THIRD DIVISION notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents covering his "undivided ONE

TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191 . . . " (Exh. 4). He
G.R. No. 104482 January 22, 1996 acknowledged therein his receipt of P10,000.00 as consideration therefor. In
February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children,
BELINDA TAEDO, for herself and in representation of her brothers and
petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 (Exh. E). On
sisters, and TEOFILA CORPUZ TAEDO, representing her minor daughter
June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in their favor in
VERNA TAEDO, petitioners,
the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate
vs.
of Title No. 166451 (Exh. 5).
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RICARDO M. TAEDO AND TERESITA
BARERA TAEDO,respondents. Petitioners on July 16, 1982 filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the
deeds of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the
DECISION
property inherited by Lazaro from his father.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an "Absolute Deed of Sale"
dated December 29, 1980 (Exit. E). Conveying to his ten children his allotted portion
Is a sale of future inheritance valid? In multiple sales of the same real property, who
tinder the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Matias, which deed included
has preference in ownership? What is the probative value of the lower court's finding
the land in litigation (Lot 191).
of good faith in registration of such sales in the registry of property? These are the
main questions raised in this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Petitioners also presented in evidence: (1) a private writing purportedly prepared and
Rules of Court to set aside and reverse the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-
signed by Matias dated December 28, 1978, stating that it was his desire that
G.R. CV NO. 24987 promulgated on September 26, 1991 affirming the decision of the
whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from him should be given to his (Lazaro's)
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Third Judicial Region, Tarlac, Tarlac in Civil Case No.
children (Exh. A); (2) a typewritten document dated March 10, 1979 signed by Lazaro
6328, and its Resolution denying reconsideration thereof, promulgated on May 27,
in the presence of two witnesses, wherein he confirmed that he would voluntarily
1992.
abide by the wishes of his father, Matias, to give to his (Lazaro's) children all the
property he would inherit from the latter (Exh. B); and (3) a letter dated January 1,
By the Court's Resolution on October 25, 1995, this case (along with several others)
1980 of Lazaro to his daughter, Carmela, stating that his share in the extrajudicial
was transferred from the First to the Third Division and after due deliberation, the
settlement of the estate of his father was intended for his children, petitioners herein
Court assigned it to the undersigned ponente for the writing of this Decision.
(Exh. C).
The Facts
Private respondents, however presented in evidence a "Deed of Revocation of a Deed
On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in of Sale" dated March 12, 1981 (Exh. 6), wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of
favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latter's wife, Teresita Barera, petitioners for the reason that it was "simulated or fictitious without any consideration
private respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter in consideration of whatsoever".
P1,500.00, "one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the
Shortly after the case a quo was filed, Lazaro executed a sworn statement (Exh. G)
cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the
which virtually repudiated the contents of the Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale
Register of Deeds of Tarlac", the said property being his "future inheritance" from his
(Exh. 6) and the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in favor of private respondents. However,
parents (Exh. 1). Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro executed an "Affidavit
Lazaro testified that he sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who
of Conformity" dated February 28, 1980 (Exh. 3) to "re-affirm, respect, acknowledge
induced him to execute a deed of sale in favor of his children after giving him five
and validate the sale I made in 1962." On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another
pesos (P5.00) to buy a "drink" (TSN September 18, 1985, pp. 204-205).

1
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed
"to adduce a proponderance of evidence to support (their) claim." On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale
dated January 13, 1981 (Exh. 9) was valid and that its registration in good faith
vested title in said respondents.
The Issues
Petitioners raised the following "errors" in the respondent Court, which they also now
allege in the instant Petition:
I. The trial court erred in concluding that the Contract of Sale of October 20, 1962
(Exhibit 7, Answer) is merely voidable or annulable and not void ab initio pursuant to
paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the New Civil Code involving as it does a "future
inheritance".
II. The trial court erred in holding that defendants-appellees acted in good faith in
registering the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 (Exhibit 9) with the Register of
Deeds of Tarlac and therefore ownership of the land in question passed on to
defendants-appellees.
III. The trial court erred in ignoring and failing to consider the testimonial and
documentary evidence of plaintiffs-appellants which clearly established by
preponderance of evidence that they are indeed the legitimate and lawful owners of
the property in question.
IV. The decision is contrary to law and the facts of the case and the conclusions
drawn from the established facts are illogical and off-tangent.
From the foregoing, the issues may be restated as follows:
1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?
2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 (and registration with the
Registry of Property) of a deed of sale covering the same property to the same
buyers valid?
3. May this Court review the findings of the respondent Court (a) holding that the
buyers acted in good faith in registering the said subsequent deed of sale and (b) in
"failing to consider petitioners' evidence"? Are the conclusions of the respondent
Court "illogical and off-tangent"?
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, let it be clear that the "errors" which are reviewable by this Court in
this petition for review on certiorariare only those allegedly committed by the
respondent Court of Appeals and not directly those of the trial court, which is not a
party here. The "assignment of errors" in the petition quoted above are therefore
totally misplaced, and for that reason, the petition should be dismissed. But in order
to give the parties substantial justice we have decided to delve into the issues as
above re-stated. The errors attributed by petitioners to the latter (trial) court will be
discussed only insofar as they are relevant to the appellate court's assailed Decision
and Resolution.
The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In
context, the assailed Decision conceded "it may be legally correct that a contract of
sale of anticipated future inheritance is null and void."3
But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347
of the Civil Code, "(n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except
in cases expressly authorized by law."
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of
any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.
Hence, the "affidavit of conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to
validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent
Court, "suffers from the same infirmity." Even private respondents in their
memorandum4 concede this.
However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are: (a) the
deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's
undivided inheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was
subsequently registered on June 7, 1982; and (b) the deed of sale dated December
29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the same property. These two documents
were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of extra-
judicial settlement of his (Matias') estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro actual
title over said property. In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting, were
no longer infected with the infirmities of the 1962 sale.
Petitioners contend that what was sold on January 13, 1981 was only one-half
hectare out of Lot No. 191, citing as authority the trial court's decision. As earlier
2
pointed out, what is on review in these proceedings by this Court is the Court of
Appeals' decision which correctly identified the subject matter of the January 13,
1981 sale to be the entire undivided 1/12 share of Lazaro in Lot No. 191 and which is
the same property disposed of on December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners.
Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given effect is the
registration of the sale in favor of private respondents with the register of deeds on
June 7, 1982.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of
multiple sales, as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law,
ownership shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry
of property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later
than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of
the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered
the sale to them at all.
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private
respondents never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who
registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not
registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable
property.5
As to third issue, while petitioners conceded the fact of registration, they nevertheless
contended that it was done in bad faith. On this issue, the respondent Court ruled;
Under the second assignment of error, plaintiffs-appellants contend that defendants-
appellees acted in bad faith when they registered the Deed of Sale in their favor as
appellee Ricardo already knew of the execution of the deed of sale in favor of the
plaintiffs; appellants cite the testimony of plaintiff Belinda Taedo to the effect that
defendant Ricardo Taedo called her up on January 4 or 5, 1981 to tell her that he
was already the owner of the land in question "but the contract of sale between our
father and us were (sic) already consumated" (pp. 9-10, tsn, January 6, 1984). This
testimony is obviously self-serving, and because it was a telephone conversation, the
deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 was not shown; Belinda merely told her uncle
that there was already a document showing that plaintiffs are the owners (p. 80).
Ricardo Taedo controverted this and testified that he learned for the first time of the
deed of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of his children "about a month or sometime
in February 1981" (p. 111, tsn, Nov. 28, 1984). . . .6
The respondent Court, reviewing the trial court's findings, refused to overturn the
latter's assessment of the testimonial evidence, as follows;
We are not prepared to set aside the finding of the lower court upholding Ricardo
Taedo's testimony, as it involves a matter of credibility of witnesses which the trial
judge, who presided at the hearing, was in a better position to resolve. (Court of
Appeals' Decision, p. 6.)
In this connection, we note the tenacious allegations made by petitioners, both in
their basic petition and in their memorandum, as follows:
1. The respondent Court allegedly ignored the claimed fact that respondent Ricardo
"by fraud and deceit and with foreknowledge" that the property in question had
already been sold to petitioners, made Lazaro execute the deed of January 13, 1981;
2. There is allegedly adequate evidence to show that only 1/2 of the purchase price
of P10,000.00 was paid at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, contrary to
the written acknowledgment, thus showing bad faith;
3. There is allegedly sufficient evidence showing that the deed of revocation of the
sale in favor of petitioners "was tainted with fraud or deceit."
4. There is allegedly enough evidence to show that private respondents "took undue
advantage over the weakness and unschooled and pitiful situation of Lazaro Taedo .
. ." and that respondent Ricardo Taedo "exercised moral ascendancy over his
younger brother he being the eldest brother and who reached fourth year college of
3
law and at one time a former Vice-Governor of Tarlac, while his younger brother only
attained first year high school . . . ;
5. The respondent Court erred in not giving credence to petitioners' evidence,
especially Lazaro Taedo's Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 27, 1982 stating that
Ricardo Taedo deceived the former in executing the deed of sale in favor of private
respondents.
To be sure, there are indeed many conflicting documents and testimonies as well as
arguments over their probative value and significance. Suffice it to say, however, that
all the above contentions involve questions of fact, appreciation of evidence and
credibility of witnesses, which are not proper in this review. It is well-settled that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised and passed upon. Absent
any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless the lack of any basis for
the conclusions made by the lower courts be amply demonstrated, the Supreme
Court will not disturb their findings. At most, it appears that petitioners have shown
that their evidence was not believed by both the trial and the appellate courts, and
that the said courts tended to give more credence to the evidence presented by
private respondents. But this in itself is not a reason for setting aside such findings.
We are far from convinced that both courts gravely abused their respective
authorities and judicial prerogatives.
In the same vein, the ruling in the recent case of South Sea Surety and Insurance
Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.8 is equally applicable to the present
case:
We see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions of the appellate court. . . .
(I)t is not the function of this Court to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties, particularly where,
such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the
matter coincide. (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 58-64.

As held in the recent case of Chua Tiong Tay vs. Court of Appeals and Goldrock 2
Thirteenth Division, composed of J. Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, ponente, and JJ.
Construction and Development Corp.7 Arturo B. Buena, chairman, and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., member.

The Court has consistently held that the factual findings of the trial court, as well as 3
CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 62.
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.
Among the exceptional circumstances where a reassessment of facts found by the 4
At pp. 11-12; rollo, pp. 145-146.
lower courts is allowed are when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
5
speculation, surmises or conjectures; when the inference made is manifestly absurd, Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 213 (March 13, 1989).
mistaken or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts; when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; when the
6
Court of Appeals' Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 63.
findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the 7
G.R. No. 112130, March 31, 1995; J. Flerida Ruth P. Romero, ponente.
admissions of both appellant and appellee. After a careful study of the case at bench,
we find none of the above grounds present to justify the re-evaluation of the findings 8
G.R. No. 102253, June 2, 1995; J. Jose C. Vitug, ponente.
of fact made by the courts below.
EN BANC

4
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO
GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
Elviro L. Peralta and Hermenegildo A. Prieto for petitioner.
Faustino B. Tobia, Juan I. Ines and Federico Tacason for respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the will of
Antero Mercado dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect and
contains the following attestation clause:
We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of
Antero Mercado was signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this
attestation clause and that of the left margin of the three pages thereof. Page three
the continuation of this attestation clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which
is spoken and understood by the testator, and it bears the corresponding number in
letter which compose of three pages and all them were signed in the presence of the
testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the testator and all and
each and every one of us witnesses.
In testimony, whereof, we sign this statement, this the third day of January, one
thousand nine hundred forty three, (1943) A.D.
(Sgd.) NUMERIANO EVANGELISTA (Sgd.) "ROSENDA CORTES
(Sgd.) BIBIANA ILLEGIBLE
The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name
of Antero Mercado, followed below by "A reugo del testator" and the name of
Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after
his name. The Court of Appeals, reversing the judgement of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, ruled that the attestation clause failed (1) to certify that the
will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the end of the will by
Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence of the
testator and each and every one of the witnesses; (2) to certify that after the signing
of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said testator has
written a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the three pages of
which the will consists and at the end thereof; (3) to certify that the three witnesses
signed the will in all the pages thereon in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
In our opinion, the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that
Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his
express direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
herein petitioner (who is appealing by way of certiorari from the decision of the Court
of Appeals) argues, however, that there is no need for such recital because the cross
written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the signature of
Atty. Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as much
a signature as a thumbmark, the latter having been held sufficient by this Court in
the cases of De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104; Dolar vs. Diancin, 55 Phil.,
479; Payad vs. Tolentino, 62 Phil., 848; Neyra vs. Neyra, 76 Phil., 296 and
Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil., 429.
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of
Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature
reflection, we are not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark,
and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of
a thumbmark.
What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine there is a sufficient
recital in the attestation clause as to the signing of the will by the testator in the
presence of the witnesses, and by the latter in the presence of the testator and of
each other.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the petitioner. So
ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
5
 The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:
LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, G.R. No. 157451
Petitioner, x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the
Present: United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home
Panganiban, J., to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon
Chairman, St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez, Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from
Corona, the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in
Carpio Morales, and Garcia, JJ a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Promulgated: little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a
Respondent. cause written down as COR PULMONALE.
December 16, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of
two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983.
The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the
DECISION attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator
and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page
contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was
PANGANIBAN, J.: signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left
hand margin. It provides in the body that:
T he law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden
of showing why it should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD
discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any AMEN:
reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the
will. I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a
resident of 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of
The Case sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and
testament:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision[2] and the March 7, 1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the
2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Catholic Church in accordance with the rites and said Church and that a suitable
Decision disposed as follows: monument to be erected and provided my by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my
memory in the minds of my family and friends;
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered approving and 2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one
allowing probate to the said last will and testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering half (1/2) portion of the follow-described properties, which belongs to me as [co-
the issuance of letters testamentary to the petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case owner]:
be remanded to the court a quo for further and concomitant proceedings.[4]
a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in
Makati, Metro Manila, described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister
(Ciriaca Valmonte), having share and share alike;
The Facts

6
b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong
and mixed materials used as my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200
Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-
00482, Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly in the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca
Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and share alike or equal co-owners
thereof;
3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties,
including my savings account bank book in USA which is in the possession of my
nephew, and all others whatsoever and wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath
to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte;
4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will
and testament, and it is my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in
Quezon City, Philippines.
The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the
USA;
2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the
testator; or to give them proper notice pursuant to law;
3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and
formalities were not complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution
he being in an advance sate of senility;
5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of
the petitioner and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that
the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;
and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of
understanding and integrity.
At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary
public Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the
instrumental witnesses spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie
Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega
testified.
According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents
house at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to get
his $366.00 monthly pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were
times though when to shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it
was in one of his travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The
will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who were their
wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no knowledge of the
existence of the last will and testament of her husband, but just serendipitously
found it in his attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned that the
testator bequeathed to her his properties and she was named the executrix in the
said will. To her estimate, the value of property both real and personal left by the
testator is worth more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator
never suffered mental infirmity because despite his old age he went alone to the
market which is two to three kilometers from their home cooked and cleaned the
kitchen and sometimes if she could not accompany him, even traveled to Manila
alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in
good health and that he was hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually
resulted in his death.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will,
testified that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with
the three witnesses of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to
prepare his last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and
dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on June
15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary
public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses
returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were
instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before
the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to
them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and
understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by
the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been
executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August
9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15,
1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The notary public also
testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at
the time he affixed his signature on the will.
7
The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public,
and testified that the testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza
Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the
house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving his
instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983; that
they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of the will but were asked to come
back instead on August 9, 1983 because of the absence of the notary public; that the
testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and
disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that the contents of the
will was explained by the notary public in the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all
of them as witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and
of each other. And that during the execution, the testators wife, Josefina was not
with them.
The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside
from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled
to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that
at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old
and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983
Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticias family to live with him and
they took care of him. During that time, the testators physical and mental condition
showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her
daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.
Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced,
reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and
attestation of the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he
was then in an advanced state of senility
It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate. [5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to
probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing
witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that
the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It
added that his sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways [6] did not
make him a person of unsound mind.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I.
Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.
II.
Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by
fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument
should be his last will and testament.
III.
Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the subject will.[8]
In short, petitioner assails the CAs allowance of the probate of the will of Placido
Valmonte.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Probate of a Will
At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for
Review under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however,
the evidence presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters
resolved by this Court when, as in the instant case, the findings of fact of the
appellate court differ from those of the trial court.[9]
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that
every will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the
procedures and requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will. [10] Verily,
Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as
follows:
Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
8

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will,
at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by
imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the testators state of mind at the
time.
Existence of Fraud in the
Execution of a Will
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of
the will, but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the
existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testators wife
and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the three attesting
witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the
varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.
Petitioner contends that it was highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young
life [to] almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her
age x x x and who happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado,[11] thus casting doubt
on the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it
supposedly defies human reason, logic and common experience [12] for an old man
with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and
testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by
which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is
misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes,
or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding
which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not
have made.[13]
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the
existence of fraud at the time of its execution.[14] The burden to show otherwise shifts
to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.
[15]
Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no
evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will.[16] That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently
established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years
his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who
were the ones who had taken the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his
twilight years.[17]
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not
even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion.[18] More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by
three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the
testator and of one another.[19] Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must
acknowledge the will before a notary public.[20] In any event, we agree with the CA
that the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation
was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the
instrumental witnesses.[21]
The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25,
1985, October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are
reproduced respectively as follows:
Atty. Floro Sarmiento:
Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator
and his witnesses were supposed to be in your office?
A Yes sir.
Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.
xxxxxxxxx
9
Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per
acknowledgement appearing therein. Was this the actual date when the document
was acknowledged?
A Yes sir.
Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their
respective signature on the first and second pages of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.
Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body
of the document as well as the attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own
handwriting August 9, 1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)
Eugenio Gomez:
Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in
the acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and
tell us this discrepancy in the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses;
that was first week of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15 thof June
but when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.
Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your
companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)
Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:
Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?
xxxxxxxxx
A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out
first time. We went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the
last will and testament. After that what they have talked what will be placed in the
testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the 15 th of June.
When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to
sign it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went there on August 9 and that
was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Josie Collado:
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what
transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.
Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.
Q For what purpose?
A Our purpose is just to sign the will.
Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?
A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)[22]
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand conspiracy in the
commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent
stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the
three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution.
[23]
Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with
the formalities required by law should be affirmed,absent any showing of ill motives.
[24]
Capacity to Make a Will
In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the
following guidelines:
Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind
at the time of its execution.
Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know
the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.
Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making
his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the
testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane,
10
the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it
during a lucid interval.

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to
know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to
be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character
of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the
appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the
time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify
accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even
their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he
identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some
relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of
fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,[25] which
held thus:

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which

unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental
aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of
mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere
weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not
render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may
make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable
him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his
property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind
be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held
that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually
be insane or of unsound mind."[26]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

11
G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006
FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G.
CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by
Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In
refusing to give legal recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is
provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of
notarial wills, all self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on
which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause
is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And
perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these
defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is
just aching for judicial rejection.
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive
catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful
compliance with all the detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little
room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806
likewise imposes another safeguard to the validity of notarial wills that they be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will
executed with indifference to these two codal provisions opens itself to nagging
questions as to its legitimacy.
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to
admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10
June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in
full:
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila,
pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay
nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko
lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong
sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng
habiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya
at kaibigan;
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking
pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon,
yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa
Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na
nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten
Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at
lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela
at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubalit at kondiciones;
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling
habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng
piyansiya.
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.
(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na
ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin,
ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng
12
kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa harap ng The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the
lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to
tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters
kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito. testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.

EUGENIA E. IGSOLO The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who
address: 500 San Diego St. represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37 decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981. purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court
cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and
QUIRINO AGRAVA usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioners right to occupy the properties
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum of the decedent.3 It also asserted that contrary to the representations of petitioner,
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365 the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren,
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981 who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was subsequently alleged that
decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965, 4 and the mother of a
LAMBERTO C. LEAO
legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3)
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
months.5
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981 Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to
in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on
JUANITO ESTRERA
the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin
address: City Court Compound,
arguments are among the central matters to this petition.
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981. After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August
1992.6 The RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng
to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called
Maynila.
to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x
x x with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
(Sgd.)
wishes;"7 and from this perspective, rebutted oppositors arguments that the will was
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
not properly executed and attested to in accordance with law.
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
subscribing and attesting witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
respect to the formalities in the execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81
interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this Court is
margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been executed by the
testatrix in accordance with law.

13
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the of the petition for probate.9 The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause
will after the signature of the testatrix, the following statement is made under the failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and
sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi": undeserving of probate.10

"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na Hence, the present petition.
ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin,
ngayong ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the
kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa harap ng number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely
lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as "the
tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing substantial compliance rule."11
kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito."
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the Code, which we replicate in full.
acknowledgement and is considered by this Court as a substantial compliance with
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
the requirements of the law.
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other
On the oppositors contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.
except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively
With regard to the oppositors argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
in letters placed on upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state the
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written,
number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only two
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and
other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the
acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her
signature on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
interpreted to them.
As regards the oppositors assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
forgery, the testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing
the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or
enough to establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due
file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
execution of the will.8
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had
attestation clause to state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the
substituted his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17
will itself reveals several more deficiencies.
August 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal

14
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of
pages of the will.12 There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a
space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation
clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied
with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the
process Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca13 and In re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the
Court noted that among the defects of the will in question was the failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the will. 15 In ruling that
the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following consideration
which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the number of
sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document might
easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change
the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement
of the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out
the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or
pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation
clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages and
the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter
attended with much greater difficulty."16
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which
failed to state the number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was
sufficient for the Court to declare "unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed
out in the attesting clause is fatal."17 It was further observed that "it cannot be
denied that the x x x requirement affords additional security against the danger that
the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this
requirement, it must be considered material."18
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino19 and Taboada v.
Hon. Rosal,20 wherein the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein
despite the fact that the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the
will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of these two cases, and made
the following distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt with
approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the
attestation does not state the number of pages used upon which the will is written.
Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson
versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon.
Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195," to the effect that a will may still be valid even if
the attestation does not contain the number of pages used upon which the Will is
written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in the
aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of "Manuel Singson
versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although the attestation in the subject Will did
not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in the
last part of the body of the Will:
"x x x
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act
No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages
or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to be
mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or
omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the
property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque
vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata,
54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these
cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the
number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted,
it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not
by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here
the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of
sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of
the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance
in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within
the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to
prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical
considerations." (page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring supplied)
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial
acknowledgement in the Will states the number of pages used in the:
"x x x
15
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed
to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal
defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will
that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the
entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the
bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page
which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "this Last Will and
Testament consists of two pages including this page" (pages 200-201, supra)
(Underscoring supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated
in any part of the Will. The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment
wherein the number of pages of the will should be stated. 21
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in
1950, at a time when the statutory provision governing the formal requirement of
wills was Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases remains apropos,
considering that the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of
the will is extant from Section 618.23 However, the enactment of the Civil Code in
1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least
insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that
governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the absence of bad
faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805."
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which
stated that "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on
the [law] on [wills] in this project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the testator more [freedom] in [expressing]
his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the [modern tendency] in respect to
the formalities in the execution of wills."24 However, petitioner conveniently omits the
qualification offered by the Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites
from their report, that such liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards and
restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the testator."25
Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion made by Justice
Regalado, speaking for the Court on the conflicting views on the manner of
interpretation of the legal formalities required in the execution of the attestation
clause in wills.27 Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several other
cases, as examples of the application of the rule of strict construction. 28 However, the
Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the
"substantial compliance rule" under Article 809. A cautionary note was struck though
by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by
an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered;
whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing
witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can
reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can
be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons
required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially
appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in
the probate proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed
decision, considering that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the
attestation clause is one of the defects which cannot be simply disregarded.
In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will whose attestation
clause failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other,30 the other omission cited by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that
omission which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need
of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not
obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those
omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself." 31 Thus, a failure
by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page can be liberally
construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by
the attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one anothers presence
16
should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of
compliance.32
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will
was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in
requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and
to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.33 The failure to state the number of
pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental
witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had
ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial
compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it
is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case,
there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article
805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself
as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the
formal requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of
the members of the Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains
that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated
in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced that these remained effective
safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills.34 Compliance with
these requirements, however picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree
of comfort that the testator himself or herself had decided to convey property post
mortem in the manner established in the will.35 The transcendent legislative
intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the Code Commission,
is for the fruition of the testators incontestable desires, and not for the
indulgent admission of wills to probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an
examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should
necessarily lead to its rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-
hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause
which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three
witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although
the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand
margin."37 While three (3) Justices38 considered the signature requirement had been
substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through Chief Justice
Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering the will
fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the
same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The
attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will"
required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear
their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their
participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the
left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in
compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of
all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom
thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a
subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the
witnesses.39
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly
segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the
will, from the requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental
witnesses]." The respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct
from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among
others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the
will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the
witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself.
Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will.
An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental
witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned
17
attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses undertakings
in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards
a wholly different avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the
attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such
clause. Without diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses signatures on
each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause which
contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses
themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article
805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that
the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental
facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the
instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should
also hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied
with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been
segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a
separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is
equally as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should
be treated as of equivalent import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote
"Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod
ng Maynila."40 By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in
going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed.41 It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to
the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same
is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not
hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the
notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by
the executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the document
was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary
public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though,
the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in of
the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and
the instrumental witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will
would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that
the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does
not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The
acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard
against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. An
acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act. 43 The acknowledgment coerces
the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law
that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such
declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal
prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those
executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of
assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is
under Article 806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by
the will in question. We need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer
material to the
disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last;
and that all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both
pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so-called
"logical end"44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not numbered
correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic numerals.
18
There is a line of thought that has disabused the notion that these two requirements ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
be construed as mandatory.45Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may Chief Justice
not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not
decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on, though indicative
as they may be of a general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805
by whoever executed the will.

All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the
probate denial inexorable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
FIRST DIVISION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
G.R. No. 74695 September 14, 1993
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.

19
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the
Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO
QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices,
Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA.
RINO, respondents.
Vicente R. Redor for petitioner.
Bayani Ma. Rino for and in his own behalf.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 1986 1 of the First Civil Cases
Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the Order dated 27 June 19832 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, admitting to probate the last will and testament 3 with codicil4 of the late
Brigido Alvarado.
On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will
entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and
expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate
before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz, Laguna.
As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private
respondent who were present at the execution, the testator did not read the final
draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the
eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the
three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the
reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.
Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9
December 1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng
Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa
Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in
the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then
suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were
unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the
final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his
presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of
the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own
copies.
A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's
death on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor with the Court of First
Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan, Laguna.5Petitioner, in turn, filed an
Opposition on the following grounds: that the will sought to be probated was not
executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise
mentally incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and
old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear and threats;
that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly, that
the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the
Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was
made to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was
blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil
attached thereto was executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the
Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and
codicil should have been denied.
On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the
following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and
codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness, the reading requirement of Art.
808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to the
testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following
the reading with their respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then
concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial
compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the contents of the
drafted will was served.
The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purpose
of Art, 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so, was
the double-reading requirement of said article complied with?
20
Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado
was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. However, his
vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the
glaucoma which he had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his
first consultation with an eye specialist on
14 December 1977.
The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify Brigido as
a "blind" testator under Art. 808 which reads:
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of
the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged.
Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and
codicil were executed, he can be so considered within the scope of the term as it is
used in Art. 808. To support his stand, petitioner presented before the trial court a
medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute of
Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research Institute), 6 the contents of which were
interpreted in layman's terms by Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted
by private respondent.7 Dr. Roasa explained that although the testator could visualize
fingers at three (3) feet, he could no longer read either printed or handwritten
matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his first consultation. 8
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that
the testator could still read on the day the will and the codicil were executed but
chose not to do so because of "poor eyesight." 9 Since the testator was still capable of
reading at that time, the court a quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied
with.
We agree with petitioner in this respect.
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of
reading at the time his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was
testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so because of his
"poor," 10 "defective," 11 or "blurred"12 vision making it necessary for private
respondent to do the actual reading for him.
The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13 provides an insight into the
scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit:
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind
or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the
provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes . . .
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to
those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since
Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the
separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred"
vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado
comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the
contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer
who drafted the will and codicil did so confortably with his instructions. Hence, to
consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we
ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be
read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary
public before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the
incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him
an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public
and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the
eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator,
and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.
Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that
the single reading suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner
maintains that the only valid compliance or compliance to the letter and since it is
admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the contents
of the will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have
been disallowed.
We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition must be denied.
This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is
acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that
the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator
21
from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible
as to destroy the testamentary privilege. 14
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the
presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public.
Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the
contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and
acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege,
that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and
communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin,"
the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and
authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino
is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance
with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to
the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the
draft. 15
Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on
5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three instrumental
witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de
la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three
instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician) asked the testator whether the
contents of the document were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the
affirmative. 16 With four persons following the reading word for word with their own
copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what
was read to him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions),
were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially
true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons
known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and another
(Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to him since childhood.
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there
should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to
insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside
when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only
defeat the testator's will. 17
As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate
Order and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following
pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand,
also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's will, must be disregarded(emphasis supplied).
Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his
"Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside
fro the mere reason that a legal requirement intended for his protection was not
followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the fact
that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the
contents of the draft of his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate,
substantial compliance suffices where the purpose has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of
Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this
case has remained pending, this decision is immediately executory. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
MANUEL L. LEE, A.C. No. 5281
22
Complainant, testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.
[3]
Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as
Present: donor in a deed of donation[4] (containing his purported genuine signature).
Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
deed of donation were in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic)
one another in all angle[s].[5]
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had
AZCUNA and likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters affidavits.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the
archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National
ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of
the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated:
Respondent. Promulgated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by
February 12, 2008 BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in this Office[s] files.[6]

x--------------------------------------------------
-x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged
respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics
of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr.,
never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the
forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to
its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife
Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and
Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30,
1965.[1] Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate[2] of the
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against
him contained false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent
Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged
that complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and
testament was validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per affidavit [7] of
Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint
affidavit[8] of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee,
Jr. xxx.[9]
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because
the criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman
did not prosper.
Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will was on
file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will
could be found there because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against
him as he (complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the
will and demand his share in the inheritance.

23
 In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [10]
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of
pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative
Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon
1[11] and Rule 1.01[12] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).[13] Thus, the
investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended
the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26,
2006, resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the
laws in the discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is
hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year and Respondents notarial
commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for
two (2) years.[14]
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law,
to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his
death.[15] A will may either be notarial or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of
wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee
their truth and authenticity.[16]
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed
at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
one another.[17]
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this
circumstance alone, the will must be considered void.[18] This is in consonance with
the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws
shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses.[19] The importance of this requirement is
highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other requirements under
Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.[20]
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra
step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the
same is his or her own free act and deed.[21] The acknowledgment in a notarial will
has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise
and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to
be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this
particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one,
there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the
notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation
of the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear
breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to
faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held
in Santiago v. Rafanan:[22]
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him had
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and
to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree
of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.[23] A notary
public, especially a lawyer,[24] is bound to strictly observe these elementary
requirements.
24
 The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate 2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;
upon notarization of a document or instrument:
3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [ cedula] residence tax. Every
contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have 4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;
certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula]
5. fees collected by him for his services as notary;
residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall
be entered by the notary public as a part of such certificate the number, place of
6. give each entry a consecutive number; and
issue, and date of each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.[25]
7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the
The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax
instrument.[27]
Act[26] which stated:
In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule,
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document
respondent contended that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the
before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with whom such
will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To
transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the residence
reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a certification [28] stating that the
certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.
archives division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that
correct identity of the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of
the original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of
residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to exhibit an
the unavailability of the original,[29] otherwise, the evidence presented will not be
expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of
admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondents notarial register was not admissible as
both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his
evidence of the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to comply with the
failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy
In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the certification dated
of the notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:
September 21, 1999[30] must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of the
certification dated March 15, 2000;[31] its contents did not squarely prove the fact of
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
entry of the contested will in his notarial register.
the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)
Notaries public must observe with utmost care[32] and utmost fidelity the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the
Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the
public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined. [33]
notarized will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary
invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and
entries pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required the
delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this
entry of the following matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:
case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its contents.
[34]
1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him; Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the
will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty. [35]

25
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the part
of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be
sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula
certificates.[36]
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath
as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court[37] and Canon 1[38] and Rule 1.01[39] of the CPR.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land .[40] For a lawyer
is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted
the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[41]
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed
on every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic
requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover
make himself an example for others to emulate. [42] Being a lawyer, he is supposed to
be a model in the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned. [43]
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. [44] A breach of these
conditions justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction
is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in
professional misconduct.[45] These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers include
disbarment, suspension and reprimand.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. [46] We have held in a
number of cases that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution [47] and
should not be decreed if any punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension,
or fine will accomplish the end desired.[48] The rule then is that disbarment is meted
out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the court.[49]
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary
duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary
Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had
complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx, we
find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such
recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of
law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission [50] and his
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public. [51]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of
professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4)
Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
year and his notarial commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the
trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he
is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the
personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
549 Phil. 908
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 174144, April 17, 2007 ]
BELLA A. GUERRERO, PETITIONER, VS. RESURRECCION A. BIHIS,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
26
The Scriptures tell the story of the brothers Jacob and Esau[1], siblings who fought
bitterly over the inheritance of their father Isaac's estate. Jurisprudence is also
replete with cases involving acrimonious conflicts between brothers and sisters over
successional rights. This case is no exception.
On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A.
Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died at the Metropolitan Hospital in
Tondo, Manila.
On May 24, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last will and
testament of the decedent in Branch 95[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-20661.
The petition alleged the following: petitioner was named as executrix in the
decedent's will and she was legally qualified to act as such; the decedent was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of her death; at the time of the execution of the
will, the testatrix was 79 years old, of sound and disposing mind, not acting under
duress, fraud or undue influence and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was
not executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and
acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of
the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will
through undue and improper pressure and influence.
In an order dated November 9, 1994, the trial court appointed petitioner as special
administratrix of the decedent's estate. Respondent opposed petitioner's appointment
but subsequently withdrew her opposition. Petitioner took her oath as temporary
special administratrix and letters of special administration were issued to her.
On January 17, 2000, after petitioner presented her evidence, respondent filed a
demurrer thereto alleging that petitioner's evidence failed to establish that the
decedent's will complied with Articles 804 and 805 of the Civil Code.
In a resolution dated July 6, 2001, the trial court denied the probate of the will ruling
that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was
"acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's, residence at No.
40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a
commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City. The dispositive portion of the
resolution read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds, and so declares that it cannot
admit the last will and testament of the late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura to probate
for the reasons hereinabove discussed and also in accordance with Article 839 [of the
Civil Code] which provides that if the formalities required by law have not been
complied with, the will shall be disallowed. In view thereof, the Court shall henceforth
proceed with intestate succession in regard to the estate of the deceased Felisa
Tamio de Buenaventura in accordance with Article 960 of the [Civil Code], to wit:
"Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (1) If a person dies without a
will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity, xxx."
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the appellate court dismissed
the appeal and affirmed the resolution of the trial court. [4]
Thus, this petition.[5]
Petitioner admits that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at
the testatrix's residence in Quezon City before Atty. Directo and that, at that time,
Atty. Directo was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City. She,
however, asserts that the fact that the notary public was acting outside his territorial
jurisdiction did not affect the validity of the notarial will.
Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a
notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement
under Article 806 of the Civil Code? It did not.
Article 806 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will,
or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial
will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
27
witnesses.[6] This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the
validity of a will.[7] In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be
accepted for probate.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed.[8] In the case of a notarial
will, that competent officer is the notary public.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of a notary public in a
province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in
the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess
authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (emphases
supplied)

A notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial
The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental
acts.[13] It is issued "within and for" a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary
witnesses to declare before an officer of the law, the notary public, that they
public's authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, a notary public is authorized
executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed.[9] Such declaration
to perform notarial acts, including the taking of acknowledgments, within that
is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for the criminal
territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of power
prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those
to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the
executed without the free consent of the testator.[10] It also provides a further degree
limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. As this Court categorically
of assurance that the testator is of a certain mindset in making the testamentary
pronounced in Tecson v. Tecson:[14]
dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or designated as devisees or legatees in
the will.[11]

Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, that is, a lawyer duly An acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of the officer's jurisdiction is
commissioned as a notary public. void as if the person taking it ware wholly without official character. (emphasis
supplied)
In this connection, the relevant provisions of the Notarial Law provide:
Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City, he
SECTION 237. Form of commission for notary public. -The appointment of a notary
lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix and the instrumental
public shall be in writing, signed by the judge, and substantially in the following form:
witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix and her witnesses could not have validly
acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's last will and
testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by law.
GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Moreover, Article 5 of the Civil Code provides:
PROVINCE OF ___________
ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall
This is to certify that ____________, of the municipality of ________ in said
be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
province, was on the ___ day of __________, anno Domini nineteen hundred and
_______, appointed by me a notary public, within and for the said province, for the
The violation of a mandatory or a prohibitory statute renders the act illegal and void
term ending on the first day of January, anno Domini nineteen hundred and _____.
unless the law itself declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and prohibitory
_________________
statutes were transgressed in the execution of the alleged "acknowledgment." The
Judge of the Court of first Instance[12] of said Province
compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the
interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of

28
the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all completely void.
[5]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to Atty. Directo's participation in the preparation,
execution and unlawful "acknowledgment" of Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's will. [6]
The other formalities are:
Had he exercised his notarial commission properly, the intent of the law to effectuate (1) the will must be in writing;
the decedent's final statements[15] as expressed in her will would not have come to (2) it must be written in a language or dialect known to the testator;
naught.[16] Hence, Atty. Directo should show cause why he should not be (3) it must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
administratively sanctioned as a member of the bar and as an officer of the court. testator's name written by some other person in his presence and by his express
direction;
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. (4) it must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another;
Costs against petitioner. (5) the testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will shall also sign each and every page thereof, except
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the the last, on the left margin;
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation on the (6) all the pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
possible misconduct of Atty. Macario O. Directo. upper part of each page and
(7) the will must contain an attestation clause.
SO ORDERED.
[7]
In the Matter of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Vicente C. Alberto, 408 Phil.
Puno, C.J., (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur. 1281 (1959).

[8]
Tigno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 129416, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 61.

[9]
[1]
Jacob and Esau were the sons of Isaac and Rebekah. Even before they were born, Azuela v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006, 487 SCRA 119.
they were struggling against each other in the womb of their mother. Their prenatal
striving foreshadowed later conflict. (Genesis 25:21-26) Jacob, the younger of the
two, desired Esau's birthright -the special honor that Esau possessed as the older son
which entitled him to a double portion of his father's inheritance. Jacob was later on
able to acquire not only Esau's birthright and superior right to inheritance but also
their father's blessing. (Genesis 25:27-34, 27: 1-40) FIRST DIVISION

[2]
Presided by Judge (now Sandiganbayan Associate Justice) Diosdado M. Peralta. G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF
[3]
Rollo, pp. 81-87. DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner,
vs.
[4]
Decision dated July 31, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76707. Penned by Associate Justice HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern
Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alio- Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin), respondent.
Hormachuelos and Santiago Javier Ranada (retired) of the Fourth Division of the
Erasmo M. Diola counsel for petition.
Court of Appeals. Id., pp. 55-64.

29
Hon. Avelino S. Rosal in his own behalf. his new station at Pasig, Rizal. The said motions or incidents were still pending
resolution when respondent Judge Avelino S. Rosal assumed the position of presiding
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.: judge of the respondent court.

This is a petition for review of the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator.
Southern Leyte, Branch III, in Special Proceedings No. R-1713, entitled "In the Matter
of the Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez, Deceased; Apolonio Taboada, Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the
Petitioner", which denied the probate of the will, the motion for reconsideration and manifestation and/or motion filed ex parte. In the same order of denial, the motion
the motion for appointment of a special administrator. for the appointment of special administrator was likewise denied because of the
petitioner's failure to comply with the order requiring him to submit the names of' the
In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the intestate heirs and their addresses.
alleged last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-
Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire The petitioner decided to file the present petition.
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the
testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that
The second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is the testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of
signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another?
the left hand margin by the testatrix.
Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:
Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the requirement
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by
of publication, the trial court commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the
the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
petitioner's evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his evidence and
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
presented Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who testified
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
on its genuineness and due execution.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian issued the questioned
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
order denying the probate of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its
except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively
execution. In the same order, the petitioner was also required to submit the names of
in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
the intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses so that they could be properly
notified and could intervene in the summary settlement of the estate.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a
other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
manifestation and/or motion, ex partepraying for a thirty-day period within which to
instrumental witnesses, and that the lacier witnesses and signed the will and the
deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the disallowance of the will. He also
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
asked that the ten-day period required by the court to submit the names of intestate
heirs with their addresses be held in abeyance.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of
the will. However, the motion together with the previous manifestation and/or motion
The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require that,
could not be acted upon by the Honorable Ramon C. Pamatian due to his transfer to
for a notarial will to be valid, it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end"

30
but an the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the
end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because the attesting
witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of the
testator. It is not sufficient compliance to sign the page, where the end of the will is
found, at the left hand margin of that page.
On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not
make it a condition precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for the extrinsic
validity of the wig that the signatures of the subscribing witnesses should be
specifically located at the end of the wig after the signature of the testatrix. He
contends that it would be absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an
import on the space or particular location where the signatures are to be found as
long as this space or particular location wherein the signatures are found is consistent
with good faith and the honest frailties of human nature.
We find the petition meritorious.
Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or
signed at its end by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by another
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation
consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note
mentally that those things are, done which the statute requires for the execution of a
will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand,
subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the
purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the
testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that
the will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of
Identification.
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of
the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also
the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure
from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will
is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).
The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective
permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards
and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with
the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will" ( Report
of the Code commission, p. 103).
Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were
not for the defect in the place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have found
the testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the will.
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the
present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole
page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was
properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will
executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the
questioned order.
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed
to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal
defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire wig
that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the
entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the
bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page
which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and
Testament consists of two pages including this page".
In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following
observations with respect to the purpose of the requirement that the attestation
clause must state the number of pages used:
31
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act aside. The respondent court is ordered to allow the probate of the wig and to conduct
No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement on costs.
or sheets upon which the win is written, which requirement has been held to be
mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or SO ORDERED.
omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the
Melencio-Herrera (Acting Chairperson), Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
property is intended to be bequeathed (In re will of Andrada, 42 Phil., 180; Uy
Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs.
Teehankee, J, is on leave.
Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of
these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the
number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted,
it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not
by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here
the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of
sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of
the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance
in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within
the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to
prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical
considerations.

Icasiano v. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422, 429) has the following ruling which applies a
similar liberal approach:

... Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only (sic) the fact that the
testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing
the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament
was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and
literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a
single witness over whose conduct she had no control where the purpose of the law
to guarantee the Identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently
attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record EN BANC
attests to the fun observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda.
de Gil. Vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919
'witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause.
In re will of Ana Abangan.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the respondent GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
court which denied the probate of tile will, the motion for reconsideration of the vs.
denial of probate, and the motion for appointment of a special administrator are set ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

32
Filemon Sotto for appellants.
M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee.
AVANCEA, J.:
On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana
Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first
of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by
Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three
witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the
bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the
left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and
these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the
probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was
duly admitted to probate.
In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left
margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No.
2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to
the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby
changing the testator's dispositions. But when these dispositions are wholly written
on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the
instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely
purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into
consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must
have referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign
at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the statute requires that
this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the
statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the
witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the
bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin
would be unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on
another part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute
regards of such importance the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign
on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the bottom do not
guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient
security.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act
No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all
the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute
disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot
be hidden.
What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without
considering whether or not this clause is an essential part of the will, we hold that in
the one accompanying the will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the
three witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the pages of the sheet are
formalities not required by the statute. Moreover, referring specially to the signature
of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the attestation clause
because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the
testator since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of
which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the
testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and
is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both
sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be
paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand,
also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's
last will, must be disregarded. lawphil.net
As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the
testarix knew the dialect in which the will is written. But the circumstance appearing
in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this
33
locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to
the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is written.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with
costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964

34
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA
VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellee.
Rosendo J. Tansinin for oppositor-appellant Natividad Icasiano.
Jaime R. Nuevas for oppositor-appellant Enrique Icasiano.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate the
document and its duplicate, marked as Exhibits "A" and "A-1", as the true last will
and testament of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and appointing as executor Celso
Icasiano, the person named therein as such.
This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition for the allowance
and admission to probate of the original, Exhibit "A" as the alleged will of Josefa
Villacorte, deceased, and for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor
thereof.
The court set the proving of the alleged will for November 8, 1958, and caused notice
thereof to be published for three (3) successive weeks, previous to the time
appointed, in the newspaper "Manila chronicle", and also caused personal service of
copies thereof upon the known heirs.
On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her
opposition; and on November 10, 1958, she petitioned to have herself appointed as a
special administrator, to which proponent objected. Hence, on November 18, 1958,
the court issued an order appointing the Philippine Trust Company as special
administrator. 1wph1.t
On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a
manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the
alleged will.
On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his
evidence; but on June 1, 1959, he filed a motion for the admission of an amended
and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate
with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed
duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959. On
June 17, 1959, oppositors Natividad Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed
their joint opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but
by order of July 20, 1959, the court admitted said petition, and on July 30, 1959,
oppositor Natividad Icasiano filed her amended opposition. Thereafter, the parties
presented their respective evidence, and after several hearings the court issued the
order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors
appealed directly to this Court, the amount involved being over P200,000.00, on the
ground that the same is contrary to law and the evidence.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in
the City of Manila on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa
Villacorte executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter
Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published before and attested
by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V.
Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and
by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose
Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will was
actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the
execution and signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with former
Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said
three instrumental witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and
testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad were in the Philippines at the time of the
hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and authenticity of the said will.
So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and
attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the
document. The latter also testified upon cross examination that he prepared one
original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte last will and testament at his house in
Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one signed copy to Manila,
retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously
with the filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and
while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of
the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the
duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked as
Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and
every page.
35
The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original
of the will and its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each
and every page thereof by the testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the
three mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's presence and in that of one another as
witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad on page three (3)
of the original); that pages of the original and duplicate of said will were duly
numbered; that the attestation clause thereof contains all the facts required by law to
be recited therein and is signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is
written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrix that the attestation
clause is in a language also known to and spoken by the witnesses; that the will was
executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the original and
the duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of
Manila on the same date June 2, 1956.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original,
admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same,
but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence.
Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the
signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate (Exhibit "A-1") are not genuine nor were
they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further aver that
granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and
with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting
as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the
provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof,
whereby proponents-appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as
attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while
oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in
the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the
portion of free disposal.
We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the
testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies (Exhibits "A" and "A-1",
respectively) of the will spontaneously, on the same in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson,
who actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in
Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses,
and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they were
actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken
by the testatrix and the witnesses. The opinion of expert for oppositors, Mr. Felipe
Logan, that the signatures of the testatrix appearing in the duplicate original were not
written by the same had which wrote the signatures in the original will leaves us
unconvinced, not merely because it is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos
for the proponents, but principally because of the paucity of the standards used by
him to support the conclusion that the differences between the standard and
questioned signatures are beyond the writer's range of normal scriptural variation.
The expert has, in fact, used as standards only three other signatures of the testatrix
besides those affixed to the original of the testament (Exh. A); and we feel that with
so few standards the expert's opinion and the signatures in the duplicate could not be
those of the testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is particularly so since the
comparison charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that the are radical
differences that would justify the charge of forgery, taking into account the advanced
age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signatures, and the effect of writing
fatigue, the duplicate being signed right the original. These, factors were not
discussed by the expert.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and
questioned signatures does not appear reliable, considering the standard and
challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with different surfaces
and reflecting power. On the whole, therefore, we do not find the testimony of the
oppositor's expert sufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental
witnesses, Torres and Natividad (Dr. Diy being in the United States during the trial,
did not testify).
Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some
heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither (see In re Butalid, 10 Phil. 27;
Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163; Pecson vs. Coronal, 45 Phil. 216). Diversity of
apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent
might as well die intestate. The testamentary dispositions that the heirs should not
inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution made in the
will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part do not suffice to prove
fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged
litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion
of the estate being diverted into the hands of non-heirs and speculators. Whether
these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occassion. It is
also well to note that, as remarked by the Court of Appeals in Sideco vs. Sideco, 45
Off. Gaz. 168, fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each
36
other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite
evidence against the validity of the will.
On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his
signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in
the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility
of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two
other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident
imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by
testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally
interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single
witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to
guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently
attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record
attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda.
de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration)
"witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation
clause".
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure
oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will,
which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no
one was aware of the defect at the time.
discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma; if the original is
defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon
duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be
probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being
superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove
that the omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament was
inadvertent and not intentional.
That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted without a new
publication does not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by
the original publication of the petition for probate. The amended petition did not
substantially alter the one first filed, but merely supplemented it by disclosing the
existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made that new interests were involved
(the contents of Exhibit A and A-1 are admittedly identical); and appellants were duly
notified of the proposed amendment. It is nowhere proved or claimed that the
amendment deprived the appellants of any substantial right, and we see no error in
admitting the amended petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellants.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Barrera and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal
application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are
otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that
a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not
in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil.
476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a
will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal
defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy
to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and
bid faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and
available, the duplicate (Exh. A-1) is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed
probate of original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily

37