TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON.

COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents.
Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion
was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration,[14] or (2) it did not comply
with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to
law or not supported by the evidence,[15] or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors,[16] or (4)
it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law,[17] or (5) the adverse party
was not given notice thereof.[18] The 16-page motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the
COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error for the
COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioners motion for reconsideration was pro forma because
the allegations raised therein are a mere rehash of his earlier pleadings or did not raise new
matters. Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the
petition in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided
by law.

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of

Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section
78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall
not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no
final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless,
on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds
for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile,
the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates
of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue even after such
elections and proclamation of the winners. In Abella v. COMELEC[19] and Salcedo II v.
COMELEC,[20] the candidates whose certificates of candidacy were the subject of petitions for
cancellation were voted for and, having received the highest number of votes, were duly
proclaimed winners. This Court, in the first case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed the
decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground
that the latter had been divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates proclamation but on the
merits.

Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections[33] in support of his

contention that the residency requirement in 39(a) of the Local Government Code includes the
residency of one who is not a citizen of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue
in that case and this Court did not make any ruling on the issue now at bar. The question
in Frivaldo was whether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the same day that
his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995, complied with the citizenship
requirement under 39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may be possessed even
on the day the candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already noted, 39(a)
of the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must have been a resident of the
municipality for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Nor can petitioner invoke this Courts ruling in Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.[34] What the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former natural-born
Filipino is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.
Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray,[35] however, registration as a voter
does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidates lack of residency.
Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his
motion to be allowed to present evidence. Under 5(d), in relation to 7, of R.A. No. 6646
(Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any
event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a
Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in which he
submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioners claim, are
complete and intact in the records.

The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of

Oras, Eastern Samar for two years at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The
question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was. Petitioner made a false
representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such
certificate liable to cancellation. The Omnibus Election Code provides:

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy

shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are
true to the best of his knowledge.

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

Indeed, it has been held that a candidates statement in her certificate of candidacy
for the position of governor of Leyte that she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this
was not so[37] or that the candidate was a natural-born Filipino when in fact he had become
an Australian citizen[38] constitutes a ground for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy. On the other hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC[39] that a candidate who
used her husbands family name even though their marriage was void was not guilty of
misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false
statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners
certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division
of the Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30,
2002 of the Commission on Elections en banc are AFFIRMED.

MAUYAG B. PAPANDAYAN, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and FAHIDA P. BALT, respondents.

In its resolution, dated May 8, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-114 declared
petitioner to be disqualified and ordered his name to be stricken off the list of candidates and all votes
cast in his favor not to be counted but considered as stray votes
 On May 14, 2001, elections were held in Tubaran. Petitioner was among those
voted by the electorate for the position of municipal mayor. On May 15, 2001, he
received a telegram[14] from the COMELEC notifying him of the resolution, dated May
12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc which denied his motion for reconsideration.
On May 17, 2001, he filed the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

n May 29, 2001, the First Division of the COMELEC (in SPC No. 01-039) issued an order suspending the
proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Tubaran pending the resolution of this present
petition. However, despite the said order (in SPC No. 01-039), the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Tubaran proceeded with the proclamation of petitioner on June 3, 2001. Upon motion of respondent,
therefore, the COMELEC (First Division), in an order, dated June 25, 2001, set aside the proclamation of
petitioner, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate charges against the members of the Board
responsible for the proclamation.[15] Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution, dated
January 30, 2002, sustaining the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner and dismissing SPC No. 01-
039 for being moot and academic. It appears that, as a consequence thereof, the incumbent Vice-Mayor
of Tubaran assumed the position of mayor pursuant to the COMELEC en banc resolution dated January
30, 2002.

In her comment, respondent insists that petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran but of Bayang. She
contends that petitioner made misrepresentations in claiming that he filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor of Tubaran in the May 11, 1998 elections and that he was a registered voter in the May 11,
1998 elections; that when petitioner registered as a voter in Precinct No. 28-A in Tangcal, Tubaran on
May 8, 1999, he refused to fill out the space corresponding to the period of his residency in Tubaran;
that it was unusual for the BEI Chairman to execute an affidavit, stating therein that he allowed the
registration of the petitioner because he had known the latter to be a legitimate resident of [Tubaran]
even prior to the May 8, 1999 registration; that it was doubtful if the election officer of Tubaran really
conducted a continuous verification of household members of Tubaran; and that the certification of the
election officer of Bayang that petitioner was not a registered voter in Bayang during the May 11, 1998
and May 14, 2001 elections does not prove that he was a registered voter in Tubaran. Respondent
argues that the COMELEC did not commit any error of jurisdiction to justify the grant of this petition for
certiorari but, if at all, only an error of judgment, which is correctible by ordinary appeal.

After reviewing the records, we find the foregoing allegations of petitioner to be

correct. Hence, his petition should be granted.
First. Petitioner contends that the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the
COMELEC en banc was not yet final and executory when the elections were held on
May 14, 2001. Consequently, the Board of Election Inspectors of Tubaran, in the
exercise of its ministerial duty, had to count the votes cast in his favor. Respondent, on
the other hand, avers that the assailed resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the
COMELEC en banc had attained finality five (5) days thereafter, on May 17, 2001, as
its enforcement had not been restrained by this Court within the said period. The
temporary restraining order should thus be set aside, the same having been issued by
this Court only on May 22, 2001.
At the time the elections were held in May 14, 2001, the assailed resolution, dated
May 12, 2001, had not become final and executory. Hence, the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) was duty bound to tally and count the votes cast in favor of petitioner.
As R.A. No. 6646, 6 provides:

Effect of disqualification. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

RESOLUTION NO. 4116

This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or

division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification cases).

Sec. 13, Rule 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions or
Resolutions provides:

Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. (a) In ordinary actions, special

proceedings, provisional remedies, and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation.

(b) In Special Actions and Special cases, a decision or resolution of the

Commission en banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of

a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special
Actions and Special cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or
proceedings, following its promulgation.
Special Actions cases refer to the following:

a) Petition to deny due course to certificate of candidacy;

b) Petition to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate;
c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of
decisions or resolutions on Special Actions cases (disqualification cases); the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVED, as follows:

1. the decision or resolution of the en banc of the Commission on disqualification

cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme Court;

2. the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final

and executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is
seasonably filed;

3. where the ground for the disqualification case is by reason of non-residence,

citizenship, violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the
election the resolution has not become final and executory, the BEI shall tally and
count the votes of such disqualified candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Second. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
declaring him disqualified on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran. On the
other hand, respondent argues that whether or not petitioner is a resident of Tubaran is
a factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and determined by the Second
Division of the COMELEC and later by the COMELEC en banc.Respondent echoes
the ruling of the COMELEC in its resolution of May 12, 2001, which said that, as an
administrative body and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, it has more than enough expertise in its
field, and its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality.
With due regard for the expertise of the COMELEC, we find the evidence to be
insufficient to sustain its resolution. We agree with the Solicitor General, to the
contrary, that petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of
the Municipality of Bayang, he later transferred residence to Tangcal in the
Municipality of Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence therein for 10
years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.
 What a slap on your face! I wonder what triggered COMELECs declaration that
the candidate is bereft of residency qualification. hmmm
Section 39 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:

Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the

Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other language or dialect.

Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of
whether or not a candidate has complied with the residency requirement for elective
positions. The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a
candidate has an intention to return to the place where he seeks to be
elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an abandonment of
his former residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court
of Appeals,[19] this Court set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court
of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan on the ground that respondents immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a
green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of
the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran
for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[20] respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims that he was not a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the ruling of
the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino,[21] applied the concept of animus revertendi or
intent to return, stating that his absence from his residence in order to pursue studies or practice
his profession as a certified public accountant in Manila or his registration as a voter other than in
the place where he was elected did not constitute loss of residence. The fact that respondent made
periodical journeys to his home province in Laoang revealed that he always had animus revertendi.
In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on
Elections,[22] it was explained that the determination of a persons legal residence or
domicile largely depends upon the intention that may be inferred from his acts,
activities, and utterances. In that case, petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained
the highest number of votes in the local elections of February 1, 1988 and who had thus
been proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was disqualified by the COMELEC for
lack of residence and registration qualifications, not being a resident nor a registered
voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC ruled that the attempt of petitioner Larrazabal
to change her residence one year before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte
to qualify her to run for the position of governor of the province of Leyte was proof that
she considered herself a resident of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling of the
COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal had established her residence in Ormoc
City, not in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the time that she ran for the position of
Provincial Governor of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to show that
she and her husband maintained separate residences, i.e., she at Kananga, Leyte and her
husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte through
the years did not signify an intention to continue her residence after leaving that place.
In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,[23] the Court held that domicile and
residence are synonymous. The term residence, as used in the election law, imports not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends
to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established his residence during
the early 1980s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the sudden
departure from the country of petitioner, because of the EDSA Peoples Power
Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United States until favorable conditions
had been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an abandonment of
residence.
The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in
or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida Guina Dimaporo got married in
1990, they resided in Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest intention on the part of
petitioner to reside in Tubaran, which he deemed to be the place of his conjugal abode with his
wife. The fact that he and his wife transferred residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that
petitioner was relinquishing his former place of residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran
to be his place of domicile. Although petitioner worked as a private secretary of the mayor of
Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after work. This is proof of animus manendi.

A candidate running for an elective office should at least have resided in the place
where he seeks election for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election. Herein respondent is wanting in this respect
 When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate
for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the
purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victors right to the
office, the will of the electorate should be respected.[27] For the purpose of election
laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. [28] To
successfully challenge petitioners disqualification, respondent must clearly
demonstrate that petitioners ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby
giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.[29] Respondent failed to
substantiate her claim that petitioner is ineligible to be mayor of Tubaran.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolution of the
COMELEC (Second Division), dated May 8, 2001, disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B.
Papandayan, Jr. as a candidate for municipal mayor in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, and the
resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc, denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued is made PERMANENT.

ENGR. ERNESTO T. MATUGAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and ROBERT LYNDON S. BARBERS, respondents.

The Local Government Code of 1991[1] requires that an elective local official be a
citizen of the Philippines.[2] Whether the incumbent Governor of Surigao del Norte is a
citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, qualified to hold such office is the issue in this
case.
Basic in the law of evidence is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is substantial
[9]

evidence.[10] Petitioner did not overcome his burden. The documentary evidence he
submitted fails to establish that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

These new documents likewise cannot be admitted in evidence. To repeat, Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court requires that if the public document or the public record is not kept in
the Philippines, its official publication or its copy duly attested by the officer in charge of the
custody of the same must be accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the
custody.Said certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his
office. In this case, the Authentication executed by Cristina G. Ortega, the Philippine Consul in
Los Angeles, California merely states that Abel Martinez is the Deputy Clerk of the United
States District Court, Central District of California. It does not state that said Deputy Clerk has
the custody of the above record.

The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the
first time on appeal,[17] and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate
court will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action.[18] This is true whether
the decision elevated for review originated from a regular court [19] or an administrative
agency or quasi-judicial body,[20] and whether it was rendered in a civil case,[21] a special
proceeding,[22] or a criminal case.[23] Piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply not in
accord with orderly justice.[24] The same rules apply with greater force in certiorari
proceedings. Indeed, it would be absurd to hold public respondent guilty of
grave abuse of discretion for not considering evidence not presented before it.
The patent unfairness of petitioners plea, prejudicing as it would public and
private respondents alike, militates against the admission and consideration of
the subject documents.
Finally, petitioner in his Memorandum invokes the case of Yu v. Defensor-
[25]

Santiago, holding that a naturalized Filipino citizen effectively renounces his

[26]

Filipino citizenship when he applies for and is issued a Portuguese passport,

and declares his nationality as a Portuguese in commercial documents he
signed. That case, however, has no relevance here because the documents
submitted in this case, assuming that they constitute substantial evidence that
private respondent indeed renounced his Filipino citizenship, are
inadmissible. In other words, there is no evidence in this case of any
renunciation.
Petition is dismissed

EMILIANA TORAL KARE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.
When a mayoral candidate who gathered the highest number of votes is disqualified after the
election is held, a permanent vacancy is created, and the vice mayor succeeds to the position.

Before us are two Petitions for Certiorari under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the nullification of the March 19, 2003 En Banc Resolution issued by the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) in SPA No. 01-272. The Comelec resolved therein to disqualify Salvador K.
Moll from the mayoralty of Malinao, Albay, and to proclaim Avelino Ceriola as the mayor-elect of
the said municipality. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:

On May 18, 2001, Ceriola filed a Petition to Confirm the Disqualification and/or Ineligibility of
Dindo K. Moll to Run for Any Elective Position. The Petition alleged that the latter had been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1)
year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, for the crime of usurpation of authority or
official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Comelec further ruled that the trial courts final judgment of conviction of Moll disqualified
him from filing his certificate of candidacy and continued to disqualify him from holding
office. Accordingly, the votes cast in his favor were stray or invalid votes, and Ceriola -- the
candidate who had obtained the second highest number of votes -- was adjudged the
winner.Thus, the Comelec ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim him as the
mayor-elect of the municipality.

issues that have to be resolved:

1. Should Moll be disqualified from running and/or holding the position of mayor?

2.) If the first issue is answered in the affirmative, who should become the mayor --
Ceriola, the second placer in the mayoral election? Or Kare, the elected vice mayor?

The Rules of Court mandates that an appeal should be filed within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. It necessarily
follows that this period is interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment or of the final order being appealed.

Section 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;

x x x x x x x x x.

Moll argues that he cannot be disqualified from running for mayor, since his
judgement of conviction[5] -- the basis of his disqualification -- has allegedly not
yet attained finality. He contends that while the said judgment promulgated on
May 11, 1999 was not appealed by filing the Notice of Appeal in the ordinary
course of the proceedings, he still filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May
28, 1999 within the reglementary period.[6] Thus, according to him, the filing of
such Motion stayed the finality of his conviction.
We disagree. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
reads thus:

Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. -- A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of

the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (Italics supplied)

Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1)
year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, a penalty that clearly disqualified him
from running for any elective local position.