G.R. No.
L-56169 June 26, 1992 Travel-On's witness, Elita Montilla, on the other hand explained that the
TRAVEL-ON, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO S. MIRANDA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Travel-On. Inc. ("Travel-On") is a travel agency selling airline tickets
on commission basis for and in behalf of different airline companies. Private
respondent Arturo S. Miranda had a revolving credit line with petitioner. He
procured tickets from petitioner on behalf of airline passengers and derived
commissions therefrom.
On 14 June 1972, Travel-On filed suit before the Court of First Instance ("CFI")
of Manila to collect on six (6) checks issued by private respondent with a total
face amount of P115,000.00. The complaint, with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment and attorney's fees, averred that from 5
August 1969 to 16 January 1970, petitioner sold and delivered various airline
tickets to respondent at a total price of P278,201.57; that to settle said
account, private respondent paid various amounts in cash and in kind, and
thereafter issued six (6) postdated checks amounting to P115,000.00 which
were all dishonored by the drawee banks. Travel-On further alleged that in
March 1972, private respondent made another payment of P10,000.00
reducing his indebtedness to P105,000.00. The writ of attachment was granted
by the court a quo.
In his answer, private respondent admitted having had transactions with
Travel-On during the period stipulated in the complaint. Private respondent,
however, claimed that he had already fully paid and even overpaid his
obligations and that refunds were in fact due to him. He argued that he had
issued the postdated checks for purposes of accommodation, as he had in the
past accorded similar favors to petitioner. During the proceedings, private
respondent contested several tickets alleged to have been erroneously debited
to his account. He claimed reimbursement of his alleged over payments, plus
litigation expenses, and exemplary and moral damages by reason of the
allegedly improper attachment of his properties.
In support of his theory that the checks were issued for accommodation,
private respondent testified that he bad issued the checks in the name of
Travel-On in order that its General Manager, Elita Montilla, could show to
Travel-On's Board of Directors that the accounts receivable of the company
were still good. He further stated that Elita Montilla tried to encash the same,
but that these were dishonored and were subsequently returned to him after
the accommodation purpose had been attained.
"accommodation" extended to Travel-On by private respondent related to
situations where one or more of its passengers needed money in Hongkong,
and upon request of Travel-On respondent would contact his friends in
Hongkong to advance Hongkong money to the passenger. The passenger
then paid Travel-On upon his return to Manila and which payment would be
credited by Travel-On to respondent's running account with it.
In its decision dated 31 January 1975, the court a quo ordered Travel-On to
pay private respondent the amount of P8,894.91 representing net
overpayments by private respondent, moral damages of P10,000.00 for the
wrongful issuance of the writ of attachment and for the filing of this case,
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
The trial court ruled that private respondent's indebtedness to petitioner was
not satisfactorily established and that the postdated checks were issued not for
the purpose of encashment to pay his indebtedness but to accommodate the
General Manager of Travel-On to enable her to show to the Board of Directors
that Travel-On was financially stable.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration that was, however, denied by the
trial court, which in fact then increased the award of moral damages to
P50,000.00.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, but
reduced the award of moral damages to P20,000.00, with interest at the legal
rate from the date of the filing of the Answer on 28 August 1972.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's' decision, without
success.
In the instant Petition for Review, it is urged that the postdated checks are per
se evidence of liability on the part of private respondent. Petitioner further
argues that even assuming that the checks were for accommodation, private
respondent is still liable thereunder considering that petitioner is a holder for
value.
Both the trial and appellate courts had rejected the checks as evidence of
indebtedness on the ground that the various statements of account prepared
by petitioner did not show that Private respondent had an outstanding balance
of P115,000.00 which is the total amount of the checks he issued. It was
pointed out that while the various exhibits of petitioner showed various
accountabilities of private respondent, they did not satisfactorily establish the
amount of the outstanding indebtedness of private respondent. The appellate
court made much of the fact that the figures representing private respondent's
unpaid accounts found in the "Schedule of Outstanding Account" dated 31
January 1970 did not tally with the figures found in the statement which
showed private respondent's transactions with petitioner for the years 1969
and 1970; that there was no satisfactory explanation as to why the total
outstanding amount of P278,432.74 was still used as basis in the accounting
of 7 April 1972 considering that according to the table of transactions for the
year 1969 and 1970, the total unpaid account of private respondent amounted
to P239,794.57.
We have, however, examined the record and it shows that the 7 April 1972
Statement of Account had simply not been updated; that if we use as basis the
figure as of 31 January 1970 which is P278,432.74 and from it deduct
P38,638.17 which represents some of the payments subsequently made by
private respondent, the figure P239,794.57 will be obtained.
Also, the fact alone that the various statements of account had variances in
figures, simply did not mean that private respondent had no more financial
obligations to petitioner. It must be stressed that private respondent's account
with petitioner was a running or open one, which explains the varying figures in
each of the statements rendered as of a given date.
The appellate court erred in considering only the statements of account in
determining whether private respondent was indebted to petitioner under the
checks. By doing so, it failed to give due importance to the most telling piece of
evidence of private respondent's indebtedness the checks themselves
which he had issued.
Contrary to the view held by the Court of Appeals, this Court finds that the
checks are the all important evidence of petitioner's case; that these checks
clearly established private respondent's indebtedness to petitioner; that private
respondent was liable thereunder.
It is important to stress that a check which is regular on its face is
deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration and
every person whose signature appears thereon is deemed to have become a
party thereto for value. 1 Thus, the mere introduction of the instrument sued on
in evidence prima facie entitles the plaintiff to recovery. Further, the rule is
quite settled that a negotiable instrument is presumed to have been given or
indorsed for a sufficient consideration unless otherwise contradicted and
overcome by other competent evidence. 2
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, contrary to these established rules,
placed the burden of proving the existence of valuable consideration upon
petitioner. This cannot be countenanced; it was up to private respondent to
show that he had indeed issued the checks without sufficient consideration.
The Court considers that Private respondent was unable to rebut satisfactorily
this legal presumption. It must also be noted that those checks were issued
immediately after a letter demanding payment had been sent to private
respondent by petitioner Travel-On.
The fact that all the checks issued by private respondent to petitioner were
presented for payment by the latter would lead to no other conclusion than that
these checks were intended for encashment. There is nothing in the checks
themselves (or in any other document for that matter) that states otherwise.
We are unable to accept the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the checks here
involved were issued for "accommodation" and that accordingly private
respondent maker of those checks was not liable thereon to petitioner payee of
those checks.
In the first place, while the Negotiable Instruments Law does refer to
accommodation transactions, no such transaction was here shown. Section 29
of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides as follows:
Sec. 29. Liability of accommodation party. An
accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as
maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value
therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other
person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder
for value, notwithstanding such holder, at the time of taking the
instrument, knew him to be only an accommodation party.
In accommodation transactions recognized by the Negotiable
Instruments Law, an accommodating party lends his credit to the
accommodated party, by issuing or indorsing a check which is held by
a payee or indorsee as a holder in due course, who gave full value
therefor to the accommodated party. The latter, in other words,
receives or realizes full value which the accommodated party then
must repay to the accommodating party, unless of course the
accommodating party intended to make a donation to the
accommodated party. But the accommodating party is bound on the
check to the holder in due course who is necessarily a third party and
is not the accommodated party. Having issued or indorsed the check,
the accommodating party has warranted to the holder in due course
that he will pay the same according to its tenor. 3
In the case at bar, Travel-On was payee of all six (6) checks, it presented
these checks for payment at the drawee bank but the checks bounced. Travel-
On obviously was not an accommodated party; it realized no value on the
checks which bounced.
Travel-On was entitled to the benefit of the statutory presumption that it was a
holder in due course, 4 that the checks were supported by valuable
consideration. 5 Private respondent maker of the checks did not successfully
rebut these presumptions. The only evidence aliunde that private respondent
offered was his own self-serving uncorroborated testimony. He claimed that he
had issued the checks to Travel-On as payee to "accommodate" its General
Manager who allegedly wished to show those checks to the Board of Directors
of Travel-On to "prove" that Travel-On's account receivables were somehow
"still good." It will be seen that this claim was in fact a claim that the checks
were merely simulated, that private respondent did not intend to bind himself
thereon. Only evidence of the clearest and most convincing kind will suffice for
that purpose; 6 no such evidence was submitted by private respondent. The
latter's explanation was denied by Travel-On's General Manager; that
explanation, in any case, appears merely contrived and quite hollow to us.
Upon the other hand, the "accommodation" or assistance extended to Travel-
On's passengers abroad as testified by petitioner's General Manager involved,
not the accommodation transactions recognized by the NIL, but rather the
circumvention of then existing foreign exchange regulations by passengers
booked by Travel-On, which incidentally involved receipt of full consideration
by private respondent.
Thus, we believe and so hold that private respondent must be held liable on
the six (6) checks here involved. Those checks in themselves constituted
evidence of indebtedness of private respondent, evidence not successfully
overturned or rebutted by private respondent.
Since the checks constitute the best evidence of private respondent's liability
to petitioner Travel-On, the amount of such liability is the face amount of the
checks, reduced only by the P10,000.00 which Travel-On admitted in its
complaint to have been paid by private respondent sometime in March 1992.
The award of moral damages to Private respondent must be set aside, for the
reason that Petitioner's application for the writ of attachment rested on
sufficient basis and no bad faith was shown on the part of Travel-On. If anyone
was in bad faith, it was private respondent who issued bad checks and then
pretended to have "accommodated" petitioner's General Manager by assisting
her in a supposed scheme to deceive petitioner's Board of Directors and to
misrepresent Travel-On's financial condition.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT due course to the Petition for
Review on Certiorari and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated 22
October 1980 and the Resolution of 23 January 1981 of the Court of Appeals,
as well as the Decision dated 31 January 1975 of the trial court, and to enter a
new decision requiring private respondent Arturo S. Miranda to pay to
petitioner Travel-On the amount of P105,000.00 with legal interest thereon
from 14 June 1972, plus ten percent (10%) of the total amount due as
attorney's fees. Costs against Private respondent.
G.R. No. L-8844 December 16, 1914
FERNANDO MAULINI, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ANTONIO G. SERRANO, defendant-appellant.
R. M. Calvo for appellant.
Jose Arnaiz for appellees.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P3,000, with interest thereon at the
rate of
1 per cent month from September 5, 1912, together with the costs.
The action was brought by the plaintiff upon the contract of indorsement
alleged to have been made in his favor by the defendant upon the following
promissory note:
3,000. Due 5th of September, 1912.
We jointly and severally agree to pay to the order of Don Antonio G.
Serrano on or before the 5th day of September, 1912, the sum of three
thousand pesos (P3,000) for value received for commercial operations.
Notice and protest renounced. If the sum herein mentioned is not
completely paid on the 5th day of September, 1912, this instrument will
draw interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month from the date when
due until the date of its complete payment. The makers hereof agree to
pay the additional sum of P500 as attorney's fees in case of failure to
pay the note.
Manila, June 5, 1912.
(Sgd.) For Padern, Moreno & Co., by F. Moreno, member of the firm.
For Jose Padern, by F. Moreno. Angel Gimenez.
The note was indorsed on the back as follows:
Pay note to the order of Don Fernando Maulini, value received. Manila,
June 5, 1912. (Sgd.) A.G. Serrano.
The first question for resolution on this appeal is whether or not, under the
Negotiable Instruments Law, an indorser of a negotiable promissory note may,
in an action brought by his indorsee, show, by parol evidence, that the
indorsement was wholly without consideration and that, in making it, the
indorser acted as agent for the indorsee, as a mere vehicle of transfer of the
naked title from the maker to the indorsee, for which he received no
consideration whatever.
The learned trial court, although it received parol evidence on the subject
provisionally, held, on the final decision of the case, that such evidence was
not admissible to alter, very, modify or contradict the terms of the contract of
indorsement, and, therefore, refused to consider the evidence thus
provisionally received, which tended to show that, by verbal agreement
between the indorser and the indorsee, the indorser, in making the
indorsement, was acting as agent for the indorsee, as a mere vehicle for the
transference of naked title, and that his indorsement was wholly without
consideration. The court also held that it was immaterial whether there was a
consideration for the transfer or not, as the indorser, under the evidence
offered, was an accommodation indorser.
We are of the opinion that the trial court erred in both findings. 1awphil.net
In the first place, the consideration of a negotiable promissory note, or of any
of the contracts connected therewith, like that of any other written instrument,
is, between the immediate parties to the contract, open to attack, under proper
circumstances, for the purpose of showing an absolute lack or failure of
consideration.
It seems, according to the parol evidence provisionally admitted on the trial,
that the defendant was a broker doing business in the city of Manila and that
part of his business consisted in looking up and ascertaining persons who had
money to loan as well as those who desired to borrow money and, acting as a
mediary, negotiate a loan between the two. He had done much business with
the plaintiff and the borrower, as well as with many other people in the city of
Manila, prior to the matter which is the basis of this action, and was well known
to the parties interested. According to his custom in transactions of this kind,
and the arrangement made in this particular case, the broker obtained
compensation for his services of the borrower, the lender paying nothing
therefor. Sometimes this was a certain per cent of the sum loaned; at other
times it was a part of the interest which the borrower was to pay, the latter
paying 1 per cent and the broker per cent. According to the method
usually followed in these transactions, and the procedure in this particular
case, the broker delivered the money personally to the borrower, took note in
his own name and immediately transferred it by indorsement to the lender. In
the case at bar this was done at the special request of the indorsee and simply
as a favor to him, the latter stating to the broker that he did not wish his name
to appear on the books of the borrowing company as a lender of money and
that he desired that the broker take the note in his own name, immediately
transferring to him title thereto by indorsement. This was done, the note
being at once transferred to the lender.
According to the evidence referred to, there never was a moment when
Serrano was the real owner of the note. It was always the note of the indorsee,
Maulini, he having furnished the money which was the consideration for the
note directly to the maker and being the only person who had the slightest
interest therein, Serrano, the broker, acting solely as an agent, a vehicle by
which the naked title to the note passed fro the borrower to the lender. The
only payment that the broker received was for his services in negotiating the
loan. He was paid absolutely nothing for becoming responsible as an indorser
on the paper, nor did the indorsee lose, pay or forego anything, or alter his
position thereby.
Nor was the defendant an accommodation indorser. The learned trial court
quoted that provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law which defines an
accommodation party as "one who has signed the instrument as maker,
drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the
purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on
the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of
taking the instrument knew the same to be only an accommodation party." (Act
No. 2031, sec. 29.)
We are of the opinion that the trial court misunderstood this definition. The
accommodation to which reference is made in the section quoted is not one to
the person who takes the note that is, the payee or indorsee, but one to the
maker or indorser of the note. It is true that in the case at bar it was an
accommodation to the plaintiff, in a popular sense, to have the defendant
indorse the note; but it was not the accommodation described in the law, but,
rather, a mere favor to him and one which in no way bound Serrano. In cases
of accommodation indorsement the indorser makes the indorsement for the
accommodation of the maker. Such an indorsement is generally for the
purpose of better securing the payment of the note that is, he lend his name
to the maker, not to the holder. Putting it in another way: An accommodation
note is one to which the accommodation party has put his name, without
consideration, for the purpose of accommodating some other party who is to
use it and is expected to pay it. The credit given to the accommodation part is
sufficient consideration to bind the accommodation maker. Where, however,
an indorsement is made as a favor to the indorsee, who requests it, not the
better to secure payment, but to relieve himself from a distasteful situation, and
where the only consideration for such indorsement passes from the indorser to
the indorsee, the situation does not present one creating an accommodation
indorsement, nor one where there is a consideration sufficient to sustain an
action on the indorsement.
The prohibition in section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to
a case like the one before us. The purpose of that prohibition is to prevent
alternation, change, modification or contradiction of the terms of a written
instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of parol evidence, except in the
cases specifically named in the section. The case at bar is not one where the
evidence offered varies, alters, modifies or contradicts the terms of the
contract of indorsement admittedly existing. The evidence was not offered for
that purpose. The purpose was to show that no contract of indorsement ever
existed; that the minds of the parties never met on the terms of such contract;
that they never mutually agreed to enter into such a contract; and that there
never existed a consideration upon which such an agreement could be
founded. The evidence was not offered to vary, alter, modify, or contradict the
terms of an agreement which it is admitted existed between the parties, but
to deny that there ever existed any agreement whatever; to wipe out all
apparent relations between the parties, and not to vary, alter or contradict
the terms of a relation admittedly existing; in other words, the purpose of the
parol evidence was to demonstrate, not that the indorser did not intend to
make the particular indorsement which he did make; not that he did not intend
to make the indorsement in the terms made; but, rather, to deny the reality of
any indorsement; that a relation of any kind whatever was created or existed
between him and the indorsee by reason of the writing on the back of the
instrument; that no consideration ever passed to sustain an indorsement of
any kind whatsoever.
The contention has some of the appearances of a case in which an indorser
seeks prove forgery. Where an indorser claims that his name was forged, it is
clear that parol evidence is admissible to prove that fact, and, if he proves it, it
is a complete defense, the fact being that the indorser never made any such
contract, that no such relation ever existed between him and the indorsee, and
that there was no consideration whatever to sustain such a contract. In the
case before us we have a condition somewhat similar. While the indorser does
not claim that his name was forged, he does claim that it was obtained from
him in a manner which, between the parties themselves, renders, the contract
as completely inoperative as if it had been forged.
Parol evidence was admissible for the purpose named. 1aw phil.net
There is no contradiction of the evidence offered by the defense and received
provisionally by the court. Accepting it as true the judgment must be reversed.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed on the
merits; no special finding as to costs.
G.R. No. L-17845 April 27, 1967
INTESTATE ESTATE OF VICTOR SEVILLA. SIMEON SADAYA, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO SEVILLA, respondent.
Belen Law Offices for petitioner.
Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
On March 28, 1949, Victor Sevilla, Oscar Varona and Simeon Sadaya
executed, jointly and severally, in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, or
its order, a promissory note for P15,000.00 with interest at 8% per annum,
payable on demand. The entire, amount of P15,000.00, proceeds of the
promissory note, was received from the bank by Oscar Varona alone. Victor
Sevilla and Simeon Sadaya signed the promissory note as co-makers only as
a favor to Oscar Varona. Payments were made on account. As of June 15,
1950, the outstanding balance stood P4,850.00. No payment thereafter made.
On October 6, 1952, the bank collected from Sadaya the foregoing balance
which, together with interest, totalled P5,416.12. Varona failed to reimburse
Sadaya despite repeated demands.
Victor Sevilla died. Intestate estate proceedings were started in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Special Proceeding No. 1518. Francisco Sevilla was
named administrator.
In Special Proceeding No. 1518, Sadaya filed a creditor's claim for the above
sum of P5,746.12, plus attorneys fees in the sum of P1,500.00. The
administrator resisted the claim upon the averment that the deceased Victor
Sevilla "did not receive any amount as consideration for the promissory note,"
but signed it only "as surety for Oscar Varona".
On June 5, 1957, the trial court issued an order admitting the claim of Simeon
Sadaya in the amount of P5,746.12, and directing the administrator to pay the
same from any available funds belonging to the estate of the deceased Victor
Sevilla.
The motion to reconsider having been overruled, the administrator
appealed.1 The Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on July, 15, 1960,
voted to set aside the order appealed from and to disapprove and disallow
"appellee's claim of P5,746.12 against the intestate estate."
The case is now before this Court on certiorari to review the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
Sadaya's brief here seeks reversal of the appellate court's decision and prays
that his claim "in the amount of 50% of P5,746.12, or P2,873.06, against the
intestate estate of the deceased Victor Sevilla," be approved.
1. That Victor Sevilla and Simeon Sadaya were joint and several
accommodation makers of the 15,000.00-peso promissory note in favor of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, need not be essayed. As such accommodation
the makers, the individual obligation of each of them to the bank is no different
from, and no greater and no less than, that contract by Oscar Varona. For,
while these two did not receive value on the promissory note, they executed
the same with, and for the purpose of lending their names to, Oscar Varona.
Their liability to the bank upon the explicit terms of the promissory note is joint
and several.2 Better yet, the bank could have pursued its right to collect the
unpaid balance against either Sevilla or Sadaya. And the fact is that one of the
last two, Simeon Sadaya, paid that balance.
2. It is beyond debate that Simeon Sadaya could have sought reimbursement
of the total amount paid from Oscar Varona. This is but right and just. Varona
received full value of the promissory note.3 Sadaya received nothing therefrom.
He paid the bank because he was a joint and several obligor. The least that
can be said is that, as between Varona and Sadaya, there is an implied
contract of indemnity. And Varona is bound by the obligation to reimburse
Sadaya.4
3. The common creditor, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, now out of the
way, we first look into the relations inter se amongst the three consigners of
the promissory note. Their relations vis-a-vis the Bank, we repeat, is that of
joint and several obligors. But can the same thing be said about the relations
of the three consigners, in respect to each other?
Surely enough, as amongst the three, the obligation of Varona and Sevilla to
Sadaya who paid can not be joint and several. For, indeed, had payment been
made by Oscar Varona, instead of Simeon Sadaya, Varona could not have
had reason to seek reimbursement from either Sevilla or Sadaya, or both. After
all, the proceeds of the loan went to Varona and the other two received nothing
therefrom.
4. On principle, a solidary accommodation maker who made payment
has the right to contribution, from his co-accommodation maker, in the
absence of agreement to the contrary between them, and subject to conditions
imposed by law. This right springs from an implied promise between the
accommodation makers to share equallythe burdens that may ensue from their
having consented to stamp their signatures on the promissory note.5 For
having lent their signatures to the principal debtor, they clearly placed
themselves in so far as payment made by one may create liability on the
other in the category of mere joint grantors of the former.6 This is as it
should be. Not one of them benefited by the promissory note. They stand on
the same footing. In misfortune, their burdens should be equally spread.
Manresa, commenting on Article 1844 of the Civil Code of Spain,7 which is
substantially reproduced in Article 20738 of our Civil Code, on this point stated:
Otros, como Pothier, entienden que, si bien el principio es evidente
enestricto concepto juridico, se han extremado sus consecuencias
hasta el punto de que estas son contrarias, no solo a la logica, sino
tambien a la equidad, que debe ser el alma del Derecho, como ha
dicho Laurent.
Esa accion sostienen no nace de la fianza, pues, en efecto, el
hecho de afianzar una misma deuda no crea ningun vinculo juridico, ni
ninguna razon de obligar entre los fiadores, sino que trae, por el
contrario, su origen de una acto posterior, cual es el pago de toda la
deuda realizado por uno de ellos, y la equdad, no permite que los
denias fiadores, que igualmente estaban estaban obligos a dicho
pago, se aprovenchen de ese acto en perjuico del que lo realozo.
Lo cierto es que esa accion concedida al fiador nace, si, del hecho del
pago, pero es consecuencia del beneficio o del derecho de division,
como tenemos ya dicho. En efecto, por virtud de esta todos los
cofiadores vienen obligados a contribuir al pago de parte que a cada
uno corresponde. De ese obligacion, contraida por todos ellos, se
libran los que no han pagado por consecuencia del acto realizado por
el que pago, y si bien este no hizo mas que cumplir el deber que el
contracto de fianza le imponia de responder de todo el debito
cuando no limito su obligacion a parte alguna del mismo, dicho acto
redunda en beneficio de los otros cofiadores los cuales se aprovechan
de el para quedar desligados de todo compromiso con el acreedor.9
5. And now, to the requisites before one accommodation maker can seek
reimbursement from a co-accommodation maker.
By Article 18 of the Civil Code in matters not covered by the special laws, "their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code". Nothing extant in
the Negotiable Instruments Law would define the right of one accommodation
maker to seek reimbursement from another. Perforce, we must go to the Civil
Code. 1wph1.t
Because Sevilla and Sadaya, in themselves, are but co-guarantors of Varona,
their case comes within the ambit of Article 2073 of the Civil Code which
reads:
ART. 2073. When there are two or more guarantors of the same debtor
and for the same debt, the one among them who has paid may
 demand of each of the others the share which is proportionally owing
from him.
If any of the guarantors should be insolvent, his share shall be borne
by the others, including the payer, in the same proportion.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable, unless the
payment has been made in virtue of a judicial demand or unless the
principal debtor is insolvent.10
As Mr. Justice Street puts it: "[T]hat article deals with the situation which arises
when one surety has paid the debt to the creditor and is seeking contribution
from his cosureties."11
Not that the requirements in paragraph 3, Article 2073, just quoted, are devoid
of cogent reason. Says Manresa:12
c) Requisitos para el ejercicio del derecho de reintegro o de reembolso
derivado de la corresponsabilidad de los cofiadores.
La tercera de las prescripciones que comprende el articulo se
refiere a los requisitos que deben concurrir para que pueda tener lugar
lo dispuesto en el mismo. Ese derecho que concede al fiador para
reintegrarse directamente de los fiadores de lo que pago por ellos en
vez de dirigir su reclamacion contra el deudor, es un beneficio
otorgado por la ley solo ell dos casos determinados, cuya justificacion
resulta evidenciada desde luego; y esa limitacion este debidamente
aconsejada por una razon de prudencia que no puede desconocerse,
cual es la de evitar que por la mera voluntad de uno de los cofiadores
pueda hacerse surgir la accion de reintegro contra los demas en
prejuicio de los mismos.
por el deudor y el del reintegro por los cofiadores,
indudablemente optaria siempre y en todo caso por el segundo,
puesto que mucha mas garantias de solvencia y mucha mas
seguridad del cobro ha de encontrar en los fiadores que en el deudor;
y en la practica quedaria reducido el primero a la indemnizacion por el
deudor a los confiadores que hubieran hecho el reintegro, obligando a
estos, sin excepcion alguna, a soportar siempre los gastos y las
molestias que anteriormente homos indicado. Y para evitar estos
perjuicios, la ley no ha podido menos de reducir el ejercicio de ese
derecho a los casos en que absolutamente sea indispensable.13
6. All of the foregoing postulate the following rules: (1) A joint and several
accommodation maker of a negotiable promissory note may demand from the
principal debtor reimbursement for the amount that he paid to the payee; and
(2) a joint and several accommodation maker who pays on the said promissory
note may directly demand reimbursement from his co-accommodation maker
without first directing his action against the principal debtor provided that (a) he
made the payment by virtue of a judicial demand, or (b) a principal debtor is
insolvent.
The Court of Appeals found that Sadaya's payment to the bank "was made
voluntarily and without any judicial demand," and that "there is an absolute
absence of evidence showing that Varona is insolvent". This combination of
fact and lack of fact epitomizes the fatal distance between payment by Sadaya
and Sadaya's right to demand of Sevilla "the share which is proportionately
owing from him."
For the reasons given, the judgment of the Court of Appeals under review is
hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

El perjuicio que con tal motivo puede inferirse a los cofiadores es bien
notorio, pues teniendo en primer termino el fiador que paga por
el deudor el derecho de indemnizacion contra este, sancionado por el
art. 1,838, es de todo punto indudable que ejercitando esta
accion pueden quedar libres de toda responsabilidad los demas
cofiadores si, a consecuencia de ella, indemniza el fiado a aquel en los
terminos establecidos en el expresado articulo. Por el contrario de
prescindir de dicho derecho el fiador, reclamando de los confiadores
en primer lugar el oportuno reintegro, estos en tendrian mas remedio
que satisfacer sus ductares respectivas, repitiendo despues por ellas
contra el deudor con la imposicion de las molestias y gastos
consiguientes.

No es aventurado asegurar que si el fiador que paga pudiera

libremente utilizar uno u otro de dichos derechos, el de indemnizacion