Cangco v.

Manila Railroad (1918)

FACTS:
Jose Cangco, a clerk of Manila Railroad, with a monthly rate of P25 and lives in Rizal, located along the line of the railroad. He
was entitled of a pass that he uses for transportation to office free of charge.
One time, as the train slowed down, a passenger got off the car. When the train had proceeded a little farther, Cangco
stepped off but his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons which caused him to slip and fall on the platform. He was
drawn under the moving car, where his arm was crushed and lacerated (injuries were serious). It appears that after the Cangco
alighted from the train, the latter moved for six meters more before fully stopping. The accident between 7-8pm, station was
dimly lighted.
The presence of a sack of melons was explained as it was the season for harvesting these melons which were to be shipped.
Melons were contained in numerous sacks piled on the platform in rows, placed at the edge of platform. He said he failed to see
these objects because platform was dimly lit.
The injuries were very serious. He was operated and amputated twice due to unsatisfactory operation. It appears in that
the plaintiff expended P790.25 in medical and surgical fees and other expenses.

Cangco then instituted a proceeding with CFI Manila to recover damages, claiming negligence of the employees of the
defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform.
Trial Court: found the facts to be true; but ruled although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the
fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering.
Cangco appealed the decision.

ISSUE/S and RULING:

1. WON the negligence of the employees is attributable to their employer whether the negligence is based on contractual
obligation (culpa contractual) or on torts (culpa extracontractual)?

YES. It cannot be doubted that the employees of defendant were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform
in the manner stated. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless
recovery is barred by the plaintiffs own contributory negligence.

It is to note that the foundation of the legal liability is the contract of carriage. Art. 1903 relates only to culpa aquiliana and
not to culpa contractual, as the Court cleared on the case of Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf. It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence
and care in the selection and control of the employee relieves the master from liability fro the latters act.
The fundamental distinction between obligation of this character and those which arise from contract, rest upon the fact
that in cases of non-contractual obligations it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris,
whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties
when entering into the contractual relation.
When the source of obligation upon which plaintiffs cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden
of proof rest upon the plaintiff to prove negligence. On the other hand, in contractual undertaking, proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is sufficient prima facie evidence to warrant recovery. The negligence of employee cannot be invoked to relieve
the employer from liability as it will make juridical persons completely immune from damages arising from breach of their
contracts.
Manila Railroad was therefore liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be
regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or contractual. As Manresa discussed, whether negligence occurs as an incident in the
course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-contractual obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the
part of the defendant.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to
provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains. Contributory negligence on the part of petitioner as invoked by defendant is
untenable. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act- that is to say, whether the passenger
acted prudently or recklessly- age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety
of the passenger, and should be considered. It is to be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was his daily
routine. Our conclusion is there is slightly underway characterized by imprudence and therefore was not guilty of contributory
negligence. The decision of the trial court is REVERSED.

2. WHO has the burden of proof to show negligence?

The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is wholly different from
that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent
act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does not his action fails. But when the
facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or
refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is
due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.

The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to
provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and
immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.

3. WON plaintiff has contributory negligence to the incident.

In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came
to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions
every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is
no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's
negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.

We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence
(vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows: The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting
to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent
person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed
by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the
care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on
Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)

Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that
the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which
would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous?
If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.

As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances
are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding
ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was
thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement
material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of
the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the
same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such
act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger
are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a
general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel
obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his
daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to
the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is
that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the
injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown that any
other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately
thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is
the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention,
hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.

DISPOSITION The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and
for the costs of both instances. So ordered.