appeals 11 which 12 affirmed that of the court of first
instance 13 with costs against the petitioner. Again petitioner filed 14 a motion
for reconsideration based, for the first time, upon the ground that "the lower
court had no jurisdiction over the person of appellant and over the subject
matter of the action, with respect to the offense of abduction with consent."
Upon denial of the motion, 15 petitioner interposed the present appeal by
certiorari.
Petitioners theory is that no complaint for abduction with consent has been filed
by either Ester Ulsano or her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, and that, accordingly,
the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of
abduction with consent and had, therefore, no authority to convict him of said
crime. We find no merit in this pretense.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his
apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of
the court. 16 In the case at bar, it is not claimed that petitioner had not been
apprehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Indeed, although brought before the bar of justice as early as January 25,1 956,
first, before the then justice of the peace court of Piat, then before the court of
first instance of Cagayan, later before the Court of Appeals, thereafter back
before said court of first instance, and then, again, before the Court of Appeals,
never, within the period of six (6) years that had transpired until the Court of
Appeals rendered its last decision 17, had he questioned the judicial authority of
any of these three (3) courts over his person. He is deemed, however, to have
waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his
person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Courts jurisdiction. What
is more, his behaviour and every single one the steps taken by him before said
courts particularly the motions therein filed by him implied, not merely a
submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to
exercise the authority thereof over his person.
Upon the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of an action in this case the crime of abduction with consent is and may be
conferred only by law 18, that jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law
upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involved in
the offense; and that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused
may be convicted of abduction with consent 19. It is true that, pursuant to the
third paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
". . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offended has been
expressly pardoned by the above- named persons, as the case may be."
This provision does not determine, however, the jurisdiction of our courts over
the offense therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the
same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code,
which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to
the punishment of the culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is
merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the
power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed "out
of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public
trial." 20
In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such
preference by filing the complaint adverted to above and going through the
trials and tribulation concomitant with the proceedings in this case, before
several courts, for the last ten (10) years. Petitioner says that the complaint
was for forcible abduction, not abduction with consent; but, as already adverted
to, the latter is included in the former. Referring particularly to the spirit of said
provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, we believe that the assent
of Ester Ulsano and her mother to undergo the scandal of a public trial for
forcible abduction necessarily connotes, also, their willingness to face the
scandal attendant to a public trial for abduction with consent.
The gist of petitioners pretense is that there are some elements of the latter
which are not included in the former, and, not alleged, according to him, in the
complaint filed herein, 21 namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and 2)
that she is over 12 and under 18 years of age. The second element is clearly set
forth in said complaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor . . . 17 years
of age . . .", and, hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age.
As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Article
343 of the Revised Penal Code, 22 as an essential ingredient of the crime of
abduction with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does
not exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation 23
because the essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but
the outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of
one of its members." 24
The complaint in the case at bar 25 alleges not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor
17 years of age, but also that petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously"
took her by force and violence . . . against her will and taking advantage of the
absence of her mother" from their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot
to gain carnal intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force,
intimidation and violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies that Ester
is a minor living under patria protestas, and, hence, single, thus leading to the
presumption that she is a virgin 26 apart from being virtuous and having a good
reputation, 27 for, as former Chief Justice Moran has aptly put it, the
presumption of innocence includes, also, that of morality and decency, and, as a
consequence, of chastity. 28
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the petitioner Maximino Valdepenas. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON,
Petitioners, vs. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby
ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21,
2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14,
2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public
respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-
3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another
entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25,
2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED
in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE
forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose
"Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused
Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan,
Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now
under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1
Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel
Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago
City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila
convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion
perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being
at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on
9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001,
he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and
Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and
Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners,
Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2
Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of
arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the
absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on
the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons,
the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners
appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of
Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the
case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan.
Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued
against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon
and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S.
Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint
Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the
prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order,
seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and
seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August
2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the
prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge
Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two
Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court
took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15
November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the
petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November
2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous
referral to it of respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the
RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this
Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the
following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing
and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August
17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001
issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in
upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then
Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused
cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction
of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of
Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of
arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524
in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of
Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue
warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued
therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of
the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court
of Appeals ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or
through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or
to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his
person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs.
Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an
accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may
validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners
Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not
yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their
"Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall
and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications for
bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their
person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant
for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the
court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication
of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar
Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other
relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case
was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the
accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA
307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in
abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred
from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of
the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits
(such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of
the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or
by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before
custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by
his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law
and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court
can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of
other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon
his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law
but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when
a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11 Being in
the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived
of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the
law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals
should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the
application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law.
The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.
Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the
applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused
before considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail,
we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the
aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in
civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of
the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we
held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure ones release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security required
and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law." The
rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents
resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send
another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the
court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of
pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the
court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil
cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18
(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant
of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them
would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very
issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files
any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can
invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over
the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies,
i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no
requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best
illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not
in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under
the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the
application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of
jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for
certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the
respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to
elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the
ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we
directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding
with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against
the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition
for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to
the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in
applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If
we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is
foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and
could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is
proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest
to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not
genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the
same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he
followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can
easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after
personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the
warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still
be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night.22 Furthermore,
the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the
determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is
likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it.
Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property
rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come
before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review
with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political
climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge
Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal
cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest
issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the
Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable
cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on
the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused,
doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner
Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of
Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of
arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence
dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but
proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge
Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued
the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in
the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of
Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the
review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of
arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as
premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that
they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the
Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same
ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of
arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad
asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-
quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to
Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited
decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments
raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the
contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as
having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the
supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of
probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the
petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that
the determination of probable cause was based on the certification, under oath,
of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge.
No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly
and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscals certification.28
Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such
indication that he relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order
even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court
proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally
evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was
accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim,
Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are the
following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and
Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41
in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of
Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad,
however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of
probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the
confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was
given after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of
Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy
for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious
reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the
election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City
voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on
one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR
Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to
disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness
is not within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in
Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely,
not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar
v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it
requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial
x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another
case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other
things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors
resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed
the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following
explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC,
Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr.
Miranda the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the
direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court
absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a
"narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said
officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27,
2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable
value." This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use is
Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions
evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel
Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the
Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is
practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated
October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder
charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the
Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused
therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution
in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against
Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist
our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at
large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A
decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be
the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same
crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that
our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao
that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied
on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the
criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an
eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to
kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in
the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in
Leao, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated
and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value."35
On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an
acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of
the prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly
meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two
days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary
restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The
bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While the
dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this
Courts resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions
about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the
orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals
did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but
instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36
According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have
done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new
warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest
issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the
slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the
merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of
Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated
the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of
arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings
conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of
proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders
set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the
warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are
henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new
warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have
been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary
investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available
to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally
examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the
prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of
Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective
criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable
cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the
same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of
probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed
before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued
therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge
Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were
assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As
carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the
following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private
respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which
ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included
in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should
not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14,
2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this
Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to
them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25
October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon
receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no
time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of
court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001
dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred
said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of
respondent Tuliaos petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in
Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case
decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed
contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent
Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave
abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001
Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12
November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved
to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond
in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15
November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as
disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases
of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on
the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and
for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be construed to
include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where
the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the
case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as
well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse
of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the
part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1
Leao,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-
3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002
and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-
3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the
City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases
within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise
directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from
transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal
cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this
Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said
compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on
said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of
arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio,
Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is
hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a
tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the
February 28, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
22697.
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
was filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan,
Branch 18.4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on
the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the
petitioner as charged.6 In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned,
among others, for the first time, the trial courts jurisdiction.7
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the
petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly
attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches
from asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to
reverse the trial courts decision, the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction but
modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.8
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
raising the following issues for our resolution:
a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during
the trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor
before the wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately
raised in petitioners appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely,
does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is
initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?
b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a
bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a
person who unexpectedly crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating
evidence to warrant his conviction for the crime charged?
c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of
accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20
kilometers per hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever
presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case?
d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for
homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is
"reckless imprudence resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code when the prosecution did not prove this during
the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does
not contain an allegation to that effect?
e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal
that the victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the
bus driven by the petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime
charged?9
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear
and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution
of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof.10 In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now
Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already been amended by Republic Act No.
7691.12 The said provision thus reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.Except in cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or
amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1
day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the
Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not
have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact,
they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has
already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC
the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and
without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part,
counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be
raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further
absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel by
laches, which continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze
the various Court decisions on the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been
conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter
submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa15 that:
It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is
fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the
court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of
cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the
jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133;
190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the
manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such
jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. x x x16
Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory
that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing
such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863).
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and
decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted,
on appeal, to assume an inconsistent positionthat the lower court had
jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no
bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been
granted an instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to
acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the former
indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the
indictment in the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after
the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the
information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction,
accused cannot successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. x x x
(22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.)
Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that
the court was without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in
support of a defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22
C.J.S. p. 378.)18
But in Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining
the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the
following observations:
It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the
plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this Courts jurisdiction over the case.
Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on
January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was
never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed down. The
conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the
belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has
jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the
actual real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional
amount of this Court (over 200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-
10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaa de Seguros, et al., of March 23,
1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this
case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of
Appeals for decision, without questioning the latters jurisdiction until decision is
rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of
his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason
that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants
submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of
favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the
decision be unfavorable: x x x20
Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by
laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of
annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party
invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and
for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or
by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but
is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or.
694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason
that such a practice cannot be toleratedobviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc.,
243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S.
127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said
that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the
resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)to the effect that
we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverseas well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans et al.,
G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas,
100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party
on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force,
was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as in
the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It
was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such
conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948
and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.22
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and
tribunals, in resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of
jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim
v. Ramirez,23 we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general
rule rather than the exception:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-
matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified
the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the
time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered
the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled
that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to
dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As
defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.24
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of
jurisdiction was the one who invoked the courts jurisdiction, and who later
obtained an adverse judgment therein, we refused to apply the ruling in
Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to the time-honored principle that
the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too
plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became
the rule rather than the exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines,
Inc.,25 the Court ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule
presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent
actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and
invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is
estopped from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction, especially when an
adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the
lower court x x x in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second
amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this
Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the
case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the
courts jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second
amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower
courts jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion
for reconsideration of the lower courts decision that petitioner raised the
question of the lower courts lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its
right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs.
Cabrigas, we ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996
decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the
petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13
of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial courts
jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR
Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively
participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting
its evidence. They invoked the trial courts jurisdiction in order to obtain
affirmative relief the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have
thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a litigants participation in all stages of the case before
the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative
relief, bars such party from challenging the courts jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping
and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals,
300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442
[1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating
in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998],
citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]).
(italics ours)26
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times
Corporation v. Pastorin,27 where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only
in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after
examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel, that the ruling in
Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia,
thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before
the NLRC on appeal.281avvphi1
Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified that:
Petitioner argues that the CAs affirmation of the trial courts dismissal of its
case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been
conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used
as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used
quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of
jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held
that a party may be barred from questioning a courts jurisdiction after being
invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents
the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by
a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has
actively participated.
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the
exception rather than the rule.1avvphi1 Estoppel by laches may be invoked to
bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be
clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly
as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned
or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional
circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-
matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified
the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the
time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is
determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in
the answer.30
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack of
jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to
seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said:
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived
by estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the
general rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances
in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of
jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings
had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case
because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.32
And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court again emphasized that
laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable,
thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine
enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is
the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar
the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have
been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so
belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had
abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time
in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned
ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the
said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final
adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered
by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction.
Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the
case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals
resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction based on procedural
infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate courts
directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a
single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active
participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu
of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the
court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.34
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in
Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De
La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should,
however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence
or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual
milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to
invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter
challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must
arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true
where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does
not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any
harm.35
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way
estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he
raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no
considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone,
though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless
it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce
them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become
so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then
enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and
other causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and
revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their
Calvary once more after more or less 15 years.37 The same, however, does not
obtain in the instant case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not
favored by law. It is to be applied rarelyonly from necessity, and only in
extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and
the equity must be strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of
estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.39
Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is
void.40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking
judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the
concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void
for want of jurisdiction.41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and
Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer
or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or
complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of
the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is
entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter
of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent
or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction
over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through,
or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not
apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action.
xxx
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or
theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to
dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or
the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that
is the subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or
tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence,
susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.43
With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other
issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF JANE HONRALES, Petitioners, G.R. No. 182651 - versus -
JONATHAN HONRALES, Respondent. Promulgated: August 25, 2010
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the October 1, 2007 Decision[1]
and April 3, 2008 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
92755.
The antecedents are as follows:
On August 19, 2002, Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent
Jonathan Honrales. Thus, in a Resolution[3] dated October 28, 2002, Bernardino
R. Camba, Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila, recommended the filing of an
information for parricide against respondent. On November 18, 2002, the
following Information[4] was filed against respondent with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila:
That on or about August 19, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one JANE HONRALES
y ILAGAN, his legal wife, by then and there shooting her with a 45 cal. pistol,
thereby inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound of the head and neck which
was the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter.
Contrary to law.
On November 21, 2002, Judge Teresa P. Soriaso of the RTC of Manila, Branch
27, ordered respondents arrest.[5]
On November 22, 2002, respondent moved to reconsider[6] the October 28,
2002 Resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Camba which recommended the
filing of parricide charges. Respondent later also filed a supplement to his
motion.
In view of respondents motion for reconsideration, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor
Alfredo E. Ednave moved that the RTC defer proceedings.[7] Respondent in turn
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest,[8] which the public
prosecutor opposed.[9]
On December 12, 2002, the RTC issued an Order[10] deferring proceedings in
view of the pendency of respondents motion for reconsideration. It, however,
denied the motion to recall the arrest warrant since deferment of proceedings
does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same
defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the offense as
would constitute a ground for quashing the information. The trial court further
held that considering the evidence submitted, it finds probable cause for the
issuance of the arrest warrant.
On May 21, 2003, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Laura D. Biglang-Awa filed a
Motion for Leave to Conduct Reinvestigation[11] with the RTC in light of the
affidavit of one (1) Michelle C. Luna, which respondent, in his
motion/supplemental motion for reconsideration, argues will belie the statement
of witness for the complainant, John James Honrales that the shooting of the
victim . . . was intentional.
On May 30, 2003, the RTC issued an Order[12] granting leave to conduct the
reinvestigation and authorizing 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa to
reinvestigate the case.
On September 9, 2003, the heirs of the victim (petitioner heirs) moved before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for the inhibition[13] of 2nd Assistant
City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa from conducting the reinvestigation and praying
that the case be remanded to the court for trial.[14]
On September 25, 2003, City Prosecutor Ramon R. Garcia issued Office Order
No. 1640[15] reassigning the case to Assistant City Prosecutor Antonio R.
Rebagay. Hearings were scheduled on October 15 and 22, 2003.
On October 15, 2003, both parties appeared but petitioner heirs manifested that
they earlier moved to reconsider Office Order No. 1640. Respondent moved that
he be given up to October 22, 2003 to file an opposition.
On October 22, 2003, respondent filed his opposition. Counsel for petitioner
heirs then manifested that they be given until November 5, 2003 to submit a
reply thereto.
On November 17, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued an Order[16]
denying petitioners motion to reconsider Office Order No. 1640 and set the
continuation of the hearings on December 3 and 10, 2003.
On December 3, 2003, both parties appeared. Petitioner heirs moved that the
hearing be suspended on the ground that they have filed a petition for review
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) to assail the Order of November 17,
2003. Respondents counsel objected in view of the presence of their witness
Michelle Luna. Thus, the hearing proceeded. After the hearing, petitioner heirs
moved for the cancellation of the December 10, 2003 hearing and filed a formal
motion to that effect.
On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a Motion and Manifestation praying
that the case be submitted for resolution or, in the alternative, that it be set for
final clarificatory hearing on December 22, 2003.
The following day or on December 16, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay
issued an Order denying the prayers for suspension and submission of the case
for resolution and instead set the hearing on December 22, 2003.
On December 19, 2003, however, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued a
Resolution[17] setting aside the October 28, 2002 Resolution and
recommending the withdrawal of the information for parricide and the filing of
an information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide in its stead. City
Prosecutor Garcia approved the Resolution.
On January 16, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay filed with the RTC a
motion to withdraw the information for parricide.[18]
On January 28, 2004, while the Motion to Withdraw Information was still
pending, an Information[19] for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Parricide was
filed against respondent before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
The Information reads,
That on or about August 19, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then in possession of a 45 cal. pistol, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously, after removing the bullets of the gun in a careless,
reckless, negligent and imprudent manner playfully poked the gun to his maid,
son and to his wife, by then and there accidentally shooting upon one JANE
HONRALES, his legal wife, inflicting upon the latter a gun shot wound of the
head and the neck which was the direct and immediate cause of her death
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Determined to have respondent prosecuted for parricide, petitioner heirs filed a
petition for review[20] with the DOJ questioning the downgrading of the
offense. They likewise filed an Opposition to Motion to Withdraw
Information[21] with the RTC arguing that there was no final resolution yet
downgrading the charge against respondent that would justify withdrawal of the
Information for parricide.
On February 17, 2004, petitioner heirs filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer
Proceedings[22] with the RTC to give time to the DOJ Secretary to resolve their
petition for review.
On March 17, 2004, the DOJ, through Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo,
dismissed the petitions for review assailing (1) the Order dated November 17,
2003 of Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay denying the urgent motion to
reconsider Office Order No. 1640 and (2) the Resolution dated December 19,
2003 finding probable cause against respondent for reckless imprudence
resulting in parricide, instead of intentional parricide as charged.[23]
Petitioner heirs moved to reconsider[24] the Resolution, and the RTC of Manila
issued an Order[25] on April 14, 2004, holding in abeyance the resolution of the
pending incidents in the parricide case in view of the said motion for
reconsideration.
On May 14, 2004, the DOJ, through Chief State Prosecutor Zuo, denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[26] Thus, Judge Soriaso of the RTC of
Manila issued an Order[27] on May 28, 2004 considering the motion to
withdraw the Information submitted for resolution.
Undaunted by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, however,
petitioners again filed a petition for review[28] with the DOJ on June 14, 2004,
assailing said denial. Said petition, however, was dismissed with finality by the
DOJ in a Resolution[29] dated July 14, 2004.
Contending that the petition for review before the DOJ questioning the
downgrading of the offense was no longer an impediment to the resolution of
the pending Motion to Withdraw Information, respondent promptly filed with the
RTC a Manifestation with Reiteration to Resolve the Motion to Withdraw
Information.[30]
On August 5, 2004, petitioner heirs appealed[31] the dismissal of their petitions
to the Office of the President (OP). Thus, on August 6, 2004, Judge Soriaso
reiterated her previous ruling to hold in abeyance the resolution of the motion to
withdraw in deference to the appeal taking its course before the OP.[32]
In the meantime, on October 11, 2004, respondent was arraigned before the
MeTC and pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in
parricide. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of one (1) year,
seven (7) months and eleven (11) days to two (2) years, ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of prision correccional.[33]
On October 27, 2004, respondent filed with the RTC a motion[34] seeking to
dismiss the parricide charges against him. He cited his arraignment and
conviction by the MeTC as grounds for the dismissal of the case against him.
On October 28, 2004, petitioner heirs filed with the MeTC a motion[35] to nullify
the proceedings held on October 11, 2004. They claimed that they were denied
procedural due process since October 11, 2004 was not the agreed date for
respondents arraignment but October 18, 2004. They also argued that the
Information before the MeTC was invalid.
On December 6, 2004, the OP dismissed petitioner heirs appeal of the DOJ
Resolution.[36] Petitioner heirs promptly moved to reconsider the OPs dismissal
of their appeal, but their motion was denied by Resolution[37] dated April 20,
2005.
On May 5, 2005, respondent moved for Judge Soriasos inhibition[38] alleging
bias in favor of the prosecution as shown by her continued inaction on his
motion to withdraw Information.
On June 6, 2005, petitioner heirs filed before the CA an appeal by certiorari[39]
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
denial by the OP of their motion for reconsideration.
On June 30, 2005, Judge Soriaso inhibited herself from the case.[40] The case
was eventually re-raffled off to Branch 54 presided over by Judge Manuel M.
Barrios.
Shortly thereafter, Judge Barrios issued an Order[41] on September 26, 2005
granting the withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the
warrant of arrest issued against respondent. Judge Barrios ruled that the
Information for parricide found itself without a supporting resolution and thus its
withdrawal was appropriate.
On October 14, 2005, petitioner heirs filed a motion for reconsideration[42] of
the September 26, 2005 Order but their motion was noted without action on
November 3, 2005, as it was made without the approval or intervention of the
Public Prosecutor.[43]
On January 9, 2006, petitioner heirs filed a petition for certiorari[44] with the
CA assailing the September 26, 2005 and November 3, 2005 Orders issued by
the RTC through Judge Barrios. Petitioner heirs argued that Judge Barrios
granted the motion to withdraw the Information for parricide on grounds other
than his personal and independent findings. They likewise contended that Judge
Barrios should not have granted the withdrawal of the Information and recall of
the arrest warrant since he knew that their appeal with the CA disputing the
downgrading of the offense was still pending. Petitioner heirs further argued
that the adoption of a contrary stand by the prosecutor after the filing of the
Information for parricide should not bar them from prosecuting the case actively
sans supervision and intervention of the prosecutor.
On August 16, 2006, petitioner heirs filed a Motion to Implead the People of the
Philippines as party respondent.[45] On August 31, 2006, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a similar motion[46] and further prayed that it be
furnished a copy of the petition and be given time to file its comment. On
October 10, 2006, the CA granted the motions.[47]
On October 1, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. Though it found
that Judge Barrios failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of
the case and thus abdicated his judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of
the Secretary of Justice, it ruled that the remand of the case to the RTC would
serve no useful purpose since it may result in the reopening of the parricide
case which would violate respondents constitutional right against double
jeopardy.
Petitioner heirs and the OSG moved to reconsider the CA decision, but their
motions were denied on April 3, 2008. Hence, they filed the present
consolidated petitions raising the sole issue of whether the remand of the
parricide case to the trial court will violate respondents constitutional right
against double jeopardy.
Petitioner heirs argue that the MeTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the
case for parricide through reckless imprudence and that jurisdiction remained
with the RTC where the Information for parricide was filed. They also assail the
filing with the MeTC of the Information for the downgraded offense after a
supposedly dubious reinvestigation and question the hasty arraignment of
accused which was done allegedly without notice to petitioner heirs and without
them being furnished with the result of the reinvestigation. They even claim that
they were not furnished with a copy of the motion for leave to conduct
reinvestigation as it was sent to the wrong address. Petitioner heirs further
argue that when respondent immediately pleaded guilty to the charge for
reckless imprudence without notice to them, such a plea cannot be legally
invoked in respondents defense of double jeopardy. Also, the Information for
parricide was still pending with the RTC when accused was hastily arraigned for
the downgraded offense. Thus, not all requisites of double jeopardy are present.
The OSG, for its part, argues that the MeTC could not have validly acquired
jurisdiction over the case for the same offense of parricide or any offense
necessarily included therein because the prosecutions motion to withdraw the
Information for parricide before the RTC remained unacted upon by the said
court.
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that if the petition is granted, it
would violate his right against double jeopardy. The first jeopardy has already
attached because there was a valid indictment, arraignment and plea and the
proceedings were already terminated as he is already serving sentence and has
applied for probation. He also contends that proceeding with reinvestigation was
justified since the principal action can continue if there is no order from the
appellate court to stop the proceedings. He further argues that petitioner heirs
have no right to file this appeal especially since the appeal was filed by
petitioner heirs without the public prosecutors conformity. Respondent likewise
contends that it is already too late for petitioner heirs to question the validity of
the MeTC proceedings since its decision has become final and executory, no
appeal having been taken from the decision. Also, petitioner heirs failed to
present evidence to prove that there was fraud in the reinvestigation and
subsequent plea to a lesser offense.
We grant the petitions.
It is beyond cavil that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting
the withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of
arrest without making an independent assessment of the merits of the case and
the evidence on record.[48] By relying solely on the manifestation of the public
prosecutor that it is abiding by the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the
trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law. What remains for our resolution is whether the case may be
remanded to the RTC without violating respondents right against double
jeopardy. On this question, we find the answer to be in the affirmative.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended
provides:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
xxxx
Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a
first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.[49]
In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless
imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal case for parricide was still
pending before the RTC. In Dioquino v. Cruz, Jr.,[50] we held that once
jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information is filed, it is there
retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide
was included in the charge for intentional parricide[51] pending before the RTC,
the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the criminal case filed before it, the
RTC having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the exclusion of all other
courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is therefore absent.
A decision rendered without jurisdiction is not a decision in contemplation of law
and can never become executory.[52]
WHEREFORE, the present petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated October 1,
2007 and Resolution dated April 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 92755 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the September
26, 2005 and November 3, 2005 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 54 are hereby NULLIFIED and said trial court is hereby DIRECTED to
REINSTATE Criminal Case No. 02-207976 for parricide for appropriate criminal
proceedings.
[G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004]
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out
becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the
judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for
a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the
accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in
one single decision that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the March 29, 2000[2] and the March 27, 2001[3] Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the
appeal is ordered DISMISSED.[4]
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty
and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6)
years, and to pay damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
his death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned
income for one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
support of Renato Torres, and the further sum of P300,000.00 as moral
damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income
for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00
as moral damages and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her
death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as
medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month,
and the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses,
doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the
[n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future
correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as
loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses,
P800.00 for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00
as actual damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages
in the amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses,
P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral
damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for
medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for
medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and
P5,000.00 as moral damages;

k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace
Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally
wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as
actual damages;
The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of
accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the
judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth
mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the
dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also
admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was
denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in
behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from
the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due
course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed
its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a]
copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused
from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to
represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was
however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999,
[respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss.[6]
(Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of
the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal
case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as
set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and
enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-
employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the
notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and
executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers
subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57)
and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.[8]
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In
effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-
employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states
thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but
the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in
double jeopardy.[9] Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground
that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.[10] On the
other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to
their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of
conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much
of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.[11]
Appeal by the Accused
Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may,
upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the
accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps
bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.[12]
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court
when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction,
they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.[13]
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during
the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and
during the trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation
of a judgment against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless
remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid
provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x
x[14]
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days
from notice of the judgment against them.[15] While at large, they cannot seek
relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.[16]
Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of
Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to
appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.[17]
Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of
innkeepers, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any
other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some
general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or
theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods
within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care
and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers
employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to
Article 103 which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply
to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices,
or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue
raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has
clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
xxxxxxxxx
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed
impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior
to the criminal action.[18] Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on
the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.[19]
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent
civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions.
Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,[20] 33,[21]34[22] and
2176[23] of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of
any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be
reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included
therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising
from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once
for the same act or omission.[24]
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability
arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if
a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the
prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein.[25]
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which
states that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[26]
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal
case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner
must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion --
including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the
criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with
the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be
applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not
interpose an appeal.[27] Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which
the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is
not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare
that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted
against their employees.[28] Although in substance and in effect, they have an
interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on
their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard
Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his
criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions
are apparent from its Appellants Brief[29] filed with the CA and from its
Petition[30] before us, both of which claim that the trial courts finding of guilt is
not supported by competent evidence.[31]
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render
judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
appellant.[32] This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a
sentence of conviction.[33] Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse,
affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the
penalty it imposed.[34]
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-
employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than
that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to
him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy,
since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without
his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively
waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner
may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal
procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and
thereby made the judgment of the court below final.[35] Having been a fugitive
from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to
appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v.
Ang Gioc[36] ruled:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the
accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted
solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He
may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after
the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to
have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x
x.[37]
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court
and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In
the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the
judgment nugatory at his option.[38] Such conduct is intolerable and does not
invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.[39]
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses
to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.[40]
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal
case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his
right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now
final.
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner
argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab,
Inc.,[41] Alvarez v. CA[42] and Yusay v. Adil[43] do not apply to the present
case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these
cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By participating
in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the
undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability,
petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an
employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is
subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable
for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters
insolvency.[44] The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -
- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to
which they are applicable.[45] Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision,
the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the
offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable.[46] In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.[47]
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.[48] By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive
upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also
with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from
that of the employee.[49]
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be
adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the
convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry;
(3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their
duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due
to insolvency.[50]
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But
the determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and
the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in
the same criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal and civil, has
been pronounced;[51] and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due
notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the
judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-
employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability
remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The
fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction has attained finality,
then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality
of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for
jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-
employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-
employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal
case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil
aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the
accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent
upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers
subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is
correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on
the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate
that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and
dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the
employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that
acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.[52]
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part
of due process.[53] It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a
remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions
of law authorizing such exercise.[54] Hence, the legal requirements must be
strictly complied with.[55]
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as
merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.[56] Indeed,
deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.[57] In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed by
parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those
cases.[58]
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality
of the resolution of the case.[59]
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated
in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer
was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was
not denied its day in court.[60] In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the
accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that
there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is engaged
in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the
wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26 August
1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by
petitioner, being then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured
in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x.[61] Neither does petitioner dispute
that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the
discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, substituted by MERCEDES V. ALONSO, TOMAS V.
ALONSO and ASUNCION V. ALONSO, Petitioners, - versus - CEBU
COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,
Respondent, G.R. No. 188471 Promulgated: April 20, 2010
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners appeal the order dated
December 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Cebu City,
denying the motion for issuance of writ of execution of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in behalf of the Government, and the order dated April 24, 2009,
denying their motion for reconsideration filed against the first order.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts are those established in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,[1]
which follow.
Petitioner Francisco M. Alonso (Francisco) was the only son and sole heir of the
late spouses Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion Medalle. Francisco died during the
pendency of this case, and was substituted by his legal heirs, namely: his
surviving spouse, Mercedes V. Alonso, his son Tomas V. Alonso (Tomas) and his
daughter Asuncion V. Alonso.[2]
In 1992, Francisco discovered documents showing that his father Tomas N.
Alonso had acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the
Government in or about the year 1911; that the original vendee of Lot No. 727
had assigned his sales certificate to Tomas N. Alonso, who had been
consequently issued Patent No. 14353; and that on March 27, 1926, the
Director of Lands had executed a final deed of sale in favor of Tomas N. Alonso,
but the final deed of sale had not been registered with the Register of Deeds
because of lack of requirements, like the approval of the final deed of sale by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as required by law.[3]
Francisco subsequently found that the certificate of title covering Lot No. 727-D-
2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been administratively reconstituted from
the owners duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1310 in the
name of United Service Country Club, Inc., the predecessor of respondent Cebu
Country Club, Inc (Cebu Country Club); and that upon the order of the court
that had heard the petition for reconstitution of the TCT, the name of the
registered owner in TCT No. RT-1310 had been changed to that of Cebu Country
Club; and that the TCT stated that the reconstituted title was a transfer from
TCT No. 1021.[4]
It is relevant to mention at this point that the current TCT covering Lot 727-D-2
in the name of Cebu Country Club is TCT No. 94905, which was entered in the
land records of Cebu City on August 8, 1985.[5]
With his discoveries, Francisco formally demanded upon Cebu Country Club to
restore the ownership and possession of Lot 727-D-2 to him. However, Cebu
Country Club denied Franciscos demand and claim of ownership, and refused to
deliver the possession to him.[6]
On September 25, 1992, Francisco commenced against Cebu Country Club in
the RTC in Cebu City an action for the declaration of nullity and non-existence of
deed/title, the cancellation of certificates of title, and the recovery of property.
On November 5, 1992, Cebu Country Club filed its answer with counterclaim.[7]
On May 7, 1993, the RTC decided in favor of Cebu Country Club.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which ultimately affirmed
the RTC on March 31, 1997. Thus, Francisco filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied on October 2, 1997.[8]
Nothing daunted, Francisco appealed to this Court (G.R. No. 130876).
On January 31, 2002, this Court decided G.R. No. 130876, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. However, we SET ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City,
Branch 08.
IN LIEU THEREOF, we DISMISS the complaint and counterclaim of the parties in
Civil Cases No. CEB 12926 of the trial court. We declare that Lot No. 727 D-2 of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 251,
232, and 253 legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines. [9]
The petitioners sought a reconsideration. On December 5, 2003, however, the
Court denied their motion for reconsideration.[10] Hence, the decision in G.R.
No. 130876 became final and executory.
In late 2004, the Government, through the OSG, filed in the RTC a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution.[11] Cebu Country Club opposed the motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution in due course.
Later on, the proceedings on the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution at the instance of Cebu Country Club in deference to the on-going
hearings being conducted by the Committee on Natural Resources of the House
of Representatives on a proposed bill to confirm the TCTs and reconstituted
titles covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in Cebu City.[12] The Congress
ultimately enacted a law to validate the TCTs and reconstituted titles covering
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in Cebu City. This was Republic Act No. 9443,[13]
effective on July 27, 2007.
Thereafter, both Cebu Country Club and the OSG brought the passage of R.A.
No. 9443 to the attention of the RTC for its consideration in resolving the OSGs
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.[14] On December 28, 2007,
therefore, the RTC denied the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution through the first appealed order.[15]
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 1, 2008,
questioning the denial of the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution.[16]
Upon being directed by the RTC to comment on the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the OSG manifested in writing that the Government was no
longer seeking the execution of the decision in G.R. No. 130876, subject to its
reservation to contest any other titles within the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
should clear evidence show such titles as having been obtained through
fraud.[17]
After the filing of the OSGs comment, the RTC issued the second appealed
order, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration, giving the following
reasons:
1. The party who had a direct interest in the execution of the decision and
the reconsideration of the denial of the motion for execution was the
Government, represented only by the OSG; hence, the petitioners had no legal
standing to file the motion for reconsideration, especially that they were not
authorized by the OSG for that purpose;
2. R.A. No. 9443 confirms and declares as valid all existing TCTs and
reconstituted titles; thereby, the State in effect waived and divested itself of
whatever title or ownership over the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in favor of the
registered owners thereof, including Lot 727 D-2; and
3. The situation of the parties had materially changed, rendering the
enforcement of the final and executory judgment unjust, inequitable, and
impossible, because Cebu Country Club was now recognized by the State itself
as the absolute owner of Lot 727 D-2.[18]
Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Contentions of the Petitioners
The petitioners challenge the orders dated December 28, 2007 and April 29,
2009, because:
1. R.A. No. 9443 did not improve Cebu Country Clubs plight, inasmuch as
R.A. No. 9443 presupposed first a sales certificate that lacked the required
signature, but Cebu Country Club did not have such sales certificate. Moreover,
the titleholders were in fact the owners of the lands covered by their respective
titles, which was not true with Cebu Country Club due to its being already
adjudged with finality to be not the owner of Lot 727-D-2. Lastly, Cebu Country
Clubs title was hopelessly defective, as found by the Supreme Court itself;
2. The doctrine of law of the case barred the application of R.A. No. 9443 to
Cebu Country Club;
3. The RTCs declaration that R.A. No. 9443 confirmed Cebu Country Club as
the absolute owner of Lot 727-D-2 despite the prior and final judgment of the
Supreme Court that Cebu Country Club was not the owner was unconstitutional,
because it virtually allowed the legislative review of the Supreme Courts
decision rendered against Cebu Country Club;
4. The use of R.A. No. 9443 as a waiver on the part of the Government vis--
vis Cebu Country Club was not only misplaced but downrightly repugnant to Act
1120, the law governing the legal disposition and alienation of Friar Lands; and
5. The petitioners had the requisite standing to question the patent errors of
the RTC, especially in the face of the unholy conspiracy between the OSG and
Cebu Country Club, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the passage of
R.A. No. 9443 and DENR Memorandum No. 16, both of which in fact made their
predecessor Tomas N. Alonsos sales certificate and patent valid.[19]
Issues
The Court confronts and resolves the following issues, to wit:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were the real parties-in-interest to
question the denial by the RTC of the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution;
2. Whether or not R.A. No. 9443 gave the petitioners a legal interest to
assail the RTCs orders; and
3. Whether or not the petitioners can appeal by petition for review on
certiorari in behalf of the OSG.
Ruling
The petition for review is denied due course.
A. Preliminary Considerations: Petitioners contravene the hierarchy of courts,
and the petition is fatally defective
Before delving on the stated issues, the Court notes that the petitioners are
guilty of two violations that warrant the immediate dismissal of the petition for
review on certiorari.
The first refers to the petitioners breach of the hierarchy of courts by coming
directly to the Court to appeal the assailed issuances of the RTC via petition for
review on certiorari. They should not have done so, bypassing a review by the
Court of Appeals (CA), because the hierarchy of courts is essential to the
efficient functioning of the courts and to the orderly administration of justice.
Their non-observance of the hierarchy of courts has forthwith enlarged the
docket of the Court by one more case, which, though it may not seem
burdensome to the layman, is one case too much to the Court, which has to
devote time and effort in poring over the papers submitted herein, only to
discover in the end that a review should have first been made by the CA. The
time and effort could have been dedicated to other cases of importance and
impact on the lives and rights of others.
The hierarchy of courts is not to be lightly regarded by litigants. The CA stands
between the RTC and the Court, and its establishment has been precisely to
take over much of the work that used to be done by the Court. Historically, the
CA has been of the greatest help to the Court in synthesizing the facts, issues,
and rulings in an orderly and intelligible manner and in identifying errors that
ordinarily might escape detection. The Court has thus been freed to better
discharge its constitutional duties and perform its most important work, which,
in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco,[20] is less concerned with the decision of
cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of particular
individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies,
momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental
authority and its impact upon fundamental rights.[21]
The need to elevate the matter first to the CA is also underscored by the reality
that determining whether the petitioners were real parties in interest entitled to
bring this appeal against the denial by the RTC of the OSGs motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution was a mixed question of fact and law. As such,
the CA was in the better position to review and to determine. In that regard, the
petitioners violate Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
demands that an appeal by petition for review on certiorari be limited to
questions of law.[22]
The second violation concerns the omission of a sworn certification against
forum shopping from the petition for review on certiorari. Section 4, Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the petition for review should
contain, among others, the sworn certification on the undertakings provided in
the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
viz:
Section 2. xxx
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under
oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and
other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (n)
Only petitioner Tomas V. Alonso has executed and signed the sworn certification
against forum shopping attached to the petition. Although neither of his co-
petitioners Mercedes V. Alonso and Asuncion V. Alonso has joined the
certification, Tomas did not present any written express authorization in his
favor authorizing him to sign the certification in their behalf. The signing of the
certification by only one of the petitioners could not be presumed to reflect the
personal knowledge by his co-petitioners of the filing or non-filing of any similar
action or claim.[23] Hence, the failure of Mercedes and Asuncion to sign and
execute the certification along with Tomas warranted the dismissal of their
petition.[24]
B. Petitioners are not proper parties to appeal and assail the order of the RTC
The petitioners are relentless in insisting that their claim to Lot No. 727-D-2 of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate should be preferred to that of Cebu Country Club,
despite the final judgment in G.R. No. 130876 being adverse to their claim.
Their insistence raises the need to resolve once and for all whether or not the
petitioners retained any legal right to assert over Lot No. 727-D-2 following the
Governments manifest desistance from the execution of the judgment in G.R.
No. 130876 against Cebu Country Club.
The above-noted defects of the petition for review notwithstanding, therefore,
the Court has now to address and resolve the stated issues on the sole basis of
the results the Court earlier reached in G.R. No. 130876. In this regard, whether
or not the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this appeal is decisive.
After careful consideration, the Court finds that the cause of the petitioners
instantly fails.
In G.R. No. 130876, the Court found that the petitioners did not validly acquire
ownership of Lot No. 727-D-2, and declared that Lot No. 727 D-2 legally
belonged to the Government, thus:
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Cebu
Country Club, Inc. is owner of Lot No. 727.
Admittedly, neither petitioners nor their predecessor had any title to the land in
question. The most that petitioners could claim was that the Director of Lands
issued a sales patent in the name of Tomas N. Alonso. The sales patent,
however, and even the corresponding deed of sale were not registered with the
Register of Deeds and no title was ever issued in the name of the latter. This is
because there were basic requirements not complied with, the most important
of which was that the deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands was not
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the
deed of sale was void. Approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
is indispensable for the validity of the sale. Moreover, Cebu Country Club, Inc.
was in possession of the land since 1931, and had been paying the real estate
taxes thereon based on tax declarations in its name with the title number
indicated thereon. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are strong evidence of ownership. This Court has ruled that although
tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind will be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or constructive possession.
Notwithstanding this fatal defect, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was
substantial compliance with the requirement of Act No. 1120 to validly convey
title to said lot to Tomas N. Alonso.
On this point, the Court of Appeals erred.
Under Act No. 1120, which governs the administration and disposition of friar
lands, the purchase by an actual and bona fide settler or occupant of any
portion of friar land shall be agreed upon between the purchaser and the
Director of Lands, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (mutatis mutandis).
In his Memorandum filed on May 25, 2001, the Solicitor General submitted to
this Court certified copies of Sale Certificate No. 734, in favor of Leoncio Alburo,
and Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 734, in favor of Tomas N. Alonso.
Conspicuously, both instruments do not bear the signature of the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of the Interior. They also do not bear the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Only recently, in Jesus P. Liao v. Court of Appeals, the Court has ruled
categorically that approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce of the
sale of friar lands is indispensable for its validity, hence, the absence of such
approval made the sale null and void ab-initio. Necessarily, there can be no
valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment. Consequently,
petitioner Franciscos father did not have any registerable title to the land in
question. Having none, he could not transmit anything to his sole heir,
petitioner Francisco Alonso or the latters heirs.
In a vain attempt at showing that he had succeeded to the estate of his father,
on May 4, 1991, petitioner Francisco Alonso executed an affidavit adjudicating
the entire estate to himself (Exh. Q), duly published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province and city of Cebu (Exh. Q-1). Such affidavit of self-
adjudication is inoperative, if not void, not only because there was nothing to
adjudicate, but equally important because petitioner Francisco did not show
proof of payment of the estate tax and submit a certificate of clearance from the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Obviously, petitioner Francisco has not paid
the estate taxes.
Consequently, we rule that neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M.
Alonso or the latters heirs are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in dispute.
xxx.[25]
The pronouncement in G.R. No. 130876 renders beyond dispute that the non-
execution of the judgment would not adversely affect the petitioners, who now
hold no right whatsoever in Lot No. 727-D-2. Otherwise put, they are not the
proper parties to assail the questioned orders of the RTC, because they stand to
derive nothing from the execution of the judgment against Cebu Country Club.
Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or the rules.[26] A real party in
interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[27] Interest within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. The rule refers to a real or present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.[28] One having no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff
in an action.[29]
Thus, an appeal, like this one, is an action to be prosecuted by a party in
interest before a higher court. In order for the appeal to prosper, the litigant
must of necessity continue to hold a real or present substantial interest that
entitles him to the avails of the suit on appeal. If he does not, the appeal, as to
him, is an exercise in futility. So it is with the petitioners!
In contrast, the Government, being the legal owner of Lot No. 727-D-2, is the
only party adversely affected by the denial, and is the proper party entitled to
assail the denial.[30] However, its manifest desistance from the execution of
the decision effectively barred any challenge against the denial, for its non-
appeal rendered the denial final and immutable.
C. R.A. No. 9443 gives petitioners no legal interest to assail the denial of the
motion for execution
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9443 provides:
Section 1. All existing Transfer Certificates of Title and Reconstituted Certificates
of Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province and/or Cebu City
covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, notwithstanding the lack
of signatures and/or approval of the then Secretary of Interior (later Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources) and/or the then Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands (later Director of Public Lands) in the copies of the duly executed
Sale Certificates and Assignments of Sale Certificates, as the case may be, now
on file with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
Cebu City, are hereby declared as valid titles and the registered owners
recognized as absolute owners thereof.
The law expressly declares as valid (a)ll existing Transfer Certificates of Title
and Reconstituted Certificates of Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu Province and/or Cebu City covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate, and recognizes the registered owners as absolute owners. To benefit
from R.A. No. 9443, therefore, a person must hold as a condition precedent a
duly issued Transfer Certificate of Title or a Reconstituted Certificate of Title.
Although Lot 727-D-2 was earlier declared to be owned by the Government in
G.R. No. 130876, R.A. No. 9443 later validated Cebu Country Clubs registered
ownership due to its holding of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) in its own name. As
the OSG explained in its manifestation in lieu of comment[31] (filed in the RTC
vis--vis the petitioners motion for reconsideration against the RTCs denial of the
OSGs motion for issuance of a writ of execution), the enactment of R.A. No.
9443 had mooted the final and executory Decision of the Supreme Court in
Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., docketed as G.R. No. 130876, which
declared the Government as the owner of Lot 727-D-2 based on the absence of
signature and approval of the then Secretary of Interior; and that the decision
in G.R. No. 130876 had ceased to have any practical effect as the result of the
enactment of R.A. No. 9443, and had thereby become academic.[32]
On the other hand, the petitioners could not benefit from R.A. No. 9443 because
of their non-compliance with the express condition of holding any Transfer
Certificate of Title or Reconstituted Certificate of Title respecting Lot 727-D-2 or
any portion thereof.
The appropriate recourse for the petitioners, if they persist in the belief that the
TCT of Cebu Country Club should be nullified, is to compel the OSG through the
special civil action for mandamus to commence the action to annul on the
ground that Cebu Country Club had obtained its title to Lot 7217-D-2 through
fraud. Yet, that recourse is no longer availing, for the decision in G.R. No.
130876 explicitly found and declared that the reconstituted title of Cebu Country
Club had not been obtained through fraud. Said the Court:
On the question that TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) bears the same number as
another title to another land, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is
nothing fraudulent with the fact that Cebu Country Club, Inc.s reconstituted title
bears the same number as the title of another parcel of land. This came about
because under General Land Registration Office (GLRO) Circular No. 17, dated
February 19, 1947, and Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 6, RD 3, dated
August 5, 1946, which were in force at the time the title was reconstituted on
July 26, 1948, the titles issued before the inauguration of the Philippine Republic
were numbered consecutively and the titles issued after the inauguration were
numbered also consecutively starting with No. 1, so that eventually, the titles
issued before the inauguration were duplicated by titles issued after the
inauguration of the Philippine Republic. xxx.
xxx
Petitioners next argue that the reconstituted title of Cebu Country Club, Inc. had
no lawful source to speak of; it was reconstituted through extrinsic and intrinsic
fraud in the absence of a deed of conveyance in its favor. In truth, however,
reconstitution was based on the owners duplicate of the title, hence, there was
no need for the covering deed of sale or other modes of conveyance. Cebu
Country Club, Inc. was admittedly in possession of the land since long before
the Second World War, or since 1931. In fact, the original title (TCT No. 11351)
was issued to the United Service Country Club, Inc. on November 19, 1931 as a
transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1021. More importantly, Cebu
Country Club, Inc. paid the realty taxes on the land even before the war, and
tax declarations covering the property showed the number of the TCT of the
land. Cebu Country Club, Inc. produced receipts showing real estate tax
payments since 1949. On the other hand, petitioner failed to produce a single
receipt of real estate tax payment ever made by his father since the sales
patent was issued to his father on March 24, 1926. Worse, admittedly petitioner
could not show any [T]orrens title ever issued to Tomas N. Alonso, because, as
said, the deed of sale executed on March 27, 1926 by the Director of Lands was
not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and could
not be registered. Under the law, it is the act of registration of the deed of
conveyance that serves as the operative act to convey the land registered under
the Torrens system. The act of registration creates constructive notice to the
whole world of the fact of such conveyance. On this point, petitioner alleges that
Cebu Country Club, Inc. obtained its title by fraud in connivance with personnel
of the Register of Deeds in 1941 or in 1948, when the title was administratively
reconstituted. Imputations of fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Petitioner failed to adduce evidence of fraud. In an action for re-
conveyance based on fraud, he who charges fraud must prove such fraud in
obtaining a title. In this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed. The strongest
suspicion cannot sway judgment or overcome the presumption of regularity. The
sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without
rudder or compass. Worse, the imputation of fraud was so tardily brought, some
forty-four (44) years or sixty-one (61) years after its supposed occurrence, that
is, from the administrative reconstitution of title on July 26, 1948, or from the
issuance of the original title on November 19, 1931, that verification is rendered
extremely difficult, if not impossible, especially due to the supervening event of
the second world war during which practically all public records were lost or
destroyed, or no longer available.[33]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review on certiorari is denied for
lack of merit.
The Court declares that Cebu Country Club, Inc. is the exclusive owner of Lot
No.727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, as confirmed by Republic Act No.
9443. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999]
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA
PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which
further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this
petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to
prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases
Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and
documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime
syndicate which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila,
were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-
Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief
Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The
ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command
(TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.;
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by
petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District
Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the
Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief
Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC,
that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary
execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng
gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of
investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolve from any criminal
liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995
incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police
operation.[1]
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa
modified the Blancaflor panels finding and recommended the indictment for
multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner
and intervenors. This recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman,
except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged
as principal in eleven (11) informations for murder[2] before the
Sandiganbayans Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco
Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as accessories
after-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations,[3] the Sandiganbayan
allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action.[4]
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996
eleven (11) amended informations[5] before the Sandiganbayan, wherein
petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the accused[6] was dropped from the
case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.[7] They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or more of the "principal accused are government officials with
Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector,
and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9,
1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon
concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,[9] the
Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases
transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and
exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the
rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan.
This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even
before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended
informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299[10] and No. 1094[11]
(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II,
respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844[12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali
Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the
phrase principal accused in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249[13].
The law is entitled, AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. It took effect on February 25, 1997.13 by the President of the
Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution[14] denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor,
ruling that it stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996.
On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5,
1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in
it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting
opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the
Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent
provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of
granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutors motion for
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and
dissenting opinion.
xxxxxxxxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M.
Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of
arrest has been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these
cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 to 2,
the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases and by the
unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting, retained
jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.[16] [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249,
including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law shall apply to all
cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof. Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the authors
thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which
petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction
thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the
Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a
pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court,
the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to
render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners vested
rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again
made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioners cases were under,
namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make
certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex
post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in
Criminal Case Nos. 23047 23057 to procedural due process
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the
old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title-one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.[17]
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that while
Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said
statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post
facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong
Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.[18] They further argued that
if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due
process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal
to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to
the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed separate
pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the
law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-
intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file
simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice
thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended
informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently alleged the
commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning
Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of
the Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the
nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in
the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of
the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers and employees including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the
following provision in Article XI, Section 4:
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486[21]
created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the
Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22]
Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No. 1860,[24] P.D. No.
1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.[27] Under the latest
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or
higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgment, resolution or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of
the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising
or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals,
shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In
all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases pending in any
court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A.
7975 provides:
SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of high
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or
their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals
from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the
accused are occupying positions lower than grade 27, or not otherwise covered
by the preceding enumeration.
xxxxxxxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial has not
begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word principal before the
word accused appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of
R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word principal that the
parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the Subject criminal cases
since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank
of Superintendent[28] or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the
People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases,[29] contends that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on
ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code (the law on bribery),[30] (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-
A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),[31] or (e) other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing
the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee[32]
holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3)
the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with
murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code,
the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph but
paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to other offenses
or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A.
8249] in relation to their office. The phrase other offenses or felonies is too
broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation
to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs
a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal
participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a
principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply
restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the
criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate
their right to equal protection of the law[33] because its enactment was
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan,
is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the
entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness.[34]
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class,[35]
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption
of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The
classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public
officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been
affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249,
as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the
law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences.[36] In the first
instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter
the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and
presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the
jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations,[37] it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily
affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of
a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that
Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly
situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply
to all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision
in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and
intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases
where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under
Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised
on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of
the Sandiganbayan[38] for their participation in the passage of the said
provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the
Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as
he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the
object of the deletion of the word principal in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D.
1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.[39] R.A. 8249,
while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by
about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and
House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against
petitioner during the committee hearings, the same would not constitute
sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and
participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress
since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is
the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress,
in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution
to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation.[40]
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law[41] for
they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer
avail of the two tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A.
7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249.
In Calder v. Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which
was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed;
or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when it was committed,
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in
order to convict the defendant.[43]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the
situation of a person to his disadvantage.[44]
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he
has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal,
or a proclamation of amnesty.[45]
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.[46] R.A.
8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal
in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations;[47] or those that define crimes,
treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.[48] R.A. 7975, which
amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of
appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a
penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice.[49] Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249
cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal
which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A.
8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court
several times[50] considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but
statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure
provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition
against ex post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure,
and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex
post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come
within the prohibition.[52] Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence
or the mode of trial.[53] It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[54]
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds right to appeal to the
Supreme Court to review questions of law.[55] On the removal of the
intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to
determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome.[56]
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject
provisions of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the
title of the law that it defines the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it
allegedly does is to expand its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary
consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only
have one subject expressed in the title[57] is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the
general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.[58] Such rule is severally
interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction.
There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A.
8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the
provisions of the law are germane to that general subject.[59] The Congress, in
employing the word define in the title of the law, acted within its powers since
Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.[60]
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory
provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as
provided in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the
allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner
and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The
elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to
ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule
that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information,[61] and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the
trial.[62]
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors
falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the
offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in
order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional
requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction
over criminal cases committed by public officers and employees, including those
in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as
may be determined by law. This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the
new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple
murder was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is intimately connected with
the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of
his official functions.[65] This intimate relation between the offense charged and
the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information.[66]
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language
without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the
offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the
court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the charge is
the actual recital of the facts.[67] The real nature of the criminal charges is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.[68]
The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was
explained in U.S. v. Karelsen:[69]
The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the accused with
such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense, and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court
of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law Every crime is made up of
certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances.
In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are
imputed to him as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.[70]
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the
amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors
wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection
between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the
offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations[71] for
murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman
hereby accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN
SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F.
CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON,
SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF
INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP.
GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR
TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO
LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the
crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code committed as follows:
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE,
SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of
their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine
National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public
office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strengths did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR.
SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF INSP.
GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to
office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged
herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above
alleged by among others falsely representing that there were no arrests made
during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision,
Paraaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY TO LAW
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal
accused committed the crime of murder in relation to their public office, there
is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official
duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate
that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the
latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner
and intervenors as among the accessories after-the-fact, the amended
information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories
concealed the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, on or about
the early dawn of May 18, 1995. The sudden mention of the arrests made
during the raid conducted by the accused surprises the reader. There is no
indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the raid. Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly
conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila but, as alleged in
the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting
of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue,
Quezon City. How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two places far
away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the
amended information that the said accessories committed the offense in relation
to office as officers and members of the (PNP), we, however, do not see the
intimate connection between the offense charged and the accuseds official
functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as
will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that
the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed
by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase
is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accuseds official
duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial
Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where the amended information
alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of
police patrol and civilian commandos consisting of regular policemen and x x x
special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power
guns and then established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his
command x x x supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed,
entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations,
as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due
process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line
with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting
upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who
died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been
committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal
motive in committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate connection
between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in
the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the
victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The
informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or
extorting the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two
victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said
victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that
shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase
committed in relation to public office does not appear in the information, which
only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to
qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge
of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of
the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is
plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court,[73] not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby
sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over said cases.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELITO P. MAGNO, G.R. No. 171542 Petitioner, - versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. April 6, 2011
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through a petition for review on certiorari,[1] petitioner Angelito P. Magno
seeks the reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
September 26, 2005[2] in People of the Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Augustine A.
Vestil, Presiding Judge, RTC Mandaue City, Br. 56, et al. (docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 79809), and its Resolution dated February 6, 2006[3] denying
respondents motion for reconsideration.[4] The assailed rulings denied the
petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and upheld the
ruling[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, which precluded
Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy from acting as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No.
DU-10123.[6]
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On May 14, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder against several accused,
including Magno, who were public officers working under the National Bureau of
Investigation.[7]
During the scheduled arraignment, Magno, in open court, objected to the formal
appearance and authority of Atty. Sitoy, who was there as private prosecutor to
prosecute the case for and on behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.[8] The
oral objection was reduced to writing on July 21, 2003 when Magno filed an
opposition[9] before Branch 56 of the RTC of Mandaue City, citing the provisions
of Section 31 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.[10]
The Office of the Ombudsman submitted its comment,[11] while the accused
submitted their joint opposition.[12] The respondents likewise submitted their
comments to the opposition of the other co-accused.[13]
On September 25, 2003, the RTC issued an Order, ruling that the Ombudsman
is proper, legal and authorized entity to prosecute this case to the exclusion of
any other entity/person other than those authorized under R.A. 6770.[14]
In open court, the Office of the Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of
the Order, which the RTC later denied in its October 1, 2003 Order.[15]
Proceedings before the CA
On October 13, 2003, the respondents, through the Ombudsman for the Visayas
and Atty. Sitoy, filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.[16] They contended
that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting the
appearance of Atty. Sitoy as counsel for the private offended parties, as the
Rules of Court expressly provides that a private offended party may intervene,
by counsel, in the prosecution of offenses.[17]
Magno, in his comment[18] filed on December 15, 2003, insisted that what he
questioned before the RTC was the appearance and authority of the private
prosecutor to prosecute the case in behalf of the Ombudsman.[19] He stressed
that while the Office of the Ombudsman can designate prosecutors to assist in
the prosecution of criminal cases, its authority in appointing, deputizing or
authorizing prosecutors to prosecute cases is confined only to fiscals, state
prosecutors and government lawyers. It does not extend to private
practitioners/private prosecutors.[20] He further stressed that while the Order
of the RTC states that the Office of the Ombudsman is the proper legal and
authorized entity to prosecute the case, it did not affect the right to intervene
personally, as the Office of the Ombudsman can take the cudgels for the private
respondents in prosecuting the civil aspect of the case.[21]
On February 16, 2005, the CA, in its original Decision, declared that the private
prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in the case, but only insofar as the
prosecution of the civil aspect of the case is concerned.[22]
The respondents moved for the reconsideration[23] of the CA decision. On
September 26, 2005, the CA amended its decision,[24] ruling that the private
prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in Criminal Case No. DU-10123 to
intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in collaboration with any
lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case.[25]
Failing to obtain a reconsideration[26] of the amended CA decision, Magno
elevated the dispute to this Court through the present petition for review on
certiorari[27] filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
Magno submits that the CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
certiorari; the power to hear and decide that question is with the
Sandiganbayan.[28] To support this contention, Magno invokes Engr. Teodoto
B. Abbot v. Hon. Judge Hilario I. Mapayo, etc., et al.[29] where the Court held
that the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive power to issue petitions for certiorari
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[30]
Even if the Court were to set aside this procedural lapse, Magno adds, the
private prosecutor cannot be allowed to intervene for the respondents as it
would violate Section 31 of RA No. 6770.[31] Section 31 limits the
Ombudsmans prerogative to designate prosecutors to fiscals, state prosecutors
and government lawyers. It does not, Magno maintains, allow the Ombudsman
to deputize private practitioners to prosecute cases for and on behalf of the
Office of the Ombudsman.[32]
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
submitted its memorandum on February 8, 2008. Substantively, the
Ombudsman maintains that Atty. Sitoy may intervene in the case pursuant to
Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil
action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to
Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense.
The Ombudsman maintains that Section 31 of RA No. 6770 did not amend
Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.[33] Section 31 merely allows the
Ombudsman to designate and deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in
the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in
the investigation and prosecution in certain cases.[34] The Ombudsman opines
that the two provisions of law are not diametrically opposed nor in conflict,[35]
as a private prosecutor may appear for the private offended complainants in the
prosecution of an offense independent of the exclusive right of the Ombudsman
to deputize.[36] The Ombudsman, however, did not address the contention that
the Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTC in this
case.
THE COURTS RULING
We resolve to grant the petition.
The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTCs
decision not to allow Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the
Ombudsman

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4
thereof establishes the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
xxxx
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection of this
section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise
of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising
or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals,
shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In
all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in,
the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or to appropriate courts, the filing
of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the
criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil
action had theretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be deemed abandoned." [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
This is clear: the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
resolutions issued by RTCs in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of
their appellate jurisdiction.
We reaffirmed this rule in Abbot.[37] In that case, petitioner Engr. Abbot filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion for not dismissing the information for Malversation thru Falsification of
Public Document. The CA refused to take cognizance of the case, holding that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition. Recognizing the
amendments made to PD No. 1606 by RA No. 7975,[38] we sustained the CAs
position since Section 4 of PD No. 1606 has expanded the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction to include petitions for mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.[39]
In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for
certiorari filed by Magno. While it is true that the interlocutory order issued by
the RTC is reviewable by certiorari, the same was incorrectly filed with the CA.
Magno should have filed the petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan,
which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are
public officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators of
the National Bureau of Investigation.[40]
The CA should have dismissed the petition outright. Since it acted without
authority, we overrule the September 26, 2005 Amended Decision of the CA and
the subsequent denial of Magnos motions for reconsideration.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
the CAs judgment, issued without
jurisdiction, is void.
There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is
conferred by law,[41] and any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is
void[42] and cannot be given any effect.[43] This rule applies even if the issue
on jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal or even after final
judgment.[44]
We reiterated and clarified the rule further in Felicitas M. Machado, et al. v.
Ricardo L. Gatdula, et al.,[45] as follows:
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties
action or conduct. Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of
action to a tribunal where none, by law, exists. In Lozon v. NLRC, we declared
that:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter.
Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time,
during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind
of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the
parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.
We note that Magno had already raised in his supplemental motion for
reconsideration before the CA[46] the ground of lack of jurisdiction before the
CAs Decision became final. The CA did not even consider this submission,
choosing instead to brush it aside for its alleged failure to raise new or
substantial grounds for reconsideration.[47] Clearly, however, its lack of
jurisdiction is a new and substantial argument that the CA should have passed
upon.
The Office of the Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel to cure
the jurisdictional defect of its petition before the CA
The Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel in this case
since Magno raised the issue of jurisdiction before the CAs decision became
final. Further, even if the issue had been raised only on appeal to this Court, the
CAs lack of jurisdiction could still not be cured. In Machado,[48] citing People of
the Philippines v. Rosalina Casiano,[49] we held:
In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory
that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing
such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel. However if the lower court
had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such,
for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to
adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent
position that the lower court had jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari, and
DECLARE the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79809, promulgated on September 26, 2005, as well as its Resolution of
February 6, 2006, NULL AND VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction.
The respondents are hereby given fifteen (15) days from the finality of this
Decision within which to seek recourse from the Sandiganbayan. No costs.
[ GR No. 147678-87, Jul 07, 2004 ]
PEOPLE v. EFREN MATEO Y GARCIA 477 Phil. 752
VITUG, J.:
On 30 October 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape,
allegedly committed on ten different dates - 07 October 1995, 14 December
1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 29 February 1996, 08 May 1996, 02
July 1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996 - were filed
against appellant EFREN MATEO. Except for the variance in dates, the ten
informations, later docketed Criminal Cases No. 9351 to No. 9360, inclusive, in
the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, uniformly read -
"The undersigned OIC Provincial Prosecutor upon preliminary investigation
conducted by the MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1, accuses Efren Mateo of Brgy.
Buenavista, Tarlac, Tarlac of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
"That on or about January 12, 1996, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Efren Mateo y Garcia, who is the guardian of the complaining witness,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force
and intimidation have carnal knowledge with said Imelda C. Mateo in their
house against her consent."[1]
The trial ensued following a plea of "not guilty" entered by appellant to all the
charges.
According to Imelda Mateo, she was born on 11 September 1980 to the spouses
Dan Icban and Rosemarie Capulong. Rosemarie Capulong and appellant started
to live together without the benefit of marriage when private complainant was
only two years old. Imelda stayed with her mother and appellant in a house in
Buenavista, Tarlac, and adopted the surname of appellant when she started
schooling.
Imelda recalled that each time the ten rape incidents occurred her mother,
Rosemarie, was not at home. On 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape,
Rosemarie went to Bamban and returned home only the next day. The second
rape was said to have occurred on 14 December 1995, while her mother was
attending a seminar for day-care workers. Imelda recalled the third rape to
have been committed on 05 January 1996, the same day her mother resigned
from her job and left for Manila. The fourth rape, she said, happened a week
later, on 12 January 1996, when Rosemarie Capulong was attending yet another
seminar for day-care workers. The fifth incident was on 29 February 1996,
when Rosemarie left for Manila to follow-up her application for an overseas job.
The sixth rape took place on 08 May 1996 when Rosemarie was once again in
Manila to attend to her application papers. On 01 July 1996, Rosemarie and
appellant left for Manila as Rosemarie was scheduled to depart for Jeddah.
Appellant returned home in the evening of the next day, 02 July 1996, the same
day the job recruiter relayed the news that Rosemarie Capulong could not yet
leave for Jeddah. During the night, appellant again molested Imelda. With
Rosemarie finally away, appellant frequented his nocturnal visits. On the night
of 18 July 1996, appellant went into her room and abused her while her siblings
were sleeping in the sala. The same incident was repeated on the night of 16
August 1996 when appellant, already naked, entered the room and sexually
assaulted Imelda. The last rape was committed on 28 August 1996. According
to private complainant, she never reported any of the ten incidents to anybody
because the accused had threatened to kill her and her mother if she were to
disclose the matter to anyone.
Imelda stated that each of the ten rape incidents were committed in invariably
the same fashion. All were perpetrated inside the house in Buenavista, Tarlac,
during the night and, each time, she would try to ward off his advances by
kicking him but that he proved to be too strong for her. These incidents
occurred in the presence of her three sleeping siblings who failed to wake up
despite the struggles she exerted to fend off the advances. She recalled that in
all ten instances, appellant had covered her mouth with a handkerchief to
prevent her from shouting. Subsequently, however, she changed her statement
to say that on two occasions, particularly the alleged sexual assaults on 02 July
1996 and 18 July 1996, appellant had only covered her mouth with his hands.
Still much later, Imelda testified that he had not covered her mouth at all.
The predictable pattern of the rape incidents testified to by Imelda prompted
the defense to ask her whether she had, at any one time, taken any protective
measure in anticipation of the rape incidents. She replied that once she had
requested her brothers and sister to keep her company in the bedroom at
night but appellant had scolded them. On the night of the fourth rape, she
narrated that she armed herself with a knife but, when appellant entered her
room that night, she was not able to retrieve the bladed weapon from under the
bed as appellant was sitting right on top of it.
Dr. Rosario Fider, the second witness for the prosecution, stated that she had
physically examined private complainant on 14 October 1996 and found
superficially healed lacerations at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 positions on her private
organ that could have been caused by an insertion of an instrument or by
sexual intercourse. According to Dr. Fider, the lacerations pointed to possibly
one or two, and at most three, incidents of rape, which had happened not
earlier than two weeks before the date of the physical examination.
Appellant denied each of the charges. On 07 October 1995, the date of the first
rape, he claimed that he was in Barangay Talaga, Capas, to pick up newly
hatched ducklings, numbering about a thousand, which had to be properly fed,
kept warm and constantly cared for that required him to be around the entire
day and night for two weeks. The fowls had then to be brought into an open
field located one and a half kilometers away which could be traversed by foot.
He continued to tend to the animals from 20 October 1995 until sometime in
February 1996. During the period, he was able to go home only once a week
or three times a month.
On 14 December 1995, the supposed date of the second rape, appellant
admitted that he had temporarily left the care of his ducks to go caroling with
his wife, their daughter Imelda and some friends. He immediately returned to
care for his ducks, located some 500 meters from their residence, that kept him
busy and away from home when the third, fourth and fifth rape incidents were
said to have taken place on the 5th and 12th of January and 29th of February of
1996. While he admitted to leaving occasionally the animals in order to go
home, these visits, however, were said to be brief and mainly for getting some
food and fresh clothes. Appellant could not recall when exactly he sold the
ducks but it was definitely prior to 08 May 1996, the day he was accepted and
reported for work at the LA Construction of Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac, located
some three kilometers away. On 08 May 1996, the date of the sixth rape, he
was at work from seven o'clock in the morning until the following day to finish a
rush job.
On 01 July 1996, he accompanied his wife, Rosemarie, to Manila who was
scheduled to leave for Jeddah the following day. Upon being advised that her
flight was postponed, the couple stayed in the house of one Luding Sevilla in
Caloocan. On 03 July, he returned to Tarlac. From 15 July to September, 1996,
he was given the nightshift at the LA Construction. Appellant asserted that it
was impossible for him to have raped private complainant on 28 August 1996
because at six o'clock that evening, his friends Boy Botio, Boy Pineda, Marvin
Dalangin and Nelson Castro had picked him up at his house to attend the fiesta
at Barangay Murcia, Concepcion, Tarlac, where they spent the night.
Appellant dismissed the charges against him as being the malicious "retribution"
of a vengeful stepdaughter. Allegedly, on 11 October 1996, he took private
complainant to task after his son, Marlon Mateo, who had reported seeing her
engaged in sexual intercourse with one Pikong Navarro inside the room of their
house. Earlier, on 05 August 1996, he also learned that Sharon Flores, a
neighbor and a friend of private complainant, had caught his stepdaughter and
Navarro in a very compromising position. In anger, he hit Imelda twice with a
piece of bamboo. He then forbade her from going out at night and leaving her
siblings alone in the house.
Rosemarie Capulong, the mother of private complainant, rose to testify in
defense of her common-law husband. Capulong asserted that she had not at
any time, prior to her departure for Jeddah, spent any night outside their house.
Rosemarie said that she was a day-care teacher from June 1990 until June
1996. On 07 October 1995, the date of the supposed first rape, she was at
home and did not go to Bamban as so claimed by private complainant.
Capulong disputed the claim of private complainant that she attended a seminar
for day-care workers on 12 January 1996 since her job did not require her to
attend seminars except for regular meetings held on the last Friday of every
month, with each meeting lasting for only half a day. The last seminar she had
attended was in June of 1990 in Tarlac. On 29 February 1996, Rosemarie was
also certain that she spent the night at home as she had to report for work the
following day. She started obtaining documents for her planned employment
abroad only on 12 February 1996, when she secured her birth certificate in
Bamban as so attested by the date appearing on the certification from the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Bamban. On 08 May 1996, she admitted being away
from home while attending a general assembly of day-care workers in
Zambales. On that day, appellant was likewise not at home due to his overtime
work up until about three or four o'clock in the early morning. Imelda herself,
Capulong testified, had attended on that day the San Miguel fiesta. Contrary to
the allegation of private complainant, the witness was not in Manila on the 5th
and 12th of January 1996 because, at that time, she had yet no plans of
working overseas. She denied the assertions of private complainant that
Capulong had resigned from her day-care work on 05 January 1996, saying it
was actually months later, or in June of 1996, when she quit her job. It was on
13 February 1996 when she went to Manila for the first time to attend to her
application for a possible overseas work. She made subsequent trips to the
city, that is, on the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 24th of the month of June, to follow-up
her employment papers and to submit herself to a medical check-up. All these
visits only took a day, and she would always be home in Buenavista at nightfall.
On 01 July 1996, appellant accompanied her to Manila but, upon learning that
her flight was postponed, they spent the night in Caloocan. The couple stayed
together in Manila until 03 July 1996, when appellant decided to return to
Tarlac. Rosemarie worked in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, until 11 November 1996
when she decided to return home.
Rosemarie Capulong corroborated the testimony of appellant regarding his
whereabouts from October 1995, when the ducks were first brought to the field,
until 15 December 1995, when appellant had joined her and their friends
caroling. Capulong believed that the charges may have been fabricated by her
relatives who were "jealous" of appellant because it was he, not they, who had
been receiving the remittances of her earnings from Saudi Arabia.
Sharon Flores, a neighbor, testified that, about noontime on 05 August 1996,
she repaired to the house of private complainant to investigate rumors
regarding a man seen entering the Capulong residence. When she went in, she
saw private complainant and Pikong Navarro lying on the bed, embracing each
other under a blanket.
Anselmo Botio, a friend of appellant, and Marlon Mateo, a brother of private
complainant, corroborated appellant's alibi. Botio said that on 28 August 1996,
at six o'clock in the evening, he, together with appellant and some friends, went
to attend the fiesta in Barangay Murcia upon the invitation of one Ruben Santos.
The group arrived in Murcia at seven o'clock that evening and promptly had
dinner and a drinking spree which lasted until the morning of the next day.
Marlon Mateo testified that one day in October 1996, while his mother was
working overseas, he arrived home from school, and saw Pikong Navarro and
private complainant, both naked, on the bed. Navarro was on top of private
complainant and was making thrusting motions. Marlon Mateo hurriedly left to
report the incident to his father.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision, dated 23
January 2001, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10)
counts of rape -
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
ten (10) counts of rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and to indemnify the complainant the
sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages for
each count of rape."[2]
More often than not, the Court has deemed it sufficient to convict an accused
for rape solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim.[3] The heavy reliance
normally given by the Court on the narration of the victim finds justification on
the fact that, generally, she would be the sole witness to the incident and the
shy and demure character of the typical Filipina would preclude her from
fabricating that crime. It is imperative, nonetheless, that the testimony must
be convincing and straightforward in order to avoid any serious doubt from
being cast on the veracity of the account given.
Relative to the first supposed rape incident, private complainant categorically
stated that she had slept in the lone bedroom of the house while her siblings
and her stepfather slept in the sala
"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?
"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Q. How did (sic) he able to take you out from the room? In what way?
"A. She (sic) lifted me and still my mouth was covered, my hands were
stocked and I cannot move, sir.
"Q. She (sic) lifted you by his two hands, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir."[4]
"Q. You testified on direct examination that there is only one room in your
house, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And you were then sleeping inside your house in that one room, is that
right?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. While your brothers as well as your stepfather were then sleeping outside
your room, you [were] also sleeping, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir."[5]
In the next breath, however, she testified that all her three siblings were
sleeping with her on the night of 07 October 1995 -
"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?
"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.
"Q. Do you want to tell this Honorable Court that he brought you to the sala
where your brothers Ryan and Marlon and your sister Iris were then sleeping?
"A. My brothers and sister were sleeping in the room, sir.
"Q. Is it not a fact that there was only one room in your house?
"A. But they slept there on that night, sir.
"Q. In other words, Madam Witness, you were sleeping together with Ryan,
Marlon, and Iris by that time in one room together in one bed?
"A. Yes, sir."[6]
Still, later, Imelda changed her testimony and said that her brothers were in the
sala and that it was only her sister Iris who was with her in the bedroom when
the rape incidents were committed -
"Q. How about your brother Ryan where did he sleep on October 7, 1995?
"A. At the sala, sir.
"Q. Who was with him in the sala?
"A. He [was] sleeping with my stepfather and my brother Marlon, sir.
"Q. How about Iris, where was she sleeping?
"A. She was with me, sir.
"Q. You mean to imply to the Court that according to you the accused abused
you on October 7, 1995, Iris [was] with you in the room?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Are you sure of that?
"A. Yes, sir.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Q. You stated in your direct testimony that on October 7, 1995 your father
entered your room where you were sleeping, covering your mouth and forced
you to go to the sala, do you recall that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember that you have testified that he was able to take you
to the sala?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And then when you reached the sala, you stated that the accused
criminally abused you?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember having been asked by the prosecutor examining
you, and now I cite to you your statement; `Q - Public Prosecutor Llobrera,
`Now, let us make it clear. You said you were brought to the sala and your
answer, `Yes, sir.''' Do you not remember having made that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And another question, `When you reached the sala what were the first
things he did to you and your answer, `He kissed me, sir.'' Do you remember
that?
"A. No, sir. The first time he abused me was in the room, sir."[7]
The Solicitor General would posit that the claim of private complainant that she
had the sole privilege of sleeping in the lone bedroom of their house while the
rest of the family, namely both her parents and her three siblings, had to
squeeze themselves in the sala strained credulity, and that the testimony of her
mother, Rosemarie Capulong, to the effect that the couple were the occupants
of the single bedroom while their children stayed in the sala where the television
was located, made more sense.
Imelda testified that her three siblings - Marlon, Ryan and Iris - were sleeping
inside the house every time the rape incidents were committed. The identical
testimony of everyone else in the Mateo household, including her mother
Rosemarie Capulong and brother Marlon Mateo, exposed such assertions to be a
blatant lie and categorically stated that Ryan himself had never stayed in the
Mateo residence because he was living with his grandparents since childhood.
Private complainant testified that during the rape incidents she was gagged with
a handkerchief which rendered her unable to shout for help. Later on, however,
she gave different versions on whether appellant covered her mouth with his
hand or with a handkerchief during the rape incidents occurring on 07 October
1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28
August 1996. Eventually, she repudiated her earlier testimony by stating that
appellant had never covered her mouth, either with a handkerchief or with his
hand -
"Q. Both the incidents of July 2 and July 18, according to you, he only covered
your mouth on both occasions?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. He did not tie your mouth with anything?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Miss Witness, in your statement also on August 20, 1997, you stated that
the accused covered your mouth and tied your mouth with a handkerchief on
both occasions. Do you remember having given that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. So, you do not remember having made that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Recalling your testimony you gave on August 20, 1997, for the July 2
occasion and
the testimony that you gave as appearing on page 18 of the transcript of
stenographic notes. These questions and answers were given and answered by
you. `Q. While he was doing all these things to you, did you call for help? A.
I cannot shout because my mouth was covered with a handkerchief, sir. Q.
Was he holding that handkerchief? A. It was tied, sir.' On July 17, 1997, you
said that the accused tied your mouth on July 2, 1996, and you said that you
cannot shout because your mouth was tied with a handkerchief. Do you
remember having stated that?
"A. No, sir.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Q. On the July 18 occasion, you also stated in your direct testimony on
August 29, 1997, when asked these following questions appearing on page 21
of the transcript of stenographic notes. `Q. Tell the Court how did he rape you
on that night? A. On that night while I was sleeping in my room, he tied a
handkerchief in my mouth so I could not shout, sir.' Do you remember having
stated that?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And also you were asked this question: `Q. After tying this handkerchief
to your mouth, what did he do to you?' You said that he raped you. Do you
remember having given this statement?
"A. No, sir."[8]
Also quite telling were some discrepancies in the testimony of private
complainant regarding the whereabouts of her mother Rosemarie Capulong on
the dates of the incidents. According to private complainant, it was when her
mother Rosemarie was not at home when appellant would commit the dastardly
crimes. Not only did the account of Imelda contradict that of Rosemarie but
that Imelda herself would appear to have made irreconcilable statements.
According to her, on 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie had
gone to Bamban to visit her mother. Subsequently, however, she said that
Rosemarie went to Bamban because she worked there, only to later say that, at
that time, Rosemarie had already resigned from work. Imelda would further
change her story by stating that Rosemarie Capulong did not report for work
that day; then, in a quick turnaround, she remarked that her mother did go to
Bamban not to work but to get her birth certificate. Interestingly, Imelda said
that 07 October 1995 was a working day, and that she had gone to school the
following day. Judicial notice could be taken of the fact, however, that 07
October 1995 was a Saturday and that the following day, a Sunday, could not
have been a school day. With respect to the rape committed on 12 January
1996, Imelda testified that Rosemarie was attending a seminar; yet, when
cross-examined, she told the trial court that on that day Rosemarie went to
Manila to borrow money from her cousin.
The subsequent conduct of a victim could also either confirm or negate her
claim of rape.[9] The human nature, characterized by an instinct for self-
preservation and an aversion to humiliation, would dictate that a typical victim
of rape could display changes in behavior, erratic mood swings and an alteration
in her daily routine. No such changes were observed in the case of private
complainant. She testified that on the day after the first incident on 07 October
1995, she woke up at six o'clock in the morning, washed her face, and went to
school. There was no apparent attempt on her part to run away from home
despite every chance to escape from her tormentor or to exercise every means
available to ensure that the incidents would not be repeated. At fifteen years
old, already old enough to think of her safety and well-being, Imelda Mateo
went about her usual business as if nothing unusual had occurred. She
continued to sleep in the same bedroom with nary any precaution against the
bestiality she was sure would come everytime her mother was away.
While it may be argued that appellant's moral ascendancy over Imelda was
enough to intimidate her to suffer in silence; still, it could well be improbable for
a victim who had been raped no less than ten times not to make a simple outcry
against her unarmed rapist when she had every opportunity to do so.
The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial court and
recommends an acquittal of appellant.
The records would disclose that the first half of the trial, from 17 July 1997 until
15 October 1997, was conducted by Judge Lino L. Diamsay. Judge Edgardo F.
Sundiam conducted the trial from 14 January 1999 until 24 February 1999.
From 11 May 1999 until the day of the last hearing, it was Judge Arsenio P.
Adriano who heard the case. While this change of the presiding judges would
not invalidate the proceedings, it did deny to the deciding magistrate the
opportunity to observe in entirety the demeanor of the witnesses which could
well be vital to the decision-making process, particularly where credibility would,
by and large, constitute the singular issue.
The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a
verdict of guilt.
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over
all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same
occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987
Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts
in:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher."
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659,[10] as
well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule 122,[11] Section 10 of
Rule 122,[12] Section 13 of Rule 124[13] and Section 3 of Rule 125[14] of the
Rules of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision
is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in
the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or
review in favor of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has
been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of
herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be
sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from
the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma,
i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the
Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the
Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual
issues.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court
of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or
death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to
ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible
avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and
no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior
determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would
minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should
affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could
then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances
so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the
case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.[15]
Statistics would disclose that within the eleven-year period since the re-
imposition of the death penalty law in 1993 until June 2004, the trial courts
have imposed capital punishment in approximately 1,493,[16] out of which 907
cases[17] have been passed upon in review by the Court. In the Supreme
Court, where these staggering numbers find their way on automatic review, the
penalty has been affirmed in only 230 cases comprising but 25.36% of the total
number. Significantly, in more than half or 64.61% of the cases, the judgment
has been modified through an order of remand for further proceedings, by the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or by a reduction of the
sentence. Indeed, the reduction by the Court of the death penalty to reclusion
perpetua has been made in no less than 483 cases or 53.25% of the total
number. The Court has also rendered a judgment of acquittal in sixty-five (65)
cases. In sum, the cases where the judgment of death has either been modified
or vacated consist of an astounding 71.77% of the total of death penalty cases
directly elevated before the Court on automatic review that translates to a total
of six hundred fifty-one (651) out of nine hundred seven (907) appellants saved
from lethal injection.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is
constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court -
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts."
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-
making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of
Congress. The rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate
review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural
matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more
particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124,
Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct
appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as
the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in
"Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death
penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof
ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition, consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - EMMANUEL
ROCHA alias Nopoy and RUEL RAMOS alias Aweng, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 173797 Promulgated: August 31, 2007
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 12 May 1994, an Information was filed against herein accused-appellants
Emmanuel Rocha y Yeban alias Nopoy (Rocha) and Ruel Ramos y Alcober alias
Aweng (Ramos), along with Romeo Trumpeta y Aguaviva (Trumpeta), in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 215. Another accused,
Eustaquio Cenita y Omas-As (Cenita), was impleaded in the Amended
Information. The Amended Information alleged a crime committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of September, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with several others,
whose true identities, whereabouts and personal circumstances have not as yet
been ascertained and mutually helping one another, all armed with high power
(sic) guns, with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation against
person (sic), did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob the
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) represented by ALEX BABASA, JR. in the
following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned, while Alex
Babasa, Jr. was placing the money contained in two (2) duffle bags inside the
vault of the armored van, with the two (2) security guards on the watch, the
said accused pursuant to their conspiracy and with intent to kill, opened fire at
them hitting S/G ROGER TARROQUIN and S/G TITO HOMERES, thereby inflicting
upon them serious and mortal wounds which were the immediate cause of their
death and thereafter, accused took, robbed and carried away the said two (2)
duffle bags containing P1.5 million pesos, Philippine Currency, and the 12 gauge
shotgun with SN 1048245 worth P11,000.00 issued to S/G Roger Tarroquin and
the cal. 38 revolver with SN 23238 worth P6,500.00 issued to S/G Tito Henares
and owned by Eaglestar Security Services, Incorporated to the damage and
prejudice of the offended parties in the amount aforementioned and to the heirs
of the said victims.[1]
On 6 February 1996, the RTC promulgated its Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-
93-49474 finding Trumpeta, Cenita and herein accused-appellants Rocha and
Ramos guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and imposing upon them
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused ROMEO TRUMPETA y AGUAVIVA, EMMANUEL RIOCHA
y YEBAN, RUEL RAMOS y ALCOBER and EUSTAQUIO CENITA y OMAS-AS, are
found GUILTY of the crime of Robbery With Homicide as charged, the
prosecution having proven their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In accordance
with Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 1 thereof, all of the
above-named accused are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with all the accessory penalties attendant thereto. They could have been
sentenced to death but for the fact that the death penalty was suspended, then
the crime was committed.[2]
In addition, all the accused are jointly and severally ordered to pay the heirs of
deceased Roger Tarroquin and Tito Henares P50,000.00 each, respectively.
Further, all the accused are jointly and severally ordered to indemnify the Bank
of the Philippine Islands the sum of P1,600,000. With costs against the
accused.[3]
Trumpeta, Cenita and accused-appellants appealed to this Court. On 13
September 1999, however, Trumpeta filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw
Appeal,[4] which was granted by this Court on 11 October 1999.[5] On 29 May
2001, Cenita filed his own Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal,[6] which was
granted by this Court on 15 August 2001.[7]
On 25 August 2004, pursuant to the Decision of this Court in People v.
Mateo,[8] we transferred the case to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 March 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision[9] in CA-G.R.
CR H.C. No. 01765 affirming with clarification the Decision of the RTC, thus:
Wherefore, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with CLARIFICATION. Appellants
Emmanuel Rocha @ Nopoy and Ruel Ramos @ Aweng are found guilty as co-
principals in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and each is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Each one of them is ordered to pay
civil indemnity in the amount of [Fifty Thousand Pesos] (P50,000.00) each to
the heirs of Roger Tarroquin and Tito Homeres. All other aspects of the appealed
Decision are MAINTAINED.[10]
On 18 April 2006, accused-appellants Rocha and Ramos, through the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO), appealed the Decision of the Court of Appeals to this
Court.
On 13 September 2006, this Court required the parties to submit their
respective supplemental briefs.
On 14 November 2006, accused-appellant Rocha, having been detained for
more than seventeen years, filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal, stating that he
intends to apply for parole. He also manifested that his co-accused on this case,
Romeo Trumpeta and Estaquio Cenita, had already withdrawn their appeal.
On 14 February 2007, plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, filed a Comment opposing accused-appellant Rochas Motion to
Withdraw Appeal.
On 28 February 2007, accused-appellant Ramos followed suit and filed his own
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Appeal. He likewise manifested that he
had already served fourteen years in prison and that all his other co-accused
had already withdrawn their appeal, and applied for executive clemency to avail
himself of parole.[11]
We are therefore determining herein whether or not the Motions to Withdraw
Appeal of accused-appellants Rocha and Ramos should be granted.
According to the plaintiff-appellee,
8. It is well-settled that in cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, appeal in criminal cases to this Honorable Court is a matter of right. A
review of the trial courts judgment of conviction is automatic and does not
depend on the whims of the convicted felon. It is mandatory and leaves the
reviewing court without any option.
9. In U.S. v. Laguna [17 Phil. 533 (1910)], this Honorable Court first enunciated
the rationale behind the Courts power of automatic review. The High Court
ratiocinated:
The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a case in which capital
punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one having
for its object simply and solely the protection of the accused. Having received
the highest penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under that law to have
the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is founded
placed before the highest tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and
legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful.
It gives a second chance of life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it.
It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no
evasions. (emphasis supplied)
10. No less than this Honorable Court recognizes the value of human life that it
provided an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused. In People vs.
Mateo, this Honorable Court held:
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court
of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or
death, nowhere, however has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to
ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment is imposed, the court now deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible
avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and
no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be undone. A prior determination
by the court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the
possibility of an error in judgment. If the court of Appeals should affirm the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render
judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant,
refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the
Supreme Court for its final disposition.
11. Appellants motion to withdraw appeal, therefore, contravenes this
Honorable Courts power to automatically review a decision imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Neither appellant nor this Honorable
Court can waive by mere motion to withdraw appeal, the Courts power to
review the instant case.
12. Based on the above disquisition, the review by this Honorable court of
appellants conviction is mandatory and the withdrawal of his appeal can not be
granted as it will contravene the applicable rules and jurisprudence.[12]
Plaintiff-appellee also claims that accused-appellant Rochas motion is actually a
scheme to evade the supreme penalty of reclusion perpetua[13] and that it is
obviously merely an afterthought designed to trifle not only with our procedural
law, but more importantly, our judicial system.[14] Plaintiff-appellee continues
that if indeed, appellant Emmanuel Rocha was acting in good faith, he should
have withdrawn his appeal at the first opportunity. Instead, he waited for the
intermediate review of the RTC Decision to be first resolved and after an
unfavorable decision thereon that he now decides to withdraw his appeal.[15]
We resolve to grant the Motions of accused-appellants Rocha and Ramos.
The confusion in the case at bar seems to stem from the effects of the Decision
of this Court in People v. Mateo.[16] In Mateo, as quoted by plaintiff-appellee, it
was stated that [w]hile the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by
the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an
intermediate review.[17] A closer study of Mateo, however, reveals that the
inclusion in the foregoing statement of cases where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment was only for the purpose of including
these cases within the ambit of the intermediate review of the Court of Appeals:
[this] Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases [cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death]
review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court.[18]
We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are subject to the mandatory
review of this Court. In Mateo, these cases were grouped together with death
penalty cases because, prior to Mateo, it was this Court which had jurisdiction to
directly review reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and death penalty cases
alike. The mode of review, however, was different. Reclusion perpetua and life
imprisonment cases were brought before this Court via a notice of appeal, while
death penalty cases were reviewed by this Court on automatic review. Thus, the
erstwhile Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10, provided as follows:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken.
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review
under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the
Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a
lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or
which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious
offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a)
of this section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is
imposed by the Regional Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed
by the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of this Rule.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. In all cases where
the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded
to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment within five (5) days
after the fifteenth (15) day following the promulgation of the judgment or notice
of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be
forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic
reporter.
After the promulgation of Mateo on 7 June 2004, this Court promptly caused the
amendment of the foregoing provisions, but retained the distinction of requiring
a notice of appeal for reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases and
automatically reviewing death penalty cases. Thus, Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10,
as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (which took effect on 15 October 2004),
now provides:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken.
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review
under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed
but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the
same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be
by notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court
imposed the death penalty. The Court of Appeals automatically review the
Judgment provided in section 10 of this Rule.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. In all cases where
the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded
to the Court of Appeals for automatic review and judgment within twenty days
but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or
notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall
also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the
stenographic reporter.
Neither does the Constitution require a mandatory review by this Court of cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The
constitutional provision quoted in Mateo merely gives this Court jurisdiction over
such cases:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over
all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same
occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987
Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts
in:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.[19]
For a clear understanding of this provision, the full text thereof provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts
in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months
without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the
Civil Service Law.
In this provision, only paragraphs (1) and (2) speak of jurisdiction over cases.
However, this Constitutional provision does not enumerate cases involving
mandatory review. Indeed, it would almost be silly to claim that this Court is
mandatorily required to review all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower
court is in issue. Instead, the significance of the enumeration of this Courts
jurisdiction in paragraphs (1) and (2) is that while Section 2 of the same Article
VIII of the Constitution gives to Congress the power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts, it denies to Congress the power to
deprive this Court of jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5.[20]
Since the case of accused-appellants is not subject to the mandatory review of
this Court, the rule that neither the accused nor the courts can waive a
mandatory review is not applicable. Consequently, accused-appellants separate
motions to withdraw appeal may be validly granted.
The granting of a Motion to Withdraw Appeal, however, is addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court. After a case has been submitted to the court for
decision, the appellant cannot, at his election, withdraw the appeal.[21] In
People v. Casido,[22] we denied the accused-appelants Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal therein:
It is then clear that the conditional pardons separately extended to the accused-
appellants were issued during the pendency of their instant appeal.
In the resolution of 31 January 1995 in People vs. Hinlo, this Court categorically
declared the practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite
pending appeals to be in clear violation of law.
Earlier, in our resolution of 21 March 1991 in People vs. Sepada, this Court
signified in no uncertain terms the necessity of a final judgment before parole or
pardon could be extended.
Having observed that the pronouncements in the aforementioned cases
remained unheeded, either through deliberate disregard or erroneous
applications of the obiter dictum in Monsanto vs. Factoran or the ruling in People
vs. Crisola, this Court, in its resolution of 4 December 1995 in People vs. Salle,
explicitly declared:
We now declare that the conviction by final judgment limitation under Section
19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether
full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his
conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not
be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the
appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not
appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof
may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate
court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue
of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an
appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable.
Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon
as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
xxxx
This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31 January 1995 during the
pendency of the grantees appeal. (Italics supplied)
It follows then that the conditional pardons granted in this case to accused-
appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin are void for having been
extended on 19 January 1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal.
In the case at bar, however, we see no reason to deny accused-appellants
Motions to Withdraw Appeal. There is no showing that accused-appellants had
already applied for parole at the time of the filing of their Motions to Withdraw
Appeal. On the contrary, they stated in their motions that they merely intend to
apply for the same.
Plaintiff-appellee claims that the present Motion to Withdraw Appeal is actually a
scheme to evade the penalty of reclusion perpetua and is meant to trifle with
our judicial system. Plaintiff-appellee, however, does not explain how the
withdrawal of appeal can be used by accused-appellants for these purposes. It
seems that plaintiff-appellee is expecting that the granting of the Motions to
Withdraw Appeal would nullify the Court of Appeals Decision, on the
understanding that the Court of Appeals cannot enter judgments on cases
remanded to them pursuant to Mateo. Such conclusion, however, is applicable
only where the death penalty is imposed. Rule 124, Section 13 of the Rules of
Court, which was likewise amended in A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC pursuant to Mateo,
provides:
Section 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. (a) Whenever
the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the
court shall render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and
forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for
review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed
on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise
to the more severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and the
accused appeals, the appeal should be included in the case certified for review
to the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing
such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of
appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff-appellee must have likewise observed that accused-appellants intend to
apply not only for parole, but also for executive clemency. This is shown by the
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Appeal of accused-appellant Ramos,
where he affirmed that he intends to follow his co-accused who had already
applied for executive clemency to avail of parole.
It should be kept in mind that accused-appellants could not avail themselves of
parole if their appeal is dismissed, unless they also apply for executive clemency
and ask for the commutation of their reclusion perpetua sentences. Republic Act
No. 4108, as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with death penalty
or life imprisonment. In several cases,[23] we have considered the penalty of
reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that said law does not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty. As further discussed by
Associate Justice Dante Tinga in his Concurring Opinion in People v.
Tubongbanua[24]:
Parole is extended only to those convicted of divisible penalties. Reclusion
perpetua is an indivisible penalty, with no minimum or maximum period. Under
section 5 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it is after any prisoner shall have
served the minimum penalty imposed on him, that the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence may consider whether such prisoner may be granted parole. There
being no minimum penalty imposable on those convicted to reclusion perpetua,
it follows that even prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, persons
sentenced by final judgment to reclusion perpetua could not have availed of
parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
This Court cannot review, much less preempt, the exercise of executive
clemency under the pretext of preventing the accused from evading the penalty
of reclusion perpetua or from trifling with our judicial system. Clemency is not a
function of the judiciary; it is an executive function.[25] Thus, it is the
President, not the judiciary, who should exercise caution and utmost
circumspection in the exercise of executive clemency in order to prevent a
derision of the criminal justice system. We cannot and shall not deny accused-
appellants Motions to Withdraw Appeal just because of their intention of
applying for executive clemency. With the Constitution bestowing upon the
Executive the power to grant clemency,[26] it behooves the Court to pass the
ball to the President and let her determine the fate of accused-appellants.
In sum, the mandatory review by this Court is only required for cases where the
penalty imposed is death. Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, a review of the trial court decision is conducted only when
the accused files a notice of appeal. Neither the Decision of this Court in Mateo
nor the abolition of the death penalty has changed this. As the penalty imposed
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the case at bar is reclusion
perpetua, the review by this Court is not mandatory and, therefore, the
accused-appellants can validly withdraw their appeal.
The granting of a Motion to Withdraw Appeal is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court. In the case at bar, we see no reason to deny accused-
appellants Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Plaintiff-appellees allegation that the
Motion was for the purpose of evading the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
trifling with our judicial system is unsubstantiated, as the Court of Appeals
imposition of reclusion perpetua, unlike an imposition of the death penalty, may
be entered by said appellate court even without another review by this Court.
Neither should we deny the Motions just because of accused-appellants
intention to apply for executive clemency, since the granting of such executive
clemency is within the prerogative of the Executive Department, and not of this
Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the respective Motions to Withdraw Appeal of
accused-appellants Emmanuel Rocha and Ruel Ramos are GRANTED, and the
Court of Appeals Decision dated 31 March 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01765 is
hereby deemed FINAL AND EXECUTORY.