Filamer Christian Institute vs CA

Daniel Funtecha was a working student at the Filamer Christian Institute. He was assigned as
the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning.
Allan Masa was the son of the school president and at the same time he was the schools
jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to
their homes, Masa returned to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the
jeep so that he could fetch the students early in the morning.
Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together. Funtecha had a
student drivers license so Masa let him take the drivers seat.
While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan which led to his
hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action
based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for the
tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180 which
provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the
decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR,
working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no employer-
employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due
to negligence only attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the
school janitor.
The CA denied Filamers appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed
for a motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.
HELD: Yes.
This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time Kapunan was
already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only
meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest
periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other laws
like the civil code.
The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide
to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule
X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured
person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school
itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for
injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his
employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability
of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor
cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the
Civil Code.
 Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a drivers
position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act
of driving the jeep from the school to Masas house is beneficial to the school because this
enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning).
Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his
janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum
that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

Ramos V. CA (1999)
FACTS:
June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman underwent on an operation to
the stone at her gall bladder removed after being tested that she was fit
for "cholecystectomy" operation performed by Dr. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of
P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after the
operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will get a good anesthesiologist who
was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand was held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who
was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center together with her husband
went down with her to the operating room.
Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M.
Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda becoming
bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.
She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong.
When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. she was taken to
the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she stayed for a month due to bronchospasm
incurring P93,542.25 and she was since then comatosed.
She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to
five minutes.
She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage"
Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000
Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez
RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses totalling to P632,000 as of
April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000 moral damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and
cost of suit
CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest
ISSUE: W/N the Ramos' are entitled to damages.
HELD: YES.
CA modified in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1)
P1,352,000 actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation plus a monthly payment of
P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2)
P2,000,000 moral damages, 3) P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4) P100,000 exemplary damages
and P100,000 attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.

The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it
is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law,
permit a given inference.
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is
dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence - applicable in this case
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which
involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment
As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient
according to witness Herminda
With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with her testimony
Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled
operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the
subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on
the subject or by practical experience.
o Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic
encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate
was not accepted as expert opinion
Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not
determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols
Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this,
he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This
indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient
private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant"
staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital
asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages.
 Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such
cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The
reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without
the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances,
an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.
the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently
changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo
through the years.
Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatose
state for over fourteen years now
Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral
injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. Award of P2,000,000 in moral damages
would be appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby
awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's
fees valued at P100,000 are likewise proper.

Facts: