SUCCESSION CASES
G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.
JAO, respondents.
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and
Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real
estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507. 1Pending the appointment of a regular
administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged
that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More
particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any
accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and
disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. 2 He
argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their
lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedents actual residence was in Angeles
City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health
of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfos residence at 61 Scout
Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and
hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously executed by the
decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voters affidavits, statements of assets and
liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all
indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga. 1wphi1.nt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in
Rodolfos house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was
conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before they died
was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City. 4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry
appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature
on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents
residence on the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his
residence only as reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late
years at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in
his house was merely transitory, in the same way that they were taken at different times
for the same purpose to Pericos residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The
death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents
residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise. 5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position. 6 Both
failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived. 7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived. 8 After the parties
submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice
Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and
Andrea Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988
and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of
residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death
certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose
signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own
representation by taking an inconsistent position other than his own admission.
xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack
of merit movants motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.10
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a
quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in toto. SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
resolution dated February 17, 1997. 12 Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the
following grounds:
I RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY
TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
II RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS.
1

593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN
SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE
IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS
RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE
RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF
SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE
RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE
OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A
DECEASED.
V RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY
OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH
CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF
ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE
PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS
THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VII RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP.
PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in
Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City,
where they actually stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
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any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of
administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we
held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had
his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the
time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a)
capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen;
and (c) intention to stay therein permanently. 15 While it appears that the decedents in this
case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner
avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence. 1wphi1.nt
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein,
Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal
belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and
was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer
to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even
before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile
--- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio
changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City
was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to
petitioners Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondents
assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years
before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were both
residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner
himself who filled up his late mothers death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly
shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mothers residence
2

to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacios death
certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus
properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the
appellate courts observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even
before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied
upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at the time
of death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure,
the documents presented by petitioner pertained not toresidence at the time of
death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile.
In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the
terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been
living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find
this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the
challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioners assertion, the court below
considered not only the decedents physical presence in Quezon City, but also other
factors indicating that the decedents stay therein was more than temporary. In the
absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts factual findings stemmed from
SUCCESSION CASES
an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section
2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to
settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former understandably refers
to actual physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent
residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that
venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile
because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and where most of
the decedents properties are located.
Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in the
place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a persons
properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be
that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his records, or
where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can
thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individuals choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue
in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of
Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue
for the settlement of the decedents intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City
court. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
3
 SUCCESSION CASES
ILDEFONSO JAPITANA Civil Case No. 65 Plaintiff,

G.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982 FOR:

NICANOR NACAR, petitioner, vs. CLAUDIO A. NISTAL as Municipal Judge of
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur, ILDEFONSO Versus
JAPITANA and ANTONIO DOLORICON, respondents.
CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE NICANOR NACAR THE LATE ISABELO NACAR
Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary WITH Defendant. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT x ---------------------------------x
injunction to annul an order of the respondent judge of the municipal court of Esperanza,
Agusan del Sur directing the attachment of seven (7) carabaos, to effect the return of COMPLAINT
four (4) carabaos seized under the questioned order, and to stop the respondent judge
from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 65. COMES NOW the undersigned plaintiff and before this Honorable Court,
respectfully avers:
Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 65 and entitled it
"Claim Against the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar With Preliminary Attachment:" On xxx xxx xxx
the basis of this complaint, including an allegation "that defendant are (sic) about to
remove and dispose the above-named property (seven carabaos) with intent to defraud
That at various dates since the year 1968, the defendant have (sic) incurred
plaintiff herein", and considering that Mr. Japitana had given security according to the
indebtedness to the plaintiff in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN
Rules of Court, Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the provincial sheriff to attach
HUNDRED NINETY ONE (P2,791.00) PESOS, which said amount had long
the seven (7) heads of cattle in the possession of petitioner Nicanor Nacar. Actually only
been overdue for payment, and which the defendant up to this date have (sic) not
four (4) carabaos were attached because three (3) carabaos had earlier been
been able to pay, despite repeated demands from the plaintiff;
slaughtered during the rites preceding the burial of the late Isabelo Nacar.
That the defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April, 1970 leaving among other
Nicanor Nacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment, and to
things personal property consisting seven (7) heads of carabaos now in the
order the return of the carabaos. Private respondent Japitana filed an opposition to this
possession of the defendant Nicanor Nacar;
motion while intervenor Antonio Doloricon filed a complaint in intervention asserting that
he was the owner of the attached carabaos and that the certificates of ownership of large
cattle were in his name. That plaintiff herein file a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to
recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.99;
The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr. Nacar to come to the
Supreme Court. That defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above mentioned
property with intent to defraud plaintiff herein;
In a resolution dated January 12, 1971, this Court, upon the posting of a bond in the
amount of P1,000.00, directed the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The That plaintiff is willing to put up a bond for the issuance of a preliminary
respondents were enjoined from further enforcing the writ of attachment and to return the attachment in an amount to be fixed by the Court, not exceeding the sum of P
seized carabaos. The judge was restrained from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 2,791.00 which is the plaintiff's claim herein;
65.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the hearing of this case, a
We find the petition meritorious. writ of preliminary attachment be issued against the properties of the defendant
to serve as security for the payment or satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered herein; and that after due hearing on the principal against the
The pertinent portions of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana with the municipal court read
defendant for the sum of P 2,791,00 with legal interest from September 15, 1970
as follows:
plus costs of this suit. (Annex "A", p. 7 rollo).
4

In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and absence
of a cause of action. Mr. Nacar averred that the indebtedness mentioned in the complaint
was alleged to have been incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar.
There was, therefore, no cause of action against him. The petitioner also stated that a
municipal court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action involving a claim filed against
the estate of a deceased person.
The same grounds have been raised in this petition. Mr. Nacar contends:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction.The municipal courts or
inferior courts have NO jurisdiction to settle the estate of deceased persons. The
proper remedy is for the creditor to file the proper proceedings in the court of first
instance and file the corresponding claim. But assuming without admitting that
the respondent judge had jurisdiction, it is very patent that he committed a very
grave abuse of discretion and totally disregarded the provisions of the Rules of
Court and decisions of this honorable Court when he issued an ex-parte writ of
preliminary attachment, when there is no showing that the plaintiff therein has a
sufficient cause of action, that there is no other security for the claim sought to be
enforced by the plaintiff; or that the amount claimed in the action is as much as
the sum for which the order is prayed for above all legal counterclaims; There
was no bond to answer for whatever damages that herein petitioner may suffer;
(Rollo, pp. 3- 4).
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent judge tried to avoid the consequences of the issues raised in the motion
to dismiss by stating that although the title of the complaint styled it a claim against the
estate of the late Isabelo Nacar, the allegations showed that the nature of the action was
really for the recovery of an indebtedness in the amount of P2,791.99.
The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but it is hardly relevant to the contents of
the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana.
It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that the allegations are not only
vague and ambiguous but downright misleading. The second paragraph of the body of
the complaint states that the defendant (herein petitioner Nicanor Nacar) at various dates
since the year 1968 incurred debts to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the
subsequent paragraphs, one clearly gathers that the debts were actually incurred by the
late Isabelo Nacar, who died several months before the filing of the complaint. The
complaint which the respondent judge reads as one for the collection of a sum of money
SUCCESSION CASES
and all the paragraphs of which are incidentally unnumbered, expressly states as a
material averment:
xxx xxx xxx
That plaintiff herein file (sic) a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to
recover the aforementioned sum of P2,791.00;
xxx xxx xxx
Under the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no cause of action
against petitioner Nacar. Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company (58 SCRA
559) gives the elements of a valid cause of action:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right
of the other. Its essential elements are, namely: (1) the existence of a legal right
in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant, and (3) an act or
omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiff's right with consequential injury
or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief. ( Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios,
et al., 79 Phil. 666, 667; Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-
19751, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 251, 255). On the other hand, Section 3 of
Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the complaint must state the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Hence, where the complaint
states ultimate facts that constitute the three essential elements of a cause of
action, the complaint states a cause of action; (Community Investment and
Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215, 218) otherwise, the complaint must
succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground.
Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recover an indebtedness
due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the
simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the debt or
had anything to do with the creation of the liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there
is no allegation or showing that the petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's
rights with consequential injury or damage to the latter as would create a cause of action
against the former.
It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case against
petitioner Nacar to recover seven (7) heads of carabaos allegedly belonging to Isabelo
Nacar which Japitana wanted to recover from the possession of the petitioner to answer
for the outstanding debt of the late Isabelo Nacar. This matter, however, is only ancillary
to the main action. The ancillary matter does not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for
5

the main action is for the recovery of an outstanding debt of the late lsabelo Nacar due
respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which petitioner Nacar has nothing to do.
In fact the fatal defect in the complaint was noticed by the respondent court when it
advised respondent Japitana to amend his complaint to conform with his evidence and
from the court's admission that it was inclined to dismiss the case were it not for the
complaint in intervention of respondent Doloricon. Respondent Doloricon filed his
complaint for intervention on the ground that the four carabaos, subject of the writ of
attachment, were actually his carabaos. Thus, the respondent court in its Order denying
the petitioner's motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment and in order
the return of the carabaos said:
... Antonio Doloricon manifested before this Court that he is filing a third-party
complaint alleging that he is the true and lawful owner of the carabaos in
questions.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court for the interest of both parties will
not for the meantime dismiss this case. Antonio Doloricon is hereby given 10
days from receipt hereof within which to file his third-party complaint. The plaintiff
who in his opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss pray (sic) for the custody
of the carabaos. This Court further requires plaintiff to put up the additional bond
of P I,000.00 after which the latter may be entitled of (sic) the custody of the
carabaos subject of litigation pending final termination of this case. (Rollo, pp. 18-
19)
The respondent court's reason for not dismissing the case is contrary to applicable
precedents on the matter. We ruled in Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company,
supra:
Section I, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, providing in part that:
Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss may be made on any of
the following grounds; ...
(g) That the complaint states no cause of action. ...
explicitly requires that the sufficiency of the complaint must be tested exclusively on the
basis of the complaint itself and no other should be considered when the ground for
motion to dismiss is that the complaint states no cause of action. Pursuant thereto this
Court has ruled that:
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As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint, when challenged in a motion to
dismiss, must be determined exclusively on the basis of the facts alleged therein'
(Uy Chao vs. De La Rama Steamship Co., Inc., L-14495, September 29, 1962, 6
SCRA 69, 72. See also De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino et al., 95 Phil. 365, 371;
Dalandan, et at. vs. Julio, et al., L- 19101, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 400;
Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16
SCRA 250, 254; Acuna vs. Batac Producers Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc., et al., L-20338, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 526, 531)
Hence, it was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case simply because
respondent Doloricon filed the complaint for intervention alleging that he owned the
carabaos.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legal right to the carabaos
which were in the possession of petitioner Nacar, the proper procedure would not be to
file an action for the recovery of the outstanding debts of the late Isabelo Nacar against
his stepfather, the petitioner Nacar as defendant. As we said in Maspil v. Romero (61
SCRA 197):
Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of rights must be taken in
accordance with procedural rules and cannot be left to the whims or caprices of
litigants. It cannot even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the courts of
justice without sacrificing uniformity and equality in the application and effectivity
thereof.
Considering the foregoing, the respondent court's denial of the motion to dismiss the
complaint and its issuance of a writ of attachment based on the allegations of the
complaint are improper. With this conclusion, we find no need to discuss the other issue
on whether or not the procedural rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment were
followed by the respondent court in issuing the subject writ of attachment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The preliminary mandatory injunction
issued on January 13, 1971 is made permanent and the cash bond filed by the petitioner
in connection therewith is ordered returned to him.
SO ORDERED.
6

G.R. No. L-4275 March 23, 1909
PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-appellant.
From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special proceedings
brought in the Court of First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement of the intestate
estate and the distribution of the property of Casiano Abaya it appears:
I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and
Sabrina Labadia, died on the 6th of April, 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of the
natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom the states she had by Casiano Abaya,
on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the settlement of the said intestate succession;
that an administrator having been appointed for the said estate on the 25th of November,
1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina Labadia, the
parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and opposed said appointment and
claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased; that this was granted
by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th of November, 1906,
Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the court declare him to be the sole
heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde,
and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate, and that
it be adjudicated to him; and that on November 22, 1906, the court ordered the
publication of notices for the declaration of heirs and distribution of the property of the
estate.
II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in replying to the foregoing motion
of Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the
relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she considered that her right was superior
to his and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the evidence that
she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the
property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to her together with
the corresponding products thereof.
III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence, and
the court below entered the following judgment:
That the administrator of the estate of Casiano Abaya should recognize Teopista
and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the petitioner
Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with respect
to the inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore,
it is hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property of the said intestate
estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya.
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IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this court, and
presented the following statement of errors:
1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of
natural children under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code, might be brought in special
probate proceedings.
2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged natural
child, the mother of such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may bring an action
to enforce the acknowledgment of her deceased child in accordance with articles 135
and 137 of the Civil Code.
3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuos possession of the deceased
children of Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the late Casiano Abaya, has
been fully proven in these proceedings; and
4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this intestate estate
to Paula Conde, as improperly found by the court below, the court erred in not having
declared that said property should be reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano Abaya to
the third degree, and in not having previously demanded securities from Paula Conde to
guarantee the transmission of the property to those who might fall within the reservation.
As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special proceedings
for the administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an action might be brought
to enforce the acknowledgment of the natural child of the person from whom the
inheritance is derived, that is to say, whether one might appear as heir on the ground that
he is a recognized natural child of the deceased, not having been so recognized by the
deceased either voluntarily or compulsorily by reason of a preexisting judicial decision,
but asking at the same time that, in the special proceeding itself, he be recognized by the
presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim to be entitled to the succession
opened in the special proceeding.
According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure
If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the
lawful heirs of the deceased person are, or as to the distributive share to which
each person is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall
be taken in writing by the judge, under oath, and signed by the witness. Any party
in interest whose distributive share is affected by the determination of such
controversy, may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
determining such controversy to the Supreme Court, within the time and in the
manner provided in the last preceding section.
7

This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of Juana
Pimentel vs. Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. Rep., 436.)
The main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or not the mother
of a natural child now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is claimed, was his
natural father, also deceased, may bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural
filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance
from the person who is supposed to be his natural father.
In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following as the
only foundation:
In resolving a similar question Manresa says: "An acknowledgment can only be
demanded by the natural child and his descendants whom it shall benefit, and
should they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such person as legally
represents them; the mother may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is
under her authority." On this point no positive declaration has been made,
undoubtedly because it was not considered necessary. A private action is in
question and the general rule must be followed. Elsewhere the same author
adds: "It may so happen that the child dies before four years have expired after
attaining majority, or that the document supporting his petition for
acknowledgment is discovered after his death, such death perhaps occurring
after his parents had died, as is supposed by article 137, or during their lifetime.
In any case such right of action shall pertain to the descendants of the child
whom the acknowledgment may interest." (See Commentaries to arts. 135 and
137, Civil Code, Vol. I.)
The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the Civil
Code, lacks legal and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right of such action
by the natural child to his descendants can not be sustained under the law, and still less
to his mother.
It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most positive,
limiting in form, when establishing the exception for the exercise of such right of action
after the death of the presumed parents, as is shown hereafter. It is not supported by any
doctrine, because up to the present time no argument has been presented, upon which
even an approximate conclusion could be based.
Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized natural
children, granting them rights and actions that they did not possess under the former
laws, they were not, however, placed upon the same place as legitimate ones. The
difference that separates these two classes of children is still great, as proven by so
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many articles dealing with the rights of the family and the succession in relation to the
members thereof. It may be laid down as legal maxim, that whatever the code does not
grant to the legitimate children, or in connection with their rights, must still less be
understood as granted to recognized natural children or in connection with their rights.
There is not a single exception in its provisions.
If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family rights of the
child, the acknowledgment of the natural child is, among illegitimate ones, that which
unites him to the family of the father or the mother who recognized him, and affords him
a participation in the rights of the family, relatively advantageous according to whether
they are alone or whether they concur with other individuals of the family of his purely
natural father or mother.
Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code, nothing is more logical than to
establish a comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce
acknowledgment.
ART. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any
time of its lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be allowed a period
of five years in which to institute the action.
The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it has
not lapsed before then.
ART. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be
instituted only during the life of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:
1. If the father or mother died during the maturity of the child, in which case the
latter may institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its
maturity.
2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown,
should be discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.
In this case the action must be instituted with the six months following the
discovery of such instrument.
On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the other
consists in that the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole lifetime of the
child, that is, it can always be brought against the presumed parents or their heirs by the
8

child itself, while the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child does not
last his whole lifetime, and, as a general rule, it can not be instituted against the heirs of
the presumed parents, inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of the
presumed parents.
With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of the
presumed parents of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to recognize the
natural filiation, there exists the most radical difference in that the former continues
during the life of the child who claims to be legitimate, and he may demand it either
directly and primarily from the said presumed parents, or indirectly and secondarily from
the heirs of the latter; while the second does not endure for life; as a general rule,
it only lasts during the life of the presumed parents. Hence the other difference, derived
as a consequence, that an action for legitimacy is always brought against the heirs of the
presumed parents in case of the death of the latter, while the action for acknowledgment
is not brought against the heirs of such parents, with the exception of the two cases
prescribed by article 137 transcribed above.
So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or
to acknowledge the natural filiation.
As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter's action to claim his legitimacy,
or to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen that the code grants it in
the first case, but not in the second. It contains provisions for the transmission of the right
of action which, for the purpose claiming his legitimacy inheres in the child, but it does
not say a word with regard to the transmission of the right to obtain the acknowledgment
of the natural filiation.
Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) That the
right of action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article 118,
may be transmitted to his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article; (2) That
the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers,
can never be transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no mention of it in any
case, not even as an exception.
It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the right of
action to secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be
transmitted, independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the right of action to claim
legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly, independently, or, as a general rule,
conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child, but only relatively and as an exception.
Consequently, the pretension that the right of action on the part of the child to obtain the
acknowledgment of his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is altogether
unfounded. No legal provision exists to sustain such pretension, nor can an argument of
presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no basis for the greater one,
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and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is placing the heirs of
the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate one, when, as a
matter of fact, the position of a natural child is no better than, no even equal to, that of a
legitimate child.
From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are
derived:
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his
whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during
the life of his presumed parents.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during
his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs;
while the right of action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does
not last during his whole life, but depends on that of the presumed parents, as a general
rule can only be exercised against the latter.
Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal
character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time
during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the
heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or while insane, or after action had
been already instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised
against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of
the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some
instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the
existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him.
It can not be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.
In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:
Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise of Civil Law, propounds the question as to whether said
action should be considered transmissive to the heirs or descendants of the natural child,
whether he had or had not exercised it up to the time of his death, and decides it as
follows:
There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be deemed
admissible as a solution, that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a
9

natural child is transmitted by the analogy to his heirs on the same conditions
and terms that it is transmitted to the descendants of a legitimate child, to claim
his legitimacy, under article 118, but nothing more; because on this point nothing
warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on a better footing than those of the
legitimate child, and even to compare them would not fail to be a strained and
questionable matter, and one of great difficulty for decision by the courts, for the
simple reason that for the heirs of the legitimate child, the said article 118 exists,
while for those of the natural child, as we have said, there is no provision in the
code authorizing the same, although on the other hand there is none that
prohibits it. (Vol. V.)
Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The Civil Code as construed by the
supreme court of Spain," commenting upon article 137, say:
Article 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of children,
grants them the right to claim said legitimacy during their lifetime, and even
authorizes the transmission of said right for the space of five years to the heirs
thereof, if the child die during his minority or in a state of insanity. But as article
137 is based on the consideration that in the case of a natural child, ties are less
strong and sacred in the eyes of the law, it does not fix such a long and indefinite
period for the exercise of the action; it limits it to the life of the parents, excepting
in the two cases mentioned in said article; and it does not allow, as does article
118, the action to pass on to the heirs, inasmuch as, although it does not prohibit
it, and for that reason it might be deemed on general principles of law to consent
to it, such a supposition is inadmissible for the reason that a comparison of both
articles shows that the silence of the law in the latter case is not, nor it can be, an
omission, but a deliberate intent to establish a wide difference between the
advantages granted to a legitimate child and to a natural one.
(Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)
Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Cdigo Civil) raises the question: "Can the heirs of a
natural child claim the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the father or mother are
under obligation to acknowledge"? And says:
Opinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13, 1844) that
the right of investigation forms a part of the estate of the child, and along with his
patrimony is transmitted to his heirs. The affirmation is altogether too categorical
to be admissible. If it were correct the same thing would happen as when the
legitimacy of a child is claimed, and as already seen, the right of action to
demand the legitimacy is not transmitted to the heirs in every case and as an
absolute right, but under certain limitations and circumstances. Now, were we to
admit the doctrine of the court of Rennes, the result would be that the claim for
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natural filiation would be more favored than one for legitimate filiation. This would
be absurd, because it can not be conceived that the legislator should have
granted a right of action to the heirs of the natural child, which is only granted
under great limitations and in very few cases to those of a legitimate one. Some
persons insist that the same rules that govern legitimate filiation apply by analogy
to natural child are entitled to claim it in the cases prescribed by the article 118.
The majority, however, are inclined to consider the right to claim acknowledgment
as a personal right, and consequently, not transmissive to the heirs. Really there
are no legal grounds to warrant the transmission. (Vol. 2, 229.)
In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument of
analogy for the purpose of considering that the heirs of the natural child are entitled to
the right of action which article 118 concedes to the heirs of the legitimate child. The
existence of a provision for the one case and the absence thereof for the other is a
conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, and it can not be
understood that the provision of law should be the same when the same reason does not
hold in the one case as in the other.
The theory of law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case. This theory,
which in the Roman Law expressed the general rule than an heir who did not accept an
inheritance during his lifetime was incapacitated from transmitting it to his own heirs,
included at the same time the idea that if the inheritance was not transmitted because
the heir did not possess it, there were, however, certain things which the heir held and
could transmit. Such was the law and the right to accept the inheritance, for the existing
reason that all rights, both real and personal, shall pass to the heir; quia haeres
representat defunctum in omnibus et per omnia. According to the article 659 of the Civil
Code, "the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of a person, which
are not extinguished by his death." If the mother is the heir of her natural child, and the
latter, among other rights during his lifetime was entitled to exercise an action of his
acknowledgment against his father, during the life of the latter, if after his death in some
of the excepting cases of article 137, such right, which is a portion of his inheritance, is
transmitted to his mother as being his heir, and it was so understood by the court of
Rennes when it considered the right in question, not as a personal and exclusive right of
the child which is extinguished by his death, but a any other right which might be
transmitted after his death. This right of supposed transmission is even less tenable than
that sought to be sustained by the argument of analogy.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior
to that of the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is evident that
the right of action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate
child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of
his inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity to establish its
transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and conditions of article 118 of the
10
 SUCCESSION CASES
code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the child's inheritance, it is
necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in article 118 shall be present,
since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime, being personal and
exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible of transmission,
would and should have been extinguished by his death. Therefore, where no express
provision like that of article 118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a
natural child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by his death, and can not
be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.

On the other hand, if said right of action formed a part of the child's inheritance, it would
be necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an acknowledgment
from the presumed natural father and from his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of
the child, not limited by certain circumstances as in the case of the heirs of a natural child
with a legitimate one to place the heirs of a natural child and his inheritance on a better
footing than those of a legitimate child would not only be unreasonable, but, as stated in
one of the above citations, most absurd and illegal in the present state of the law and in
accordance with the general principles thereof.

For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from in all its
parts, without any special ruling as to the costs of this instance.

11

G.R. No. 56700 March 28, 1983
WARLITO MABALOT and ARACELI MABALOT, petitioners, vs. THE HON. JUDGE
TOMAS P. MADELA, JR., in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and PEDRO V. MALIT, respondents.
The petitioners took a direct appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila on the legal question raised by them with respect to the alleged lack of jurisdiction
of the City Court of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Manila to take cognizance of
the basic action.
The facts of this case, as synthesized in the decision of Judge Madela and which are
impliedly admitted by the petitioners in taking this direct appeal to this Court on a pure
question of law, are as follows:
From the records and evidence of the case, plaintiff appellant as owner of an
apartment No. 2262 located at Coral Street, San Andres, Manila leased it to Atty.
Armando Galvez on a monthly basis of P200.00 a month since 1967. Staying
with him in said apartment is defendant Araceli Mabalot and a maid the former
claiming to be a ward of Atty. Galvez since she was 10 years old when her
mother died and her father could not support her (t.s.n. pp. 3-4, Dec. 6, 1979). In
1970 Araceli Mabalot married defendant Warlito Mabalot and continued to stay
with Atty. Galvez until his death on August 23, 1977. After the death of Atty.
Armando Galvez, the arrearages for the monthly rentals of July and August were
paid by Atty. Fernando Galvez, a brother of the late Atty. Armando Galvez and for
the month of September 1977, Atty. Fernando Galvez issued a check (pay to
cash) which he gave to the defendants-appellees to pay the plaintiff-appellant.
However, the corresponding receipts were issued by plaintiff in the name of Atty.
Fernando Galvez.
As early as September 1, 1977, in his letter to Atty. Fernando Galvez, the
plaintiff-appellant intimated that with the death of his brother, Araceli Mabalot and
husband cannot take over the apartment as the contract of lease between him
and Atty. Armando Galvez is a personal one and could not be transmitted to them
(Exh. "A"). On September 5, 1977, plaintiff wrote the defendants that they could
not take over the apartment as it could not be the subject of inheritance and gave
them three (3) months to vacate the same (Exhibit "B"). However, defendants
refused to receive said letter, as plaintiff with the help of patrolman Tomas
Soriaga served it the following morning with the policeman as a witness (Exh. "B-
1").
SUCCESSION CASES
Araceli Mabalot admitted that the late Armando Galvez has his own family, a wife
and children namely, Cynthia, Rosalinda, Danilo, Jocelyn and Olivia who were
mentioned in his application for insurance as his legitimate children with Araceli
mentioned as a niece (t.s.n. p. 16, Oct. 25, 1977). The succeeding payments of
the rentals were paid by defendants- appellees' counsel, Atty. Efren Santos.
The question to be resolved is, whether or not the defendants, Warlito and
Araceli Mabalot have the right to continue as tenants of the plaintiff from the
death of Atty. Armando Galvez. (Annex "A", Petitioners' Brief, p. 72, Rello.)
As may be noted from the definition of the issue by Judge Madela, the question which
was raised and argued by the parties in the lower courts was the right of the petitioners
to succeed to the lease over the subject apartment previously existing between Armando
Galvez and the private respondent. Apparently convinced of the correctness of the
holding of Judge Madela that they may not continue said lease inasmuch as the
petitioners are not heirs of Armando Galvez (Art. 1311, Civil Code), nor was such lease
assigned by Armando Galvez to the petitioners with the consent of private respondent
(Art. 1649, Ibid), the petitioners now rely on the alleged legal infirmity of the proceedings
had in the lower courts by attacking their jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
It is the petitioners' main contention that the City Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
action filed by the private respondent inasmuch as it is not an action for unlawful
detainer, but one the subject matter of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation falling
within the original jurisdiction of the court of first instance pursuant to Section 44(a) of the
former Judiciary Act. Petitioners argue that an action for unlawful detainer must be filed
within one year after the unlawful deprivation of the possession of the subject property by
the defendant. They contend that this requirement does not exist in this case inasmuch
as petitioner Araceli Mabalot was admittedly staying in the apartment together with
Armando Galvez since 1966, and the action to eject her was filed only on January 8,
1978. They further point out that in paragraph 7 of the complaint, the private respondent
had expressly alleged that he denied the request of the petitioners to continue the lease
of Armando Galvez on the ground "that a lease contract is personal in nature and cannot
be the subject of inheritance." By this allegation, so the petitioners contend, the basic
issue becomes a determination of whether or not a lease contract may be the subject of
inheritance, thereby making the action as one of the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation.
Petitioners' submissions are typical examples of the arguments advanced by defendants
in ejectment cases in their attempt to prolong their occupancy of premises over which
they ceased to have valid ground to possess, by keeping alive the litigation involving
their ejectment therefrom. The records of our courts will reveal that a considerable
percentage of the cases pending in them are actions for forcible entry and detainer.
Ordained by law to be commenced in the courts at the municipal or city level, they pass
12
 SUCCESSION CASES
thru all the other grades of courts in the judicial system up to the Highest Court of the
land. It is ironic that a forcible entry or detainer case which is intended to be disposed of
in summary fashion has oftentimes proved to be the most cumbersome and difficult to
terminate. It has become a truism that, if a landlord would like to eject a tenant in the
shortest possible time, the worst thing that he could do is to file an ejectment case. It is,
indeed, about time that this situation be remedied if only to contribute to the solution of
the worsening problem of court congestion, by refusing to edify these cases by giving
them a full-blown treatment in all the courts in the judicial structure, and thereby save the
courts the expenditure of precious time and energy which could otherwise be devoted to
more significant and vital litigations.

The time limitation of one year within which to file an action for forcible entry and detainer
is reckoned not from the moment of occupancy by the defendant, but from the time that
his possession becomes unlawful. The occupancy of the apartment by Araceli Mabalot in
1966 was not unlawful because she was then a member of the household of Armando
Galvez who was the lessee of the premises in question. The possession of the
petitioners became unlawful only after Armando Galvez died, which was on August 23,
1977. Such death of Armando Galvez terminated the lease in his favor. Petitioners do not
have any colorable right to occupy the apartment thereafter. The filing of the case on
January 8, 1978 was well within one year period from August 23, 1977.

There is less merit in the contention that the action filed by the private respondent is one
in which the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation just because it involves
the legal question as to the right of the petitioners to continue the lease by reason of
inheritance. Such legal issue is purely incidental to the question of whether they are
entitled to possess the apartment in question. The action is for the recovery of the
possession of real property brought within one year from the time the possession of the
defendant became unlawful, technically known as an action for unlawful detainer.
Although it is a real action which should ordinarily fall under the jurisdiction of the court of
first instance (now the regional trial court), the law vests the exclusive original jurisdiction
over it in the courts at the municipal or city level as an exception to the general rule on
jurisdiction over real actions, presumably in view of the summary nature of the
proceedings contemplated to be taken therein. This kind of action is different and distinct
from the class of actions where the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. An action does not become one where the subject is incapable of pecuniary
estimation by the mere fact that an issue of law is raised therein. Such a view would
result in converting virtually all civil actions into that category, and in depriving the
municipal and city trial courts of jurisdiction over all civil cases where a party raises a
question of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
13

G.R. No. L-14127 August 21, 1962
ISIDORO M. MERCADO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA, defendants-appellants.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-14128 August 21, 1962
LEON C. VIARDO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PILAR BELMONTE, PATRICIA DRIZ,
JOAQUINA DRIZ, ISIDORO MERCADO,
TRINIDAD ISIDRO, ZACARIAS BELMONTE, TERESITA FLORES,
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK,defendants-appellees.
In civil case No. 7611 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, entitled Leon C.
Viardo vs. Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte, a writ of execution was issued and levy
was made "upon all the rights, interest and participation which the spouses Bartolome
Driz and Pilar Belmonte have or might have" in a parcel of land covered by original
certificate of title No. 3484 of the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Nueva
Ecija (Exhibit A, p.3). This certificate of title covers a parcel of land (Lot No. 1, Psu-
14371) in the barrios of Nieves and Santo Rosario, municipality of Zaragoza, province of
Nueva Ecija, containing an area of 1,192,775 square meters, more or less. The land is
registered in the names of "Leonor Belmonte, Felisa Belmonte, Pilar Belmonte and Ines
de Guzman, subject . . . to the condition that share [that] belongs to Ines de Guzman
is usufructuary "correspondiendo la nuda propiedad a sus tres hijas arriba citadas en
participaciones iguales quienes se consolidara el dominio despues del fallecimiento de
su madre' " (Exhibit A, p. 2).
On 25 February 1941, by virtue of the writ of execution above mentioned, the provincial
sheriff of Nueva Ecija sold at public auction one-half () of the following property:
TAX DECLARATION NO. 11313 OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF ZARAGOZA, PROVINCE
OF NUEVA ECIJA AND COVERED BY ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484
OF THE LAND RECORDS OF NUEVA ECIJA.
A parcel of land, situated in the sitio of Valdez, barrio Sto. Rosario, municipality of
Zaragoza, Province of Nueva Ecija. Bounded on the North by property of Felisa
Belmonte; on the East by Sapang Dalagot; on the Southeast by Ines de Guzman;
on the South by the property of Felisa Belmonte; and on then West by the
property of Cirilo Acosta; containing an area of THIRTY (30) HECTARES, more
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or less. Declared under tax No. 11313 in the name of Pilar Belmonte with an
assessed value of P8,400.00.
The highest bidder at the auction sale was the judgment creditor, Leon C. Viardo, who
paid P2,125.64 for the interest sold and P83.15 for the land tax corresponding to such
interest (Exhibit B). When the judgment debtors failed to redeem the property within the
statutory period of one year from the date of sale (21 February 1941), the provincial
sheriff of Nueva Ecija executed on 12 May 1943 a Final Bill of Sale of the property
described in Exhibit B in favor of Leon C. Viardo (Exhibit C). On 3 May 1943 a co-
owner's copy of the certificate of title was issued to Leon C. Viardo (Exhibit A, p. 3).
On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Land Registration
Case No. 918, G.L.R.O. Record No. 17910, acting upon a verified petition of Leon C.
Viardo, ordered the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija
to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 and to issue another in lieu thereof
in the name of and in the proportion as follows: LEONOR BELMONTE share;
FELISA BELMONTE, share; PILAR BELMONTE, /8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, /8 share;
and INES DE GUZMAN, share, upon the payment of the corresponding fees (Exhibit D).
However, it appears from Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 (Exhibit A) that the above-
mentioned order was not carried out and that said original certificate of title was not
cancelled.
On 27 May 1946 Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte filed in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija a complaint against Leon C. Viardo (civil case No. 161) praying that
judgment be rendered against the defendant:
(a) Ordering the defendant to reconvey the property in question in favor of
plaintiffs herein upon payment by the latter of the lawful redemption price in
accordance with law, or the sum of P2,125.64 with interest at the rate of one per
centum (1%) per month for twelve (12) months from February 27, 1941 to
February 27, 1942. (Exhibit E.)
On 4 June 1946 Patricia Blando, attorney for the plaintiffs Bartolome Driz and Pilar
Belmonte, requested the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija for
the annotation of a Notice of LIS PENDENS on the back of ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Nueva Ecija, affecting the undivided one-half () portion of the
property of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled cause, situated in the Sitio of
Valdez, Barrio of Sto. Rosario, Municipality of Zaragoza, which is involved in the
14

said controversy against the defendant LEON C. VIARDO, and which is more
particularly described under paragraph (4) of the plaintiffs' complaint a copy of
which is hereby presented, hereunto attached. (Exhibit F.)
On 6 June 1946 the Registrar of Deeds made the following annotation on the back of
original certificate of title No. 3484:
Entry No. 3347/0-3484: Kind Lis Pendens Executed in favor of Bartolome
Driz and Pilar Belmonte; Conditions Al the rights, interests, and participation of
Leon C. Viardo in this title is the subject of a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 16
of the C.F.I. of N.E. now pending for action. Date of the instrument June 4,
1946; Date of the inscription June 6, 1946 at 3:18 (?) p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. Cuizon,
Acting Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, p. 3.)
While the above-mentioned case was pending in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Pilar Belmonte, one of the plaintiffs, entered into the following contracts involving
her interest or rights over the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No.
3484:
(1) Entry No. 10984: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Isidro M. Mercado &
Trinidad Isidro; Conditions--Pilar Belmonte sold a portion of Seven and One-Half
(7-) hectares of the property described in this title for the sum of P5,500.00 (D-
126: P-90: B-11: S-1948, Herminio E. Algas, N. E.) Date of the Inst. June 28,
1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(2) Entry No. 10985/0-3484: Kind Sale with right of repurchase: Executed in
favor of Federico Aquino; Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold with a right of
repurchase seven and one-half (7-) hectares of her share, interest and
participation in this title for the sum of P3,600.00 (D-127: P-90: B-11: S-48. H.
Algas, N. E.) Date of the Inst. June 28, 1948; Date of the Inscription June
28, 1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F. C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(3) Entry No. 15110/0-3484: Kind Resale: Executed in favor of Pilar
Belmonte; Conditions Federico Aquino resold his share in this title consisting
of 7- Has. for the sum of P3,600.00 (D-63: P-15: B-6: S-1949, Jose E.
Castaeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. March 8, 1958: Date of the Inscription
April 8, 1949 at 11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(4) Entry No. 15111/0-3484: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Dominador
Asuncion and Tomasita Dansil: Pilar Belmonte sold a portion of seven (7) Has. of
her share and participation in this title for the sum of P7,000.00. (D-64: P-15: B-6:
S-1949, J. E. Castaeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. March 9, 1949; Date of the
SUCCESSION CASES
Inscription April 8, 1949 at 11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(Exhibit A, p. 4)
On 11 April 1950 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered judgment in civil
case No. 161, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court absolves the defendant from the complaint of
the plaintiffs, in the same manner that plaintiffs are absolved from the counter complaint
of the defendant. Defendant is the legal owner of the land in question and the right of
redemption of the plaintiff of said land had already elapsed. With costs to the plaintiff.
(Exhibit G.)
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the defendant Leon C.
Viardo appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the following
transactions involving the interest or rights of Pilar Belmonte over the parcel of land
covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 took place:
(1) Entry No. 7967/NT-15162: Kind Partition: Executed in favor of Felisa
Belmonte, et al.; Conditions By virtue of a deed of partition, the share of the
deceased Ines de Guzman and Isidro Belmonte has been adjudicated in favor of
the heirs of said deceased. (D-891: P-77: B-V: S-1948, Manuel E. Castaeda,
Manila) Date of the Inst. March 31, 1948: Date of the Inscription Feb. 18,
1954 at 10:18 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(2) Entry No. 7968/NT-15162: Kind Agreement: Executed in favor of Felisa
Belmonte, et al; Conditions By virtue of an agreement of the parties concerned
in the partition, Lots Nos. 1-D and 1-J, with an area of 300,000 sq. m. and 80,000
sq.m., more or less, respectively in the subdivision plan Psd-36340, a portion of
lot 1 described on plan Psu-14371, of this title, have been adjudicated in favor of
Felisa Belmonte and Lot 1-G with an area of 75,000 sq.m., more or less, of the
same subdivision, has been adjudicated in favor of Isidoro Mercado, See TCT
No. 15162 and 15163, Vol. No. 76. (D-211: P-44: B-IV: S-1952, P. Bautista, Cab.
City) Date of the Inst. Jan. 22, 1952: Date of the Inscription Feb. 18, 1954
at 10:18 a.m.(Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(3) Entry No. 9715/NT-15746: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Sp. Zacarias
Belmonte and Teresita Flores; Conditions Dominador Asuncion and Tomasita
Dansil sold all their rights and interest in this title consisting of seven hectares for
the sum of P6,000.00. (D-177: P-37: B-IV: S-1952; R. S. Pengson, N.E.) Date of
the Inst. Feb. 4, 1952; Date of Inscription May 13, 1954 at 10:08 a.m.
(Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
15

(4) Entry No. 12168/NT-15162: Kind Project of Partition Executed in favor
of Pilar Belmonte; Conditions By virtue of a project of partition re-estate of the
late Ines de Guzman, a portion of 13.2775 hectares of the land described in this
title has been adjudicated in favor of Pilar Belmonte. (D-891: P-77: B-V: S-1948,
Manuel E. Castaeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. March 31, 1948: Date of the
Inscription Aug. 23, 1954 at 2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of
Deeds. 1wph1.t
(5) Entry No. 12169/NT-16440: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Joaquin
Driz: Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-B of the subdivision plan of this title
Psd-36340 a portion taken from her undivided 13.2775 hectares with an area of
52,775 sq.m., more or less, for the sum of P800.00. See TCT NT-16440, Vol. No.
83. (D-160: P-33: B-I: S-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the Inst.
Aug. 23, 1954; Date of the Inscription Aug. 23, 1954 at 2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(6) Entry No. 12370/NT-16488: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Patricia
Driz: Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-A of the subdivision plan Psd-36340
being a portion of Lot 1 described in plan Psu-14371, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No.
17910, of this title for the sum of P1,000.00 with an area of 80,000 sq.m., with
respect to her share of 13.2775 hectares. See TCT No. NT-16488, Vol. 83. (D-
440: P-90: B-V: S-1954, H. V. Garcia, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. Aug. 31,
1954: Date of the Inscription Sept. 2, 1954 at 8:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON,
Register of Deeds.
(7) Entry No. 12512/NT-16546: Kind Sale; Executed in favor of Patricia
Driz: Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lots Nos. 1-H and 1-I of the subdivision
plan Psd-30340 of the property described in this title for the sum of P850.00. See
TCT No. NT-16524, Vol. 83. (D-167: P-35: B-I: S-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab.
City) Date of the Inst. Sept. 9, 1954; Date of the Inscription Sept. 9, 1954 at
11:50 a.m. (Sgd.) F. C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(8) Entry No. 12569/NT-16546: Kind Sale; Executed favor of Patricia Driz;
Conditions Pilar Belmonte sold Lot I-E of the subdivision plan Psd-30340 of
the property described in this title, with an area of 79,848 sq.m., more or less the
subdivision plan of this title, was sold for the sum of P2,000.00. See TCT No. NT-
16546, Vol. 83. (D-172: P-36: BS-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City) Date of the
Inst. Sept. 11, 1954; Date of the Inscription Sept. 13, 1954 at 8:20 am.
(Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, pp. 4-5.)
On 22 September 1954, a few days after the last transactions mentioned above, the
Court of Appeals passed a resolution granting the prayer of defendant-appellant Leon C.
Viardo that the children and only heirs, namely, Artemio, Patricia, Mario, Domingo,
SUCCESSION CASES
Joaquina and Catalina, surnamed Driz, who were all of age, be substituted for the
deceased appellee Bartolome Driz (the husband of Pilar Belmonte). (Exhibit H-1).
On 25 September 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment awarding damages
prayed for in the counterclaim of Leon V. Viardo. The judgment made the following
findings and conclusions:
. . . The area of the contested property is 15 hectares. By computation, this is
capable of producing 750 cavans of palay a year. On the basis of 70-30,
defendant is entitled to 225 cavans of palay a year. Therefore, plaintiffs are under
obligation to deliver to defendant this quantity of palay every agricultural year
from the filing of defendant's answer on August 5, 1946, up to the time he
vacates said land, or pay the equivalent value thereof at P12.00 a cavan.
Having been declared owner of the land in dispute, defendant is entitled to its
possession. Inasmuch as the court below did not order plaintiffs to restore the
possession of the land in question, we hereby order them to vacate the same
and restore possession thereof to defendant. (Exhibit H.)
This judgment of the Court of Appeals became final and executory and the records were
remanded to the lower court. On 16 December 1954 the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija issued a writ of execution (Exhibit W). The return made by Chief of Police of the
Municipality of Zaragoza on 14 February 1955 states that Leon C. Viardo had been
placed in possession of the parcel of land referred to in the writ and that levy was made
on a total of 86 cavans and 74 kilos of palay, and that the same were deposited in a
warehouse (Exhibit X).
On or about 4 January 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed a third party claim with the
Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit Y). The affidavit attached to the claim states
that Isidoro M. Mercado and his wife purchased from Pilar Belmonte on 28 June 1948
seven and one-half hectares of her undivided share in the land described in original
certificate of title No. 3484, that on the same day the deed of sale was registered, that a
transfer certificate of title was issued in their names, and that since 1948 up to the time of
the levy on execution he had been in actual possession of the parcel of land, paying the
corresponding taxes thereon and had exclusively benefited from the harvests therein,
(Exhibit Y-1). The sheriff was requested not to continue with the levy on the harvest in the
parcel of land they were claiming.
On 2 February 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija a complaint docketed as civil case No. 1718, against Leon C. Viardo and the
Provincial Sheriff. The complaint alleged that improper levy had been made on the
harvest in plaintiff's parcel of land and prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
16

defendants to return the palay levied upon, together with damages. On 26 February 1955
the defendants answered that plaintiffs' purchase of the parcel of land in question from
Pilar Belmonte was subject to whatever judgment the courts might render in civil case
No. 161 between Pilar Belmonte and Leon C. Viardo. On 17 October 1955 the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija entered an order suspending the trial of the case, in view of
the information by counsel for the defendant that his client Leon C. Viardo would file a
complaint against all persons claiming ownership of or interest in the parcel of land
covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
On 5 December 1955 civil case No. 2004 was filed by Leon V. Viardo against Pilar
Belmonte, Patricia Driz, Joaquina Driz, Isidoro Mercado, Trinidad Isidro, Zacarias
Belmonte, Teresita Flores, Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. and the
Philippine National Bank, as parties claiming some right, participation, share or interest in
the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 or by trader certificates
of title derived therefrom. The defendants filed their answers. After trial, 1 on 24 August
1956 the trial court rendered judgment in civil cases Nos. 1718 and 2004, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, in Civil Case 2004, Leon
C. Viardo, Isidoro M. Mercado, Zacarias Belmonte and Patricia Driz are hereby
declared CO-OWNERS PRO-INDIVISO of lots 1-A PSD-16864, which is the
share of Pilar Belmonte in Lot 1, PSU 14371, OCT No. 3484 in the following
proportions: ONE-HALF for LEON C. VIARDO; 7 hectares for Isidoro M.
Mercado; 7 hectares for Zacarias Belmonte, and the remainder for Patricia Driz,
it being understood that whatever is adjudicated to Patricia Driz in the partition
shall be subject to the mortgage in favor of the Philippine National Bank; the
deeds of sale executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of Patricia Driz, Exhibits R and
S are declared NULL AND VOID; the deeds of partition Exhibits L and N, are set
aside, and the certificates of title issued in favor of Zacarias Belmonte, Isidoro M.
Mercado and Patricia Driz, Exhibits P, Q, R-1 and S-1 are ordered cancelled. And
in civil case 1718 Isidoro M. Mercado is hereby declared to be entitled to the
products which had been levied upon by the Provincial Sheriff. No damages are
awarded. The parties in civil case 2004 shall come to an amicable settlement
with respect to the partition. Upon their failure to arrive at an amicable settlement,
commissioner shall be appointed by this Court in accordance with a law to make
the partition.
With costs against the defendants in both cases.
Only Leon C. Viardo, plaintiff in civil case No. 2004 and defendant in civil case No. 1718,
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 21 May 1958 the latter certified and forwarded the
appeals to this Court because the facts are not in dispute and "the questions raised by
appellant in his brief are purely legal in nature."
SUCCESSION CASES
In his first assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court "erred in not
annulling the sale executed by Pilar Belmonte to Isidoro M. Mercado, marked as Exhibit
I, and to Dominador Asuncion and Teresita Bansil (Exhibit J) and the sale by Dominador
Asuncion to Zacarias Belmonte and Teresita Flores in a Deed of Sale marked Exhibit M."
In support thereof he argues that the three sales took place and were registered after he
had become the absolute owner of an undivided one-half interest in the parcel of land
owned by Pilar Belmonte and after notice of lis pendens had been recorded on the title of
Pilar Belmonte.
The argument is without merit. It is true that the appellant became the absolute owner of
an undivided one-half interest in the undivided one-fourth interest owned by Pilar
Belmonte in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484; that
before Pilar Belmonte sold parts of her undivided share in the parcel of land to Isidoro M.
Mercado and Dominador Asuncion and the last in turn sold his part to Zacarias
Belmonte, there was notice of lis pendens recorded on the certificate of title; and that this
notice is binding upon all who should acquire an interest in the property subsequent to
the record of the lis pendens. The notice of lis pendens (Exhibit A), however, was limited
to one-half interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo from Pilar Belmonte. The other one-half
undivided interest of the latter was not in litigation and therefore the trial court correctly
held that Pilar Belmonte, as the owner of this undivided one-half interest, had a right to
sell it and could convey absolute title thereto or to parts thereof. Of course, the deeds of
sale executed by Pilar Belmonte appears to convey definite or segregated parts of her
remaining interest in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484,
which she could not do, because this one-fourth in interest had not yet been subdivided
to show the interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo, amounting to one-half of the said one-
fourth interest. This defect, however, does not result in the nullity of the deeds of sale she
had executed relating to her remaining interest of one-eighth. The sales were valid,
subject only to the condition that the interests acquired by the vendees were limited to
the parts which might be assigned to them in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership (Article 493, Civil Code).
In the second assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court "erred in not
annulling the sales executed by Pilar Belmonte in favor of her daughters Joaquina and
Patricia Driz of lots 1-B and 1-A, Exhibits U and V of Plan PSD 36340."
Lots 1-B and 1-A of Plan PSD-36340 are taken, not from the original one-fourth interest
of Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484,
which interest was levied upon and thereafter acquired by Leon C. Viardo to the extent of
one-half, but from another one-fourth interest in the same parcel of land, which belonged
originally to Ines de Guzman, the mother of Pilar Belmonte. This one-fourth interest
subsequently devolved upon Pilar Belmonte and her two sisters. The three sisters
partitioned this one-fourth interest among themselves and lots 1-A and 1-B were
17

assigned to Pilar Belmonte who, in turn, sold them to her daughters. These sales, the
appellant contends, are fictitious and in fraud of his rights as creditor.
The only evidence adduced by the appellant in support of this contention is that the sales
were made by the mother to her daughters. This is not enough evidence to hold the sale
fictitious and fraudulent. There is no evidence whatsoever that Pilar Belmonte, at the
time she sold the lots, had outstanding debts or was in an otherwise embarrasing
financial position. Even the credit of Leon C. Viardo, the appellant, was established only
after the sales were executed, when the Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the
trial court in civil case No. 161 by awarding damages to him. There is no merit, therefore,
in the second assignment of error.
In the third assignment of error the appellant contends that the trial court "erred in
declaring that the "product raised in the portion under the occupancy of Isidoro Mercado,
therefore, pertains to him and was not subject to the levy or execution in favor of Leon C.
Viardo in Civil Case No. 161." In support of this assignment the appellant again harps on
the fact that the time Isidoro Mercado acquired an interest in the property, there was
notice of lis pendens, and therefore Isidoro Mercado "is not a purchaser in good faith."
This contention has been overruled in the first assignment of error when the notice of lis
pendens (Exhibits A and F) was held to refer not to the remaining one-eighth interest of
Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484, but
to the one-eighth interest which Leon C. Viardo had acquired from Pilar Belmonte, and
which the latter was trying to recover from him in civil case No. 161. It was Pilar
Belmonte who caused the notice of lis pendens to be recorded to subject "all the rights,
interests and participation of Leon C. Viardo in this Title" to the result of the litigation in
the aforesaid civil case No. 161. Pilar Belmonte did not thereby subject her remaining
one-eighth interest to the result of civil case No. 161 which she had filed against Leon C.
Viardo. If the latter wanted to subject the remaining one-eighth interest of Pilar Belmonte
to the outcome of his counterclaim in civil case No. 161, he should have asked for it.
The view held by this Court in passing upon the third assignment of error renders it
unnecessary for the Court to discuss the respective rights and liabilities of co-owners
when one co-owner, without the knowledge and/or consent of the other co-owners,
plants or builds on the property owned in common.
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred "in concluding that the heirs of
Bartolome Driz could not be held personally liable for the judgment rendered against the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 161 and therefore Lots 1-A and 1-B cannot be subject to the
payment of the judgment in favor of Leon C. Viardo."
SUCCESSION CASES
The only ground of appellant for this contention is that the present owners of these lots
are the children of the spouses Pilar Belmonte and Bartolome Driz, the plaintiffs in civil
case No. 161, and that, upon the death of Bartolome Driz during the pendency of the
appeal in civil case No. 161, these children were substituted as parties. This assignment
of error is without merit. The substitution of parties was made obviously because the
children of Bartolome Driz are his legal heirs and therefore could properly represent and
protect whatever interest he had in the case on appeal. But such a substitution did not
and cannot have the effect of making these substituted parties personally liable for
whatever judgment might be rendered on the appeal against their deceased father.
Article 774 of the Civil Code provides:
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law. (Emphasis supplied.)
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor,
was to proceed against the estate of Bartolome Driz.
Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome Driz was only a formal party to
civil case No. 161, the real party in interest being his wife Pilar Belmonte. The subject
matter in litigation was Pilar Belmonte's interest in the parcel of land described in original
certificate of title No. 3484, which appears to be paraphernal property.
The appellant's fifth and last assignment of error is that "the trial court erred in not
awarding damages to the plaintiff Leon C. Viardo in Civil Case No. 2004." Obviously the
appellant refers to the prayer in his complaint that P5,000 be awarded to him against
Pilar Belmonte for attorney's fees. He maintains that appellee Pilar Belmonte had
disposed of all her property with the intent of avoiding payment of her liability or debt to
him.
A review of the record lends credence to the appellant's claim. Appellee Pilar Belmonte
had one-fourth interest in a parcel of land containing an area of 119.2775 hectares. On
12 May 1943 Leon C. Viardo acquired one-half interest of Pilar Belmonte's one-fourth
interest. In a partition, where the appellant did not participate but which he does not
impugn, Pilar Belmonte's original one-fourth interest was segregated and delimited. She
was assigned in that partition and subdivision, Lot 1-A of Plan PSD-16864, containing an
area of 30 hectares (Exhibit K). Upon the death of her mother, she acquired another
13.2775 hectares. These 13.2775 hectares she sold to her two daughters and the validity
of the sales has been upheld by this Court. With the original 30 hectares, however, Pilar
Belmonte did not act in good faith when she sold more than 15 hectares to her daughter
Patricia Driz. Knowing that one-half of said 30 hectares or a total of 15 hectares
belonged to the appellant Leon C. Viardo, she nevertheless proceeded to enter into the
18

following transactions: (1) sale of seven and one-half hectares to Isidoro Mercado, dated
28 June 1948, Exhibit A; (2) sale of seven hectares to Dominador Asuncion, who later
sold the same parcel or interest to Zacarias Belmonte, dated 9 March 1949, Exhibit A; (3)
subdivision and partition of her lot 1-A, PSD-16864, into lots 1-E, 1-F, 1-G, 1-H and 1-I,
without the knowledge of her co-owner Leon C. Viardo, Plan PSD-36340, Exhibit O; (4)
sale in favor of her daughter Patricia Driz of lots 1-H and 1-I, Plan PSD-36340,
containing an area of 20,000 and 55,152 sq. meters, respectively, dated 9 September
1954, Exhibits R and A; and (5) sale in favor of her daughter Patricia Driz of lot 1-E; Plan
PSD-36340, containing an area of 79,848 sq. meters, dated 11 September 1954,
Exhibits S and A.
It will thus be seen that on 9 March 1949, after Pilar Belmonte had sold seven hectares
to Dominador Asuncion, she had only one-half hectare left to dispose of, since out of her
original thirty hectares (Lot 1-A, PSD-16864) the appellant Leon C. Viardo had acquired
one-half or fifteen hectares, Isidoro Mercado, seven and one-half hectares, and
Dominador Asuncion, seven hectares.
SUCCESSION CASES
when Pilar Belmonte proceeded to sell to her daughter Patricia Driz parcels of land which
no longer belonged to her.
The judgment appealed from is modified by holding and declaring that (1) Leon C.
Viardo, Isidoro M. Mercado, Zacarias Belmonte and Pilar Belmonte (not Patricia Driz) are
the co-owners pro-indiviso of lot 1-A, Plan PSD-16864, which is the one-fourth share of
Pilar Belmonte in lot 1, PSD-14371, original certificate of title No. 3484, in the following
proportion: one-half or fifteen hectares owned by Leon C. Viardo, seven and one-half
hectares by Isidoro M. Mercado, seven hectares by Zacarias Belmonte, and one-half
hectares by Pilar Belmonte, subject to the rights of Leon C. Viardo to the balance of his
judgment credit against Pilar Belmonte; and (2) Leon C. Viardo is awarded damages of
P1,000 against Pilar Belmonte. In all other respects, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against appellees Pilar Belmonte and Patricia Driz.

Fully aware that one-half hectare remained her only property, Pilar Belmonte
nevertheless proceeded to sell to her daughter Patricia Driz three lots containing a
combined area of more than fifteen hectares. It is obvious, therefore, that the sales to
Patricia Driz cannot be sustained, regardless of whether Pilar Belmonte was aware or
suspected that she would be held liable for damages to Leon C. Viardo in civil case No.
161, as in fact she was held liable by the Court of Appeals about two weeks after she
had executed the sales in favor of her daughter. The sales above referred to stand on a
different footing from the sales made in favor of Isidoro Mercado and Dominador
Asuncion, because in the latter sales Pilar Belmonte still had something to sell, namely,
her remaining fifteen hectares. But after she had disposed of fourteen and one-half
hectares to Mercado and Asuncion she had only one-half hectare left and therefore could
not sell another fifteen hectares.

The trial court, however, did not completely annul the sales made by Pilar Belmonte in
favor of her daughter. It merely reduced the sale of fifteen hectares to a sale of one-half
hectare, obviously in the belief that the sales should be sustained to the extent of Pilar
Belmonte's remaining interest. The record shows that both Pilar Belmonte and her
daughter Patricia Driz knew that one-half hectare only remained as the former's property,
but they nevertheless proceeded to sell and purchase more than fifteen hectares. When
it is considered further that the final judgment in civil case No. 161 awarded damages to
Leon C. Viardo amounting to 225 cavans of palay from 1946 (Exhibit H) and that when
this judgment was executed in 1954 no property of Pilar Belmonte could be found to
satisfy the damages (p. 11, t.s.n.), it is evident that Pilar Belmonte and her daughter
Patricia Driz had conspired to dispose of all the property of Pilar Belmonte in order to
frustrate any award of damages the Court of Appeals might make in favor of Leon C.
Viardo and that this conspiracy must have taken place at the latest on 9 September 1954
19

G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA
ONTE, petitioners, vs. VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO,
MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO,
SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA,
JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA, respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff-
1 married to Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A").
Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants," affirming the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at Bian.
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage,
they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land
Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters
respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in the name of "Flaviano Moreto,
married to Monica Maniega."
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6)
children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed
Moreto.
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs
Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto.
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria
Tuiza.
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs, namely, herein
plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza.
Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff Josefina
Moreto.
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his
brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein.
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.
SUCCESSION CASES
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica Maniega,
Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and
before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be
effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte,
the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale
(Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781 square
meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the name of
Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was acquired during their
marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and a new
transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part of
lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he
sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot 1496 about one
meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the
vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781 square meters
which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495
appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale (Exh. "1") although the fact is that
the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged their
house and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said house about
one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on
the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on the
ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano
Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased
wife and the latter was already dead when the sale was executed without the consent of
the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and hence, this suit was
instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the
deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as regards one-half of the property
subject matter of said deed; to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other
half of said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one-half portion thereof sold to the
defendants. "After payment of the other half of the purchase price"; to order the
defendants to vacate the portions occupied by them; to order the defendants to pay
actual and moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs; to order the defendants to
pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from August 1958 until they have vacated the premises
occupied by them for the use and occupancy of the same.
20

The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid as the
lot sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers believing in
good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it was
found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in
the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed recited that the lot sold is
lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781
square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their sale transaction.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof being as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs declaring the deed
of absolute sale dated July 30, 1952 pertaining to the eastern portion of Lot 1496
covering an area of 781 square meters null and void as regards the 390.5 square
meters of which plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful owners and entitled to
its possession.
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half (1/2) of 1781
square meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square meters of which defendants
are declared lawful owners and entitled to its possession.
After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with an area of
390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall be entitled to a certificate
of title covering said portion and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9843 of the office
of the Register of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new titles
issued to the plaintiffs and to the defendants covering their respective portions.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the name of Cornelio Pamplona,
married to Apolonia Onte, is by virtue of this decision ordered cancelled. The
defendants are ordered to surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 within thirty
(30) days after this decision shall have become final for cancellation in
accordance with this decision.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for the province of
Laguna for his information and guidance.
With costs against the defendants. 2
SUCCESSION CASES
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come to this Court.
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the facts and
circumstances duly established by the evidence, petitioners are entitled to the full
ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the same.
There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July 30, 1952
from Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica Maniega had already
been dead six years before, Monica having died on May 6, 1946. Hence, the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega had already been
dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code; Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The records
show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled and divided by
the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary proceedings for the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending Section 685 of Act
190. Neither was there an extra-judicial partition between the surviving spouse and the
heirs of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the
purpose. Accordingly, the estate became the property of a community between the
surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega
in the concept of a co-ownership.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the
death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and
becomes the property of a community, by operation of law, between the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the
widower or the widow, it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse. Every co-
owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived
therefrom, and he therefore may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question.
(Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107)
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here is no
reason in law why the heirs of the deceased wife may not form a partnership with the
surviving husband for the management and control of the community property of the
marriage and conceivably such a partnership, or rather community of property, between
the heirs and the surviving husband might be formed without a written agreement."
In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the Supreme Court held that "(a)lthough, when the
wife dies, the surviving husband, as administrator of the community property, has
authority to sell the property withut the concurrence of the children of the marriage,
nevertheless this power can be waived in favor of the children, with the result of bringing
about a conventional ownership in common between the father and children as to such
property; and any one purchasing with knowledge of the changed status of the property
21

will acquire only the undivided interest of those members of the family who join in the act
of conveyance.
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952, the
vendees constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which the vendor
pointed out to them as the area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a son of
the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496. Subsequently, a cemented piggery
coral was constructed by the vendees at the back of their house about one and one-half
meters from the eastern boundary of Lot 1496. Both vendor and vendees believed all the
time that the area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was Lot No. 1495 which
according to its title (T.C.T. No. 14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so that the
deed of sale between the parties Identified and described the land sold as Lot 1495. But
actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon agreement of the parties during the
proceedings of the case below, the area sold was within Lot 1496.
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete
piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the
complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of over nine (9) years.
And during said period, the private respondents who are the heirs of Monica Maniega as
well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956, lived as
neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation,
possession and ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are
persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel by laches to
claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches is a rule of
equity which bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment
and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting the same.
(International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92)
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was already
dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between
Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica
Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is applicable and it provides a follows:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involve. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-ownership when
at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq.
SUCCESSION CASES
meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their house and
also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house and an
adjacent coral for piggery.
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega owned
three parcels of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot
1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters. The
three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. These three parcels of lots are
contiguous with one another as each is bounded on one side by the other, thus: Lot 4545
is bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on the southeast by Lot 1496. Lot 1495 is
bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. It is
therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are not separate
properties located in different places but they abut each other. This is not disputed by
private respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership constituted or
covered these three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled
to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a
perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona
spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to him at
the time of the sale.
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid as
to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had the
legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which he could
dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro-indiviso or
inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location and even
indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erectd without objection,
protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and
tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or
termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not only the
vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from
asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of
sale executed by said vendor Flaiano Moreto.
Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased
spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale
executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00
and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs of
both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to
comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation
of the vendor of the property of delivering and transfering the ownership of the whole
property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein private
respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:
22
 SUCCESSION CASES
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself
to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other part
to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.

A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.

Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well
as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale.

Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received
from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property
rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art.
1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased
Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the
private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the
obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners
(which was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only
one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said obligation.

The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners for
more than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed
by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the
area from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also
entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their name based on the
relocation survey.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that the sale made and executed by Flaviano
Moreto in favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby declared legal and valid in its
entirely.

Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq. meters at the
eastern portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners and whereon their houses
and piggery coral stand.

The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of 781 sq.
meters from Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title to
the petitioners covering the segregated area of 781 sq. meters.

No costs. SO ORDERED.

23

G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992
DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR.,
EVELYN SUAREZ-DE LEON and REGINIO I. SUAREZ, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, VALENTE RAYMUNDO, VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION
VITO and VIRGINIA BANTA, Respondents.
CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF
THE CHILDREN, DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM THEIR MOTHER. The legitime
of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of
petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of
their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother
but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are
not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their
own interest.
The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all
the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners and registered in the name of
petitioners deceased father. Marcelo Suarez, whose estate has not been partitioned or
liquidated, after the said properties were levied and publicly sold en masse to private
respondents to satisfy the personal judgment debt of Teofista Suarez, the surviving
spouse of Marcelo Suarez, mother of herein petitioners.chanrobles law library
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his
estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been
liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners widowed mother and Rizal Realty
Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages,
and were ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch
151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate
principal amount of about P70,000 as damages. 1
The judgment against petitioners mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become
final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be
millions then) were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private
respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents
were then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1,
1983.
SUCCESSION CASES
On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a
reinvindicatory action 2 against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal,
thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and
the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property. Therein, they alleged,
among others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot
be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners,
can neither be levied nor sold on execution.
On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents a final
deed of sale 3 over the properties.
On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with Branch 151 a
Motion for Reconsideration 4 of the Order dated October 10, 1984, claiming that the
parcels of land are co-owned by them and further informing the Court the filing and
pendency of an action to annul the auction sale (Civil Case No. 51203), which motion
however, was denied.
On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining private
respondents from transferring to third parties the levied parcels of land based on the
finding that the auctioned lands are co-owned by petitioners.
On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 a
Motion to Dismiss for failure on the part of the petitioners to prosecute, however, such
motion was later denied by Branch 155, Regional Trial Court, Pasig.
On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte Motion to
Dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute. This was granted by Branch 155 through an
Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding petitioners pending motion for the issuance
of alias summons to be served upon the other defendants in the said case. A motion for
reconsideration was filed but was later denied.
On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739 an Order
directing Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the lots
subject of the judicial sale; to desist from removing or alienating improvements thereon;
and to surrender to private respondents the owners duplicate copy of the torrens title
and other pertinent documents.
Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul
the Orders of Branch 151 dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986 issued in Civil
Case Nos. 21736-21739.
24
 SUCCESSION CASES
On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for reconsideration of "If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall
the Order 5 dated September 24, 1986. In an Order dated June 10, 1987, 6 Branch 155 be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or
lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of alias summons. descendants."

Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated
February 25, 1985, 7 May 19, 1989 8 and February 26, 1990 9 issued in Civil Case No.
51203 and further ordering respondent Judge to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The
appellate court rendered its decision on July 27, 1990, 10 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders
dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No.
51203 are hereby annulled, further respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case
No. 51203." 11
Hence, this appeal.
Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner and private
respondents and the developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint, We cannot
but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of
each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different
from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property
not because of their mother but through their own right as children of their deceased
father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul
the auction sale to protect their own interest.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its
Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No.
51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and to
annul the sale with regard to said portion.
SO ORDERED.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and
the manner of publicly selling en masse the subject properties for auction. To start with,
only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have been the subject of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the
institution of the case.

"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent."

Article 888 further provides:

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate
children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided:

Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:

25

G.R. No. L-19270 March 31, 1962
MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS, THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED MARIA GERVACIO
BLAS, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. CECILIA MUOZ-PALMA, as Judge of the Rizal
Court of First Instance; ROSALINA SANTOS, as Executrix of the testate estate of
the late Maxima Santos; MARTA GERVACIO BLAS CHIVI, LUDOVICO PINPIN and
TOMASA AVENDAO, respondents.
Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition against the order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Judge Cecilia Muoz Palma, presiding, dated October 25, 1961, which
(1) granted the motion of respondent executrix Rosalina Santos to set Civil Case No.
4395 of said court, appealed to this Court as G.R. No. L-14070, for hearing to determine
certain factual issues before proceeding with the execution of the judgment rendered
therein by this Court, (2) admitted the complaint in intervention of intervenors Ludovico
Pinpin and Tomasa Avendao, and (3) denied the motion filed by plaintiffs, petitioners
herein, to enforce the judgment of this Court in the above-mentioned case without the
necessity of further hearing.
The events that led to the present petition may be summarized as follows: On July 26,
1961, plaintiffs, petitioners herein, filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a
motion for the execution of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-14070, dated March
29, 1961 (Civil Case No. 4395, Court of First Instance of Rizal), which motion was
granted by the respondent judge in an order dated August 16, 1961. Pursuant to said
order, a writ of execution was issued by the clerk of the lower court on August 24, 1961,
and notice thereof served upon respondent Rosalina Santos on August 29, 1961, giving
the latter 10 days within which to comply the same. Instead of complying with the order,
respondent executrix, on September 15,1961, filed a motion to set the case for hearing,
alleging that it would be difficult to comply with the court's order unless the following
questions were first resolved: (1) what properties to be conveyed by the executrix; (2) to
whom conveyance is to be made; and (3) in what proportions conveyance should be
effected. This motion was opposed by herein petitioners as well as by Marta Chivi on the
ground that the decision of this Court was clear enough on the questions raised and
could be complied with without the necessity of adducing evidence. A reply to this
opposition was filed by respondent executrix and a rejoinder thereto presented by
petitioners.
On October 3, 1961, plaintiff again filed a motion to enforce the final judgment in the
above-numbered case in accordance with Sec. 10, Rule 39, to which motion defendant
executrix filed an opposition reiterating the necessity of a hearing before the judgment of
this Court could be executed.
SUCCESSION CASES
In the meantime, or on August 29, 1961, Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendao
presented a complaint in intervention, alleging that they are legatees named in the last
will and testament of the deceased Don Simeon Blas as well as in that of the deceased
Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, and that they are, therefore, entitled to participate in the
one-half share of Maxima Santos in her conjugal partnership with Simeon Blas.
Petitioners opposed the admission of the intervention complaint on the ground that
Pinpin and Avendao have absolutely no interest in the case, not being the heirs and
legatees contemplated in the document Exhibit "A", signed by the late Maxima Santos,
nor in the will and project of partition covering the estate of Simeon Blas nor in the
decision rendered by the Supreme Court sought to be executed; and that the admission
of the intervention complaint would violate the rule of res judicata and the doctrine of "law
of the case". A reply to the opposition was filed by the claimants-intervenors and a
rejoinder thereto presented by plaintiffs. After considering the allegations of the parties in
their respective pleadings, respondent judge issued an order dated October 25, 1961,
wherein the motion for intervention was admitted, the motion for hearing granted, and the
motion to enforce the judgment of this Court was denied. A motion for reconsideration of
this order presented by petitioners on October 31, 1961 was denied by respondent judge
on December 7, 1961. Hence, the present action was brought before this Court.
The pertinent parts of the order against which the present petition has been instituted is,
for the sake of clarity, hereby quoted:
In pages 27 to 46 of said Project of Partition, an enumeration was made of the
properties constituting the entire share of Maxima Santos on the basis of the
above-quoted distribution. It is, therefore, incorrect to state that all these
properties listed in pages 27 to 46 of the Project of Partition constitute the one-
half share of Maxima Santos in the conjugal properties for as already indicated,
said enumeration includes: (a) the one-third portion devised to her by her
husband, Simeon Blas in his will; (b) the one-third portion constituting the share
of Lazaro Gervacio Blas; and (c) her one-half share in the conjugal properties. In
view of this, there is need of segregating in that list of properties found in pages
27 to 46 of the Project of Partition, those which constitute the one-half share of
Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas in the conjugal properties from those portions which
she inherited from her husband as well as those which she bought from Lazaro
Gervacio Blas.
As regards the allowance of the intervention of several parties in this proceeding,
this Court is simply guided by that portion of the Decision of the Supreme Court
which states that considering that all heirs and legatees designated in the will of
Simeon Blas have not appeared in this Civil Case, the said heirs and legatees
may file adversary pleadings to determine the participation of each and every
one of them in the properties to be conveyed.
26

For a proper understanding of the case at bar, we hereby quote the dispositive part of the
decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-14070:.
... the defendant-appellee, administratrix ... is ordered to convey and deliver one-
half of the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal
properties in said Civil Case No. 6707, ... to the heirs and the legatees of her
husband Simeon Blas.
The objection to the execution of the above-quoted dispositive part of the decision lies,
as contended by counsel for respondent executrix Rosalina Santos and as found by the
trial court, in the supposed impossibility of pointing out from among the properties
adjudicated to Maxima Santos in the project of partition of the estate of her deceased
husband, the properties that should be conveyed and delivered.
It must be borne in mind that it was not the intention of our decision in the, previous case
(G.R. No. L-14070) which was ordered executed, that of the very numerous properties
adjudicated to Maxima Santos in the project of partition, those that should be conveyed
and delivered to the petitioners herein, petitioners also in the previous case, be
specifically pointed out separately from the rest of the properties that should remain as
Maxima Santos' share. It was not expected, in view of the fact that the project of partition
of the estate of Simeon Blas does not indicate the properties adjudicated to Maxima
Santos as her share in the conjugal partnership separately from those received by her
from her husband as devisee of the free portion of his estate, or those acquired by
purchase, that the properties constituting the one-half to be conveyed out of Maxima
Santos' share in the conjugal partnership, be expressly singled out from the others. What
was expected to be done by the court executing the judgment, in order to carry out the
decision of this Court, was to determine what undivided portion or aliquot part of all the
properties adjudicated to her in various capacities should be conveyed by virtue of the
judgment, and then to have said undivided portion or aliquot part conveyed in an
appropriate deed and delivered to the petitioners, without need of actually partitioning the
bulk of the properties and pointing out which of them belongs to petitioners and which
belongs to the widow Maxima Santos. 1wph1.t
The practice in the distribution of the estates of deceased persons is to assign the whole
of the properties left for distribution to the heirs in a certain definite proportion, an aliquot
part pertaining to each of the heirs. This method or plan of distribution and partition of
estates is provided for in section 1 of Rule 91, which reads thus: .
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. Testimony taken on
controversy preserved. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowances to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on
the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
SUCCESSION CASES
estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to
which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having
the same in his possession. ...
It might be pertinent to recall, in order to show the propriety of this method of partition by
determination of the aliquot portion pertaining to each heir, that the original action, G.R.
No. L-14070, was instituted to obtain a judicial declaration that one-half of the properties
of Maxima Santos assigned to her as her share in the conjugal properties of herself and
her husband, be conveyed to the petitioners, because of a document signed by Maxima
Santos (Annex "H" of complaint) in which she promised to convey to the heirs of her
deceased husband one-half of the properties that she would receive as her share in the
conjugal properties of herself and her husband. The action was expressly based on said
document, Annex "H" of complaint, in which the promise to convey said one-half portion
was made. There was no demand that said one-half be expressly and actually
segregated in the action, or that the conjugal properties be actually divided or partitioned.
The defendants in that case contended that the document Annex "H" was not executed
by Maxima Santos and that if it was so executed, the same was null and void as
constituting a promise to convey future inheritance. There was no intent to designate or
point out the properties to be conveyed. The properties appear in the inventory filed in
the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas but no demand was
made for their determination in the case. In view of the nature of the claim, which was to
compel conveyance in accordance with the written contract or promise, and the nature of
the defense, which is the supposed invalidity of the promise, the decision could not be
other than a mere declaration of the validity of the instrument, coupled with an order for
the conveyance and delivery to the petitioners of the said one-half share as promised in
the document Annex "H". All of the above circumstances would have been ascertained
had the court below taken pains to read even the decision and the project of partition
alone.
It is true that objection was also raised by the defendants in the previous case to the
action on the ground that the deceased Maxima Santos had received in one single mass
of properties, not only her share in the conjugal estate but also a devise of one-third of
the free portion of the estate of her husband Simeon Blas, as well as the share of one of
the latter's heirs. But such objection could not prevent compliance with the promise made
the deceased Maxima Santos (to convey to the heirs of her husband one-half of what
she received of the conjugal properties of her husband and herself). And the objection
then raised was opportunely denied.
The project of partition mentioned in the dispositive part of our decision sought to be
enforced, which is the project of partition in Civil Case No. 6707 of the Court of First
27

Instance of Rizal, contains the following resume of the properties received by Maxima
Santos in various capacities in the settlement of the estate of her husband Simeon Blas:
1/2 of all properties left by the deceased, as her
share in the conjugal partnership property . . . . . . . . . P339,440.00
1/3 free disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113,146.66
1/3 of strict legitime devised to Lazaro Blas
and sold by the latter to the widow . . . . . . . . . . . 37,715.56
T O TAL .......... P490,302.22
The properties received by Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal partnership
properties is expressly stated to be P339,440.00. In accordance with the promise made
in Annex "H", to convey and deliver to the heirs of the deceased husband one-half
thereof, the value of the properties that she was obliged to convey and deliver is one-half
of said properties, or P169,720. Following what we have stated above, that the practice
in the settlement of assets of deceased persons is to assign to each heir or participant a
certain aliquot portion, undivided if division is difficult to carry out, the share to be
assigned by Maxima Santos is P169,720 divided by P490,302.22 or approximately
34.61-1/3%. In order to carry out the decision of this Court, therefore, the administratrix
should have been compelled or ordered to convey and deliver the 34.61-1/3% of the total
amount of the properties that she received in the project of partition.
The procedure to be followed is that outlined in section 8 of Rule 90 which reads as
follows:
Sec. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased
contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed. Where the deceased was in his
lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest
therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that
purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property
according to such contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the
parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real property to
the executor or administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. The
deed executed by such executor, administrator or clerk of court shall be as
effectual to convey the property as if executed by the deceased in his lifetime;
but no such conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the application for that
purpose has been given personally or by mail to all persons interested, and such
further notice has been given, by publication or otherwise, as the court deems
proper; nor if the assets in the hands of the executor or administrator will thereby
SUCCESSION CASES
be reduced so as to prevent a creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his
dividend.
The above-quoted section is applicable because the deceased Maxima Santos had
agreed and promised to convey in her will one-half of her share in the conjugal assets to
such of the heirs of her husband as she may designate. If the administratrix Rosalina
Santos is reluctant to execute the deed as ordered by the Court, the deed of conveyance
and delivery of the properties may be executed by the clerk of court, in which case, as
declared by the rule, the deed shall be as effectual to convey the property as if executed
by the deceased in her lifetime.
We note that the petitioners prepared a deed of conveyance to be signed by the clerk of
court, but the error in the said deed of conveyance lies in that it includes all of the
properties mentioned in the project of partition, adjudicated to Maxima Santos which, as
above indicated, should not be the case, because what was actually adjudicated to her in
the project of partition included not only her share in the conjugal property, but also what
she received from her husband out of the free portion, and what she had purchased from
an heir of her husband.
It is to be noted further that in order to have the document executed and approved by the
court, the specific steps prior to the execution of the deed of conveyance as pointed out
in the last part of the above-quoted section must be strictly followed.
With the above explanations, there should be no difficulty for the court below to proceed
with the execution of the decision in accordance with its terms. Our attention has been
called to the fact of the properties included in the inventory of the estate left by the
deceased Simeon Blas, certain properties listed in Annex "2" of the petition in the case at
bar, are not included in the project of partition. We have checked the said properties and
have found that the same are actually included in the inventory of the estate left by
Simeon Blas but do not appear among those adjudicated to any of the heirs in the project
of partition. Without making a final pronouncement as to the effect of such conveyances,
it is possible that such conveyances violated the express promise made by Maxima
Santos in Annex "H" that she convey one-half of her share in the conjugal properties to
the heirs of her deceased husband. On the other hand, the persons who may have
purchased the same may have acquired them in good faith, without knowledge of the
existence of the promise made by the deceased Maxima Santos in Annex "H". The only
just ruling regarding these properties would be to reserve to the petitioners herein the
right of action to claim from the administratrix of Maxima Santos, or from the persons to
whom they have been transferred, or from both, their one-half share therein as promised
by Maxima Santos in Annex "H".
The above considerations dispose of the main issue submitted to this Court in the case
at bar. One minor matter remains to be considered, and that is, the petition for
28

intervention filed by Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendao alleging that they have
interest in the action as legatees of the deceased Simeon Blas. This petition was
opposed by the petitioners herein, but was finally admitted by the court a quo.
These intervenors appear to have received legacies in the will of the deceased Simeon
Blas. The portion of said will containing the legacies to these intervenors are as follows:.
IV
"Ang isang ikatlong bahagi, etc.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Ipinagkakaloob ko kay TOMASA AVENDAO, etc.
xxx xxx xxx
6. Ipinagkakaloob ko kay LUDOVICO PINPIN, etc."
(Pp. 254-255, Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-14070, Maria Gervacio Blas,
et al. vs. Rosalina Santos.).
The question at issue, therefore, is whether these intervenors are embraced within the
term "herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na asawa, SIMEON
BLAS, sa kaniyang testamento," to which persons Maxima Santos had obligated herself
to convey one-half of her share in the conjugal properties.
A study of the testament of Simeon Blas (Record on Appeal, pp. 249-257, G.R. No. L-
14070) and the promise or contract executed by Maxima Santos, Annex "H", shows that
the two terms (herederos and legatarios) are used in the devises or legacies to the
various heirs and legatees. With respect to the legitimate heirs of Simeon Blas, to whom
he devised the strict legitime and the mejora, he used the expression
"ibinibigay ko at ipinamamana sa aking apong Maria Gervacio Blas, Marta Gervacio Blas
at Lazaro Gervacio Blas" (Chapter II, paragraph 2 of the testament of Simeon Blas). With
respect to the mejora he uses the same term "ipinamamana" and he says thus:"Para sa
aking mga apong Luding at Leoncio Blas ay ipinagkakaloob ko at ipinamamana ang
halagang SAMPUNG LIBONG PISO (P10,000) sa bawat isa sa kanila." In the last or
fourth chapter where the one-third subject to the free disposal are disposed of, he uses
only the term "ipinagkakaloob". This term is used for Andres Pascual, Leoncio Santos,
Catalina Blas, Tomasa Avendao, Justo Garcia, Ludovico Pinpin, and Fermin Santiago,
all of whom are not relatives of the deceased. Taking into account the fact that both the
will of the deceased Simeon Blas and the document Annex "H" executed by Maxima
Santos were prepared by the same persons and at about the same time, both bearing
date of December 26, 1936, and are attested by the same witnesses, and the further fact
that it was the deceased Simeon Blas that had asked for the execution of the document
Annex "II", it stands to reason that the word "ipinamamana" refers to devices made legal
heirs (heirs at law) of the deceased Simeon Blas, whereas the term "ipinagkakaloob"
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refers to persons who are not related to him, on his heirs at law. Accordingly, in the
document Annex "H" which reads as follows:.
MAUNAWA NG SINO MANG MAKABABASA:
Na akong si MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, nasa hustong gulang, kasal kay
SIMEON BLAS, taga bayan ng Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, sa pamamagitan
ngkasulatang ito ay malaya kong ipinahahayag:
Na aking nabasa at naunawa ang testamento at huling kalooban na nilagdaan ng
aking asawa, SIMEON BLAS, at ipinahahayag ko sa ilalim ng aking karangalan
at sa harap ng aking asawa na igagalang at pagpipitaganan ang lahat at bawat
isang bahagi ng nabanggit na testamento at ipinangangako ko pa sa
pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito na ang lahat ng maiiwang pag-aari at
kayamanan naming mag-asawa, na nauukol at bahaging para sa akin sa
paggawa ko naman ng aking testamento ay ipinagkakaloob ko ang kalahati (1/2)
sa mga herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na asawa,
SIMEON BLAS, sa kaniyang testamento na ako'y makapipili o makahihirang sa
kahi't kangino sa kanila ng aking pagbibigyan at pamamanahan sang-ayon sa
pag-galang, paglilingkod, at pakikisama na gagawin sa akin.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO, ay nilagdaan ko ang kasulatang ito
ngayong ika 26 ng Diciembre ng taong 1936, dito sa San Francisco del Monte,
SanJuan, Rizal, Philippines.
MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS
the words "herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na asawa,"
mean the heirs at law or relatives of the deceased Simeon Blas and not other persons
who are not heirs but had received legacies in money or otherwise. Consequent to this
conclusion, intervenors Ludovico Pinpin and Tomasa Avendao cannot claim any right by
virtue of said document Annex "H" and their petition for intervention should be, as it
hereby is, disallowed.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the order sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside and the court
below is ordered to proceed with the execution of the judgment in G.R. No. L-14070 in
accordance herewith. With costs against the respondent Rosalina Santos.
29

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T.
ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES
and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
1. Parent and Child; Filiation; Recognition; Family Code; Words and Phrases; The
phrase vested or acquired rights under Article 256 is not defined by the Family Code,
leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted
to them.-
The phrase vested or acquired rights under Article 256, is not defined by the Family
Code. The Committee did not define what is meant by a vested or acquired right, thus Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.
leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted
to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question that may arise in
the future.
2. Parent and Child; Filiation; Recognition; Family Code; Actions; An action for
compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to
the advent of the Family Code must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not
by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.-
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private
respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional
rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article
285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The
present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned,
as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case
decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that
she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
3. Parent and Child; Filiation; Recognition; Family Code; Actions; Jurisdiction; The
jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached, cannot be ousted
by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and the Court retains
jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.-
Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred,
notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already
deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception
to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court,
SUCCESSION CASES
which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost
jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the
Family Code of the Philippines. Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the
jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted
by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it
finally disposes of the case.
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint 1 for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila by
the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F.
Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named
defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the
deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an
amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30,
1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on
October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an
Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate
children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to
recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M.
Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be
determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and
continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children" as stated in paragraphs 6
and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:
6. The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the
herein plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs' and their mother's family
friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not limited to
the following:
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his surname;
(c) Payment of maternal bills;
(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;
30

(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family
rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status
of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them,
with the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as
above outlined.2
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz
Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the
legitimate children of Jose Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate
daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in the
estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of
P10,000.00 as atty's fee;
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3
8. Cost against the defendants.
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss
of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of
Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227), otherwise known as
the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was
denied by the lower court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on the
ground that it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was
dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion for
Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent court in a minute resolution,
dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following
grounds:
A
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY
TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.
B
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY
PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF
JURISDICTION.
C
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS
NO PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION
AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT THE TIME AN ACTION FOR
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO
DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE
CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE
31

STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE
LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE
RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT
THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED OR AT LEAST
MODIFIED BY THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.
D (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' PETITION
FOR PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT
OF AN APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST. 4
Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was
brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285
thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate children may prove their filiation, to
wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from
the attainment of his majority; . . . .
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family
Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of
private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under Article
175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided
that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the
"open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise
the action will be barred by prescription.
The law cited reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
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(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173 [during the lifetime of the child], except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private
respondent and her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1)
year after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has
clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code.
Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action was filed prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant to
Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:
This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested of acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be:
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary
Will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of
the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular
case?
The phrase "vested or acquired rights" under Article 256, is not defined by the Family
Code. "The Committee did not define what is meant by a 'vested or acquired right,' thus
leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted
32
 SUCCESSION CASES
to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question that may arise in Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in
the future."5 criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or
events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,6 a case which involves a similar complaint denominated the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. 8
as "Claim for Inheritance" but treated by this court as one to compel recognition as an
illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the Family Code by the mother of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
minor child, and based also on the "open and continuous possession of the status of an August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
illegitimate child," we had occasion to rule that:
SO ORDERED.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of
action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court
under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 7 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition
already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed
to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such
right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

xxx xxx xxx

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent
and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been
vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct
in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that
private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.

Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private
respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional
rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article
285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The
present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned,
as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case
decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that
she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the
conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact
that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private
respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule
provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired
jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the
same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the
Philippines.

33

G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997
ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ and
MYRNA T. SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
ROSALIA S. LUGOD, ARTURO S. LUGOD, EVELYN LUGOD-RANISES and
ROBERTO S. LUGOD, respondents.
Is a petition for certiorari, in lieu of appeal, the proper remedy to correct orders of a
probate court nullifying certain deeds of sale and, thus, effectively passing upon title to
the properties subject of such deeds? Is a compromise agreement partitioning inherited
properties valid even without the approval of the trial court hearing the intestate estate of
the deceased owner?
The Case
These questions are answered by this Court as it resolves the petition for review
on certiorari before us assailing the November 23, 1992 Decision of the Court of
1 formally be terminated and closed, Juan C. Sanchez, [herein private respondent]
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28761 which annulled the decision of the trial court and
2 3 4 Rosalia's father, died on October 21, 1968.
which declared the compromise agreement among the parties valid and binding even
without the said trial court's approval. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons hereinabove set forth and discussed, the
instant petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision as well as the
subsequent orders of the respondent court are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on October
14, 1992 is made PERMANENT. The compromise agreement dated
October 30, 1969 as modified by the memorandum of agreement of April
13, 1970 is DECLARED valid and binding upon herein parties. And
Special Proceedings No. 44-M and 1022 are deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED. 5
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C.
Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while [herein private respondents] Arturo S.
SUCCESSION CASES
Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of
[herein private respondent] Rosalia.
[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed
Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.
Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, on September 29, 1967,
[herein private respondent] Rosalia filed on January 22, 1968, thru counsel, a
petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and the estate
of her father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of senility (Annex
"B", Petition).
On September 30, 1968, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, as administratrix of
the intestate estate of her mother, submitted an inventory and appraisal of the
real and personal estate of her late mother (Annex "C", Petition).
Before the administration proceedings Special in Proceedings No. 44-M could
On January 14, 1969, [herein petitioners] as heirs of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a
petition for letters of administration (Special Proceedings No. 1022) over the
intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which petition was opposed by (herein
private respondent) Rosalia.6
On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia and [herein
petitioners] assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise
agreement (Annex "D", Petition) wherein they agreed to divide the properties
enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez.
On November 3, 1969, petitioner Rosalia was appointed by [the trial court], and
took her oath as the administratrix of her father's intestate estate.
On January 19, 1970, [herein petitioners] filed a motion to require administratrix,
[herein private respondent] Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and or to
set aside compromise agreement (Annex "E", Petition).
Under date of April 13, 1970, (herein private respondent) Rosalia and [herein
petitioners] entered into and executed a memorandum of agreement which
modified the compromise agreement (Annex "F". Petition)
34

On October 25, 1979, or nine years later, [herein petitioners] filed, thru counsel, a
motion to require [herein private respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory
and to render an accounting over properties not included in the compromise
agreement (Annex "G", Petition). They likewise filed a motion to defer the
approval of the compromise agreement (Annex "H", Ibid), in which they prayed
for the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud.
On February 4, 1980, however, counsel for [herein petitioners] moved to
withdraw his appearance and the two motions he flied, Annex "G" and "H"
(Annex "I", Petition).
On February 28, 1980, the [trial] court issued an order directing [herein private
respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory of properties under her
administration and an accounting of the fruits thereof, which prompted [herein
private respondent] Rosalia to file a rejoinder on March 31, 1980 (Annex "K",
Petition).
On May 12, 1980, [herein petitioners], thru new counsel, filed a motion to change
administratrix (Annex "L", Petition) to which [herein private respondent] Rosalia
filed an opposition (Annex "M", Ibid).
The parties were subsequently ordered to submit their respective position
papers, which they did (Annexes "N" and "O", Petition). On September 14, 1989,
former counsel of (herein petitioners) entered his re-appearance as counsel for
(herein petitioners).
On the bases of memoranda submitted by the parties, the [trial court], this time
presided by Judge Vivencio A. Galon, promulgated its decision on June 26, 1991,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows by declaring and ordering:
1. That the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca Sanchez under
Special Proceedings No. 44-M consists of all her paraphernal properties
and one-half (1/2) of the conjugal properties which must be divided
equally between Rosalia Sanchez de Lugod and Juan C. Sanchez;
2. That the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special
Proceedings No. 1022 consists of all his capital properties, one-half (1/2)
from the conjugal partnership of gains and one-half (1/2) of the intestate
estate of Maria Villafranca under Special Proceedings No. 44-M;
SUCCESSION CASES
3. That one-half (1/2) of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez
shall be inherited by his only legitimate daughter, Rosalia V. Sanchez de
Lugod while the other one-half (1/2) shall be inherited and be divided
equally by, between and among the six (6) illegitimate children, namely:
Patricia Alburo, Maria Ramuso Sanchez, Rolando Pedro T. Sanchez,
Florida Mierly T. Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T. Sanchez;
4. That all the Deed (sic) of Absolute Sales executed by Juan C. Sanchez
and Maria Villafranca in favor of Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Arturo S.
Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod on July 26, 1963 and
June 26, 1967 are all declared simulated and fictitious and must be
subject to collation and partition among all heirs;
5. That within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision, Rosalia
Sanchez Lugod is hereby ordered to prepare a project of partition of the
intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 1022
and distribute and deliver to all heirs their corresponding shares. If she
fails to do so within the said thirty (30) days, then a Board of
Commissioners is hereby constituted, who are all entitled to honorarium
and per diems and other necessary expenses chargeable to the estate to
be paid by Administratrix Rosalia S. Lugod, appointing the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Gingoog City as
members thereof, with the task to prepare the project of partition and
deliver to all heirs their respective shares within ninety (90) days from the
finality of said decision;
6. That within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, Administratrix
Rosalia Sanchez Vda. de Lugod is hereby ordered to submit two (2)
separate certified true and correct accounting, one for the income of all
the properties of the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under
Special Proceedings No. 44-M, and another for the properties of the
entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings
No. 1022 duly both signed by her and both verified by a Certified Public
Accountant and distribute and deliver to her six (6) illegitimate brothers
and sisters in equal shares, one-half (1/2) of the net income of the estate
of Juan C. Sanchez from October 21, 1968 up to the finality of this
decision;
7. For failure to render an accounting report and failure to give cash
advances to the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez during their
minority and hour of need from the net income of the estate of Juan C.
Sanchez, which adversely prejudiced their social standing and pursuit of
college education, (the trial court) hereby orders Rosalia Sanchez Vda.
35

de Lugod to pay her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters the sum of
Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages,
and also the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos
for attorney's fees;
8. Upon release of this decision and during its pendency, should appeal
be made, the Register of Deeds and Assessors of the Provinces and
Cities where the properties of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca are
located, are all ordered to register and annotate in the title and/or tax
declarations, the dispositive portion of this decision for the protection of
all heirs and all those who may be concerned.
SO ORDERED.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia filed a motion for reconsideration dated July
17, 1991 (Annex "P", Petition) on August 6, 1991.
On August 13, 1991, [herein petitioners] filed a motion for execution and
opposition to [herein private respondent] Rosalia's motion for reconsideration
(Annex "Q", Petition).
On September 3, 1991, [the trial court] issued an Omnibus Order (Annex "S",
Petition) declaring, among other things, that the decision at issue had become
final and executory.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia then filed a motion for reconsideration of said
Omnibus Order (Annex "T", Petition). Said [herein private respondent] was
allowed to file a memorandum in support of her motion (Annex "V", Petition).
On June 26, 1991, [the trial court] issued and Order denying petitioner Rosalia's
motion for reconsideration (Annex "W", Petition). 7
Thereafter, private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition
for certiorari and contended:
I The [trial court] has no authority to disturb the compromise agreement.
II The [trial court] has arbitrarily faulted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S.
Lugod for alleged failure to render an accounting which was impossible.
III The [trial court] acted without jurisdiction in derogation of the constitutional
rights of [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and
SUCCESSION CASES
Roberto S. Lugod when [the trial court] decided to annul the deed of sale
between the said [herein private respondents] and Juan C. Sanchez without
affording them their day in court.
IV [The trial court judge] defied without rhyme or reason well-established and
entrenched jurisprudence when he determined facts sans any evidence thereon.
V [The trial court] grossly misinterpreted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S.
Lugod's right to appeal.
8
For clarity's sake, this Court hereby reproduces verbatim the compromise agreement of 9
the parties:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
COME NOW, the parties in the above-entitled case, motivated by their mutual
desire to preserve and maintain harmonious relations between and among
themselves, for mutual valuable considerations and in the spirit of good will and
fair play, and, for the purpose of this Compromise Agreement, agree to the
following:
1. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez who died intestate on October 21, 1968
was legally married to Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, who predeceased her on
September 29, 1967, out of whose wedlock Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Oppositor
herein, was born, thus making her the sole and only surviving legitimate heir of
her deceased parents;
2. That the said deceased Juan C. Sanchez, left illegitimate children, Intervenors-
Oppositors and Petitioners, respectively, herein namely;
(1) Patricio Alburo, born out of wedlock on March 17, 1926 at Cebu City,
Philippines, to Emilia Alburo;
(2) Maria Ramoso Sanchez, born out of wedlock on May 9, 1937 at
Gingoog, Misamis Oriental, now, Gingoog City, to Alberta Ramoso;
(3) (a) Rolando Pedro Sanchez, born on May 19, 1947,
(b) Florida Mierly Sanchez, born on February 16, 1949,
(c) Alfredo Sanchez, born on July 21, 1950, and
36

(d) Myrna Sanchez, born on June 16, 1952, all born out of wedlock to
Laureta Tampus in Gingoog City, Philippines.
3. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez left the following properties, to wit:
I. SEPARATE CAPITAL OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ
NATURE, DESCRIPTION AND AREA ASSESSED VALUE
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax. Decl. No. 06458, Cad. Lot No. 1041 C-2,
located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 1033,
1035, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1040, 1042 & 1043; South by Lot No. 1080, 1088, 1087
& 1084; East by Lot Nos. 1089, 1061 & 2319; West by Lot Nos. 954, 1038, 1057
& 1056, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO (183, 672) sq. ms. more or less.
P21,690.00
II. CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ AND MARIA VILLAFRANCA
DE SANCHEZ
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06447, Cad. Lot No. 2745, C-7
located at Agay-ayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 2744,
2742, 2748; South by Lot No. 2739; East by Lot No. 2746; West by Lot No. 2741,
containing an area of FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED (14,700) sq.
ms. more or less.
P1,900.00
(2) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad, Lot No. 3271 C-7
located at Panyangan, Lanao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot
No. 3270; South by Lot Nos. 2900 & 3462; East by Panyangan River & F.
Lumanao; and Part of Lot 3272; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area
of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (104,600) sq. ms. more
or less.
P11,580.00
(3) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad. Lot No. 2319, Case
2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 1061;
South by Hinopolan Creek; East by Lot No. 1044; and West by Lot No. 1041,
SUCCESSION CASES
containing an area of THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE
(3,225) sq. ms. more or less.
(4) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06452, Cad. Lot No. 3272, C-7
Part 4 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by
Lot Nos. 3270 & 3273; East by Panyangan River; South by Panyangan River;
and West by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3271, containing an area of FIFTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (55,600) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by
Damian Querubin.
P2,370.00
(5) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270 Case
7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Samay
Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 & 3272; East by Lot Nos. 3269 &
3273; and West by Samay Creek, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED
EIGHT THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms. more or less.
P61,680.00
(6) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06457, Cad. Lot No. 3273, C-7
Part 2 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by
Lot No. 3269; South by Lot No. 3272; East by Panyangan River; and West by Lot
No. 3270, containing an area of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
(34,300) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by Miguel Tuto.
P3,880.00
(7) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12000, Cad. Lot No. 2806, Case
7 located at Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Agayayan
River; South by Victoriano Barbac; East by Isabelo Ramoso; and West by
Restituto Baol, containing an area of SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY
SIX (6,676) sq. ms. more or less.
P380.00
(8) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12924, Cad. Lot No. 1206 C-1
located at Cahulogan, Gingoog City and bounded on the NW., by Lot No. 1209;
SW., by Lot No. 1207; Eastby National Highway; and West by Lot No. 1207;
containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTEEN (4,513)
sq. ms. more or less.
37

P740.00
(9) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12925, Cad. Lot No. 5554,
located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalohan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by
Lot Nos. 5559 & 5558; South by Lot No. 3486; East by Lot No. 5555; and West
by Lot No. 5355, containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
TWENTY EIGHT (18,528) sq. ms. more or less.
P320.00
(10) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12926, Cad. Lot No. 5555 C-7
located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalojan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by
Tinaytayan Creek & Lot Nos. 5557 & 5558; South by Lot Nos. 3486, 3487, 3488,
3491 & 3496; East by Cr. & Lot No. 3496; and West by Lot No. 5554, containing
an area of SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX
(77,776) sq. ms. more or less.
P1,350.00
(11) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06454, Cad. Lot No. 61-C-1
located at Guno-Condeza Sts., Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot
64; South by Road-Lot 613 Condeza St; East by Lot Nos. 63, and 62; West by
Road-Lot 614-Guno St., containing an area of ONE THOUSAND FORTY TWO
(1,042) sq. ms. more or less.
P9,320.00
(12) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06484, Lot No. 5, Block 2,
located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 4, block
2; South by Lot No. 8, block 2; East by Lot No. 6, block 2, West by Subdivision
Road, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED (400) sq. ms. more or less.
P12,240.00
(13) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798, Block No. 7-A-16-0
located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 7-A-16-
0; South by Lot No. 7-16-0; East by Lot No. 7-A-18-Road; West by Lot No. 8,
PSU-120704-Julito Arengo vs. Restituto Baol, containing an area of TWO
HUNDRED SIXTEEN (216) sq. ms. more or less.
P1,050.00
SUCCESSION CASES
(14) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax, Decl. No. 06789, Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7,
located at Kiogat, Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No.
5158, 5159, 5156; South by SE-Steep Bank; East by NW, by Lot No. 5158,
Villafranca, containing an area of NINETY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
(96,200) sq. ms. more or less.
P3,370.00
III. PERSONAL ESTATE (CONJUGAL)
NATURE AND DESCRIPTION LOCATION APPRAISAL
1. Fifty (50) shares of stock
Rural Bank of Gingoog, Inc.
at P100.00 per share P5,000.00
2. Four (4) shares of Preferred Stock
with San Miguel Corporation 400.00
4. That, the parties hereto have agreed to divide the above-enumerated
properties in the following manner, to wit:
(a) To Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro T.
Sanchez, Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T.
Sanchez, in equal pro-indiviso shares, considering not only their
respective areas but also the improvements existing thereon, to wit:
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270
Case 7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 and 3272;
East by Lot Nos. 3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek, containing an
area of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
(483,600) sq. ms. and assessed in the sum of P61,680.00.
(b) To Rosalia Sanchez Lugod all the rest of the properties, both real and
personal, enumerated above with the exception of the following:
(1) Two Preferred Shares of Stock in the San Miguel Corporation,
indicated in San Miguel Corporation Stock Certificate No. 30217,
which two shares she is ceding in favor of Patricio Alburo;
38

(2) The house and lot designated as Lot No. 5, Block 2 together
with the improvements thereon and identified as parcel No. II-12,
lot covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798 identified as Parcel No. II-13
in the above enumerated, and Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7 together
with the improvements thereon, which is identified as parcel No.
II-14 of the above-enumeration of properties, which said Rosalia
S. Lugod is likewise ceding and renouncing in favor of Rolando
Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez,
in equal pro-indiviso shares;
5. That Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez
hereby acknowledge to have received jointly and severally in form of advances
after October 21, 1968 the aggregate sum of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (P8,533.94) and NINETY-FOUR
CENTAVOS;
6. That the parties hereto likewise acknowledge and recognize in the
indebtedness of the deceased Juan G. Sanchez and his deceased wife Maria
Villafranca Sanchez to the Lugod Enterprises, Inc., in the sum of P43,064.99;
7. That the parties hereto shall be responsible for the payment of the estate and
inheritance taxes proportionate to the value of their respective shares as may be
determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and shall likewise be responsible
for the expenses of survey and segregation of their respective shares;
8. That Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro Sanchez, Florida
Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo Sanchez and Myrna Sanchez hereby waive, relinquish
and renounce, jointly and individually, in a manner that is absolute and
irrevocable, all their rights and interests, share and participation which they have
or might have in all the properties, both real and personal, known or unknown
and/or which may not be listed herein, or in excess of the areas listed or
mentioned herein, and/or which might have been, at one time or another, owned
by, registered or placed in the name of either of the spouses Juan C. Sanchez or
Maria Villafranca de Sanchez or both, and which either one or both might have
sold, ceded, transferred, or donated to any person or persons or entity and which
parties hereto do hereby confirm and ratify together with all the improvements
thereon, as well as all the produce and proceeds thereof, and particularly of the
properties, real and personal listed herein, as well as demandable obligations
due to the deceased spouses Juan C. Sanchez, before and after the death of the
aforementioned spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, in
favor of oppositor Rosalia S. Lugod;
SUCCESSION CASES
9. That the expenses of this litigation including attorney's fees shall be borne
respectively by the parties hereto;
10. That Laureta Tampus for herself and guardian ad-litem of her minor children,
namely: Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, hereby
declare that she has no right, interest, share and participation whatsoever in the
estate left by Juan C. Sanchez and/or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, or both, and
that she likewise waives, renounces, and relinquishes whatever rigid, share,
participation or interest therein which she has or might have in favor of Rosalia S.
Lugod;
11. That, the parties hereto mutually waive and renounce in favor of each other
any whatever claims or actions, arising from, connected with, and as a result of
Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental, Rosalia S. Lugod, warranting that the parcel of land ceded to
the other parties herein contains 48 hectares and 36 ares.
12. That, Rosalia S. Lugod shall assume as she hereby assumes the payment to
Lugod Enterprises, Inc., of the sum of P51,598.93 representing the indebtedness
of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez and the
advances made to Rolando Pedro, Mierly, Alfredo, and Myna all surnamed
Sanchez, mentioned in paragraphs 5 hereto agree to have letters of
administration issued in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod without any bond.
That Rosalia S. Lugod likewise agrees to deliver possession and enjoyment of
the parcel of land herein ceded to petitioners and intervenors immediately after
the signing of this agreement and that the latter also mutually agree among
themselves to have the said lot subdivided and partitioned immediately in
accordance with the proportion of one sixth (1/6) part for every petitioner and
intervenor and that in the meantime that the partition and subdivision is not yet
effected, the administrations of said parcel of land shall be vested jointly with
Laureta Tampos, guardian ad litem of petitioners and Maria Ramoso, one of the
intervenors who shall see to it that each petitioner and intervenor is given one
sixth (1/6) of the net proceeds of all agricultural harvest made thereon.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing compromise
agreement be approved.
Medina, Misamis Oriental, October 30, 1969.
39
 SUCCESSION CASES
(Sgd.) (Sgd.) Please set the foregoing compromise agreement for the approval of the
PATRICIO ALBURO ROSALIA S. LUGOD Honorable Court today, Oct. 30, 1969.
Intervenor-Oppositor Oppositor
(Sgd.) (Sgd.) (Sgd.)
(Sgd.) PABLO S. REYES TEOGENES VELEZ, JR. REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ
MARIA RAMOSO SANCHEZ ASSISTED BY:
Intervenor-Oppositor The Memorandum of Agreement dated April 13, 1970, which the parties entered into with
the assistance of their counsel, amended the above compromise. (It will be reproduced
(Sgd.) later in our discussion of the second issue raised by the petitioners.)
ASSISTED BY: PABLO S. REYES
R-101-Navarro Bldg. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated September 4, 1992, initially dismissed
10

(Sgd.) Don A. Velez St. private respondents' petition. Acting, however, on a motion for reconsideration and a
REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ Cagayan de Oro City supplemental motion for reconsideration dated September 14, 1992 and September 25,
Gingoong City 1992, respectively, Respondent Court thereafter reinstated private respondents' petition
11

in a resolution dated October 14, 1992.

12

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ROLANDO PEDRO T. SANCHEZ ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ In due course, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered its assailed Decision
Petitioner Petitioner granting the petition, setting aside the trial court's decision and declaring the modified
compromise agreement valid and binding.
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
FLORIDA MIERLY T. SANCHEZ MYRNA T. SANCHEZ Hence, this appeal to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Petitioner
The Issues
(Sgd.)
LAURETA TAMPUS In this appeal, petitioners invite the Court's attention to the following issues:
For herself and as Guardian
Ad-Litem of the minors
I The respondent court grossly erred in granting the petition for certiorari under
Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and
Rule 65 considering that the special civil action of certiorari may not be availed of
Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez
as a substitute for an appeal and that, in any event, the grounds invoked in the
petition are merely alleged errors of judgment which can no longer be done in
ASSISTED BY: view of the fact that the decision of the lower court had long become final and
executory.
TEOGENES VELEZ, JR.
Counsel for Petitioners II Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court erred in annulling the
Cagayan de Oro City decision of the lower court for the reason that a compromise agreement or
partition as the court construed the same to be, executed by the parties on
The Clerk of Court October 30, 1969 was void and unenforceable the same not having been
Court of First Instance approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably
Branch III, Medina, Mis. Or. repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud.

Greetings: III The respondent court grossly erred in ignoring and disregarding findings of
facts of the lower court that the alleged conveyances of real properties made by
40

the spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca just before their death in
favor of their daughter and grandchildren, private respondents herein, are tainted
with fraud or made in contemplation of death, hence, collationable.
IV In any event, the respondent court grossly erred in treating the lower court's
declaration of fictitiousness of the deeds of sale as a final adjudication of
annulment.
V The respondent court grossly erred in declaring the termination of the intestate
proceedings even as the lower court had not made a final and enforceable
distribution of the estate of the deceased Juan C. Sanchez.
VI Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court grossly erred in not at
least directing respondent Rosalia S. Lugod to deliver the deficiency of eight (8)
hectares due petitioners under the compromise agreement and memorandum of
agreement, and in not further directing her to include in the inventory properties
conveyed under the deeds of sale found by the lower court to be part of the
estate of Juan C. Sanchez. 13
The salient aspects of some issues are closely intertwined; hence, they are hereby
consolidated into three main issues specifically dealing with the following subjects: (1)
the propriety of certiorari as a remedy before the Court of Appeals, (2) the validity of the
compromise agreement, and (3) the presence of fraud in the execution of the
compromise and/or collation of the properties sold.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Propriety of Certiorari
Before the Court of Appeals
Since private respondents had neglected or failed to file an ordinary appeal within the
reglementary period, petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in allowing private
respondent's recourse to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They contend that private
respondents' invocation of certiorari was "procedurally defective." They further argue
14
that private respondents, in their petition before the Court of Appeals, alleged errors of
the trial court which, being merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, were
not correctable by certiorari. This Court disagrees.
15
Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado lists several exceptions to this rule, viz.:
SUCCESSION CASES
"(1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades
vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil. 77), as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in
a single proceeding which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB
vs. Escolin, et al., L-27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orders were also
issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, Jun 30, 1970,
Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137, Sept. 231985); (3) for certain special
consideration, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs. Zulueta, et al. 16598, May
31, 1961 and the cases cited therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects
rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy
(People vs. Abalos, L029039, Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity
(Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6) where the decision in
the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Campos,
et al., L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975)." Even in a case where the remedy of appeal was lost,
16
the Court has issued the writ of certiorari where the lower court patently acted in excess
of or outside its jurisdiction, as in the present case.
17
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is appropriate and allowable
when the following requisites concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. After a thorough review of the case at
18
bar, we are convinced that all these requirements were met.
As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued its
assailed resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings
involved in this case with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction, it could resolve
questions of title only provisionally. It is hornbook doctrine that "in a special proceeding
19
for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with
equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar." In the instant case, the
20
trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious all the deeds of
absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C. Sanchez and Maria
Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod; and
grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The trial
court ruled further that the properties covered by the said sales must be subject to
collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of
sale and determined with finality the ownership of the properties subject thereof . In
doing so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate court. Jurisprudence teaches:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
41

could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so. 21
Furthermore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its
decision in disregard of the parties' compromise agreement. Such disregard, on the
22
ground that the compromise agreement "was nor approved by the court," is tantamount
23
to "an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
in contemplation and within the bounds of law. " 24
The foregoing issues clearly involve not only the correctness of the trial court's decision
but also the latter's jurisdiction. They encompass plain errors of jurisdiction and grave
abuse of discretion, not merely errors of judgment. Since the trial court exceeded its
25
jurisdiction, a petition for certiorari is certainly a proper remedy. Indeed, it is well-settled
that "(a)n act done by a probate court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected
by certiorari."
26
Consistent with the foregoing, the following disquisition by respondent appellate court is
apt:
As a general proposition, appeal is the proper remedy of petitioner Rosalia here
under Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court. But the availability of the ordinary
course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to [prevent] a party from
making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient (Echauz vs. Court
of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381). Here, considering that the respondent court has
disregarded the compromise agreement which has long been executed as early
as October, 1969 and declared null and void the deeds of sale with finality, which,
as a probate court, it has no jurisdiction to do, We deem ordinary appeal is
inadequate. Considering further the [trial court's] granting of [herein petitioners')
motion for execution of the assailed decision, [herein private respondent]
27
Rosalia's resort to the instant petition [for review on certiorari] is all the more
warranted under the circumstances. 28
We thus hold that the questioned decision and resolutions of the trial court may be
challenged through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. At the very least, this case is a clear exception to the general rule that certiorari is
not a substitute for a lost appeal because the trial court's decision and resolutions were
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, which may thus be challenged or attacked at
any time. "A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the
SUCCESSION CASES
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and
all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and
any writ of execution based on it is void; ' . . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which
can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head.' " 29
Second Issue: Validity of Compromise Agreement
Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the
pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with
validity. They stress that the probate court had jurisdiction over the properties covered by
said agreement. They add that Petitioners Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna were all
miners represented only by their mother/natural guardian, Laureta Tampus. 30
These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise
agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid
a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is
perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required
for its perfection. Petitioners' argument that the compromise was not valid for lack of
31
judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of
Appeals, where the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled:
32
It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A
compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting
of the minds of the parties to the contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599
[1912]; see also De los Reyes v. de Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].) And from that
moment not only does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De
Ugarte, supra ), it also has upon them the effect and authority of res
judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved (Meneses v. De la
Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23
SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel, L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977],
76 SCRA 361). (Emphasis found in the original.)
In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a
valid compromise agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they
each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months; in fact, said agreement was
executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first and second
drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969;
and the fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30,
1969, followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out
33
process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come
out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely
and voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. To be valid, it is merely
34
42

required under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith
by the parties thereto. 35
Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also
encouraged in civil cases. Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a "court shall
36
endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise."
In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp
on the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code,
they contend that the court's approval is necessary in compromises entered into by
guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children. 37
However, we observe that although denominated a compromise agreement, the
document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the
Civil Code which provides that "[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction."
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the
concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left
no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all
of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal
representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or
affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites
38
are present in this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties' compromise
agreement/partition in this case.
In any event, petitioners neither raised nor ventilated this issue in the trial court. This new
question or matter was manifestly beyond the pale of the issues or questions submitted
and threshed out before the lower court which are reproduced below, viz.:
I Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased spouses to
their grandchildren collationable?
II Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased spouses to
their legitimate daughter also collationable?
III The first and second issues being resolved, how much then is the rightful
share of the four (4) recognized illegitimate children? 39
Furthermore, the 27-page Memorandum dated February 17, 1990 filed by petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court readily reveals that they never questioned the validity of
40
SUCCESSION CASES
the compromise. In their comment before the Court of Appeals, petitioners based their
41
objection to sad compromise agreement on the solitary "reason that it was tainted with
fraud and deception," zeroing specifically on the alleged fraud committed by private
respondent Rosalia S. Lugod. The issue of minority was first raised only in petitioners'
42
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision; thus, it "is as if it was
43
never duly raised in that court at all." Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on
44
appeal, entertain this issue, for to do so would plainly violate the basic rule of fair play,
justice and due process. We take this opportunity to reiterate and emphasize the well-
45
settled rule that "(a)n issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the
proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel. Questions raised on appeal must
be within the issues framed by the parties and, consequently, issues not raised in the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 46
The petitioners likewise assail as void the provision on waiver contained in No. 8 of the
aforequoted compromise, because it allegedly constitutes a relinquishment by petitioners
of "a right to properties which were not known." They argue that such waiver is contrary
47
to law, public policy, morals or good custom. The Court disagrees. The assailed waiver
pertained to their hereditary right to properties belonging to the decedent's estate which
were not included in the inventory of the estate's properties. It also covered their right to
other properties originally belonging to the spouses Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca
de Sanchez which have been transferred to other persons. In addition, the parties
agreed in the compromise to confirm and ratify said transfers. The waiver is valid
because, contrary to petitioners' protestation, the parties waived a known and existing
interest their hereditary right which was already vested in them by reason of the death
of their father. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent." Hence, there is no legal
obstacle to an heir's waiver of his/her hereditary share "even if the actual extent of such
share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate." At any rate, such
48
waiver is consistent with the intent and letter of the law advocating compromise as a
vehicle for the settlement of civil disputes.
49
Finally, petitioners contend that Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod's alleged
fraudulent acts, specifically her concealment of some of the decedent's properties,
attended the actual execution of the compromise agreement. This argument is
50
debunked by the absence of any substantial and convincing evidence on record showing
fraud on her part. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
[Herein petitioners] accuse [herein private respondent] Rosalia of fraud or
deception by alleging, inter alia, that the parcel of land given to them never
conformed to the stated area, i.e., forty-eight (48) hectares, as stated in the
compromise agreement. We find this argument unconvincing and unmeritorious.
[Herein petitioners'] averment of fraud on the part of [herein private respondent]
Rosalia becomes untenable when We consider the memorandum of agreement
43

they later executed with [herein private respondent] Rosalia wherein said
compromise agreement was modified by correcting the actual area given to
[herein petitioners] from forty-eight (48) hectares to thirty-six (36) hectares only. If
the actual area allotted to them did not conform to the 48 hectare area stated in
the compromise agreement, then why did they agree to the memorandum of
agreement whereby their share in the estate of their father was even reduced to
just 36 hectares? Where is fraud or deception there? Considering that [herein
petitioners] were ably represented by their lawyers in executing these documents
and who presumably had explained to them the import and consequences
thereof, it is hard to believe their charge that they were defrauded and deceived
by [herein private respondent] Rosalia.
If the parcel of land given to [herein petitioners], when actually surveyed,
happened to be different in area to the stated area of 48 hectares in the
compromise agreement, this circumstance is not enough proof of fraud or
deception on [herein private respondent] Rosalia's part. Note that Tax Declaration
No. 06453 plainly discloses that the land transferred to [herein petitioners]
pursuant to the compromise agreement contained an area of 48 hectares (Annex
"A", Supplemental Reply). And when [herein petitioners] discovered that the land
allotted to them actually contained only 24 hectares, a conference between the
parties took place which led to the execution and signing of the memorandum of
agreement wherein [herein petitioners'] distributive share was even reduced to 36
hectares. In the absence of convincing and clear evidence to the contrary, the
allegation of fraud and deception cannot be successfully imputed to [herein
private respondent] Rosalia who must be presumed to have acted in good faith.
SUCCESSION CASES
b. That the said 36-hectare area shall be taken from that parcel of land which is
now covered by O.C.T. No. 146 (Patent No. 30012) and the adjoining areas
thereof designated as Lot A and Lot C as reflected on the sketch plan attached to
the record of this case prepared by Geodetic Engineer Olegario E. Zalles
pursuant to the Court's commission of March 10, 1970 provided, however, that if
the said 36-hectare area could not be found after adding thereto the areas of said
lots A and C, then the additional area shall be taken from what is designated as
Lot B, likewise also reflected in the said sketch plan attached to the records;
c. That the partition among the six illegitimate children of the late Juan C.
Sanchez (petitioners and intervenors) shall be effective among themselves in
such a manner to be agreed upon by them, each undertaking to assume
redemption of whatever plants found in their respective shares which need
redemption from the tenants thereof as well as the continuity of the tenancy
agreements now existing and covering the said shares or areas.
d. The subdivision survey shall be at the expense of the said petitioners and
intervenors prorata.
e. That the administratrix agrees to deliver temporary administration of the area
designated as Lot 5 of the Valles Sketch Plan pending final survey of the said 36-
hectare area.
Cagayan de Oro City, April 13, 1970.
51

(Sgd.)
The memorandum of agreement freely and validly entered into by the parties on April 13,
LAURETA TAMPOS
1970 and referred to above reads:
For herself and as Guardian
ad-litem of Rolando, Mierly,
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT Alfredo and Myrna, all
surnamed Sanchez
The parties assisted by their respective counsel have agreed as they hereby agree:
Assisted by:
1. To amend the compromise agreement executed by them on October 30, 1969 so as to
include the following: (Sgd.)
TEOGENES VELEZ, Jr.
a. Correction of the actual area being given to the petitioners and intervenors, all Counsel for Petitioners
illegitimate children of the late Juan C. Sanchez, forty-eight (48) hectares, thirty-
six (36) ares as embodied in the aforementioned compromise agreement to (Sgd.)
thirty-six (36) hectares only, thus enabling each of them to get six (6) hectares ROSALIA S. LUGOD
each. Administratrix

44

Assisted by:
(Sgd.)
PABLO S. REYES
Counsel for Administratrix
(Sgd.)
MARIA RABOSO SANCHEZ
Intervenor 52
Not only did the parties knowingly enter into a valid compromise agreement; they even
amended it when they realized some errors in the original. Such correction emphasizes
the voluntariness of said deed.
It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had
already consummated and availed themselves of the benefits of their compromise. This 53
Court has consistently ruled that "a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission
after it has enjoyed its benefits." By their acts, the parties are ineludibly estopped from
54
questioning the validity of their compromise agreement. Bolstering this conclusion is the
fact that petitioners questioned the compromise only nine years after its execution, when
they filed with the trial court their Motion to Defer Approval of Compromise Agreement,
dated October 26, 1979. In hindsight, it is not at all farfetched that petitioners filed said
55
motion for the sole reason that they may have felt shortchanged in their compromise
agreement or partition with private respondents, which in their view was unwise and
unfair. While we may sympathize with this rueful sentiment of petitioners, we can only
stress that this alone is not sufficient to nullify or disregard the legal effects of said
compromise which, by its very nature as a perfected contract, is binding on the parties.
Moreover, courts have no jurisdiction to look into the wisdom of a compromise or to
render a decision different therefrom. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that "the law does
56
not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered
into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing" and
57
"a compromise entered into and carried out in good faith will not be discarded even if
there was a mistake of law or fact, (McCarthy vs. Barber Steamship Lines, 45 Phil. 488)
because courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed,
simply because their contracts turned out to be disastrous deals or unwise
investments." Volenti non fit injuria.
58
Corollarily, the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
in deeming Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 "CLOSED and TERMINATED,"
arguing that there was as yet no order of distribution of the estate pursuant to Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court. They add that they had not received their full share thereto. We 59
disagree. Under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, an order for the distribution of
the estate may be made when the "debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any," had been paid.
SUCCESSION CASES
This order for the distribution of the estate's residue must contain the names and shares
of the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of the whole record, particularly the trial court's
conclusion, reveals that all the foregoing requirements already concurred in this case.
60
The payment of the indebtedness of the estates of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria
Villafranca in the amount of P51,598.93 was shouldered by Private Respondent Rosalia,
who also absorbed or charged against her share the advances of Rolando T. Lugod in
the sum of P8,533.94, in compliance with Article 1061 of the Civil Code on
collation. Furthermore, the compromise of the parties, which is the law between them,
61
already contains the names and shares of the heirs to the residual estate, which shares
had also been delivered. On this point, we agree with the following discussion of the
Court of Appeals:
But what the (trial court) obviously overlooked in its appreciation of the
facts of this case are the uncontroverted facts that (herein petitioners)
have been in possession and ownership of their respective distributive
shares as early as October 30, 1969 and they have received other
properties in addition to their distributive shares in consideration of the
compromise agreement which they now assail. Proofs thereof are Tax
Declarations No. 20984, 20985, 20986, 20987, 20988, 20989 and 20990
(Annexes "B" to "H", Supplemental Reply) in the respective names of
(herein petitioners), all for the year 1972. (Herein petitioners) also
retained a house and lot, a residential lot and a parcel of agricultural land
(Annexes "I", "J" and "K", Ibid.) all of which were not considered in the
compromise agreement between the parties. Moreover, in the
compromise agreement per se, it is undoubtedly stated therein that cash
advances in the aggregate sum of P8,533.94 were received by (herein
petitioners) after October 21, 1968 (Compromise Agreement, par. 5) 62
All the foregoing show clearly that the probate court had essentially finished said
intestate proceedings which, consequently, should be deemed closed and terminated. In
view of the above discussion, the Court sees no reversible error on the part of the Court
of Appeals.
Third Issue: Fraud and Collation
Petitioners fault Respondent Court for not ordering Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod
to deliver to them the deficiency as allegedly provided under the compromise agreement.
They further contend that said court erred in not directing the provisional inclusion of the
alleged deficiency in the inventory for purposes of collating the properties subject of the
questioned deeds of sale. We see no such error. In the trial court, there was only one
63
hearing conducted, and it was held only for the reception of the evidence of Rosalia S.
Lugod to install her as administratrix of the estate of Maria Villafranca. There was no
other evidence, whether testimonial or otherwise, "received, formally offered to, and
45
 SUCCESSION CASES
subsequently admitted by the probate court below"; nor was there "a trial on the merits of
the parries' conflicting claims." In fact, the petitioners "moved for the deferment of the
64

compromise agreement on the basis of alleged fraudulent concealment of properties

NOT because of any deficiency in the land conveyed to them under the
agreements." Hence, there is no hard evidence on record to back up petitioners'
65

claims.

In any case, the trial court noted Private Respondent Rosalia's willingness to reimburse
any deficiency actually proven to exist. It subsequently ordered the geodetic engineer
who prepared the certification and the sketch of the lot in question, and who could have
provided evidence for the petitioners, "to bring records of his relocation
survey." However, Geodetic Engineer Idulsa did not comply with the court's subpoena
66

duces tecum and ad testificandum. Neither did he furnish the required relocation
survey. No wonder, even after a thorough scrutiny of the records, this Court cannot find
67

any evidence to support petitioners' allegations of fraud against Private Respondent

Rosalia.

Similarly, petitioners' allegations of fraud in the execution of the questioned deeds of sale
are bereft of substance, in view of the palpable absence of evidence to support them.
The legal presumption of validity of the questioned deeds of absolute sale, being duly
notarized public documents, has not been overcome. On the other hand, fraud is not
68

presumed. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and not by mere
conjectures or speculations. We stress that these deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous
transfers of future inheritance; these were contracts of sale perfected by the decedents
during their lifetime. Hence, the properties conveyed thereby are not collationable
69

because, essentially, collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code
contemplates properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of
donation or other gratuitous title.

In any event, these alleged errors and deficiencies regarding the delivery of shares
provided in the compromise, concealment of properties and fraud in the deeds of sale
are factual in nature which, as a rule, are not reviewable by this Court in petitions under
Rule 45. Petitioners have failed to convince us that this case constitutes an exception
70

to such rule. All in all, we find that the Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the
issues raised by them. Indeed, they have not persuaded us that said Court committed
any reversible error to warrant a grant of their petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

46

G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE
PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA,
TARLAC, petitioner-appellant, vs. BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA
ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That devise was
made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his
nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.
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(2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra derecho de
empezar a gozar y administrar de este legado al principiar a curzar la
Sagrada Teologio, y ordenado de Sacerdote, hasta su muerte; pero que
pierde el legatario este derecho de administrar y gozar de este legado al
dejar de continuar sus estudios para ordenarse de Presbiterado
(Sacerdote).
Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a celebrar cada
ao VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y de mis padres
difuntos, y si el actual legatario, quedase excomulgado, IPSO FACTO se
le despoja este legado, y la administracion de esto pasara a cargo del
actual Parroco y sus sucesores de la Iglecia Catolica de Victoria, Tarlac.

The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado segun lo
this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate arriba queda expresado, pasara la administracion de este legado a cargo
court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the del actual Parroco Catolico y sus sucesores, de Victoria, Tarlac.
Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara, anualmente todos
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on los productos que puede tener estate legado, ganando o sacando de los
August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the productos anuales el CINCO (5) por ciento para su administracion, y los
Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in derechos correspondientes de las VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas que
the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor- debiera el Parroco celebrar cada ao, depositando todo lo restante de
Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a los productos de estate legado, en un banco, a nombre de estate legado.
devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a project
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing supplied containing the following item:
to facilitate comprehension of the testamentary provisions):
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno palayeros
situados en el municipiooo de Guimba de la provinciaaa de NUEVA That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the
ECIJA, cuyo num. de CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to
SON; Titulo Num. 6530, mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic
Titulo Num. 6548, mide 242,998 m. cuadrados de superficie y annual Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the real
6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie; y Titulo Num. 6521, mide properties hereinbelow indicated, to wit:
119,251 m. cuadrados de superficie; a cualquier pariente mio varon mas
cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiatica hasta ordenarse de
Presbiterado o sea Sacerdote; las condiciones de estate legado son;
Title No. Lot No. Area in Has. Tax Dec. Ass. Value
(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba situados T-6530 3663 1.6249 18740 P340
objectos de este legado; T-6548 3445-C 24.2998 18730 P7290
T-6525 3670 6.2665 18736 P1880
T-6521 3666 11.9251 18733 P3580
47

Total amount and value 44.1163 P13,090.00
Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project of partition,
directed that after payment of the obligations of the estate (including the sum of
P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria parish) the administratrix should deliver to the
devisees their respective shares.
It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the
meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the
devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of
Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that
ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19,
1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition
praying for the appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased
administration Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and
further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the
fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new administrator was appointed. On
January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the ricelands to
the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957
praying that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons
entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no
nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and
35, Record on Appeal). That petition was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge Bernabe de
Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the testator's
legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The parish priest filed two motions for
reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order of
December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo
G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose
Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to deliver
the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that
Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would
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take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to
enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that
since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testator's death, the
same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code
and article 870 of the new Civil Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding
that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally construing the
testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and to prevent intestacy.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest inoperative
because no one among the testator's nearest male relatives had studied for the
priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable trust. According to the legal
heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court. They point out that appellant priest's
change of theory cannot be countenanced in this appeal .
In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where
the intention of the contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the
primary issue is the determination of the testator's intention which is the law of the case
(dicat testor et erit lex. Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs. Court of
Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his
intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the
plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his
intention was different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil.
333).
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life and
soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving effect
to a will". (See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223,
237-8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the wilt taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the testator's oral declarations as
to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following re-statement
of the provisions of his will.
48

1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would
pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and
administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue enjoying and
administering the same up to the time of his death but the devisee would cease to enjoy
and administer the ricelands if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every year
twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and the
administration of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and
his successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as contemplated
above, the administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the
incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors, and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate annually the
products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce five percent thereof for his
administration and the fees corresponding to the twenty masses with prayers that the
parish priest would celebrate for each year, depositing the balance of the income of the
devise in the bank in the name of his bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended
to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was
forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies
for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who
would be obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the
souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male
relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's
nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would it be determined that he had
a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that
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has brought about the controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's
legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the testator contemplate only
his nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his
nearest male relatives at anytime after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to
inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens,
except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To
construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his
death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the
disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters or second-
degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the
testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a
son of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But
since he could not prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what
category of nearest male relative would be living at the time of his death, he could not
specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son of
his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon
Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs.
Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the
affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who
deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not
claim the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos
Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for his
nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not
the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that he was
not consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for
reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew,
Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
49

Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a
seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that
the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no
more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the
testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the
said bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death,
when his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became
vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que
estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male
relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his will He must have known
that such a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the
efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his
nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in
grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish
priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary.
But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to
enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the
trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father
Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had
manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically
answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January
31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father)
Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as
envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator
in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That contention is
untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not
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support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in
the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only
when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a
priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in
this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the
seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old
Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those
in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto
se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de
acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2),
which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all
that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said
ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as
if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or
that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's
win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be
intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong
Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed. Costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED
50

G.R. No. 118114 December 7, 1995
TEODORO ACAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDY DE LOS
REYES, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 2nd
1 surnamed PIDO, do hereby waive, quitclaim all our rights, interests and
Division, in CA-G.R. No. 36177, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
2 participation over the said parcel of land in favor of EDY DE LOS REYES, of
of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental holding that private respondent Edy de los Reyes
had acquired ownership of Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental based on a document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights",
and ordering the dispossession of petitioner as leasehold tenant of the land for failure to
pay rentals.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The title to Lot No. 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental was
evidenced by OCT No. R-12179. The lot has an area of 13,720 sq. meters. The title was
issued and is registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma.
After both spouses died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto
executed a duly notarized document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Deed of
Absolute Sale" in favor of Cosme Pido.
The evidence before the court a quo established that since 1960, petitioner Teodoro
Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the said land, covering an area of nine
thousand five hundred (9,500) meters. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by
Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap continued to be the registered tenant thereof and
religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon Pido's death, to his
widow Laurenciana.
The controversy began when Pido died intestate and on 27 November 1981, his
surviving heirs executed a notarized document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship
and Waiver of Rights of Lot No. 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre," wherein they declared; to
quote its pertinent portions, that:
. . . Cosme Pido died in the Municipality of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, he died
intestate and without any known debts and obligations which the said parcel of
land is (sic) held liable.
That Cosme Pido was survived by his/her legitimate heirs, namely:
LAURENCIANA PIDO, wife, ELY, ERVIN, ELMER, and ELECHOR all surnamed
PIDO; children;
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That invoking the provision of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the
above-mentioned heirs do hereby declare unto [sic] ourselves the only heirs of
the late Cosme Pido and that we hereby adjudicate unto ourselves the above-
mentioned parcel of land in equal shares.
Now, therefore, We LAURENCIANA , ELY, ELMER, ERVIN and ELECHOR all
3
legal age, (f)ilipino, married to VIRGINIA DE LOS REYES, and resident of
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, Philippines. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
4
The document was signed by all of Pido's heirs. Private respondent Edy de los Reyes
did not sign said document.
It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pido's death, title to the property continued to
be registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Upon obtaining the Declaration of
Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor, private respondent Edy de los Reyes filed the
same with the Registry of Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claimagainst the
original certificate of title.
Thereafter, private respondent sought for petitioner (Acap) to personally inform him that
he (Edy) had become the new owner of the land and that the lease rentals thereon
should be paid to him. Private respondent further alleged that he and petitioner entered
into an oral lease agreement wherein petitioner agreed to pay ten (10) cavans of
palay per annum as lease rental. In 1982, petitioner allegedly complied with said
obligation. In 1983, however, petitioner refused to pay any further lease rentals on the
land, prompting private respondent to seek the assistance of the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The MAR invited petitioner to a
conference scheduled on 13 October 1983. Petitioner did not attend the conference but
sent his wife instead to the conference. During the meeting, an officer of the Ministry
informed Acap's wife about private respondent's ownership of the said land but she
stated that she and her husband (Teodoro) did not recognize private respondent's claim
of ownership over the land.
On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four (4) years, private respondent filed a complaint
for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner, alleging in the main that as
his leasehold tenant, petitioner refused and failed to pay the agreed annual rental of ten
(10) cavans of palay despite repeated demands.
During the trial before the court a quo, petitioner reiterated his refusal to recognize
private respondent's ownership over the subject land. He averred that he continues to
recognize Cosme Pido as the owner of the said land, and having been a registered
51

tenant therein since 1960, he never reneged on his rental obligations. When Pido died,
he continued to pay rentals to Pido's widow. When the latter left for abroad, she
instructed him to stay in the landholding and to pay the accumulated rentals upon her
demand or return from abroad.
Petitioner further claimed before the trial court that he had no knowledge about any
transfer or sale of the lot to private respondent in 1981 and even the following year after
Laurenciana's departure for abroad. He denied having entered into a verbal lease
tenancy contract with private respondent and that assuming that the said lot was indeed
sold to private respondent without his knowledge, R.A. 3844, as amended, grants him
the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price. Petitioner also bewailed private
respondent's ejectment action as a violation of his right to security of tenure under P.D.
27.
On 20 August 1991, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent,
the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, Edy de los Reyes, and against the defendant, Teodoro Acap, ordering
the following, to wit:
1. Declaring forfeiture of defendant's preferred right to issuance of a Certificate of
Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and his farmholdings;
2. Ordering the defendant Teodoro Acap to deliver possession of said farm to
plaintiff, and;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, the sum of
P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation and the amount of P10,000.00 as actual
damages. 5
In arriving at the above-mentioned judgment, the trial court stated that the evidence had
established that the subject land was "sold" by the heirs of Cosme Pido to private
respondent. This is clear from the following disquisitions contained in the trial court's six
(6) page decision:
There is no doubt that defendant is a registered tenant of Cosme Pido. However,
when the latter died their tenancy relations changed since ownership of said land
was passed on to his heirs who, by executing a Deed of Sale, which defendant
admitted in his affidavit, likewise passed on their ownership of Lot 1130 to herein
plaintiff (private respondent). As owner hereof, plaintiff has the right to demand
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payment of rental and the tenant is obligated to pay rentals due from the time
demand is made. . . . 6
xxx xxx xxx
Certainly, the sale of the Pido family of Lot 1130 to herein plaintiff does not of
itself extinguish the relationship. There was only a change of the personality of
the lessor in the person of herein plaintiff Edy de los Reyes who being the
purchaser or transferee, assumes the rights and obligations of the former
landowner to the tenant Teodoro Acap, herein defendant. 7
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, imputing error to the lower court
when it ruled that private respondent acquired ownership of Lot No. 1130 and that he, as
tenant, should pay rentals to private respondent and that failing to pay the same from
1983 to 1987, his right to a certificate of land transfer under P.D. 27 was deemed
forfeited.
The Court of Appeals brushed aside petitioner's argument that the Declaration of
Heirship and Waiver of Rights (Exhibit "D"), the document relied upon by private
respondent to prove his ownership to the lot, was excluded by the lower court in its order
dated 27 August 1990. The order indeed noted that the document was not identified by
Cosme Pido's heirs and was not registered with the Registry of Deeds of Negros
Occidental. According to respondent court, however, since the Declaration of Heirship
and Waiver of Rights appears to have been duly notarized, no further proof of its due
execution was necessary. Like the trial court, respondent court was also convinced that
the said document stands as prima facie proof of appellee's (private
respondent's) ownership of the land in dispute.
With respect to its non-registration, respondent court noted that petitioner had actual
knowledge of the subject saleof the land in dispute to private respondent because as
early as 1983, he (petitioner) already knew of private respondent's claim over the said
land but which he thereafter denied, and that in 1982, he (petitioner) actually paid rent to
private respondent. Otherwise stated, respondent court considered this fact of rental
payment in 1982 as estoppel on petitioner's part to thereafter refute private respondent's
claim of ownership over the said land. Under these circumstances, respondent court
ruled that indeed there was deliberate refusal by petitioner to pay rent for a continued
period of five years that merited forfeiture of his otherwise preferred right to the issuance
of a certificate of land transfer.
In the present petition, petitioner impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals as not in
accord with the law and evidence when it rules that private respondent acquired
52

ownership of Lot No. 1130 through the aforementioned Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights.
Hence, the issues to be resolved presently are the following:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP AND
WAIVER OF RIGHTS IS A RECOGNIZED MODE OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT OVER THE LOT IN QUESTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID DOCUMENT CAN BE CONSIDERED A
DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE LOT IN
QUESTION.
Petitioner argues that the Regional Trial Court, in its order dated 7 August 1990, explicitly
excluded the document marked as Exhibit "D" (Declaration of Heirship, etc.) as private
respondent's evidence because it was not registered with the Registry of Deeds and was
not identified by anyone of the heirs of Cosme Pido. The Court of Appeals, however, held
the same to be admissible, it being a notarized document, hence, a prima facie proof of
private respondents' ownership of the lot to which it refers.
Petitioner points out that the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is not one of
the recognized modes of acquiring ownership under Article 712 of the Civil Code. Neither
can the same be considered a deed of sale so as to transfer ownership of the land to
private respondent because no consideration is stated in the contract (assuming it is a
contract or deed of sale).
Private respondent defends the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as in accord
with the evidence and the law. He posits that while it may indeed be true that the trial
court excluded his Exhibit "D" which is the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights
as part of his evidence, the trial court declared him nonetheless owner of the subject lot
based on other evidence adduced during the trial, namely, the notice of adverse claim
(Exhibit "E") duly registered by him with the Registry of Deeds, which contains the
questioned Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights as an integral part thereof.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
In the first place, an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing
arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to
ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain
conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant
to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual
process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.8
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Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally
classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation,
acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through
succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter,
donation, assignment or mutuum).
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect of
the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a contract
(deed) of sale. They are not the same.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain
in money or its equivalent.9
Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public
instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate
and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect
an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. 10
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of
hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between
the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership
11
where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with
knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are
co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession
12
of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole
basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a 13
donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
14
Quite surprisingly, both the trial court and public respondent Court of Appeals concluded
that a "sale" transpired between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent and that
petitioner acquired actual knowledge of said sale when he was summoned by the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform to discuss private respondent's claim over the lot in question.
This conclusion has no basis both in fact and in law.
On record, Exhibit "D", which is the "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights"
was excluded by the trial court in its order dated 27 August 1990 because the document
was neither registered with the Registry of Deeds nor identified by the heirs of Cosme
Pido. There is no showing that private respondent had the same document attached to or
made part of the record. What the trial court admitted was Annex "E", a notice of adverse
claim filed with the Registry of Deeds which contained the Declaration of Heirship with
53
 SUCCESSION CASES
Waiver of rights and was annotated at the back of the Original Certificate of Title to the landowner/agricultural lessor which, in this case, private respondent failed to establish in
land in question. his favor by clear and convincing evidence. 16

A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private respondent's
ownership over the tenanted lot. "A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a
claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in
court at some future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice
of a case already pending in court." 15
Consequently, the sanction of forfeiture of his preferred right to be issued a Certificate of
Land Transfer under P.D. 27 and to the possession of his farmholdings should not be
applied against petitioners, since private respondent has not established a cause of
action for recovery of possession against petitioner.

It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is
no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs
and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private
respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an
adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title
the same in private respondent's name.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 1 May 1994 which affirmed the decision of the
RTC of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental dated 20 August 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE.
The private respondent's complaint for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioner Acap is hereby DISMISSED for failure to properly state a cause of action,
without prejudice to private respondent taking the proper legal steps to establish the legal
mode by which he claims to have acquired ownership of the land in question.

Consequently, while the transaction between Pido's heirs and private respondent SO ORDERED.
may be binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as a registered tenant to
the land cannot be perfunctorily forfeited on a mere allegation of private
respondent's ownership without the corresponding proof thereof.

Petitioner had been a registered tenant in the subject land since 1960 and religiously
paid lease rentals thereon. In his mind, he continued to be the registered tenant of
Cosme Pido and his family (after Pido's death), even if in 1982, private respondent
allegedly informed petitioner that he had become the new owner of the land.

Under the circumstances, petitioner may have, in good faith, assumed such statement of
private respondent to be true and may have in fact delivered 10 cavans of palay as
annual rental for 1982 to private respondent. But in 1983, it is clear that petitioner had
misgivings over private respondent's claim of ownership over the said land because in
the October 1983 MAR conference, his wife Laurenciana categorically denied all of
private respondent's allegations. In fact, petitioner even secured a certificate from the
MAR dated 9 May 1988 to the effect that he continued to be the registered tenant of
Cosme Pido and not of private respondent. The reason is that private respondent never
registered the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights with the Registry of Deeds or
with the MAR. Instead, he (private respondent) sought to do indirectly what could not be
done directly, i.e., file a notice of adverse claim on the said lot to establish ownership
thereover.

It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that there was no unjustified or deliberate

refusal by petitioner to pay the lease rentals or amortizations to the

54

G.R. No. 116018 November 13, 1996
NELIA A. CONSTANTINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA S. ROQUE,
PRISCILLA S. LUNA and JOSEFINA S. AUSTRIA, respondents.
JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas, Bulacan.
Among her heirs are respondents Aurora S. Roque, Priscilla S. Luna and Josefina S.
Austria. Sometime in 1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres, as vendors, and petitioner Nelia A.
Constantino, as vendee, entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land with a total land
area of two hundred and fifty (250) square meters. The lot, owned in common by the
Torres heirs, is being occupied by petitioners' mother and sister. An adjoining lot, also co-
owned by the heirs, is being occupied by spouses Severino and Consuelo Lim. Pursuant
to their agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner to prepare the necessary Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.
After having the document drafted with several spaces left blank including the
specification as to the metes and bounds of the land petitioner asked the heirs to affix
their signatures on the document. The heirs signed the document with the understanding
that respondent Aurora S. Roque, one of the heirs, would be present when the latter
would seek permission from the Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed.
However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was
subsequently surveyed, subdivided and then covered by TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-
292266. Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of the subdivision plan and the certificates of title.
Upon securing a copy of the deed from the Registry of Deeds, the respondents learned
that the area of the property purportedly sold to petitioner was much bigger than that
agreed upon by the parties. It already included the portion being occupied by the
spouses Severino and Consuelo Lim.
On 2 June 1986, private respondents sent a letter to petitioner demanding the surrender
to them of the deed of settlement and conveyance, the subdivision plan and the
certificates of title; but to no avail. On 25 June 1986 respondents filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan an action for annulment of the deed and cancellation of the
certificates of title, with prayer for recovery of damages, attorney's fees and costs of
suit.
1 court, and on 20 June 1994 denied the motion to reconsider its decision.
Petitioner controverted the allegations of respondents by presenting the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale dated 10 October 1984 wherein respondents
agreed to divide and adjudicate among themselves the inherited property with an area of
one thousand five hundred and three (1,503) square meters. In the same document, they
SUCCESSION CASES
caused the subdivision of the property into two (2) lots according to Plan No. PSD-03-
009105 identified as Lot 4-A with an area of one thousand ninety-six (1,096) square
meters, and Lot 4-B with an area of four hundred and seven (407) square meters, and
acknowledged the sale to petitioner of said Lot 4-B. As a consequence, on 18 March
1985, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-292265 in the name of the heirs of Josefa
Torres and TCT No. T-292266 in the name of petitioner.
In reply, private respondents reiterated that all the heirs signed the document before the
land was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as yet no definite area to be sold
that could be indicated in the deed at the time of the signing. They also claimed that they
were not notified about the survey and the subdivision of the lot and therefore they could
not have agreed on the area supposedly sold to petitioner. The respondent heirs insist
that they could not have agreed to the extent of the area actually reflected in the deed
because it included the portion being occupied by the Lim spouses, which was already
the subject of a previous agreement to sell between them and their predecessor.
The trial court entertained serious doubts with respect to the preparation and due
execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale taking into account
that (a) while petitioner claimed that all the heirs signed before the notary public and in
her presence, she was not able to enumerate all the signatories to the document; (b)
while petitioner claimed that the document was signed only after the survey of the land
was completed, or on 10 October 1984, such fact was negated by her own witness who
testified that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984; and, (c) while petitioner
alleged that the document was signed and notarized in Manila no explanation was
offered why the same could not have been signed and notarized in Bulacan where
notaries public abound which could have been less inconvenient to the parties
concerned. Additionally, the trial court relied heavily on the assertions of respondents as
reflected in their demand letter that they did not give their consent to the sale of Lot 4-B.
Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court on 27 September 1990
ordered the annulment and cancellation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Sale, TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-292266 and Subdivision Plan No. PSD-03-009105.
It also ordered petitioner to pay private respondents P50,000.00 for moral damages,
P15,000.00 for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit. 2
On 16 March 1994 respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial
3 4
Petitioner faults respondent Court of Appeals: (a) for disregarding documentary evidence
already presented, marked and identified on a purely technical ground, and (b) for
concluding that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale did not reflect the
true intent of the parties.
55

Petitioner argues that the trial court should not have denied her motion to admit formal
offer of evidence merely on the basis of technicality such as late filing, citing Siguenza
v. Court of Appeals. We are not persuaded. Indeed, we held in Siguenza that rules of
5
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense as they are used only
to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Yet the holding is inapplicable to the
present case as the trial court had a reasonable basis for denying petitioner's motion
On February 6, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, defendant's counsel, manifested
in Court that he has (sic) no more witness to present. He asked that he be given
15 days to make a formal offer of evidence and which the Court granted. At the
scheduled hearing of April 03, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado . . . . was not in
Court. Atty. Veneracion, plaintiffs' counsel, called the attention of the Court that
Atty. Mercado has (sic) not yet filed and/or complied with the Court Order dated
February 06, 1990, which is to file his formal offer of evidence. On motion of Atty.
Veneracion, defendant's right to file a formal offer of evidence was deemed
waived. Atty. Veneracion waived the presentation of rebuttal evidence
considering that the defendant can (sic) no longer make a formal offer of
evidence.
On May 11, 1990, the Court was in receipt of a motion to admit formal offer of
exhibits filed by the defendant thru counsel, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, on May 02,
1990. Considering that the same was filed out of time and the plaintiffs having
filed their memorandum already, the motion to admit formal offer of exhibits was
denied (emphasis supplied).
The trial court was correct in holding that petitioner waived the right to formally offer his
evidence. A considerable lapse of time, about three (3) months, had already passed
before petitioner's counsel made effort to formally offer his evidence. For the trial court to
grant petitioner's motion to admit her exhibits would be to condone an inexcusable laxity
if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless
delays and derail the speedy administration of justice.
Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the entire Lot 4-B the
subject matter of the sale. She claims that during cross-examination respondent Aurora
S. Roque admitted that she signed in behalf of her co-heirs a receipt for P30,000.00 as
partial payment for the lot occupied by Ka Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner)
and Iling (Consuelo Lim). Moreover, according to petitioner, the assertions of private
respondents to petitioner contained in the demand letter should not necessarily be true
and that the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale was not
affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the subject matter
thereof was situated, citing Sales v. Court of Appeals. 6
SUCCESSION CASES
These other arguments of petitioner are barren and futile. The admission of respondent
Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that there was as yet no meeting
of the minds on the land area to be sold since private respondents were still awaiting the
survey to be conducted on the premises. Obviously, the trial court only lent credence to
the assertions in the demand letter after having weighed the respective evidence of the
parties. But even without the letter, the evidence of respondents had already amply
substantiated their claims.
We ruled in the Sales case that the extrinsic validity of a document was not affected by
the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the subject matter thereof was
located. What is more important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public has
authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction. The
ruling in Sales is not applicable to the present case. Our concern here is not whether the
notary public had the authority to acknowledge the document executed within his
territorial jurisdiction but whether respondents indeed appeared before him and signed
the deed. However, the quantum of evidence shows that they did not.
The trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized in Manila when
it could have been notarized in Bulacan. This additional detail casts doubt on the
procedural regularity in the preparation, execution and signing of the deed. It is not easy
to believe that petitioner and the ten (10) Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to
have their questioned document notarized considering that they, with the exception of
respondent Roque, are residents of Balagtas, Bulacan, where notaries public are easy to
find. Consequently, the claim of private respondents that they did not sign the document
before a notary public is more plausible than petitioner's feeble claim to the contrary.
Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior to the
survey, or before determination of the area to be sold, worthy of credit as against the
contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey or on 10 October 1984. As found
by the trial court, such contention was contradicted by petitioner's own witness who
positively asserted in court that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or
six (6) days after the signing. Quite obviously, when respondents affixed their signatures
on the deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be prepared left
several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the property to be
sold. The heirs were persuaded to sign the document only upon the assurance of
petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their understanding, would be present
when the property would be surveyed after obtaining permission from the Bureau of
Lands. As it surfaced, the supposed understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to
induce respondents to sign the deed without which the latter would not have given their
conformity thereto. Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank
7
spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then causing the
issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge, much less consent. Thus
all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a)
56
 SUCCESSION CASES
It was employed by a contracting party upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to
enter into the contract; (c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to the
party seeking annulment. 8

Perhaps, another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of settlement
and conveyance is that the second page thereof clearly manifests that the number of the
subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A and 4-B were merely handwritten
while all the rest of the statements therein were typewritten, which leads us to the
conclusion that handwritten figures thereon were not available at the time the document
was formalized.

WHEREFORE, their being no error to warrant a reversal of the decision and resolution in
question of respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 22, the instant petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

57