Hernandez vs.
NPC issues clearly outside this dimension and involving
Facts:
Sometime in 1996, National Power
Corporation (Napocor) began the construction of 29
decagon-shaped steel poles or towers in
connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-
Balintawak Power Transmission Project. Said
transmission line passes through the Sergio
Osmena, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the
perimeter of Fort Bonifacio and Dasmarias Village
proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners
homes are. Alarmed by the sight of the towering
steel towers, petitioners researched and found out
through internet sources that exposure to
electromagnetic fields could cause diseases
ranging from cancer to leukemia. Thus, petitioners
had various meetings with Napocor about the
infrastructure project but such meetings remained
futile. Hence, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages with prayer for the issuance of TRO
and/or preliminary injunction against Napocor. The
complaint was granted by the court.
Napocor filed a petition for certiorari with
prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction with the
CA, on the ground that Sec. 1 of PD 1818 prohibits
any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects.CA reversed the trial courts
order, ruling that the proscription on injunctions
against infrastructure projects of the government is
clearly mandated by the Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1818.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court may issue a
temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction to enjoin the construction and operation
of the 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by
the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential
Decree No. 1818
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
It granted the petition.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits
courts from issuing injunctions against government
infrastructure projects in order not to disrupt or
hamper the pursuit of essential government
projects or frustrate the economic development
effort of the nation.
However, although Presidential Decree No.
1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in
cases involving infrastructure projects, the
prohibition extends only to the issuance of
injunctions or restraining orders against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts
or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On
questions of law, this Court declared that courts
could not be prevented from exercising their power
to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
In the case at bar, petitioners sought the
issuance of a preliminary injunction on the ground
that the Napocor project impinged on their right to
health as enshrined in the Constitution and for
violation of Sec. 27 of the Local Government Code
for Napocors failure to conduct prior consultation
with them.
Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of
a preliminary injunction finds legal support in
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. The rule
on preliminary injunction merely requires that
unless restrained, the act complained of will
probably violate his rights and tend to render the
judgment ineffectual. Here, there is adequate
evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the
project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the health
and safety of the petitioners so as to justify the
issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
The trial court could not ignore the facts that
form as sufficient basis to engender the cloud of
doubt that the NAPOCOR project could, indeed,
endanger the lives of the petitioners. A preliminary
injunction is likewise justified prior to a final
determination of the issues of whether or not
NAPOCOR ignored safety and consultation
requirements in the questioned project. Indeed, the
court could, nay should, grant the writ of preliminary
injunction if the purpose of the other party is to
shield a wrongdoing. A ruling to the contrary would
amount to an erosion of judicial discretion. After all,
for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the
Rules do not require that the act complained of be
in violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed,
what the Rules require is that the act complained of
be probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is
enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional
remedy, which is different from injunction as a main
action where one needs to establish absolute
certainty as basis for a final and permanent
injunction.
University of the Philippines vs. Catungal, Jr., et
al.
Facts:
Petitioner University of the Philippines (UP)
is a state university created by virtue of Act No.
1870. Petitioner Posadas is the Chancellor of UP
Diliman. Petitioners Dayco and Gregorio are Vice
Chancellors for Administration and Community
Affairs, respectively, of UP Diliman. Petitioners
Balbastro, Florencio, and Penao-Ho are UP Diliman
faculty members and members of the UP
Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (Tribunal), the
administrative body created to try the administrative
case filed by UP against the private respondent.
Private respondent Salvador Carlos is a UP
Diliman faculty member and teaching some units at
the Philosophy Department of the College of Social
Sciences and Philosophy, U.P. Diliman, you
committed acts amounting to Grave Misconduct.
The Office of the Chancellor, UP Diliman,
through petitioner Dayco as officer-in-charge, filed
a Formal Charge for grave misconduct against
Carlos. It also constituted the Tribunal, composed
of petitioners Balbastro, Florencio, and Penao-Ho,
to conduct the investigation, with Balbastro as
Chairman. That same day, petitioner Dayco issued
an Order of Preventive Suspension against
Carlos. The order likewise required the latters
appearance before the Tribunal when
warranted. The charge and order of suspension
were served upon Carlos while in detention. The
charge stated that unlicensed firearms and
ammunition, and pornographic materials and
sexual paraphernalia were found in Carlos
possession. It also stated that on different
occasions he caused three minors to be brought to
his house and on separate instances, by means of
intimidation or deceit or by giving monetary
consideration, goods, or other pecuniary benefit to
said minors, succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with said minors, and took photographs
of them while they were naked after having sexual
intercourse with them. All such acts amount to
Grave Misconduct punishable under University
Rules and Regulations in the Discipline of Faculty
Members and the Civil Service Law and Rules.
Unknown to the Tribunal and the UP
prosecutor, Carlos filed a complaint for injunction
before the RTC of Quezon City. Carlos alleged that
he was compelled to submit himself to the Tribunal
when there never was a proper complainant; that
the proceedings were used as a fishing expedition
and were conducted in violation of the
Constitution and the Rules; and that he opted to
seek immediate judicial redress, since the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies was
inapplicable to him, considering that any appeal
before the Tribunal would have been futile.
The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order against the petitioners. The
following day, the Tribunal issued an order granting
the request of Carlos for the resetting of the
presentation of his evidence, subject to the
outcome of the hearing on the preliminary
injunction. Pending the hearing for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioners
moved to dismiss the said civil action.
The trial court issued by the then presiding
judge, respondent Judge Elpidio M. Catungal, Jr.
the assailed order which granted a writ of
preliminary injunction. The petitioners were directed
to refrain from proceeding with the administrative
case against Carlos. The petitioners sought a
reconsideration of the order. This was followed by a
motion to resolve the motion for reconsideration
and the motion to dismiss which the court
denied for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the trial courts issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by private
respondent Salvador Carlos was proper.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It
nullified and set aside the grant of the writ of
preliminary injunction.
A litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue. Since
injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must
apply for it must come with equity or with clean
hands. This is so because among the maxims of
equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity,
and (2) he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim
which is also expressed in the principle that he who
has done inequity shall not have equity. Carlos did
not come to court for equitable relief with equity or
with clean hands. Also, the conduct of Carlos and
his counsel before the Tribunal can by no means
be characterized as nobly fair, just, and
reasonable.
Moreover, Carlos did not exhaust
administrative remedies, which were available. It
has been consistently held by the Supreme Court,
in a long line of cases, that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity
to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted
first before the courts judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of a courts intervention
is fatal to ones cause of action.

Levi Strauss & Co. vs. Clinton Apparelle, Inc.
Facts:
Petitioner Levi Strauss & Co. (LS & Co.), a
foreign corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Delaware, U.S.A.,
and engaged in the apparel business, is the owner
by prior adoption and use since 1986 of the
internationally famous Dockers and Design
trademark. The ownership is evidenced by its valid
and existing registrations in various member
countries of the Paris Convention. In the
Philippines, it has a Certificate of Registration in the
Principal Register for use of said trademark on
pants, shirts, blouses, skirts, shorts, sweatshirts
and jackets. The Dockers and Design trademark
was first used in the Philippines by Levi Strauss
(Philippines), Inc. (LSPI), a domestic corporation
engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution
of various products bearing trademarks owned by
LS & Co. To date, LSPI continues to manufacture
and sell Dockers Pants with the Dockers and
Design trademark.
LS & Co. and LSPI filed a Complaint for
Trademark Infringement, Injunction and Damages
against respondent Clinton Apparelle, Inc. (Clinton
Aparelle) together with an alternative defendant,
Olympian Garments, Inc. (Olympian Garments),
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
They alleged that they discovered the presence in
the local market of jeans under the brand name
Paddocks using a device which is substantially, if
not exactly, similar to the Dockers and Design
trademark owned by and registered in the name of
LS & Co., without its consent. Based on their
information and belief, they added, Clinton
Apparelle manufactured and continues to
manufacture such Paddocks jeans and other
apparel.
Neither Clinton Apparelle nor Olympian
Garments appeared on the hearing. Clinton
Apparelle claimed that it was not notified of such
hearing. Only Olympian Garments allegedly had
been issued with summons. Despite the absence of
the defendants, the hearing on the application for
the issuance of a TRO continued. The following
day, the trial court issued an Order granting the
TRO applied for. Then, another Order granting the
writ of preliminary injunction was issued. The trial
court denied Clinton Apparelles Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court
did not follow the procedure required by law for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order as
Clinton Apparelle was not duly notified of the date
of the summary hearing for its issuance. Thus, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the TRO had been
improperly issued.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction by the trial court was proper.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It
denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the
CA. Petitioners did not adequately prove their
entitlement to the injunctive writ.
Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of
equity or a transcendent remedy to be used
cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the
parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of
the court of its extreme necessity.
Injunction is not a remedy to protect or
enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will
not issue to protect a right not in esse and which
may never arise, or to restrain an act which does
not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist
an actual right. There must be a patent showing by
the complaint that there exists a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the writ is
to be directed are violative of said right.
There are generally two kinds of preliminary
injunction: (1) a prohibitory injunction which
commands a party to refrain from doing a particular
act; and (2) a mandatory injunction which
commands the performance of some positive act to
correct a wrong in the past.
The Court of Appeals did not err in
reviewing proof adduced by petitioners to support
its application for the issuance of the writ. While the
matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court, this discretion must be exercised
based upon the grounds and in the manner
provided by law. The exercise of discretion by the
trial court in injunctive matters is generally not
interfered with save in cases of manifest abuse.
In the present case, the Court found that
there was scant justification for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction.
 Unciano Paramedical College vs. Court Of
Appeals
Facts:
Some nursing students were not admitted
for the second semester for organizing a student
body council which was not allowed by the school
which was allegedly a violation of the school
regulations. The school argued that under the
Alcuaz Doctrine, schools have the discretion to
admit students for the second semester because
upon enrolment of a student in the first semester,
the contract was for that semester only. However a
new doctrine was later on promulgated which
abandoned the Alcuaz doctrine which is now the
NON doctrine.
Private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted
Magallanes, thru their mothers, Victoria Villegas and
Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 21, a petition for injunction and damages with
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc.
The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining petitioner school from
not enrolling private respondents in its College of
Nursing and setting the hearing for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction.Petitioners filed an
opposition on the ground that private respondents
are not entitled thereto and have no clear legal right
to the relief demanded. On the same date, the trial
court issued an order that there will be irreparable
injury to the students if they are not allowed to
enroll. At least they will miss another semester. On
the other hand, the injuries mentioned by Dr.
Unciano, in particular, the withdrawal of the other
students and the school will lose money if the
private respondents are allowed to enroll is still a
speculation, and may not take place. The writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not there was propriety in trial
courts issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
The trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which
ordered petitioners to allow private respondents to
enroll for the first semester of school year 1990-1190.
The contract between the parties was validly
terminated upon the end of the first semester of
school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is
the status quo. Guided by the Capitol case, certainly,
the writ will not restore the status quo but will go a
step backward, then restore the condition preceding
the status quo. Private respondents do not possess
any clear legal right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners
are not obliged legally to re-admit them.
The sole object of a preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard. The status quo is the last actual peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the controversy
It may only be resorted to by a litigant for the
preservation or protection of his rights or interests
and for no other purpose during the pendency of
the principal action.
Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends
to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is
generally improper to issue such an injunction prior
to the final hearing. It may, however, issue in cases
of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear;
where considerations of relative inconvenience
bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is
a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right
against his protest and remonstrance, the injury
being a continuing one; and where the effect of the
mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and
maintain a preexisting continuing relation between
the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by
the defendant, than to establish a new relation.
Indeed, the writ should not be denied the
complainant when he makes out a clear case, free
from doubt and dispute.
Yujuico vs. Quiambao
Facts:
The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) approved the amendment of Strategic Alliance
Development Corporations (STRADEC) Articles of
Incorporation authorizing the change of its principal
office from Pasig City Pangasinan. On March 1, 2004,
STRADEC held its annual stockholders meeting in
Pasig City its office as indicated in the notices sent to
the stockholders. Herein petitioners and respondents
were elected members of the Board of Directors. Five
months thereafter, respondents filed with the RTC in
Pangasinan a complaint against STRADEC. The
complaint seeks for the nullification of the election on
the ground of improper venue and the nullification of
all subsequent transactions conducted by the elected
directors and lastly that a special stockholders
meeting be held once again. The RTC issued an
Order for granting respondents application for
preliminary injunction ordering (1) the holding of a
special stockholders meeting of STRADEC on
December 10, 2004 in the principal office of the
corporation in Bayambang, Pangasinan; and (2) the
turn-over by petitioner Bonifacio Sumbilla to the court
of the duplicate key of the safety deposit box in Export
Industry Bank, Shaw Boulevard, Pasig City where the
original Stock and Transfer Book of STRADEC was
deposited. The plaintiff filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari. CA dismissed such petition and upheld the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not in granting a writ of preliminary
injunction the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It
held that in issuing the questioned order granting a
writ of preliminary injunction the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion.
The purpose of the writ of preliminary
injunction is to preserve the status quo until the court
could hear the merits of the case. The status quo is
the last actual peaceable uncontested status that
preceded the controversy which, in the instant case,
is the holding of the annual stockholders meeting on
March 1, 2004 and the ensuing election of the
directors and officers of STRADEC. But instead of
preserving the status quo, Judge Emuslans Order
messed it up when, in compliance therewith, a special
stockholders meeting was held anew and a new set
of directors and officers of STRADEC was elected.
That effectively resolved respondents principal action
without even a full-blown trial on the merits since the
Order impliedly ruled that the March 1, 2004 annual
stockholders meeting and election are void. Verily,
the issuance of the questioned Order violates the
established principle that courts should avoid granting
a writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect
dispose of the main case without trial.

The duty of the court taking cognizance of an

application for a writ of preliminary injunction is to
determine whether the requisites necessary for the
grant of such writ are present. The requisites for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the
applicant for such writ must show that he has a clear
and unmistakable right that must be protected; and
(2) there exists an urgent and paramount necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage. In this case,
Judge Emuslans order is hazy and too unsubstantial
to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The Order does not contain specific
findings of fact and conclusion of law showing that the
requirements for the grant of the injunctive writ are
present. It merely mentions the names of witnesses
presented by respondents during the hearing on the
application for the issuance of the writ, but there is no
specific and substantial narration of the witnesses
testimonies to establish the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right on their part that must be
protected, as well as the serious damage or
irreparable loss that they would suffer if the writ is not
granted. It does not also disclose the specific
evidence formally offered by the applicants.
Obviously, the basis of the judges conclusion is too
uncertain.

Every court should remember that an

injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of
the defendant and should not be granted lightly or
precipitately. It should be granted only when the court
is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the
emergency demands it.