THIRD DIVISION answered that they were going home.

She told him that they were already

[G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997] on the opposite direction because her grandparents house is at Binuangan,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNULFO while their route was going towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an opposite
ASTORGA, accused-appellant. direction. Notwithstanding the assertion of Yvonne that they were on the
DECISION wrong direction, accused placed his hands on her shoulder and dragged
her. She cried and protested that she must go home. Accused did not heed
PANGANIBAN, J.: her plea and while she was forced to walk she continued crying.

Actual detention or locking up is the primary element of kidnapping. If While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described,
the evidence does not adequately prove this element, the accused cannot somewhere near the Luponlupon bridge they met some group of
be held liable for kidnapping. In the present case, the prosecution merely men. Having met on their opposite direction, the two, were noticed by the
proved that appellant forcibly dragged the victim toward a place only he group of youngsters. The group were bound to Maco Catholic Church to see
knew. There being no actual detention or confinement, the appellant may be a drama. Having met the two and as noticed by the group accused keep [sic]
convicted only of grave coercion. on looking back at them. The group were suspicious about the man who was
The Case bringing a child. The group decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly
The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being overtaken, he carried
Arnulfo Astorga challenging the March 31, 1993 Decision[1] of the Regional the victim and ran. They were chased. After a distance of half a kilometer
Trial Court of Tagum, Davao convicting him of kidnapping. they were overtaken.
In an Information[2] dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 8243, Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was charged with violation of
Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in
follows: chasing, asked the accused where they were bound. He answered towards
Binuangan. The group noticed something suspicious because their
destination was already towards Tagum which is an opposite direction to
That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province Binuangan.
of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, a When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan one of
minor, 8 years of age, thereby depriving her of her liberty against her will, to those who chased knew the family. He got from the accused Yvonne who
the damage and prejudice of said offended party. showed some resistance. Nevertheless, the group brought her home at
Binuangan. Likewise, accused was also brought by them to Yvonnes
home. The house of accused and Yvonne were five (5) meters
Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly assisted by away. Accused wanted to talk to the parents of the victim, but he was driven
[3]
his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits by her aunt and adviced [sic] to leave otherwise he will be stabbed by
ensued. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision[4] reads as follows:[5] Yvonnes father. He left and never talked with the family.
Evidence for the Defense
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of accused ARNULFO The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the Appellants
[8]
ASTORGA having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Brief, dated December 10, 1993:
Article 267 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, [he] is hereby sentenced
to Reclusion Perpetua to be served at the National Penitentiary, The defense consisted of the testimonies of Arbeth Nalcot and the accused-
[Muntinlupa]. appellant himself.

This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the penalty Arbeth Nalcot, a resident of Tagum, Davao, testified tht [sic] in the afternoon
imposed.[6] of December 29, 1991, she was at the Municipal Hall of Maco, Davao. She
The Facts saw Astorga with two (2) companions. They were drinking Red Horse and
Evidence for the Prosecution were already drunk. When they finished drinking, she went with Astorga to
the latters house. (TSN, pp. 7-8 and 18, March 23, 1993). The house of
The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision of the Astorga is about 5 meters away from the house of the complainant[.] Yvonne
trial court, as follows:[7] came and asked money from the accused to buy candy. The two went
together and she was left behind. She told them to hurry up. When they
Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies categorically assert that failed to return, she looked for them, but because it was already dark, she
around 6:30 P.M. children of neighbors were near the store of the did not find them. She went back to the house of the accused. (Ibid., pp. 10-
grandparents of Yvonne Traya. 11).

Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle was Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner testified that
used. The daughter and nephew of her aunt Bebeth were quarelling [sic] at around 1:00 P.M. of December 29, 1991, he arrived at Maco from
Tagum.Upon arrival his two friends, Vicvic and Anding were already at his
about the possession of a flashlight until the glass got lost. Accused or Boy
Astorga, went near and asked her daughter Jane what happened. Glenda home. They decided to drink, hence they proceeded to Adecor Cottage and
or Bebeth grabbed her baby and went home. drank two gallons of Tuba. At around 2:00 P.M., they were at the market
place and drink beer grande. At 5:00 P.M. on the same day, the three
proceeded near the municipal hall and with some persons, they again
Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and continued their drinking spree taking up Red Horse wine. (Decision, p. 3).
accused immediately grabbed and hold [sic] her hand. Accused placed his
hand on her shoulder and covered his [sic] mouth.
At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. Yvonne
approached him and asked him money to buy candy. He told her that they
Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991 when she was will buy.They were not able to buy because the two stores where they went
brought by the accused allegedly to buy candy. Some stores were closed; were already closed. (TSN, pp. 12 and 13, March 24, 1993). He took her for
others were opened. Accused never went inside the store to buy a stroll for his drunkeness [sic] to subside. They walked inside the school
candy. Instead she [sic] held and dragged Yvonne until they went inside the premises which was about 20 meters away from the second store. They
compound of Maco Elementary School. They were walking inside the went out of the school compound going towards Lupon-lupon because due
perimeter fence, [while the accused was] holding closely the child. Later, to his drunkneness [sic], he thought it was the way towards their house. (Ibid,
there being no person around the gate, accused brought her out to the pp. 14-15) They reached Lupon-lupon bridge, crossed it twice thinking that
highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum. it was the bridge near the municipal hall. After reaching Purok, they met
several persons, he was asked were (sic) they were heading, and he
Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio answered to Tagumpay, but he was told that they [sic] way was already
Binuangan, Maco. She asked him where they were going and accused going to Tagum. He requested those persons to guide them to
Tagumpay. They asked him who was the child he was carrying. He
answered that it was Trayas child. (Ibid, pp. 16-17). He was carrying the
child because he was already crying as she already wanted to go home. The
group of persons, men and women, guided them. Yvonne was being held by
the women. They arrived at Yvonnes house. He talked to the auntie of the
child and told her that he would converse with her but he was advised to go
away because the father of Yvonne might hack him. So he went home. (Ibid,
pp. 18-19)
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following discussion:[9]
Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he took Yvonne
to buy candy, he strolled with her so that his drunkenness be subsided.
III
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that appellant
had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya.
In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and the legal characterization of the acts imputed to him.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only
of grave coercion, not kidnapping.
First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are not worthy of credence because they were inconsistent and
improbable. He cites the following:

All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she categorically Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the accused told Yvonne
declared that she did not smell liquor on the accused. that they will buy candy. She sensed that the accused was drunk. (TSN, pp.
10-11, March 10, 1993). These testimonies were contradicted by Yvonne
Traya when she declared that Glenda Chavez had already went [sic] inside
His defense of intoxication has no leg to stand [on].
their house when [the] accused told her that they will buy candy (TSN, pp.
10, March 16, 1993). She testified that she did not smell liquor on the
Consider these facts. accused.(Decision, pp. 3-4)

Never did he present Vicvic and Anding to corroborate that he was Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the accused at a
intoxicated that afternoon and at dusk because of their drinking spree from distance of 2 fathoms and they [sic] him about 15 to 20 meters (TSN, p. 35,
1:00 P.M. until 5:00 P.M. March 10, 1993). Arnel Fabila, on the other hand, testified that they overtook
the accused after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10,
March 11, 1993).
He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they noticed his actions
suspicious bringing with him a child, he walked fast dragging Yvonne. When
he noticed that the group of youngsters were chasing him, he carried Yvonne Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast carrying her
and ran until they covered a distance of half a kilometer in chasing them, because she was heavy. (TSN, p. 19, March 16, 1993). However, Arnel
until they had overtaken him. Fabila declared that they were able to overtake the accused only after
chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993)
meaning accused was running fast.[11]
If he was that intoxicated, being under stupor and weakened by liquor, he
could not ran that fast carrying Yvonne for half a kilometer.
We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses
concerning minor details and collateral matters, like the examples cited by
Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony asserted that appellant, do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of their
she did not smell liquor on the accused.
declarations. These inconsistencies reinforce, rather than weaken, their
credibility, for different witnesses of startling events usually perceive things
Accused, naivety [sic], that because of his intoxication, he got lost and was differently.[12] Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cannot
not able to proceed with Yvonne to Binuangan was a shallow afterthought. be expected to be uniform to the last detail.
The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at that
It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already going at opposite time allegedly contradicted Yvonnes statement that the accused did not
direction from home. Instead they were heeding towards Tagum. Accused smell of liquor. This does not detract from the credibility of either
did not change course. witness. Yvonne, then an eight-year-old child,[13] and her Aunt Glenda, then
twenty-seven years old,[14] do not have the same experiences or level of
xxx xxx xxx maturity; hence, their perceptions of events differ.More important, whether
the accused was drunk or not is an insignificant detail that does not
substantially affect the testimonies of these witnesses.
Again, not only force was employed in having Yvonne as captive by
dragging, slapping her mouth and was holding her tight, but accused also Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses estimate of the distance
used psychological means of scaring her about a red eyed ghost. covered by the men who chased appellant does not render their testimonies
incredible.[15] Quite the contrary, such discrepancy shows their candor and
sincerity, demonstrating that their testimonies were unrehearsed.[16] Yvonne
Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her liberty and was testified that when appellant noticed the group of men following them, he
by force prevented to go home to her parents. carried her and ran. Yvonnes testimony is in accord with that of Arnel Fabila
-- a member of the group who chased appellant -- that they were able to
[17]
On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from accused to buy overtake appellant after chasing him half a kilometer.
candy. She also denied as testified by defense witness Arbeth Nalcot that
she went to the house of the accused on 29 December 1991 or on any other Appellants challenge to the credibility of the prosecution account is
dates to ask money from Astorga for candy. also premised on the alleged failure of the trial court to consider the following
points:[18]

Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his off tangent
and incredible theory of drunkardness. His alleged being lost in the direction
of Binuangan in spite of Yvonnes insistence and that of the person they met
that he was on the wrong way considering that there are no criss crossing
roads except the highway, is preposterous.
The Issues
Appellant imputes the following errors to the trial court: [10]
I the two were walking casually along the highway when he first saw them;
The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecutions
witnesses which were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.
II
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that Yvonne
Traya was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty.
a) that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused casually moved
around the school premises, as if they were strolling; That when they were
already in the highway, they were also walking openly and casually until they
were met by a group of youngster[s].
Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecutions witnesses, corroborated the fact that
b) That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged victim will not be
seen or noticed by the people travelling or those persons residing along the
highway if it was true that the accused was dragging her and she was
continuously crying from her residence up to a distance of more than one 2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the
kilometer; latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances
c) That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at a very slow
is present:
pace; a distance of barely a kilometer for a period of more than two hours;
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or
(b) That it is committed simulating public authority; or
d) That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking different kinds of (c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
intoxicating liquors from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., causing him to be confused kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
on which way they should take in going home. (d) That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer.
e) That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters who allegedly The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses
rescued the child, nor was immediately brought to the municipal hall whichthe terms lockup (encerrar) rather than kidnap (secuestrar or raptar). Lockup
was just near the house of the victim for the filing of the necessary charge;
is included in the broader term of detention, which refers not only to the
this [sic] actuations only confirm the fact that the accused merely sought their
placing of a person in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any
help in guiding them home, and other deprivation of liberty which does not necessarily involve locking
up.[28] Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and
f) That it took more than one week for the complainant and her parents to enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases
file the case at the Fiscals Office. of conflict with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised
Administrative Code.[29]

We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied by the A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses
one-week delay in the filing of the complaint. It has been held that delay or ineluctably shows the absence of locking up. Victim Yvonne Traya
vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily weaken the testified:[30]
credibility of a witness where such delay is satisfactorily explained. [19] In the Q. And after that what happened next?
present case, one week was reasonable, considering that the victim was a A. When Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was already
resident of Binuangan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao. bringing her child and bringing with her candle. And
Arnulfo Astorga told me thatwe will buy candy, sir.
Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or bring him Q. And after that?
to the municipal hall, because they deemed it more urgent at the time to A. And while I was not answering the question he immediately
rescue Yvonne and to bring her home, which they actually did.[20] There is grabbed me.
no settled rule on how a group of young men should react upon seeing a xxx xxx xxx
young girl snatched by an older man. Verily, violence is not the only normal Q. And after that, after he held your hand, what did he do next?
reaction of young men who see a girl being forcibly taken. A. He placed his hands on my shoulder and also covering [sic]
my mouth.
Appellants claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and walking xxx xxx xxx
casually does not negate the fact that Yvonne was deprived of her will. As Q. And after that what did he do next?
noted by the trial court, appellant used physical force and psychological A. He brought me to the school.
[21]
means in restraining her. Despite her young age, Yvonne was able to Q. What school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is the name of
clearly recount the events that transpired on that fateful night. the school?
Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people travelling A. Maco Central Elementary School.
or living along the highway should have noticed appellant and Yvonne. The Q. How far is Maco Central Elementary School from your
fact is that a group of men actually noticed and ultimately chased them. house?
All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long A. A little bit near.
settled rule that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses Q. When Boy Astorga brought you to school, was it dark?
should be accorded great respect on appeal.[22] A. Yes, sir.
Second Issue: No Motive to Kidnap Q. Exactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy Astorga
Petitioner contends that [t]here was no evidence presented to prove bring you?
why the accused should kidnap Yvonne Traya. He submits that the A. Inside the gate, sir.
prosecution had failed to prove [any] motive to support the alleged Q. And once inside the gate what did he do to you?
kidnapping incident, thus, making the theory of the defense more credible A. We were going around the school?
and believable.[23] xxx xxx xxx
The contention is insignificant. Motive is not an element of the Q. Do you know why you were going around the school?
crime. Furthermore, motive becomes material only when the evidence is A. Yes, sir.
circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime Q. Why, what did he do?
has been committed or whether the accused has committed it.Indeed, A. We were going around and when he saw that there is no
motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the person in the gate we passed at that gate.
[24]
culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the Q. And where did he go after passing that gate?
identity of appellant is not in question. He himself admitted having taken A. Towards Lupon-lupon, sir.
Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School. xxx xxx xxx
Third Issue: Kidnapping or Coercion? Q. What about you, did you talk to him?
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one essential A. I asked him where we were going and he told me that we are
element of kidnapping -- the fact of detention or the deprivation of liberty. The going home and I told him that this is not the way to our
solicitor general counters that deprivation of liberty is not limited to house, and we did not pass this way. (Witness gesturing
imprisoning or placing the victim in an enclosure. Citing People vs. a certain direction).
Crisostomo,[25] he argues: Q. And so when you said that that is not the way, when you said
(T)he act proven in the record constitutes (kidnapping). It is no argument that is not the way because our house is towards
against this conclusion that the accused deprived the offended party of her Binuangan...
liberty without placing her in an inclosure; because illegal detention, as By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do
defined and punished in our Code, may consist not only in imprisoning a you know to what direction is going to Lupon-lupon, to
person but also in detaining her or depriving her in any manner of her what place is Lupon-lupon going to?
liberty.[26] A. Yes, sir.
We agree with appellants contention this time. Q. Where?
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, [27] the elements of A. Going to my place.
kidnapping are as follows: Q. Do you know the place where it was going? What is that
1. That the offender is a private individual. place?
A. On the road going to Tagum.
 Q. Now, what about your house, where is it going?
A. To Binuangan.
Q. And so when you ... what did he do next when you said that
is not the place going to your house?
A. We continued walking and he also placed his hands on my
shoulder and dragged me, sir.
Q. What about you, what did you do when he was dragging you?
A. I was crying, sir.
Q. Did you say any word to him when you were crying?
A. Yes, I told him that we are going home.
Q. And what did Boy Astorga say?
A. He told me that we will be going home, and told me not to
make any noise because if I will make any noise we will
be lost on our way.
Q. And so, what did you do?
A. I continued crying, sir.
Q. And after that, what happened?
A. We continued walking and we met a person and he asked
Boy Astorga where we are going, sir.
Q. What did that man ask Boy Astorga?
A. The man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and Boy
Astorga answered, to Binuangan, but the man continued
to say that this way is going to Tagum and not to
Binuangan any more.
Q. What else did the man ask, if any?
A. I further said that we will already leave, and we will be the
ones to go to Binuangan, and after that, Boy Astorga put
me down because he urinated. So, at that instance, I ran,
but, after he urinated, he already took hold of me not to
run any more because there is a ghost.
Q. When you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you when
he urinated, where did you run?
A. Towards Binuangan, sir.
Q. Towards the direction of your house?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you were overtaken again by Boy Astorga?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he do to you when you were overtaken by Boy
Astorga?
A. He took hold of me again and he told me, he threatened me
that there is [sic] a red eyes but I answered him that is
[sic] not a red eyes of the ghost but that is a light coming
from the vehicle.
Q. Now, what happened next?
A. He placed a necklace on me, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
A. He was dragging me and I was crying when he was dragging
me.
Q. While you were being dragged did you make any plea to
him?
A. Yes, I told him that I will go home.
Q. And what did he say?
A. He said that we will go home but I know [sic] that that place
we are [sic] heading to is [sic] not a way to our home but
it is [sic] the opposite.
Q. So, what happened next?
A. He continued dragging me and after that we met plenty of
persons and I shouted for help and at that instance, he
slapped my mouth and after a few steps he already
carried me.
xxx xxx xxx
A. He continued walking and I also continued crying and I told
him that I want to go home and he told me that we are
heading towards home, but I told him that the way we are
going to is not the way to our house.
Q. By the way, when you shouted [for] help, was it loud?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, what happened next?
A. He continued running and he stopped several vehicles but
they did not stop, so, we just continued walking.
Q. After that, what happened next?
A. He moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back and
he saw that persons were already chasing him and after
that he carried me and ran.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were
constantly on the move. They went to Maco Elementary School and strolled Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. -
on the school grounds. When nobody was at the Luponlupon bridge, - When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
appellant took the victim to the highway leading to Tagum, Davao. At that
time, Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to go home to
Binuangan, but appellant ignored her pleas and continued walking her
toward the wrong direction. Later on, the group of Witness Arnel Fabila
spotted them. Appellant Astorga carried the victim and ran, but Fabilas
group chased and caught up with them.
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or
restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of
kidnapping.[31]Appellants apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her
will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellants plan did not materialize,
however, because Fabilas group chanced upon them. The evidence does
not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually
detained her. Appellants forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew
cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of
Yvonne. There was no lockup. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted
of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under
Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three
elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something
not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will,
be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce
intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party;
and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no
right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority
of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right.[32] When appellant forcibly
dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to
Binuangan.Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from
going home, and we cannot find any.
The present case should be distinguished from People vs. Rosemarie
de la Cruz. [33] Here, Appellant Astorga tricked Yvonne to go with him by
telling her that they were going to buy candy. When Yvonne recognized the
deception, she demanded that she be brought home, but appellant refused
and instead dragged her toward the opposite direction against her will. While
it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga intended to detain or lock up Yvonne,
there is no question that he forced her to go with him against her will.
In Rosemarie de la Cruz, Victim Whiazel voluntarily went with accused.
Furthermore, the accused in that case failed to consummate the crime of
kidnapping because of the timely intervention of the victims neighbor. Thus,
the Court held in that case:[34]
In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the
victim of the latters liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by
indubitable proof (People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by
the trial court, and maintained by the People, as consummating the crime of
kidnapping in this case are those when accused-appellant held the victims
hand and refused to let go when the victim asked to go over to her neighbor,
who by then already saw what was happening. This happened for only a
very brief span of time and the evidentiary record shows that there were a
good number of people present at that time, that a guard was stationed at
the gate, and that there was at least a teacher nearby. The child could have
just as easily shouted for help. While it does not take much to scare the wits
out of a small child like Whiazel, under the attendant circumstances, we
cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of her liberty. It must
further be noted that up to that brief moment when Cecilia saw them, and
the child asked to be let go, the victim had gone with accused-appellant
voluntarily. Without any further act reinforcing the inference that the victim
may have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance of her minority,
the Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the case at bar was
consummated. While it is a well-entrenched rule that factual findings of trial
courts, especially when they concern the appreciation of testimony of
witnesses, are accorded great respect, by exception, when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the case at bar, the
Court may choose to substitute its own findings (People vs. Padua, 215
SCRA 266 [1992]).
The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga
contains sufficient allegations constituting grave coercion, the elements of
which were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Hence, a conviction for
said crime is appropriate under Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1988 Rules on
Criminal Procedure:
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
offenses as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that
which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved.

At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991, the
penalty imposed by law for grave coercion was arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding five hundred pesos.[35] The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not
apply here because the maximum penalty does not exceed one
year.[36] However, appellant has been imprisoned for more than six (6)
months. He has more than served the penalty imposable for such an
offense.[37]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY

GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED only of grave coercion and is
sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor. Unless he is being detained
for any other valid cause, his IMMEDIATE RELEASE is herewith ordered,
considering that he has more than served the maximum penalty imposable
upon him. The director of prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within
five days from receipt of this Decision, of the actual date the appellant is
released. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

 water, and passing by her house on his way to the road. She and appellant
Republic of the Philippines used to be friends until the incident.14
SUPREME COURT
Manila
At about past 6 oclock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his
FIRST DIVISION
eight-year-old daughter CCC to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes.
G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011
AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
He thought she was watching television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay
vs.
[Rita].15
HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of
Tanduay Rum.16 At the store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap. 17 He
PEREZ, J.:
was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants.18 All of them left the
store at the same time.19 Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the
alibi cannot prevail over the victims positive identification of the accused as direction of the "lower area or place."20
the perpetrator of the crime.1 For it to prosper, the court must be convinced
that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to have been
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of
at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.2
short pants21 when he held her hand while on the road near the store.22 They
walked towards the rice field near the house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction Perocho [the Perochos].23 There he made her lie down on harrowed ground,
has become final and executory only after his disqualification from availing removed her panty and boxed her on the chest. 24 Already half-naked from
of the benefits of suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has waist down,25 he mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed apart,
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the pushed his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement.26 She
right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with felt pain and cried.27 Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a Perochos.28 She, in turn, went straight home crying.29
Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, Appropriating
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs. 30 She was
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."
without slippers.31 He found her face greasy.32 There was mud on her head
and blood was oozing from the back of her head.33 He checked for any injury
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto and found on her neck a contusion that was already turning black.34 She had
seeks before this Court the reversal of the judgment of his conviction. 4 no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her vagina.35 AAA
told him that appellant brought her from the store36 to the grassy area at the
back of the house of the Perochos;37 that he threw away her pair of slippers,
The Facts
removed her panty, choked her and boxed her breast; 38 and that he
proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.39
In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos.40 He asked
of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
the appellant what he did to AAA.41Appellant replied that he was asked to
buy rum at the store and that AAA followed him.42 FFF went home to check
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 oclock in the on his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked again,44 and
evening more or less, at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx boxed him.45
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with
lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still
knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
watching television at the house of Rita.46AAA and her mother MMM
arrived.47 AAA was crying.48 Julito pitied her, embraced her, and asked what
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped her. 49 Julito left
minority, the victim being only five years old.7 and found appellant at the Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you
really rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his
question.51Appellants aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen were
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.8 During pre-trial,9 the coming to which the appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash
defense admitted the existence of the following documents: (1) birth the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees." 52 Julito did found the elbows and
certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3 December 1997; (2)
knees of appellant with dirt.53
police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon
presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have
the incident blottered.54 FFF also had AAA undergo a physical check up at
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to the municipal health center.55 Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health
prove their respective versions of the story. Physician, issued a medical certificate56 dated 29 January 2003. It reads:

Evidence for the Prosecution Injuries seen are as follows:

The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki
[Julito]12 may be summarized in the following manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFFs house
is along the road. That of appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters
from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass by FFFs house, the
frequency of which the latter describes to be "every minute [and] every hour."
Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no
grudge against appellant prior to the incident.13
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees
him all the time playing at the basketball court near her house, fetching
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish
mucoid-like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 oclock and 9 oclock position
Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted herself to AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 oclock in the evening. This time, he
another examination at the provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his daughter.85
Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the provincial hospital,
attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,86 the
2003,58 the pertinent portion of which reads:
dispositive portion of which reads:

P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except

No. 6 and 7 there is no bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)59
Evidence for the Defense
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to
death and orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs87

Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered
story. To corroborate his testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt evidence stating that appellant was apparently born on 1 March 1985 and
Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he was at the Perochos at the that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was committed
time of the commission of the crime.60 Luzvilla even went further to state that on 28 January 2003.88 The trial court appreciated the evidence and reduced
she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road.61 In addition, the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.89 Thus:
Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-law of appellants aunt,
Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape incident was
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon
revealed.63
the accused is amended in order to consider the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused,
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
house stands at the back of FFFs house.64He denied that there was a need
to pass by the house of FFF in order to access the road or to fetch
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for
water.65 He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked for FFF, 66 and
its disposition in view of the ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules
whenever he was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always
67 of the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
approached him.
Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment.90
At about 8 oclock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the
Perochos to attend a birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors,
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial
including appellant and his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were
court with the following MODIFICATIONS:
gathered together in a drinking session, appellants uncle sent him to the
store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the
house, he was able to return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from
time because he had a watch .68 six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim in
Appellants aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her
the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
house attending the birthday party; and that appellant went out between 6
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.91
and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She recalled
that appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She also observed that
appellants white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean. 69 On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the
appellants Notice of Appeal.92 This Court required the parties to
70 simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs. 93 Both parties
At 6:30 in the evening, Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant
manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in their
at the kitchen having a drink with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the
71 respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement.94
visitors. She went out to relieve herself at the side of the tree beside the
72
road next to the house of the Perochos. From where she was, she saw
Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO
AAA.73 AAAs face was covered and she was wiggling. 74 This did not alarm GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT
her because she thought it was just a game.75 Meanwhile, appellant was still GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE"95 by invoking the
in the kitchen when she returned.76 Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two
saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,77 running towards the house of Rita.78 AAA or more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the
was slowly following behind.79 Luzvilla followed them.80 Just outside the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does
house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to her.81 The not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a
child did not answer.82 conviction."96
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape,
incident and testified that appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to
we consider the three well-entrenched principles:
her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF
came in the second time and again boxed appellant. This time, he had a
bolo pointed at appellant. Appellants uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
and another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member admonished more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the
FFF.83 intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 oclock in the evening, she was
own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
watching the television along with other people at the house of Rita. Around
the evidence for the defense.97
7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of black short pants without a shirt
on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10 minutes,
AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim
happened. AAA did not answer. Upon Antonias advice, Julito released her may be sufficient to convict the accused. 98More so, when the testimony is
and went out of the house.84 supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.99

Appellant further testified that at past 7 oclock in the evening, FFF arrived, Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victims positive
pointed a finger at him, brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting identification of the perpetrator of the crime, 100except when it is established
that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.101
I water near their house, and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve
(12) years of age even in the absence of any of the following circumstances:
(a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority.102
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of
the acts culminating in the insertion of appellants organ into the vagina of
five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently
proved such fact.
AAA testified:
PROS. OMANDAM:
xxxx
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty
and boxed you, what else did he do to you?
A He mounted me.
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs
positioned?
A They were apart.
Q Who pushed them apart?
A Hermie.
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis.
Q Where did he push his penis?
A To my vagina.
Q Was it painful?
A Yes.
Q What was painful?
A My vagina.
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.103
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were
phrased and re-phrased in order to test that AAA well understood the
information elicited from her, said it all she had been raped. When a
woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is essential to
show that rape was committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are
normally badges of truth and honesty.105
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo106 revealed
that the hymenal lacerations at 5 oclock and 9 oclock positions could have Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve
been caused by the penetration of an object; that the redness of the introitus consideration.
could have been "the result of the repeated battering of the object;" and that
such object could have been an erect male organ.107
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physicians finding of
penetration conclusively established the essential requisite of carnal
knowledge.108
II
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvillas recollection differ in that
time of the commission of the crime are now in dispute.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was
accused, whom she called "kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch
at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive. The defense
attempted to impute the crime to someone else one Julito Apiki, but the
child, on rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was
accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older, who molested her. 112
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the
determination by the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses deserves
full weight and respect considering that it has "the opportunity to observe the
witnesses manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and
the scant or full realization of their oath,"113 unless it is shown that material
facts and circumstances have been "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted."114
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing
the crime to someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private
complainants positive identification of accused and other corroborative
circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same evening, Julito
Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?",
thus corroborating the latters testimony that he confronted accused after
hearing of the incident from the child."115
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court
erred in finding his denial and alibi weak despite the presentation of
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over
their respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of the
appellants very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to
store to buy Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had
already been drinking long before he bought Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle
Alejandro. On cross-examination, she revealed that her husband was not
around before, during, and after the rape incident because he was then at
work.116 He arrived from work only after FFF came to their house for the
second time and boxed appellant.117 It was actually the fish vendor, not her
husband, who asked appellant to buy Tanduay. 118 Further, the drinking
session started only after the appellants errand to the store.119
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking
session. This is contrary to Glorias statement that her husband was at work.
Luzvillas testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness
Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This
belied Luzvillas claim that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house
of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as testified to by AAA and
Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying
Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to white), and, thus, a
short-sleeved shirt.

The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and
that appellant was elsewhere when the crime was committed. 109 Also, contrary to Luzvillas story that she saw AAA walking towards Ritas
house three (3) minutes after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the
evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily this respect, we find the trial courts appreciation in order. Thus:
identify her assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her,
considering that she could have a good look at him during the commission
of the crime.110 AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home,
and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the situs crying, to tell her father that Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into
criminus111 that it would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers who were watching TV, as
who held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field. Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When the child was seen at
the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only
later, after she had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering Lingkay could take a look at her just as Julito Apiki said. 120
testimony of AAA.
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is
credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested
witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as
such, "they being related or were one way or another linked to each other."121
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations
on his whereabouts, still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would
be physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus
122
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between
the situs criminis and the location of the accused when the crime was
committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not
have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed.123
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive application of the
Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time
of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at
the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act
should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is
still under review.133 (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but
below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is
found to have acted with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate
proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed. 134
We determine discernment in this wise:
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act.135 Such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case. 136

In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew
of the commission of the crime was considered not physically impossible to
what he was doing and that it was wrong.137 Such circumstance includes the
reach in less than an hour even by foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take the
gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.138
accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this Court disregarded
the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast
asleep when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing
after. She could have merely presumed that the accused slept all an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;]
throughout.126 and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense" are indicative of then
seventeen (17) year-old appellants mental capacity to fully understand the
consequences of his unlawful action.139
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends
corroborating that of the appellant that he was in their company at the time
of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by this Court in Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.
the following manner:
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997.
Ruben Nicolas, the appellants part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the Considering that she was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her
appellants sister-in-law and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is
appellants physical presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. committed against a child below seven (7) years old141 applies.
It is, however, an established fact that the appellants house where the
rape occurred, was a stones throw away from the fishpond. Their
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the
claim that the appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of
prohibition against the imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with
December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have
Republic Act No. 9346;142 and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of
kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours, since she testified that
minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing the penalty one
she, too, was very much occupied with her task of counting and recording
degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the
the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50
Revised Penal Code.143
meters away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention
solely on the appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the appellant
easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim, Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the
brought her inside his house and ravished her, then returned to the graduation of penalties provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal
fishpond as if he never left.128 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1 Code.145 Consequently, in its appreciation of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree
from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
appellant never left their sight, save from the 5-minute errand to the store, is
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover, considering that the
temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.146
farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the house of the
Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the
road near the store next to the Perochos down the farmland and We differ.
consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
appellant could have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay 147
and immediately returned to his uncles house. 129 Unfortunately, the In a more recent case, the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:
testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he
was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime. 130
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor
under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for
imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
appellant to have been at the time and place of the commission of the crime.
determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-
guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. appellant is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly
considered Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3) years before it was
enacted on 28 April 2006. Civil Liability

We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated We have consistently ruled that:
in People v. Sarcia:131
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and
character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration.
imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the childs restoration,
imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.149 rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159

Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule
the crime has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the on Children in Conflict with the Law,which reflected the same position.160
victim and her family.150 The respective awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages in the amount of 75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper. 151
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a
suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the
of minority which effectively lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.161 Section 40162 of the law and
the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the amount of 75,000.00 Section 48163 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is
as civil indemnity and 75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with now twenty-five (25) years old.
prevailing jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages should be
increased from 25,000.00 to 30,000.00.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the
promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as
the Lapse of the Period of Suspension of Sentence he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall
be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in
normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of
conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of
the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:
judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. 164
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence,
of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp
guilt. (Emphasis supplied.) and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
xxxx
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to
153 the court of origin to effect appellants confinement in an agricultrual camp
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton, which was promulgated on 18 August
or other training facility.
2006, the Court of Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,154 the aforestated provision does
not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.155 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the appellant
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision
is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the
in Sarcia,156 overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of
committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. Republic Act No. 9344.
No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that
the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with
SO ORDERED.
the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who
has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted
of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply
the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who
has been found guilty of a heinous crime.157

The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations 158 on Senate Bill
No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further
strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous crimes in the
application of the provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a
child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged,

accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have
acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiagos] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision2 dated October 26, 2000 which affirmed in toto the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999,
convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.
The Facts
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in
two separate informations both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping
AAA,6 then about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory portions thereof
respectively state:
Criminal Case No. 98-19083
That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX,
Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or
sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years
old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 98-19084
That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the
Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic)
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of
and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about
6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged.9Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the
trial, two varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. 10 Among
her siblings CCC, BBB, DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the
family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family members were close
friends of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good
neighbors. However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA
inside their own home. BBB then informed their mother MMM who in turn
asked AAA.11 There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times
on three (3) different occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her
daughter AAA, then 6 years old and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care
of Luzviminda Ortega12 (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2) nights
because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was
sick.13 During the first night at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the
room where AAA slept together with Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner
woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA. The
second occasion occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's
residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to
their comfort room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted
his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner
warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her.14AAA
did not tell her parents about her ordeal.
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996.
Petitioner went to the house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in
watching a battery-powered television. At that time, Luzviminda was
conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitioner
called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside
the said room which was lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA
behind the door, removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts and
panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of
AAA.15 AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and
the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair
on the base of his penis.16
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was
about to drink water in their kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB
was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from their waist down in
the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a
pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn,
hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB reported the incident to his mother, MMM.17
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her
that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM
learned that this was not the only incident that petitioner molested AAA as
there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not
report her ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM
testified that when BBB reported the matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda
already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to sleep, MMM,
with a heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same
was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and
MMM were not able to sleep that night. The following morning, at about four
o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their house. MMM
confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her daughter, and
consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for
examination.18
MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas19 (Dr.
Katalbas), the Rural Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and
found no indication that she was molested. 20Refusing to accept such
findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr.
Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson
made an unofficial written report21 showing that there were "abrasions on
both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior
fourchette." She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals
were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could
disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her
certification that her findings required the confirmation of the Municipal
Health Officer of the locality.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two
families through the DAWN Foundation, an organization that helps abused
women and children. Part of the settlement required petitioner to depart from
their house to avoid contact with AAA.23 As such, petitioner stayed with a
certain priest in the locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went
home for brief visits and in order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the
sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and confrontations
occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape.
However, the prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant cases.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and
Luzviminda Ortega.24 He is the second child of three siblings an elder
brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the accusations made
against him. He testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good
friends; when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother,
petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB and CCC while AAA
slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never touched or
raped AAA or showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA
in any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he
merely accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared
the toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he may have accidentally touched
AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his parents, went
to AAA's house;25 they were dancing and playing together with all the other
children at the time; while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted
AAA up in a playful act, at the instance of which BBB ran and reported the
matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying that petitioner
and AAA were having sexual intercourse;26 petitioner explained to MMM that
they were only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA what he was
accused of doing, as they were together with her brothers, and he treated
AAA like a younger sister;27 BBB was lying; AAA's parents and his parents
did not get angry at him nor did they quarrel with each other; petitioner and
his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the evening;
however, at about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were
summoned by MMM to go to the latter's house; upon arriving there they saw
BBB being maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as the one who the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is
molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with
examination.28 discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great
weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son
was a minor at the time of the incident; CCC and BBB were the children of
MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and the rest of her siblings were of the Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision
second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM which the CA denied in its Resolution33 dated November 7, 2001.
entrusted AAA and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept
with AAA and her youngest daughter in a separate room from petitioner; on
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's house watching television and
I.
conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking spree
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED
in the kitchen; from where they were seated, she could clearly see all the
CERTAIN FACTS OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF
children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in the dining
CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
area; she did not hear any unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were
II.
conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
sexual intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL
immediately stood up and looked for them, but both mothers did not find
FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
anything unusual as all the children were playing and dancing in the dining
III.
area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's statement; the parents of
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE
AAA, at that time, did not examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor
APPELLATE COURT, THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN
did they get angry at petitioner or at them; and they peacefully left AAA's
FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE
house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that
ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM
FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to
WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY
petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda
MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE
intervened, telling FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a
PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN
doctor for examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who
EXPERIENCE.
found no indication that AAA was molested. She also accompanied her to
IV.
Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of the examination conducted by Dr.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
Jocson, they went to the police and at this instance only did Luzviminda learn
UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED
that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied
VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING
to Luzviminda that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to
THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.34
their employer who recommended that they should seek advice from the
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are
Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an amicable settlement
conclusive on this Court, we are not prevented from overturning such
wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with
findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of substance and
a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years. But almost every
value which if considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner
Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring his
stresses that from the testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that
dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-
penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain. Petitioner contends that
mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist. Confrontations occurred until an
assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers
altercation erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda.
29 and his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain
Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant cases.
abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into
consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis.
The RTC's Ruling However, such allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr.
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot Katalbas who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a medical
prevail over the positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or indications that
crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty and credibility. Moreover, AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a
the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's family to grave error when it disregarded such medical report since it disproves the
impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations allegation of the existence of rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed
of both families. Thus, the RTC disposed of this case in this wise: to prove its case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner
subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child
of the barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar
As such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13- year-old
Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal
boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to
by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged in
pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims
Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no
that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the instant case, as she wanted to
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer
extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out that the
the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium period.
medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions that were inflicted
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be
on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could disappear
imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1)
within a period of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the
day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of
medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11)
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is condemned to
days after the alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the
pay the offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as
instant case after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a
indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).
case of slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable that MMM
inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to depart from the
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.30 initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally,
petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to
fabricate these stories.35
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the
corresponding bail bond for his provisional liberty in the amount of
P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending appeal.31 On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office
The CA's Ruling of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA; the RTC,
that the petitioner's defense of denial could not prevail over the positive as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since
identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother BBB, which despite the absence of abrasions, rape is consummated even with the
were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive. The CA slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ; what is relevant in this
also held that the respective medical examinations conducted by the two case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August and
doctors were irrelevant, as it is established that the slightest penetration of December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape was committed
considering AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or
in accusing petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape could be not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found
committed even in the presence of other people nearby. Moreover, the OSG by both the RTC and the CA. However, with the advent of R.A. No. 9344
relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial court is accorded while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue arises,
the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly the namely, whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to
demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness was telling petitioner's case, considering that at the time he committed the alleged rape,
the truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment he was merely 13 years old.
when he committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts. 36
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and AAA. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor is the single most
Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility,
on May 20, 2006.38 The law establishes a comprehensive system to manage the accused can be convicted solely on that basis. 44 The RTC, as affirmed
children in conflict with the law39 (CICL) and children at risk40 with child- by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to
appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as charge petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him
prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and after- as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that
care programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure its he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While
implementation, the law, particularly Section 841 thereof, has created the petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and
duties and functions42 such as the formulation of policies and strategies to FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and
prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the administration of juvenile the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience
justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the CICL. The law also would damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not
provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections true.45 We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by
64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions. 43 Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from petitioners
parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of rape
committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to the small vaginal
opening. Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of the victim's organ
Title VIII or rupture of the hymen is not required.46Therefore, it is not necessary for
Transitory Provisions conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because
the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the
pudendum constitutes rape.47
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years
Old and Below. Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children
fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances,
the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal
officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall liability arises.48 Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal
determine whether to release the child to the custody of his/her liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar,49 we held:
parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided [I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the
under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the
rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child. intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. If the child is accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of
detained pending trial, the Family Court shall also determine dolus, Albert has stated:
whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if not, "The second element of dolus is intelligence; without
determine appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is this power, necessary to determine the morality of
necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no
immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth detention crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no
home. intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in liability."
Conflict with the Law. The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and
hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90) days below are not capable of performing a criminal act.
from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no
with the law under their custody. longer covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was
Years Pending Diversion and Court Proceedings. If a child affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and
reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and with the petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as
court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the
consultation with the local social welfare and development officer retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is applicable only if the child-
or the Family Court in consultation with the Social Services and accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68
Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the
may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case the provisions of Section 3851of R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic
appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that
the child in conflict with the law has already availed of probation while it is a recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be
under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child given retroactive application, such principle does not apply if the law itself
may apply for probation if qualified under the provisions of the provides for conditions for its application.
Probation Law.
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are
We are not persuaded.
Serving Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who
were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be
the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
Section 20 of this Act.
 A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted
with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to
the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children
15 years old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate
local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling,
therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is
not the CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's
age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A.
No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15
years old.52
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord
retroactive application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344
pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt
amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the
accused are given retroactive effect.53 This principle is embodied in Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have
a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given
expanded application in certain instances involving special laws. 54 R.A. No.
9344 should be no exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent
from the deliberations on the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions,
pages 34 to 35, may I humbly propose that we should insert, after
Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE
OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND
THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN
(LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY
TRANSFERRED TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL
UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM,
PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS
OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities
for these adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the
DSWD does not have the capability at the moment. It will take time
to develop the capacity.
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred
whenever the facilities are ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When
we speak here of children who do not have criminal liability under
this law, we are referring here to those who currently have criminal
liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this measure,
will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either
to their parents or through a diversion program, Mr. President.
That is my understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a
process of sifting before that. That is why I was proposing that
they should be given to the DSWD, which will conduct the sifting
process, except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the
physical facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no
argument. We will now have to just craft it to ensure that the input
raised earlier by the good Senator is included and the capacity of
the DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the
issue should also be incorporated in the amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this
law becomes effective, all those children in conflict with the
law, who were convicted in the present Penal Code, for
example, who will now not be subject to incarceration under
this law, will be immediately released. Is that the
understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what
will happen to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet
been settled . . . . . provides, for example, for conferencing family
mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These
methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain
in detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will
still require some sort of infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The
personnel from the DSWD will have to address the counseling.
So, there must be a transition in terms of building the capacity and
absorbing those who will benefit from this measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for
as an amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, the Santiago amendment is accepted.55
xxxx
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr.
President, in their application, I would like to suggest to the
Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a transitory
provision that would make this law apply also to those who
might already have been convicted but are awaiting, let us
say, execution of their penalties as adults when, in fact, they
are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision
under the Transitory Provisions wherein we address the
issue raised by the good Senator, specifically, Section 67. For
example, "Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children
fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission
of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child
shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer." So that would be giving retroactive
effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been
prosecuted? I was trying to cite the instance of juvenile offenders
erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.
 Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that 9 years old to 15 years old has compounded the problem of
as an additional amendment, subject to style. employment of children in the drug trade several times over. Law
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police,
is a reality that we have to address, otherwise injustice will really most particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become
be . . . more aggressive in using children 15 years old or below as
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic
that as a separate provision. Act No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful
The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, discharge of their duties in that they are proscribed from taking
the offender is able to prove that at the time of the commission of into custody children 15 years old or below who openly flaunt
the offense he is a minor under this law, he should be given the possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply
benefit of the law. because their age exempts them from criminal liability under the
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct. new law. 60
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed
amendment.56
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant
exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who
factor in interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a
was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the
number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:
petitioner, and one who deserves the laws greater protection. However, this
consequence is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect wisdom of which is not subject to review by this Court.61 Any perception that
according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to
part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning
ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is
enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts proven facts, and we have done so in this case.62
will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent
and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and
general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to
98-19084 filed against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED.
Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social welfare and development
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless,
out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil
harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
apparent policy and objects of the legislature. 57 and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00). No costs.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.58 In this
case, the plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and
with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No other the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).
interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL.
SO ORDERED.

It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of
live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother.
Furthermore, petitioners age was never assailed in any of the proceedings
before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the
commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344,
he is exempted from criminal liability.

However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two
(2) counts of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly
provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability.
Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the
CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of actual or compensatory
damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages,

distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled
to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape,
pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional
pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in
recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime
of rape.59

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a
law intended to protect our children from the harshness of life and to
alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and children at
risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not
escaped us that major concerns have been raised on the effects of the law.
It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale for the Proposed Rule on Children
Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, it was found that:

The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from
FIRST DIVISION On the night of April 11, 1992, BBB heard a loud noise coming from the
[G.R. No. 117407. April 15, 1997] apartment building, and when she inquired about it she came to know that it
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IRVIN
was Irvin Tadulan creating the noise because he was kicking the door of the
TADULAN y EPAN, accused-appellant. apartment unit occupied by him and his family. So, BBB called up the police
DECISION because of her apprehension that Irvin Tadulan would create trouble due to
PADILLA, J.: the quarrel that was then taking place between him and his
Accused-appellant Irvin Tadulan was charged with the crime of rape wife. Responding policemen soon arrived at the place in a mobile car, and
before the Regional Trial Court of xxx, Branch xxx, Metro Manila, in a because Irvin Tadulanwas denounced by his wife for having rape [sic] the
complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-186, alleging as follows: daughter of BBB, the said police officers brought Irvin Tadulan to the xxx
"That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1992 in the Municipality of xxx, Police Station for questioning and also asked BBB and her daughter to follow
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable them. So, that same evening, BBB and her daughter went to the xxx Police
Court, armed with a knife, with lewd design and by means of force, threats Station where they gave their respective sworn statements (Exhs. 'B' & 'E')
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and lodged their complaint against Irvin Tadulan. It was during the taking of
have sexual intercourse with one AAA, a minor, nine (9) years old, without her statement before the police when AAA also revealed that
her consent and against her will. Irvin Tadulan had laid with her not only on April 2, 1992. She stated that
Irvin Tadulan had previously laid on top of her and first attempted to have
CONTRARY TO LAW."[1] intercourse with her sometime in September 1, 1991, but it was not
consummated because she was hurt whenever he tried to insert his penis
When arraigned under the foregoing indictment, appellant pleaded not into her vagina.
guilty to the crime attributed to him. Thereafter, trial commenced with both
prosecution and defendant presenting evidence consisting of testimonies of In order to determine physical signs of sexual abuse, the xxx Police Station
witnesses and documentary exhibits. made a Request For The Medico Legal Examination of AAA to the PC Crime
Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City (Exh. 'F') on the following
The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to establish the day, April 12, 1992, upon the written Consent For Examination (Exh. 'G')
following facts: which was signed by the mother, BBB. A medico-legal officer of the PCCLS
examined AAA and then issued Medico-Legal Report No. M-0708-92 dated
" x x x Complainant BBB owns a house at xxx, in Barangay xxx, Metro April 13, 1992 (Exh. 'C') finding her 'hymen with deep, healed laceration at 4
Manila where she resides with her common-law husband and their minor o'clock", and with the conclusion that the 'Subject is in non-virgin state
daughter, AAA. Behind the said house, complainant also owns a three-door physically'. Thereafter, the xxx Police Station forwarded the sworn
apartment building, one unit of which was rented and occupied by accused statements of AAA and her mother, together with all the pertinent papers to
Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan and their three children name [sic] the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of xxx where the said minor child and
Dianne, Angie and Bochoywho were aged 10, 9 and 5, respectively. In 1992 her mother signed the Complaint for Rape (Exh. 'D') against Irvin Tadulan,
complainant's daughter, AAA was about nine (9) year [sic] old (Exh. 'A') and which initiated the prosecution of the said accused in this case." [2]
was in grade school. She often played with the accused's children in the
vicinity of their house and the apartment building.
On the other hand, accused Irvin Tadulan set up the defense of alibi
and pardon. In support of his defense, Tadulan testified that he could not
In the morning of April 2, 1992, at about 11:00 o'clock, AAA was playing with have raped AAA in his apartment unit in xxx, Metro Manila, at 11:00 o'clock
the other children when she was called by Irvin Tadulaninto the latter's in the morning of 2 April 1992 as he was then at his place of work at the
apartment unit. He brought the girl upstairs and told her to lie down on the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in xxx, Metro Manila, where he was
floor. Irvin Tadulan then removed the shorts and panties of AAA and his employed as a mobile equipment operator. His testimony was corroborated
own pants and briefs. He kissed the girl and fondled her breasts and private by his supervisor at the plant who testified that on 2 April 1992,
parts. Then he put himself on top of her and inserted his organ into her Irvin Tadulan worked with him at the company plant during the first shift,
genitals. AAA felt the pain in her vagina. She pushed Irvin Tadulan away from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; and that as shown in Tadulan's daily time record
from her and got up, but the latter poked a kitchen knife at her and told her (Exhibit " 1 "), said accused punched in at 5:25 a.m. and punched out at 2:31
to remain lying down; and because of fear, AAA lay [sic] down on the floor p.m.
again. Irvin Tadulan placed himself on top of her once more, kissed and
fondled her breasts as before, and finally succeeded in inserting his penis Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation, Adefa Tadulan, wife
into her sex organ. As he had intercourse with AAA, blood oozed out of her of accused-appellant, testified that when she arrived at their apartment on 7
vagina and she felt the pain. Shortly thereafter, however, she heard her April 1992 from Cagayan de Oro, she learned from BBB and her daughter
mother calling her. So, Irvin Tadulan told her to dress up quickly and AAA that the latter had been raped by her husband; that she again went to
ordered her to go home. see BBB and asked for forgiveness and that the latter told her:
"Hayaan mo na lang, umalis na lang kayo dito,
Upon reaching home, AAA did not inform her mother that Irvin Tadulan had kung ang Dios nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya." Said witness also testified that
carnal knowledge of her; but two days later, their laundry woman saw the she asked BBB if the accused Irvin Tadulan could just leave first while she
blood stains on her panties and told her mother about it. At first, AAA and their children would vacate the apartment unit on the coming Saturday,
refused to talk when her mother asked her about the said blood stains, but and BBB agreed; and that pursuant to said agreement,
when the mother persisted in asking her, the girl cried and revealed that Irvin Tadulan immediately left the apartment and she started packing their
Irvin Tadulan had sexual intercourse with her. The mother (BBB) was belongings and sent their children to Cagayan de Oro in the company of her
shocked. She reported the matter to her godson who immediately mother.
confronted Irvin Tadulan relative to what he had done to AAA. At first,
Irvin Tadulan denied having done the act imputed to him by the said girl, but Adefa Tadulan further testified that on the night of 11 April 1992, her
he later on admitted that he had sexual intercourse with her. husband came home and upon learning that she had sent their children to
the province, he got angry and they had a violent quarrel. The noise created
Shortly thereafter, Irvin Tadulan's wife (Adefa Tadulan) arrived from a trip by the quarrel was heard by BBB who immediately called the police; and on
from Cagayan de Oro City, and BBB immediately informed her that her that same night, BBB and AAA lodged a complaint for rape against accused
husband, Irvin Tadulan has raped her (BBBs) daughter AAA. BBB further Irvin Tadulan despite the previous understanding between BBB
informed Adefa Tadulan that she would not take action against the latter's and Adefa Tadulan that BBB would not take action anymore against
husband if they would vacate the apartment unit right Irvin Tadulan.
away. Adefa Tadulan later on met with BBB and told her that she had driven
Prior to the reception of evidence for the accused, his counsel filed a
away Irvin Tadulan, but requested that she and her children be allowed to
Motion to Plead Guilty to Lesser Offense[3] praying that accused be allowed
stay until Saturday, April 11, 1992. BBB thereafter noted, however, that
to plead guilty to the crime under Article 336, Revised Penal Code,
Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to the apartment unit every night despite
denominated as Acts of Lasciviousness. No communication having been
the promise of his wife that she herself would call the police should he ever
received from the complainant with regard to said offer to plead guilty to a
come back to the place. So, BBB conferred with her cousin, a lawyer, and
lesser offense, the trial proceeded for the reception of evidence for the
later on made up her mind to file a criminal charge against
defense
Irvin Tadulan before leaving for abroad, for she was then scheduled to go to
the United States to fetch her mother who was ill due to a stroke.
 After trial, the now appealed judgment was rendered by the lower court been raped by her husband; that she again met with BBB and asked for
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime forgiveness; and that the said mother told her:
charged. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows: 'Hayaan mo na lang, umalis na lang kayo dito,
kung ang Diyos ay nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya.' The said wife also testified
"WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING that she asked BBB if her husband could just leave first while she and their
CONSIDERATIONS, this Court hereby finds accused IRVIN TADULAN children could vacate the apartment unit on the coming Saturday, and BBB
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized agreed; and that pursuant to the said agreement Irvin Tadulan immediately
by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to the left their house, after which she also sent their children to Cagayan de Oro
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessory penalties the law City in the company of her mother and then started packing-up their
provides therefor. belongings. She further testified that on the night of April 11, 1992, however,
her husband came home and quarreled with her upon knowing that she had
Accused Irvin Tadulan is also hereby ordered to indemnify the offended sent their children to the province; that because of the noise their quarrel
minor girl, AAA in the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), created, BBB called for the police; and that on that same night, BBB and her
with interest thereon at the legal rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from daughter lodged a complaint for rape against Irvin Tadulan, despite the
the filing of the complaint in this case until the same is fully paid. previous understanding between her and BBB that the latter would not
anymore take any action against her husband.
[4]
SO ORDERED."
It should be pointed out, however, as earlier narrated above, that according
In this appeal, accused Irvin Tadulan assigns the following errors to to BBB, she agreed not to file any complaint against Irvin Tadulan upon the
the trial court: representation of his wife, Adefa Tadulan, that she had driven away her
I husband, and her promise that if he would ever return to their apartment unit,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY she herself would call for the police; that she (BBB) noted, however, that
Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to their apartment unit every night; that
WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
she was prompted to call for police assistance because she saw
II Irvin Tadulan kicking the door of the apartment during a violent quarrel with
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND his wife on the night of April 11, 1992; and that because soon after policemen
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION arrived at the place, Adefa Tadulan herself informed them that her husband
WITNESSES MARKED AS THEY ARE WITH INCONSISTENCIES has raped AAA, she (BBB) and her said child proceeded with the filing of
AND IMPROBABILITIES WHICH CAST SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO their complaint for rape against Irvin Tadulan.
THEIR TRUTHFULNESS.
From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance
III of BBB from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon the
ASSUMING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S VERSION OF THE representation of the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven away
INCIDENT IS CORRECT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT her husband, and her promise that should he ever come back to their
CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS apartment unit she herself would call for the police; but that the said
ALREADY PARDONED BY COMPLAINANTS. representation turn [sic] out to be untrue, and the promise was not complied
with because Irvin Tadulan was still coming home every night and, in fact,
IV he and her [sic] wife had a violent quarrel in the apartment unit on the night
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING of April 11, 1992. Otherwise stated, the desistance was subject to certain
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON GROUND OF REASONABLE conditions which were not complied with, and for which reason BBB
DOUBT.[5] proceeded with the filing of a criminal complaint against Irvin Tadulan. Upon
such circumstances, it is clear to the mind of this Court that the complainant
The issues raised by accused-appellant boil down to credibility of
has not expressly pardoned the said accused.
witnesses.

In rejecting the version of the accused-appellant, the trial court made Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only
the following findings and conclusions to which we agree. by the parents of an offended minor but also by the minor herself in order
"This Court finds, however, that the abovementioned testimonies of accused to be effective as an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal
Irvin Tadulan and his witness cannot prevail over the more convincing Code. Thus, in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460,
testimony of the rape victim, AAA, who positively identified the said accused we find the following words: 'Neither must we be understood as supporting
as the one who raped her and described in a clear and straightforward the view that the parents alone can extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for
manner how she was sexually abused by him. In the absence of any clear we, too are of the belief that the pardon by the parents, standing alone, is
showing of ill motive that might have impelled her to impute the heinous inefficacious.' It was also held in another case, that 'The express pardon of
crime of rape against the said accused, there is no reason to doubt the a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter's
veracity of the declarations of the said victim in court; for as held in a case parents, is not sufficient to remove criminal responsibility, but must be
(People vs. Camasis, 189 SCRA 649), 'it is hard to believe that a young accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself.' (U.S. vs. Luna, 1
unmarried woman would reveal that she was deflowered and allow the Phil. 360)
examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be the
subject of public trial if her motive was not to bring to justice the person who In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly
wronged her.' Also applicable here is the well-settled principle that 'alibi is granted only by the mother (BBB) without the concurrence of the offended
unavailing as a defense where there is positive identification of the minor, AAA. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that
perpetrator of the crime, most specially, when the said identification is made the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the
by the victim of the rape herself in the absence of any motive to implicate accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited
the assailant' (People vs. Felipe, 191 SCRA 176, and cases therein above, such pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the
cited). Besides, it has been held time and time again, that for alibi to prosper offended minor herself.
as a defense the accused must show that he was so far away that he could
not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate In fine, this Court concludes that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the
vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA accused Irvin Tadulan of the crime of rape charged against him, and that
266). In this case, however, it is clear that accused Irvin Tadulanwas not so the defenses of alibi and pardon or condonation set up by him are lacking
situated on April 2, 1992, for according to him he was at the plant of the in merit."[6]
Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation in xxx, Metro Manila -- which is but a few
kilometers from Barangay xxx of the same municipality where the crime was We have consistently held that appellate courts, as a rule, will not
committed. disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. We have
sustained trial courts in this respect, considering their vantage point in the
Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation also set up by accused evaluation of testimonial evidence, absent, of course, any showing of serious
Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan testified that on April 7, 1992 when error or irregularity that otherwise would alter the result of the case. [7] We
she arrived at their apartment unit from a trip from Cagayan de Oro City, she find no such serious error or irregularity in the case at bar.
came to know from both BBB and her daughter, AAA, that the latter has
 Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court gravely erred when it away her husband, and her promise that should he ever come back to their
disregarded the defense of alibi despite the overwhelming evidence that the apartment unit she herself would call for the police; but that the said
accused did not leave his place of work on 2 April 1992. According to the representation turned out to be untrue, and the promise was not complied
appellant, his immediate supervisor, Leandro Daguro, testified that he with because Irvin Tadulan was still coming home every night and, in fact,
(appellant) reported for work on 2 April 1992 and was assigned in a critical he and her wife had a violent quarrel in the apartment unit on the night of
area, and being the only driver at that time a problem would have ensued April 11, 1992. Otherwise stated, the desistance was subject to certain
had he left his post at any given time on 2 April 1992. Appellant likewise conditions which were not complied with, and for which reason BBB
faults the trial court when it observed that there was no physical impossibility proceeded with the filing of a criminal complaint against
for him to be at xxx where the crime was committed because the court mainly Irvin Tadulan. Upon such circumstances, it is clear to the mind of this
focused its attention on the fact that Barangay xxx is but a few kilometers Court that the complainant has not expressly pardoned the said accused.
away from Barangay xxx, both in xxx, hence, appellant could have returned
to his place of work after committing the crime at the time and place it Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only
occurred. Accused argues that the distance between the by the parents of an offended minor but also by the minor herself in order
two barangayswas never an issue, that the question really is whether or not to be effective as an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal
appellant left or could have left his work at the Republic Asahi Glass Code. Thus, in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460,
Corporation in Barangay xxx and gone home to Barangay xxx in the we find the following words: 'Neither must we be understood as supporting
morning of 2 April 1992. the view that the parents alone can extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for
we, too are of the belief that the pardon by the parents, standing alone, is
We are not persuaded. The testimony of Leonardo Daguro that inefficacious.' It was also held in another case, that 'The express pardon of
accused could not have left his work as this would have resulted in a big a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter's
problem at the area where appellant was working is too simple for parents, is not sufficient to remove criminal responsibility, but must be
comfort. The same witness testified that he could not remember if a problem accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself.' (U.S. vs. Luna, 1
arose on that date when the crime was committed and that he was Phil. 360)
supervising an average of seventeen (17) men in different sections of the
raw material department so that he had to go around each section. In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly
We quote with approval the following observation of the court a quo: granted only by the mother (BBB) without the concurrence of the offended
minor, AAA. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that
" x x x Besides, it has been held time and time again that for alibi to the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the
prosper as a defense the accused must show that he was so far away that accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited
he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its above, such pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 offended minor herself."[12]
SCRA 266). In this case, however, it is not so situated on April 2, 1992, for
according to him he was at the plant of the Republic Asahi Glass WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated 4 August 1994 in
Corporation in Barangay xxx, Metro Manila -- which is but a few kilometers Criminal Case No. 92186 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch xxx of xxx,
from Barangay xxx of the same municipality where the crime was Metro Manila, is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification as to the indemnity
committed."[8] for the victim which is raised to P50,000.00 from P30,000.00 to conform with
prevailing jurisprudence including the recent case of People
Accused-appellant tries to discredit the victim's testimony by v. Romualdo Miranda y Geronimo, et al., G.R. No. 97425, 24 September
questioning her behavior after she was allegedly raped by the accused in 1996, where the victim was also a minor, as in the case at bar.
September 1991 in that she did not show any fear of the accused on 2 April
1992 when she was called by him. It should be borne in mind, in this SO ORDERED.
connection, that the victim was only a naive nine (9) year old child when the Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
crime was committed on her. She considered the accused as a friend,
almost like a relative, as in fact she called him "Tito Loloy." She therefore Hermosisima, Jr., J., on leave.
unsuspectingly went near the accused when called by the latter.

As we have stressed in a recent case -

" x x x it is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone
traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected under the
circumstances from mature people. The range of emotion shown by rape
victims is yet to be captured even by the calculus. It is thus unrealistic to
expect uniform reactions from rape victims."[9]

The victim AAA was too young to totally comprehend the

consequences of the dastardly act inflicted on her by the accused-appellant.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: "(A)s regards the acts

imputed to BBB, the delay of seven (7) days from the date of her knowledge
of the rape incident on 4 April 1992 in reporting to the authorities the rape of
her daughter is excusable. At that time, she was not yet certain of the steps
she would take considering the delicate nature of the problem they were
facing" (citing People v. Danguilan, 218 SCRA 98;People v. Joaquin, Jr.,
225 SCRA 179)." Besides, we have ruled that a delay in prosecuting the
rape is not indicative of fabricated charges.[10]

Finally, the accused's denial and alibi cannot prevail over his positive
identification by the victim AAA as her rapist. AAA testified in a clear and
straightforward manner that appellant through force and intimidation and
with use of a deadly weapon (kitchen knife), succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her.[11]

As for the defense that BBB, as the mother of the victim BBB,
expressly pardoned him, we sustain the trial court's finding which reads as
follows:

"From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial
desistance of BBB from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon
the representation of the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven
SECOND DIVISION In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her
[G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000] son's death in the hands of Ka Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE was issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA,
alias "KA JESSIE" and TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused- When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to
appellant. identify them as belonging to her son by reason of the briefs found in the
DECISION burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print his name on the waistband
BUENA, J.: of his briefs so that it would not get lost.

Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django," The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco
"Carlos Narra" and "Ka Jessie," appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Derla who admitted that accused is a member of the NPA operating in
Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 2773 entitled Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the victims in the three criminal
"People of the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias 'Ka Django,' cases filed against him.
'Carlos Narra,' 'Ka Jessie,' and 21 John Does" convicting him of murder and
On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the accused
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
and imposing the following penalty:
On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose
Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., charging "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose
them of murder committed as follows: Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, alias Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and hereby
"That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with all the
evening in the Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines accessory provided by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named indemnity to the heirs of the victim Alfredo Arevalo, without subsidiary
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, imprisonment in case of insolvency and as regards Crim. Case No. 2665
armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his and Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of
residence and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and the accused beyond reasonable doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with Narra, Ka Django, is hereby acquitted.
treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO
AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly "In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full credit of his
caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs. period of detention.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." "With cost de-oficio.

Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder "SO ORDERED."[1]
for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under
Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively.
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, lone error allegedly committed by the trial court:
assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
Joint trial of the three cases was conducted considering the substantial
identity of the facts and circumstances of the case. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER, AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN
Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the PURSUANCE OR IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION.
accused, with ten (10) armed companions, requested permission to rest in
his house, which was granted. They had with them a person who was Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724
hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting
extinguished and Malto complied. Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May
Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was
Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and
awakened by a gunshot. When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a
Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably
gun and ordering the person who was hogtied to lie down. After several
granted by the National Amnesty Board. Attached to appellant's brief is the
minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his
Notice of Resolution of the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) dated
companions to carry away the dead man.
November 17, 1999 which states:
Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo
when Patriarca went back to his place, together with the military, on March "Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty Commission dated
29, 1990. 22 October 1998.[2]
The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property
of a Rubuang Tolosa and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the 'RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125 of MR.
victim. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA filed with the Local Amnesty Board of Legazpi
City on 18 February 1997.
The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew
Patriarca, alias "Ka Django", as he told her on March 10, 1987 not to let her
son join the military. She, however, replied that they were only seeking 'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the
employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in attending to their farm Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda and participated in the following
and he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in their armed activities:
locality. 'a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay
Hirawon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 14 February 1986;
After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that 'b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at
her son was abducted by the New People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, Barangay Godon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 15 February 1986;
she reported the matter to the military and looked for him. She was informed 'c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay
by the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they saw her son Banwang, Gurang, Donsol, Sorsogon in 1987;
hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and complained that he 'd) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer at
was being maltreated by the NPA. After three days of searching, a certain Barangay Boroan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in
Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and a relative of hers, notified her that her which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 was filed
son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr. against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
 'e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and
nuisance of the community, at Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09
March 1984, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No.
2665 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his
misconducts at San Antonio, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12
February 1986, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case
No. 2664 was filed against him before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former
member of the CHDF at Sitio Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol,
Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in which a case of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 2773 was filed against him before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay
captain, at Barangay Tinanogan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20
September 1986 in which a (sic) Criminal Case No. 2663
was filed against him.
'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the
applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were done
in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus recommended on 20 May 1998
the grant of his application for amnesty.
'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999,
resolved to approve the recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board.
'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA
PATRIARCA under Proclamation No. 724 is hereby GRANTED for
rebellion constituted by the acts detailed above, provided they were
committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June 1988. Let a
Certificate of Amnesty be issued in his favor as soon as this Resolution
becomes final. It shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is
filed with the Commission by any party within said period.'"[3]
On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the National
Amnesty Commission, wrote the following letter to the Provincial Prosecutor
of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:
"Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca"
"Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting herewith the
attached copy of RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 granting amnesty to JOSE
N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was accused of the following cases:
"1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"2. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"3. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"4. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"5. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2663 filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief prosecutor of
the province, the opportunity to take whatever action you may deem
appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant of amnesty shall become
final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice,
unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any
party within said period.
"Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process."[4]
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to
the National Amnesty Commission, requested information as to whether or
not a motion for reconsideration was filed by any party, and the action, if
there was any, taken by the NAC.[5]
In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among likewise ORDERED unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
other things, that there has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any
party.[6]
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under
Proclamation No. 724 dated May 17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No.
347 dated March 25, 1994.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
"Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons
who shall apply therefor and who have or may have committed crimes, on
or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political beliefs, whether
punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but
not limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of
public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition;
conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal
association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to
a person in authority or agents of such person; tumults and other
disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of publication and
unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of
Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition),
68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the
Articles of War; Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against
chastity and other crimes for personal ends."
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their
treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one
sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some
breach, the law of nations.[7] Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and
puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. [8]
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely
In the case of People vs. Casido,[9] the difference between pardon
and amnesty is given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act
which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may
be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward
and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for
that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article
36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes
and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense."
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-
appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It
serves to put an end to the appeal.[10]
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case
No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jose N.
Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,[11] Criminal Case Nos. 2663
and 2664, which are both filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon,[12] are ordered DISMISSED. The release of Jose N.
Patriarca who is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon is
The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his
compliance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
 Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations
JJ., concur. penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case,
the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or
on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before
Republic of the Philippines the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running
SUPREME COURT of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
Manila administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more
SECOND DIVISION than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been
G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008 filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner had already prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of
vs. the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
CAWILI, respondents. because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the
DECISION investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had
TINGA, J.: no dealings with petitioner.15

This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary
dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had
which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16Petitioner filed a motion for
and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.2 reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time
through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor
and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate
to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003,
business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with
petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored,
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting
either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner
on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject
made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23
offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3)
May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3
informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its
sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to
Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription
had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner of offenses penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia
had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings
petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not
services, he was the one before the prosecutor's office.

offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals
Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was
cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a
had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the proper verification and certification of non-forum
said checks had been falsified.
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere photocopy. 26 Petitioner moved
showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as the for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said
those appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27Still,
adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent
associate.8 compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a
reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the
9 petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara unsubstantial to require consideration.28
found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice
(DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed
In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that
for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too
altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary unsubstantial to require consideration.
investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in
Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also
Investigation (NBI).
reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which
denied for lack of merit. does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four
(4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP
Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of
matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that
resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No.
3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and
the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. 30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than
one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of
the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position
that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the
prescriptive period.

Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the
Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the verification being
intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading
are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that
a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect
being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correctthe court may
simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive
strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be
served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching
the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December
1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment," 39 and the prevailing rule
at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. 40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is
illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time
when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at
the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is
that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the
complaint signifies the

Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused. 44 These cases
were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first
petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or
duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plainstep taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the
reading of the petition before the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the
offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
dated 9 August 2004,33 a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
"A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake. the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In
addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may
Now, on the substantive aspects. only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the
initial step of the proceedings against the offender,48 and hence, the
35 prescriptive period should be interrupted.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes, a case involving
the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive
period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which
petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v. involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both
with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of special laws, the Court ruled that the
the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly
involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of
notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals'
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation,
pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
the present case were clearly beyond his control.38 conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal interrupts the prescriptive period.
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law
applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive,
prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read: thus:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and
following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by
punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of
(c) x x x prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may
ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.54
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
jeopardy. vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.55 A clear
example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit
on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the
22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed
periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with
the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ
issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had
elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had
already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August
1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions
and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those
who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not
be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's
filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24
August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover,
since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the
claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the
information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of

Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August
2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140231 July 9, 2007
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG),
represented by ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, Office of the Ombudsman-Manila,
CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE PNB BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
REYNALDO TUASON, CARLOS CAJELO, JOSE BARQUILLO, JR.,
LORETO SOLSONA, PRIMICIAS BANAGA, JOHN DOES, and
NORTHERN COTABATO SUGAR INDUSTRIES, INC.
(NOCOSII), respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government1 (petitioner) filed the
herein Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Resolution2 dated May 21, 1999 of Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in
OMB No. 0-95-0890 which dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint for
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 30193 against
concerned members of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Board of Directors
and Northern Cotabato Sugar Industries, Inc. (NOCOSII) officers, namely:
Reynaldo Tuason, Carlos Cajelo, Jose Barquillo, Jr., Loreto Solsona,
Primicias Banaga and John Does (respondents); and the Order4 dated July
23, 1999 which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts:
xxx
e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the
Government or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx
g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the the
Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-
Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence.
In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-
Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents
and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the
recommendation on May 21, 1999.5
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 but it was denied by GIO Diaz-
Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by
Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.7

On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative

Forthwith, petitioner elevated the case to this Court and in support of its
Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
petition alleges that:
Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans,
A) The Respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or
determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the
actions to be pursued thereby.
complaint filed by the Petitioner on the ground of Prescription
considering that:
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 1. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER
expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and BEHEST LOANS AS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH IS
review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest. IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER ARTICLE XI, SECTION
15, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
2. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a
TRUSTEE TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
"behest loan," to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation
BENEFICIARY;
is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government
3. THE OFFENSES CHARGED ARE IN THE NATURE
officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or
OF CONTINUING CRIMES AS THE STATE
agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation
CONTINUES TO SUFFER INJURY ON EACH DAY OF
of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate
DEFAULT IN PAYMENT. HENCE, PRESCRIPTION
layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being
DOES NOT APPLY;
sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was
4. PRESCRIPTION AS A MATTER OF DEFENSE
made."
MUST BE PLEADED, OTHERWISE, IT IS DEEMED
WAIVED;
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group 5. PRESCRIPTION HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN
(TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB. THIS CASE. SINCE IT MAY BE WAIVED OR MAY
NOT BE SET IN DEFENSE, THE OMBUDSMAN
CANNOT MOTU PROPRIO DISMISS THE
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan
COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION;
transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from 6. ARTICLE 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate WHICH ADOPTS THE "DISCOVERY RULE" SHALL
collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975,
APPLY IN THIS CASE;
NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; 7. THE LOAN CONTRACT AS OTHER LOAN
that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or TRANSACTIONS IN THE NATURE OF BEHEST
an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site
LOANS ARE KEPT SECRET.8
offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the General B) The respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or
Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in not finding that a
the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant
probable cause exists for violation by the private respondents of
site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 despite the presence of clear,
paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was overwhelming and unrebutted evidence.9
only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.

In its Comment, the Ombudsman, without delving on the issue of

Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, prescription, in view of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint
Behest Loans v. Desierto (1999),10 contends that its finding of insufficiency
against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the of evidence or lack of probable cause against respondents deserves great
following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019: weight and respect, and must be accorded full weight and credit.
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and No comment was filed by the rest of the respondents.
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
The issue before the Court is whether the Ombudsman committed grave compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.19 Said exercise of powers is based
abuse of discretion in ruling that: (a) the offense leveled against respondents upon his constitutional mandate20 and the courts will not interfere in its
has prescribed; and (b) no probable cause exists against respondents. exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions
The petition is partly meritorious.
seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the
Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to
the subject complaint on the ground of prescription. review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time
they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.21
Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors and Officers of
NOCOSII are charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019, a special law.
Amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,11 increased the While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the
prescriptive period from ten to fifteen years. prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for
the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2
12 actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when
of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides: the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be
jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9)
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied,22 none
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting apply here.
jeopardy.
The issue of prescription has long been laid to rest in the
aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner,
Loans v. Desierto,13 where the Court held: the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party,
to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave
questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
public officials concerned connived or conspired with the
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.23 The exercise of power must have been
"beneficiaries of the loans.' Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE
done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which
hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not
in contemplation of law.24
from the day of such commission.
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase 'if the same not
be known' in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean 'lack of The disquisition of GIO Diaz-Salcedo, in dismissing the criminal complaint,
knowledge' but that the crime 'is not reasonably knowable' is as approved by Ombudsman Desierto, is worth-quoting, thus:
unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation that defeats or
negates the intent of the law, which is written in a clear and
Taking into consideration the provisions of Administrative Order
unambiguous language and thus provides no room for
14 No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61, the subject transactions
interpretation but only application.
can not be classified as behest.
The Court reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto(2001),15 thus:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to Evaluation of the records of this case reveals that the loans
the February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President acquired by NOCOSII are actually foreign loans from Midland
Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the Bank Ltd. of London. There were no direct loans released by PNB
aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time but merely credit accommodations to guaranty the loans from
the questioned transactions were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. Midland Bank.
No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo v.
Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Anent complainant's claim that the collaterals offered by NOCOSII
Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of are insufficient, it should be noted that under PNB Board
Resolution No. 689 dated July 30, 1975, one of the conditions
those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period
commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after imposed to NOCOSII was the execution of contract assigning all
an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee NOCOSII's share of sugar and molasses to PNB. NOCOSII was
also required to increase its paid up capital at P5,000,000.00 a
on Behest Loans.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980 or a total
of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that prescription is of P25,000,000.00. In addition thereto, the stockholders of
NOCOSII were required to pledge or assign all their present and
interrupted 'when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person. 16
future shares to PNB while the accommodation remains standing.
The proposed plant site which was offered as collateral was
Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992. The estimated to cost P307,903,000.00. The foregoing collaterals
complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5, 1995,17 or offered by NOCOSII are more than sufficient to cover the loans
within three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the of P333,465,260.00.
complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.
Furthermore, since the loan was approved by PNB, it
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of presupposes that all the required clearances were submitted by
discretion in finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it NOCOSII including the clearance from the Office of the President;
must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether and having complied with all the documentary requirements,
there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed NOCOSII became entitled to the release of the loan.
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. 18 Settled is the rule
that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's Complainant further alleged that NOCOSII was undercapitalized
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and because its paid up capital was only P50,000,000.00.
 Complainant, however, failed to consider the other assets of
NOCOSII which also form part of its capital. x x x25

The finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause by the

Ombudsman is borne out by the evidence presented by petitioner: firstly,
there were no direct loans released by PNB but merely credit
accommodations to guaranty NOCOSII's foreign loans from Midland Bank
Ltd. of London; secondly, NOCOSII effectively came under government
control since 1975 when PNB acquired a majority of the voting rights in
NOCOSII and was given the power to appoint a comptroller therein; thirdly,
PNB's credit accommodations to NOCOSII between 1975 and 1981 in the
aggregate sum of P333,465,260.00 were sufficiently secured by: (1) the
Assignment of Subscription Rights and/or Pledge of Shares dated
September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII officers pledged their shares of stock,
representing 90% of NOCOSII's subscribed capital stock, and assigned their
subscription rights to future stocks in favor of PNB; 26 (2) the Deed of
Assignment dated September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII assigned its share
of sugar and molasses from the operation of its sugar central located
at Barrio Mateo, Matalam, North Cotabato in favor of PNB;27 (3) the Joint
and Solidary Agreement dated September 5, 1975 whereby the NOCOSII
officers bound themselves jointly and severally liable with the corporation for
the payment of NOCOSII's obligations to PNB;28 (4) the Real Estate
Mortgage dated October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various
buildings, machineries and equipments, otherwise known as the NOCOSII
Sugar Mill Plant, with an estimated value of P307,593,000.00 in favor of
PNB;29 and (5) the Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney dated October
2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various transportation, agricultural
and heavy equipment in favor of the PNB;30fourthly, PNB imposed other
conditions, such as, (1) the submission by NOCOSII of the Central Bank's
approval of its foreign loans; (2) the submission by NOCOSII of the required
clearances from the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)
and/or Presidential Committee on Sugar Industry (PHILSUGIN); (3)
submission by NOCOSII of its milling contracts covering a total area of not
less than 14,000 hectares; (4) submission by NOCOSII of the government
permit that the planters can cultivate the required hectarage; (5) further
increase in NOCOSII's total paid-in capital to P25,000,000.00
at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980; (6)
deposit in NOCOSII's account with the PNB of all cash proceeds of
NOCOSII's foreign loans the disposition of which shall be subject to the
bank's control; and, (7) designation by the PNB of its own representatives in
NOCOSII's Board of Directors and its own comptroller who shall have the
authority to control all disbursements and receipts of funds of NOCOSII. 31

The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there

is no basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of
the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the
Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be overturned.32

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the

assailed Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of
the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 158131 August 8, 2007
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JOSE V. MARTEL, OLGA S. MARTEL,
and SYSTEMS AND ENCODING CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 filed by the Social Security System (petitioner)
of the Decision2 dated 17 October 2002 and Resolution dated 5 May 2003
of the Court of Appeals. The Decision of 17 October 2002 affirmed the ruling
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing petitioners complaint against
respondents Jose V. Martel, Olga S. Martel and five other individuals 3 for
violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of Republic Act
No. 1161 (RA 1161),4 as amended by Republic Act No. 8282 (RA 8282),5 for
non-remittance of contributions to petitioner. The 5 May 2003 Resolution
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Respondents Jose V. Martel and Olga S. Martel (respondent Martels) are
directors of respondent Systems and Encoding Corporation (SENCOR), an
information technology firm, with respondent Jose V. Martel serving as
Chairman of the Board of Directors. Petitioner is a government-owned and
controlled corporation mandated by its charter, RA 1161, to provide financial
benefits to private sector employees. SENCOR is covered by RA 1161, as
amended by RA 8282, Section 22 of which requires employers like SENCOR
to remit monthly contributions to petitioner representing the share of the
employer and its employees.
In 1998, petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutors Office a complaint
against respondent Martels and their five co-accused (docketed as I.S. No.
98-L-1534) for SENCORs non-payment of contributions amounting
to P6,936,435.80 covering the period January 1991 to May 1997. To pay
this amount, respondent Martels offered to assign to petitioner a parcel of
land in Tagaytay City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26340
issued under respondent Martels name. Petitioner accepted the offer
"subject to the condition that x x x [respondent Martels] will x x x settle their
obligation either by way of dacion en pago or through cash settlement within
a reasonable time x x x."6 Thus, petitioner withdrew its complaint from the
Pasay City Prosecutors Office but reserved its right to revive the same "in
the event that no settlement is arrived at." Accordingly, the Pasay City
Prosecutors Office dismissed I.S. No. 98-L-1534.
In December 2001, respondent Jose V. Martel wrote petitioner offering, in
lieu of the Tagaytay City property, computer-related services. The record
does not disclose petitioners response to this new offer but on 7 December
2001, petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutors Office another
complaint against respondent Martels and their five co-accused (docketed
as I.S. No. 00-L-7142) for SENCORs non-remittance of contributions, this
time from February 1991 to October 2000 amounting to P21,148,258.30.
In their counter-affidavit, respondent Martels and their co-accused alleged
that petitioner is estopped from holding them criminally liable since petitioner
had accepted their offer to assign the Tagaytay City property as payment of
SENCORs liability. Thus, according to the accused, the relationship
between SENCOR and petitioner was "converted" into an ordinary debtor-
creditor relationship through novation.
The Ruling of the Pasay City Prosecutors Office
In the Resolution of 28 February 2001, Pasay City Assistant Prosecutor
Artemio Puti (Prosecutor Puti) found probable cause to indict respondent
Martels for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of
RA 1161, as amended by RA 8282.7 Prosecutor Puti rejected respondent
Martels claim of "negation" of criminal liability by novation, holding that (1)
SENCORs criminal liability was already "consummated" before respondent
Martels offered to pay SENCORs liability and (2) the dacion en
pago involving the Tagaytay City property did not materialize. Prosecutor
Puti noted that respondent Martels did not dispute petitioners claim on
SENCORs non-remittance of contributions.8 Accordingly, the Pasay City
Prosecutors Office filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City the
corresponding Information against respondent Martels, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 01-0517.
Respondent Martels appealed to the DOJ.
The Ruling of the Department of Justice
In the Resolution dated 18 May 2001 signed by DOJ Undersecretary Manuel
A.J. Teehankee, the DOJ granted respondent Martels appeal, set aside
Prosecutor Putis Resolution of 28 February 2001, and ordered the
withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 01-0517. The DOJ
found that respondent Martels and petitioner entered into a compromise
agreement before the filing of the Information in Criminal Case No. 01-0517
and that such "negated" any criminal liability on respondent Martels part.
The DOJ Resolution pertinently reads:
From the facts obtaining, it cannot be denied that the dismissal of
the first complaint docketed as I.S. No. 98-L-1534 constituted the
compromise agreement between the parties whereby
complainant SSS agreed to respondents mode of settling their
liability through a "dacion en pago". Consequently, the original
relation between the parties was converted to that of an ordinary
creditor-debtor relationship thereby extinguishing the original
obligation by a new one. Complainant, therefore, cannot insist on
the original trust it had with respondents existing prior to the
dismissal of the former complaint (I.S. No. 98-L-1534) by filling
[sic] the present complaint (I.S. No. 00-L-7142 now subject of this
appeal). Incidentally, this Office considers the latter complaint as
a mere refilling [sic] of the former already compromised and
dismissed [complaint], because of the similarity of the parties and
causes of action.
After the dismissal of the complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-1534 and prior
to the filing of the complaint at bar docketed as 00-L-7142,
respondents have exerted great effort towards complying with the
terms and conditions of the compromise by way of "dacion en
pago". For example, respondents cite their arrangement for ocular
inspection of the Tagaytay land by the Presidential Commission
on Tagaytay-Taal and with the Municipal Engineer of Laurel,
Batangas. The approval of the said commission to build a 12-
storey building had been complied with. This is not disputed by
complainant. Access roads were acquired by respondents from
adjacent owners, ready to be titled in complainants name. Papers
and permits like ecological impact certification, site resurvey, soil
test and site appraisal were secured from various offices like the
Municipality of Laurel, the Municipal Engineer, the Presidential
Commission on Tagaytay-Taal, the Philippine Volcanology
Commission, the Bureau of Lands and the Department of
Agriculture, among others.
On the part of complainant, it equally shows [sic] adherence to the
agreement to compromise. Records show that on October 1999,
one of its officers, Atty. Mariano Pablo S. Tolentino, assistant vice-
president, had expressed in writing his finding to the effect that
"(they) are satisfied to see the lot that (respondents) have
negotiated with Congressman Dumpit that (respondents) offered
as access road to (respondents[]) property" (Annex "8" of Petition
for Review). And, as borne by the records, a Dacion En Pago
Committee had been created by complainant SSS precisely to set
the mechanism of the settlement in motion. Further, respondents
proposed an alternative mode of settlement through computer-
related services, which proposal was submitted to complainant as
late as December 1, 2000.
Verily, the foregoing facts indelibly show that the parties had acted
with an obvious intention to compromise. Hence, respondents
reliance on the doctrine of incipient criminal liability had [sic]
factual and legal bases. While the rule provides that novation does
not extinguish criminal liability, this rule, however holds true only
if a criminal information is already filed in court. Before that bench
mark point, the criminal liability is only at its incipient stage and
the new relation between the parties forged at such stage had the
effect of negating the criminal liability of the offender (People vs.
Galsim, People vs. Trinidad, 53 OG 731). x x x x
 In fine, the compromise agreement between the parties whereby
respondents obligation will be settled through a "dacion en pago"
and the dismissal of the complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-1534 has [sic]
all the earmarks of novation negating respondents criminal
liability. Ergo, complainant is precluded from filing the present
criminal complaint against respondents.9
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the DOJ denied its motion in the
Resolution of 20 September 2001.
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of
the means recognized by the Penal Code whereby criminal
liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation may
only be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast
doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction,
whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise
to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to
appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to x
x x.16(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, novation has been invoked to reverse convictions in cases where an

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari.
underlying contract initially defined the relation of the parties such as the
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
contract in sale on commission in Estafa cases 17 or the contract in sale of
In its Decision of 17 October 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DOJs
goods in cases of violation of the Trust Receipts Law. 18 Further, the party
rulings and dismissed petitioners petition. The appellate court deferred to
invoking novation must prove that the new contract did indeed take effect.19
the DOJs power to review rulings of prosecutors and held that in reversing
Prosecutor Putis findings, the DOJ did not act with grave abuse of
discretion.10 The facts of this case negate the application of novation. In the first place,
there is, between SENCOR and petitioner, no original contract that can be
replaced by a new contract changing the object or principal condition of the
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the appellate court denied its motion
original contract, substituting the person of the debtor, or subrogating a third
in the Resolution of 5 May 2003.
person in the rights of the creditor. The original relationship between
SENCOR and petitioner is defined by law RA 1161, as amended which
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in requires employers like SENCOR to make periodic contributions to petitioner
affirming the DOJs rulings because (1) respondent Martels were charged under pain of criminal prosecution. Unless Congress enacts a law further
not with Estafa but with violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to amending RA 1161 to give employers a chance to settle their overdue
Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended, a special law impressed with public contributions to prevent prosecution, no amount of agreements between
interest; (2) petitioner did not agree to settle respondent Martels criminal petitioner and SENCOR (represented by respondent Martels) can change
liability; and (3) novation serves only to negate civil, but not criminal, liability. the nature of their relationship and the consequence of SENCORs non-
payment of contributions.
In their Comment, respondent Martels countered that the DOJ correctly
applied the concept of novation as they had settled SENCORs liability. The indispensability of a prior contractual relation between the complainant
Respondent Martels added that as of the filing of their Comment, they had and the accused as requisite for the application of novation in criminal cases
already paid P17,887,442.54 of SENCORs liability. was underscored in People v. Tanjutco.20 In that case, the accused, who
was charged with Qualified Theft, invoked People v. Nery to support his
claim that the complainants acceptance of partial payment of the stolen
In its Reply, petitioner contended that although respondent Martels funds before the filing of the Information with the trial court converted his
attempted to pay SENCORs overdue contributions through dacion en pago,
liability into a civil obligation thus rendering baseless his prosecution. The
no payment took place, as evidenced by respondent Martels alternative Court rejected this claim and held that unlike in Nery, there was, in that case,
offer to provide computer related services to petitioner instead of assigning no prior "contractual relationship or bilateral agreement, which can be
the Tagaytay City realty. On respondent Martels partial payment of
modified or altered by the parties," thus:
SENCORs liability, petitioner contended that such does not preclude the
resolution of this petition.
The Issue Reliance on the aforecited Nery case, in support of the contention
The issue is whether the concept of novation serves to abate the prosecution that the acceptance by complainant of payment converted the
of respondent Martels for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to liability of the accused-appellant into a civil obligation or else that
Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended. it estopped said complainant from proceeding with the prosecution
The Ruling of the Court of the case, is misplaced and unwarranted.
We rule in the negative and accordingly grant the petition.
The Concept of Novation Finds No Application Here
[I]n the Nery case, which is an action for estafa, there
Novation, a civil law concept relating to the modification of
11 was contractual relationship between the parties that can be
obligations, takes place when the parties to an existing contract execute a
validly novated by the settlement of the obligation of the
new contract which either changes the object or principal condition of the
offender. Whatever was said in that case, therefore, cannot
original contract, substitutes the person of the debtor, or subrogates a third
12 be invoked in the present case where no contractual
person in the rights of the creditor. The effect is either to modify or
relationship or bilateral agreement, which can be modified or
extinguish the original contract. In its extinctive form, the new obligation
altered by the parties, is involved. There is here merely a
replaces the original, extinguishing the obligors obligations under the old
13 taking of the complainants property by one who never
contract.
acquired juridical possession thereof, qualified by grave
abuse of confidence.21 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing
This Court first recognized the possibility of applying the concept of novation and underscoring supplied)
to criminal cases in People v. Nery,14involving a case for Estafa. In that case,
the Court observed that although novation is not one of the means
Similarly, there is here merely an employers failure to pay its contributions
recognized by the Revised Penal Code to extinguish criminal liability, 15 it
to a government corporation as mandated by that corporations charter.
may "prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature
of the original basic transaction," provided the novation takes place before
the filing of the Information with the trial court. We held: Secondly, as Prosecutor Puti correctly noted, the agreement between
petitioner and respondent Martels for the latter to pay SENCORs overdue
contributions through the assignment to petitioner of a piece of realty never
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the
materialized. Petitioners acceptance of respondent Martels offer was
criminal information in court by the state prosecutors because up
subject to a suspensive condition that "x x x [private] respondents will x x x
to that time the original trust relation may be converted by the
settle their obligation either by way of dacion en pago or through cash
parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing
settlement within a reasonable time x x x." This condition was not met
the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust. But after
because three years after respondent Martels offer, petitioner did not
the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and
receive any payment. In fact, respondent Jose Martel, at that point, changed
instituted action in court, the offended party may no longer divest
the terms of the supposed settlement by offering computer-related services
the prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, as
instead of assigning the Tagaytay City realty. In their Comment to the
distinguished from the civil. The crime being an offense against
petition, respondent Martels explained that they made such alternative offer
the state, only the latter can renounce it x x x.
because "the processing of the papers for the Tagaytay property met with
some delay."22 In short, respondent Martels failed to make good on their
promise in 1998 to settle SENCORs liability through dacion en pago. The
circumstances the DOJ cited as proof of the compromise agreements
alleged implementation were nothing but steps preparatory to the actual
payment of SENCORs overdue contributions.

In sum, we hold that any payment respondent Martels would have made to
petitioner (and it appears that pending this petition, respondent Martels
partially paid SENCORs liability) only affects their civil, if any, but not their
criminal liability for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section
28(e) of RA 1161, as amended. As noted in the Resolution dated 28
February 2001 of the Pasay City Prosecutors Office, respondent Martels do
not dispute SENCORs non-remittance of contributions from February 1991
to October 2000. Thus, the existence of probable cause against respondent
Martels, SENCORs directors,23 is beyond doubt.

Prosecutors Findings Not Conclusive

In dismissing petitioners petition, the Court of Appeals held:

[T]his Court has no power to determine whether probable cause

to warrant prosecution exist or not. x x x [T]he determination of
whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution
in court of [respondent Martels] should be consigned and
entrusted to the Department of Justice as reviewer of the findings
of the public prosecutor x x x.

In this Petition, We are being asked to assume the function of

Public Prosecutor by determining whether probable cause exists
or not. Such is a function that this Court should not be called upon
to perform x x x.24

This is a misstatement of the law. This Court and the Court of Appeals
possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary
investigations.25 Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of
deference to the prosecutors findings,26 courts should never shirk from
exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine
whether the prosecutors findings are supported by the facts, or as in this
case, by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs
of the judiciary, exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant
statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the
exercise of this Courts review power ensures that, on the one hand,
probable criminals are prosecuted27 and, on the other hand, the innocent are
spared from baseless prosecution.28

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated

17 October 2002 and Resolution dated 5 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals.
We REINSTATE the Resolution dated 28 February 2001 of the Pasay City
Prosecutors Office.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION that in particular the above-mentioned Decision ruled that the
G.R. Nos. 165510-33 July 28, 2006 herein informations may be quashed because the officer who filed
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, the same had no authority to do so; and that the said Decision has
vs. become final and executory on November 29, 2002, these cases
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the are considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the
Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD archives.
GOVERNMENT, respondents.
RESOLUTION
The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Sandiganbayan6 where petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayans Order
For resolution is petitioners Motion for Reconsideration1 assailing the
dated June 8, 2000 in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 which denied his
Decision dated September 23, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
Motion to Quash, terminated the preliminary investigation conducted by
Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero and set his arraignment for violations of Section
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 12, 7 of RA No. 3019 on June 26, 2000.7 In annulling and setting aside the
2004 and September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, are aforesaid Order of the Sandiganbayan, we held that:
AFFIRMED.
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere
SO ORDERED.2 remediable defect of form, as in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where
the wording of the certification in the information was found
inadequate, or in People v. Marquez, where the required
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its
certification was absent. Here, the informations were filed by an
discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for
unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured even by
violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid
Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the
information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the
criminal proceedings.8
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of
prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there
is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan9 petitioners Motion to
quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031- Quash and directed the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429
28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04- because the informations were filed by an unauthorized party, hence void.
23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on
the ground of prescription.
In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and
applicable. Thus:
In its Comment,3 the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the
informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another
petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new
prosecution; exception. An order sustaining the motion to quash
informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause
is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless
in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint
the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3(g) and
with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987
(i)10 of this Rule.
and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted
the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines
from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of
91 of the Revised Penal Code. criminal liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another
information for a crime constituting the same facts. Indeed, we held in Cudia
v. Court of Appeals11 that:
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment 4 that, in accordance with the
1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or
for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint
petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form
the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot
Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information,
when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar in
which answers the same in the negative, should be applied. petitioners subsequent prosecution. x x x.12

The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a
nullity; and (2) whether the offenses for which petitioner are being charged
have already prescribed.
Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case
Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid proceeding despite the previous dismissal
thereof by the Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution5 dated February 10,
2004 which reads:
Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T.
ROMUALDEZ
Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in
G.R. Nos. 143618-41, entitled "Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez vs.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division, et al.)"
promulgated on July 30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the
issued by this Court on June 8, 2000 which, among others, denied above-referred preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision
the accuseds motion to quash the informations in these cases;
Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman in the instant cases was not a violation of petitioners right to
be informed of the charges against him. It is of no moment that the cases
investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those
cases which have already been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429. As we have previously stated:
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed
for efficient record keeping. It is usually written in the Docket
Record in sequential order corresponding to the date and time of
filing a case.
This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the
dismissed cases was merely for reference. In fact, after the new
informations were filed, new docket numbers were
assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 x x x.13
in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan14 when we categorically declared therein SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
that: commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion
when it abruptly terminated the reinvestigation being conducted
by Prosecutor Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
based on our ruling that the right to a preliminary investigation is the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
a substantive, rather than a procedural right. Petitioners right was jeopardy.
violated when the preliminary investigation of the charges against
him were conducted by an officer without jurisdiction over the said
In the case of People v. Duque,24 we construed the aforequoted provision,
cases. It bears stressing that our directive should be strictly
specifically the rule on the running of the prescriptive period as follows:
complied with in order to achieve its objective of affording
petitioner his right to due process.15
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment" may be either disregarded as
Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first
surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word "until."
resolve the question of whether this Court may validly take cognizance of
Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
and resolve the aforementioned issue considering that as we have said in
the assailed Decision, "this case has never progressed beyond the filing of
the informations against the petitioner"16and that "it is only prudent that "Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
evidence be gathered through trial on the merits to determine whether the commission of the violation of the law; and if the same
17
offense charged has already prescribed." We reconsider our stance and be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;"
shall rule in the affirmative.
or as:
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time
before he enters his plea, move to quash the complaint and information18 on
the ground that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished,19 which "Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
ground includes the defense of prescription considering that Article 89 of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
Revised Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of those grounds which
totally extinguishes criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial and until institution of judicial proceedings for its
on the merits of a criminal case, the accused can very well invoke the investigation and punishment." (Emphasis supplied)25
defense of prescription.
Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein
Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject began to run from the discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date
criminal cases have prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v. of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
Sandiganbayan20 that: against the petitioner with the PCGG.

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the In the case26of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for v. Desierto this Court already took note that:
the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts
to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. 21 In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to
the February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for
failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967- aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time
1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person
would have dared to question the legality of those transactions.
and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the
Department of Foreign Affairs. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive
investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall Loans.27
prescribe in 15 years. Significantly, this Court already declared in the case
of People v. Pacificador22 that:
However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive
R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, period for the alleged offenses from running.
1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the
said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive
period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. We disagree.
3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for
the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence
accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive of the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive
effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) period. The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean that Section
years from January 6, 1976.23 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike
the explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as previously held:
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to
March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap
for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume
March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years. otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative
lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. the guise of the interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and
include therein situations not provided nor intended by the
3326 which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by
and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides: lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after
later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not
 authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or amendment, should run only after petitioner returned to this
to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.
attention has been called to the omission.28
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article
The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with 10 of the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long
the PCGG in 1987 as well as the filing of the informations with the line of decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus,
Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989 the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when the to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the matters
Ombudsman directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is
the offenses have already prescribed. thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in
2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted
"when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person." However, there He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of
is no such proceeding instituted against the petitioner to warrant the tolling the Majority Opinion and argues that
of the prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him.
The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,29 petitioner averred that PCGG acted own prosecution by the simple expedient of escaping from the
without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in conducting a States jurisdiction. x x x An accused cannot acquire legal
preliminary investigation of cases not falling within its competence.30 This immunity by being a fugitive from the States jurisdiction. x x x.
Court, in its resolve to "deal with the merits of the case to remove the
possibility of any misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving
petitioners cases in the Sandiganbayan to take"31declared invalid
this jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in
favor of the accused to the detriment of the States ability to
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 investigate and prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and
offenses ascribed to Romualdez (of failure to file annual accessible global travel, this Court should not encourage
statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction of said individuals facing investigation or prosecution for violation of
offenses.32 special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the
prescriptive period. The majority opinion unfortunately chooses to
lay the basis for such anomalous practice.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,33 petitioner assailed the validity of the
informations filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 considering that the same were subscribed and filed by the PCGG. With all due respect, we beg to disagree.
In granting petitioners plea, this Court held, thus:
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect
cannot be cured by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code.
information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
proceedings.34
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General should specially provide the contrary.
Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan
in 1989 is judicially settled. In contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law
that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
such as RA No. 3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any
and all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his Dissenting Opinion
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription that
is that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate
body or office. Thus, in the case of People v. Maravilla,35 this Court ruled
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article
that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes of
10 of the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long
preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of
line of decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus,
prescription. Similarly, in the case of Llenes v. Dicdican,36 this Court held
the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC
that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with the Ombudsman
to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the matters
tolled the running of the period of prescription.
in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is
thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the
prescriptive periods.
However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the
Revised Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds
However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the relevance only when the provisions of the special law are silent on a
offenses charged against the petitioner could not have prescribed because particular matteras evident from the cases cited and relied upon in the
the latter was absent from the Philippines from 1986 to April 27, 2000 and Dissenting Opinion:
thus the prescriptive period did not run from the time of discovery on May 8,
1987, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "[t]he
In the case of People v. Moreno,37 this Court, before ruling that the
term of prescription should not run when the offender is absent from the
subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code may be
Philippine Archipelago."
applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that the
Mr. Justice Carpio argues that defendant can be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 "x x x supplementary
to [special laws], unless the latter should x x x provide the In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung,38 this Court applied the rules on the
contrary." Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the supplementary service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in
application of Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of RA No.
prescriptive period in Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack of similar
rules under the special law.
In the case of People v. Chowdury,39 the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and
19 of the Revised Penal Code to define the words "principal," "accomplices"
and "accessories" under RA No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not defined therein although it referred
to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal
recruitment.
According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills
the so-called "gap" in Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the
operation of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019, Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied in cases where the
accused is absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would
supplement Act No. 3326.

In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.
not the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents or tolls the
running of the prescriptive period is more apparent than real.
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code
suppletory to special laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was of "special law" as contemplated and used in Article 10 of the RPC.
already in effect as early as December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof
categorically defines "special acts" as "acts defining and penalizing
In the case of United States v. Serapio,42 the Court had the occasion to
violations of the law not included in the Penal Code".
interpret the term "special laws" mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code
of the Philippines, which is now Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as
Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest referring to penal laws that punish acts not defined and penalized by the
Loans v. Desierto,40 this Court was categorical in ruling that Penal Code of the Philippines. Thus

The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as
of the Revised Penal Code for offenses punishable thereunder. that phrase is used in article 7 of the Penal Code. Does this phrase
For those penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies. "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) have the
meaning applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is
generally used? x x x It is confidently contended that the phrase
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run
"leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) is not
from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
used with this general signification: In fact, said phrase may refer
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
not to a special law as above defined, but to a general law. A
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of
careful reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that the phrase
the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are
"leyes especiales" was not used to signify "special laws" in the
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
general signification of that phrase. The article, it will be noted,
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
simply says, in effect, that when a crime is made punishable under
jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the
some other law than the Penal Code, it (the crime) is not subject
absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the
to the provisions of said code.43
prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the
foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider
the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA
running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To No. 3019, the same result would obtain. A conflict will arise from the
elaborate, - contemporaneous application of the two laws. The Revised Penal Code
explicitly states that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall
be a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the
not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it
express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
specifically and directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal
excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
Code shall apply to special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its
do not provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of statutory
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
construction dictate that special legal provisions must prevail over general
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
ones.
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been
not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpios reservations about the effects of
expressly mentioned.41 ruling that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall not suspend
the running of the prescriptive period. Our duty, however, is only to interpret
the law. To go beyond that and to question the wisdom or effects of the law
Had the legislature intended to include the accuseds absence from the
is certainly beyond our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already
Philippines as a ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period in
explained
special laws, the same could have been expressly provided in Act No. 3326.
A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 where the
legislature made its intention clear and was thus categorical that Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap
caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume
otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this
lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in
Code All violations of any provision of this Code shall prescribe
the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and
after five (5) years.
include therein situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its
attention has been called to the omission.44
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty persons and shall begin to run again if Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting of limitations in favor of the accused only relates to the following issues: (1)
jeopardy. retroactive or prospective application of laws providing or extending the
prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the felony
committed vis--vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the reckoning
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is
of when the prescriptive period runs. Therefore, the aforementioned
absent from the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
principle cannot be utilized to support the Majority Opinions conclusion that
the prescriptive period in a special law continues to run while the accused is
abroad.
We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal
cases equally provides the authority for the rule that the prescriptive period
runs while the accused is outside of Philippine jurisdiction. The nature of the
law on prescription of penal statutes supports this conclusion. In the old but
still relevant case of People v. Moran,45 this Court extensively discussed the
rationale behind and the nature of prescription of penal offenses
"We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in
applying to statutes of limitation in criminal suits the construction
that has been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two
classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits
the statute is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter
between two contending parties. In the construction of the statute,
therefore, there is no intendment to be made in favor of either
party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is therefore no
grantor against whom the ordinary presumptions, of construction
are to be made. But it is, otherwise when a statute of limitation is
granted by the State. Here the State is the grantor, surrendering
by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense
to be no longer the subject of prosecution.' The statute is not a
statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but
an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall
be cast over the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty
to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a
citizen and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve
the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are
blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally
construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such
liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace,
but because the very existence of the statute, is a recognition and
notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually
wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and
positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently
of these views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting
prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of
peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by
mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the
law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes,
enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained.
They are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the
State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and
to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be
obtained." (Emphasis supplied)
The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and
grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after
a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense;
that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his
country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and
that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the
proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are
blotted out. Hence, it is that statues of limitation are to
be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only
because such liberality of construction belongs to all
acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very
existence of the statute is a recognition and notification
by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually
wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed
and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.47
In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods
in the instant case, were not interrupted by any event from the time they
began to run on May 8, 1987. As a consequence, the alleged offenses
committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982 prescribed 10 years
from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged offenses
committed by the petitioner for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years
from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.
Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by
requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses
subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right
to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-
28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-
23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending
before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Azcuna, J.J., concur.

Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits

accruing from the liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal
statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality of the State. Any bar to or
cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot simply
be implied nor derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this
endowment must be directly and expressly sanctioned by the source itself,
the State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee
thereof, the accused.

The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on

prescription. The exceptions to the running of or the causes for the
interruption of the prescriptive periods may and should not be easily implied.
The prescriptive period may only be prevented from operating or may only
be tolled for reasons explicitly provided by the law.

In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we ruled that:

It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the

interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is
more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The said legal
principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription
of crimes which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of
the state in favor of the offender. In the case of People v. Moran,
this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of limitations
in criminal cases, as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 100285 August 13, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NAPOLEON DUQUE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Trinidad, Reverente, Makalintal, Cabrera and Monsod Law Office for
accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Appellant Napoleon Duque was charged with and convicted of violating
Section 38 in relation to Section 39 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, known
as The Labor Code of the Philippines. The charge of illegal recruitment
was set out in the information in the following terms:
That on or about and/or sometime in January 1986, at Calamba, Laguna and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused
well knowing that he is not licensed nor authorized by the proper government
agency (POEA) to engage in recruitment of workers for placement abroad,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Glicerio
Teodoro, Agustin Ulat, Ernesto Maunahan, Norma Francisco, Elmo Alcaraz
and Marcelino Desepida as workers abroad exacted and actually received
money from the above-named victims, to their damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law. 1
The evidence in chief of the prosecution consisted principally of the
testimony of the following witnesses: Agustin Ulat, Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Before this Court, appellant Duque raises only one (1) issue: that of
Desepida and Norma Francisco. Their testimonies were summarized in the prescription of the criminal offense for which he was convicted.
trial court's decision as follows:
. . . sometime in January 1986, he (Agustin Ulat) was invited by the accused
to his house in Calamba, Laguna. Thereat accused informed him that he
was recruiting workers for Saudi Arabia and that he was interested in getting
(sic) him. Accused likewise presented to him that he (accused) was a
licensed recruiter (TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 6-7). The accused told him to
secure his birth certificate, an NBI clearance and medical certificate. He was
able to secure an NBI clearance which he showed to the accused. The latter
thereafter told him that he would secure the rest of his papers like passport,
visa and medical certificate for him and for this, accused asked him to
prepare the amount of P20,000.00. He did not have that money, so he
mortgaged his lot for P20,000.00 to the cousin of the accused, Socorro
Arlata. He immediately gave this amount to the accused who assured him
that he would be able to leave within two months. The accused did not issue
a receipt for that amount despite his request. He did not persist in asking the
accused because he trusted him, accused coming from an affluent family
and a member of a well-known Catholic organization, the "Cursillo" (TSN, 22
Oct. 1990, pp. 4-9). However, accused failed to employ him at Saudi Arabia
within two months despite repeated promise (sic) to do so. Thus, he
demanded the return of his money but accused failed. Finally, he decided,
together with the other complainants, to file a complaint against accused
before the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). . . .
Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco individually
testified to the following: sometime also in January 1986, they went to the
house of accused for work abroad as the latter had earlier told them that he
was recruiting workers for the Saudi Arabia. The accused asked money to
process their papers. Alcaraz was able to give the accused on 22 February
1986 the amount of P5,000.00, but the accused failed to issue him a receipt
and he did not persist in asking for it because he trusted the accused on
(TSN, 5 Nov. 1990, pp. 5-7). Desepida was able to give the accused on 18
Feb. 1986, the amount of P7,000.00 as placement fee for which the accused
did not issue a receipt although he promised to issue one the next day.
However, the following day, when he reminded the accused of the receipt,
he refused saying that he (Desepida) should trust [the accused]. Francisco
was able to give the accused P9,000.00 on 21 February 1986 in the
presence of the other applicants (TSN, 26 Nov. 1990, p. 5). But, the accused
again failed to issue a receipt despite demand. She was told by the accused
to trust him (Ibid., p. 6). However, the accused failed to return their money
notwithstanding. Thus, all of them decided to file a complaint with the POEA
against the accused. There, they executed a joint affidavit (Exh. "A"). 2
During the trial, Duque denied the charges. He controverted the allegation
that he had recruited complainants for overseas employment. He also
denied that he had received any monies in consideration of promised
employment. However, he acknowledged that his house had served as a
meeting place for a certain Delfin and one Engr. Acopado who allegedly
were the persons who had promised complainants, work abroad.
On the basis of the positive identification by private complainants of
appellant Duque as the person they had talked to for placement abroad, the
person who had collected fees from them and who had received information
from them needed for arranging their departure for abroad, the trial court
concluded that accused Duque was primarily responsible for promising
placement and inducing private complainants to part with their money. The
prosecution also submitted a certification from the licensing branch of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") stating that no
records existed whatsoever of a grant to the accused of a license or authority
to recruit for overseas employment. The dispositive part of the decision
reads:
Wherefore, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, [of] violation of [Art.] 38 in relation to
[Art.] 39 of P.D. 442 otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines, and hereby sentences the
accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
a fine of P100,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to indemnify the offended
parties: Agustin Ulat the amount of P20,000.00;
Marcelino Desepida the amount of P7,000.00; Norma
Francisco the amount of P9,000.00; and Elmo Alcaraz
the amount of P3,000.00 and the cost of suit. 3
The recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary
recruiting permit or authority form the POEA constitutes a crime penalized,
not by the Revised Penal Code, but rather by a special law, i.e., Article 38 in
relation to Article 290 of the Labor Code. Article 290 of the Labor Code
provides, in relevant part, that:
Art. 290. Offenses penalized under this Code and the
rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall
prescribe in three (3) years.
xxx xxx xxx
The Labor Code, however, does not contain any provisions on the mode of
computation of the three-year prescriptive period it established.
The Solicitor General states, and we agree with him, that Act No. 3326, as
amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin to Run" (emphasis supplied), supplied the
applicable norm. 4 Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, reads as follows:
Section 2: . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
Examination of the abovequoted Section 2 shows that there are two (2) rules
for determining the beginning of the prescriptive period: (a) on the day of the
commission of the violation, if such commission be known; and (b) if the
commission of the violation was not known at the time, then from discovery
thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and
punishment. Appellant Duque contends that the prescriptive period in the
case at bar commenced from the time money in consideration of promises
for overseas employment was parted with by complainants. Duque thus Here appellant has a point. However, it should be noted, firstly, that the literal
contends that the prescriptive period began to run sometime in January reading that appellant suggests, does not benefit appellant, for the
1986. The information was, however, filed by the Assistant Provincial prescriptive period in the case at bar had not in any case been exhausted
Prosecutor of Laguna on 22 May 1990, i.e., more than four (4) years later. since prosecution of appellant commenced only a few months after the
Duque concludes that the offense of illegal recruitment had accordingly POEA and the complainants had discovered that appellant had no
prescribed by May 1990. governmental authority to recruit for overseas work and was merely
pretending to recruit workers for overseas employment and to receive
money therefor, i.e., that appellant did not even attempt to locate
We are not persuaded. Article 38 of the Labor Code as amended reads as
employment abroad for complainants. Secondly, we do not think there is any
follows:
real need for such a literal reading of Section 2. As is well-known, initiation
of proceedings for preliminary investigation of the offense normally marks
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the the interruption of the period of prescription. Under appellant Duque's literal
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to reading, the prescription period would both begin and be interrupted by the
be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed same occurrence; the net effect would be that the prescription period would
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor not have effectively begun, having been rendered academic by the
and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints simultaneous interruption of that same period. A statute providing for
under this Article. prescription of defined criminal offenses is more than a statute of repose and
constitutes an act of grace by which the State, after the lapse of a certain
period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall
A statute on prescription of crimes is an act of liberality on the part of the
be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be State in favor of the offender. 5 The applicable well-known principles of
penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof. statutory interpretation are that statutes must be construed in such a way as
to give effect to the intention of the legislative authority, 6 and so as to give
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a a sensible meaning to the language of the statute and thus avoid
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one nonsensical or absurd results, 7 departing to the extent unavoidable from the
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or literal language of the statute. Appellant's literal reading would make
scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is nonsense of Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group. In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of
such non-license or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and
commission of the violation of the law; and if the same
public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;
shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, or as:
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
activities and the closure of companies, establishments and entities found to commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
having been licensed or authorized to do so. (Emphasis supplied)
and until institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that illegal recruitment has two (2) basic elements, to wit: (a)
recruitment activities as listed in Articles 38 and 34 of the Labor Code; and
We believe and so hold that the applicable prescriptive period in the case at
(b) the lack of the necessary license or authority from the POEA to engage bar began to run from the time the recruitment activities of appellant Duque
in such activities. Recruitment for overseas employment is not in itself were ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been
necessarily immoral or unlawful. It is the lack of necessary license or permit
carried out without any license or authority from the government. The
that renders such recruitment activities unlawful and criminal. Such lack of discovery by the complainants and by the POEA was, as a practical matter,
necessary permit or authority, while certainly known to appellant Duque back simultaneous in character and occurred sometime in December 1989 when
in January 1986, was not known to private complainants at that time. Indeed,
the complainants went to the POEA with the complaint for recovery of the
private complainants discovered that appellant did not possess such placement fees and expenses they had paid to appellant Duque, and the
authority or permit only when they went to the offices of the POEA for the POEA, acting upon that complaint, discovered and informed the private
purpose of filing a claim for return of the money they had delivered to
complainants that Duque had operated as a recruiter without the essential
appellant Duque. Since good faith is always presumed, the complainants government license or authority. Accordingly, the offense of illegal
were entitled to assume the appellant Duque was acting in good faith when recruitment had not prescribed when the complaint was filed with the
he presented himself as a recruiter for overseas placement. Even if it be
Provincial Prosecutor's Office in April 1990 and when the information was
assumed arguendo that ordinary prudence required that a person seeking filed in court in May 1990.
overseas employment ought to check the authority or status of persons
pretending to be authorized or to speak for a recruitment or placement
agency, the offended parties' failure to do so did not start the running of the It is relevant to note that the same result would be reached by
prescriptive period. In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special giving supplemental effect to provisions of the Revised Penal Code in the
laws are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this application of Article 290 of the Labor Code. 8 Article 91 of the Revised
reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special law Penal Code reads as follows:
is not known at the time, then prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act
Art. 91. Computation of the prescription of offenses.
or acts.
The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act No. 3326 as illogical or absurd. A offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
literal reading of Section 2 appears to suggest that two (2) elements must be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
coincide for the beginning of the running of the prescriptive period: first, the information, and shall commence to run again when
element of discovery of the commission of the violation of the special law; such proceedings terminate without the accused being
and second, the "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
punishment." It is then argued by appellant that because the co-existence of any reason not imputable to him.
these two (2) requirements is necessary under Section 2 of Act No. 3326,
the relevant prescriptive period would never begin to run.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender
is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the above-quoted Article 91, the prescriptive period in respect of the
offense of illegal recruitment began to run on the date of discovery thereof
by the private complainants and the authorities concerned (POEA)
sometime in December 1989 and was interrupted on 16 April 1990 when the
affidavit-sworn complaint was filed before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, 9 and certainly by May 1990 when the criminal information was
filed in court by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna. Once more,
the appellant's defense of prescription must fail.

Under Section 39 of the Labor Code as amended, the penalty of life

imprisonment is properly imposable where the illegal recruitment is
committed "in large scale," i.e., where it is "committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group." 10 In the case at bar, private
complainants are more than three (3) in number. Moreover, appellant Duque
had represented to the public at large, including private complainants, that
he was a licensed
recruiter.11 Duque's house served as his business office and he asked the
private complainants to see him in his house. 12 There, complainants were
"briefed" as to the requirements for overseas employment before their
supposed departure and were each required to secure a clearance from the
National Bureau of Investigation. 13Considerable sums were collected from
each of the complainants supposedly to "facilitate" the processing of
passports, medical certificates and other working papers. 14 Complainants
were, in addition, shown documents which purported to be job placement
orders. This organized modus operandi was repeated in respect of each of
the complainants and presumably in respect of other persons who were
similarly victimized by appellant. There is no question that the recruitment
activities of Duque were organized and "large scale" in nature. 15

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is

hereby AFFIRMED, with the solemodification that the penalty properly
imposable and hereby imposed is life imprisonment and not reclusion
perpetua. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines Dr. Oliver Leyson, Medical Officer III of the Ospital ng Maynila, testified to
SUPREME COURT his medical examination and treatment of Vergaras injury caused by a
Manila bladed weapon which he sustained on February 11, 2001.12
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 177763 July 3, 2013
After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
December 29, 2001, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond
vs.
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the
GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO1 y
Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of the Decision stated:
PAULINO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations,
this Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused GARY VERGARA
Y ORIEL alias GARY and JOSEPH INOCENCIO Y PAULINO alias JOSEPH
Before this Court is an appeal of the March 30, 2007 Decision2 of the Court
both GUILTY as principal and accomplice, respectively, for the crime of
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 023873 affirming with modification the
Murder, as this felony is defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised
December 29, 2001 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, and appreciating in favor of the
116, Pasay City in Crim. Case No. 01-0275, entitled People of the
accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary the mitigating circumstance of
Philippines v. Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" and Joseph Inocencio y
voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the
Paulino alias "Joseph, " finding accused-appellants Gary Vergara (Vergara)
same, the Court hereby sentences said accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias
and Joseph Inocencio (Inocencio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
Gary to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the other accused
as principal and accomplice, respectively.
Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias Joseph to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
On February 13, 2001, an Information for the crime of murder qualified by Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1)
treachery was filed against accused-appellants. Day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and for them to pay, jointly and
severally the Heirs of the deceased Miguelito Alfante the sums of
Php51,250.00, as actual damages, Php1,020,000.00, as indemnity for loss
On March 12, 2001, upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not
of earnings of the same deceased, Php250,00.00 as moral damages, plus
guilty to the crime charged.5 Trial on the merits ensued.
costs (sic).13

The prosecution established that at around midnight of February 10, 2001,

Accused-appellants filed their notice of appeal on February 5, 2002 to the
accused-appellants were causing a ruckus on Libertad-Colayco Streets,
Supreme Court.14 The appeal was accepted by this Court in its
Pasay City by throwing water bottles at passers-by. At around 2:00 a.m., the
Resolution15 dated September 4, 2002 but was subsequently transferred to
victim, Miguelito Alfante, who was seemingly drunk, walked down the street.
the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.16
Vergara approached Alfante and told him: "Pare, mukhang high na high ka."
Alfante retorted: "Anong pakialam mo?" At this juncture, Vergara threw his
arm around Alfantes shoulder, received a knife from Inocencio, and As in the Court of Appeals, accused-appellants challenge the court a quos
suddenly stabbed Alfante. Vergara then said "Taga rito ako." Thereafter, finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They averred that the elements of
Vergara and Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued by several the crime of murder were not proven.17 On March 30, 2007, the Court of
witnesses. Alfante, meanwhile, was brought to the Pasay City General Appeals affirmed with modification as to the award of damages the Decision
Hospital where he died.6 of the RTC. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal in the following
manner:
The autopsy report conducted on the cadaver of the victim revealed that
Alfante sustained eight stab wounds: five located on the chest area and WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated December 29,
three on the left forearm. The victim sustained two fatal wounds: one which 2001, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region,
severed the left ventricle of the heart and another wound puncturing the Branch 116, Pasay City is AFFIRMED with
lower lobe of the left lung. The Autopsy Report N-01-1517 signed by Dr.
Dominic Agbuda, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants are jointly and severally held
who conducted the autopsy, stated that:
liable to pay the heirs of the victim, to the exclusion of his common-law-wife,
the following amount, to wit:
CAUSE OF DEATH: MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, CHEST, LEFT ARM. a. 50,000.00 as civil indemnification;
b. 50,000.00 as moral damages; and
c. 51,250.00 as actual damages.18
The common-law wife of the victim, Gina Alfante,8 testified that she incurred
Hence, this appeal.19 Accused-appellants confinement was confirmed by
the following expenses in connection with the death and burial of Alfante:
the Bureau of Corrections on April 11, 2007.20
a) 17,000.00 for the coffin
b) 3,000.00 for the nicho
c) 250.00 for the mass The appellee21 manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief.
d) 15,000.00 for food and drinks for the wake; and
e) 16,000.00 for the burial lot.
On May 13, 2008, accused-appellant Joseph P. Inocencio filed a motion to
Gina further testified that Alfante had been working as a mason prior to his
withdraw his appeal stating that he is no longer interested to pursue an
death earning 500.00 a day. 9
appeal.22 This Court, in a Resolution dated June 25, 2008, granted the
motion of appellant Inocencio and declared the case terminated as far as he
In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified is concerned.23
that on February 10, 2001, at around midnight, he and Inocencio went to a
convenience store to buy salted eggs for "baon" the following day. When
Due to the failure of accused-appellant Vergaras counsel to file a
they passed by Libertad corner Colayco Streets in Pasay City to go to the 7-
supplemental brief, the Court, in a Resolution dated November 19, 2008,
11 convenience store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons.
resolved to dispense with its filing.24
Contrary to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, it was Alfante who
approached Vergara, knife in hand and proceeded to stab him. He was able
to evade the attack and grappled with Alfante for possession of the knife We affirm the March 30, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals with
and, in the course of their struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio modification respecting the award of damages.
stood by his side for the duration of the incident. 10 Thereafter, he fled the
scene. He went to the nearest police station and was subsequently brought
to the Ospital ng Maynila for treatment for the injury on his right palm The pertinent provision in this case is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
sustained during the tussle.11 to wit:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of home albeit drunk when he passed by accused-appellants. However, there
Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished is no indication of any untoward action from him to warrant the treatment that
by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following he had by accused-appellant Vergaras hands. As succinctly stated by the
attendant circumstances: RTC:

1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of The victim was just walking, he was neither uttering invectives words nor
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or provoking the appellants into a fight. Appellant Vergara was the unlawful
persons to insure or afford impunity. (Emphasis added.) aggressor. He was the one who put the life of the victim in actual peril. This
can be inferred from the wounds sustained by the victim."32
Jurisprudence is consistent in reiterating that the trial court is in a better
position to adjudge the credibility of witnesses especially if it is affirmed by It is thus clear that there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the
the Court of Appeals.25 People v. Clores26 reminds us that: victim, the act of accused-appellant Vergara of taking a knife and stabbing
the victim was not made in lawful self-defense.
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding
rules some of which are that (1) the Appellate court will not disturb the factual We also agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the acts of
findings of the lower Court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, accused-appellant Vergara constituted treachery qualifying the crime
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and committed to murder. As we have previously ruled upon, treachery is present
substance that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
absent herein; (2) the findings of the Trial Court pertaining to the credibility means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially
of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, which the offended party might make.33
can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who
testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
Here, accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging words with the victim,
remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. (Citations
threw his arm around the victims shoulder and proceeded to stab him. The
omitted.)
victim was totally unaware of the evil that would befall him. The number and
severity of the wounds received by the victim indicated that he was rendered
The rationale for these guidelines is that, having heard the witnesses immobile and without any real opportunity to defend himself other than
themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of feebly raising his arm to ward off the attack. We, thus, sustain the trial court
testifying under grueling examination, the trial courts are in a better position and the Court of Appeals in finding that the qualifying circumstance of
to decide the question of credibility.27 On the other hand, this Court is far treachery is present in the commission of the crime.
detached from the details and drama during trial and relies only on the
records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
witnesses, therefore, this Court admits to its limitations and acknowledges
7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of
the advantage of the trial court whose findings we give due deference.
murder. Though there was an appreciation of voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance, following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. A careful review of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of
records reveals that accused-appellant Vergara failed to negate the findings reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
of the trial court with concrete evidence that it had overlooked, misconstrued Code.34
or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would
have affected the result of the case. We agree with the Court of Appeals
However, to conform to existing jurisprudence the Court must modify the
when it stated that:
amount of indemnity for death and exemplary damages awarded by the
courts a quo.
The death of the victim, Miguelito Alfante, is directly caused by the stab
wounds inflicted by [appellant Vergara] when he placed his left arm on the
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the
shoulder of the victim and stabbed him repeatedly in his chest and left
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
forearm with a knife handed to him by [appellant Inocencio]. This is an
victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
overwhelming evidence, and in stark contrast, all [appellant Vergara] could
exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6)
offer are denial and self-defense. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense,
interest, in proper cases.35
which the accused must buttress with strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credibility. Having failed to satisfy, the denial must necessarily
fail.28 (Citation omitted.) We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim was able to
prove before the trial court, actual damages in the amount of 51,250.00
based on the receipts36 they submitted to the trial court.1wphi1
Anent accused-appellant Vergaras claim of self-defense, the following
essential elements had to be proved: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or We also agree with the Court of Appeals when it removed the RTCs award
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of respecting the indemnity for the loss of earning capacity. As we have already
the person resorting to self-defense.29 A person who invokes self-defense previously ruled that:
has the burden of proof. He must prove all the elements of self-defense.
However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages,
which as a rule must be duly proven by documentary evidence, not merely
self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. 30
by the self-serving testimony of the widow.

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict

By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive
and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-
"presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not merely employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws,
and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceaseds line of
threatening and intimidating action." It is present "only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life."31 work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed
as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.37 (Citations and emphasis omitted.)
In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. By the
testimonies of all the witnesses, the victims actuations did not constitute
unlawful aggression to warrant the use of force employed by accused- In this case, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals
since no documentary evidence was presented to buttress the claim for the
appellant Vergara. The records reveal that the victim had been walking
loss of earning capacity of the victim as claimed by his common-law wife.
Neither was it shown that the victim was covered by the exceptions
mentioned in the above-quoted case. The Court of Appeals stated:

Settled is the rule that actual damages, inclusive of expected earnings lost
caused by the crime, must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty
and on the best evidence to prove obtainable by the injured party. The
prosecution failed to meet this criteria, no witness was presented to support
the contention of the common-law-wife of the victim that the latter is a self-
employed mason earning 500.00 a day. Hence, this Court cannot rely on
the uncorroborated testimony of the common-law-wife of the victim which
lacks specific details or particulars on the claimed loss earnings. 38 (Citation
omitted.)

Moreover, we deem it proper that an award for exemplary damages be

made. We have ruled as follows:

Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended
party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying.
Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to
the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case,
an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.39(Emphasis omitted.)

We, thus, award exemplary damages in the amount of 30,000.00 to

conform to existing jurisprudence.40

We increase the award for mandatory civil indemnity to 75,000.00 to

conform to recent jurisprudence.41

Lastly, we sustain the RTCs award for moral damages in the amount of
50,000.00 even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering
of the victims heirs.42 As borne out by human nature and experience, a
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victims family.43 While no amount of damages
may totally compensate the sudden and tragic loss of a loved one it is
nonetheless awarded to the heirs of the deceased to at least assuage them.

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the
monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.44

WHEREFORE, the March 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02387 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of murder, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Miguelito Alfante the amounts
of 51 ,250.00 as actual damages, 75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
50,000.00 as moral damages, and 30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All
monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6o/o
per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 175781 March 20, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCA TALARO,* GREGORIO TALARO,** NORBERTO (JUN)
ADVIENTO, RENATO RAMOS, RODOLFO DUZON,*** RAYMUNDO
ZAMORA** and LOLITO AQUINO, Accused.
NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, RENATO RAMOS and LOLITO
AQUINO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
promulgated on December, 15, 2005, in accordance with Section 2 of Rule
125, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 56, of the Rules of Court. The CA
affirmed with modification the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 38 of Lingayen, Pangasinan, thereby finding accused-
appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Renato Ramos and Lolito Aquino, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to
death, but acquitting accused Rodolfo Duzon.
Accused-appellants were charged before the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
with the crime of murder under an Information reading as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of April 1994, in the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Laoac, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with each
other, with intent to kill, and with treachery, and evident premeditation, in
consideration of a price, and by means of motor vehicle, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot one MELVIN ALIPIO,
with a handgun hitting the latter in the different parts of his body and the
wounds being mortal caused directly the death of said MELVIN ALIPIO, to
the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.2
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses showed the sequence of events
shortly before and after the killing of victim Melvin Alipio to be as follows.
Raymundo Zamora is the nephew of Gregorio Talaro, the husband of
Francisca Talaro. In the morning of April 24, 1994, when Zamora went home
for breakfast after driving his tricycle, he found Francisca Talaro, Lolito
Aquino, Renato "Atong" Ramos, and Norberto "Jun" Adviento conversing
among themselves under a santol tree in front of his (Zamora's) house. He
went near the group to find out what they were talking about and he learned
that his aunt, Francisca Talaro, was transacting with the other three
accused-appellants for the killing of Atty. Melvin Alipio. He was merely a
meter away from the group so he heard the group's conversation. He learned
that Francisca Talaro would give the three accused-appellants an advance
payment of 30,000.00 and then another 30,000.00 after Atty. Melvin
Alipio is killed, with said last payment to be delivered in Barangay (Brgy.)
Bactad. The three accused-appellants then nodded their heads in
agreement. After learning of the group's plan, Zamora got scared and stayed
away from the group, but three days after that meeting in front of his house,
he was asked by Francisca Talaro to drive her and her husband Gregorio
to Brgy. Bactad. The Talaro spouses alighted at a place in Brgy. Bactad,
while Zamora stayed in his tricycle and merely waited for them. He assumed
that the couple delivered the payment of 30,000.00 to someone in Brgy.
Bactad.3
Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino, when questioned during preliminary
investigation, admitted that he and co-accused Renato Ramos conducted a A few weeks after Atty. Melvin Alipio had been killed, Zamora was in the
surveillance on Atty. Alipio in the afternoon of April 25, 1994. 4 parking lot in Sta. Maria Norte in Binalonan, when accused-appellant Aquino
approached him and told him to remind Francisca Talaro that she still has to
pay him (Aquino) 10,000.00. Zamora then immediately told his uncle
Around 6 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994, tricycle driver Rodolfo Gregorio Talaro about Aquino's message and the very next day, Gregorio
Duzon was at the parking area in the poblacion of Urdaneta waiting for
passengers, when accused-appellant Renato Ramos approached him.
Accused-appellant Ramos offered to pay Rodolfo Duzon 200.00 for the
latter to drive Ramos' motorcycle to Laoac, Pangasinan to take some onions
and turnips there. Duzon agreed, so after bringing his own tricycle home to
his house in Bactad, Urdaneta, he then drove Ramos' motorcycle to
the poblacion of Urdaneta. At the poblacion, Ramos bought a basket where
he placed the onions and turnips. Ramos then told Duzon to drive the
motorcycle to Laoac, but they first passed by Garcia Street in Urdaneta. At
a house along Garcia Street, Ramos alighted and talked to someone whom
Rodolfo Duzon later came to know as accused-appellant Lolito Aquino.
Ramos then told Duzon that after coming from Laoac, Duzon should leave
the motorcycle at that house on Garcia Street with Lolito Aquino. Ramos and
Duzon then proceeded to Laoac, stopping at a gas station where they fueled
up. Ramos alighted from the motorcycle at the gas station and, taking along
the basket of onions and turnips, walked towards Guardian Angel Hospital
(the clinic owned by the Alipios). Five minutes after Ramos alighted, Duzon
heard three gunshots coming from the west, and moments later, he saw
Ramos, who was coming toward him, being chased by another man. When
Ramos got to the motorcycle, he ordered Duzon to immediately drive away,
and poked a gun at Duzon's back. Ramos then instructed Duzon as to the
route they should take until they reached Urdaneta where Ramos alighted,
leaving Duzon with instructions to bring the motorcycle to Garcia Street,
leave it with Lolito Aquino, then meet him (Ramos) again at
the poblacion where he (Duzon) will be paid 200.00 for his services. Duzon
did as he was told, but when he met with Ramos at the poblacion and asked
for the 200.00, Ramos got mad and shouted invectives at him. A few days
later, he again ran into Ramos who warned him to keep his silence,
threatening to kill him (Duzon) too if he tells anyone about the killing.
Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento also threatened him not to
reveal to anyone whatever he knows about the crime. That was why Duzon
decided to keep quiet. Later, however, he revealed the matter to his brother,
Victoriano Duzon, who accompanied him to the Criminal Investigation
Services (CIS) Office in Urdaneta so he could give his statement. He
executed affidavits, assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO), attesting to what he knew about the crime, in his desire to be a state
witness.5
Witness Rene Balanga, who was the helper of the spouses Atty. Melvin and
Dr. Lina Alipio, was cleaning the windows at the clinic of Dr. Alipio around 8
o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994. He heard three gunshots coming
from the garage of the clinic, which was around ten meters away from where
he was. Immediately after the gunshots, he saw a man quickly walking out
from the garage, going towards the main gate, but he was not able to clearly
see the face of the man. He merely observed that the man was around 5'4"
to 5'5" in height, medium-built, wearing a blue jacket and
faded maong (denim) pants. He ran towards the garage and there, he saw
Atty. Melvin Alipio lying dead. He then chased after the man so he could
identify him better but he did not succeed in doing so because the driver of
the motorcycle that the gunman was boarding was already drawing
something out from the rear portion of the motorcycle. After the assailant
sped off, Balanga went to the police station in Laoac to report the crime and
give his statement before the CIS. Sometime later, at the CIS Office, he
identified Rodolfo Duzon as the driver of the motorcycle used by the gunman
to get away.6
Another eyewitness, Eusebio Hidalgo, whose son was confined at the clinic,
was sitting at a bench in the garage of the clinic on the morning of April 26,
1994. Two other women who were looking for Atty. Alipio also sat at the
bench with him after he told them that Atty. Alipio was still having his
breakfast. After a few minutes, a man arrived looking for Dr. Alipio, and also
sat at the bench. Thereafter, Atty. Alipio came out to the garage and talked
to the two women. When Atty. Alipio finished talking to them, the man sitting
with them on the bench suddenly stood up and shot Atty. Alipio three times.
Atty. Alipio was merely one meter away from the assailant when the latter
shot him. After the shooting, the assailant walked away. Hidalgo then saw
the helper at the clinic, Reny Balanga, run after the assailant, but the latter
had whistled to his companion who was waiting on his motorcycle and the
two were able to speed away aboard said vehicle. Hidalgo identified the
assailant from a picture7 shown to him.8 The picture was that of Renato
Ramos.9
went to Zamora's house with the 10,000.00. Gregorio could no longer wait 2,400,000.00 as loss in the earning capacity of the deceased without
for Aquino so he just left the money with Zamora, instructing him to hand it subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
over to Aquino when the latter arrives. Later that day, Zamora saw Aquino
so he told him (Aquino) to just get the money from his house. About three
Taking into consideration that accused Francisca Talaro is already 75 years
weeks later, Aquino again went to Zamora's house, this time saying he
old, the death penalty meted upon her shall be commuted to reclusion
needs another 5,000.00 just in case he needs to escape. Zamora then
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised
contacted Francisca Talaro and conveyed Aquino's message to her. The
Penal Code.
following day, Gregorio again went to Zamora's house and left the 3,000.00
for Aquino. That afternoon, Zamora again told Aquino to just pick up the
money from his house. Zamora observed that Aquino seemed happy And considering that the evidence adduced by the prosecution against the
enough with the 3,000.00 he received.10 accused Gregorio Talaro is not sufficient to sustain his conviction of the
offense filed against him, the court hereby declares accused Gregorio Talaro
not guilty. The court likewise declares Raymundo Zamora acquitted of the
Zamora said that he thinks the Talaros had Atty. Alipio killed because the
offense filed against him.
latter was not able to comply with his contractual obligations to the Talaros
to complete the construction of a building. Dr. Lina Alipio, the wife of the
victim Atty. Melvin Alipio, confirmed that indeed, the victim entered into an Let an order of arrest be issued against accused Renato Ramos who
agreement with Rodolfo Talaro, the Talaro spouses' son, for the construction escaped from jail during the pendency of this case, to be served by the NBI,
of a building, but the construction was not finished within the agreed one- CIC and PNP of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
year period because of the sudden rise of prices for materials. Atty. Alipio
asked Rodolfo for additional payment so he could finish construction, but the 16
latter refused to pay more. Dr. Alipio stated that eventually, Atty. Alipio and SO ORDERED.
Rodolfo agreed that Atty. Alipio would return all the money he received from
Rodolfo and the whole property would, in turn, be turned over to Atty. Alipio. The case was then brought to this Court for automatic review in view of the
Atty. Alipio was unable to return the money despite several demands made penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants. However, in accordance
by Rodolfo, and Dr. Alipio believes this is the reason why the Talaros had with the ruling in People v. Mateo,17 and the amendments made to Sections
her husband killed. Dr. Alipio further testified on matters regarding expenses 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and Section 3 of Rule 125 of
for the wake and burial, and the earnings of her husband.11 the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Court transferred this case to
the CA for intermediate review.
Dr. Arnulfo Bacarro conducted the autopsy on the victim and stated that
three slugs were taken from the body of the victim, and the cause of death On December 15, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion
was internal hemorrhage.12 Police officers testified on how they conducted of which reads as follows:
the investigation, stating that accused-appellant Aquino and Zamora's
statements were taken in the presence of their respective lawyers. They
maintain that no bodily harm was inflicted on the accused-appellants while WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
they were being investigated.13 Court, Branch 38 of Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. U-8239, is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
Rodolfo Duzon is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and his release is
On the other hand, accused-appellant Lolito Aquino stated that he was taken hereby ordered unless he is being held for some other legal cause.
by CIS men without a warrant of arrest; that he was mauled by police
authorities while under detention, but could not undergo a medical check-up
due to fear from threats that he would be killed by police authorities if he did Further, in lieu of the awards made by the trial court in favor of the heirs of
so; that he was assisted by a PAO lawyer when he made his confession, but deceased Atty. Melvin Alipio, accused-appellants are ordered to pay, jointly
he did not read the contents of the document, Sgt. Tomelden just ordered and severally, the heirs of the victim the following amounts: (1) 25,000.00
him to sign the same; that the PAO lawyer is not his own choice; that he as temperate damages; (2) 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (3) 50,000.00 as
does not know Rodolfo Duzon and Raymundo Zamora; and that he was not moral damages; and (4) 25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
present at the meeting held in Raymundo Zamora's yard. He admitted,
however, that the motorcycle used by the gunman belongs to him; and that SO ORDERED.18
he first agreed to be a state witness because he was promised to be paid
P20,000.00 and that he would be placed in the witness protection program. 14
The case is now before this Court on automatic review. The prosecution
opted not to file a supplemental brief with this Court. Accused-appellants
Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento's defense is denial and alibi. He Lolito Aquino and Renato Ramos jointly filed their supplemental brief where
claimed that he was not present during the April 24, 1994 meeting held to it is argued that the two should be acquitted because (1) the prosecution
plan the killing of Atty. Alipio, because on said date and time, he was in the evidence is insufficient to prove that Lolito Aquino was part of the conspiracy
house of Congressman Amadito Perez, for whom he works as driver- to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio; and (2) the identity of Renato Ramos was never
messenger, and that morning, he also drove the Congressman's family to established. Accused-appellant Noberto (Jun) Adviento argued in his
church to hear mass. On April 26, 1994, he also reported for work at the Appellant's Brief filed with the CA, that the prosecution's evidence is
house of the Congressman from 8 o'clock in the morning until 5 o'clock in insufficient to establish conspiracy, and there are no aggravating
the afternoon. He likewise denied personally knowing any of his co-accused circumstances to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
except for Duzon whose face is familiar to him. 15
The Court agrees with the CA's conclusion that the evidence on record
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment as follows: proves beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants Lolito Aquino,
Renato Ramos, and Norberto (Jun) Adviento, together with Francisca
Wherefore, in the light of all the considerations discussed above, this court Talaro, conspired to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio.
hereby finds and holds the accused Francisca Talaro, Norberto (Jun)
Adviento, Renato Ramos, Rodolfo Duzon and Lolito Aquino, guilty beyond Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by
provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. The presence of
Act No. 7659 and conformable thereto, pursuant to law, hereby imposes on any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is
each of the accused the death penalty and to pay proportionately the costs sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.19
of the proceedings.
In People v. Sanchez,20 the Court held that "[t]he essence of treachery is the
The court further orders the accused to indemnify, jointly and severally, the sudden attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part
heirs of the deceased the sum of 83,000.00 as actual damages; of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself,
100,000.00 as moral damages; 50,000.00 as death indemnity; thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor."
10,000.00 as [attorney's fees] paid to their private prosecutor and There can be no cavil that the evidence on record shows treachery in the
killing of Atty. Alipio, thus qualifying the crime as murder. The assailant, opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of witnesses.27 The Court again
identified as accused-appellant Renato Ramos, just suddenly fired upon explained the rationale for this principle in Molina,28 to wit:
Atty. Alipio at a very close distance, without any provocation from said
unarmed victim, who was then just conversing with some other people.
As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it
There is also evident premeditation because the evidence shows that a is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe
couple of days before the actual shooting of Atty. Alipio, Raymundo Zamora the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in
already saw and heard accused-appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Renato which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can better
Ramos, and Lolito Aquino, talking to Francisca Talaro and coming to an determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position
agreement to kill Atty. Alipio. to weigh conflicting testimonies. Further, factual findings of the trial court as
regards its assessment of the witnesses' credibility are entitled to great
weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals
Pitted against the prosecution evidence, accused-appellants' only defense
affirms the said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that
is that the evidence is insufficient to prove they are part of the conspiracy to
the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could
commit the murder. Said defense is sorely wanting when pitted against the
substantially affect the outcome of the case.29
prosecution evidence.

The Court cannot find anything on record to justify deviation from said rule.
In People v. Bautista,21 the Court reiterated the hornbook principle of
conspiracy, to wit:
Accused-appellant Renato Ramos insisted that he was not properly
identified in open court, and considering that there are so many persons
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
named "Renato Ramos," then there can be some confusion regarding his
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where
identity. There is no truth to this claim. Ramos was properly identified in open
all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense,
court by Raymundo Zamora, as one of the men he saw and heard
and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common
transacting with Francisca Talaro for the killing of Atty. Alipio.30 Hence, there
design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently
can be no doubt as to which Renato Ramos is being convicted for the murder
established. It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts
of Atty. Alipio.
which such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or
design to commit the felony.
Another strong indication of Lolito Aquino's and Renato Ramos' guilt is the
fact that they escaped from detention while the case was pending with the
xxxx
trial court. Renato Ramos escaped from prison on December 20,
1994,31 while Lolito Aquino escaped on May 5, 1996.32 It has been repeatedly
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his held that flight betrays a desire to evade responsibility and is, therefore, a
confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common strong indication of guilt.33 Thus, this Court finds no reason to overturn their
design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was conviction.
not intended as part of the original design. x x x22 (Emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, this Court must modify the penalty imposed on accused-
In this case, the existence of a conspiracy has been established by the appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Lolito Aquino, and Renato Ramos.
testimony of Raymundo Zamora, positively identifying all three accused- In People v. Tinsay,34 the Court explained that:
appellants as the ones he saw and heard transacting with Francisca Talaro
on April 24, 1994 to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio for the price of P60,000.00, and
On June 30, 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 (R.A. 9346), entitled An Act
pointing to Lolito Aquino as the one who demanded and received part of the
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, took effect.
payment after Atty. Alipio had been killed. The credibility of Raymundo
Pertinent provisions thereof provide as follows:
Zamora's testimony is further bolstered by Lolito Aquino's admission 23 that
he and Renato Ramos even conducted surveillance on the victim a day
before Renato Ramos carried out the shooting, and that the motorcycle used Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.
as a getaway vehicle belonged to him. Rodolfo Duzon also pointed to Renato Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven
Ramos as the gunman; he also pointed to Renato Ramos and Norberto (Jun) (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal
Adviento as the ones who threatened to kill him if he talks to anyone about Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred
the shooting. All the proven circumstances point to the conclusion that Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659) otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and
accused-appellants acted in concert to assure the success of the execution all other laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the
of the crime; hence, the existence of a conspiracy is firmly established. death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Lolito Aquino's admission, and accused-appellants' positive identification of Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
Raymundo Zamora and Rodolfo Duzon cannot be belied by accused-
appellants' mere denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial and alibi
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of
cannot prevail over the witness' positive identification of the accused-
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
appellants.24 Moreover, accused-appellants could not give any plausible
reason why Raymundo Zamora would testify falsely against them. In People
v. Molina,25 the Court expounded, thus: xxxx

In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution
witnesses and since no ill motive on their part or on that of their
families was shown that could have made either of them institute the
case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime
he did not commit, appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It
is settled in this jurisdiction that the defense of alibi, being inherently weak,
cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime. x x x26 (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
It has also been held in People vs. Quiachon that R.A. No. 9346 has
retroactive effect, to wit:

Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino claimed he merely admitted his
participation in the crime out of fear of the police authorities who allegedly
manhandled him, however, the trial court did not find his story convincing.
The trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it is the trial court which had the
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case
pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive
effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides as follows:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although
at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.1wphi1

However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No.
9346 provides that "persons convicted of offenses pushed with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by
reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."

Hence, in accordance with the foregoing, appellant should only be

sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.35

The awards for damages also need to be modified. In People v. Alberto

Anticamara y Cabillo, et al.,36 the Court held that in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is
death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the
award of moral damages should be increased from 50,000.00 to
75,000.00, while the award for exemplary damages, in view of the
presence of aggravating circumstances, should be 30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 15,

2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00071 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed on accused-
appellants is REDUCEDto reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole in
accordance with R.A. No. 9346; and INCREASING the award of moral
damages from 50,000.00 to 75,000.00, and the award of exemplary
damages from 25,000.00 to 30,000.00. The rest of the award of the Court
of Appeals is hereby maintained.

SO ORDERED.
 An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same
with the evidence presented by the prosecution would reveal that the
evidence presented has not established said allegations. The facts and
Republic of the Philippines
circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. It
SUPREME COURT
is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own
Manila
affirmative allegations.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009
JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner, xxxx
vs.
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was
DURAN, Respondents.
the accused who committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have never
DECISION
identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime. The
Tinga, J.:
prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who
Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17
committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the
August 2006 and Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in
elements of the crime. The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it
CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R.
was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident. The
Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and
Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has
Jeffrey Reso Dayap.
been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. There
was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as
The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4 on 29 December 2004 there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. The alleged less
by the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not
herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor
resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to
Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads: the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness
ever testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence was also
presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish
That at about 11:55 oclock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy.
if indeed it was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene
Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified only on the
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner
expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a
a 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded
result of the incident. But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the
with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta.
accused who committed the crime and be held responsible for it. This Court
Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile, a Colt
could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this case from its
Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who
inception.
was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus
causing the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious
physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive x x x x
damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name
of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage
The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecutions
of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended
[evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant]
parties above-mentioned.
to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of the
accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the
An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated
in the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical explanation of the
accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan,
latters inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows
Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the
5 the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1s ramming into the
charge.
rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be
cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with their axle. The cutting of the
On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the tires to the truck
Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve
amended information.6 They sought to add the allegation of abandonment towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that caused the swerving,
of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.
abandoned the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was
still alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-
xxxx
standers."7

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things

On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus
the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for
Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be considered
8 which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the
withdrawn. On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and the
perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to
motion to amend was considered withdrawn.9
prove these two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden
of establishing the guilt of the accused, an accused need not even offer
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the evidence in his behalf.
prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought
leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his
xxxx
Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecutions
failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for
reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment11 dated 25 April WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the
2005. accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby
12 cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized
In the Order dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and
representative.
acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that
the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in
the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state: SO ORDERED.13
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14 alleging In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had
that the MTCs dismissal of the case was done without considering the jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the
evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that the MTC enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,22 which confers jurisdiction to
failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal
in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on
liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented. The case was the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information
raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32. alleging abandonment. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the
MTCs order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of
petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTCs The petition has merit. It should be granted.
recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that
it failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction
also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the
over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.
manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the
defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to
the accuseds demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the
23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the
accuseds civil liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did not complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious
include a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise
physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however
did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not
declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the
passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the
portion of the decision states: victims. It appears from the records however that respondents attempt to
amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was
unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutors motion
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan
to withdraw their motion to amend the information. The information filed
on accuseds acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the court
before the trial court had remained unamended.23 Thus, petitioner is deemed
of origin or its successor for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the
to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original Information
case. No costs.
without any aggravating circumstance.

SO ORDERED.16
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless
imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute
Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
these were denied for lack of merit in the order17 dated 12 September 2005. to prision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless
imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person
attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court
subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of
Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence
damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property,
proceedings before the MTC are a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in
two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed.24 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the
null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct
18 single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia) which ruled that in complex crimes
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the
period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through
case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property
negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or
resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for
omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or
the physical injuries charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary
fault (culpa).25 Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner, were he to be
Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure,
found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months
which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses
and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to
involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the
6 years).
imposable fine does not exceed 10,000.00. As there was no proof of the
total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the
amount of 1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTCs Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear
jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution
reads: of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us
R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal
REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region,
cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case.
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It
19
SO ORDERED. explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It
follows that criminal cases for reckless
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision,20 arguing that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the
allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and
Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the
the basis of the RTCs jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal
Resolution dated 25 April 2007.21 It reiterated that it is the RTC that has case.27 Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly
proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful, taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and
felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims. legal.
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners demurrer to evidence and establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence.
acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The Consequently, there is no more need to remand the case to the trial court
demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since petitioners acquittal
the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls has extinguished his civil liability.
"for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP.
accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused
of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No.
in double jeopardy.29 But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer
3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey
to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by
Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is REINSTATED and
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual
AFFIRMED.
findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the
only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon
demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting SO ORDERED.
the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed
judgment void.30

Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari
alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case
and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same,
and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the
Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs conclusions were
based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC
failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records
also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the
Rules of Court.

The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case
to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the
RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment

against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. 31 However, the civil action
based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist32 or where the accused did not commit the
acts or omission imputed to him.33

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case
unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist.34 This is because when the accused files a
demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal
and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence
for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial
judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and
set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on
the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce
evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on
the civil aspect of the case.35

A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal
was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him; hence, petitioners civil liability has been extinguished by his
acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot
find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and
that accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution
failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged
since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the
cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the
proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck
caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the
cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly
 Republic of the Philippines reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched
SUPREME COURT Christopher.
Manila
EN BANC
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and
G.R. No. 174659 July 28, 2008
told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed
vs.
over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several
RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA
minutes with Christopher.
TAURAK, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
CORONA, J.: Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child
There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or compassion for was unmoved. He no longer recognized nor understood her for he could only
others. speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a muslim
name with "Taurak" as surname.
Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost
her two-year old son, Christopher, two weeks before Christmas on Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom
December 13, 1999. And again upon being reunited with him some 16 money. She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox.
months later when he could neither recognize her nor remember who he Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was
was. parked outside, under Tauraks watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3
Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3
Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in
Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing
and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
separation of mother and child be punished to the full extent of the law.

Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget

At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher
the incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time
and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonalds outlet in the KP Tower in Juan
Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child,
Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table
born very sickly, eventually died.
while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her
seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher
gone from his mothers sight when she realized that he had disappeared. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom
She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises under the following Information:
of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the child was
futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.
That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did
the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information. then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and
Despite the publicity, however, Teresa received no word about Christophers deprive Christopher Basario, a two-year old minor of his liberty against his
whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a field day will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was
aggravating her misery. made as a condition for his release amounting to THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (30,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Christopher Basario
in said amount and such other amount as maybe awarded to him under the
On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded
provisions of the Civil Code.
like a muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked
for 30,000 in exchange for the boy.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and
instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial
at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went ensued and the parties presented their respective evidence.
there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted
the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had
In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak
previously given her. When the woman instructed her to immediately board
a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom testified that at the time and date of the alleged kidnapping, she was peddling
money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April wares in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw Christopher wandering
about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not seem to understand her.
7, 2001 at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
She took the boy under her care and waited for someone to come for him.
No one did. As it was already 7:00 p.m., she brought the boy home with her
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force to the Muslim Center in Quiapo.
(PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)31 Juliet Palafox was
designated to act as Teresas niece.
The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police
outpost but no one was there so they just brought the boy to their stall. They
Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim him.
On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated
meeting place.1awphi1
On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan
Kumander, Lanao del Sur. Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and asked
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitangs for Christophers picture for confirmation. It was at this point that Taurak
Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and arranged a meeting at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on
Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox April 7, 2001. She did not bring the boy at first as a precautionary measure.
and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting Only after confirming that Teresa was the boys mother did she relinquish
for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she custody to her. However, she was shocked when members of the PAOCTF
received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak suddenly arrested her. She protested because she was innocent. There
who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would were no charges against her nor was there a warrant for her arrest.
ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned
to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and
PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Mamantak corroborated her sister Tauraks testimony. She claimed that she
Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak was at Nunungan, Lanao del Norte on December 13, 1999. At that time, she
did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was in Manila and whom
she had not seen for some time. They met again on April 7, 2001 at Pitangs
Carinderia but only by chance. She happened to be there when Taurak (1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of
came. When Teresa arrived later, Taurak talked to her and then left, the victim7 or a public officer who has a duty under the law to
returning after a few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the detain a person;8
first time. Taurak told her that she had found the boy and was returning him
to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the carinderia all the while, waiting for
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
her ride home at 4:00 p.m. She was stunned when PAOCTF members
latter of his liberty;
suddenly arrested her and her sister as she had not committed any crime
and there was no warrant for her arrest.
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court
rendered a decision2 on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
guilty as charged: circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused LIKAD
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or
SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK]
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
official.
as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and
severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise,
[Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting
damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime
accused. is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code is present.9
Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone
by them during the pendency of this case.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the
victims liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.10 It includes
SO ORDERED.3
not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty
in whatever form and for whatever length of time.11 And liberty is not limited
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a to mere physical restraint but embraces ones right to enjoy his God-given
decision4 dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare. 12
erred in not considering the demand for 30,000 as a demand for ransom.
Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the
The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and
appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with
was recovered only after almost 16 months from Taurak and Mamantak
modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to
5 (both of them private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. During the
death. Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative
entire time the boy was kept away from his mother, he was certainly deprived
Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court
or restrained of his liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to leave
and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.6
appellants custody and return to his family on his own. He had no choice
but to stay with total strangers, go with them to a far away place and learn a
We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty. culture and dialect alien to him. At such a very tender age, he was deprived
of the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his family, specially his
mother.
Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) 7659:
Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even
brought him to Lanao del Norte. She demanded 30,000 in exchange for his
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual
return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantaks actions (e.g., her
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of
presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed
his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
without doubt that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert with
her. These were the identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three courts. There is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently supported
days. by evidence.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except
when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
Tauraks story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It
was like the apocryphal tale of a man accused of theft of large cattle; his
excuse was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home not knowing
that there was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried to bring the
boy to the proper authorities or surrender him to the Department of Social
Welfare and Developments social workers in her barangay or in the city hall
at any time during the 16 months he was with her. And how could Teresa
have initiated her phone conversations with Taurak when they were total
strangers to each other?

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed Similarly, Mamantaks account that she was at Pitangs Carinderia only by
coincidence and that it was only there that she first saw Christopher invites
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even
if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies of the prosecution
commission of the offense. witnesses on her role in arranging for the payment of ransom and the release
of the kidnap victim (e.g., confirming the identity of Teresa and demanding
and receiving the ransom money) showed otherwise. The evidence clearly
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is established that Mamantak was a principal in the kidnapping of Christopher.
raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself.13The trial and appellate courts correctly
The crime has the following elements: ruled that the statements of Taurak and Mamantak did not deserve
credence. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, including its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight
thereof, are accorded great, if not conclusive, value when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.14

The Court of Appeals considered the demand for 30,000 as a qualifying

circumstance which necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. On the
other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as too measly, compared to
what must have been actually spent for the care and subsistence of
Christopher for almost two years. It therefore treated the amount not as
ransom but as a reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking care of the
child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement for "board-and-
lodging.")

Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the

redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity.15 No
specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping
for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in
exchange for the victims freedom.16 The amount of and purpose for the
ransom is immaterial.

In this case, the payment of 30,000 was demanded as a condition for the
release of Christopher to his mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
considered it as a demand for ransom.

One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code17 is death, RA 934618 has banned the death penalty
and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants
from death to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of 50,000 civil

indemnity19 was proper. Pursuant to People v.Garalde,20 the award of
50,00021 moral damages is increased to 200,000 considering the minority
of Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand for
ransom, and by way of example or correction, Christopher is entitled to
100,000 exemplary damages.22

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006 decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00729
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga Sarapida Mamantak
and Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom for which they are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. They are
further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, 50,000 civil indemnity,
200,000 moral damages and 100,000 exemplary damages to their young
victim Christopher Basario.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on
G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006 duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the
PAJARILLO, petitioners, matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been
vs. convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN
LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and
severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that
Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees,
DECISION
particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security
it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the
Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the
supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only
Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated October 20, 2004
the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but
also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) complied with.
went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time
deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry
issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who
was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to
deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death. hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art.
103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs. 9
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children
(respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a
criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the
0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the
file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from
subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found
19, 2000.3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving
modification as to the penalty in a Decision4 dated July 31, 2000. Entry of sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the
Judgment was made on August 25, 2001. provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability
recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction,
because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273,
is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the
Marikina City, a complaint5 for damages against Pajarillo for negligently
penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action
shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the
might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by
delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment
its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary
and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities
damages and attorney's fees.
based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their
In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a
was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense.
Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and
attorney's fees.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following
assignment of errors, to wit:
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its
Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner
plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of damages and
Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said other money claims.
defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied
damages Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner
Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death
indemnity; payment of damages and other money claims.
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral
damages; The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due
(P300,000.00), as exemplary damages; diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, hence,
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as should be excused from any liability.10
attorney's fees; and
6. costs of suit.
For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED. The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in
SO ORDERED. 8 shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's the damages awarded to respondents.
claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's
bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based
shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611 of the Civil Code, in which case, its
liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has
established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil liability.
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking
their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing
responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing
a separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the recovery of
Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:
damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of
Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code12 is subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employee is not available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:
negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute
it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed
the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the
crime of homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of and serving
sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities,
such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31
of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured
party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities
may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission or under both causes.13
It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The
nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint
as constituting the cause of action.14 The purpose of an action or suit and
the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief.15
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and
posted in the Ecology Bank Katipunan Branch, Quezon City,
who was employed and under employment of Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship
between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage to herein
plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline
Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly without
exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the
use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M.
Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly
and severally liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.16
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of
Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words,
the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability
of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
crime.18 The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case
is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was whether
the civil action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-
delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime
in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the
criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the
court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the
assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of
May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept
the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this
Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that
case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to
institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to
file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil
action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling
in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court
is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
xxxx
 In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice 10 meters away from the bank28 and saw her talking to a man thereat;29 that
between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached the
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not
for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a show that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank
party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no
for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the bank's
defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to the
police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for
damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she
reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside
civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the
action for quasi-delict.20 (Emphasis supplied) bank30manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really
had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters
far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a back-up.
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of
In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun
Homicide is already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or
21 at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as there were guards
importance to this case. It would have been entirely different if
manning the entrance door.
respondents' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which
case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. 22 Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when
conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is
the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial
a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
cognizance.31
the employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and
petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner
family in the selection and supervision of their employee. Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in
petitioners' petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline
approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting
petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as
Evangeline.
a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct; 32 that
the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act, regardless of whether or not
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo; 33 that the fear
or not is a question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline
a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former
errors of law.23 Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.34
CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The
established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent,
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
Pajarillo's claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such
(3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension
his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in
Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
Pajarillo's imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
on his part.
they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence.
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on Although she was a licensed firearm holder, she had no business bringing
record. [24] the gun in such establishment where people would react instinctively upon
seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned
Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did not conduct herself with suspicion
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason
by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held
for us to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the
the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up
CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.
or robbery.

Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to

We are not persuaded.
the bank was to renew her time deposit.25On the other hand, Pajarillo claims
that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus,
acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense. As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that
Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting
suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance
26 due to Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that
of about one meter or one arm's length he stepped backward, loaded the
Evangeline will rob the bank.
chamber of his gun and shot her.27 It is however unimaginable that petitioner
Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was already
pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had
trigger to shoot him. adequately shown that it had exercised the diligence required in the
selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required the
guards to undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on
qualifications and credentials which even the RTC found to have been
his mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However,
complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the
such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to
diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further
the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about
claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel, wherein
supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security
guards which include among others, whether or not they are in their proper
post and with proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the
employees' performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm
contrary to Safeguard's operating procedure is not sufficient basis to say that
Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it was likewise error
to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and
policies were not properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for
the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be
negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of
law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that
the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records.35 On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees
includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of
employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations
through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary
measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to
ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant
concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should
regularly report on their supervisory functions. 36 To establish these factors
in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence
in the selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent
a psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St.
Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted,
submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training course for security
guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence
required in the supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case,
while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations,
who testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the
Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks, 37 Weapons
Training,38 Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training Lesson
Plan,39Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also been established
during Camero's cross-examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such
rules and regulations.41 Notwithstanding Camero's clarification on his re-
direct examination that these company rules and regulations are lesson
plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom instructions
and not necessary to give students copy of the same, 42 the records do not
show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July
16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
continuous evaluation of the security guard's performance. Pajarillo had only is SOLIDARYand PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta.
Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in
collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such SO ORDERED.
training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and protection
of the life of the employees.43 Ynares-Santiago, (Working Chairperson), Callejo Sr., and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J., Retired as of December 7, 2006.
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard
had ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned
to guard a bank which has a different nature of business with that of Toyota.
In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being
on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area. 44
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing
her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that
there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on
human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors
who go around the bank two times a day to see the daily performance of the
security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of
such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the
alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and
reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual
damages in the amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by
respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported by
receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides
that the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are
awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed
at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 45 The intensity of the pain
experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of
affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means
of the offender.46
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by
Evangeline's death was so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife
and a mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her death.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one million pesos as moral
damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,48 we likewise
awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the parents
of a third year high school student and who was also their youngest child
who died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death left a void in their lives.
Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of one
million pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her husband
and minor children as they were deprived of her love and care by her
untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount
of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages
are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 49 It is awarded
as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. 50
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered
when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we
affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178115 July 28, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG,
PASOT SALOLI, ERIC ENOC, WARLITO MONTEBON,* and CIO
LIMAMA, Accused,
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, and
PASOT SALOLI, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00187-MIN, which affirmed with
modifications the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) conviction2 of appellants Jojo
Sumilhig (Jojo), Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig (Carding), and
Pasot Saloli (Pasot) in Criminal Case No. 3(99).
Factual Antecedents
Appellants, together with the accused Eric Enoc, Warlito Montibon and Cio
Limama, were charged with double murder and double frustrated murder in
an Amended Information,3 the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about October 31, 1998, inthe Municipality of Kiblawan, Province
of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, armed with assortedfirearms, with intent to kill with treachery
and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, simultaneously strafe the house of Eugenio Santander resulting
to death of [Cresjoy] Santander and RollySantander and seriously wounding
Marissa Santander and Micel Santander, which would have caused their
death had there been no timely and able medical assistance rendered to
them, to the damage and prejudice of the offended parties.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Only Jojo, Carding and Pasot, who entered separate pleas of "not guilty"
during their arraignment,5 faced trial. The other accused could not be located
and remain at-large to this day.
Factual Antecedents
The prosecution established that onOctober 31, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m.,
Jerry Masaglang (Jerry), together with Eugenio Santander (Eugenio) and his
son Mario, were in the living room of Eugenios house in SitioOverland,
Kimlawis, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Suddenly, they heard gun bursts and
saw six persons firing at the kitchen where members of the Santander family
werehaving dinner. Jerry and Mario recognized the assailants to be the
appellants and their co-accused.
The strafing of the kitchen lasted for about two minutes. Before the gunmen
dispersed, Jojo shouted, "At last, I have retaliated!" In the aftermath, the
children of Eugenios other son Remegio6 Santander (Remegio), 3-year old
Cresjoy,7 8-year old Rolly, and teeners Marissa and Micel, sustained
gunshot wounds. Unfortunately, Cresjoy expired while on the way to the
hospital while Rolly was pronounced dead-on-arrival. Marissa sustained
gunshot wounds atthe right breast area and left wrist, while Micel was
wounded inthe left sternal area and elbow.
Jojo denied involvement in the incident and interposed the defense of alibi.
At the time of the incident, he claimed to be in the house of his parents-in-
law in SitioOlogo-o, BarangayTacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. He further
asserted that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime on
October 31, 1998 since he could not walk briskly due to a gunshot wound
he earlier sustained in his left knee and anus. He maintained that it was only
in January 1999 that he was able to walk without the aid of crutches.
However, Jojo admitted harboring ill-will against the Santander clan since he
believed that they were the ones responsible for the massacre of his family
in February 1998.
Carding, for his part, claimed to be illiterate and unaware of the incident. He
contended that at the time of the shooting, he was in Dalmandang, Tacub,
Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, which is four-hours walk away from the crime
scene. Pasot, on the other hand, maintained that he was withhis wife at the
house of Pablo Mot in Lampara, Balasiao, Kiblawan, Davao atthe time the
crime was committed. Bothclaimed total ignoranceof the incident.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC convicted the appellants ofthe complex crime of double murder
and double frustrated murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
death. It further ordered them to indemnify, jointlyand severally, the heirs of
Cresjoy and Rolly the sum of 100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and the
surviving victims, Marissa and Micel, the sums of 50,000.00 and
30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively. 8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the RTC.
However, it found merit in appellants argument that the crime committed
could not have been a complex crime since the death and injuries
complained of did not result from a single act but from several and
distinctacts of shooting. And as treachery was alleged in the Amended
Information and sufficiently proven during trial, appellants should be
convicted instead of two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder. Thus, in rendering its Decision9 dated July 28, 2006, the CA
disposed ofthe case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of appellants Jojo Sumilhig, Alias
Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli is affirmed butmodified as follows
Appellants Juan "Jojo" Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli,
are found guilty beyondreasonable doubt of:
a. Murder for killing Crisjoy Santander, and x x x are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
b. Murder for the killing of Rolly Santander, and x x x are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
c. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Marissa Santander and x
x x are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four
(4) months and [ten] (10) days of prision mayoras minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporalas maximum; d. Frustrated Murder for the
shooting of Micel Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of
prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporalas maximum. All
accused are ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
Crisjoy Santander and Rolly Santander the sum of 100,000.00
and the surviving victims Marissa Santander and Micel Santander
50,000.00 as moral damages and 30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
Since there is no more dispute that appellants should not have been
convicted of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder as
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) already concedes to the
same,11 the only error left from those raised by appellants in their brief is as
follows:
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE
GUILTY, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
CONSPIRACY WAS PRESENT AND INFINDING THAT THE CRIMES
COMMITTED WERE MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.12
It must be noted at the outset that Carding diedon June 24, 2011 during the
pendency of this appeal.13 "[I]n view of [this] supervening event, it is
unnecessary for the Court to rule on [Cardings] appeal. Whether x x x he
was guilty of the [crimes] charged has becomeirrelevant since, following
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, x x x, even assuming [that Carding]
had incurred any criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by his death.
Moreover, because [the] appeal was still pending and no final judgment of
conviction had been rendered against him [before] he died, his civil liability
arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto,was likewise
extinguished by his death."14
Appellants Arguments accused when traces of ingenuity and craftiness characterize their
testimonies.
Appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying heavily on the ill-feelings and
vendetta Jojo harbored against the Santander family. They contend that this All these observations however become insignificant in the face of the
motive for committing the crime is not a substitute for proof beyond positive and spontaneous identification of the assailants/accused by credible
reasonable doubt. Moreover, Jojosalibi that it was impossible for him to be witnesses Jerry Masaglang and Remigio Santander.15
at the crime scene due to the gunshot wounds in his knee and anus is amply
corroborated by a medical prognosis.
There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Marios identification of the appellants
considering that (1) Jerry was just six meters away from them;16 (2) the moon
Anent Pasot, appellants argue that although the trial court found his claim of was bright and Jerry was familiar with all the accused as most of them are
total ignorance on almost about everything to beincredulous, still, his his relatives;17 and, (3) Mario knows Jojoever since he was small.18 Besides,
conviction must not rest on the weakness of his defense but on the strength "[t]ime-tested is the rulethat between the positive assertions of prosecution
of the prosecutions evidence. witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former
undisputedly [deserve] more credence and [are] entitled to greater
evidentiary weight."19
Appellants likewise question the finding of conspiracyand treachery.

Anent the respective alibis interposed by appellants, suffice it to say that

Our Ruling
"[a]libi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible witness." 20

The appeal has no merit.

There was conspiracy among the accused.
Appellants conviction was based on
their positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses. "[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." 21 It is not
necessary to adduce evidence of a previous agreement to commit a
True, the RTC noted in its Decision the existence of motive on the part of
crime.22"Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence,
Jojo for committing the crime as well as Pasots incredulous claim of
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated,
ignorance on almost about everything. It is well to note, however, that the
or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such leadto a joint
said court neither based the appellants conviction on the existence of such
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest." 23
motive nor on Pasots weak defense of ignorance alone, but upon the
prosecution witnesses identification of appellants as the assailants, viz:
Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but
there is a series of events that clearly established conspiracy among them.
Assessing the evidence presented by both [P]rosecution and defense, we
First, they were all armed with firearms. Second, they surreptitiously
see a less than glaring hint of vendetta. As part of his defense, the accused
approached the crime scene. Third, when they were within close range of
Jojo Sumilhig narrated that his family was massacred by Jerry Santander,
the intended victims, they simultaneously discharged their firearms. Fourth,
brother of Remigio Santander [in] February 1998. Short of admitting the
they ceased firing at the same time and fled together. Undoubtedly, their
crime, Sumilhig stated that because of this, he harbored ill feelings not only
acts before, during and immediately after strafing the house of Eugenio
against Jerry and Carlos Santander but also against their family. Thus a
evince their unanimity in design, intent and execution.24 Treachery attended
clear motive for killing the Santander family has been established giving
the commission of the crime.
credence to prosecution witnesses allegation that after the strafing Jojo
Sumilhig shouted"Nakabalos na ko!" The likelihood of his intention to wipe
out the said family became even more apparent. "There is treachery whenthe offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods orforms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure the execution, without risk to himself
Despite his positive assertion that it was the Santanders that killed his family,
arising from [any] defense which the offended party might make."25
he did not file any case against them. It was only after he was arrested that
he filed a complaint against Jerry and Carlos Santander.
Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of
the assault deprived the victims of an opportunity to resist it or offer any
His alibi likewise failed to meet the stringent requisites of the Rules. Even as
defense of their persons. This is considering that the victims were unaware
Dr. Quirapas appeared determined to rule out the possibility that he could
that they would be attacked by appellants with a hailof bullets from their
walk without crutches five months after his discharge, the same was based
firearms fired at close range. Indeed, "[t]he suddenness of the attack, without
on general medical prognosis. Such prognostication admits certain
the slightest forewarning thereof, placed the [victims] x x x in such a position
exception[s], as could be gleaned from the testimony of the doctor himself
that they could not have defended themselvesfrom the aggression x x x."26
that the healing period may vary depending on the age and physical
condition of the patient. Notably Jojo Sumilhig was then 23 years old.
The crime committed is two counts of
murder and two counts of frustrated
What was certain was the positive identification made by Jerry Masaglang
murder.
and Remegio Santander of all of the accused.

As earlier discussed, treachery attendedthe commission of the crime. This

The "overkill" by which the accused Pasot Saloli and Carding Sumilhig
qualifies the killing of Cresjoy and Rolly to murder.
claimed total ignorance of almost anything only served to arouse incredulity.
Both accused claimed they could not read, write, tell time, day, month or
year. Neither could [they] allegedly speak [or] understand Visayan, which is With regard to Marissa and Micel, the Court notes that while the RTC was
of common knowledge to be widely spoken in almost every part of Mindanao. silent as to the nature of injuries sustained by them, the CA correctly ruled
Saloli claimed he did not know what day [it] was when he was testifying, or on the seriousness thereof. The Medico Legal report of Marissa shows that
the day before and after that. Both claimed they did not know the she suffered multiple gunshot wounds in her right breast and left wrist27 while
complainants or of the massacre that took place. the Certificate of Treatment/Confinement of Micel states that she sustained
gunshot wounds in the area of the sternum and elbow. 28As aptly found by
the CA, the girls would have died if not for the timely medical attention
xxxx
provided to them. The crimes committed by the appellants against them
were thus frustrated murders.
More importantly, these claims [of] utter ignorance are belied by the
evasiveness by which all three accused answered in obvious effort to avoid
The Penalty
criminal responsibility. Behind the faade of ignorance and lack of education
lurks a calculating mind. We find [it] difficult to ascribe innocence to the
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of (2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are ordered to pay
murder is reclusion perpetuato death.1wphi1With both penalties being moral damages and exemplary damages to each of the victims in
indivisible and there being no aggravating circumstance other than the the reduced amounts of 40,000.00 and 25,000.00,
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the lower of the two penalties which is respectively.
reclusion perpetua was properly imposed by the CA on appellants for each
count of murder.29 However, appellants are not eligible for parole.30
All amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6%
per annum commencing from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
As regards the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the penalty lesser
by one degree shall be imposed on appellants. 31 Accordingly, the penalty
Due to the death of Ricardo Swnilhig alias Carding Sumilhig prior to final
that must be imposed is reclusion temporalfor each count of frustrated
judgment, his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto as found by the
murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of
Regional Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are extinguished.
modifying circumstances other than the qualifying circumstance of
Consequently, Criminal Case No. 3(99) is ordered dismissed insofar as
treachery, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig is concerned.
reclusion temporal, which has a range of fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while
the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is Costs against appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli.
prision mayorin any of its periods, the range of which is from six (6)
years,one (1) day to twelve (12)years. The prison term imposed by the CA
on appellants must therefore be modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of SO ORDERED.
prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporalas maximum, which is within these ranges, 32 for
each count of frustrated murder.

Awards of Damages

For the murders of Cresjoy and Rolly, the CA correctly held that their heirs
are entitled to an award of civil indemnity, however, the amount of the award
must be 75,000.00 for each death pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.33 The awards of moral damages in the amount of 50,000.00
each and exemplary damages in the amount of 30,000.00 each are
proper.34 In addition, the heirs of the victims are entitled to temperate
damages in the sum of 25,000.00 for each death in lieu of actual
damages.35

For the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the awards of moral and
exemplary damages by the CA must be decreased to 40,000.00 and
20,000.00, respectively for each victim.36 They are likewise entitled to
temperate damages in the amount of 25,000.00 each in lieu of actual
damages.37

All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annumfrom
the date of finality of thisjudgment until fully paid.38

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No.

00187-MIN which affirmed withmodification the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of DigosCity, Davao del Sur, Branch 19, finding appellants Jojo
Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
murder and two counts offrustrated murder is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONSas follows:

For the murders of Cresjoy Santander and Rolly Santander:

(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall suffer the
prison tenn of reclusion perpetua for each count of murder without
eligibility for parole;

(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs
of the victims the amount of 5,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of each victim;

(3) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs
of the victims 25,000.00 as temperate damages for each death.

For the frustrated murders of Marissa Santander and Micel Santander:

(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are sentenced to

suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for
each count of frustrated murder; and,
 THIRD DIVISION left. When she got home, MMM immediately took a bath and noticed
August 31, 2016 bloodstain on her underwear. Afraid of accusedappellant's threats of killing
G.R. No. 200157 her, MMM kept mum and did not disclose to anyone the tragedy that
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee happened to her that day. 11
vs.
JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA", Accused-
On or about the 1st day of July 2002, MMM was at the nipa plantation again
Appellant
when accused-appellant suddenly arrived. He poked MMM's back with a
DECISION
knife and threatened to stab her unless she followed accusedappellant' s
PEREZ, J.:
orders. MMM was fearful and was left with no choice but to submit to
On appeal is the 29 June 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
accused-appellant's commands. She was directed to bend over and to lower
CEB CR-HC NO. 00435, affirming the 22 December 2005 Decision2 of the
down her shorts and underwear. While MMM was bending over and half
Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Silay City, Negros Occidental, in Criminal
naked, accused-appellant held the victim's waist and inserted his penis into
Case Nos. 5214-69 and 5215-69, which found accused-appellant Joery
MMM's private part. MMM could not do anything but cry. Before leaving, he
Deliola y Barrido guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
again threatened to kill MMM if she would reveal what happened between
Statutory Rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
them. 12
perpetua in both cases.

MMM still remained silent about her ordeal. However, about two. weeks after
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of Statutory Rape. The
the second rape, MMM' s grandmother noticed that there was something
accusatory portions of the Informations narrate:
unusual in the way MMM was walking. This prompted her to confront
MMM. 13Upon learning of what happened to MMM, the victim's aunt, brought
Criminal Case No. 5214-69 the former to the Municipal Health Office of Manapla, Negros Occidental for
examination, 14 and thereafter to the police authorities, before whom the
victim executed her sworn statement. 15
That sometime in the month of June, 2002, in the Municipality of Manapla,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, 15 years old, with the use of a Dr. Edbert Jayme (Dr. Jayme), the Municipal Health Officer who conducted
bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation, with the attendant a physical and internal examination upon MMM, testified as an expert
qualifying aggravating circumstances of relationship and minority, the witness for the prosecution. Dr. Jayme's internal findings showed that the
accused being the uncle of herein victim who was less than eighteen (18) victim had positive hyperemia of the vulva or congestion, redness, and
years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have swelling around the area, which may have been caused by a blunt object
carnal knowledge of one [MMM],3 a minor, 11 years old, against her will, to such as the finger of the human being or an erect penis. The victim was also
the damage and prejudice.4 found to have a positive incomplete hymenal laceration at 3:00 and 7:00
positions, which was similarly caused by a blunt object such as the finger of
the human being or an erect penis. 16 According to Dr. Jayme, the
Criminal Case No. 5215-69
lacerations may have been inflicted within two weeks prior to the
examination since the lacerations were fresh. 17 Dr. Jayme also found that
That on or about the 1st day of July, 2002, in the Municipality of Manapla, the victim's vagina could admit two (2) fingers with ease, which is unusual
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this for an 11-year old. 18 A Medical Certificate 19dated 12 July 2002 was issued
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, 15 years old, with the use of a by the Municipal Health Center of Manapla.
bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation, with the attendant
qualifying aggravating circumstances of relationship and minority, the
As lone witness for the defense, accused-appellant denied raping the victim
accused being the uncle of herein victim who was less than eighteen (18)
and claimed that he was fishing with his grandfather during the times MMM
years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
was raped. 20 He testified that he is MMM's uncle and that he was only fifteen
carnal knowledge of one [MMM], a minor, 11 years old, against her will, to
5 years old when the alleged crime occurred.
the damage and prejudice.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY. 6 At the
joint pre-trial 7 of the
On 22 December 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision finding accused-
appellant guilty of two counts of Statutory Rape. The dispositive portion of
cases, the following stipulation of facts were admitted: (1) that the court has
the decision reads:
jurisdiction over the case (2) the identity of accused-appellant as the
accused in the two criminal cases; (3) that accusedappellant is the uncle of
MMM; (4) that MMM, was 11 years old when the incidents giving rise to the WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Cases Nos. 5214-
present criminal actions were allegedly committed; (5) that at the time of the 69 and 5215-69, this Court finds accused, JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO,
incidents on June and 1 July 2002, accused-appellant and Ml\1M were AK.A. "JAKE DELIOLA", Guilty of the crimes of Rape, as defined in A1iicle
neighbors; (6) that MMM was then a grade school pupil; and (7) that 266-A in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 5, subparagraph 1, of Republic
accused-appellant was not attending school at the time of the submitted Act No. 8353, as his guilts had been established by the prosecution beyond
incidents giving rise to these criminal actions. Trial on the merits ensued any reasonable doubt.
afterwards.
Taking into consideration the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority,
The Facts this Court, in Criminal Case No. 5214-69, sentences accused, Joery Deliola
y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
the same to be served by him at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City,
The facts culled from the records and as summarized by the Court of
Province of Rizal, Philippines. Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake
Appeals, are as follows:
Deliola, is, further, ordered by this Court to pay minor, [MMM], the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages, and the sum
When the crime was committed, MMM was 11 years old,8 while the accused- of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all in Philippine Currency, as
appellant, MMM's uncle,9 was 15 years old. 10 The prosecution submits that Exemplary Damages.
sometime in the first week of June 2002, at about three o'clock in the
afternoon, MMM went to the nipa plantation to defecate but before she was
In Criminal Case No. 5215-69, this Court likewise sentences accused, Joery
able to do so, accused-appellant, armed with a knife, suddenly appeared.
Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
He approached MMM, poked a knife at her neck, ordered her to bend over,
Perpetua, the same to be served by him at the National Penitentiary,
and took off her shorts and underwear. Fearing for her life, MMM obeyed the
Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal, Philippines. Accused, Joery Deliola y
orders of accused-appellant. MMM tried to resist but accused-appellant was
Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is, likewise, ordered by this Court to pay minor,
still able to force his penis inside MMM' s vagina. MMM felt pain and cried.
[MMM], the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (50,000.00) as Moral
After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant put on his briefs and shorts then
Damages, and the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all in qefore us is whether or not accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the
Philippine Currency, as Exemplary Damages. victim.

Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is remanded to the Credibility of Witness
custody of the Jail Warden of the Provincial Jail of Negros Occidental, until
he is finally committed to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City, Rizal.
Accused-appellant tried to dispute MMM' s credibility by pointing out several
inconsistencies in her testimony. He argued that the victim testified that on
In the service of the sentences imposed on him by this Court, accused the alleged second incident of rape, on 1 July 2002, she felt no pain and her
named shall be given full credit for the entire period of his detention pending vagina did not bleed. Accused-appellant maintains that such statement is
trial. 21 inconsistent with MMM's grandmother's claim that MMM was walking with
great difficulty and pain. Accused-appellant likewise argues that given the
tender age of the victim, she could have felt pain, if not suffered bleeding,
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
even on the second incident of rape.

The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 2011, affirmed
We disagree. It is carnal knowledge, not pain nor bleeding, which is essential
the judgment of conviction of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the decision
to consummate rape. 29 It is also possible for physiological manifestations of
reads:
rape, such as pain, to appear only after the incident. More importantly, the
testimony of MMM's grandmother was just an observation on the victim's
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision insofar as the finding of guilt beyond manner of walking. It is baseless and unreasonable to put the victim's and
reasonable doubt of accused-appellant Joery B. Deliola of the two crimes of the grandmother's testimonies side by side and claim them to be
rape in Criminal Cases No. 5214-69 and 5215-69 is AFFIRMED. However, inconsistent. Moreover, as consistently held by this Court, discrepancies and
as accused-appellant Joery Deliola y Barrido is a child in conflict with the inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness referring to minor details, and
law, the pronouncement of his sentence is hereby SUSPENDED and the not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair her
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court,6th Judicial Region, Branch credibility. If at all, they serve as proof that the witness is not coached or
69, Silay City, Negros Occidental, for appropriate disposition in accordance rehearsed. 30
with Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Accused-appellant is
CONDEMNED to pay the victim MMM: 1) In Criminal Case No. 5214-69, the
Accused-appellant also points out that Dr. Jayme's findings are not
amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, 75,000.00 for moral damages,
conclusive and that the non-intact hymen of the victim could be congenita
and 30,000.00 for exemplary damages; and 2) In Criminal Case No. 5215-
This argument is bereft of merit. The prime consideration in the prosecution
69, the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, 75,000 for moral
of rape is the victim's testimony, not necessarily the medical findings.
damages and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages. 22
Assuming arguendo that the non-intact hymen of the victim is congenital,
this Court has consistently held that the absence of laceration in the hymen
Accused-appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal. In a Resolution23 dated 27 does not negate rape. 31Apart from the findings of Dr. Jayme, MMM was
February 2012, we required the parties to submit their respective steadfast in testifying that accused-appellant raped her twice. When a rape
supplemental briefs. However, both parties manifested24 that they are victim's testimony is straightforward and consistent despite grueling
dispensing with the filing of supplemental briefs and, instead, adopting their examination, it deserves full faith and confidence. 32 The victim's testimony
respective briefs as supplemental briefs in this case. alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.33

Our Ruling Accused-appellant likewise argues that the victim's claim that she was
penetrated from behind is contrary to human experience. We are not
persuaded.1wphi1 As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, the animal in
We find no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial man may come out when he commits rape such that it is not unlikely that in
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. His defenses of denial and alibi
the process of his immersion and transformation into another character, he
are bereft of merit. would prefer to mate in the way lower creatures do. 34
Statutory Rape
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Cod, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.25 define and punish Statutory Rape as follows: Accused-appellant further questions the fact that the v1ctnn did not attempt
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.- Rape is committed- to escape from her captor or even shout or call for help, and that she did not
1) by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman x x x: report the alleged rape to anyone after its occurrence. However, as held in
xxxx the case of People v. Rosales: 35
d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
At any rate, it is an oft-repeated principle that not every witness to or victim
Art. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article
of a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to the usual
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
expectations of everyone. People may react differently to the same situation.
xxxx
One person's spontaneous, or unthinking or even instinctive, response to a
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
horrible and repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while another's may be
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
cold indifference. Yet, it can never be successfully argued that the latter are
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
any less sexual victims than the former. 36
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim; Given the nature of the crime of rape, the credible, natural, and convincing
xxxx testimony of the victim alone may be sufficient to convict the accused, more
Statutory rape is committed when the prosecution proves that: (l) the so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the
offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused had carnal examining physician. 37
knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation; whether the offended party was deprived of reason or
MMM's testimony, positively identifying accused-appellant as the person
consciousness; or whether it was done through fraudulent machination or
who raped her is believable. We uphold the ruling of the trial court on the
grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and
26 credibility of MMM and the truthfulness of her testimonies, to wit:
that there was sexual intercourse.

The two elements were proven in the present case. The age of MMM was
27
uncontested. In her Birth Certificate, presented and admitted in open
court, 28 it was indicated that she was born on 5 March 1991 and, thus, only
eleven years old when the crime was committed. The only controversy left
[MMM], though a minor, thirteen (13) years old at the time she took the stand,
demonstrated to this Court her capacity of observation, recollection, and
communication. She showed that she can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known her perception to this Court as she clearly and capably related
the details of her sad and horrible experiences at the hands of the accused.
She withstood a thorough and exhaustive examination. There is no doubt
that she is a competent witness. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA the exact date of the alleged rape, or for the quashal of the Information, on
451, G.R. No. 116372 January 18, 2001; People vs. Rama, 350 SCRA 266, the ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form. 46
G.R. No. 136304, January 25, 2001). [MMM] gave a clear, straightforward,
spontaneous, frank and consistent narrative. It was a positive and credible
Penalty and Damages
account she presented before this Court. There was not a motive ascribed
or, in the very least, suggested by the defense that might have raised doubt
on her credibility and on the credibility of the statements she made before To determine the appropriate penalty, we refer to the pertinent law on the
this Court.38 matter. According to R.A. No. 9344,47 as amended:48

We find no reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of MMM's SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - x x x
testimony. Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial
court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth
anniversary of his/her birthdate.
and demeanor on the witness stand, a vantage point denied appellate
courts; and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. 39 A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
Furthermore, testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such
when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with
this Act.
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth
40
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. No young
woman would admit that she was raped, make public the offense and allow The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
the examination of her private parts undergo the troubles and humiliation of exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
a public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all gory details, if she had existing laws.
not in fact been raped.41
To reiterate, the law says that a minor is fifteen (15) years of age on the day
Denial and Alibi as Inherently Weak Defenses of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birth date. In A.M. No. 02-l-18-
SC49 dated November 24, 2009, the Supreme Court likewise defined the age
of criminal responsibility as the age when a child, fifteen (15) years and one
In contrast to MMM's direct, positive and categorical testimony and
identification of her assailant, accused-appellant's bare denial and alibi could (1) day old or above but below eighteen (18) years of age, commits an
not prevail. This Court has consistently held that: "denial is an intrinsically offense with discernment.
weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled Accused-appellant testified that he was born on 14 April 1987, 50 making him
than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and 15 years and 2 months old when the crime was committed. We are now left
difficult to disprove and for which reason it is generally rejected. For the alibi with the question of whether or not accused-appellant acted with
to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establishes two elements: (1) he discernment. In People v. Jacinto, 51 we explained that discernment is the
was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it mental capacity of a minor to fully grasp the consequences of his act, known
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its and determined by taking into account all the facts and circumstances
commission.42 "Accused-appellant failed to establish these elements. His presented by the records in each case.
claim that at the time of the alleged crime, he was at sea fishing with his
grandfather was uncorroborated. For some reason, he did not even present
his grandfather Clemente Gabayeron to testify in court. As opposed to MMM' That the accused-appellant acted with discernment when he raped the victim
s convincing recital of facts, accused-appellant's denial and alibi will not is demonstrated by the following surrounding circumstances: (1) the victim
stand. was a helpless minor; (2) accused-appellant secured the consummation of
the offense with a weapon; (3) he satisfied his lust by penetrating the victim
from behind; and (4) he threatened the victim not to report what happened.
Time of commission Taking all these facts into consideration, accusedappellant clearly knew that
not an essential element what he did was wrong.
to establish rape
Considering that the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship
Lastly, accused-appellant argues that the Information43 stating that the first were alleged and proven during trial, 52accused-appellant shall be criminally
crime of rape was committed "sometime in the month of June 2002" is not liable for the crime of Qualified Statutory Rape. However, given that
sufficiently explicit and certain as to inform him of the date on which the accused-appellant was only 15 years old and 2 months when the crime was
criminal act was alleged to have been committed. committed, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be
appreciated; thus, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed. 53 In accordance with the controlling jurisprudence on
Accused-appellant is mistaken. This Court has repeatedly held that it is not
incumbent upon the victim to establish the date when she was raped for the matter,54 for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
purposes of convicting the perpetrator.44 The date of commission is not an privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the
penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, we affirm the ruling of the lower courts
essential element of the crime of rape; what is material is its occurrence.
Thus, there is no need to prove the exact date of comm1ss1on; an and impose upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
approximation thereof will suffice.45
Although it is acknowleged that accused-appellant was qualified for
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that accused-appellant's suspension 55
of sentence when he committed the crime, Section 40 of R.A.
belated objection to the Information cannot prosper, to wit: 9344 provides that the same extends only until the child in conflict with the
law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years old. Nevertheless,
in extending the application of RA No. 9344 to give meaning to the legislative
Moreover, accused-appellant's counsel took active part in the trial by cross- intent of the said law, we ruled in People v. Jacinto, 56 as cited in People v.
examining the prosecution witnesses on the particular dates and Ancajas,57 that the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law
circumstances of the two offenses of rape as alleged in the informations should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one
without prior objection to the validity or propriety of the informations. It is now (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a
too late in the day for the accused-appellant to claim that any of the child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation
Informations was defective. Objections relating to the form of the complaint and reintegration in order that he/she may be given the chance to live a
or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. If the appellant normal life and become a productive member of the community. 58 Thus,
had found the Information insufficient, he should have moved before accused-appellant is ordered to serve his sentence, in lieu of confinement in
arraignment either for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly informed of
a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities,
in accordance with Section 51 59 of R.A. 9344.

Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,60 we modify the award of damages of

the lower courts.1wphi1 Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to indemnify
MMM, the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape,
75,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape, and 75,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape. The damages awarded shall
earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid. 61

WHEREFORE, the 29 June 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CEB CR-HC NO. 00435 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA," is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Qualified
Statutory Rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape. Appellant is ORDERED to indemnify MMM
the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape,
75,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape, and 75,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape. All monetary awards for
damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Silay City,
Branch 69 for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION about 3 meters, the pair was spotted by Rico who, while waiting for someone
March 22, 2017 at the roadside, also saw accused sitting on the sidecar of a trimobile parked
G.R. No. 225599 nearby. When Eliseo passed by the trimobile, he was approached from
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee behind by accused who suddenly stabbed him on the left lower back with a
vs bolo locally known as ginunting of an approximate length of 8 to 12 inches.
CHRISTOPHER MEJARO ROA, Accused-Appellant Taken aback, Eliseo exclaimed "Tara man, " before falling to the ground.
DECISION Chased by both Edgar and Rico and spotted running by Mrs. Sombrero who
VELASCO. JR., J.: went out of the Barangay Hall upon hearing the resultant din, accused
The Case immediately fled and took refuge inside the house of his uncle, Camilo
Mejaro.
This is an appeal from the Decision1 promulgated on August 27, 2015, in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06456, which affirmed accused-appellant's conviction With the incident already attracting people's attention, Barangay Captain
for the offense of murder, punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Herminion Ballebar called for police assistance even as Isaac tried to
Code, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, in appease Eliseo's relatives. Entering Camilo's house, Issac saw accused
its Decision in Criminal Case No. P-4100, promulgated on September 3, who said nothing when queried about what he did. Shortly thereafter, SPO
2013. 1 Hermilando Manzano arrived on board a motorcycle with SPO 1 Ballebar
who called on accused to surrender. Upon his voluntary surrender and tum
over of the jungle knife he was holding to the police officers, accused was
The present case stems from an Information filed against accused-appellant
brought to the Bula Municipal Police Station for investigation and detention.
Christopher Mejaro Roa (Roa) on June 5, 2007, charging him for the murder
In the meantime, Eliseo was brought to the Bula Municipal Health Center
of Eliseo Delmiguez (Delmiguez), committed as follows:
where he was pronounced dead on arrival and, after the necropsy
examination, later certified by Dr. Consolacion to have died of Hypovolemia
That on or about 16 March 2007 at around 3:30 in the afternoon at Barangay secondary to multiple stab wounds.3 (citations omitted)
San Miguel, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, with
When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty," but in the certificate
intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
of arraignment, he signed his name as "Amado M. Tetangco." Trial on the
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab Eliseo Delmiguez with
merits ensued. There was no contest over the fact that accused-appellant,
the use of a bladed weapon, locally known as "ginunting," hitting and injuring
indeed, stabbed the victim, but he interposed the defense of insanity.
the body of the latter, inflicting multiple mortal hack wound[s] thereon, which
were the immediate and direct cause of his instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount that may be The Ruling of the RTC
proven in court.
In its Decision promulgated on September 3, 2013, the RTC of Pili,
That the killing was committed 1) with treachery, as the qualifying Camarines Sur found that accused-appellant is guilty of the offense of
circumstance or which qualified the killing to murder, and 2) [w]ith taking Murder. The RTC ruled that the defense of insanity was not sufficiently
advantage of superior strength, as aggravating circumstance.2 proven as to exculpate accused-appellant from the offense charged. The
RIC noted that as an exempting circumstance, insanity presupposes that the
accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of
The Facts
will at the time of the commission of the crime. Thus, the RTC said, the
accused must be shown to be deprived of reason or that he acted without
The facts surrounding the incident, as succinctly put by the RTC, are as the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
follows: discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. It is the accused who
pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity that has the burden of proving
the same with clear and convincing evidence. This entails, the RTC added,
A resident of Brgy. San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur, accused [Roa] is opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who has rational basis
known to have suffered mental disorder prior to his commission of the crime to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own
charged. While his uncle, Issac [Mejaro ], attributes said condition to an
perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert,
incident in the year 2000 when accused was reportedly struck in the head such as a psychiatrist.4
by some teenagers, SPOl [Nelson] Ballebar claimed to have learned from
others and the mother of the accused that the ailment is due to his use of
illegal drugs when he was working in Manila. When accused returned from In the case of accused-appellant, the RTC ruled, he failed to discharge the
Manila in 2001 , Issac recalled that, in marked contrast to the silent and burden of proving the claim of insanity. First, while Isaac Mejaro's testimony
formal deportment with which he normally associated his nephew, the latter was able to sufficiently prove that accused-appellant started having mental
became talkative and was observed to be "always talking to himself' and health issues as early as 2001 , the trial court ruled that his past medical
"complaining of a headache." history does not suffice to support a finding that he was likewise insane at
the time that he perpetrated the killing of Delmiguez in 2007. To the trial
court, the lack of showing of any psychotic incidents from the time of his
On September 27, 2001, accused had a psychotic episode and was brought discharge in 2002 until March 2007 suggests that his insanity is only
to the [Don Susana J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital] DSJRM by his mother and occasional or intermittent and, thus, precludes the presumption of
Mrs. Sombrero. Per the October 10, 2005 certification issued by Dr.
continuity.5
Benedicto Aguirre, accused consulted and underwent treatment for
schizophrenia at the [Bi col Medical Center] BMC in the years 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, and 2005. In her Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. [Edessa Second, the trial court acknowledged that accused-appellant exhibited
Padre-]Laguidao also stated that accused was prescribed antipsychotic abnormal behavior after the incident, particularly in writing the name of
medication which he was, however, not able to continue taking due to Amado M. Tetangco in his certificate of arraignment. It also noted that
financial constraints. Edgar [Sapinoso] and Rico [Ballebar], who. knew midway through the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, accused-
accused since childhood, admitted hearing about the latter's mental health appellant's mental condition worsened, prompting his counsel to file another
issues and/or his treatment therefor. Throughout the wake of an unnamed motion for psychiatric evaluation and treatment, and that he was
aunt sometime in March 2007, it was likewise disclosed by Issac that subsequently diagnosed again to be suffering from schizophrenia of an
accused neither slept nor ate and was known to have walked by himself all undifferentiated type. The trial court, however, cited the rule that the
the way to Bagumbayan, Bula. evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be
accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately
before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. The trial court then
On March 16, 2007, Issac claimed that accused was unusually silent, ruled that the witnesses' account of the incident provides no clue regarding
refused to take a bath and even quarreled with his mother when prompted the state of mind of the accused, and all that was established was that he
to do so. At about 3 :30 p.m. of the same day, it appears that Eliseo, then 50
approached Delmiguez from behind and stabbed him on his lower back. To
years old, was walking with Edgar on the street in front of the store of Marieta the trial court, this actuation of the accused, together with his immediate flight
Ballecer at Zone 3, San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur. From a distance of
and subsequent surrender to the police authorities, is not indicative of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated September 3,
insanity. 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Christopher Mejaro
Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as defined in
Finally, while the accused was reputed to be "crazy" in his community, the
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is sentenced to suffer the
trial court ruled that such is of little consequence to his cause. It said:
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the
heirs of the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez, the amount of: (1) P7 5, 000. 00 as
The popular conception of the word "crazy" is to describe a person or act civil indemnity for the death of the said victim, (b) P50,000 .00 as moral
that is unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may, therefore, behave in a damages, and (c) P30,000 .00 as exemplary damages as provided by the
crazy manner but it does not necessarily or conclusively prove that he is Civil Code in line with recent jurisprudence, with costs. In addition, all awards
legally so. The legal standard requires that the accused must be so insane for damages shall bear legal interest at the rate of six [percent] (6%) per
as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent.6 annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.9

Hence, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder, and Aggrieved by the ruling of the CA, accused-appellant elevated the case
sentenced him as follows: before this Court by way of a Notice of Appeal.10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused The Issue

Christopher Mejaro Roa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
The sole issue presented in the case before the Court is: whether there is
and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant for the
offense of Murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is ordered to pay the Heirs of Eliseo Delmiguez the following sums: However, there being no contest that accused-appellant perpetrated the
(1) 75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim; (b) 50,000.00 stabbing of the victim, which caused the latter's death, the resolution of the
as moral damages; and (c) 30,000.00 as exemplary damages. present issue hinges on the pleaded defense of insanity.

Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the CA. The Court's Ruling

The Ruling of the CA The Court finds no reversible error in the findings of fact and law by the CA.
Hence, the assailed Decision affirming the conviction of accused-appellant
for murder must be upheld.
In its presently assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the finding of conviction
by the trial court. The CA first noted that all the elements of the crime of
murder had been sufficiently established by the evidence on record. On the Insanity as an exempting circumstance is provided for in Article 12, par. 1 of
other hand, the defense of insanity was not sufficiently proven by clear and the Revised Penal Code:
convincing evidence. The CA said:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The
Record shows that the accused-appellant has miserably failed to prove that following are exempt from criminal liability:
he was insane when he fatally stabbed the victim on March 16, 2007. To
prove his defense, accused-appellant's witnesses including Dr. Edessa
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
Padre-Laguidao testified that they knew him to be insane because he was
interval.
brought and confined to the Bicol Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry
for treatment in the year 2001 . However, such fact does not necessarily
follow that he still suffered from schizophrenia during the time he fatally When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
attacked and stabbed the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez. No convincing evidence defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of
was presented by the defense to show that he was not in his right mind, or the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he
that he had acted under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity, or that shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
he had generally been regarded as insane around the time of the same court.
commission of the acts attributed to him.
In People v. Fernando Madarang,11 the Court had the opportunity to discuss
An inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period the nature of the defense of insanity as an exempting circumstance. The
immediately before or at the very moment the act under prosecution was Court there said:
committed. Mere prior confinement in a mental institution does not prove that
a person was deprived of reason at the time the crime was committed. It
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot
must be noted that accused-appllant was discharged from the mental
be punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral
hospital in 2002, or long before he committed the crime charged. He who
assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the faculties of
relies on such plea of insanity (proved at another time) must prove its
understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders
existence also at the time of the commission of the offense. This, accused-
human actions laudable or culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the
appellant failed to do.7 (citations ommitted)
understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane accused is not
morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of
Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of the defense witnesses that criminal law is served by punishing an insane accused because by reason
purport to support the claim of insanity are based on assumptions, and are of his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior and cannot
too speculative, presumptive, and conjectural to be convincing. To the CA, be deterred from similar behavior in the future.
their observation that accused-appellant exhibited unusual behavior is not
sufficient proof of his insanity, because not every aberration of the mind or
xxxx
mental deficiency constitutes insanity.8 On the contrary, the CA found that
the circumstances of the attack bear indicia that the killing was done
voluntarily, to wit: (1) the use of a long bolo locally known as ginunting, (2) In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for
the location of the stab wounds, (3) the attempt of accused-appellant to flee insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete
from the scene of the crime, and (4) his subsequent surrender upon being deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived
called by the police authorities. of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation
of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
Thus, the CA dismissed the claim of insanity, and affirmed the conviction of
imputability.
the RTC for the offense charged. The CA merely modified the award of
damages, and dispositively held, thus:
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the 2001 and in 2012, and not immediately prior to or simultaneous to the
mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof As no man can know what commission of the offense in 2007.
is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind
can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity
Second, the testimony of Mejaro also cannot be used as a basis to find that
of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness
accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the offense in 2007.
who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational
His testimony merely demonstrated the possible underlying reasons behind
basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own
accused-appellant's mental condition, but similar to Dr. Laguidao's
perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert,
testimony, it failed to shed light on accused-appellant's mental condition
such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must
immediately prior to, during, and immediately after accused-appellant
relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the
stabbed the victim without any apparent provocation.
offense with which he is charged. (citations omitted)

Accused-appellant further argues that the presumption of sanity must not be

In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the plea
applied in his case, because of the rule that a person who has been
of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. 12 Hence, the
committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the insane is presumed to
accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a
continue to be insane. In this case, however, it is noteworthy that while
judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt,
accused-appellant was confined in a mental institution in 2001, he was
because the accused had already admitted committing the crime.13 This
properly discharged therefrom in 2002. This proper discharge from his
Court had also consistently ruled that for the plea of insanity to prosper, the
confinement clearly indicates an improvement in his mental condition;
accused must present clear and convincing evidence to support the claim.
otherwise, his doctors would not have allowed his discharge from
confinement. Absent any contrary evidence, then, the presumption of sanity
Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused resumes and must prevail.
as a successful defense. It is an exception rather than the rule on the human
condition. Anyone who pleads insanity as an exempting circumstance bears
In fine, therefore, the defense failed to present any convincing evidence of
the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. The testimony
accused-appellant's mental condition when he committed the crime in March
or proof of an accused's insanity must relate to the time immediately
2007. While there is evidence on record of his mental condition in 2001 and
preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he
14 in 2012, the dates of these two diagnoses are too far away from the date of
is charged.
the commission of the offense in 2007, as to altogether preclude the
possibility that accused-appellant was conscious of his actions in 2007.
In the case at bar, the defense of insanity of accused-appellant Roa was Absent any supporting evidence, this Court cannot sweepingly conclude that
supported by the testimony of the following witnesses: (1) his uncle, Isaac accused-appellant was mentally insane for the whole 11-year period from
Mejaro (Mejaro), (2) municipal health worker Mrs. Lourdes Padregon 2001 to 2012, as to exempt him criminal liability for an act committed in 2007.
Sombrero (Sombrero), and (3) Dr. Edessa Padre-Laguidao (Dr. Laguidao). It was the defense's duty to fill in the gap in accused-appellant's state of mind
between the 2001 diagnosis and the 2012 diagnosis, and unfortunately, it
failed to introduce evidence to paint a full picture of accused-appellant's
Dr. Laguidao testified that in 2001, accused-appellant was admitted at the
mental condition when he committed the crime in 2007. With that, the Court
Bicol Medical Center, and was discharged in 2002. She examined accused-
has no other option but to adhere to the presumption of sanity, and conclude
appellant on March 15, 2012 and August 15, 2012. She evaluated his mental
that when accused-appellant attacked the victim, he was conscious of what
condition and found out that his answers to her queries were unresponsive,
he was doing, and was not suffering from an insanity.
and yielding a meaningless conversation. She then diagnosed him as having
undifferentiated type of Schizophrenia, characterized by manifest illusions
and auditory hallucinations which are commanding in nature. She also This conclusion is based not merely on the presumption of sanity, but
recommended anti-psychotic drug maintenance.15 bolstered by the circumstances surrounding the incident.1wphi1 As the
prosecution correctly argued in its Appellee's Brief, there are circumstances
surrounding the incident that negate a complete absence of intelligence on
Mejaro testified that accused-appellant's mental illness could be attributed
the part of accused-appellant when he attacked the victim. First, he
to an incident way back in May 8, 2000, when he was struck on the head by
surprised the victim when he attacked from behind. This is supported by the
some teenager. After that incident, accused-appellant, who used to be silent
companion of the victim, who testified that while they were walking, they did
and very formal, became very talkative and always talked to himself and
not notice any danger when they saw accused-appellant standing near the
complained of headaches. On September 27, 2001, accused-appellant had
trimobile. Second, accused-appellant's attempt to flee from the scene of the
a psychotic episode, prompting his mother to confine him at Don Suzano
crime after stabbing the victim indicates that he knew that what he just
Rodriguez Mental Hospital (DSRMH). He was observed to be well after his
committed was wrong. And third, when the police officers called out to
confinement. The illness recurred, however, when he failed to maintain his
accused-appellant to surrender, he voluntarily came out of the house where
medications. The symptoms became worse in March 2007, when his aunt
he was hiding and voluntarily turned himself over to them.
died. He neither slept nor ate, and kept walking by himself in the morning
until evening. He did not want to take a bath, and even quarreled with his
mother when told to do so.16 The foregoing actions of accused-appellant immediately before, during, and
immediately after he committed the offense indicate that he was conscious
of his actions, that he intentionally committed the act of stabbing, knowing
The foregoing testimonies must be examined in light of the quantum of proof
the natural consequence of such act, and finally, that such act of stabbing is
required, which is that of clear and convincing evidence to prove that the
a morally reprehensible wrong. His actions and reactions immediately
insanity existed immediately preceding or simultaneous to the commission
preceding and succeeding the act of stabbing are similar if not the same as
of the offense.
that expected of a fully sane person.

Taken against this standard, the testimonies presented by accused-

appellant unfortunately fail to pass muster. First, the testimony of Dr.
Laguidao to the effect that accused-appellant was suffering from
undifferentiated schizophrenia stems from her psychiatric evaluation of the
accused in 2012, or about five years after the crime was committed. His
mental condition five years after the crime was committed is irrelevant for
purposes of determining whether he was also insane when he committed
the offense. While it may be said that the 2012 diagnosis of Dr. Laguidao
must be taken with her testimony that the accused was also diagnosed with
schizophrenia in 2001, it is worth noting that the testimony of Dr. Laguidao
as to the 2001 diagnosis of the accused is pure hearsay, as she had no
personal participation in such diagnosis. Even assuming that that portion of
her testimony is admissible, and even assuming that it is credible, her
testimony merely provides basis for accused-appellant's mental condition in
Therefore, the Court finds no reasonable basis to reverse the findings of the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that accused-appellant's culpability had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to the award of damages, however, the Court finds the need to modify
the same, in line with the rule enunciated in People v. Jugueta, where the
Court laid down the rule that in cases where the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua, the proper amounts of awarded damages should be
75,000 as civil indemnity, 75,000 as moral damages and 75,000 as
exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating
circumstances present.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on August 27,
2015, in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 06456, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, the fallo of the Decision must read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated September 3,

2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Christopher Mejaro
Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accusedappellant is ORDERED to pay the
heirs of the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez, the amount of: (1) 75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of the said victim, (b) 75,000.00 as moral damages,
and (c) 75,000.00 as exemplary damages as provided by the Civil Code in
line with recent jurisprudence, with costs. In addition, all awards for damages
shall bear legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 93752 July 15, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAROY BUENAFLOR y TUAZON alias "Larry," defendant-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Laroy Buenaflor, who was charged with and convicted of rape and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P30,000.00 and the costs of suit, is before the
Court on appeal.
The complaint filed by the offended party, Isabella Federis, against appellant
Buenaflor reads as follows:
That on or about August 19, 1989, in the City of Naga,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
by means of force, threats and intimidation, commit
sexual intercourse against one Isabella Federis y
Cedron, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law. 1
The appellant having entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment, the case
proceeded to trial. On 10 May 1990, judgment was rendered by the trial court
with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Laroy Buenaflor y
Tuazon, alias "Larry," guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify the Before this Court, the sole error assigned by the appellant is that:
offended party, Isabella Federis, the sum of P30,000.00
and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
The facts constituting the offense were summarized by the trial
court in its decision in the following manner: Appellant did not seriously try to deny that he had sexual intercourse with
As the evidence of the prosecution stands, we find from
the clear and positive testimony of the complainant that
she is 21 years old, single, a student at the University
of Nueva Caceres in Naga City, with residence at
Lourdes Young, Nabua, Camarines Sur; that at about
11:00 o'clock in the evening of August 19, 1989, she
was on her way home to her boarding house in
Peafrancia Avenue, Naga City, together with her
boardmate Imelda Barcebal, coming from the Bichara
Theater, and they had to walk in returning to their
boarding house; that when they reached the Naga City
Post Office along Peafrancia Avenue, the accused
coming from behind them and armed with a knife put his
left arm on her shoulder and with his right hand poked
a knife on the right side of her body and told her not to
move because she might be killed; that she called for
Imelda Barcebal but the latter kept on running away and
left her alone. The accused then transferred the position
of the knife from the right side of her body to the right
side of her neck. She tried to shout but the accused
pressed harder the knife on her neck and dragged her
to a darker portion of the Mabini Interior and she noticed
that the accused had no more pants and brief and then
pushed her down and laid on top of her and tried to
remove her t-shirt (Exhibit D), and [told] her not to shout
because he was going to kill her. The accused was also
able to remove her pants (Exhibit E) and panty (Exhibit
F) and, thereafter, inserted his penis on her vagina for
which she felt pain and the accused started kissing her
on her lips and other parts of her body. That she kept
on crying and the accused threatened to kill her.
From the testimony of the complainant it has been
further sufficiently established that, when she was able
to regain her strength she told the accused that
wherever he will go she will go with him, but requested
the accused that she first be allowed to go home to got
her clothes and money, to which the accused agreed.
The accused then accompanied the complainant on the
way to her boarding house, but when they reached the
Mary Anne Snackhouse which was just in front of the
boarding house, the complainant told the accused to
wait for her in that place. She then proceeded to her
boarding house and upon reaching the same she was
met by Aurora Ozaeta, Imelda Barcebal and the rest of
her co-boarders. She then related to them the incident
that happened to her and further told them that the man
who raped her was waiting for her in front of the Mary
Anne Snackhouse and described to them the person of
the accused and the clothes he was wearing. Her
boardmate, Aurora Ozaeta, called up the police station
giving said information given by the complainant
identifying the person of the accused and where he
could be found. That after a while policemen arrived
informing them that they were able to apprehend the
person reported to have raped the complainant. The
policemen showed to her a knife (Exhibit B) which the
complainant identified as the one used by the accused
in poking at her. The policemen went back to their police
headquarters. After a while her parents arrived and they
all went to the police headquarters. Aurora Ozaeta and
Imelda Barcebal followed to the police headquarters.
That at the police headquarters the policemen showed
to the complainant the person apprehended and the
complainant readily identified him as the person who
raped her. 3
[t]he trial court erred in not considering the mitigating
circumstances of imbecility and drunkenness in
convicting the accused/appellant of the crime
charged. 4
Isabella Federis on the night of 19 August 1989. He, however, denied having
sexually assaulted Isabella; he claimed that Isabella did not physically resist
the act of penile penetration and had in effect given her consent to it.
Appellant Buenaflor testified in substance that he was in Naga City
Subdivision on 19 August 1989, in the house of one Badong for whom he
worked. He later declared that he was staying in his sister's house in
Canaman, Camarines Sur. On the night of 19 August 1989, he saw a movie
at the Robertson Cinema; he left the cinema at 12:00 midnight and
proceeded to the public plaza where he allegedly had been staying for fifteen
(15) days. On cross-examination, he declared that while at the plaza, he saw
two (2) women talking. He approached them, poked a knife at one of them
(Isabella Federis) and led her away to a dark alley. There they performed
the sexual act, appellant stated, without Isabella offering any resistance and
even embracing appellant in the course of copulation. Appellant also testified
that he was a "little bit drunk" during that time. 5
The trial court found that appellant Buenaflor had indeed forced himself on
Isabella, that he had explicitly admitted "poking a knife" at Isabella and that
the testimony of Isabella that she had been forced down upon or near a
garbage heap in the dark alley of Mabini Interior and there ravished against
her will, was forthright and candid and worthy of belief. Appellant having
presented no basis for rejecting and overturning the above finding of
coercion and intimidation, that finding must stand.
The principal submission of appellant was in fact that his criminal liability, if
any, should at least have been mitigated in view of his impaired mental
faculties. Appellant apparently does not seek completely to avoid criminal
liability on the ground of imbecility as an exempting circumstance. The
pleadings filed by appellant merely tended to show erratic behavior and lack
of coherence on his part in the course of trial, said to be symptomatic of a
diseased mind, which behavior, although not indicating complete deprivation
of intelligence and freedom of will, we are urged to take as basis for
mitigation of liability.
During the pretrial conference, counsel for appellant stated that his client
was suffering from mental disease. The pretrial conference was thereupon
reset to a later date and the trial court ordered appellant examined by a
physician to ascertain appellant's mental condition. Appellant Buenaflor was
examined by Dr. Imelda Escuadra, a medical specialist at the Don Susano
Rodriguez Regional Mental Hospital. The report prepared by Dr. Escuadra
set forth the following information:
Brief Background History:
The patient is the fifth among eight siblings. He was
born on February 14, 1968 by normal spontaneous
delivery, assisted by hilot at home. At age three months,
he started to have convulsions, up to age three years
old. As a consequence, he had poor scholastic
standing, repeating Grade I several times and stopped
at Grade II. He was observed to be childish with poor
speech development and behaved as "uto-uto."
Patient was accused of raping a girl last August 20,
1989. He was ordered to submit himself for
neuropsychiatric evaluation.
Mental Status Examination:
An adult male, with handcuffs, wearing clean printed
polo shirt and faded maong pants. He had pockmarks
on his face due to pimple scars. He looked serious, with
faraway gaze and at times downcast eyes.
He claimed he was Larry Buenaflor, a resident of San
Jose, Camarines Sur. He recognized his companions:
his mother and police escort. He claimed he finished
Grade III. Initially, he denied knowing the number of
children in their family, later, he said there are four boys
and five girls. He also claimed he did not know his age.
He admitted he had a case in court rape; mentioned Article 12 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
a girl named Annabel Frias as the victim, a resident of
Peafrancia Street, Naga City. He narrated that he
brought her home from Naga City. With him that time
was Ruel Villegas. He said he loved the girl and has
been courting her giving several dates when his love
[was] accepted. He also said he raped the girl once but
it was Ruel who did it first. He cannot give the details of
the incident of the crime.
He spoke coherently and relevantly but not
spontaneous in character. He denied not [sic] knowing
some facts as his age, the number of children of the
family and he was not sure of the dates he gave. As he
spoke, he sighed deeply.
He complained of impaired sleep and impaired appetite.
He had impaired memory as evidenced by his inability
to recall important facts like number of children in the
family.
During the second interview he was more relaxed,
responded spontaneously and claimed he had good
sleep and appetite. No hallucinations were elicited.
In his third interview, he looked depressed, complaining
of insomnia.
During the last interview, he was also depressed and
complained of poor sleep.
Physical Examinations:
Essentially normal findings.
Psychological Testing:
Subject weighted a score of 37 with an IQ equivalent to
63 indicating mild mental deficiency level of intellectual
functioning. His judgment and comprehension are poor.
Projectivewise, depressive reaction is prominently
established. Poor reality testing function is elicited.
Diagnosis:
1. Mental retardation
2. Reactive depression
3. No psychosis.
Remarks and Recommendations:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations,
the patient is suffering from Mental Retardation and
Reactive Depression. However, he is not psychotic.
A person with mental retardation has below normal
intelligence as evidenced by the intelligence quotient
tests. He has poor memory, poor judgment and poor
grasp of general information. He is trainable up to the
primary grades only. According to the "Synopsis of
Psychiatry" by Kaplan a patient with mental retardation
"has concurrent deficits or impairment in adaptive
functioning, i.e., a person's effectiveness in meeting the
standards expected for his or her age by his or her
cultural group in area such as social skills and
responsibility, communicates daily living skills, personal
indulgence and self-sufficiency." (sic) Therefore, he is
capable of undergoing judicial trial with much difficulty. 6
Art. 12. Circumstances which Exempt from Criminal
Liability. The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
1. An imbecile or insane person, unless the latter has
acted during a lucid interval.
xxx xxx xxx
Imbecility, like insanity, is a defense which pertains to the mental
condition of a person. Our case law projects the same standards
in respect of both insanity and imbecility, that is, that the insanity
or imbecility must constitute complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the criminal act, or total deprivation of freedom of
the will. 7 The above quoted medical evidence that was admitted
into the record in the case at bar does not show complete
deprivation (nor even substantial deprivation) of intelligence on
the part of appellant Buenaflor and he, accordingly, cannot be
deemed exempted from criminal liability for the rape of Isabella
Federis. His behavior on the night he raped Isabella showed that
he was quite conscious of his acts and aware of the moral quality
thereof.
At the same time, we believe, however, that the medical evidence of record
does show that appellant Buenaflor's mental faculties were to some extent
retarded or impaired in their development, which impairment or retardation
reflects a diminished level of responsibility for his criminal acts. Article 13 (9)
of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

Art. 13. Mitigating Circumstances. The following are

mitigating circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

(9) Such illness of the offender as would diminish the

exercise of the will power of the offender without,
however, depriving him of the consciousness of his
acts.

xxx xxx xxx

We think that the mitigating circumstance contemplated in Article 13 (9) of

the Revised Penal Code was present in the case at bar.

Appellant, in addition, claimed intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. As

earlier noted, he had declared on cross-examination that he was a "little bit
drunk" at the time be committed the act complained of. On that basis alone,
appellant asserts he should be credited with a mitigating circumstance.

The ordinary rule is that intoxication may be considered either as

aggravating or as mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending
the commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the
penalty, if the intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit
the contemplated crime; upon the other hand, when intoxication is habitual
or intentional, it is considered as an aggravating circumstance. 8 The person
pleading intoxication must present proof that he had taken a quantity of
alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to
produce the effect of blurring his reason; 9 and at the same time, he must
prove that not only was intoxication not habitual 10 but also that his imbibing
the alcoholic drink was not intended to fortify his resolve to commit the
crime. 11

The record here does not show that appellant had taken an alcoholic
beverage prior to raping Isabella Federis. The testimony of appellant himself
on direct examination did not establish such drinking as a fact. The sole
basis of appellant's claim to the alternative circumstance of intoxication is
his own remark during cross-examination that he was a "little bit drunk" when
he inflicted himself sexually upon Isabella Federis. We do not believe that
appellant's own remark sufficiently established his asserted state of
intoxication.

At any rate, the appreciation of a mitigating circumstance in favor of

appellant Buenaflor would not have the effect of reducing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed upon him by the trial court. Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code prescribes that "in all cases in which the law prescribes
a single indivisible penalty, [such penalty) shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed." Reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible
penalty. 12

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated 10 May 1990 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.

S0 ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

 Accused-appellants mother-in-law, Gorgonia Nieva, testified that on
the day prior to the incident, accused-appellant had asked her to look for Dr.
Luisa Medina, a dentist. Accused-appellants daughter was then sick. Her
THIRD DIVISION
inquiries showed that the dentist no longer had her clinic at her house;
[G.R. No. 120988. August 11, 1997]
instead she may be found at the Aurora A. Quezon Elementary
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSEMARIE DE
School. Thus, the next day, she went with accused-appellant to Manila to
LA CRUZ y NIEVA, accused-appellant.
look for the dentist. They parted ways when they arrived at the school at
DECISION
around 11 oclock in the morning (pp. 3-12, tsn, April 24, 1995).
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rosemarie de la Cruz was caught holding a seven- Accused-appellant testified that when she got to the school, she asked
year old schoolgirl by the hand and leading her out of the school a guard where the clinic was. The guard gave her directions, and told her to
grounds. Charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor, pass through the same gate on her way out. When she got to the clinic, no
she was convicted, and accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of no one was there so she left. On her way out, a girl, later identified as Whiazel,
less than reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant contends that her guilt has walked with her at arms length (nakasabay). She did not hold the child; she
not been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt and that the entire did not look at the child; they did not talk; not even smiles were
case is nothing but an overreaction to the situation. exchanged. Before she could get out of the school, a woman (Cecilia
Caparos) called her; hurled invectives at her, and accused her of kidnapping
The Information charged:
Whiazel. Accused-appellant got mad but nevertheless offered no resistance
when Caparos dragged her and brought her to the office of the guidance
That on or about September 27, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, counselor. There, Caparos repeated her charges against accused-
the said accused, being then a private individual and without authority of appellant, which accusations the latter denied. Whiazel was asked by the
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, detain or guidance counselor if accused-appellant was really going to kidnap her; she
in any manner deprive one WHIAZEL SORIANO y CRUZ, seven years of answered no. Very much the same things were said later at the principals
age, of her liberty, against her will and consent. office ( pp. 2-8, tsn, April 21, 1995). At the request of the principal, five
policemen later came and brought accused-appellant to Station No. 5 of the
Western Police District (pp. 14-15, Rollo).
Contrary to law.
(p. 5, Rollo) Lending credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the
trial court rendered the appealed decision finding accused-appellant guilty
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-139168 before the beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Branch 35, detention of a minor, as:
Manila). After accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, trial
commenced. The testimony of the principal witnesses for the prosecution It has been established with moral certainty that with neither legal reason
may be summarized in the following manner: nor just cause, the accused took hold of the child Whiazel by the hand, and
led her towards the gate of the school compound against her will, evidently
Cecilia Caparos, a neighbor of Whiazel Soriano, the victim, testified
to bring her out of the school perimeter. But before they could actually exit
that on September 27, 1994, at around 11:30 oclock in the morning, she was through that gate, the child saw a neighbor (obviously Cecilia Caparos) and
waiting for her two children inside the compound of the Aurora A. Quezon told the accused that she wanted to go to her neighbor. The accused,
Elementary School when she saw Whiazel held on the hand and being led
however, refused and did not agree to let the child go and continued to
away by a woman later identified as accused-appellant. Knowing that hold her, for which reason, she was not able to get away from the accused
Whiazel was enrolled in the afternoon class, she went after them and asked . . .
accused-appellant where she was going with Whiazel. Accused-appellant
answered that she asked Whiazel to bring her to Rowena Soriano, the childs
mother. Cecilia then turned to Whiazel and asked her why she was with That the accused did not employ any physical force on Whiazel Soriano in
accused-appellant. Whiazel answered that accused-appellant requested her detaining and restraining her freedom provides no significant consequence
to look for the latters child. Cecilia grew suspicious because of the to relieve the former from the resultant effects of her consummated criminal
inconsistent answers, Whiazels terrified look, and the scratches on the childs act, for it cannot be denied that she had exerted sufficient moral
face. She told accused-appellant that she will bring accused-appellant to a intimidation on the child which effectively controlled and influenced her will
teacher because she did not trust accused-appellant. Accused-appellant . . . At such tender age and immature mind she can easily be awed and
was surprised and reasoned out, but just the same agreed to go to a cowed by a person such as the accused.
teacher (pp. 3-9, 11-13, tsn, April 3, 1995).

The victim, Whiazel Soriano (sometimes referred to in the record as
Reazel or Rhiazel), at the time of the incident, was a Grade 1 pupil at the
Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School in Malate, Manila. She testified that
she voluntarily went with accused-appellant after being asked for help in
looking for the school dentist. Whiazel also mentioned that accused-
appellant asked for her assistance in looking for accused-appellants child in
a place far away from school. She was neither threatened nor hurt in any
way by accused-appellant. She was not led out of the school; in fact they
never got out of the school compound. When Cecilia Caparos saw them,
Whiazel told accused-appellant that she wanted to go. Accused-appellant
refused, and held Whiazels hand. Whiazel did not try to escape. She did not
even cry; well, not until they went to a teacher (pp. 3-9, tsn, April 7, 1995).
For the defense, Eufemia Magpantay, guidance teacher at Aurora A.
Quezon Elementary School, testified that on September 27, 1994, at around
noontime, accused-appellant, Whiazel, her teacher Mrs. Rioganes, and
Cecilia Caparos went to her office. The incident was related to her. Asked
what she was doing with Whiazel, accused-appellant said she wanted the
childs help in looking for the school dentist.Accused-appellant reiterated this
before the assistant principal to whom they all later went. This witness
testified that the school allows patients who are not connected with the
school to consult at the clinic. Further, she also mentioned that the students
of the Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School, the same being a public school,
come mostly from low to average income families (pp. 4-9, tsn, April 28,
1995).
(pp. 24-26, Ibid.)
Accordingly, accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the victim, through her parents, P50,000
as moral damages (p.26, Ibid.).
Accused-appellant interposed the instant appeal, contending that her
act of holding the child by the hand and leading her out of the school
premises cannot be considered an act of kidnapping without leaving room
for reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant points out that Whiazel did not
categorically state that accused-appellant tried to kidnap her. On the
contrary, the child testified that she voluntarily went with accused-appellant
and that she was neither forced nor intimidated into accompanying accused-
appellant. Also, it is said, accused-appellants excuse for going to Whiazels
school to look for Dr. Medina is buttressed by the fact that she had a tooth
extracted in jail sometime in November 1994; and that contrary to Whiazels
statement, the guidance teacher, Eufemia Magpantay, testified that even
persons not connected with the school are allowed to consult Dr. Medina at
the schools dental clinic. Accused-appellant thus contends that she had a
valid reason for being at the school premises, as indeed, she did not run
away and instead faced her accuser. All these circumstances, accused-
appellant submits, constitute reasonable doubt as to her guilt which,
therefore, necessitate her acquittal (pp. 4-8, Accused-Appellants Brief; pp.
53-57, Rollo).
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that
Whiazel was deprived of her liberty, no matter how short a time, the moment
accused-appellant, a person unknown to Whiazel, prevented her from going
over to her neighbor, Cecilia Caparos. Under the circumstances, considering
that she is of such tender age, deprivation of liberty was consummated even
in the absence of force or threats upon the victim. (pp. 6-7, Plaintiff-
Appellees Brief).
In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive
the victim of the latters liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by
indubitable proof (People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by
the trial court, and maintained by the People, as consummating the crime of
kidnapping in this case are those when accused-appellant held the victims
hand and refused to let go when the victim asked to go over to her neighbor,
who by then already saw what was happening. This happened for only a
very brief span of time and the evidentiary record shows that there were a
good number of people present at that time, that a guard was stationed at
the gate, and that there was at least a teacher nearby. The child could have
just as easily shouted for help. While it does not take much to scare the wits
out of a small child like Whiazel, under the attendant circumstances, we
cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of her liberty. It must
further be noted that up to that brief moment when Cecilia saw them, and
the child asked to be let go, the victim had gone with accused-appellant
voluntarily. Without any further act reinforcing the inference that the victim
may have been denied her liberty, even taking cognizance of her minority,
the Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the case at bar was
consummated. While it is a well-entrenched rule that factual findings of trial
courts, especially when they concern the appreciation of testimony of
witnesses, are accorded great respect, by exception, when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the case at bar, the
Court may choose to substitute its own findings (People vs. Padua, 215
SCRA 266 [1992]).
Since the crime is only in its attempted stage, the penalty imposable
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659,
which is reclusion perpetua to death, has to be lowered by two degrees
(Article 51, Revised Penal Code). Two degrees lower from reclusion
perpetua to death would be prision mayor, which has to be imposed in its
medium period in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
(Article 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying further the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the imposable penalty would range from prision
correccional, as the minimum, to prision mayor in its medium period, as the
maximum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is
MODIFIED in that accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of attempted kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Accordingly,
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. The award for moral
damages in the amount of P50,000 is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr.,Francisco, and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.

To our mind, the felony committed is kidnapping and serious illegal

detention of a minor in the attempted stage only. The attempted phase of a
felony is defined as when the offender commences the commission of a
felony, directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance (Article 6, Revised Penal Code). The
overt act must be an external one which has direct connection with the
felony, it being necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried
to its complete termination following its natural course without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
offender, will logically and necessarily ripen to a concrete offense
(Padilla. Criminal Law: Revised Penal Code Annotated, vol. I, 1987 ed., p.
141 citing People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil 703).

In the case at bar, accused-appellant already commenced her criminal

scheme by taking hold of Whiazel by the hand and leading her out of the
school premises. As mentioned earlier, these do not sufficiently establish
that kidnapping had been consummated. However, considering other
attendant facts and circumstances, it does reveal that accused-appellant
had less than noble intentions with the victim.Firstly, the child was led to
believe that accused-appellant wanted to see the dentist. It is not clear,
however, that there really was a Dr. Medina employed by the school as
dentist. Not even the guidance counselor who testified for the defense made
any specific mention of the doctor. Secondly, if accused-appellant wanted to
see the dentist, why was she on her way out? If it is true she had already
gone to the clinic and found no one there and that she then decided to leave,
what else was she doing with the child? Thirdly, accused-appellant did not
simply ask for directions; she wanted the victim to accompany her. That
seems suspicious enough. And of all people, why ask a seven-year
old? Fortunately, the further progress and completion of accused-appellants
felonious design was thwarted by the timely intervention of Cecilia Caparos,
the victims neighbor.

The Court thus holds that the felony committed by accused-appellant

in the case at bar is not kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor
in the consummated stage, but rather in its attempted stage.

Nevertheless, we believe that the trial court erred in granting moral

damages in the amount of P50,000 despite the absence of any evidence on
record that the victim suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, fright, or
similar injury. All that the record reveals is that the victim cried when they
were at the guidance counselors office, nothing more. Inasmuch as moral
damages are granted not to enrich, but rather to compensate the victim for
the injury suffered (Bautista vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16
[1994]), proof of moral suffering must be introduced, failing in which, such
an award is not proper (People vs. Manero, Jr. et. al., 218 SCRA 85 [1993]).
 No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the]
accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code.

SO ORDERED.14
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation15 dated February 10, 2004
SECOND DIVISION alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of
G.R. No. 168546 July 23, 2008 the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 96816 (P.D. No. 968),
MICHAEL PADUA, Petitioner, otherwise known as "The Probation Law of 1976" and Section 70 of Rep.
vs. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. none of the disqualifications under the said laws.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The RTC in an Order17 dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation
Officer of Pasig City to conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a
This petition for review assails the Decision1 dated April 19, 2005 and report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order. The
Resolution2 dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. City Prosecutor was also directed to submit his comment on the said petition
86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael Paduas petition for within five days from receipt of the order.
certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration. Paduas petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11,
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana
20043 and July 28, 20044 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168,
submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC recommending
Pasig City, which had denied his petition for probation.
that Padua be placed on probation.18

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-
Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were under Section 2419 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug
charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The
5,5 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,6 otherwise known as the court ruled thus:
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for selling dangerous
drugs.7 The Information reads:
Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on
minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City
charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a. "Allan" and Michael Padua Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
y Tordel a.k.a. "Mike", with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic
Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that
as follows:
minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his
recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this the Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension
Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael of sentence and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore,
Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and do not find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an
confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one application for probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the
another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then suspension of his sentence.
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to
PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint
On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals
containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found
with the Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents.
positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said
Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to
law.
violations of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was
[v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.
Contrary to law.8
More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de thereof deals with Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor
oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.9 Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds that
minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating
Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Paduas
in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:
counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not
guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time
offenders under Section 7010 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor "Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and
interposed no objection.11 Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Pushers. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this
Order12 stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the
withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
Decision13 dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime amended." (underlining supplied)
charged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby DENIED.
guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No.
8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer
SO ORDERED.20
an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was
(500,000.00). denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a
Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit and ordered DISMISSED.
21
SO ORDERED.
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but
it was denied. Hence, this petition where he raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION
WHICH DEPRIVED PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A MINOR
UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC]
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN
CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.
personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.28
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas petition for probation
shows that the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse
of discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of
statutory construction in denying Paduas petition for probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep.
Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep.
Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the
privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and
Pushers. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under
this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail
of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree
No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)

II. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted
for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot
avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[S] RIGHT [TO BE elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases
RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED
of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined
OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly
KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE what it says.29 If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of
THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.22 intention.30 Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. 31
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent,
opted to adopt its Comment23 as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the
countered that legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher
punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while
I. extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug
dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 1132 and 1533 of the
Act. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have legal basis in while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug
applying Section 24, Article II of R.A. 9165 instead of Section 70, traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from
Article VIII of the same law. availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and
possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways. 34 The Court of
II. Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators
to exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers
who are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule so.35
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has no application to the
instant case.24
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug
pushers while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Paduas using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months
petition for certiorari assailing the trial courts order denying his petition for rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under
probation? (2) Was Paduas right under Rep. Act No. 9344, 25 the "Juvenile Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," violated? and (3) Does Section 32 26 of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (500,000.00) to Ten Million
with the Law" have application in this case? Pesos (10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.

As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under
Paduas petition for certiorari. Rep. Act No. 9344, the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" was
violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has application in
36
directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi- this case. Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-
judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in 1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 3837 of Rep. Act No.
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.27 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section
38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
authority. There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the court transcends its conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" suspended sentence. Section 4038 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 shorts and panty. Appellant, however, glanced and saw Analiza. Frightened,
years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child 39 for Analiza ran away and went back to the sari-sari store of BBB without telling
purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 BBB what she saw.12
and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.
Appellant proceeded to satisfy his bestial desire. After undressing AAA,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April appellant made her lie down. He then placed himself on top of AAA and
19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals made push and pull movements. Afterwards, appellant stopped, allowed
are AFFIRMED. AAA to sit down for a while and then sent her home.13

SO ORDERED. When AAA arrived at their house around 7:30 p.m., she was asked by her
mother, BBB, where she came from and why she came home late. AAA
replied that she was at the back of their house as appellant brought her there
Republic of the Philippines
and had sexual intercourse with her.14
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION The following day, BBB brought AAA to the police station and then to the
G.R. No. 193507 January 30, 2013 Northern Samar Provincial Hospital where AAA was examined by Dr.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, Nochete.15 The medical examination yielded the following:
vs.
REY MONTICALVO y MAGNO, Accused-Appellant.
The findings are:
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
= Confluent abrasion 1 x 1 inches, 2 inches below the umbilicus.
1
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00457 dated 3 December 2009 affirming in toto the Decision2 of Genitalia Exam:
Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catarman, Northern Samar,
in Criminal Case No. C-3460 dated 18 October 2005 finding herein appellant
Rey Monticalvo y Magno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape = Admits 1 finger with ease.
of a demented person committed against AAA,3 thereby imposing upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay P50,000.00 as civil = (-) vulvar swelling, (-) erythema.
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
= (+) complete healed hymenal laceration at 5 oclock,
7 oclock & 10 oclock position.
Appellant Rey Monticalvo y Magno was charged with raping AAA in an
Information4 dated 30 April 2003, the accusatory portion of which reads:
Gram Stain Result: Negative for spermatozoa.16

That on or about the 9th day of December 2002 at about 7:00 oclock in the
evening in Bgy. XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named appellant,
actuated by lust and with lewd design, with force and intimidation, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
AAA, 12 years old and is suffering from mental disorder or is demented or
has mental disability, without the consent and against the will of said
victim.5 [Emphasis supplied].
Dr. Nochete explained that AAA could have possibly sustained those
complete healed hymenal lacerations more than a month prior to the date of
the examination. He also clarified that even though AAA has no fresh
hymenal laceration it does not necessarily mean that no sexual intercourse
was committed on her on 9 December 2002. It is possible that AAA did not
sustain any fresh hymenal laceration because the vaginal canal has become
loose. He did not also find any trace of spermatozoa on AAAs vagina, its
presence being dependent on whether the appellant did ejaculate or not. 17

On arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded

NOT GUILTY6 to the crime charged. AAA was also examined by Dr. Belicena, a Psychiatrist at the Northern
Samar Provincial Hospital, who found that AAA is suffering from moderate
to severe mental retardation, meaning, AAA is suffering from the specific
At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense failed to make form of below average intelligence that has a low reproduction functioning
any stipulation of facts.7 The pre-trial conference was then terminated and resulting in impaired functioning. This finding was obtained through mental
trial on the merits thereafter ensued. examination and actual interview of AAA. Dr. Belicena, however,
recommended a full battery of psychological testing to determine AAAs
exact mental age.18 Dr. Belicenas finding was reduced into writing as
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, the private 19
offended party; (2) BBB, mother of AAA; (3) Analiza Pait (Analiza), neighbor evidenced by a Medical Certificate dated 18 May 2004.
and friend of AAA; (4) Dr. Jesus Emmanuel Nochete (Dr. Nochete), Medical
Officer IV, Northern Samar Provincial Hospital; and (5) Dr. Vincent Anthony For its part, the defense offered the testimonies of (1) Pio Campos (Pio),
M. Belicena (Dr. Belicena), Medical Specialist II, Northern SamarProvincial neighbor and friend of appellant; (2) Cesar Monticalvo (Cesar), appellants
Hospital. Their testimonies established the following facts: father; (3) Alexander Sanico (Alexander), Local Civil Registrar of Bobon,
Northern Samar; and (4) appellant, who invoked the defense of denial and
AAA is a mental retardate and was 12 years and 11 months old at the time alibi to exonerate himself from the crime charged.
of the rape incident.8 She and appellant, who was then 17 years old,9 are
neighbors their respective houses are adjoining each other. 10 Appellant denied having raped AAA. He claimed that on 9 December 2002,
at around 1:00 p.m., he, together with Pio and a certain Dinnes Samson,
In the afternoon of 9 December 2002, AAA and her friend, Analiza, were in was having a drinking spree in the house of one Adolfo Congayao (Adolfo).
They finished drinking at around 6:00 p.m. As he was too drunk, Pio assisted
front of the sari-sari store of AAAs mother, BBB, while appellant was inside
the fence of their house adjacent to the said sari-sari store. Shortly, him in going home. He went to sleep and woke up only at 12:00 midnight as
thereafter, appellant invited AAA to go with him to the kiln at the back of their he needed to urinate. He went back to sleep and woke up at 6:00 a.m. of the
following day, i.e., 10 December 2002. He was surprised that AAA charged
house. AAA acceded and went ahead.11
him with rape. He was then arrested at around 3:00 p.m. of 10 December
2002.20
Upon seeing appellant and AAA going to the kiln, Analiza, pretending to look
for her one peso coin, followed them until she reached a papaya tree located
three and a half meters away from the place. Analiza hid under the papaya Appellant disclosed, however, that the house of Adolfo, where they had their
tree and from there she saw appellant undress AAA by removing the latters drinking spree, is more or less six (6) meters away from the house of AAA.
In fact, he could still see the house of AAA even when he was in the house
of Adolfo. He similarly admitted that he knew very well that AAA is suffering
from mental abnormalities. He also divulged that he asked Pio to testify on
his behalf.21
Appellants testimony was corroborated on all material points by Pio and his
father, Cesar, who also admitted that he personally knew AAA as she is their
neighbor. Cesar also knew that AAA is suffering from mental disorder.22 Both
Pio and Cesar confirmed that on 9 December 2002, they brought appellant
to his bedroom and let him sleep there because he was too drunk.
Thereafter, Pio and Cesar engaged in a drinking spree inside the latters
house, particularly at the kitchen that is more than two (2) meters away from
appellants bedroom, which lasted until 11:00 p.m. Pio and Cesar likewise
stated that there was no moment that appellant went out of his bedroom
since the time they brought him there.23
At the outset, paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353,27provides for two (2) circumstances
when carnal knowledge of a woman with mental disability is considered
rape. Subparagraph (b) thereof refers to rape of a person "deprived of
reason" while subparagraph (d) refers to rape of a "demented person."28 The
term "deprived of reason" has been construed to encompass those suffering
from mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.29 The term "demented,"
on the other hand, means having dementia, which Webster defines as
mental deterioration; also madness, insanity.30 Dementia has also been
defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as a "form of mental disorder in which
cognitive and intellectual functions of the mind are prominently affected; x x
x total recovery not possible since cerebral disease is involved." 31 Thus, a
mental retardate can be classified as a person "deprived of reason," not one
who is "demented" and carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is considered
rape under subparagraph (b), not subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.32

Alexander, another defense witness, presented appellants Certificate of

In this case, both the trial court and the appellate court incorrectly used the
Live Birth24 to prove that the latter was only 17 years old during the
word demented to characterize AAAs mental condition and mistakenly
commission of the crime, i.e., 9 December 2002.25
categorized the rape committed by appellant under subparagraph (d), Article
266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, instead of under
The trial court, convinced about the merits of the prosecutions case subparagraph (b) thereof. Nonetheless, the mistake would not exonerate
rendered a Decision on 18 October 2005, finding the appellant guilty beyond appellant. Otherwise stated, his conviction or criminal liability for rape stands
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape of a demented person and sentenced though not under subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal
him to an imprisonment term of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to Code, as amended, but under subparagraph (b) thereof.
indemnify AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Neither can it be said that appellants right to be properly informed of the
On appeal, the following errors were assigned:
nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated. This Court is
I.
not unaware that the Information was worded, as follows: "AAA is suffering
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
from mental disorder or is demented or has mental disability." This fact,
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE OF A DEMENTED PERSON
however, will not render the Information defective and will not bar this Court
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
from convicting appellant under subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A(1) of the
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE APPELLANTS AGE,
BEING A MINOR, ATTHE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. In Olivarez v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court pronounced that:
III.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY.26
x x x In People v. Rosare,34 the information did not allege that the victim was
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision on 3 December 2009
a mental retardate which is an essential element of the crime of statutory
affirming in toto the trial courts Decision dated 18 October 2005.
rape. This Court however sustained the trial courts judgment of conviction
Hence, this appeal.
holding that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor which formed the
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
basis of the information, a copy of which is attached thereto, stated that the
reasonable doubt as the testimonies of AAA, BBB, Analiza and Dr. Nochete
offended party is suffering from mental retardation. It ruled that there was
were replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Firstly, while the
substantial compliance with the mandate that an accused be informed of the
Information stated that appellant raped AAA on or about the 9th day of
nature of the charge against him. Thus:
December 2002 at around 7:00 p.m., Analiza testified that it was in the
afternoon of the same day when she saw and heard appellant calling AAA
to go to the kiln at the back of their house, and while she saw appellant Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of statutory rape because
undress AAA, she did not actually see the sexual intercourse because the the fact that the victim was a mental retardate was never alleged in the
appellant saw her watching them, so she ran away. Secondly, BBBs information and, absent this element, the acts charged negate the
testimony that on 9 December 2002, AAA confided to her that she was raped commission of the offense for which he was convicted by the lower court.
by appellant early that night was inconsistent with the testimony of Analiza
that it was in the afternoon of the same day when she saw appellant and
AAA going to the kiln, where the former undressed the latter. Thirdly, Dr. Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, we have decided to
Nochetes testimony clearly stated that the hymenal lacerations on AAAs motu proprio take cognizance of the resolution issued by the investigating
prosecutor in I.S. No. 92-0197 dated June 2, 1992, which formed the basis
vagina could have possibly been sustained by her a month ago, which does
not support AAAs claim of rape on 9 December 2002. Even granting that of and a copy of which was attached to the information for rape filed against
appellant, indeed, raped AAA on 9 December 2002, it is highly implausible herein appellant. Therein, it is clearly stated that the offended party is
suffering from mental retardation. We hold, therefore, that this should be
that the hymenal lacerations on her vagina were already completely healed
when she was examined by Dr. Nochete on 10 December 2002, which was deemed a substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate that an
only after less than 24-hours from the date the alleged rape was committed. accused 35 be informed of the nature of the charge against him x x x (citation
omitted). [Emphasis supplied].

Appellant also questions the credibility of AAA as a witness given her 37

condition as a mental retardate. Appellant opines that AAA, could not In this case, both the Complaint36 and the Resolution of the Municipal Trial
Court of Northern Samar, which formed the basis of the Information and
perceive and is not capable of making known her perception to others. As
such, she can be easily coached on what to say or do. copies of which were attached in the records, stated that AAA is suffering
from mental abnormalities she looked like a retardate and her focus is not
normal. Even, the Resolution38 of the Acting Provincial Prosecutor concurred
Appellant finally avers that granting arguendo that he is guilty of the crime with the aforesaid findings. From the aforesaid, it can be gleaned that AAAs
charged, he was only 17 years old at the time of its commission as evidenced mental disorder or mental disability is that of being a mentally retarded and
by his Certificate of Live Birth. This fact was even attested to by the Local not demented. Thus, there was substantial compliance with the mandate to
Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar. Given his minority at the time of inform the accused of the nature of the accusation. 39 More so, as discussed
the commission of the crime charged, the court should have considered the hereunder, the prosecution was able to prove that AAA is, indeed, a mental
same as privileged mitigating circumstance in imposing the penalty against retardate. Even the appellant affirmed the said mental condition of the victim.
him.
To repeat, the term "deprived of reason" has been construed to encompass
This Court affirms appellants conviction. those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation. 40 Hence,
carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under subparagraph (b) not as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on
subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands
amended.41 of the accused. Moreover, it has been jurisprudentially settled that when a
woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it
The gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A(1) is sexual intercourse
satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. 51
with a woman against her will or without her consent. 42 Article 266-A(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically states that:
Worth stressing also is the fact that during AAAs testimony, she positively
identified the appellant as the person who raped her. 52 Thus, the
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed.
straightforward narration of AAA of what transpired, accompanied by her
categorical identification of appellant as the malefactor, sealed the case for
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the the prosecution.53
following circumstances:
The allegation of inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA, BBB, Analiza
a) Through force, threat or intimidation; and Dr. Nochete as regards the exact date and time the alleged rape incident
happened, as well as the absence of fresh hymenal lacerations on AAAs
vagina, pointed to by appellant cannot work in his favor.
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
Evidently, these inconsistencies refer only to trivial and inconsequential
matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. 54 A
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of witness is not expected to remember with perfect recollection every minute
authority; and detail of her harrowing experience. A minor mistake as to the exact time of
the commission of the rape is immaterial and cannot discredit the testimony
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is of a witness. This Court has repeatedly held that the exact date of the
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. 55 Indeed,
above be present.[Emphasis supplied]. the precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its
commission.56 What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of
the rape by the accused against the complainant has been sufficiently
From the foregoing, for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must proven. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which are
prove that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman through any of the irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for
four enumerated circumstances. Without doubt, carnal knowledge of a acquittal.57
woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of
law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is
not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are In the same way, the absence of fresh hymenal lacerations and
the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the spermatozoa on AAAs vagina do not negate the fact of rape. A freshly
mental retardation of the latter.43 broken hymen, as well as the presence or absence of spermatozoa, is not
also an essential element of rape.58 As clarified by Dr. Nochete, the absence
of fresh hymenal laceration on AAAs vagina does not necessarily mean that
In People v. Dalandas,44 citing People v. Dumanon,45 this Court held that she did not engage in sexual intercourse on 9 December 2002. Possibly,
mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical AAA did not sustain any fresh hymenal laceration as her vaginal canal had
evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by become loose. And, he did not find any trace of spermatozoa because its
the trial court.46 presence depends on whether or not the appellant ejaculated.

In the present case, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is, Indeed, a mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone, be
indeed, a mental retardate through, (1) the testimony of her mother; (2) the disqualified from testifying in court.59 Mental retardation per se does not
trial courts observation; and (3) the mental examination and actual interview affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The
of AAA conducted by Dr. Belicena, a Psychiatrist at the Northern Samar acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and
Provincial Hospital, who found AAA to be suffering from moderate to severe the manner she can make them known to the court. 60 If the testimony of a
mental retardation, meaning, AAA is suffering from the "specific form of mental retardate is coherent, the same is admissible in court.61
below average intelligence which has a low reproduction functioning which
result to impairment functioning."47 It is also worthy to note that the defense
did not dispute, even admitted the fact that AAA is suffering from mental Neither can it be said that AAA was merely coached as a witness by her
retardation. The findings of the lower courts about AAAs mental condition mother. It is highly unthinkable that a mother would draw her daughter, a
must be upheld. mental retardate at that, into a rape story with all its attendant scandal and
humiliation if the rape did not really happen. No mother in her right mind
would possibly wish to stamp her child with the stigma that follows the
The prosecution was also able to establish the fact of sexual congress despicable crime of rape.62 Moreover, appellant failed to show any ill-motive
between appellant and AAA. Despite the latters mental condition, she on the part of AAA and her mother to falsely testify against him.
narrated before the court in the best way she could her ordeal in the hands
of appellant. As stated by the appellate court, AAA conveyed her ideas by
words and demonstrations.48 AAA recounted how the appellant sexually In light of the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA, her positive
abused her on 9 December 2002 by inviting her to go to the kiln at the back identification of appellant as her assailant and the lack of ill-motive on her
of their house. Thereupon, appellant suddenly undressed her by removing part to falsely testify against appellant, the latters defense of denial and alibi
her shorts and panty. This fact was attested to by Analiza, one of the must necessarily fail.
prosecution witnesses, who actually witnessed appellant undressing AAA by
removing the latters shorts and panty. AAA further testified that after Denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with
undressing her, appellant made her lie down, placed himself on top of her
disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Denial
and made push and pull movements. Thereafter, appellant stopped, made as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the accused,
her sit down and sent her home.49 This testimony of AAA was correctly found as in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance only when the
by the trial court and the appellate court as coherent and given in a detailed
prosecutions evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond
manner.50 reasonable doubt. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the competence and credibility of given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining
mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court witness who testified on affirmative matters.63
where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and
consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainants
accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone
Like denial, alibi is not looked upon with favor by the trial court. It also cannot reclusion perpetua - the penalty prescribed by law for simple rape. Being a
prevail over witnesses positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. 70
of the crime. In any event, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough
that the accused can prove his presence at another place at the time of its
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant can be sentenced to
commission, it is likewise essential that he show physical impossibility for
an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of
him to be at the locus delicti,64 which the appellant in this case failed to do.
prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal), that
is 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, and maximum of which shall be within the
As aptly observed by the trial court: range of reclusion temporal in its medium period (there being no other
modifying circumstances attendant to the crime), that is 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.71 With that, the indeterminate penalty
The houses of the offended party and the appellant are only divided by a
of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of
fence and the place of the incident is only at the back of the house of the
reclusion temporal, as maximum, should be imposed upon the appellant.
appellant. The defense of alibi must fail. In addition to the positive
However, the case of appellant does not, as it normally should, end at this
identification made by AAA and the place of the incident is adjacent to the
point. On 20 May 2006, Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the
houses of the victim and the appellant, being neighbors, the fact that the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," took effect. Section 68 thereof
appellant alleged that he was having drinking spree at that time and that he
specifically provides for its retroactive application, thus: 72
was dead drunk at around 6:00 p.m. of that date, there is no impossibility for
the appellant to be physically present at the scene of the incident, because
of its proximity. SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence.
Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of
the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years
Corroborative testimony is not credible if tainted with bias particularly in
at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted
cases where the witnesses are closely associated to the appellant as to be
and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
interested in the appellants acquittal. In this case, the appellants witnesses
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions
are his alleged drinking buddy and his father. Considering that they are
provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly.
bound by friendship and affiliation, it is conceivable that they would be
They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or
inclined to make excuses for him appellant from culpability. 65
other applicable law. [Emphasis supplied].

All told, appellants guilt has been proven by the prosecution beyond
Clearly, Republic Act No. 9344 is applicable in this case even though the
reasonable doubt, thus, his conviction stands.
crime was committed four (4) years prior to its enactment and effectivity.
Parenthetically, with more reason should Republic Act No. 9344 apply to this
As to penalty. Under Article 266-B66 in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the case as the 2005 conviction by the lower courts was still under review when
Revised Penal Code, as amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion the law took effect in 2006.73
perpetua. However, when rape is committed by an assailant who has
knowledge of the victims mental retardation, the penalty is increased to
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence
death. But this circumstance must be alleged in the information being a
of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the
qualifying circumstance which increases the penalty to death and changes
67 age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. 74It
the nature of the offense from simple to qualified rape. In the case at
reads, thus:
bench, while appellant categorically admitted that he knew AAA to be
suffering from mental abnormalities, the prosecution failed to allege this fact
in the information. As such, even if it was proved, it cannot be appreciated SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under
as a qualifying circumstance. Thus, appellants conviction is only for simple eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
rape for which he should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
Nonetheless, a reasonable ground exists in this case that calls for the
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
modification of the penaltyof reclusion perpetua imposed by both lower
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
courts upon the appellant.
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
This Court finds merit in appellants assertion that he was a minor during the
commission of the crime charged. During trial, upon order of the trial court,
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
the Local Civil Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar, brought before it their
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition
office records, particularly appellants Certificate of Live
measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law. [Emphasis supplied].
Birth containing the fact of birth of the latter. Appellants Certificate of Live
Birth shows that he was born on 23 February 1985. Indeed, at the time of
However, while Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 provides that
the commission of the crime charged on 9 December 2002, appellant was
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with
only 17 years old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating
the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal
68 pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said
Code, as amended, which specifically states that:
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21,
thus:75
ART. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of
age. When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court
one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child
80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with
the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition
xxxx or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought
before the court for execution of judgment.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by the law shall be imposed, but always in If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
the proper period.69 [Emphasis supplied]. while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period
Applying the privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
penalty upon appellant is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to
[Emphasis supplied].
At present, appellant is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of the trial
court was promulgated prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9344.
Therefore, the application of Sections 38 and 40 of the said law is already
moot and academic.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of Republic Act

No. 9344, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law
should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so
long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The
offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344 in order that he/she
is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member
of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of
the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters
is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender
age.76 The appellant, therefore, shall be entitled to appropriate disposition
under Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows:77

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and

Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence,
in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp
and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

To conform to this Courts ruling in People v.Sarcia, 78 the case shall be

remanded to the court of origin to effect appellants confinement in an
agricultrual camp or other training facility.79

As to damages. The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense
is not affected by the appropriate disposition measures and shall be
enforced in accordance with law.80 This Court affirms both the civil indemnity
of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 awarded by the lower
courts in favor of AAA. Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of
actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact
of rape. Case law also requires automatic award of moral damages to a rape
victim without need of proof because from the nature of the crime, it can be
assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.
Such award is separate and distinct from civil indemnity. 81

In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein

exemplary damages are awarded to set a public example and to protect
hapless individuals from sexual molestation, this Court likewise affirms the
lower courts award of exemplary damages but increased the same from
P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 to conform to recent jurisprudence. 82

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00457 dated 3 December 2009 is hereby MODIFIED
as follows: (I) appellant is found guilty of rape under subparagraph (b) of
Article 266-A( I) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and not under
subparagraph (d) thereof; (2) in view of the privileged mitigating
circumstance appreciated in favor of appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is reduced to reclusion temporal and being a divisible penalty, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies and the indeterminate penalty of I 0
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, is imposed upon the appellant; and (3) the amount
of exemplary damages awarded by the lower courts is increased from
P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages
both in the amount of P50,000.00 are maintained. This case, however, shall
be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance
with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

SO ORDERED.
 sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras
estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; . . . .

We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal
Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text
governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is clear that the word
"imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation
of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is
equally clear that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro
as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial,
Republic of the Philippines
in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence
SUPREME COURT
of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. This view
Manila has been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26,
EN BANC
1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court held, as quoted in the brief of the
G.R. No. L-1960 November 26, 1948
Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the
vs.
penalty when he enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in that case was
FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-appellant.
ratified by this Court, though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de
Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1, where it was held that one
Carlos Perfecto for appellant. evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Manuel prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke
Tomacruz for appellee. the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides that its
provisions do not apply to those who shall have escaped from confinement
or evaded sentence.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of

Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with service of sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish
evasion of service of sentence under the following information: text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final
judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of entered said City.
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a convict
sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months and Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any place affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by
virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5,
1946, in criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of
said sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and
commit vagrancy. Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Contrary to law.
The legal question raised in this case is whether or not appellant, for having
violated his judgment of destierro rendered by the Municipal Court of Manila,
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, can be sentenced under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code which reads
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, with the accessory as follows:
penalties of the law and to pay the costs. He is appealing from that decision
with the following assignment of error:
Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence
under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
cover evasion of service of "destierro." judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken
place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows,
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys,
a sentence of destierro is not criminally liable under the provisions of the disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance
Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said Code for the reason with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the
that said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.
institution and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention
on the word "imprisonment" used in the English text of said article which in Appellant invokes in his favor the negative opinion of author Guillermo
part reads as follows: Guevara (Revised Penal Code, 1946, p. 322). This negative position is
supported by another author, Ambrosio Padilla (Revised Penal Code
Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision annotated, p. 474).
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence The prosecution invokes the decision of this Court in People vs. De Jesus,
by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final L-1411,2promulgated April 16, 1948, but said decision has no application
judgment. because in said case the legal question involved in the case at bar was not
raised. The Supreme Court did not consider the question of interpretation of
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised the wording of article 157. Undoubtedly, there was occasion for considering
Penal Code been in the English language, then the theory of the appellant the question, but the Court nevertheless failed to do so. This failure to see
could be uphold. However, it is the Spanish text that is controlling in case of the question, at the time, is only an evidence that the tribunal is composed
doubt. The Spanish text of article 157 in part reads thus: of human beings for whom infallibility is beyond reach.

ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. Sera castigado con The prosecution maintains that appellant's contention, supported by two
prision correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el authors who have considered the question, although tenable under the
English text of article 157, is not so under the Spanish text, which is the one
controlling because the Revised Penal Code was originally enacted by the "Privacion de libertad," literally meaning "deprivation of liberty or freedom,"
Legislature in Spanish. has always been used by jurist using the Spanish language to mean
"imprisonment." They have never given them the unbounded philosophical
scope that would lead to irretrievable absurdities.
There is no quarrel, therefore, that under the above quoted English text, the
appellant is entitled to acquittal. The question now is whether or not the
Spanish text conveys a thing different from that which can be read in the Under that unlimited scope, no single individual in the more than two billion
English text. The Spanish text reads as follows: inhabitants of the world can be considered free, as the freest citizen of the
freest country is subject to many limitations or deprivations of liberty. Under
the prosecution's theory, should an accused, sentenced to pay a fine of one
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. Sera castigado con
peso, evade the payment of it, because the fine deprives him of liberty to
prision correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el
dispose of his one peso, he will be liable to be punished under article 157 of
sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras
the Revised Penal Code to imprisonment of from more that two years to six
estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; pero
years. The iniquity and cruelty of such situation are too glaring and violent to
si la evasion o fuga se hubiere llevado a efecto con escalamiento,
be entertained for a moment under our constitutional framework.
fractura de puertas, ventanas, verjas, paredes, techos o suelos, o
empleado ganzuas, llaves falsas, disfraz, engano, violencia o
intimidacion, o poniendose de acuerdo con otros sentenciados o There is no gainsaying the proposition that to allow the violation of a
dependientes del establecimiento donde a hallare recluido la pena sentence of destierro without punishment is undesirable, but even without
sera prision correccional en su grado maximo. applying article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, the act of the appellant
cannot remain unpunished, because his violation of the sentence
of destierro may be punished as contempt of court, for which imprisonment
The question boils down to the words "fugandose mientras estuviere
up to six months is provided.
sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme," which are translated into
English "by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment." The prosecution contends that the words "privacion de libertad" It is deplorable that article 157 should not provide for a situation presented
in the Spanish text is not the same as the word "imprisonment" in the English in this case, but the gap cannot be filled by this Court without encroaching
text, and that while "imprisonment" cannot include destierro, "privacion de upon the legislative powers of Congress.
libertad" may include it.
Perhaps it is better that evasions of sentence be punished, as provided by
The reason is, however, the result of a partial point of view because it the old Penal Code, by an increased in the evaded penalty. This will be more
obliterates the grammatical, logical, ideological function of the words reasonable that the penalties provided by article 157, which appear to be
"fugandose" and "by escaping" in the Spanish and English texts, disproportionate and arbitrary, because they place on equal footing the
respectively. There should not be any question that, whatever meaning we evader of a sentence of one day of imprisonment and a life-termer, one who
may want to give to the words "privacion de libertad," it has to be conditioned commits an insignificant offense and one who perpetrates the most heinous
by the verb "fugandose," (by escaping). "Privacion de libertad" cannot be crime. At any rate, this is a problem for Congress to solve.
considered independently of "fugandose."
The appealed decision should be set aside.
There seems to be no question that the Spanish "fugandose" is correctly
translated into the English "by escaping." Now, is there any sense in
BRIONES, J., concurring:
escaping from destierro or banishment, where there is no enclosure binding
the hypothetical fugitive? "Fugandose" is one of the forms of the Spanish
verb "fugar," to escape. The specific idea of "evasion" or "escape" is I concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion, because evidently the word
reiterated by the use of said words after the semi-colon in the Spanish text "fugandose" in the Spanish text refers to imprisonment, not to destierro.
and after the first period in the English text. Either the verb "to escape" or
the substantive noun "escape" essentially pre-supposes some kind of
imprisonment or confinement, except figuratively, and Article 157 does not
talk in metaphors or parables.

"To escape" means "to get away, as by flight or other conscious effort; to
break away, get free, or get clear, from or out of detention, danger,
discomfort, or the like; as to escape from prison. To issue from confinement
or enclosure of any sort; as gas escapes from the mains." (Webster's New
International Dictionary.)

"Escape" means "act of escaping, or fact or having escaped; evasion of or

deliverance from injury or any evil; also the means of escape. The unlawful
departure of a prisoner from the limits of his custody. When the prisoner gets
out of prison and unlawfully regains his liberty, it is an actual escape."
(Webster's New International Dictionary.)

"Evasion" means "escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.) .

The "destierro" imposed on appellant banished him from Manila alone, and
he was free to stay in all the remaining parts of the country, and to go and
stay in any part of the globe outside the country. With freedom to move all
over the world, it is farfetched to allege that he is in any confinement from
which he could escape.

The words "privacion de libertad" have been correctly translated into the
English "imprisonment," which gives the idea exactly conveyed by "privacion
de libertad" in the Spanish text. Undoubtedly, the drafters of the latter could
have had used a more precise Spanish word, but the literary error cannot be
taken as a pretext to give to the less precise words a broader meaning than
is usually given to them.
 AAA is a saleslady in a public market in Rosario, Cavite. On 24 January
2004, at around 8:00 in the evening, private complainant was waiting for her
cousin to fetch her, when appellant, who worked in a fish stall in the market,
approached her. Appellant asked if he could accompany private complainant
to her aunts home, where she resided. Since AAAs cousin was not around
to fetch her, she agreed for appellant to accompany her home.

The two boarded a tricycle. As they were about to leave, appellant brought
out a bladed weapon and poked the same on AAAs right waist. Struck with
fear, AAA was unable to ask for help. Along the way, AAA realized that they
were no longer proceeding to her aunts house because the tricycle made a
different turn. They stopped at a place that was not familiar to her.
Republic of the Philippines Thereafter, the two of them alighted after appellant paid the tricycle driver.
Supreme Court, Manila The entire time, however, appellant was holding the knife and poking it
THIRD DIVISION against AAAs side.
G.R. No. 225743
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Plaintiff-Appellee With appellant still holding the knife and poking it against AAAs waist, the
versus two walked toward a house, appellant knocked on the door, and a man came
SANDY DOMINGO y LABIS Accused-Appellant out. Appellant and AAA were allowed entry inside the house. The man did
PRESENT: VELASCO, JR, J, CHAIRPERSON; BERSAMIN; REYES; not say anything and immediately went inside a room.
JARDELEZA AND TIJAM, JJ
Promulgated: JUNE 7, 2017 Appellant ordered AAA to enter another room. Once inside, appellant who
was still holding the knife, undressed himself. Appellant ordered AAA to
DECISION undress next, but AAA did not obey. Appellant, still holding the knife, forcibly
BERSAMIN, J: undressed AAA until the latter was completely naked.

There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the primary Appellant ordered AAA to lie down on the wooden bed. While still holding
objective of the accused is to commit rape. the knife, appellant inserted his penis into private complainants vagina. AAA
felt pain in her private part. Appellant also kissed AAAs neck and lips.
The Case Appellant made a pumping motion while his penis was inserted in AAAs
vagina. Afterwards, appellant pulled out his penis, kissed AAA, and played
The accused appeals the affirmance by the Court of Appeals (CA) of his with the knife on the latters face. They did not sleep. After a while, appellant
conviction for forcible abduction with rape under the decision promulgated again inserted his penis inside her vagina and kissed her. After removing his
on September 24, 2015,1 viz.: penis, he inserted it again for the fourth time. Thereafter, appellant dressed
up and ordered her to put on her clothes. While he was helping her put on
her clothes, she told him that she wants to go home. He answered that he
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, will let her go home if she will not tell anybody what happened. At around
the Decision dated 6 September 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth 3:00 in the morning, they went out of the house and headed towards the
Judicial Region, Branch 17, Cavite City in Criminal Case No. 39-04 is tricycle terminal. She went home and told her Aunt what happened.
hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant is hereby ordered to pay the private offended Thereafter, they went to the police station to report the incident.
party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
Defenses Version:
SO ORDERED.2
AAA was appellants girlfriend. On 24 January 2004 at around 10:00 oclock
in the evening, he and AAA eloped and went to the house of his brother-in-
Antecedents law in Sapa II, Cavite. They spent the night there and agreed that they will
go to her Aunts house and get her things and will proceed to Bicol. When
The factual and procedural antecedents as summarized by the CA follow: they reached her aunts house, AAA went inside while he waited. After a few
minutes, a man came out and chased him with a bolo which prompted him
On 26 January 2004, an Information was filed charging appellant with the to run. At around 7:00 oclock in the morning, he was at his sisters house
crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape in this wise: when the policemen arrived and informed him that there was a complaint
filed against him. He went with them to the police station. 3
That on or about the period between January 24 and 25, 2004, in the
Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the On September 6, 2013, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused-
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated appellant guilty as charged, decreeing thusly:
by lust and with lewd designs, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
and take away one AAA, against her will and consent, and thereafter, by accused Sandy Domingo y Labis @ Bitoy GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
means of force, violence and intimidation, with the use of [a] bladed weapon of the crime of forcible abduction with rape, defined and penalized under
and actuated by lust and lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of said victim, Article 342, in relation to Article 266-A (as amended by R.A. 8353) and
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said AAA. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, accused Sandy Domingo is
CONTRARY TO LAW. hereby ordered to pay AAA: (1) the amount of P50,000.00, as civil
indemnity ex delicto, and (2) the amount of P50,000.00, as moral damages;
and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment on 2 March 2004, appellant, assisted by counsel entered
a plea of NOT GUILTY.
SO ORDERED.4
Thereafter, trial ensued. The Prosecution presented AAA, SP03 Felipe
Gomez, Jr., and Elmer Marquez. The defense on the other hand presented Judgment of the CA
Sandy Domingo and Jocelyn Mariano as witnesses.
On September 24, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that AAAs
xxx testimony categorically describing how the appellant had abducted and
ravaged her was credible; that her failure to shout for help or to offer
tenacious resistance did not make her submission to him voluntary; that his
Peoples Version
use of the knife was sufficient to compel her to submit to his demands; that
the presentation of the examining physician as a witness was not
indispensible in proving the rape; that his sweetheart theory could not be
given weight as a defense because he did not thereby establish that such
relationship had really existed.
Issue
We do not find the non-presentation of the physician who had examined AAA
to affect in any significant manner the credibility of the victims testimony.
After all, the medical findings have never been considered indispensable in
supporting convictions for rape. In contrast, we reiterate that the rape
victims testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of the successful
prosecution of the culprit provided such testimony meets the test of
credibility.9

In his appeal, the appellant submits that: Anent the sweetheart defense of the appellant, the CA and the trial court
justly rejected it. Such defense, being uncorroborated and self-serving,
deserved scant consideration. Nonetheless, that the appellant and the victim
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED- had been sweethearts was no excuse in the eyes of the law for him to
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE employ force and intimidation in gratifying his carnal desires.10
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT5
Was the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape committed?
The appellant contends that AAAs testimony was incomplete and incredible,
and as such did not substantiate the charges against him; that she had not Under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of forcible
thereby elaborated how she was forced, coerced or intimidated into abduction are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will; and (2) with lewd
submitting to him; that she had voluntarily gone with him, and had consented designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that
to the sexual congress;6 that her conduct before, during and immediately occurs when the abductor has carnal knowledge of the abducted woman
following the crime belied her allegations against him; that her testimony was under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2)
uncorroborated because the Prosecution did not present the examining when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)
physician; and that on the other hand his own witness, Jocelyn Mariano, when the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented.
corroborated his having a romantic relationship with AAA.7
Although the elements of forcible abduction obtained, the appellant should
In other words, the appellant submits that the CA committed serious be convicted only of rape. His forcible abduction of AAA was absorbed by
reversible errors in finding him guilty of forcible abduction with rape the rape considering that his real objective in abducting her was to commit
despite (a) the incredible testimony of AAA; (b) the failure of the Prosecution the rape. Where the main objective of the culprit for the abduction of the
to present the examining physician to explain the findings; and (c) the victim of rape was to have carnal knowledge of her, he could be convicted
sweetheart theory advanced by him. only of rape.11

Ruling of the Court The penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed pursuant to Article
266(b)12 of the Revised Penal Code.13
We affirm the CAs decision with modification of the characterization of the
crime committed. To accord with jurisprudence,14 the awards of damages are increased as
follows: (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P75,000.00 as moral
damages; and (3) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Moreover, the CA
We note at the outset that the RTC and the CA both found AAAs testimony correctly imposed interest of 6% per annum on all such items of civil liability
to be credible. Consequently, it became incumbent upon the appellant to reckoned from the finality of judgment until fully paid.15
present clear and persuasive reasons to persuade the Court to reverse their
unanimous determination of her credibility as a witness in order to resolve
the appeal his way. Alas, he did not discharge his burden, and, WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on September 24,
consequently, we declare that the CA aptly held that: 2015, with the MODIFICATION that accused SANDY DOMINGO y
LABIS is: (a) DECLARED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of SIMPLE RAPE as defined under Article 266-A of the Revised
Our review of the records reveals that AAAs testimony was candid and Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua; and (b) ORDERED TO
straightforward. During cross-examination, she remained steadfast, PAY to AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
consistent and unwavering in her testimony. She categorically described and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on
how appellant took advantage of her. She narrated that appellant offered to all the items of civil liability reckoned from the finality of judgment until fully
accompany her home. However, when they boarded the tricycle, appellant paid.
poked a bladed weapon on her right waist. Paralyzed with fear, she was
unable to shout or ask for help, x x x [W]hile it appears that AAA initially
agreed for appellant to accompany her home, her willingness ceased when The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
appellant pointed a bladed weapon at her right waist. Overcome by fear, she
was not able to react when the tricycle proceeded to an unfamiliar place. SO ORDERED.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, AAAs failure to shout for help
does not give less credit to her testimony. Time and again, it has been held
that physical resistance is not an element in the crime of rape and need not
be established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim. The victims
failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her
submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. Appellants use of a knife
was enough for AAA to submit to his demands. Not every victim can be
expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of
everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable; people react differently.8

We remind the appellant that the trial courts evaluation and conclusion on
the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight
and respect, and at times even finality, especially after the CA as the
intermediate reviewing tribunals has affirmed the findings, unless there is a
clear showing that the findings were reached arbitrarily, or that certain facts
or circumstances of weight, substance or value were overlooked,
misapprehended or misappreciated that, if properly considered, would alter
the result of the case. In this case, the appellant has not made such showing.
Indeed, we have no reason to reverse the well-considered findings and
observations of the lower courts.