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G.R. No.

83609 October 26, 1989

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.


COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Director of Lands through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents' application for confirmation and registration of their title to two (2)
parcels of land in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.

Applicants respondents Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land
filed on July 20,1976, claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869,
respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon,
Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Capiz. The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land and they had
been paying the taxes thereon.

Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development December 16,1976, opposed the application on the
grounds that:

1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of
the land or lots applied for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish
Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or special grant, (3) the 'composicion con
el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria'
or possessory information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized mode of acquisition of
title over realty under pertinent applicable laws.

2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application.

3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject
to private appropriation,

Applicants respondents Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar February 24,1977, filed an amended application, which was approved on
March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation:

Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter 8,
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land as
owners for more than fifty (50) years.

trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein private respondents. It found
that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of
the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of
the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and
converted a part of the land into productive fishponds.

Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of
Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural
land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the government
alleges that:

1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable agricultural land, mineral land or
forest land is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership; and

3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of
Com. Act No. 141, as amended.

ISSUE

Whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended.

RULING

The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:

As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is
not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but
the Executive Branch of the government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of
discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland
block, and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and
until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).

Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920];
Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas
covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that:

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements
of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that
the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application. (Heirs of
Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)

FULL CASE
G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents.

Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia Bisnar.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents' application for confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels
of land in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.

In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July 20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia
Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively containing
an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President
Roxas, Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land (p. 41, Rollo) and they had
been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).

On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on the
grounds that:

1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership
in fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various
types of title issued by the Spanish Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the 'concession
especial' or special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de
compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory information under the
Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under
pertinent applicable laws.

2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application.

3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record on Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was approved on March 14, 1977, and included the
following allegation:

Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby apply for the
benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the land as owners for more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein private
respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30)
prior to the filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts, bamboos and
other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).

On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the lots as timberland by the
Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as
agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the
government alleges that:

1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable agricultural land,
mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of
the courts;

2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership; and

3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:

As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the
classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now
a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With these rules, there
should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of
the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government,
through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for respondent
court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2)
as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).

Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920];
Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas
covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that:

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those
derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership
for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the former
Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 83609. October 26, 1989.]

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA
BISNAR, respondents.

Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia Bisnar.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION: ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PUBLIC LANDS; CLASSIFICATION OR RECLASSIFICATION THEREOF AS


PREROGATIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we
ruled: "As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive
Branch of the government, through the Office of the President.

2. ID.; POSITIVE ACT OF THE GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO DECLASSIFY LAND INTO ALIENABLE LAND FOR AGRICULTURAL OR OTHER
PURPOSES. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest
and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless
and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs.
Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).

3. ID.; POSSESSION HOWEVER LONG OF FOREST LANDS CANNOT RIPEN INTO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP. Possession of forest
lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]).

4. ID.; FOREST LAND; BEYOND JURISDICTION OF THE CADASTRAL COURT TO REGISTER UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM. A parcel
of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral
court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983];
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
5. ID.; SECTION 48 (b) OF C.A. NO. 141; APPLICABLE EXCLUSIVELY TO PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LAND. Section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with
forests are excluded.

6. ID.; ID.; APPLICANT TASKED WITH THE BURDEN OF PROOF THAT HE MEETS THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS. "In confirmation of
imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section
48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at
least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application." (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)

DECISION

GRIO-AQUINO, J p:

Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents' application for confirmation and registration of their title to two (2)
parcels of land in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256. cdll

In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July 20, 1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia
Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively
containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq.m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq.m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of
President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land (p. 41, Rollo)
and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).

On December 16, 1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on
the grounds that:

"1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in
fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various types of
title issued by the Spanish Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or
special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de compra' or title
by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory information under the Royal Decree of 13
February 1894, or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable
laws.

"2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application.
"3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp 17-19, Record on Appeal)." (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

On February 24, 1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was approved on March 14, 1977, and included the
following allegation:

"Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby apply for the benefits
of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land as owners for more than fifty (50) years." (p. 16, Rollo.)

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein private
respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only
30) prior to the filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts, bamboos
and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).

On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the lots as timberland by the
Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as
agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the
government alleges that:

1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable agricultural land, mineral
land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts;

2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership; and

3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:

"As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the
classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now
a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With these rules, there
should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the
public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through the
Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for respondent court to ignore
the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the
then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes." (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and
until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).

Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920];
Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689
[1984]). Cdpr

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas
covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in Amunategiu that:

"In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those
derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for
at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application." (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry,
126 SCRA 69.)

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the
former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs.

SO ORDERED.
||| (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83609, [October 26, 1989], 258-A PHIL 492-497)

[G.R. No. 154953. June 26, 2008.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66658. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas,
Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-635. AcISTE

The Antecedent Facts

This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of
the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land,
with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.

On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing
was published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794, 4 and in the 18 October
1999 issue of People's Journal Taliba, 5 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was
also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a
conspicuous place on the land. 6 All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the
initial hearing. 7

On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the Opposition
dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November
1999, the trial court issued an Order 8 of General Default against the whole world except as against petitioner.

During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave
Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his written opposition. 9 Carandang failed to file his written opposition
and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order 10 dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of
General Default. CDISAc

During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres
(Torres), respondent's Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a
72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.

The testimonies of respondent's witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and
continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his
son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of
one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on
26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonio's children,
Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). 11 On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.

The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land provided such entity and its
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession
converted the land to private property. cEaCAH

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates
and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741,
situated in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area of
564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal office at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737
Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.

Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.

SO ORDERED. 12

Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting the application for
registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of
possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in
nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been presented to corroborate
Evangelista's testimony. IESDCH

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista's knowledge of the possession and occupation of the land stemmed not only from
the fact that he worked there for three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On
Evangelista's failure to mention the name of his uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that
Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that
at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunato's relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelista's
statement that Fortunato took over the possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroy's death. The Court of
Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land became public knowledge because
San Bartolome was a small community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed
to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole witness' testimony.

The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only testifying on the fact that he had
caused the filing of the application for registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.

Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its
Memorandum: IATHaS

The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation despite the following:

1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land. 13

The Issues

The issues may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;

2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier;
and SAHIaD

3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Respondent Failed to Prove that the Land is Alienable and Disposable

Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land forms
part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public domain.

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the
State. 14 The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant. 15 AHDacC

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, 16 certified
that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of
596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582
certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second certification 17 in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued
by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls
within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."

The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions
and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land
classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues
certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, 19 dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO
No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification
status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for
lands covering over 50 hectares. 20 In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot
10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of
596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable
and disposable. AcISTE
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land
classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;

2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and

4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.

Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan; EcSCAD

2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;

3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public
infrastructure projects; and

5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure
projects. ASIDTa

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial
court, has no probative value.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials
who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not
have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly
issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. DSATCI

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19 (a), when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy . . . . The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR
Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication 21 of
the DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. cASTED

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of
the date of the latter.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer", such as entries made by the Civil Registrar 22 in the books of
registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. 23 The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records
of public documents. 24 The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative
value. 25 Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within
the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their
mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. 26 Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their
due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. EHIcaT

The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of
the facts stated therein. 27 Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent's representative, identified the certifications but
the government officials who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the
certifications cannot be given probative value. 28 The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was incompetent
to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications. 29 Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer
of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified by the
DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.

Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary
certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925.
However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.

We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification Map No.
582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and
disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and
the metes and bounds of the land described therein . . . and does not in any way certify the nature and classification of the land
involved." 30 It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land's classification. 31 However, respondent
should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records
Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot
10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer's certification were faithful reproductions of the original
documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to
explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications submitted by
respondent. DAcaIE

There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner

Petitioner alleges that the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges
that Evangelista's statement that the possession of respondent's predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous,
peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of title.
Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly, continuously,
and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.

We agree with petitioner.

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the
land for three years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy's land. The Court of Appeals took note
of this and ruled that Evangelista's knowledge of Kabesang Puroy's possession of the land stemmed "not only from the fact that
he had worked thereat but more so that they were practically neighbors." 32 The Court of Appeals observed:

In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand
that people in the said community knows each and everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each
other, news or events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land spreads
like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became of public knowledge to them. 33

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the
exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He
did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelista's testimony is contrary to the factual
finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of Antonio's
children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelista's testimony. EHcaDT

The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration.
However, in this case, we find Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondent's predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the
testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondent's acquisition of the land.
While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell
the trial court where he obtained his information.

The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. 34 Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty
taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before
1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or
possession of the land only in that year.

Land Application by a Corporation

Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain in this
case. cHDEaC

We agree with petitioner.

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses
to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor. aCSHDI

The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 35 the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain.
Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land.
The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer
allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitutioncontinues the prohibition against
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 36 The Court explained in Chavez:

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. . . .

[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the
size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have
followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of
the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.

If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a
corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in
the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation
instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into
smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next. ISCaTE

In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from
acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional
ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily
set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as
his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited
area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded
by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the
vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually
decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to
this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it
would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban. 37

In Director of Lands v. IAC, 38 the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.
(Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from members
of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the proceeding was
instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or associations from holding
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land was already
private land when Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935
Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could
acquire not more than 144 hectares. 39 HAISEa

In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for the period
prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which
is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State
than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . .
." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in
truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of
the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originallyconvert the land from public to private
land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete.
. . . [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already
private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable
title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. . . .
. 40 (Emphasis supplied) HTCIcE

Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the "land . . . was already private property at the
time it was acquired . . . by Acme". In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with
his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the
land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was not yet private
property.

For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and disposable land, the corporation
must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue
of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945.
Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 41 the Court declared:

Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in question had already
been converted to private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of
TCMC when the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the titles of the
previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.

Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973
Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through lease
(Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of
the public domain but private property.

What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to
establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive
prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on
to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription
since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain. EASCDH

Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the doctrine in Director of
Lands. Republic Act No. 9176 42 (R.A. 9176) further amended the Public Land Act 43 and extended the period for the filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
until 31 December 2020. Thus:

Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend
beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this
period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided,
further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section
Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but
this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this Chapter
at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.

Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as
having been filed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. HacADE

Under R.A. 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land.
Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of
12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary
to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its
predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not
exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case, respondent has
failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December
1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the
application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. HcSCED

SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 154953, [June 26, 2008], 578 PHIL 441-464)

[G.R. No. 195026. February 22, 2016.]

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, represented by its President, DR. MARIA LUISA R.


SOLIVEN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J p:

For this Court's resolution is a petition for review on certiorari dated January 14, 2011 filed by petitioner Central
Mindanao University (CMU), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated December 30, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which annulled the Decision 2 dated December 22, 1971, the Amended Decision 3 dated October 7, 1972 and
the Second Amended Decision 4 dated September 12, 1974 rendered by the then Court of First Instance (CFI), 15th Judicial
District, Branch II of Bukidnon and annulled the Decrees No. N-154065, N-154066 and N-154067 issued in favor of petitioner
and the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-160, OCT No. 0-161 and OCT No. 0-162 registered in petitioner's name on
January 29, 1975.

The facts follow:

Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is an agricultural educational institution owned and run by the State
established by virtue of Republic Act No. 4498. 5 It is represented by its President, Dr. Maria Luisa R. Soliven in accordance
with CMU Board of Regents Resolution No. 02, s. 2011. 6

The subjects of the controversy are two parcels of land situated at Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon identified as
"Sheet 1, Lot 1 of Ir-1031-D" consisting of 20,619,175 square meters, and "Sheet 2, Lot 2 of Ir-1031-D" consisting of
13,391,795 square meters, more or less. 7

In 1946, CMU took possession of the subject parcels of land and started construction for the school site upon the
confirmation of the Secretary of Public Instruction. 8However, during the final survey in 1952, CMU discovered that there
were several adverse claimants, holders, possessors and occupants of the portions of lots identified as school sites. 9

On January 16, 1958, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
pursuant to the provisions of Section 83 10 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, otherwise known as Public Land Act,
President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476 11 which reserved certain portions of the public domain in Musuan,
Maramag, Bukidnon for petitioner CMU's (formerly Mindanao Agricultural College) site purposes. 12 The said parcels of
land were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for CMU's school site purposes, "subject to private rights, if any
there be." CAIHTE

In a letter dated October 27, 1960, the Director of Lands Zoilo Castrillo formally requested the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources that he be authorized under Section 87 of C.A. No. 141, to file in the CFI of Bukidnon an
application for the compulsory registration of the parcels of land reserved by President Garcia underProclamation No.
476 as CMU's school site purposes. 13

In the first indorsement dated November 9, 1960, the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
through its Undersecretary Salvador F. Cunanan, forwarded to the Executive Secretary a recommendation that the Director
of Lands be authorized to file the said application. 14

Thereafter, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema, in the second
indorsement dated December 12, 1960, authorized and directed the Director of Lands to file the necessary petition in the
CFI of Bukidnon for the compulsory registration of the parcels of land reserved for CMU.15

Department Legal Counsel Alejandro V. Recto, in the indorsement dated December 28, 1960, communicated the
said directive and authority granted to the Director of Lands to file the application for compulsory registration. 16

On January 31, 1961, the Director of Lands filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance of Bukidnon for the
settlement and adjudication of the title of the parcels of land reserved in favor of CMU, and for the determination of the
rights of adverse claimants in relation to the reservation of the land. 17

The cadastral court, in its Decision dated December 22, 1971 in Land Registration Case Cadastral Rec. No. 414,
declared that the subject parcels of land as public land included in the reservation for CMU, and be registered in its name,
except for specified portions adjudicated to other persons. 18 The court also gave the other 18 claimants an opportunity to
acquire full ownership in the subject parcels of land. 19 Hence, the court reduced the claim of CMU to 3,041 hectares of
total land area. 20 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

In view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Lot No. 1
containing an approximate area of 20,619,175 square meters and Lot No. 2 containing an area of
13,391,795 square meters, both situated in the barrio of Musuan, municipality of Maramag, Bukidnon, as
described in the survey plans and technical descriptions approved by the Director of Lands as IR-1031-D,
marked as Exhibits "D" and "D-1" of the Central Mindanao University, as public land included in the
reservation in favor of said University by virtue of Proclamation No. 476, series of 1958, of the President of
the Philippines, which may be registered in its name, except such portions hereinbelow specified which
are adjudicated in favor of the following:

1. Venancio Olohoy, married, and Esmeralda Lauga, married to Julio Sagde, both of legal
ages and residents of Valencia, Bukidnon 17.75 hectares of Lot No. 1 as shown in the
survey plan (Exh. "D");

2. Martina Songkit, of legal age, married to Martin Binanos and resident of Maramag,
Bukidnon 3 hectares of Lot No. 2 as shown in the plan Exh. "D-1";

3. Pablo Saldivar, widower, of legal age and resident of Dologon, Maramag, Bukidnon
12 hectares of Lot No. 2 as indicated in the survey plan Exh. "D-1" above-mentioned;

4. Fernando Bungcas, married to Feliciana Gayonan and resident of Dologon, Maramag


6 hectares of Lot No. 2;

5. Cerilo Salicubay, married to Valentina Bento, and Virginia Salicubay, married to


Ricardo Tunasan, both of legal ages and residents of Panalsalan, Maramag, Bukidnon,
share and share alike 4 hectares of Lot No. 2;

6. Rosita Lupiahan, of legal age, married to Simplicio Alba and resident of Maramag,
Bukidnon 4 hectares of Lot No. 2.

The areas herein adjudicated to the above-named private individuals should be surveyed and
each lot given a separate number with their corresponding technical descriptions.

Considering, however, that the Court rejected most of the claim due to the dubious nature of the
occupation of the claimants prior to the take-over by the College, now University, in 1946 but most of
them remained on the land up to the present time, in order to avoid possible injustice and in line with the
national objective of providing land for the landless, it is hereby recommended that the claimants
enumerated hereunder who filed answers and presented evidence which, nevertheless, was found short
of the requirements for a decree of registration, be given the opportunity to acquire full ownership
thereof through a homestead, or free patent application if they are landless persons, otherwise by means
of a sales application if they are already owners of other pieces of real estate, after a corresponding
amendment of the Executive Proclamation through the avenues allowed by law. The following claimants
may be considered for that purpose, namely:

1. Geronimo Aniceto and his sister Francisca Aniceto 12 hectares of Lot No. 2;

2. Bonifacio Aniceto 6 hectares of Lot No. 2; DETACa

3. Julita Aniceto 12 hectares of Lot No. 2;

4. Maximo Nulo 5 hectares of Lot No. 2;

5. Magno Sepada 3 hectares of Lot No. 1;

6. Eulogio Guimba 12 hectares of Lot No. 2;

7. Mario Baguhin and his wife, Treponia Dagoplo 18 hectares of Lot No. 2;

8. Aniceto Nayawan 12 hectares of Lot No. 2;

9. Eduardo Saloay-ay 13 hectares of Lot No. 2;

10. Arcadio Belmis and his wife Beatriz Lauga 24 hectares of Lot No. 1;

11. Vitaliano Lauga 24 hectares of Lot No. 1;

12. Procopio Abellar 12 hectares of Lot No. 1;

13. Rufino Dador 12 hectares of Lot No. 1;

14. Roque Larayan 12 hectares of Lot No. 1;

15. Benito Lutad 12 hectares of Lot No. 1;

16. Juliana Pasamonte 11 hectares of Lot No. 1;

17. Tirso Pimentel 19 hectares of Lot No. 1; and

18. Dativa P. Velez 18 hectares of Lot No. 1.

Should the above recommendation be given due course, it is further suggested that those
claimants included in the said recommendation who are now occupying portions of Lot No. 2 situated
above the university grounds on the hillside which they have already denuded, should be transferred to
the lower portions of the land near or along the Pulangi river in order to enable the University to reforest
the hillside to protect the watershed of its irrigation system and water supply.

After this decision become final and the portions adjudicated to private persons have been
segregated and their corresponding technical descriptions provided, the order of the issuance of the
corresponding decree and the certificates of title shall be issued.

SO ORDERED. 21

Upon the submission of the parties of the compromise agreement through a Joint Manifestation, the cadastral
court rendered its Amended Decision dated October 7, 1972 adjudicating in full ownership of some portions of the subject
lots to the 29 groups of claimants. 22 A portion of the fallo of the amended decision reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the evidence presented and the compromise agreement submitted by
the parties, the decision rendered by this Court on December 22, 1971 is hereby AMENDED and another
one entered ADJUDICATING in full ownership to the claimants hereinbelow specified the following
portions of the lots in question, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

The remaining portions of Lots 1 and 2 not otherwise adjudicated to any of the above-named
private claimants are hereby ADJUDICATED in full ownership to the Central Mindanao State University. It
is hereby directed that the different portions of Lots 1 and 2 hereinabove granted to private claimants
must [be segregated] by a competent surveyor and given their technical descriptions and corresponding
lot numbers for purposes of the issuance of certificates of title in their favor.

It is, however, ordered that the area adjacent and around or near the watersheds or sources of
Lot No. 2 adjudicated to any of the private claimants specified in the foregoing paragraph may be replaced
or substituted to the Central Mindanao State University with other areas of equal extent in either Lot 1 or
2, should said University desire to do so in order to protect and conserve the watersheds.

The findings and resolutions made by the Court in its original decision not affected by the
amendments incorporated elsewhere herein shall stand.

The petition from relief from judgment presented by Lucio Butad which the Court finds without
merit is hereby denied.

Once the decision becomes final and the subdivision directed in the preceding paragraph has
been accomplished, the order for the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration and the
certificates of title in favor of each and every adjudicatee shall likewise issue.

SO ORDERED. 23

Based on the Order made by the court that those portions of the private claimants in the area adjacent and
around, or near the watersheds of Lot No. 2 may be replaced or substituted by CMU with areas of equal extent, the 16
grantees entered into an agreement with CMU for the replacement of the areas adjudicated to them with those outside the
watershed vicinity or beyond the area necessary for the proper development, administration, supervision and utilization of
the portion adjudicated to CMU. 24

Thereafter, the cadastral court, in its second amendment of the Decision dated September 12, 1974, ordered that
the specific portions of the subject lots be adjudicated to the 33 claimants as indicated in their agreement. 25 It also
awarded to CMU Lot 1-S (18,531,671 square meters), Lot 2-A (10,001 square meters), and Lot 2-Q (12,266,524 square
meters). 26 On January 25, 1975, the court issued Decrees No. N-154065, N-154066, and N-154067 in favor of
CMU. 27 Consequently, OCT Nos. 0-160, 0-161 and 0-162 were registered in the name of CMU on January 29, 1975. 28 The
decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding said manifestation and agreement of the parties in order, the dispositive
portions of the amended decision rendered by this Court on October 7, 1972 aforementioned is further
amended such that the lots specified hereunder and more particularly indicated in the revised plans and
technical descriptions above-mentioned are hereby adjudicated as follows: aDSIHc

1. To Roque Larayan, Lot 1-A with an area of 120.001 square meters;

2. To Fernanda Bungcas, Lot 1-B with an area of 60.00 square meters;

3. To Tirso Pimentel, Lot 1-C with an area of 190.000 square meters;

4. To Juliana Pasamonte, Lot 1-D with an area of 109.999 square meters;

5. To Dativa Velez, Lot 1-E with an area of 180.00 square meters;

6. To Mario Bagubin, Lot 1-F with an area of 60.00 square meters;

7. To Triponia Dagoplo, Lot 1-G with an area of 60.001 square meters;

8. To Mario Baguhin, Lot 1-H with an area of 60.001 square meters;

9. To Celerina Guimba, Lot 1-I with an area of 30.001 square meters;

10. To Constantino Baston, Lot 1-J with an area of 30.001 square meters;

11. To Maximo Nulo, Lot 1-K with an area of 49.999 square meters;

12. To Beatriz Lauga, Lot 1-L with an area of 100.00 square meters;

13. To Evorcio Olohoy, Lot 1-M with an area of 177.500 square meters;

14. To Arcadio Belmis, Lot 1-N with an area of 140.000 square meters;

15. To Luciano Namuag, Lot 1-O with an area of 240.000 square meters;

16. To Vitaliano Lauga, Lot 1-P with an area of 240.000 square meters;

17. To Rufino Dador, Lot 1-Q with an area of 120.00 square meters;

18. To Procopio Abellar, Lot 1-B with an area of 120.001 square meters;

19. To Eduardo Saloay-ay, Lot 2-B with an area of 130.000 square meters;

20. To Francisco Anecito, Lot 2-C with an area of 120.000 square meters;

21. To Julita Anecito, Lot 2-D with an area of 60.000 square meters;

22. To Vicente Buntan, Lot 2-E with an area of 30.000 square meters;

23. To Victoriano Lacorda, Lot 2-F with an area of 130.000 square meters;

24. To Cerilo Salicubay, Lot 2-G with an area of 40.000 square meters;

25. To Julita Anecito, Lot 2-H with an area of 60.000 square meters;

26. To Benito Butad, Lot 2-I with an area of 120.000 square meters;

27. To Pablo Zaldivar, Lot 2-J with an area of 120.000 square meters;

28. To Magno Sepada, Lot 2-K with an area of 30.000 square meters;

29. To Anecito Nayawan, Lot 2-L with an area of 120.000 square meters;
30. To Bonifacio Anecito, Lot 2-M with an area of 60.001 square meters;

31. To Eulogio Guimba, Lot 2-N with an area of 120.001 square meters;

32. To Martina Songkit, Lot 2-O with an area of 30.000 square meters;

33. To Rosita Lapianan, Lot 2-P with an area of 40.000 square meters;

34. To Central Mindanao State University; Lot 1-S with an area of 18,531.671 square meters;

35. To Central Mindanao State University; Lot 2-A with an area of 10.001 square meters;

36. To Central Mindanao State University, Lot 2-Q with an area of 12,266,524 square meters;

The findings and resolutions made by this Court in its original decision not affected by the
amendments incorporated herein shall remain in force.

Once this decision becomes final, the order for the issuance of the corresponding decrees of
registration and the certification of title in favor of each and every adjudicates shall likewise issue. ETHIDa

SO ORDERED. 29

On December 15, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed before the CA a petition for annulment of the
Decision dated September 12, 1974 by the cadastral court granting in favor of CMU the title to the subject parcels of land.

The Republic argued that the cadastral court should have summarily dismissed the registration proceedings since
the Solicitor General did not sign or file the petition for compulsory registration of the parcels of land, as provided in
Sections 53 30 and 87 31 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. 32 It also alleged that the subject parcels of land are inalienable
lands of public domain. 33 It maintained that the cadastral court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res; hence, the entire
proceedings of the case should be null and void.

Accordingly, the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 1) Decision dated December 22, 1971, 2)
Amended Decision dated October 7, 1972 and 3) Second Amended Decision dated September 12, 1974, all
rendered by the Court of First Instance, 15th Judicial District, Branch II, Bukidnon Province, in "L.R.C. Cad.
Rec. No. 414, Sec. 87 of Commonwealth Act 141, Ir-1031-D (Lots 1 & 2), Maramag, Bukidnon, insofar as
they adjudicated a portion of the land covered by Proclamation No. 476 to the Central Mindanao
University, are declared NULL and VOID.

Consequently, 1) Decrees No. N-154065, N-154066 and N-154067 issued in favor of the
University on January 24, 1975; and 2) Original Certificates of Title (OCT) No. 0-160 (covering Lot 1-S), No.
0-161 (for Lot 2-A) and No. 0-162 (for Lot 2-Q) registered in the University's name on January 29, 1975, are
likewise declared NULL AND VOID.

SO ORDERED. 34

The CA ruled that there was no sufficient proof of a positive act by the government, such as presidential
proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, or a legislative
act or statute, which declared the land of the public domain alienable and disposable. 35 The documents adduced by CMU
did not expressly declare that the covered land is already alienable and disposable and that one of such documents was
merely signed by the Assistant Executive Secretary. 36

According to the CA, CMU was unable to prove that the subject land ceased to have the status of a
reservation. 37 However, the CA clarified that despite nullification of the titles in its favor, CMU is still the rightful possessor
of the subject property by virtue of Proclamation No. 476. 38

Hence, the petitioner CMU filed the present petition before this Court raising the sole issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals:

1. committed a serious and grave error and gravely abused its discretion on a question of law, and

2. ruled and decided a question of substance in a way and manner not in accord with law and applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court.

in granting the petition for annulment of judgment filed by respondent on the ground that the cadastral
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the specific res of the subject matter of the petition
below for the reason that the subject lands are inalienable and non-disposable lands of the public
domain. 39

CMU maintains that the CA has completely misconstrued the facts of the cadastral proceedings since the
documents it presented showed that the subject property has already been declared, classified, and certified by the Office
of the President as alienable and disposable lands. 40

Particularly, CMU alleges that the specific and express authorization and the directive, as embodied in the Second
Indorsement 41 dated December 12, 1960, from the President, through the then Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C.
Quema, authorizing the Director of Lands to file the necessary petition in the CFI of Bukidnon for compulsory registration of
the parcels of land reserved for CMU's site purposes is equivalent to a declaration and certification by the Office of the
President that the subject parcels of land are alienable and disposable. 42

CMU has cited the case of Republic v. Judge De la Rosa 43 wherein the then President Quirino issued on June 22,
1951 a directive authorizing the Director of Lands to file the necessary petition in the CFI of Isabela for the settlement and
adjudication of the titles to the tract of land involved in the Gamu Public Lands Subdivision, Pls-62, Case 5. This Court held
that the said presidential directive was equivalent to a declaration and certification that the subject land area is alienable
and disposable. 44

This Court finds the instant petition without merit.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 45 Also, the doctrine states
that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. 46 Consequently, the person applying for registration has the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of
ownership of lands of the public domain. 47
To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established. 48 Hence, a public land
remains part of the inalienable public domain unless it is shown to have been reclassified and alienated by the State to a
private person. 49 cSEDTC

As noted, Proclamation No. 476 issued by then President Garcia, decreeing certain portions of the public domain in
Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon for CMU's site purposes, was issued pursuant to Section 83 of C.A. No. 141. Being reserved as
CMU's school site, the said parcels of land were withdrawn from sale and settlement, and reserved for CMU. Under Section
88 of the same Act, the reserved parcels of land would ordinarily be inalienable and not subject to occupation, entry, sale,
lease or other disposition, subject to an exception, viz.:

Section 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall
be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again
declared alienable under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the President. (Emphasis
supplied)

In the case of Navy Officers' Village Association, Inc. v. Republic, 50 it was held that parcels of land classified as
reservations for public or quasi-public uses: (1) are non-alienable and non-disposable in view of Section 88 (in relation with
Section 8) of C.A. No. 141, specifically declaring them as non-alienable and not subject to disposition; and (2) they remain
public domain lands until they are actually disposed of in favor of private persons. 51 In other words, lands of the public
domain classified as reservations remain to be property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the public or quasi-
public use for which they have been reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, or otherwise
positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial property. 52

In the case at bar, CMU relies on the Court's ruling in the De la Rosa 53 case that the directive from the President
authorizing the Director of Lands to file the necessary petition for the compulsory registration of the parcels of land so
reserved is the equivalent of the declaration and certification that the subject land is alienable and disposable. As such,
CMU avows that the subject lots, as declared alienable and disposable, are properly registered in its name.

This Court finds that the De la Rosa case does not apply in the instant petition because of the varying factual
settings, to wit:

a. In De la Rosa, the Mallig Plains Reservation was reserved by the President for settlement purposes under
the administration of National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA), later replaced by Land
Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO), while the subject lots in the present case
was reserved for educational purposes, e.g., as CMU's school site, under the administration of the
Board of Trustees of CMU.

b. The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration, when it replaced LASEDECO, excluded the
Mallig Plains Reservation among the properties it needed in carrying out the purposes and
objectives of Republic Act No. 1160, 54 thus, the Reservation eventually reverted to and became
public agricultural land. There was no evidence that CMU ceased to use and occupy the reserved
lots in Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon as its school site or that its public purpose is abandoned, for
the lots to revert to and become public agricultural land.

c. At the time that President Quirino issued the directive, the Gamu Public Land Subdivision in the Mallig
Plains Reservation was not reserved for public or quasi-public purpose or has ceased to be so. On
the other hand, the subject lots in Bukidnon are reserved for public purpose when the President,
through the Assistant Executive Secretary, issued the said directive.

d. In the De la Rosa case, the private respondent was a qualified private claimant with the requisite period of
possession of the subject residential lot in his favor. Meanwhile, CMU is not a private claimant of
the land so reserved.

It was explicated in De la Rosa 55 that the authority of the President to issue such a directive, held as equivalent to
a declaration and certification that the subject land area is alienable and disposable, finds support in Section 7 of C.A. No.
141, to wit:

Sec. 7. For purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public
lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from
time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act. (Emphasis supplied).

However, the said directive by the President is limited to those enumerated in Section 8 of C.A. No. 141, which
provides that:

Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or
any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be
so. However, the President may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to
disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same
reason, suspend their concession or disposition until they are again declared open to concession or
disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the National Assembly. (Emphases
supplied) SDAaTC

As can be gleaned from the above provision, the lands which can be declared open to disposition or concession are
those which have been officially delimited and classified, or when practicable surveyed; those not reserved for public
or quasi-public purpose; those not appropriated by the Government; those which have not become private property in any
manner; those which have no private right authorized and recognized by C.A. No. 141 or any other valid law may be
claimed; or those which have ceased to be reserved or appropriated.

For the said President's directive to file the necessary petition for compulsory registration of parcels of land be
considered as an equivalent of a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable, the subject land, among others,
should not have been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.
Therefore, the said directive on December 12, 1960 cannot be considered as a declaration that said land is
alienable and disposable. Unlike in De la Rosa, the lands, having been reserved for public purpose by virtue of Proclamation
No. 476, have not ceased to be so at the time the said directive was made. Hence, the lots did not revert to and become
public agricultural land for them to be the subject of a declaration by the President that the same are alienable and
disposable.

We have ruled in the case of CMU v. DARAB 56 that the CMU land reservation is not alienable and disposable land
of public domain, viz.:

It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the [Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program] CARP because:

(1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;

(2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by
Congress;

(3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the
CMU;

(4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands
are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and
campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for
establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers.

The inalienable character of the lands as part of the long term functions of autonomous agricultural educational
institution is reiterated in CMU v. Executive Secretary:57

It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to
appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. As already stated,
the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them
for CMU's use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be
alienable public lands. 58

This Court is not unmindful of its earlier pronouncement in CMU v. DARAB that the land reservation is a private
land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU. This pronouncement, which is now being argued by
CMU as one of its bases in convincing this Court that the subject property is owned by it and already alienable, is specious.
The 1992 CMU case merely enumerated the reasons why the said portion of the property is beyond the coverage of CARP.
Moreover, the fact that the Court had already settled the inalienable character of the subject property as part of the long
term functions of the autonomous agricultural educational institution in the case of CMU v. DARAB and reiterated in CMU v.
Executive Secretary, belies CMU's contention that this Court has recognized that the said land is a private property or that
the land is alienable and disposable.

As to what constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public domain, this Court expounds in its
pronouncements in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap: 59
xxx xxx xxx

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive
act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. 60

In the case at bar, CMU failed to establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land reservations registered
in its name are alienable and disposable lands of public domain. Aside from the series of indorsements regarding the filing
of the application for the compulsory registration of the parcels of land and the said directive from the President, CMU did
not present any proof of a positive act of the government declaring the said lands alienable and disposable. acEHCD

For lack of proof that the said land reservations have been reclassified as alienable and disposable, the said lands
remain part of inalienable public domain, hence; they are not registrable under Torrens system.

This Court will not discuss the other issue raised by CMU, e.g., the filing of the petition for cadastral proceeding
was pursuant to the written consent, authorization and directive of the OSG, as the same was not discussed in the assailed
Decision of the CA. This Court also dismisses the other issue raised that the titles in CMU's name were singled out by
respondent for lack of evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari dated January 14, 2011 filed by petitioner Central Mindanao
University is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated December 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81301 is
hereby AFFIRMED. The proceedings in the Court of First Instance, 15th Judicial District, Branch II of Bukidnon is NULL and
VOID. Accordingly, Original Certificate of Title Nos. 0-160, OCT No. 0-161 and OCT No. 0-162 issued in the name of
petitioner, are CANCELLED. Sheet 1, Lot 1 of Ir-1031-D and Sheet 2, Lot 2 of Ir-1031-D are ORDERED REVERTED to the public
domain.

SO ORDERED.
||| (Central Mindanao University v. Republic, G.R. No. 195026, [February 22, 2016])

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