Appellate Practice

VOL.
71,JUNE18,1976 491
Bonillavs.Barcena
No.L41715.June18,1976. *
ROSALIOBONILLA(aminor)SALVACIONBONILLA(a
minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who
represents the minors, petitioners,vs.LEON BARCENA,
MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA,
MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of
JULIANTAMAYOandHON.LEOPOLDOGIRONELLAof
theCourtofFirstInstanceofAbra,respondents.
Pleadings and practice;Parties;Substitution of parties in
caseofdeathofplaintiffduringpendencyofproceedingsinaction
which survives death of said plaintiff.While it is true that a
personwhoisdeadcannotsueincourt,yethecanbesubstituted
byhisheirsinpursuingthecaseuptoitscompletion.
Same;Same;Duty of attorney upon death of party.The
Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who
diedduringthependencyoftheproceedingcanbesubstituted.
UnderSection16,Rule3oftheRulesofCourtwheneverpartyto
apendingcasediesxxxitshallbethedutyofhisattorneyto
inform thecourtpromptlyofsuchdeathx xxand togivethe
nameandresidenceofhisexecutor,administrator,guardianor
otherlegalrepresentatives.
___________________
FIRSTDIVISION
*
492
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
92
Bonillavs.Barcena
Same;Same;Duty of court upon death of party.Under
section17,Rule3oftheRuleofCourtafterapartydiesandthe
claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
propernotice,thelegalrepresentativeofthedeceasedtoappear
andbesubstitutedforthedeceased,withinsuchtimeasmaybe
grantedxxx.
Same;Same;Duty of court where legal representative of
deceasedpartyfailstoappear.UnderSection17,Rule3ofthe
Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal
representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased.
Same;Same;Dutyofcourtwhererepresentativeofdeceased
partyminors.UnderSection17,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt,
thecourtisdirectedtoappointaguardianadlitemfortheminor
heirs.
Same;Same;Actiontoquiettitletopropertyasactionwhich
survives death of a party; Test to determine whether action
survivesornot.Thequestionastowhetheranactionsurvives
ornotdependsonthenatureoftheactionandthedamagesued
for.Inthecausesofactionwhichsurvive,thewrongcomplained
affects primarily and principally property and property rights,
theinjuriestothepersonbeingmerelyincidental,whileinthe
causesofactionwhichdonotsurvive,theinjurycomplainedofis
totheperson,thepropertyandrightsofpropertyaffectedbeing
incidental. Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the
deceasedplaintiffwhichisanactiontoquiettitleovertheparcels
oflandinlitigationaffectsprimarilyandprincipallypropertyand
propertyrightsandthereforeisonethatsurvivesevenafterher
death.
Succession;Rights to succession transmitted from the
moment of death of decedent.Article 777 of the Civil Code
providesthattherightstothesuccessionaretransmittedfrom
themomentofthedeathofthedecedent.Fromthemomentof
thedeathofthedecedent,theheirsbecometheabsoluteowners
of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto
exceptbythemethodsprovidedforbylaw.Themomentofdeath
isthedeterminingfactorwhentheheirsacquireadefiniteright
totheinheritancewhethersuchrightbepureorcontingent.The
rightoftheheirstothepropertyofthedeceasedvestsinthem
evenbeforejudicialdeclarationoftheirbeingheirsinthetestate
orintestateproceedings.
PETITIONforreviewoftheorderoftheCourtofFirst
InstanceofAbra,Gironella,J.
493
VOL.71,JUNE18,1976 493
Bonillavs.Barcena
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
FedericoParedesforpetitioners.
DemetrioV.Preforprivaterespondents.
MARTIN,J.:
This is a petition forreview oftheOrder oftheCourt of
1
First Instance of Abra inCivil Case No. 856,

entitledFortunataBarcenavs.LeonBarcena,etal.,denying
themotionsforreconsiderationofitsorderdismissingthe
complaintintheaforementionedcase.
OnMarch31,1975FortunataBarcena,motherofminors
RosalioBonillaandSalvacionBonillaandwifeofPonciano
Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First
InstanceofAbra,toquiettitleovercertainparcelsofland
locatedinAbra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to
dismissthecomplaint,butbeforethehearingofthemotion
todismiss,thecounselfortheplaintiffmovedtoamendthe
complaint in order to include certain allegations therein.
The motion to amend the complaint was granted and on
July171975,plaintiffsfiledtheiramendedcomplaint.
OnAugust4,1975, thedefendantsfiledanothermotion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata
Barcenaisdeadand,therefore,hasnolegalcapacitytosue.
SaidmotiontodismisswasheardonAugust14,1975.In
saidhearing,counselfortheplaintiffconfirmedthedeathof
FortunataBarcenaandaskedforsubstitutionbyherminor
childrenandherhusband,thepetitionersherein;butthe
courtafterthehearingimmediatelydismissedthecaseon
the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in
interestandhasnolegalpersonalitytosue.
OnAugust19,1975,counselfortheplaintiffreceiveda
copyoftheorderdismissingthecomplaintandonAugust
23,1975,hemovedtosetasidetheorderofthedismissal
pursuant toSections 16and17 ofRule3oftheRules of
Court. 2
___________________
1
WhichthisCourttreatsasspecialcivilactionasperitsResolutiondatedFebruary
11,1976.
2
Section 16.Duty of Attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party.
Wheneverapartytoapendingcasedies,becomesincapacitatedorincompetent,itshall
bethedutyofhis
494
Bonillavs.Barcena
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for
reconsiderationfiledbycounselfortheplaintiffforlackof
merit.OnSeptember1,1975,counselfordeceasedplaintiff
filed a written manifestation praying that the minors
Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to
substitutetheirdeceasedmother,butthecourtdeniedthe
counselsprayerforlackofmerit.Fromtheorder,counsel
for the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint
claimingthatthesameisinviolationofSections16and17
ofRule3oftheRulesofCourtbutthesamewasdenied.
Hence,thispetitionforreview.
TheCourtreversestherespondentCourtandsetsaside
itsorderdismissingthecomplaintinCivilCaseNo.856and
its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said
orderofdismissal.Whileitistruethatapersonwhoisdead
cannotsueincourt,yethecanbesubstitutedbyhisheirsin
pursuingthecaseuptoitscompletion.Therecordsofthis
caseshowthatthedeathofFortunataBarcenatookplace
onJuly9,1975whilethecomplaintwasfiledonMarch31,
1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on
March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and
therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her
person.Ifthereaftershedied,theRulesofCourtprescribes
the procedure whereby a party who died during the
pendencyoftheproceedingcanbesubstituted.
___________________
attorneytoinformthecourtpromptlyofsuchdeath,incapacityorincompetency,and
togivethenameandresidenceofhisexecutor,administrator,guardianorotherlegal
representative.
Section 17.Death of party.After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished,thecourtshallorder,uponpropernotice,thelegalrepresentativeofthe
deceasedtoappearandtobesubstitutedfordeceased,withinaperiodofthirty(30)days,
orwithinsuchtimeasmaybegranted.Ifthelegalrepresentativefailstoappearwithin
saidtime,thecourtmayordertheopposingpartytoprocuretheappointmentofalegal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representativeshallimmediatelyappearforandonbehalfoftheinterestofthedeceased.
Thecourtchargesinvolvedinprocuringsuchappointment,ifdefrayedbytheopposing
party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administratorandthecourtmayappointguardianadlitemfortheminorheirs.
495
VOL.71,JUNE18,1976 495
Bonillavs.Barcena
UnderSection16,Rule3oftheRulesofCourtwhenevera
partytoapendingcasediesxxxitshallbethedutyofhis
attorneytoinformthecourtpromptlyofsuchdeathxxx
and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representatives.
Thisdutywascompliedwithbythecounselforthedeceased
plaintiffwhenhemanifestedbeforetherespondent Court
thatFortunataBarcenadiedonJuly9,1975andaskedfor
the proper substitution of parties in the case. The
respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the
substitution,dismissedthecomplaintonthegroundthata
deadpersonhasnolegalpersonalitytosue.Thisisagrave
error.Article777oftheCivilCodeprovidesthattherights
tothesuccessionaretransmittedfromthemomentofthe
deathofthedecedent.Fromthemomentofthedeathofthe
decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The 3
momentofdeathisthedeterminingfactorwhentheheirs
acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such
right bepure or contingent. Theright of theheirs to the
4
propertyofthedeceasedvestsinthemevenbeforejudicial
declarationoftheirbeingheirsinthetestateorintestate
proceedings. WhenFortunataBarcena,therefore,diedher
5
claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation inCivil

CaseNo.856,wasnotextinguishedbyherdeathbutwas
transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have
thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and
becamepartiesininterestinthecase.Thereis,therefore,
no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
substitutionaspartiesininterestforthedeceasedplaintiff.
UnderSection17,Rule3oftheRulesofCourtaftera
partydies andtheclaim isnot therebyextinguished,the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representativeofthedeceasedtoappearandbesubstituted
forthedeceased,withinsuchtimeasmaybegrantedxxx.
The question as to whether an action survives or not
dependsonthenatureoftheaction
___________________
3
Buanvs.HeirsofBuan,53Phil.654.
4
Ibarlevs.Po,92Phil.721.
5
Morales,etal.vs.Ybanez,98Phil.677.
496
Bonillavs.Barcena
and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which
6
survive the wrong complained affects primarily and

principallypropertyandpropertyrights,theinjuriestothe
personbeingmerelyincidental,whileinthecausesofaction
which do not survive the injury complained of is to the
person,thepropertyandrightsofpropertyaffectedbeing
incidental. Followingtheforegoingcriteriontheclaimofthe
7
deceasedplaintiffwhichisanactiontoquiettitleoverthe
parcelsoflandinlitigationaffectsprimarilyandprincipally
property and property rights and therefore is one that
survivesevenafterherdeath.Itis,therefore,thedutyof
the respondent Court to order the legal representative of
thedeceasedplaintifftoappearandto besubstitutedfor
her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being
informedbythecounselforthedeceasedplaintiffthatthe
latterwasdead,wastodismissthecomplaint.Thisshould
nothavebeendoneforunderthesameSection17,Rule3of
theRulesofCourt,itiseventhedutyofthecourt,ifthe
legalrepresentativefailstoappear,toordertheopposing
partytoprocuretheappointmentofalegalrepresentative
ofthedeceased.IntheinstantcasetherespondentCourt
did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceasedbecausehercounselhasnotonlyaskedthatthe
minor children be substituted for her but also suggested
thattheirunclebeappointedasguardianadlitemforthem
becausetheirfatherisbusyinManilaearningalivingfor
thefamily.But therespondent Court refusedtherequest
forsubstitutiononthegroundthatthechildrenwerestill
minorsandcannotsueincourt.Thisisanothergraveerror
because the respondent Court ought to have known that
underthesameSection17,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt,the
court is directed to appoint a guardianad litemfor the
minorheirs.Preciselyintheinstantcase,thecounselfor
the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent
Courtthattheuncleoftheminorsbeappointedtoactas
guardianadlitemforthem.Unquestionably,therespondent
Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying
withtheclearprovisionoftheRulesofCourtindismissing
thecomplaintoftheplaintiffinCivilCaseNo.856
___________________
6
IronGateBankvs.Brady,184U.S.665,22SCT529,46L.ed.739.
7
Wenbervs.St.PaulCityCo.,97Feb.140R.39CCA.79.
497
VOL.71,JUNE18,1976 497
Bonillavs.Barcena
andrefusingthesubstitutionofpartiesinthecase.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the
respondent Court dismissing the complaint in Civil Case
No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the
motionsforreconsiderationoftheorderofdismissalofsaid
complaintaresetasideandtherespondentCourtishereby
directedtoallowthesubstitutionoftheminorchildren,who
arethepetitionersthereinforthedeceasedplaintiffandto
appoint a qualified person as guardianad litemfor them.
Withoutpronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Teehankee(Chairman),Makasiar,EsguerraandMu
ozPalma,JJ.,concur.
Orderssetaside.
Notes.a)Duty of attorney for deceased partyUnder
Sec. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court it is the duty of the
attorneyforthedeceaseddefendanttoinformtheCourtof
his clients death and furnish it with the name and
residence of the executor, administrator, or legal
representativeofthedeceased.Thisrulemusthavetaken
into consideration the fact that the attorney for the
deceasedpartyisinabetterpositionthantheattorneyfor
the other party to ascertain who are the legal
representative or heirs of his deceased client. This duty
should not be shifted to the plaintiff or his attorney.
(Barramedavs.Barbara,L4227,January28,1952).
1. b)Legalrepresentativetakesplaceofdeceasedparty.
Whenthetrialcourt is apprisedofthedeathofa
party, it should order, not the amendment of the
complaint, but then appearance of the legal
representativeofthedeceasedasprovidedinsection
17,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt.Anordertoamend
thecomplaint,beforethepropersubstitutionofthe
deceasedpartieshasbeeneffected,isvoid.Insucha
case the order of the court, dismissing the
complaint, for plaintiffs noncompliance with the
order to amend it, is likewise void. (Casenas vs.
Rosales,L18707,February28,1967).
o0o
498
VOL.236,SEPTEMBER2,1994 239
Peoplevs.Bayotas
G.R.No.102007.September2,1994. *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,vs.

ROGELIOBAYOTASyCORDOVA,accusedappellant.
CriminalLaw;Actions;Deathoftheaccusedpendingappeal
ofhisconvictionextinguisheshiscriminalliabilityaswellasthe
civilliabilitybasedsolelythereon.Deathoftheaccusedpending
appealofhisconvictionextinguisheshiscriminalliabilityaswell
asthe civil liabilitybasedsolelythereon.Asopined byJustice
Regalado,inthisregard,thedeathoftheaccusedpriortofinal
judgment terminates his criminal liability andonlythe civil
liabilitydirectlyarising from and based solely on the offense
committed,i.e.,civilliabilityexdelictoinsensostrictiore.
Same;Same;The claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may alsobe
predicatedonasourceofsurvivesnotwithstandingthedeathof
accused,ifthesamemayalsobeobligationotherthandelict.
Corollarily,theclaimforcivilliabilitypredicatedonasourceof
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumeratestheseothersourcesofobligationfromwhichthecivil
liabilitymayariseasaresultofthesameactoromission:a)
______________
ENBANC.
*
240
40
Peoplevs.Bayotas
Law;b)Contracts;c)Quasicontracts;d)xxxxxxxxx;e)
Quasidelicts.
Same;Same;Wherethecivilliabilitysurvives,anactionfor
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separatecivilactionandsubjecttoSection1,Rule111ofthe1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.Where the civil
liabilitysurvives,asexplainedinNumber2above,anactionfor
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administratorortheestateoftheaccused,dependingon
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explainedabove.
Same;Same;Privateoffendedpartyneednotfearaforfeiture
of his right to file the separate civil action by prescription.
Finally,theprivateoffendedpartyneednotfearaforfeitureof
hisrighttofilethisseparatecivilactionbyprescription,incases
whereduringtheprosecutionofthecriminalactionandpriorto
its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together
therewiththecivilaction.Insuchcase,thestatuteoflimitations
onthecivilliabilityisdeemedinterruptedduringthependencyof
thecriminalcase,conformablywithprovisionsofArticle1155of
theCivilCode,thatshouldtherebyavoidanyapprehensionona
possibleprivationofrightbyprescription.
Same;Same;Death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complainedof,i.e.,rape.Applyingthissetofrulestothecaseat
bench,weholdthatthedeathofappellantBayotasextinguished
hiscriminalliabilityandthecivilliabilitybasedsolelyontheact
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissedwithoutqualification.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtof
RoxasCity,Br.16.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellant.
ROMERO,J.:
InCriminalCaseNo.C3217filedbeforeBranch16,RTC
Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape
241
Peoplevs.Bayotas
and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending
appealofhisconviction,Bayotasdied onFebruary4,1992
at theNational Bilibid Hospital dueto cardio respiratory
arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to
hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
SupremeCourtinitsResolutionofMay20,1992dismissed
thecriminalaspectoftheappeal.However,itrequiredthe
SolicitorGeneraltofileitscommentwithregardtoBayotas
civil liability arising from his commission of the offense
charged.
Inhiscomment,theSolicitorGeneralexpressedhisview
thatthedeathofaccusedappellantdidnotextinguishhis
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged.TheSolicitorGeneral,relyingonthecaseofPeople
v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be
1
resolvedforthepurposeofreviewinghisconvictionbythe
lowercourtonwhichthecivilliabilityisbased.
Counsel for the accusedappellant, on the other hand,
opposedtheviewoftheSolicitorGeneralarguingthatthe
death of the accused while judgment of conviction is
pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties.Insupportofhisposition,saidcounselinvoked
therulingoftheCourtofAppealsinPeoplev.Castilloand
Ocfemia whichheldthatthecivilobligationinacriminal
2
casetakesrootinthecriminalliabilityand,therefore,civil
liability is extinguished if accused should die before final
judgmentisrendered.
Wearethusconfrontedwithasingleissue:Doesdeathof
theaccusedpendingappealofhisconvictionextinguishhis
civilliability?
In the aforementioned case ofPeople v. Castillo, this
issuewassettledintheaffirmative.Thissameissueposed
thereinwasphrasedthus:DoesthedeathofAlfredoCastillo
affectbothhiscriminalresponsibilityandhiscivilliability
asaconsequenceoftheallegedcrime?
Itresolvedthisissuethruthefollowingdisquisition:
__________________
1
Nos.L33252,L33253andL33254,81SCRA120.
2
No.22211R,November4,1959,56O.G.No.23,p.4045.
242
Peoplevs.Bayotas
Article89oftheRevisedPenalCodeisthecontrollingstatute.Itreads,inpart:
ART.89.Howcriminalliabilityistotallyextinguished.Criminalliability
istotallyextinguished:
1.Bythedeathoftheconvict,astothepersonalpenalties;andastothe
pecuniarypenaltiesliabilitythereforisextinguishedonlywhenthedeathofthe
offender occurs before final judgment; With reference to Castillos criminal
liability,thereisnoquestion.
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is
extinguished.
Thecivilliability,however,posesaproblem.Suchliabilityisextinguished
onlywhenthedeathoftheoffenderoccursbeforefinaljudgment.Saddledupon
usisthetaskofascertainingthelegalimportofthetermfinaljudgment.Isit
finaljudgmentascontradistinguishedfromaninterlocutoryorder?Or,isita
judgmentwhichisfinalandexecutory?
Wegotothegenesisofthelaw.ThelegalpreceptcontainedinArticle89of
theRevisedPenalCodeheretoforetranscribedisliftedfromArticle132ofthe
SpanishElCodigoPenalde1870which,inpart,recites:
Laresponsabilidadpenalseextingue.
1.Porlamuertedelreoencuantoalaspenaspersonalessiempre,yrespectoalas
pecuniarias,solocuandoasufallecimientonohubiererecaidosentenciafirme.
xxxxxxxxx
Thecodeof1870xxxitwillbeobservedemploysthetermsentenciafirme.Whatis
sentenciafirmeundertheoldstatute?XXVIIIEnciclopediaJuridicaEspaola,p.473,
furnishesthereadyanswer:Itsays:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas
pornohaberseutilizadoporlasparteslitigantesrecursoalgunocontraelladentrodelos
terminosyplazoslegalesconcedidosalefecto.
Sentencia firme really should be understood as one which is definite.
Because,itisonlywhenjudgmentissuchthat,asMedinayMaranonputsit,
thecrimeisconfirmedencondenadeterminada;or,inthewordsofGroizard,
theguiltoftheaccusedbecomesunaverdadlegal.Priorthereto,shouldthe
accuseddie,accordingtoViada,nohaylegalmente,entalcaso,nireo,nidelito,
ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase. And, as Judge Kapunan well
explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, there
cannotbeany
243
Peoplevs.Bayotas
determinationbyfinaljudgmentwhetherornotthefelonyuponwhichthecivil
action might arise exists, for the simple reason that there isnoparty
defendant. (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator
Franciscoholdsthesameview.Francisco,RevisedPenalCode,BookOne,2nd
ed.,pp.859860)
ThelegalimportofthetermfinaljudgmentissimilarlyreflectedintheRevised
Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term final
judgmentinthesensethatitisalreadyenforceable.Thisalsobringstomind
Section7,Rule116oftheRulesofCourtwhichstatesthatajudgmentina
criminalcasebecomesfinalafterthelapseoftheperiodforperfectinganappeal
orwhenthesentencehasbeenpartiallyortotallysatisfiedorserved,orthe
defendanthasexpresslywaivedinwritinghisrighttoappeal.
Byfairintendment,thelegalpreceptsandopinions herecollectedfunnel
down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the
Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgmenthasnotbecomeexecutory,itcannotbetruthfullysaidthatdefendant
isdefinitelyguiltyofthefelonychargedagainsthim.
Notthatthemeaningthusgiventofinaljudgmentiswithoutreason.For
where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not
reserved,thedecisiontoberenderedmust,ofnecessity,coverboththecriminal
and the civil aspects of the case. People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2
O.G.,No.100,p.964.Seealso:Peoplevs.Moll,68Phil.,626,634;Francisco,
CriminalProcedure,1958ed.,Vol.I,pp.234,236.Correctly,JudgeKapunan
observedthatasthecivilactionisbasedsolelyonthefelonycommittedandof
whichtheoffendermightbefoundguilty,thedeathoftheoffenderextinguishes
thecivilliability.IKapunan,RevisedPenalCode,Annotated,supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillos criminal
liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that
criminalliability.Butthen,ifwedismiss,aswemust,thecriminalactionand
let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation
wherebywewillbecalledupontoclampcivilliabilityinacasewherethesource
thereofcriminalliabilitydoesnotexist.And,aswaswellstatedinBautista,
etal.vs.Estrella,etal.,CAG.R.No.19226R,September1,1958,nopartycan
befoundandheldcriminallyliableinacivilsuit,whichsolelywouldremainif
wearetodivorceitfromthecriminalproceeding.
ThisrulingoftheCourtofAppealsintheCastillocase was 3
adoptedbytheSupremeCourtinthecasesofPeopleofthe
_____________
3
Supra.
244
Peoplevs.Bayotas
Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., People of the 4
Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. andPeople of the 5
Philippinesv.Satorre bydismissingtheappealinviewof
6
thedeathoftheaccusedpendingappealofsaidcases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in
theAlisoncase:
ThedeathofaccusedappellantBonifacioAlisonhavingbeenestablished,and
consideringthatthereisasyetnofinaljudgmentinviewofthependencyofthe
appeal,thecriminalandcivilliabilityofthesaidaccusedappellantAlisonwas
extinguishedbyhisdeath(Art.89,RevisedPenalCode;ReyesCriminalLaw,
1971Rev.Ed.,p.717,citingPeoplev.CastilloandOcfemiaC.A.,56O.G.4045);
consequently,thecaseagainsthimshouldbedismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases
ofBuenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar andLamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of
7
Appeals ruleddifferently.Intheformer,theissuedecided
8
bythiscourtwas:Whetherthecivilliabilityofoneaccused
of physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any
claimthereforagainsthisestate.Itwasthecontentionof
the administratorappellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal
and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of
Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However,thiscourtruledtherein:
Weseenomeritinthepleathatthecivilliabilityhasbeenextinguished,in
viewoftheprovisionsoftheCivilCodeofthePhilippinesof1950(Rep.ActNo.
386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointedoutbytheCourtbelow,Article33oftheCivilCodeestablishesacivil
actionfordamagesonaccountofphysicalinjuries,entirelyseparateanddistinct
fromthecriminalaction.
__________________
4
L30612,April27,1972,44SCRA523.
5
No.L28397,June17,1976,71SCRA273.
6
No.L26282,August27,1976,72SCRA439.
7
No.L24098,November18,1967,21SCRA970.
8
No.L40336,October24,1975,67SCRA394.
245
Peoplevs.Bayotas
ART.33.Incasesofdefamation,fraud,andphysicalinjuries,acivilactionfordamages,
entirelyseparateanddistinctfromthecriminalaction,maybebroughtbytheinjured
party.Suchcivilactionshallproceedindependentlyofthecriminalprosecution,andshall
requireonlyapreponderanceofevidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamalas civil action for
damageswastobeconsideredinstitutedtogetherwiththecriminalactionstill,
since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil
actionoftheoffendedpartyunderArticle33mayyetbeenforcedseparately.
InTorrijos,theSupremeCourtheldthat:
xxxxxxxxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
extinctionofthecriminalliabilityunderArticle89,onlywhenthecivilliability
arisesfromthecriminalactasitsonlybasis.Stateddifferently,wherethecivil
liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinctionofthelatterbydeath,ipsofactoextinguishestheformer,provided,of
course,thatdeathsupervenesbeforefinaljudgment.Thesaidprincipledoesnot
apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
originallyfromthecrimeitselfbutfromacivilcontractofpurchaseandsale.
(Italicsours)
xxxxxxxxx.
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liabilityoftheaccusedwhowaschargedwithestafacould
likewisetraceitsgenesistoArticles19,20and21ofthe
Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and
second vendees of the property subject matter of the
contract of sale. It therefore concluded: Consequently,
while the death of the accused herein extinguished his
criminalliabilityincludingfine,hiscivilliabilitybasedon
thelawsofhumanrelationsremains.
Thusitallowedtheappealtoproceedwithrespecttothe
civilliabilityoftheaccused,notwithstandingtheextinction
ofhiscriminalliabilityduetohisdeathpendingappealof
hisconviction.
Tofurtherjustifyitsdecisiontoallowthecivilliabilityto
survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination:
Since
246
Peoplevs.Bayotas
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires the
9
dismissalofallmoneyclaimsagainstthedefendantwhose
deathoccurredpriortothefinaljudgmentoftheCourtof
FirstInstance(CFI),thenitcanbeinferredthatactionsfor
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal,
whenthedeathofthedefendantsupervenesaftertheCFI
had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this
tribunal,thenameoftheoffendedpartyshallbeincluded
in the title of the case as plaintiffappellee and the legal
representativeortheheirsofthedeceasedaccusedshould
besubstitutedasdefendantsappellants.
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from
Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the
survivalofthecivilliabilitydependsonwhetherthesame
canbepredicatedonsourcesofobligationsotherthandelict.
Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also
extinguished together with the criminal action if it were
solelybasedthereon,i.e.,civilliabilityexdelicto.
However,theSupremeCourtinPeoplev.Sendaydiego,et
al. departedfromthislongestablishedprincipleoflaw.In
10
this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and

convicted by the lower court of malversation thru
falsification of public documents. Sendaydiegos death
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his
conviction.
Thiscourtinanunprecedentedmoveresolvedtodismiss
Sendaydiegosappealbutonlytotheextentofhiscriminal
liability.Hiscivilliabilitywasallowedtosurvivealthough
it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively
dependentonthecriminalactionalreadyextinguished.The
legalimportofsuchdecisionwasforthecourttocontinue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal,
passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiegos conviction
despitedismissalofthecriminalaction,forthepurposeof
determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court
issuedaResolutionofJuly8,1977statingthus:
_________________
9
Section21.Whereclaimdoesnotsurvive.Whentheactionisforrecoveryofmoney,
debtorinterestthereon,andthedefendantdiesbeforefinaljudgmentintheCourtofFirst
Instance,itshallbedismissedtobeprosecutedinthemannerespeciallyprovidedinthese
rules.
10
Supra.
247
Peoplevs.Bayotas
TheclaimofcomplainantProvinceofPangasinanforthecivilliabilitysurvived
Sendaydiegobecausehisdeathoccurredafterfinaljudgmentwasrenderedby
theCourtofFirstInstanceofPangasinan,whichconvictedhimofthreecomplex
crimesofmalversationthroughfalsificationandorderedhimtoindemnifythe
ProvinceinthetotalsumofP61,048.23(shouldbeP57,048.23).
Thecivilactionforthecivilliabilityisdeemedimpliedlyinstitutedwiththe
criminalactionintheabsenceofexpresswaiveroritsreservationinaseparate
action (Sec.1, Rule 111of theRules ofCourt). Thecivil action forthe civil
liabilityisseparateanddistinctfromthecriminalaction(PeopleandManuel
vs.Coloma,105Phil.1287;Roavs.DelaCruz,107Phil.8).
Whentheactionisfortherecoveryofmoneyandthedefendantdiesbefore
final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecutedinthemannerespeciallyprovidedinRule87oftheRulesofCourt
(Sec.21,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt).
Theimplicationisthat,ifthedefendantdiesafteramoneyjudgmenthad
beenrenderedagainsthimbytheCourtofFirstInstance,theactionsurvives
him. Itmay be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs.Court ofAppeals,L40336,
October24,1975;67SCRA394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperlydisbursedalthoughhehasnocriminalliability(U.S.vs.Elvina,24
Phil.230;PhilippineNationalBankvs.Tugab,66Phil.583).
Inviewoftheforegoing,notwithstandingthedismissaloftheappealofthe
deceasedSendaydiegoinsofarashiscriminalliabilityisconcerned,theCourt
Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil
liabilityforthemoneyclaimsoftheProvinceofPangasinanarisingfromthe
allegedcriminalactscomplainedof,asifnocriminalcasehadbeeninstituted
againsthim,thusmakingapplicable,indetermininghiscivilliability,Article30
oftheCivilCodexxxand,forthatpurpose,hiscounselisdirectedtoinform
thisCourtwithinten(10)daysofthenamesandaddressesofthedecedents
heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly
appointedjudicialadministrator.Saidheirsoradministratorwillbesubstituted
forthedeceased insofarasthecivilactionforthecivilliabilityisconcerned
(Secs.16and17,Rule3,RulesofCourt).
Succeeding cases raising the identical issue have
11
maintained adherence to our ruling inSendaydiego; in

otherwords,they
_________________
Peoplev.Badeo,G.R.No.72990,November 21,1991,204SCRA 122;Petralbav.

11
Sandiganbayan,G.R.No.81337,August16,
248
Peoplevs.Bayotas
wereareaffirmanceofourabandonmentofthesettledrule
that acivil liability solelyanchoredonthecriminal(civil
liabilityex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the
entireappealduetothedemiseoftheaccused.
Butwasitjudicioustohaveabandonedthisoldruling?A
reexaminationofourdecisioninSendaydiegoimpelsusto
reverttotheoldruling.
TorestateourresolutionofJuly8,1977inSendaydiego:
Theresolutionofthecivilactionimpliedlyinstitutedinthe
criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latters
extinctionduetodeathoftheaccusedpendingappealofhis
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and
Section21,Rule3oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
Article30oftheCivilCodeprovides:
Whenaseparatecivilactionisbroughttodemandcivilliabilityarisingfroma
criminal offense, andnocriminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficienttoprovetheactcomplainedof.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend
supporttotherulinginSendaydiego.Nowhereinitstextis
thereagrantofauthoritytocontinueexercisingappellate
jurisdictionovertheaccusedscivilliabilityexdelictowhen
his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30
recognizesisanalternativeandseparatecivilactionwhich
may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In
the event thatnocriminal proceedings are instituted
during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of
evidenceneededtoprovethecriminalactwillhavetobe
that
___________________
1991,200SCRA644;Dumlaov.CourtofAppeals,No.L51625,October5,1988,166
SCRA 269;Rufo Mauricio Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L75357,
November27,1987,155SCRA712;Peoplev.Salcedo,No.L48642,June22,1987,151
SCRA220;Peoplev.Pancho,No.L32507,November4,1986,145SCRA323;Peoplev.
Navoa,No.L67966,September28,1984,132SCRA410;Peoplev.Asibar,No.L37255,
October 23, 1982,117 SCRA 856;People v. Tirol, No. L30538, January 31, 1981,102
SCRA558;andPeoplev.Llamoso,No.L24866,July13,1979,91SCRA364.
249
Peoplevs.Bayotas
which is compatible with civil liability and that is,
preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond
reasonabledoubt.CitingorinvokingArticle30tojustifythe
survivalofthecivilactiondespiteextinctionofthecriminal
would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil
liabilityexdelictosurvivesuponextinctionofthecriminal
action due to death of the accused during appeal of his
conviction.Thisisbecausewhetherassertedinthecriminal
actionorinaseparatecivilaction,civilliabilityexdelictois
extinguished by the death of the accused while his
convictionisonappeal.Article89oftheRevisedPenalCode
isclearonthismatter:
Art. 89.How criminal liability is totally extinguished.Criminal liability is
totallyextinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniarypenalties,liabilitythereforisextinguishedonlywhenthedeathofthe
offenderoccursbeforefinaljudgment;
xxxxxxxxx.
However, the ruling inSendaydiegodeviated from the
expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil
liabilityexdelictotosurvivebyipsofactotreatingthecivil
actionimpliedlyinstituted with the criminal,as one filed
under Article 30, as thoughnocriminal proceedings had
beenfiledbutmerelyaseparatecivilaction.Thishadthe
effect of converting such claims from one which is
dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an
entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which
does not even necessitate the filing of criminal
proceedings. One would be hard put to pinpoint the
12
statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be

borneinmindthatinrecoveringcivilliabilityexdelicto,the
samehasperforcetobedeterminedinthecriminalaction,
rootedasitisinthecourts
_________________
JusticeBarredoinhisconcurringopinionobservedthat:
12
x x x this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal offense
withouttheneedofanycriminalproceedingtoprovethecommissionofthecrimeassuch,thatis
withouthavingtoprovethecriminalliabilityofthedefendantsolongashisactcausingdamageor
prejudicetotheoffendedpartyisprovenbypreponderanceofevidence.
250
Peoplevs.Bayotas
pronouncementoftheguiltorinnocenceoftheaccused.This
isbuttorenderfealtytotheintendmentofArticle100of
theRevisedPenalCodewhichprovidesthateveryperson
criminallyliableforafelonyisalsocivillyliable.Insuch
cases,extinctionofthecriminalactionduetodeathofthe
accusedpendingappealinevitablysignifiestheconcomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
dissolvesallthings.
Insum,inpursuingrecoveryofcivilliabilityarisingfrom
crime,thefinaldeterminationofthecriminalliabilityisa
condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action,
suchthatwhenthecriminalactionisextinguishedbythe
demise of accusedappellant pending appeal thereof, said
civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability
springsoutofandisdependentuponfactswhich,iftrue,
wouldconstituteacrime.Suchcivilliabilityisaninevitable
consequenceofthecriminalliabilityandistobedeclared
and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under
Article30oftheCivilCodewhichreferstotheinstitutionof
a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a
criminalproceeding.TheSendaydiegoresolutionofJuly8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinctionwhenitallowedthesurvivalofthecivilaction
for the recovery of civil liabilityex delictoby treating the
sameasaseparatecivilactionreferredtounderArticle30.
Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil
action to an independent one such as that contemplated
underArticle30.
Ironicallyhowever,themaindecisioninSendaydiegodid
not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding.Thus,itwasheldinthemaindecision:
Sendaydiegos appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his
criminalliabilitywhich is thebasis ofthecivil liability forwhichhis estate
wouldbeliable. 13
Inotherwords,theCourt,inresolvingtheissueofhiscivil
liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether
Sendaydiego,onthebasisofevidenceadduced,wasindeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense
charged.Thus,it
________________
Supra,p.134.
13
251
Peoplevs.Bayotas
upheldSendaydiegosconvictionandpronouncedthesame
as thesourceof his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiegos civil liability, there was a reopening of the
criminalactionalreadyextinguishedwhichservedasbasis
forSendaydiegoscivilliability.Wereiterate:Upondeathof
theaccusedpendingappealofhisconviction,thecriminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there isnolonger a
defendanttostandastheaccused;thecivilactioninstituted
therein for recovery of civil liabilityex delictoisipso
factoextinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section21,Rule3oftheRulesofCourtwasalsoinvokedto
serve as another basis for theSendaydiegoresolution of
July8,1977.IncitingSec.21,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt,
theCourtmadetheinferencethatcivilactionsofthetype
involvedin
Sendaydiegoconsist of money claims, the recovery of
whichmaybecontinuedonappealifdefendantdiespending
appealofhisconvictionbyholdinghisestateliabletherefor.
Hence,theCourtsconclusion:
Whentheactionisfortherecoveryofmoneyandthedefendantdiesbefore
final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecutedinthemannerespeciallyprovidedinRule87oftheRulesofCourt
(Sec.21,Rule3oftheRulesofCourt).
Theimplicationisthat,ifthedefendantdiesafteramoneyjudgmenthad
beenrenderedagainsthimbytheCourtofFirstInstance,theactionsurvives
him.Itmaybecontinuedonappeal.
Sadly,relianceonthisprovisionoflawismisplaced.From
the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken
inSendaydiegocannotbesanctioned.Ascorrectlyobserved
byJusticeRegalado:
xxxxxxxxx.
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
bothTorrijosandSendaydiegowhich, relying on the provisions of Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that
where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
alreadypassedbeyondthejudgmentofthethenCourtofFirstInstance(now
the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise
appellatejurisdictionthereover despitetheextinguishmentofthecomponent
criminalliabilityofthedeceased.Thispronouncement,whichhasbeenfollowed
in the Courts judgments subsequent and consonant
toTorrijosandSendaydiego,shouldbeset
252
Peoplevs.Bayotas
asideandabandonedasbeingclearlyerroneousandunjustifiable.SaidSection
21ofRule3isaruleofcivilprocedureinordinarycivilactions.Thereisneither
authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil
actionsinstitutedtogetherwithandaspartofcriminalactions.Noristhereany
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an
ordinarycivilactionuponthedeathoftheoffender.xxx.
Moreover,thecivilactionimpliedlyinstitutedinacriminal
proceedingforrecoveryofcivilliabilityexdelictocanhardly
be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that
referredtoinSec.21,Rule3enforceablebeforetheestateof
thedeceasedaccused.
OrdinarymoneyclaimsreferredtoinSection21,Rule3
mustbeviewedinlightoftheprovisionsofSection5,Rule
86 involving claims against the estate, which
inSendaydiegowas held liable for Sendaydiegos civil
liability.WhatarecontemplatedinSection21ofRule3,in
relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, are contractual money
14
claims while the claims involved in civil liabilityex

delictomayincludeeventherestitutionofpersonalorreal
property. 15
_________________
SEC.5.Claimswhichmustbefiledunderthenotice.Ifnotfiled,barred;exceptions.
14
Allclaimsformoneyagainstthedecedent,arisingfromcontract,expressorimplied,
whether thesame be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the
decedent,mustbefiledwithinthetimelimitedinthenotice;otherwisetheyarebarred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administratorcommencesanaction,orprosecutesanactionalreadycommencedbythe
deceasedinhislifetime,thedebtormaysetforthbyanswertheclaimshehasagainstthe
decedent,insteadofpresentingthemindependentlytothecourtashereinprovided,and
mutualclaimsmaybesetoffagainsteachotherinsuchaction;andiffinaljudgmentis
renderedinfavorofthedefendant,theamountsodeterminedshallbeconsideredthetrue
balanceagainsttheestate,asthoughtheclaimhadbeenpresenteddirectlybeforethe
court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be
approvedattheirpresentvalue.
AsexplainedbyJ.Regaladointhedeliberationofthiscase.
15
253
Peoplevs.Bayotas
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of
what claims may be filed against the estate. These are:
funeral expenses, expenses forthe last illness, judgments
for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or
implied.Itisclearthatmoneyclaimsarisingfromdelictdo
notformpartofthisexclusiveenumeration.Hence,there
could benolegal basis in (1) treating a civil actionex
delictoasanordinarycontractualmoneyclaimreferredto
inSection21,Rule3oftheRulesofCourtand(2)allowing
ittosurvivebyfilingaclaimthereforbeforetheestateof
the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished
upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the
deathoftheaccusedpendingfinalityofhisconviction.
Accordingly,werule:iftheprivateoffendedparty,upon
extinction of the civil liabilityex delictodesires to recover
damagesfromthesameactoromissioncomplainedof,he
must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 (1985 Rules on 16
CriminalProcedureas
__________________
SECTION 1.Institute of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is

16
instituted,thecivilactionfortherecoveryofcivilliabilityisimpliedlyinstitutedwiththe
criminalaction,unlesstheoffendedpartywaivesthecivilaction,reserveshisrightto
instituteitseparately,orinstitutesthecivilactionpriortothecriminalaction.Suchcivil
actionincludesrecoveryofindemnityundertheRevisedPenalCode,anddamagesunder
Articles32,33,34and2176oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippinesarisingfromthesameact
oromissionoftheaccused.
Awaiverofanyofthecivilactionsextinguishestheothers.Theinstitutionof,orthereservationofthe
righttofile,anyofsaidcivilactionsseparatelywaivestheothers.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonableopportunitytomakesuchreservation.
In nocasemaytheoffendedparty recoverdamagestwiceforthesameactoromission ofthe
accused.Whentheoffendedpartyseekstoenforcecivilliabilityagainstthe
accusedbywayofmoral,nominal,temperateorexemplarydamages,thefilingfeesforsuchcivil
actionasprovidedintheseRulesshallconstituteafirstlienonthejudgmentexceptinanawardfor
actualdamages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information,thecorrespondingfilingfees
254
Peoplevs.Bayotas
amended)fileaseparatecivilaction,thistimepredicated
notonthefelonypreviouslychargedbutonothersourcesof
obligation.Thesourceofobligationuponwhichtheseparate
civilactionispremiseddeterminesagainstwhomthesame
shallbeenforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises
fromquasidelictormay,byprovisionoflaw,resultinan
injurytopersonorproperty(realorpersonal),theseparate
civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator oftheestateoftheaccusedpursuanttoSec.
17
1,Rule87oftheRulesofCourt:
SECTION 1.Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executororadministrator.Noactionuponaclaimfortherecoveryofmoneyor
debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator;butactionstorecoverrealorpersonalproperty,oraninterest
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, andactions to recover
damagesforaninjurytopersonorproperty,realorpersonal,maybecommenced
againsthim.
ThisisinconsonancewithourrulinginBelamala where 18
weheldthat,inrecoveringdamagesforinjurytopersons
thruanindependentcivilactionbasedonArticle33ofthe
CivilCode,thesamemustbefiledagainsttheexecutoror
administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not
againsttheestateunderSec.5,Rule86becausethisrule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses,
expensesforthelastsicknessofthedecedent,judgmentfor
moneyandclaimsarisingfromcontract,expressorimplied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only
topurelypersonalobligationsotherthanthosewhichhave
theirsourceindelictortort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of
alsoarisesfromcontract,theseparatecivilactionmustbe
filedagainsttheestateoftheaccused,pursuanttoSec.5,
Rule 86 of shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filingthereofincourtfortrial.
__________________
Justice Regalado cited the Courts ruling inBelamalathat since the damages
17
sought,asaresultofthefelonycommittedamountstoinjurytopersonorproperty,realor
personal, the civil liability to be recovered must be claimed against the
executor/administratorandnotagainsttheestate.
Ibid.
18
255
Peoplevs.Bayotas
theRulesofCourt.
Fromthislengthydisquisition,wesummarizeourruling
herein:
1. 1.Death of the accused pending appeal of his

convictionextinguisheshiscriminalliabilityaswell
asthecivilliabilitybasedsolelythereon.Asopined
byJusticeRegalado,inthisregard,thedeathofthe
accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability andonlythe civil
liabilitydirectlyarisingfromandbasedsolelyonthe
offense committed, i.e., civil liabilityex
delictoinsensostrictiore.
2. 2.Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
19
enumerates these other sources of obligation from

whichthecivilliabilitymayariseasaresultofthe
sameactoromission:
1. a)Law 20
2. b)Contracts
_______________
Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: The civil liability may still be
19
pursuedinaseparatecivilactionbutitmustbepredicatedonasourceofobligationother
thandelict,exceptwhenbystatutoryprovisionanindependentcivilactionisauthorized
suchas,toexemplify,intheinstanceenumeratedinArticle33oftheCivilCode.Justice
Regaladostressedthat:
Conversely,suchcivilliabilityisnotextinguishedandsurvivesthedeceasedoffenderwhereitalso
arisessimultaneouslyfromorexistsasaconsequenceorbyreasonofacontract,asinTorrijos;orfrom
law,asstatedinTorrijosandintheconcurringopinioninSendaydiego,suchasinreferencetothe
CivilCode;orfromaquasicontract;orisauthorizedbylawtobepursuedinanindependentcivil
action,asinBelamala.Indeed,withouttheseexceptions,itwouldbeunfairandinequitabletodeprive
thevictimofhispropertyorrecoveryofdamagestherefor,aswouldhavebeenthefateofthesecond
vendeeinTorrijosortheprovincialgovernmentinSendaydiego.
SeeArticles19,20,21,31,32,33,34,2176oftheCivilCode;seerelatedprovisions
20
oftheRulesonCriminalProcedure,asamended,particularlySec.1,Rule111.
256
Peoplevs.Bayotas
1. c)Quasicontracts
2. d)xxxxxxxxx
3. e)Quasidelicts
1. 3.Where the civil liability survives, as explained in

Number2above,anactionforrecoverythereformay
bepursuedbutonlybywayoffilingaseparatecivil
actionandsubjecttoSection1,Rule111ofthe1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separatecivilactionmaybeenforcedeitheragainst
the executor/ administrator or the estate of the
accused,dependingonthesourceofobligationupon
whichthesameisbasedasexplainedabove.
2. 4.Finally,theprivateoffendedpartyneednotfeara
forfeitureofhisrighttofilethisseparatecivilaction
by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the privateoffended party instituted
togethertherewiththecivilaction.Insuchcase,the
statuteoflimitationsonthecivilliabilityisdeemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case,conformablywithprovisionsofArticle1155 of 21
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any

apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. 22
Applyingthissetofrulestothecaseatbench,weholdthat
the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complainedof,i.e.,rape.Consequently,theappealishereby
dismissedwithoutqualification.
WHEREFORE,theappealofthelateRogelioBayotasis
DISMISSEDwithcostsdeoficio.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa(C.J.),Feliciano,Padilla,Bidin,Regalado,
Davide,
Jr.,Bellosillo,Melo,Quiason,Puno,Vitug,KapunanandM
endoza,JJ.,concur.
Cruz,J.,Onleave.
_______________
ART.1155.Theprescriptionofactionsisinterruptedwhentheyarefiledbeforethe
21
court,whenthereisawrittenextrajudicialdemandbythecreditors,andwhenthereis
anywrittenacknowledgmentofthedebtbythedebtor.
AsexplainedbyJ.Vituginthedeliberationofthiscase.
22
257
Republicvs.CourtofAppeals
Appealdismissed.
Note.eoutcomeorresultofthecriminalcasewhether
anacquittalorconvictionisinconsequentialandwillbeof
nomomentinacivilactionfordamagesbasedonArticle33
oftheCivilCode.(DiongBiChuvs.CourtofAppeals,192
SCRA554[1990])
o0o
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
G.R.No.169793.September15,2006. *
VICTORIANOM.ENCARNACION,petitioner,vs.NIEVES
AMIGO,respondent.
Actions;Ejectment;WordsandPhrases;AccionInterdictal,
Accion Publiciana, and Accion Reinvindicatoria, Explained
and Distinguished.In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession of real property are:
1.Accion interdictal,or an ejectment proceeding which may be
eitherthatforforcibleentry(detentacion)orunlawfuldetainer
(desahucio),whichisasummaryactionforrecoveryofphysical
possessionwherethedispossessionhasnotlastedformorethan
one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2.Accionpublicianaortheplenaryactionfortherecoveryofthe
realrightofpossession,whichshouldbebroughtintheproper
RegionalTrialCourtwhenthedispossessionhaslastedformore
than one year; and 3.Accion reinvindicatoriaoraccion de
reivindicacion,whichisanactionfortherecoveryofownership
whichmustbebroughtintheproperRegionalTrialCourt.
Same;Same;The material element that determines the
properactiontobefiledfortherecoveryofthepossessionofthe
property is the length of time of dispossession.Based on the
foregoingdistinctions,thematerialelementthatdeterminesthe
properactiontobefiledfortherecoveryofthepossessionofthe
propertyinthiscaseisthelengthoftimeofdispossession.Under
theRulesofCourt,theremediesofforcibleentryandunlawful
detaineraregrantedtoapersondeprivedofthepossessionofany
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth,oralessor,vendor,vendee,orotherpersonagainstwhom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
aftertheexpirationorterminationoftherighttoholdpossession
by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representativesorassignsofanysuchlessor,vendor,vendee,or
otherperson.Theseremediesaffordthepersondeprivedofthe
possessiontofileatanytimewithinoneyearaftersuchunlawful
deprivationorwithholdingofpossession,anactionintheproper
MunicipalTrialCourtagainstthepersonorpersonsunlawfully
withholdingordeprivingofpossession,oranypersonorpersons
_______________
FIRSTDIVISION.
*
173
73
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
claimingunderthem,fortherestitutionofsuchpossession,
togetherwithdamagesandcosts.Thus,ifthedispossessionhas
not lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is
properandtheinferiorcourtacquiresjurisdiction.Ontheother
hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the
properactiontobefiledisanaccionpublicianawhichshouldbe
broughttotheproperRegionalTrialCourt.
Same;Same;Pleadings and Practice;Jurisdictions;Well
settledistherulethatjurisdictionofthecourtoverthesubject
matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the
complaintatthetimeofitsfiling,irrespectiveofwhetherornot
theplaintiffisentitledtorecoveruponallorsomeoftheclaims
assertedtherein.Wellsettledistherulethatjurisdictionofthe
courtoverthesubjectmatteroftheactionisdeterminedbythe
allegationsofthecomplaintatthetimeofitsfiling,irrespective
ofwhetherornottheplaintiffisentitledtorecoveruponallor
some of the claims asserted therein. What determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearingfromtheallegationsinthecomplaint.Theaverments
thereinandthecharacterofthereliefsoughtaretheonestobe
consulted.Onitsface,thecomplaintmustshowenoughground
for the court to assume jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony.
Same;Same;Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independentlyoftitleandreferslikewisetoanejectmentsuitfiled
aftertheexpirationofoneyearfromtheaccrualofthecauseof
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that
thepetitionerbecametheownerofthepropertyonApril11,1995
byvirtueofthewaiverofrightsexecutedbyhismotherinlaw.
HefiledthecomplaintforejectmentonMarch2,2001afterhis
February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding that the
lattervacatethepremisesremainedunheeded.Whileitistrue
that the demand letter was received by the respondent on
February12,2001,therebymakingthefilingofthecomplaintfor
ejectmentfallwithintherequisiteoneyearfromlastdemandfor
complaints for unlawful detainer, it is also equally true that
petitionerbecametheownerofthesubjectlotin1995andhas
been since that time deprived possession of a portion thereof.
Fromthedateofthepetitionersdispossessionin1995uptohis
filingofhiscomplaint
174
74
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years have elapsed. The
length of time that the petitioner was dispossessed of his
propertymadehiscauseofactionbeyondtheambitofanaccion
interdictalandeffectivelymadeitoneforaccionpubliciana.After
thelapseoftheoneyearperiod,thesuitmustbecommencedin
theRegionalTrialCourtviaanaccionpublicianawhichisasuit
for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil
proceedingtodeterminethebetterrightofpossessionofrealty
independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed
aftertheexpirationofoneyearfromtheaccrualofthecauseof
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourt
ofAppeals.
BernardD.Vitrioloforpetitioner.
ConstanteA.Foronda,Jr.forrespondent.
YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:
This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005

Decision oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.73857,
1
ordering the remand ofCivil CaseNo. Br. 201194to the

Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for
furtherproceedings.
Theantecedentfactsareasfollows:
Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered
ownerofLotNo.2121B1,consistingof100squaremeters
and covered by TCTNo. T256650; and LotNo. 2121B2
consisting of 607 square meters with TCTNo. T256651,
located at District 1, National Hiway, Cauayan, Isabela.
SaidtwolotsoriginallyformpartofLotNo.2121,asingle
707squaremetertrackoflandownedbyRogelioValiente
who
_______________
Rollo,pp.3242.PennedbyAssociateJusticeRomeoA.Brawnerandconcurredinby
1
AssociateJusticesEdgardoP.CruzandJoseC.Mendoza.
175
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
soldthesametoNicasioMallapitan onJanuary18,1982.
OnMarch21,1985,MallapitansoldthelandtoVictoriano
Magpantay.Afterthedeathofthelatterin1992,hiswidow,
Anita N. Magpantay executed an Affidavit of Waiver on 2
April11,1995wavingherrightoverthepropertyinfavorof
her soninlaw, herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion.
Thereafter,thelattercausedthesubdivisionofthelandinto
twolots andtheissuanceoftitlesinhisname onJuly18,
3
1996. 4
RespondentNievesAmigoallegedlyenteredthepremises
andtookpossessionofaportionofthepropertysometimein
1985withoutthepermissionofthethenowner,Victoriano
Magpantay.Saidoccupationbyrespondentcontinuedeven
after TCT Nos. T256650 and T256651 were issue to
petitioner.
Consequently, petitioner, through his lawyer sent a
letter dated Febuary 1, 2001 demanding that the
5
respondentvacatethesubjectproperty.Asevidencedbythe
registryreturnreceipt,thedemandletterwasdeliveredby
registered mail to the respondent on February 12, 2001.
Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letter, respondent
stillrefusedtovacatethesubjectproperty.Thereafter,on
March2, 2001, petitionerfileda complaint forejectment, 6
damages withinjunction andprayer for restrainingorder

withtheMunicipalTrialCourtinCitiesofIsabelawhich
was docketed as CV01030. In his Answer, respondent
alleged that he has been in actual possession and
occupationofaportionofthesubjectlandsince1968and
thattheissuanceofFreePatentandtitlesinthenameof
petitionerwastaintedwithirregularities. 7
_______________
2
ExhibitC,Records,p.206.
3
LotNo.2121B1coveredbyTCTNo.T256650(ExhibitF,Records,p.213)andLot
No.2121B2coveredbyTCTNo.T256651(ExhibitG,Records,p.214).
4
MTCCDecision,CARollo,pp.6566.
5
AnnexKoftheComplaint,Records,p.26.
6
Records,pp.15.
7
Id.,atpp.3233.
176
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
On October24, 2001, the Municipal TrialCourt inCities
renderedjudgment,whichreads:
WHERE[FO]RE,therebeingapreponderanceofevidence,aJUDGMENTis
herebyrenderedinfavoroftheplaintiffVICTORIANOM.ENCARNACIONand
againstthedefendantNIEVESAMIGOE(sic)asfollows:
1. a)ORDERINGthedefendanttovacatetheportionoftheparcelsofland
described in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T256650 and T
256651heisnowoccupyingandsurrenderittotheplaintiff;
2. b)ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of FIVE

THOUSANDPESOS(P5,000)asattorneysfees,and
3. c)ORDERINGthedefendanttopayrentalsequivalent[to]P500.00per
monthfromFebruary,2001untiltheportionofthelandoccupiedby
himissurrenderedtotheplaintiff.
COSTSagainstthedefendant.
SOORDERED. 8
On appeal,the RegionalTrial Court ofCauayan, Isabela,

Branch20,ruledasfollows:
WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrendereddismissingthecaseontheground
that as the Municipal Court hadnojurisdiction over the case, this Court
acquirednoappellatejurisdictionthereof.Costsagainstplaintiffappellee.
SOORDERED. 9
Aggrieved,petitionerfiledapetitionforreview underRule 10
42oftheRulesofCourtbeforetheCourtofAppealswhich
promulgated the assailed Decision remanding the case to
the Regional Trial Court. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:
_______________
8
CARollo,p.70.PennedbyJudgeBernabeB.Mendoza.
9
Id.,atp.31.PennedbyJudgeHenedinoP.Eduarte.
10
Id.,atpp.615.
177
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby REMANDED to
Branch20,RegionalTrialCourtofCauayan,Isabelaforfurtherproceedings.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED. 11
Hencethepresentpetitionraisingthesoleissue:
[WHETHER]THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINHOLDINGTHATTHE
PROPER ACTION IN THIS CASE IS ACCION PUBLICIANA AND NOT
UNLAWFULDETAINERASDETERMINEDBYTHEALLEGATIONSINTHE
COMPLAINTFILEDBYPETITIONER. 12
Thepetitionlacksmerit
In this jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the
recoveryofpossessionofrealpropertyare:
1. 1.Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding

which may be either that for forcible
entry(detentacion)orunlawfuldetainer(desahucio),
whichisasummaryactionforrecoveryofphysical
possession where the dispossession has not lasted
formorethanoneyear,andshouldbebroughtinthe
properinferiorcourt;
2. 2.Accion publicianaor the plenary action for the

recoveryoftherealrightofpossession,whichshould
bebroughtintheproperRegionalTrialCourtwhen
thedispossessionhaslastedformorethanoneyear;
and
3. 3.Accion reinvindicatoriaoraccion de
reivindicacion,whichisanactionfortherecoveryof
ownership which must be brought in the proper
RegionalTrialCourt. 13
Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element

thatdeterminestheproperactiontobefiledfortherecovery
ofthepossessionofthepropertyinthiscaseisthelengthof
_______________
Rollo,p.41.
11
Id.,atp.17.
12
REGALADO,Remedial Law Compendium, Volume 1, Sixth Revised Edition, pp.

13
767768.
178
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
time of dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the
remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
grantedtoapersondeprivedofthepossessionofanyland
or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth,oralessor,vendor,vendee,orotherpersonagainst
whomthepossessionofanylandorbuildingisunlawfully
withheldaftertheexpirationorterminationoftherightto
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied,orthelegalrepresentativesorassignsofanysuch
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person. These remedies
affordthepersondeprivedofthepossessiontofileatany
time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholdingofpossession,anactionintheproperMunicipal
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. Thus, ifthe
14
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an

ejectment proceeding is proper and the inferior court
acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the
dispossession lasted for more than one year, the proper
action to be filed is anaccion publicianawhich should be
broughttotheproperRegionalTrialCourt.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record of
this case, we find that the Court of Appeals
committednoreversible error in holding that the proper
actioninthiscaseisaccionpubliciana;andinorderingthe
remandofthecasetotheRegionalTrialCourtofCauayan,
Isabela,Branch20,forfurtherproceedings.
Wellsettledistherulethatjurisdictionofthecourtover
the subject matter of the action is determined by the
allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Whatdeterminesthejurisdictionofthecourtisthenature
oftheactionpleadedas
_______________
RULESOFCOURT,Rule70,Sec.1.
14
179
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The
avermentsthereinandthecharacterofthereliefsoughtare
theonestobeconsulted. Onitsface,thecomplaintmust
15
show enough ground for the court to assume jurisdiction

withoutresorttoparoltestimony. 16
From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that

thepetitionerbecametheownerofthepropertyonApril11,
1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights executed by his
motherinlaw. He filed the complaint for ejectment on
March 2, 2001 after his February 1, 2001 letter to the
respondentdemandingthatthelattervacatethepremises
remainedunheeded.Whileitistruethatthedemandletter
was received by the respondent on February 12, 2001,
therebymakingthefilingofthecomplaintforejectmentfall
within the requisite one year from last demand for
complaintsforunlawfuldetainer,itisalsoequallytruethat
petitionerbecametheownerofthesubjectlotin1995and
hasbeensincethattimedeprivedpossessionofaportion
thereof. Fromthedateofthepetitionersdispossessionin
1995uptohisfilingofhiscomplaintforejectmentin2001,
almost6years haveelapsed.Thelengthoftimethatthe
petitionerwasdispossessedofhispropertymadehiscause
of action beyond the ambit of anaccion interdictaland
effectivelymadeitoneforaccionpubliciana.Afterthelapse
oftheoneyearperiod,thesuitmustbecommencedinthe
Regional Trial Courtviaanaccion publicianawhich is a
suitforrecoveryoftherighttopossess.Itisanordinary
civilproceedingtodeterminethebetterrightofpossession
ofrealtyindependentlyoftitle.Italsoreferstoanejectment
suitfiledaftertheexpirationofoneyearfromtheaccrualof
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possessionoftherealty. 17
_______________
15
Herrerav.Bollos,424Phil.851,856;374SCRA107,111(2002).
16
Lopezv.David,Jr.,G.R.No.152145,March30,2004,426SCRA535,540.
17
Id.,atp.543.
180
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
Previously,wehaveheldthatiftheownerofthelandknew
thatanotherpersonwasoccupyinghispropertywaybackin
1977 but the said owner only filed the complaint for
ejectmentin1995,theproperactionwouldbeoneforaccion
publicianaand not one under the summary procedure on
ejectment.AsexplainedbytheCourt:
WeagreewiththeCourtofAppealsthatifpetitionersareindeedtheownersof
thesubjectlotandwereunlawfullydeprivedoftheirrightofpossession,they
should present their claim before the regional trial court in anaccion
publicianaor anaccion reivindicatoria, and not before the metropolitan trial
courtinasummaryproceedingforunlawfuldetainerorforcibleentry.Foreven
ifoneistheowneroftheproperty,thepossessionthereofcannotbewrested
fromanotherwhohadbeeninphysicalormaterialpossessionofthesamefor
morethanoneyearbyresortingtoasummaryactionforejectment. 18
Hence,weagreewiththeCourtofAppealswhenitdeclared
that:
Therespondentsactualentryonthelandofthepetitionerwasin1985butit
was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen years after, when petitioner filed his
ejectment case. The respondent should have filed anaccion publicianacase
whichisunderthejurisdictionoftheRTC.
However,theRTCshouldhavenotdismissedthecase.
Section8,Rule40oftheRulesofCourtprovides:
SECTION8.Appealfromordersdismissingcasewithouttrial;lackofjurisdiction.Ifan
appealistakenfromanorderofthelowercourtdismissingthecasewithoutatrialonthe
merits,theRegionalTrialCourtmayaffirmorreverseit,asthecasemaybe.Incaseof
affirmanceandthegroundofdismissalislackofjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter,the
RegionalTrialCourt,ifithasjurisdictionthereover,shalltrythecaseonthemeritsasif
thecasewasoriginallyfiledwithit.
_______________
Go,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.142276,August14,2001,362SCRA755,769.
18
181
Encarnacionvs.Amigo
Incaseofreversal,thecaseshallberemandedforfurtherproceedings.
Ifthecasewastriedonthemeritsbythelowercourtwithoutjurisdictionoverthesubject
matter,theRegionalTrialCourtonappealshallnotdismissthecaseifithasoriginal
jurisdictionthereof,butshalldecidethecaseinaccordancewiththeprecedingsection,
withoutprejudicetotheadmissionofamendedpleadingsandadditionalevidenceinthe
interestofjustice.
TheRTCshouldhavetakencognizanceofthecase.Ifthecaseistriedonthe
meritsbytheMunicipalCourtwithoutjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter,the
RTC on appeal maynolonger dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof.Moreover,theRTCshallnolongertrythecaseonthemerits,butshall
decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court,
without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional
evidenceintheinterestofjustice. 19
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIED.TheDecisionofthe
CourtofAppealsdatedJune30,2005inCAG.R.SPNo.
73857orderingtheremandofCivilCaseNo.Br.201194to
theRegionalTrialCourtofCauayan,Isabela,Branch20,
forfurtherproceedings,isAFFIRMED.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Panganiban(C.J., Chairperson),Austria
Martinez,Callejo,Sr.andChicoNazario,JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied,judgmentaffirmed.
Notes.Where the ejectment suit was filed before the
RegionalTrialCourtandnottheMunicipalTrialCourtbut
the defendant did not move to dismiss the complaint for
lackofjurisdictionandinsteadfiledhisanswerandwentto
trial,
_______________
Rollo,pp.3840;emphasissupplied.
19
182
GuiguintoCreditCooperative,Inc.(GUCCI)vs.Torres
estoppelbylachessetin.(Velarmavs.CourtofAppeals,252
SCRA406[1996])
Inordertoavoidfurtherinjusticetoalawfulpossessor,
an immediate execution of a judgment of eviction is
mandatedandthecourtsdutytoordersuchexecutionis
practically ministerial. (Puncia vs. Gerona,252 SCRA
425[1996])
o0o
TeresaT.GonzalesLaO&Co.,Inc.vs.Hatab
A.M.No.P991337.April5,2000. *
TERESA T. GONZALES LAO& CO., INC., thru counsel

JOSE P.O. ALILING IV, complainant,vs.Sheriff JADI T.
HATAB,respondent.
Actions;Ejectment;Judgments;The present wording of
Section21,Rule70explicitlyprovidesthatthejudgmentofthe
regional trial court in ejectment cases appealed to it shall be
immediatelyexecutoryandcanbeenforceddespitetheperfection
of an appeal to a higher court.Unlike Rule 70 of the 1964
RevisedRulesofCourtwherethedefendant,afterperfectinghis
appeal,couldpreventtheimmediateexecutionofthejudgment
bytakinganappealandmakingaperiodicdepositofmonthly
rentalsduringthependencyoftheappealtherebypreventingthe
plaintifffromtakingpossessionofthepremisesinthemeantime,
the present wording of Section 21, Rule 70 explicitly provides
thatthejudgmentoftheregionaltrialcourtinejectmentcases
appealedtoitshallbeimmediatelyexecutoryandcanbeenforced
despitetheperfectionofanappealtoahighercourt.
Same;Same;Same;Sheriffs;Thependencyofthemotionfor
reconsiderationandthereraffleofthecasetoanothersaladoes
notjustifythefailureofthesherifftoenforcethewritofexecution
issued by the court.Respondents claim that the pendency of
defendantVicentesmotionforreconsiderationandthereraffle
ofthecasetoanothersaladoesnotjustifyhisfailuretoenforce
thewritofexecutionissuedbythecourt.Whenawritisplacedin
thehandsofasheriff,itishisdutytoproceedwithreasonable
celerityandpromptnesstoexecuteitaccordingtoitsmandate.
Hehasnodiscretionwhetherornottoexecutethejudgment.
Courts;Court Personnel;Sheriffs;As agents of the law,
sheriffsarecalledupontodischargetheirdutieswithduecare
and utmost diligence because in serving the courts writs and
processesandimplementingitsorder,they cannotafford toerr
without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient
administrationofjustice.Sheriffsplayanimportantroleinthe
administration of justice. They are tasked to execute final
judgmentsofcourts.Ifnotenforced,such
_____________
ENBANC.
*
647
VOL.329,APRIL5,2000 647
decisionsareemptyvictoriesoftheprevailingparties.They
mustthereforecomplywiththeirmandatedministerialdutyto
implement writs promptly and expeditiously. As agents of the
law,sheriffsarecalledupontodischargetheirdutieswithdue
careandutmostdiligencebecauseinservingthecourtswritsand
processesandimplementingitsorder,theycannotaffordtoerr
without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient
administrationofjustice.
Same;Same;Same;The officers charged with the delicate
taskoftheenforcementand/orimplementationofthejudgment
must,intheabsenceofarestrainingorder,actwithconsiderable
dispatchsoasnottoundulydelaytheadministrationofjustice;
otherwise,thedecisions,ordersorotherprocessesofthecourtsof
justice and the like would be futile.In Moya vs. Bassig, we
dismissedDeputySheriffRenatoA.Bassigfromtheserviceon
thefindingthathefailedtoenforceawritofexecutionforthe
sale at public auction of property of the judgment debtor,
brushingasidehisexplanationthattherewasapendingappeal
filedbythejudgmentdebtorwiththeCourtofAppeals.Incalling
forrespondentBassigsseparationfromtheservice,wejustified
thesameinthiswise:Itisindisputablethatthemostdifficult
phaseofanyproceedingistheexecutionofjudgment.Hence,the
officerschargedwiththedelicatetaskoftheenforcementand/or
implementationofthesamemust,intheabsenceofarestraining
order,actwithconsiderabledispatchsoasnottoundulydelay
theadministrationofjustice;otherwise,thedecisions,ordersor
other processes of the courts of justice and the like would be
futile.Stateddifferently,thejudgmentifnotexecutedwouldbe
justanemptyvictoryonthepartoftheprevailingparty.
ADMINISTRATIVEMATTERintheSupremeCourt.Grave
Misconduct.
ThefactsarestatedintheresolutionoftheCourt.
JoseP.O.AlilingTVforcomplainant.
RESOLUTION
PERCURIAM:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint

filedonSeptember17,1997bycomplainantTeresaT.de
648
GonzalesLaO&Co.,Inc.againstrespondentSheriffJadi
T. Hatab of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati
forgravemisconduct.
Complainant was a winning party in an unlawful
detainer case it filed against defendant Eduardo Vicente
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 66
involving a leased apartment in Consolidated Mansion
Condominium,SouthSuperhighway,MakatiCity.
During the pendency of the appeal of the case in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati, complainant 1
movedfortheissuanceofawritofpreliminaryinjunction
whichtheRegionalTrialCourtgrantedinitsdecision dated 2
August 4, 1997 affirming the municipal trial courts

3
judgment ousting defendant Vicente from the subject

premises.
Accordingly,onAugust7,1997,thetrialcourtissueda
writofpreliminarymandatoryinjunction andonAugust8, 4
1997, a notice to vacate, duly served upon defendant

5
Vicente.However,thelatterrefusedtosurrenderpossession
ofthepremises.Thispromptedthecomplainanttofilean
urgent motion for execution pending appeal with the
Regional Trial Court which granted the motion in an
order dated September 1, 1997, the decretal portion of
6
whichreads:
Premisesconsideredandfindingthemotionforexecutiontobemeritoriousand
in order, the same is granted. Let the corresponding writ of execution in
accordancewiththedecisionofthisCourt,affirmingintotothedecisionofthe
trialcourt,infavoroftheplaintiffappelleebeissued.
NotwithstandingtheSeptember1,1997orderanddespite
repeatedfollowupsmadebycomplainantforaboutone(1)
_____________
1
DocketedasCivilCaseNo.971067.
2
Rollo,AnnexA.
3
PennedbyJudgeLuciaViolagoIsnani,nowretired.
4
Rollo,AnnexB.
5
Rollo,AnnexC.
6
Rollo,AnnexE.
649
VOL.329,APRIL3,2000 649
month after the Regional Trial Court had rendered its
August 4, 1997 decision, respondent failed to execute the
judgment, thus prompting the complainant to file an
administrativecomplaintagainstrespondent.
OnAugust14,1997,thedefendantVicentefiledwiththe
Court ofAppealsa petitionforcertiorari,prohibitionand
mandamus assailing the September 1, 1997 order of the
Regional Trial Court. On October 9, 1997, the Court of
Appealsdismissedthepetition.
In his defense, respondent claims that he held in
abeyance the execution of the Regional Trial Courts
judgment (1) upon learning ofthe pendency of an urgent
motion to reconsider, the September 1, 1997 order of the
Regional Trial Court (granting complainants motion for
executionpendingappeal)and(2)byreasonofthereraffle
of the case after Judge Lucia Violago Isnani inhibited
herselffromfurtheractingthereon.
This Court agrees with the Office of the Court
Administratorsrecommendationthatrespondentsheriffbe
held administratively liable for delaying without valid
reasontheexecutionofthedecisionoftheRegionalTrial
CourtinCivilCaseNo.971067.
Section21,Rule70ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure
provides:
Sec.21.ImmediateexecutiononappealtoCourtofAppeals,orSupremeCourt
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be
immediatelyexecutory,withoutprejudicetoafurtherappealthatmaybetaken
therefrom.
UnlikeRule70ofthe1964RevisedRulesofCourtwhere
thedefendant,afterperfectinghisappeal,couldpreventthe
immediateexecutionofthejudgmentbytakinganappeal
andmakingaperiodicdepositofmonthlyrentalsduringthe
pendency of the appeal thereby preventing the plaintiff
fromtakingpossessionofthepremisesinthemeantime,the
presentwordingofSection21,Rule70explicitlyprovides
thatthejudgmentoftheregionaltrialcourtinejectment
cases
650
appealedtoit shallbeimmediatelyexecutoryandcanbe
enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a higher
court.
Consequently, respondents claim that the pendency of
defendantVicentesmotionforreconsiderationandthere
raffleofthecasetoanothersaladoesnotjustifyhisfailure
toenforcethewritofexecutionissuedbythecourt.Whena
writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty to
proceedwithreasonablecelerityandpromptnesstoexecute
itaccordingtoitsmandate. Hehasnodiscretionwhether
7
ornottoexecutethejudgment. 8
Sheriffsplayanimportantroleintheadministrationof
justice. They are tasked to execute final judgments of
courts.Ifnotenforced,suchdecisionsareemptyvictoriesof
the prevailing parties. They must therefore comply with
9
their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs

promptlyandexpeditiously.Asagentsofthelaw,sheriffs
arecalledupontodischargetheirdutieswithduecareand
utmost diligence because in serving the courts writs and
processesandimplementingitsorder,theycannotaffordto
err without affecting the integrity of their office and the
efficientadministrationofjustice. 10
InMoyavs.Bassig wedismissedDeputySheriffRenato
11
A.Bassigfromtheserviceonthefindingthathefailedto
enforceawritofexecutionforthesaleatpublicauctionof
property of the judgment debtor, brushing aside his
explanationthat there was a pending appeal filedby the
judgment
_______________
7
Onquitvs.BinamiraParcia,297SCRA354[1998];Villarealvs.Rarama,247SCRA
493[1995];Padilla vs. Arabia,242 SCRA 227[1995];Young vs. Momblan,205 SCRA
33[1992].
8
Aristorenasvs.Molina,246SCRA134[1995];SmithBell&Companyvs.Saur,96
SCRA667[1980].
9
Dilanvs.Dulfo,A.M.No.P991293,March11,1999,304SCRA460.
10
Mamanteo vs. Magumun,A.M. No. P981264, July 28, 1999,311 SCRA 259,
citingBernasal,Jr.vs.Montes,280SCRA181[1997].
11
138SCRA49[1985].
651
VOL.329,APRIL5,2000 651
debtorwiththeCourtofAppeals.Incallingforrespondent
Bassigsseparationfromtheservice,wejustifiedthesame
inthiswise:
It is indisputable that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the
executionofjudgment.Hence,theofficerschargedwiththedelicatetaskofthe
enforcement and/or implementation of the same must, in the absence of a
restrainingorder,actwithconsiderabledispatchsoasnottoundulydelaythe
administrationofjustice;otherwise,thedecisions,ordersorotherprocessesof
the courts of justice and the like would be futile. Stated differently, the
judgment if not executed would be just an empty victory on the part of the
prevailingparty.
In this case, respondent sheriffs folly isnoless different,
thus warranting the same punishment meted out to the
deputysheriffinvolvedintheBassigcase.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES respondent
Sheriff Jadi T. Hatab, Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Makati City from the service for grave misconduct, with
forfeitureofallretirementbenefitsandleavecredits,ifany,
and with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in
any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations.
SOORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.(C.J.),Bellosillo,Melo,Puno,Vitug,Kapunan,Mendoza,
Panganiban,Quisumbing,Purisima,Pardo,Buena,Gonzag
aReyes,YnaresSantiagoandDeLeon,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
Respondent Sheriff Jadi T. Hatab dismissed from the
serviceforgravemisconduct.
Notes.Personalfeelingsofsheriffs,suchascompassion
and sympathy, must never be allowed to compromise the
publictrustcharacteroftheirofficewhichbindsthemtoa
continuing accountability to the people. (Zamora vs.
Jumamoy,238SCRA587[1994])
652
Orosavs.CourtofAppeals
Asheriffshoulddepositincourtthemoneyhecollectsin
satisfactionofajudgmentinsteadofdeliveringitdirectlyto
the prevailing party. (Borja, Sr. vs. Angeles,244 SCRA
706[1995])
o0o
SECOND DIVISION
BONIFACIO M. MEJILLANO, G.R. No. 154717

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,**
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*** and
ENRIQUE LUCILLO, HON. BRION, JJ.
GREGORIA B. CONSULTA, Presiding
Judge of RTC, Legaspi City, Branch 4, Promulgated:
Respondents. June 19, 2009
x----------------------------------------
- - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review
on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated March 14, 2002 and
the Resolution[2]dated August 12, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62322. The Court of Appeals
had affirmed the Orders dated September 13, 2000[3] and
October 23, 2000[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Legaspi City, Branch 4, in Civil Case No. 9879, which
dismissed petitioners appeal from the Decision[5] dated July
5, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Daraga,
Albay in Civil Case No. 945 and denied his motion for
reconsideration.
The factual antecedents of this petition are as

follows:
Faustino Loteria died sometime in 1931 leaving two
parcels of land, Lot No. 9007 which contains an area of
6,628 square meters, and Lot No. 9014 which contains an
area of 4,904 square meters. During his lifetime, Faustino
Loteria begot six children. He sired three children by his
first marriage to Ciriaca Luciada, namely, Tranquilino,
Antonia and Cipriano; and another three during his
subsequent marriage to Francisca Monreal, namely, Julita,
Felix and Hospicio.
On May 25, 1959, the surviving children of Faustino

Loteria with Ciriaca Luciada, namely Tranquilino and
Antonia, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Cession.
[6]
In said agreement, Tranquilino and Antonia divided Lot
No. 9007 equally between them and Antonia ceded her
one-half (1/2) share in the property to
Tranquilino. On March 1, 1978, Tranquilino executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale[7] of Lot No. 9007 in favor of Jesus
Lorente. Soon after, he modified the agreement to
include Lot No. 9014 in an Amended Deed of Absolute
Sale[8] dated September 11, 1978.
The conflict arose when the children of Faustino

with Francisca Monreal, namely Felix and Hospicio,
claimed that LotNo. 9014 is their inheritance from their late
father. Hence, Jesus Lorente could not have validly bought
it from Tranquilino. The conflicting claims to occupy and
use the disputed property led Jesus Lorente to file an action
for recovery of possession with the RTC of Legaspi City.
The RTC, in a Decision[9] dated September 20, 1985 in
Civil Case No. 6005, dismissed the complaint and declared
that Felix and Hospicio Loteria are co-heirs or co-owners
of Lot No. 9014. As such, they are entitled to the
possession of the property, subject to the final
determination of their rights as heirs of their late father.
Thereafter, the heirs of Hospicio sold to respondent
Enrique Lucillo their one-half () share in Lot No. 9014 by
way of an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale[10] on April 28,
1995. The remaining one-half (1/2) portion was also sold to
respondent Lucillo by Felix on August 7, 1995 by way of
Deed of Absolute Sale.[11]
When respondent Lucillo was about to enter said

property, however, he discovered that petitioner was
occupying Lot No. 9014. Respondent Lucillo wrote
petitioner a letter[12] requesting him to vacate said property,
but petitioner refused to surrender possession thereof
claiming that he is the owner of Lot No. 9007 and Lot No.
9014 by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition
and Sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Jesus
Lorente. Hence, on September 18, 1995, respondent
Lucillo filed an action for recovery of possession of real
property against petitioner with the MTC of Daraga, Albay.
[13]
In its Decision dated July 5, 2000 in Civil Case No.

945, the MTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
orde[r]ing defendant Bonifacio Mejillano to relinquish
possession of Lot No. 9014, situated at Pandan,
Daraga, Albay, and to turn-over the peaceful
possession thereof to plaintiff Enrique Lucillo. Costs
against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed the

foregoing decision to the RTC, but failed to file an appeal
memorandum. Consequently, respondent judge dismissed
petitioners appeal on September 13, 2000:
For failure of appellant to file a memorandum
pursuant to the mandatory requirement of Rule 40,
Sec. 7(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, despite
the lapse of the period therein given, the appeal is
hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[15]
On October 9, 2000, petitioner, through new counsel,

filed a motion for reconsideration attaching thereto the
appeal memorandum. Petitioner alleged that his failure to
file the required memorandum on time was due to
ignorance, the untimely demise of his former counsel and
the mistaken notion that what was needed in the appeal was
merely a notice of appeal and nothing more.[16] In its
Order[17] dated October 23, 2000, the RTC of Legaspi City,
ruled:
xxxx
The Court cannot accept [petitioners] claim of

ignorance for the records will show that he personally
made the Answer to the Complaint (Exp. pp. 9, 10, 11
& 12) and the Notice of Appeal (Exp. pp. 1-7).
Neither can the Court accept his claim of

poverty because he chose to be represented by the late
Atty. Delfin De Vera, a lawyer of no ordinary caliber
and there is no indication on record that his services
were for free. But even assuming that the entry of
Atty. Delfin de Vera into the picture was financially
excessive on him, why did he not seek the services of
the PAO before which he subscribed and swore the
Verification and Certification of his Answer
on November 23, 1995?
In view of the foregoing, the Opposition to the

Motion for Reconsideration stands to be meritorious.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition

for certiorari. In a Decision dated March 14, 2002, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that
respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the appeal. The fallo of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DISMISSED and the assailed orders
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[18]
On August 12, 2002, the appellate court also denied

his motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant
appeal. Petitioner now raises the following issues for our
resolution:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN NOT CONSIDERING PETITIONERS
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IN FILING HIS
APPEAL MEMORANDUM WITH THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI CITY IN THE
INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE RATHER BELATED
FILING THEREOF BY PETITIONER WAS
UNINTENTIONAL AS SHOWN IN HIS
AFFIDA[V]IT OF MERIT.
II.
IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT
THE SALE OF SUBJECTLAND TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS NULL AND VOID.
III.
IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MERITORIOUS
CAUSE OF ACTION OF PETITIONER AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.[19]
Stated simply, the issue for our resolution is whether

the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming
the order of the RTC dismissing petitioners appeal for
failure to file on time his memorandum on appeal.
Petitioner avers that his failure to file his
memorandum on time was due to his lawyers untimely
death. He avers that he received the notice to file his
memorandum, but because he is not a lawyer, he did not
fully understand the tenor of such notice. It was only later
after he talked with a Public Attorneys Office district
lawyer that he came to file, albeit belatedly, his appeal
memorandum. He insists on a liberal application of the
rules, arguing that in a long line of cases, this Court ruled
that dismissals of appeals on purely technical grounds are
frowned upon and that rules of procedure are used only to
help secure not override substantial justice.
All circumstances in this case having been

considered carefully, we now find the petition bereft of
merit.
Section 7 (b), Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court

expressly states:
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such
notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to
submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss
the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of
which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party.
Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellants
memorandum, the appellee may file his
memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a
memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of
the appeal. [Emphasis supplied.]
The rule is clear. It is obligatory on the part of

petitioner to file his memorandum on appeal within fifteen
days from receipt of the notice to file the same; otherwise,
his appeal will be dismissed. In Enriquez v. Court of
Appeals,[20] we ruled:
x x x The use of the word shall in a statute or
rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory.
Further, the Rule imposes upon an appellant the duty
to submit his memorandum. A duty is a legal or moral
obligation, mandatory act, responsibility, charge,
requirement, trust, chore, function, commission, debt,
liability, assignment, role, pledge, dictate, office, (and)
engagement. Thus, under the express mandate of
said Rule, the appellant is duty-bound to submit
his memorandum on appeal. Such submission is
not a matter of discretion on his part. His failure to
comply with this mandate or to perform said duty
will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.
In rules of procedure, an act which is

jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or
is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party
affected is mandatory.[21] [Emphasis supplied.]
The raison d'tre for such necessity was equally

clarified in the same case: in appeals from inferior courts to
the RTC, the appellants brief is mandatory[22] since only
errors specifically assigned and properly argued in the
appeal memorandum will be considered in the decision on
the merits.[23]
In this case, the fundamental cause of the dismissal

of petitioners appeal was his failure to file the obligatory
appeal memorandum on time. Petitioner only filed his
memorandum on appeal when the dismissal of his appeal
had already been ordered. Resultantly, the trial court acted
accordingly when it dismissed petitioners appeal pursuant
to the clear mandate of the Rules of Court.
Further, we cannot subscribe to petitioners tenacious

insistence to relax the application of the Rules of Court so
as not to defeat his rights.
Time and again, we have ruled that procedural rules

do not exist for the convenience of the litigants. [24] Rules of
Procedure exist for a purpose, and to disregard such rules
in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such
purpose.[25] Procedural rules were established primarily to
provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial
system.[26] It has been jurisprudentially held that, while the
rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as
they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business.[27]
Also, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor

a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law.[28] An appeal being a purely
statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply
with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In other
words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
play by the rules.[29] This, the petitioner failed to do when
he did not submit his memorandum on appeal.
All told, we find that the Court of Appeals

committed no reversible error in upholding the order of
dismissal of the RTC in Civil Case No. 9879
dated September 13, 2000 and its Order dated October 23,
2000 denying the motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition

is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 14,
2002 and Resolution dated August 12, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62322 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO- TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

NAZARIO CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E RT I FI CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and

the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 645 in place of
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales who is on official leave.
**
Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 658.
***
Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 635 in view
of the retirement of Associate Dante O. Tinga.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 103-110. Penned by Associate Justice Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. with
Associate Justices B. A. Adefuin-De La Cruz and Josefina Guevara-Salonga
concurring.
[2]
Id. at 115-116.
[3]
CA rollo, p. 59.
[4]
Id. at 70.
[5]
Id. at 52-57. Penned by Judge William B. Volante.
[6]
Id. at 25-26.
[7]
Id. at 27.
[8]
Id. at 28-29.
[9]
Id. at 33-36. Penned by Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes.
[10]
Id. at 37-38.
[11]
Id. at 39.
[12]
Id. at 71.
[13]
Id. at 46-47.
[14]
Id. at 57.
[15]
Id. at 59. Penned by Judge Gregorio A. Consulta.
[16]
Id. at 60.
[17]
Id. at 70.
[18]
Rollo, p. 109.
[19]
Id. at 171.
[20]
G.R. No. 140473, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 377.
[21]
Id. at 384.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Banting v. Maglapuz, G.R. No. 158867, August 22, 2006, 499 SCRA 505, 518.
[24]
Ko v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. Nos. 169131-32, January 20, 2006, 479
SCRA 298, 303.
[25]
Favila v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 126768, June 16,
1999, 308 SCRA 303, 313.
[26]
Ko v. Philippine National Bank, supra at 303-304.
[27]
Moneytrend Lending Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No
165580, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 705, 714.
[28]
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126620, April
17, 2002, 381 SCRA 185, 197.
[29]
Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20, at 385.

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VOL.

First Instance of Abra inCivil Case No. 856,

claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation inCivil

survive the wrong complained affects primarily and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,vs.

Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. andPeople of the 5

this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and

maintained adherence to our ruling inSendaydiego; in

Peoplev.Badeo,G.R.No.72990,November 21,1991,204SCRA 122;Petralbav.

statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be

claims while the claims involved in civil liabilityex

SECTION 1.Institute of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is

1. 1.Death of the accused pending appeal of his

enumerates these other sources of obligation from

1. 3.Where the civil liability survives, as explained in

the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any

This petition for review assails the June 30, 2005

ordering the remand ofCivil CaseNo. Br. 201194to the

damages withinjunction andprayer for restrainingorder

2. b)ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of FIVE

On appeal,the RegionalTrial Court ofCauayan, Isabela,

1. 1.Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding

2. 2.Accion publicianaor the plenary action for the

Based on the foregoing distinctions, the material element

REGALADO,Remedial Law Compendium, Volume 1, Sixth Revised Edition, pp.

dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an

show enough ground for the court to assume jurisdiction

From the allegations in the complaint, it appears that

TERESA T. GONZALES LAO& CO., INC., thru counsel

This administrative case arose from a verified complaint

August 4, 1997 affirming the municipal trial courts

judgment ousting defendant Vicente from the subject

1997, a notice to vacate, duly served upon defendant

their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs

BONIFACIO M. MEJILLANO, G.R. No. 154717

- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

The factual antecedents of this petition are as

On May 25, 1959, the surviving children of Faustino

The conflict arose when the children of Faustino

When respondent Lucillo was about to enter said

In its Decision dated July 5, 2000 in Civil Case No.

Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed the

On October 9, 2000, petitioner, through new counsel,

The Court cannot accept [petitioners] claim of

Neither can the Court accept his claim of

In view of the foregoing, the Opposition to the

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a petition

On August 12, 2002, the appellate court also denied

Stated simply, the issue for our resolution is whether

All circumstances in this case having been

Section 7 (b), Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court

The rule is clear. It is obligatory on the part of

In rules of procedure, an act which is

The raison d'tre for such necessity was equally

In this case, the fundamental cause of the dismissal

Further, we cannot subscribe to petitioners tenacious

Time and again, we have ruled that procedural rules

Also, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor

All told, we find that the Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, the instant petition

MINITA V. CHICO- TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and