Conflict of Laws

Atty. Steve Paolo Mercano

By: John Lester A. Tan

I. PRELIMINARIES

A. Private International Law/Conflict of Law, Definition

- That part of the municipal law of a state which directs its courts and administrative agencies, when
confronted with a legal problems involving a foreign element, whether or not they should apply foreign
law/s. (Paras)

- That part of the law of each State or nation which determines whether, in dealing with a legal situation,
the law or some other State or nation will be recognized, given effect, or applied. (16Am Jur, 2d, Conflict
of Laws, 1)

B. Provisions in the Civil Code/Family Code Governing Conflict of Laws

1. Article 15, Civil Code.

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family right and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

*There are two principles for determining the personal law applicable to a person. The first is the
domiciliary rule which makes the domicile of the person as the determining factor, and this is followed in
Anglo-American countries. The second is the nationality rule, which makes the citizenship or nationality of
the person as basis for determining his personal law, which the Philippines follows.

*The provision adopts nationality or citizenship as the basis for determining the personal laws of
an individual, which are Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons, and which follow him wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. Thus,
Philippine laws on marriage and its incidents or consequences, divorce, declaration of nullity of marriage,
annulment of marriage, legal separation, support between members of the family, marital status are
binding upon a citizen, as well as the question of how he may strip himself of his status as such citizen
(Oh Hek How vs. Republic, 29 SCRA 94). Where the question is what law governs in any of these
subject matters between a citizen and a foreigner, the Philippine personal laws require that our courts
apply such laws, if the case is filed in the Philippines.

2. Article 16, Civil Code.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and .to the
amount of successional rights and to intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."

*The first paragraph of Article 16 embodies the doctrine of lex loci or lex loci rei sitae. It directs
that where the property is situated in the Philippines, then Philippine laws apply to the given case, but
where the property is situated in a foreign country, then the latter's law applies.

*The second paragraph of Article 16 and Article 1039 of the Civil Code should be read together.
Pursuant thereto, Article 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate (without a will) or testamentary successions (with a will), with regard to four
items: (a) order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Where a decedent, who was a national and
domicile of Texas, United States at the time of his death, executed two wills, one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate, which provided that his properties should be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law the latter is illegal and void, as it violated
Article 16 of the Civil Code which states that the national law of the decedent should govern. The law of
Texas should apply, with respect to the four (4) items, in which the national law of the decedent applies
(Bellis v. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358).

3. Article 17, Civil Code.

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the law of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.

*The first paragraph embodies the rule of lex contractus, or the law of the place of execution of
contract, wills and other public documents and governs the forms and solemnities thereof. It has been
held that the term has undergone changes from the time that substantive questions of law were decided
by the law of the place of making while procedural questions were decided by the law of the forum
(Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition). The second paragraph makes the diplomatic or consular offices of
the Philippines abroad as extension of the Philippine territory. Hence, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in the execution of contracts, wills and other public instruments.
Philippine laws also govern their intrinsic validity, except as otherwise provided.
4. Article 14, Civil Code.

Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations.

5. Article 26, Family Code.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law. (As amended by EO No.
227)

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents
or guardians;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;

(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
 (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;

(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's
spouse, or his or her own spouse.

C. Distinctions of Private International Law between Public International Law

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW LAW
PARTIES Dealt with by private individuals; Sovereign states and other
Governs individuals in their entities possessing international
private transactions which personality.
involve a foreign element. EX. UN; Governs states in their
relationships amongst
themselves
SOURCES Generally derived from the Custom, Treaty, and General
internal law of the state except Principles of Law recognized by
any conflict of law question civilized nations and juridical
governed by a treaty. decisions and teachings of the
 most highly qualified publicists.
TRANSACTIONS GOVERNED Private transactions between Generally affected by public
private individuals. interest; Those in general are of
interest only to sovereign states.
REMEDIES Resort to municipal tribunals. May be peaceful or forcible.

Peaceful: Includes diplomatic

negotiation, tender & exercise of
good offices, mediation, inquiry
& conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement by ICJ,
reference to regional agencies.

Forcible: Includes severance of

diplomatic relations, retorsions,
reprisals, embargo, boycott,
non-intercourse, pacific
blockades, collective measures
under the UN Charter, and war.

D. Necessity for Private International Law

1. To proscribe the conditions under which a court or agency is competent to entertain a suit of
proceeding involving facts containing a foreign element;

2. To determine the extent, validity and enforceability of foreign judgment;

3. To determine for each class of cases the particular system of law by reference to which the rights of the
parties must be ascertained

E. Hilton vs. Guyot Case on Sovereignty and Conflict of Law

Theory of Comity Foreign law is applied because of its convenience and because it affords
protection to its citizens, residents, and transients of its land.

Hilton vs. Guyot

FACTS:

Plaintiffs Hilton and Libbey, New York Citizens trading in Paris, were sued in France by
Defendant Guyot, the administrator of a French firm, for sums allegedly owned to that firm. The Plaintiffs
appeared and litigated the merits in the French proceeding. The French courts rendered a judgment
against them that was affirmed by a higher court and became final. The defendant then sought to enforce
that judgment in federal district court in New York. The court held the judgment without retrial on the
merits. The Plaintiffs then appealed to the US Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the laws have any effect, on their own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty
from which its authority is derived?

RULING:

The Court ruled in the Negative. No law has any effect, on its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which authority is derived. No sovereign is bound, unless by special compact, to
execute within its dominions a judgment rendered by the tribunals of another state, and if execution be
sought by suit upon the judgment or otherwise, the tribunal in which the suit is brought, or from which
execution is sought, is, on principle, at liberty to examine into the merits of such judgment, and to give
effect to it or not, as may be found just and equitable. However, the general comity, utility, and
convenience of nations have established a usage among most civilized states, by which the final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally carried into execution, under certain
regulations and regulations, which differ in different countries. Additionally, judgments rendered in France,
or in any foreign country, by the laws of which our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not
entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence
only of the justice of the plaintiffs claim. The decision was reversed.

The Courts decision in this case reflects the traditional rules of reciprocity. According to this
concept, foreign nation judgments were granted the same or comparable treatment as American
judgments were given by the judgment nation. Since the Court in Hilton found that French courts would
not have enforced or executed a judgment rendered in this country, it therefore held that the French
judgment at issue should be non-exclusive here.

II. JURISDICTION

A. Kinds of Jurisdiction relevant to Conflict of Laws problems; Jurisdictional

questions to be taken into account by Courts in dealing Conflicts of Laws

Legislative Jurisdiction It is the power of a State to apply its laws to create or affect legal
interests.

Judicial Jurisdiction It is the power of a State to try a case in its courts.

1. Jurisdiction over Persons

 1.1 How obtained

A. Jurisdiction over the Plaintiff or Petitioner is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or
initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.

B. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Defendant or Respondent may be acquired in two ways:

1. By voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court;

2. By a coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by a valid service of

summons (Sharuff vs. Bubla, L-17029).

1.2 Summons

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her
(Remelita Robinson vs. Celita Miralles, G.R. No. 163584).

*It may be served to the defendant on the following manner pursuant to the provisions of Sections
6, 7, and 15 of the Civil Procedure, as follows, to wit:

1. Personal Service;

2. Substituted Service;

3. Extra-territorial Service

1.3 Extraterritorial Service of Summons

Section 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from
any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service
may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order,
in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order
granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer.

*Extra-territorial service of summons can be made in the following instances, to wit:

 1. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to;

2. The subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest therein; or

3. The property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may,
by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines.

*Extra-territorial Service of Summons can be done in the following manner, to wit:

1. By personal service as under section 6; or

2. By publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time
as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or

3. In any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer.

*Service by Publication is authorized in three cases, to wit:

1. If the action is rem;

2. If the action is quasi in rem; or

3. If the action involves personal status of the plaintiff (Rule 14, Sec. 15, Rules of
Court).

1.4 Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court

Section 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be

served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it,
by tendering it to him.

*Personal Service of Summons is being done in the following instances, to wit:

1. Handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person; or

 2. If he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

*The purpose of Personal Service of Summons is to ensure that the notice desired under the
constitutional requirement of due process accomplished.

1.5 Section 7, Rules 14 of the Rules of Court

Section 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within
a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

*Substituted Service of Summons can be effected in the following manner, to wit:

1. By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or

2. By leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

Requisites of a Valid Substituted Service of Summons

1. Impossibility of prompt personal service

2. Specific details in the return

3. A person of suitable age and discretion

4. A competent person in charge who must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant or at least notify the defendant in the summons (Planters Development Bank
vs. Julie Chandumal, G.R. No. 195619)

1.6 Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court

Section 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from
any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service
may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order,
in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order
granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer.

1.7 Distinctions between Action in Rem and Action in Personam

ACTION IN REM ACTION IN PERSONAM

DEFINITION One which is not directed not One which is directed against a
only against a particular person, particular persons on the basis
but against the thing itself of their personal liability.
PURPOSE To bar indifferently all who might To establish a claim against
be minded to make any them.
objection against the right
sought to be enforced.
BINDING JUDGMENT Whole world. Successors-in-interest.
SERVICE OF SUMMONS Personal and Substituted Indispensable
Service of Summons
EXAMPLES Cadastral and Land Registration Recovery of Damages, Specific
Proceedings and Probate Performance, Action for
Proceedings. Injunction, and Rescission of
Contracts.

1.8 Distinctions between Real Action and Personal Action

REAL ACTION PERSONAL ACTION

DEFINITIONS One brought for the protection of One which is not founded upon
real rights, lands, tenements or the privity or real rights or real
one founded on privity of estate property.
only. An action affecting title or
possession of real property or
interest therein.
EXAMPLES Cadastral and Land Registration Action for Specific Performance.
Proceedings. An action which seeks to
 recover Personal Property,
Enforcement of Contract or
Recovery of Damages.

2. Jurisdiction over Property

2.1 How obtained

This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus
placing in custodial legis, as in attachment of garnishment; or by provision of law which recognized in the
court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land
registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident
defendant.

2.2 Long Arm of Statutes

Statutes allowing the courts to exercise jurisdiction when there are minimum contacts between
the non-resident defendant and the forum.

2.3 Pennoyer vs. Neff Case

Pennoyer vs. Neff

FACTS:

Mitchell, a lawyer, sued Defendant Neff, his client in Oregon State court for unpaid legal fees. At
the time, defendant was a non-resident of the state who was not personally served with process.
Constructive service was issued upon defendant by publication. Defendant did not come to court or
otherwise resist the lawsuit, and default judgment was entered against him. After the default judgment,
Mitchell had the sheriff seize and sell defendants land. The land was purchased by Plaintiff, who received
a sheriffs deed as evidence of title. The sheriff then turned the sale proceeds over to Mitchell. Shortly
after the sheriffs sale, defendant discovered what had happened to his land and brought suit against
plaintiff to recover the land. This appeal followed after defendant lost his suit against plaintiff.

ISSUES:

Whether or not judgments obtained against non-residents who fail to appear in court be sustained
by default judgment where service of process is accomplished solely through publication i.e. constructive
sentence?
 RULING:

The Court ruled in the Negative. The personal judgment recovered in the state court of Oregon
against plaintiff was without validity, and the decision of the Court of Appeals overturning that judgment
was affirmed. When a suit is merely in personam, constructive service through publication upon a non-
resident is ineffective. No state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory. However, a state may subject property within its boundaries to the payments of its
citizens, even when the land is owned by a non-resident, without infringing upon the sovereignty of the
state of residency of the landowner. The US Supreme Court distinguished in this case suits in personam
and in rem. An in personam suit is a suit against a person, whose purpose is to determine the personal
rights and obligations of the defendant. Thus, the court reasoned that constructive service is sufficient to
inform parties of action taken against any properties owned by them within the forum state, because
property is always in possession of the owner, and seizure of the property will inform the owner of legal
action taken against him.

2.4 International Shoe vs. Washington to be contrasted with Shaffer vs.

Heitner

International Shoe vs. Washington

FACTS:

International Shoe Co., Defendant, was a company based in Delaware with an office in St. Louis,
Missouri. Defendant employed salesmen that resided in Washington to sell their product in the state of
Washington. Defendant regularly shipped orders to the salesmen who accepted them, the salesmen
would display the products at places in Washington, and the salesmen were compensated by commission
for sale of the products. The salesmen were also reimbursed for the cost of renting the places of business
in Washington. Washington sued Defendant after Defendant failed to make contributions to an
unemployment compensation fund exacted by state statutes. The Washington statute said that the
commissioner could issue personal service if Defendant was found within the state, or by mailing it to
Defendant if Defendant was not in the state. The notice of assessment was served upon Defendants
salesperson and a copy of the notice was mailed to Defendant. Defendant appeared specially, moving to
set aside the order that service upon the salesperson was proper service. Defendant also argued that it
did not do business in the state, that there was no agent upon which service could be made, and that
Defendant did not furnish employment within the meaning of the statute. Defendant also argued that the
statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and imposed a prohibitive burden
of interstate commerce. The trial court found for Washington and the Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed, reasoning that the continuous flow of Defendants product into Washington was sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction. Defendant appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not service of process upon Defendants agent sufficient notice when the
corporations activities result in a large volume of interstate business so that the corporation receives the
protection of the laws of the state and the suit is related to the activities which make the corporation
present?

RULING:

The Court ruled in the Affirmative. The general rule is that in order to have jurisdiction with
someone outside the state, the person must have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. For a
corporation, the minimum contacts required are not just continuous and systematic activities but also
those that give rise to the liabilities sued on. Defendant could have sued someone in Washington. It was
afforded the protection of the laws of that state, and therefore it should be subject to suit. This decision
articulates the rule for determining whether a state has personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant via
the minimum contacts test. In general, International Shoe demonstrates that contacts with a state
should be evaluated in terms of how fair it would be to exercise jurisdiction over an absent defendant.

Shaffer vs. Heitner

FACTS:

Plaintiff, a stockholder for Greyhound Corp., a company incorporated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in Arizona, sued Greyhound Corp., Greyhound Lines, Inc., (a subsidiary of
Greyhound Corp.) and present and former officers of the two companies for violating duties to Greyhound
Corp. by causing it to be liable for damages in an antitrust suit and a fine in a criminal contempt action in
Oregon. Plaintiff filed a motion for sequestration of the officers stock. Under a Delaware statute,
Delaware is the situs of all stock in Delaware corporations. The stock was seized. Defendants were
notified by certified mail of the sequestration and notice was published in a Delaware newspaper.
Defendants entered a special appearance so they could move to quash service of process and vacate the
sequestration order. Defendant argued that the order violated due process and therefore the property
could not be attached in Delaware. In addition, Defendants argued that they did not have the minimum
contacts with Delaware required to establish jurisdiction under International Shoe Co. v. Washington. In
addition, Defendants argued that the sequestration procedures were inconsistent with the Sniadach
cases. The Court of Chancery found for Plaintiff and the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Court of
Chancery. The Supreme Court of Delaware reasoned that the Sniadach cases involved default judgments
and not compelling a party to appear. This court furthered reasoned that sequestration procedures help to
adjudicate claims of mismanagement against Delaware companies, and do not cause permanent
deprivation of property to their shareholders. Defendants appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not nonresident must have minimum contacts with the forum state such that the
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of that states laws, in order for the forum state to
exercise in rem jurisdiction on a nonresident? If so, must the cause of action be sufficiently related to the
contacts the nonresident has with the forum state?

RULING:

The Court ruled in the Affirmative. Judgment reversed. In rem is not a proceeding against the
property, it is a proceeding against a persons interest in the property. You need to give an owner of
property reasonable and appropriate notice of an in rem proceeding so that he or she recognizes that
such a proceeding directly affects his or her interests. Having property in a state does not give the state
jurisdiction over causes of action unrelated to the property unless the person also passes the minimum
contacts test articulated in the International Shoe decision. If it is unconstitutional to exercise jurisdiction
over the person directly then it should be unconstitutional to assert jurisdiction indirectly. Plaintiffs
argument that Delaware has an interest in asserting jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries is not
established by Delaware law. Delaware law determines that it has jurisdiction over Defendants because
Defendants property is in Delaware; and not due to their status as corporate fiduciaries. First, the statute
authorizing jurisdiction does not specifically apply to stockholder derivative actions. Moreover, Plaintiffs
inability to secure jurisdiction over seven of the defendants because they didnt have property in Delaware
shows that there is no necessary relationship between corporate fiduciaries and stockholders. In addition,
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Delaware is a fair forum. Plaintiff must demonstrate more than the
applicability of Delawares laws to the controversy to establish a basis for jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argument
that Defendants have received benefits from Delaware laws only demonstrates that it would be
appropriate for Delaware law to govern obligations between Defendant and stockholders. This argument
does not require that Delaware be permitted to exercise jurisdiction, especially considering its lack of a
long-arm statute. Concurrence. Justice Stevens: The majority should not broadly eliminate in rem
jurisdiction by stating that there is no personal jurisdiction if the only contact the defendant has with the
forum state is property located in the state. There are other means of acquiring jurisdiction over local
actions that may be unintentionally limited by this broad language.
 The general rule is that the forum state has jurisdiction over the directors and officers of a
corporation chartered by the state in a shareholder derivative action. A states valid substantive interests
are considerations in assessing the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction. Delaware has interests in
preventing local corporations from being victims of foreign stockholders and in regulating its own
corporations. In addition, jurisdiction can be based on out-of-state activities that have foreseeable effects
in the forum state. Delawares failure to express an interest in corporate fiduciaries does not pertain to the
minimum contacts analysis. In addition, there was purposeful availment of the forums laws because the
corporate officers entered business relationships with Greyhounds stockholders pursuant to the laws of
Delaware. It is highly unlikely a court has personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant that is
absent from the forum state when the only contact is property owned by the defendant located within the
forum state. Even if the property is connected to the suit, minimum contacts must still be established in
compliance with the International Shoe test.

3. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter

3.1 How determined

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is generally conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint. Unlike jurisdiction over the parties, it cannot be bestowed upon the court by
the voluntary act or agreement of such parties (Deltaventures Resources vs. Cabato, 327 SCRA 521).
This kind of jurisdiction is not procedural, but a matter of substantive law. Nothing else can confer
jurisdiction except the law (Dela Cruz vs. CA, 510 SCRA 103).

3.2 Idonah vs. Perkins Case

Idonah vs. Perkins

FACTS:

This is a special civil action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Respondent
Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company
for the recovery of a sum consisting of dividends which have been declared and made payable on shares
of stock registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the company, and for the
recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares to the exclusion of all others. The
company alleged, by way of defense that the withholding of plaintiffs right to the disposal and control of
the shares was due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by the petitioner Idonah
Perkins, and by one Engelhard. Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants
petitioner, Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Perkins and H.
Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim
they assert thereon. Summons by publication were served upon the nonresident defendants Idonah
Perkins and Engelhard. Engelhard filed his answer. Petitioner filed her answer with a cross-complaint in
which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against respondent Eugene Perkins, from the SC
of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the
possession and control of the shares of stock in question with all the cash dividends declared thereon by
the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that
the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, because the alleged judgment of the SC of the
State of New York is res judicata. Petitioners demurrer was overruled, thus this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the SC of New
York and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by the respondent, Eugene
Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action?

RULING:

By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief
sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and is to be sought for
in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred. In the present case, the amended
complaint filed by the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication of title to certain
shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and the granting of affirmative reliefs,
which fall within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila. Similarly CFI- Manila is empowered to
adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioners cross-complaint. Idonah Perkins in her cross-
complaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the
alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment
enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by
section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls
within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to adjudicate, settle and determine.

The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment annulling the
final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this petitioners favor by the courts of the State of
New York, which decision is res judicata on all the questions constituting the subject matter of civil case
and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity and efficacy
to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the
merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not to the
jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter
upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is
erroneous, its judgment can be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the
petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful exercise of
its jurisdiction.

3.3 How does a Local Court deal with a conflicts problem?

A. Dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

B. Dismiss the case on the ground of Forum of Non Conveniens.

Forum of Non Conveniens A forum may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even
when the jurisdiction is authorized by law on the ground that the forum is inconvenient or the ends of
justice would be best served by trial in another forum or the controversy may be more suitably tried
elsewhere.

C. Assume jurisdiction and apply the Forum Law.

Forum Law/Lex Fori It is the positive law of the state, country or jurisdiction of whose
judicial system of the court where the suit is brought or remedy is sought is an integral part.

D. Assume jurisdiction and apply the Foreign Law.

III. Ways of Dealing with a Conflict of Law Problem

A. Dismissal

1. On the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

2. On the ground of Forum of Non Conveniens.

1. Forum of Non Conveniens; Definition

 A forum may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when the jurisdiction is authorized by law
on the ground that the forum is inconvenient or the ends of justice would be best served by trial in another
forum or the controversy may be more suitably tried elsewhere.

1.2 Rationale

1. To prevent abuse of the courts processes.

2. Burdensome on the court or taxpayers.

3. Local machinery is inadequate to effectuate a right.

4. Avoid global forum shopping.

1.3 Application

In re Union Carbide

FACTS:

A gas leak occurred at the pesticide plant of Union Carbide India Limited resulting in the deaths of
more than 2,000 people and injuries to more than 200,000 others in the city of Bhopal. Thereafter, the
India passed a law named Bhopal Act giving the Indian government the exclusive right the exclusive right
to represent the victims of the disaster. As thus, the Indian government filed a complaint before a New
York district court. The defendant Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of forum non conveniens and lack of personality. The defendant argued that while Indian courts
may provide an adequate alternative forum, they adhere to standards of due process much lower than
that followed in the US. Hence, US courts must supervise the proceedings before Indian courts. The
district court granted the motion on three conditions, namely, that UCC: (1) consent to the jurisdiction of
Indian courts and waive defenses based on the Statute of Limitations; (2) agree to the satisfy the
judgement of the Indian court, provided it complied with the requirements of due process; and (3) be
subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the US. Consequently, the Indian
government filed sued the UCIL and the UCC before the district court in India. The UCC appealed the
conditions.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens is proper?

RULING:

The Court ruled in the Affirmative. The Indian courts are adequate alternative fora. Almost all of
the estimated 200,000 plaintiffs are citizens and residents in India who have revoked their representation
by an American counsel in favor of the Indian government, which now prefers Indian Courts. Further, the
UCC has already consented to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Indian courts. All the witnesses and
evidence are likewise in India. As to the conditions, the first is valid in order to secure the viability of the
Indian courts as alternate fora. The second is problematic as it gives the impression that foreign
judgments the UCC's consent is necessary in order for the judgement of the Indian courts to be
enforceable in New York. The laws of New York, in fact, recognizes that a judgment rendered by a foreign
court may be enforced in that State except if such judgment was rendered in violation of due process or
without jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The request of UCC of supervision by US courts of
Indian courts is untenable. The power of US courts cannot extend beyond their territorial jurisdiction.
Moreover, once US courts dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens, they lose any further
jurisdiction over the case, except in case of an action for enforcement later on. Denial of due process
may, however, constitute a defense against the enforcement of the Indian judgment. The third condition is
likewise invalid. Basic justice dictates that both parties must be given equal access to evidence in each
other's possession. Hence, both parties maybe subjected to the modes of discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on equal terms subject to approval by Indian courts.

Wing on Company vs. Syyap

FACTS:

Wing On Company entered into contract with Syyap in New York for the purchase of clothing
material with verbal agreement that Syyap would pay Wing on the value of the clothing material, then
after the sale, the profits would be divided among them. Syyap failed pay Wing On, a New York-based
partnership, its obligation for a contract of purchase of clothing material. Wing On filed an action in the
Philippines against Syyap, but Syyap contends that the trial court should have declined jurisdiction on the
ground of forum non conveniens. Syyap argued that Wing is not licensed to do business in Philippines
thus having no legal capacity to sue. Furthermore, Syyap argued that the court should have declined
jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens. The Court rules in favor of Wing.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens?

RULING:

Forum non conveniens is inapplicable. Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant,
the plaintiffs choice of forum should be rarely disturbed, and furthermore, the consideration of
inadequacy to enforce the judgment, which is one of the important factors to be considered in the
application of said principle, would precisely constitute a problem to the plaintiff if the local courts decline
to assume jurisdiction on the basis of said principle, considering that defendant is a resident of the
Philippines. There is no existing catalogue of circumstances that will justify sustaining a plea of forum non
conveniens but, in general, both public and private interests should be weighed. When the forum is the
only state where jurisdiction can be obtained over the defendant and, in addition, some relation with the
parties exists or when the forum provides procedural remedies not available in another state, the forum
court may not resist imposition upon its jurisdiction. In the case at bar, defendant is in the Philippines. So,
for the court to assume jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the Philippine Court is the
convenient forum. The present suit is a personal action. The case may be commenced and tried where
the defendant resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

B. Assume Jurisdiction

1. Apply the Internal/Forum Law.

2. Apply Foreign Law.

1. When justified

A. A specific law of the forum decrees that internal law should apply.

EXAMPLES:

1. Article 16, Civil Code (Lex Nationale governs Testate and Intestate Succesion of the Person
whose succession is under consideration)
 Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

2. Article 829, Civil Code (Revocation of Wills outside the Philippines)

Article 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his
domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made,
or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation
takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

3. Article 819, Civil Code (Prohibition on Joint Wills by Filipinos)

Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country
shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may
have been executed.

B. The proper foreign laws was not properly impleaded and proved.

2. Instances when Foreign Law cannot be applied

(a) The foreign law is contrary to the public policy of the forum.

EX. Article 17, Civil Code.

(b) The foreign law is procedural in nature.

(c) The case involves issues related to property, real or personal (Lex Situs).

(d) The issue involved in the enforcement of foreign claim is fiscal or administrative.

(e) The foreign law or judgment is contrary to good morals (Contra Bonos Mores).

(f) The foreign law is penal in character.

 (g) When application of the foreign law may work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the
forum.

(h) When application of the foreign law might endanger the vital interest of the state.

C. Choice of Law

1. Approaches

A. Traditional

Theories that emphasize simplicity, convenience, and uniformity

A.1 Vested Rights Theory; Definition

- An act done in a foreign jurisdiction gives rise to a right if the laws of that state provides
so. The right vests and he can bring suit in any forum he chooses.
- The forum refers law of the place of the last act necessary to complete the cause of
action. (Place of Injury)
- If place of the last act creates no legal right, although forum court creates such right if
act is done within its territory, it will not enforce the right.

A.1.2 Application
Gray vs. Gray
FACTS:
A New Hampshire wife injured by the negligence of her husband while driving with him in Maine
is barred from recovery against him in this state because under Maine law a wife has no cause of action
for negligence against her husband.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Maine Law should apply?

RULING:
If there is a conflict between the Lex Loci and the Lex Fori, the former governs in torts the same
as in contracts, in respect to the legal effect and incidents of acts. Therefore, whatever would be a
defense to this action if it had been brought in the state of Maine is a defense here, although it would not
be if the cause of action had arisen in this state. It is sought to distinguish the present case upon the
ground that the act complained of was a delict, in the sense that it was not made innocent by Maine law;
and the only reason a recovery could not be had in Maine is the spousal relation of the parties. As the
parties are residents of New Hampshire, where spousal incapacity to sue has been abolished, it is argued
that the wife's complaint for acts done in Maine may be brought into this state and suit upon it maintained
here. The argument fails to distinguish between status and the incidents which local law attaches to the
status. The parties are husband and wife. That status they took with them into Maine. But the incidents of
that status are those prescribed by the law of the place where transactions take place. As before pointed
out, this rule has frequently been applied in tort actions where other relations were involved. Every
argument urged in favor of this plaintiff is applicable to these decided cases. The defendant's act is a
delict by the Lex Loci. It would have been actionable if committed here; and, as to persons in general, it is
actionable there. But because of the particular relation of the parties, the law there is that there is no
cause of action in the special instance. The plaintiff fails here, as those plaintiffs failed, because there is
no cause of action at the place where the acts complained of were done. It should be observed that much
of the plaintiff's argument is based upon the assertion that inability to recover in Maine is merely because
suits between husband and wife are forbidden. Hence it is urged that recovery may be had by resort to a
jurisdiction where such suits are allowed. But an examination of the Maine law shows that the rule is
much broader. The theory adopted there is not merely that there is a prohibition of suit, but that the acts
complained of do not give rise to any cause of action. There has been no breach of legal duty.
It being the rule in some jurisdictions that in a suit by a non-resident upon a cause arising locally
his capacity to sue will be determined by looking to the law of his domicil rather than to the local law, it is
urged that this feature (called the Renvoi Doctrine) should be treated the same as the rest of the Lex Loci.
If that law looks beyond local limitations to broader or otherwise different rules of the party's domicil, it is
argued that the same course should be followed by the court in another jurisdiction when called upon to
adjudicate disputes which arose under such circumstances. That is, in determining the applicability of
foreign law, the court should be governed by that foreign law as to the applicability of foreign law. This
idea is urged as calling for the recognition of Renvoi under such circumstances. It has not as yet met with
judicial approval. We do not understand it is claimed that the doctrine of Renvoi ought to be adopted. One
of the authors upon whose reasoning the plaintiff relies says: "The Renvoi doctrine is, therefore, no part of
the Conflict of Laws of the United States. Its introduction into our law would be most unfortunate on
account of the uncertainty and confusion to which it would give rise in the administration of Justice and its
demoralizing effect upon the future development of the Conflict of Laws. It is advanced in argument here
as a feature of existing law, in some foreign jurisdictions, and its recognition where existing is urged as a
logical part of the vested right theory, and as showing that, thus encumbered, that theory should be
rejected. It is unnecessary to determine the validity of the argument. If its soundness were assumed, and
recognition of Renvoi should be treated as a part of our rule applying the Lex Loci, there would be two
sufficient answers here. The plea demurred to states "that under the laws of the State of Maine, the
plaintiff being the wife of said defendant is barred from maintaining this action." This leaves no room for
speculation upon the matter. Beyond this, it is conceded in the plaintiff's argument that there is no
decision in Maine bearing upon the doctrine of Renvoi. Nor is there any claim that it is a part of a
generally prevailing common-law doctrine. If the matter were open for consideration, the plaintiff would fail
for lack of proof that the doctrine prevails in Maine.

Alabama Great Southern Railroad vs. Carroll

FACTS:

Plaintiff W.D. Carroll, an Alabama citizen, was employed as a brakeman under an Alabama
contract with the Defendant Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company. While working on a freight train
running from Alabama to Mississippi, Carroll was injured on account of a defective link between two cars.
The injury occurred in Mississippi, but Carroll alleged that its cause happened in Alabama. Evidence
showed that fellow employees of Carroll were negligent in failing to discover the defect or remedy it.
Carroll sued Alabama Southern in Alabama court. He alleged that the employment contract rendered
Alabama Southern subject to Alabama law even if Carroll were working outside of the state. If Mississippi
law were applicable, Alabama Southern could not be liable because Mississippi subscribed to the
common law rule that a master is not liable for harm to a servant caused by a fellow servant. An Alabama
employers liability statute, however, modified the common law in that state so as to make a master liable
for injury to a servant. A jury decided in favor of Carroll. Alabama Southern appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not recovery be obtained for a tortious act in the state where the breach of duty
occurred, but not the injury?

RULING:

The Court ruled in the Negative. The general rule is that recovery cannot be made in one state for
the injuries to the person sustained in a different state unless the infliction of the injuries is actionable
under the law of the state where the injuries were received. In this case, up to the time the train passed
from Alabama, no injury had resulted. The Alabama statute has no efficiency beyond state lines. Only
Mississippi could apply proper jurisdiction over the claim. There may have been a different result if Carroll
had been injured in Alabama but suffered in Mississippi. As for an argument that the defendant Railroad
was under a contractual duty to Plaintiff Carroll, which arose in Alabama, the Alabama law will govern
only occurrences of the employment relationship and not with any specific contractual obligations.
Reversed and remanded.

B.1 Local Law Theory; Definition

- Treat conflicts cases as a purely domestic case that does not involve a foreign element.

- Power of a state to regulate within its territory has no limitation except as imposed by its own
positive law.
 C.1 Cavers Principle of Preference

- Choice-of-law decisions should be made with reference to principles of preference which are
conceived to provide a fair accommodation of conflicting state policies and afford fair treatment to the
parties.

- Cavers principles have a territorialist bias; It looks to the place where the significant events
occurred or where the legal relationship is centered.

B. Modern

B.1 Place of the Most Significant Relationship

- Identifies a plurality of factors:

i. Needs of the interstate and international system

ii. Relevant policies of the concerned states

iii. Relevant policies of other interested states

iv. Protection of justified expectations of the parties

v. Basic policies underlying the particular field of law

vi. Certainty, predictability and uniformity of result

vii. Ease in the determination and application of law to be applied

B.1.2 Case
Auten vs. Auten
FACTS:
Margarite Auten sues Harols Auten in New York to recover support for her and her children that
Harold owed by virtue of a separation agreement. The Autens were married in England. Harold deserted
her, went to America, obtained a Mexican divorce, then married another woman. Margarite went to New
York, where she and Harold came to a separation agreement which proved that Harold was to pay to a
trustee, for Margarites account, a month for her support and that for their 2 children. The agreement also
provided that they were not to sue each other in any action relating to their separation, and Margarite
would not cause any complaint against Harold in any jurisdiction because of his alleged divorce and
remarriage. Harold made a few payments only, so Margarite filed a petition for separation in England,
charging Harold with adultery. Harold was served in New York with process in that suit and he was
ordered to pay alimony pendent lite. This English case never proceeded to trial. Margarite instituted the
instant suit to recover support due under the agreement. The CFI dismissed the complaint which was
affirmed by the Appellate Division.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the English law should be applied in Margarites commencement for the petition
for separation with charge of adultery?
RULING:
English law should govern the parties. England has all the truly significant contacts while the
nexus to New York is entirely fortuitous. In the case, England has the most significant contacts with the
case. The agreement was between English subjects. They were married in England. They lived there as
a family for 14 years. Harold abandoned his family and was in the US on a temporary visa. Margarites
sole purpose was to get Harold to agree to support their family. The money was to be paid to a trustee in
New York, but those who stood to benefit live in England. New Yorks only connection to the case is
where the agreement was made, and where the trustee to whom the money was to be paid held office.
The Court noted that based on English law, there was no breach of the agreement by Margarite. In
applying the grouping of contacts theory, courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the intention of the
parties or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather on the law of the place which has the
most significant contacts with the matter in dispute. This has been thought to effect the probable intention
of the parties when making their contract.

B.2 Interest Analysis

- Resolve conflicts cases by looking at the policy behind the laws of the involved states
and the interest each state has in applying its own law.

B.2.1 Case

Babcock vs. Jackson

FACTS:

Miss Georgia Babcock and her friends, Mr. and Mrs. William Jackson, all residents of Rochester, left
that city in Mr. Jackson's automobile, Miss Babcock as guest, for a week-end trip to Canada. Some hours
later, as Mr. Jackson was driving in the Province of Ontario, he apparently lost control of the car; it went
off the highway into an adjacent stone wall, and Miss Babcock was seriously injured. Upon her return to
this State, she brought the present action against William Jackson, alleging negligence on his part in
operating his automobile. At the time of the accident, there was in force in Ontario a statute providing that
"the owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying
passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the
death of any person being carried in the motor vehicle. Even though no such bar is recognized under this
State's substantive law of torts, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the law
of the place where the accident occurred governs and that Ontario's guest statute bars recovery. The
court at Special Term, agreeing with the defendant, granted the motion and the Appellate Division, over a
strong dissent by Justice Halpern, affirmed the judgment of dismissal without opinion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the law of the place of the tort invariably govern the availability of relief for the
tort?

RULING:

Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New York and Ontario in this litigation,
vis-a-vis the issue here presented, makes it clear that the concern of New York is unquestionably the
greater and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal. The present action involves
injuries sustained by a New York guest as the result of the negligence of a New York host in the operation
of an automobile, garaged, licensed and undoubtedly insured in New York, in the course of a week-end
journey which began and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with the
occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the accident occurred there. New York's policy of
requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused by his negligence cannot be doubted
as attested by the fact that the Legislature of this State has repeatedly refused to enact a statute
denying or limiting recovery in such cases and our courts have neither reason nor warrant for
departing from that policy simply because the accident, solely affecting New York residents and arising
out of the operation of a New York based automobile, happened beyond its borders. Per contra, Ontario
has no conceivable interest in denying a remedy to a New York guest against his New York host for
injuries suffered in Ontario by reason of conduct which was tortious under Ontario law. The object of
Ontario's guest statute, it has been said, is "to prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims by passengers,
in collusion with the drivers, against insurance companies" and, quite obviously, the fraudulent claims
intended to be prevented by the statute are those asserted against Ontario defendants and their
insurance carriers, not New York defendants and their insurance carriers. Whether New York defendants
are imposed upon or their insurers defrauded by a New York plaintiff is scarcely a valid legislative
concern of Ontario simply because the accident occurred there, any more so than if the accident had
happened in some other jurisdiction. It is hardly necessary to say that Ontario's interest is quite different
from what it would have been had the issue related to the manner in which the defendant had been
driving his car at the time of the accident. Where the defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of
his automobile is in issue, the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually
have a predominant, if not exclusive, concern. In such a case, it is appropriate to look to the law of the
place of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest in regulating conduct within its borders,
and it would be almost unthinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of some other place.

In Auten v. Auten, however, this court abandoned such rules and applied what has been termed the
"center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory of the conflict of laws. Under this theory, we declared in
the Auten case, the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties' intention or the place of making
or performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the place which has the most significant contacts
with the matter in dispute. The "center of gravity" rule of Auten has not only been applied in other cases in
this State, as well as in other jurisdictions, but has supplanted the prior rigid and set contract rules in the
most current draft of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Babcock should be allowed to recover. New
York had a greater & more direct interest than Ontario. New Yorks policy is to afford compensation to a
guest against tortfeasor host while Ontarios policy is to prevent fraudulent collusion to the prejudice of
Ontario defendants-insurance companies. Thus, Ontario had no interest in denying a remedy to a New
York guest against a New York host. The rule on tort claim is where the issue involves standard of
conduct, law of the place of the tort is controlling, but as to other issues, court must apply the law of the
state which has the strongest interest in the resolution of the issue presented.

B.2.2 Choice-Influencing Considerations

A. Predicability of Results

B. Maintenance of Inter-state and international order

C. Simplification of judicial task

D. Application of the better rule of law

IV. CHARACTERIZATION AND SINGLE ASPECT METHOD

A. Characterization and Single-Aspect Method

1. Characterization, Definition

- The process by which a court at the beginning of the choice of law process assigns a disputed question
to the proper area in substantive law.

2. Single-Aspect Method, Definition

- The process by which a court assigns a disputed question to an area in substantive law. It is a part of
legal analysis and a pervasive problem since at least two jurisdictions with divergent laws are involved.

3. Articles 15, 16, & 17 of Civil Code

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family right and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and .to the
amount of successional rights and to intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the law of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.

4. Subject-Matter Characterization, Definition

- This calls for classification of a factual situation into a legal category. It is significant in a single-aspect
method because the legal category to which an issue is assigned determines governing law.

5. Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, Definition

- Directs the court to the extent it will apply foreign law.

6. Statute of Frauds

- It is considered substantive if words of law relate to forbidding the creation of obligation. One that forbids
the enforcement of the obligation is characterized as procedural.
- Found Article 1403 (2), Civil Code.

Article 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same,
or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by
his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a
secondary evidence of its contents:
 (a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making
thereof;

(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;

(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to

marry;

(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less
than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and
chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at the time
some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made
by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of
property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose
account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;

(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real
property or of an interest therein;

(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.

(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

7. Statute of Limitations/Law on Prescription

- Statutes of limitations are traditionally classified as procedural because they only barred the legal
remedy w/out impairing the substantive right involved. Thus, a suit can still be maintained in another
jurisdiction which has a longer Statute of Limitations. However, certain Statute of Limitation have been
classified as substantive for conflicts purposes if providing a shorter period for certain claim types falling
w/in wider class covered by the general Statute of Limitation.

8. Borrowing Statutes

- Many states, the Philippines among others, have passed borrowing statutes to eliminate forum-
shopping. However, in the case of Cadalin, the court said that to enforce the borrowed statute would
contravene public policy on protection of labor.

8.1 Case

Cadalin vs. POEA Administrator

FACTS:

Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Intl Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic
recruitment corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root Intl Inc. (BRII) which is a
foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas. Plaintiff instituted a class suit with the POEA for money
claims arising from the unexpired portion of their employment contract which was prematurely terminated.
They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the termination of their employment
contract. As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the Private Sector of
Bahrain: a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year
from the date of the expiry of the contract, it appears that their suit has prescribed. Plaintiff contends that
the prescription period should be 10 years as provided by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code as their claim arise
from a violation of a contract. The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period of prescription
should be applied but the NLRC provides a different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines with a 3 years prescription period should be applied. The Solicitor General expressed his
personal point of view that the 1 year period provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bahrain Law should apply?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that as a general rule a foreign procedural law will not be applied in our
country as we must adopt our own procedural laws. The exception is when the country of the forum has a
"borrowing statute," the country of the forum will apply the foreign statute of limitations. A law on
prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as
procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. However, the
characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of
the forum (local Court) has a borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the state of the forum (local
Court) to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there
are several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place
where it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: If by the laws of the state or country
where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands. Section
48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light of the 1987
Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums
public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards
the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor. Thus, the applicable
law on prescription is the Philippine law. Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides the following actions must
be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon
an obligation created by law; or (3) Upon a judgment. Since the claim for pay differentials is primarily
anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art.
1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern.

9. Depecage, Definition

- From the word depecer means to dissect.

- The phenomenon where the different aspects of the case involving a foreign element may be governed
by different systems of laws.

B. Renvoi, Definition

- A procedure whereby a legal matter is referred by the conflict of laws rules of the forum to a foreign
state, the conflict of laws rule of which, in turn refers the matter back to the law of the forum (Remission)
or a third state (Transmission).

B.1 Various Ways of Dealing with Renvoi

1. Reject the Renvoi.

If the conflicts rules of the forum refer the case to the law of another state, it is deemed to mean
only the internal law of that state. Thus, the court will apply the foreign law.

2. Accept the Renvoi.

If the conflict rules of the forum refer the case to the law of another state, it is deemed to include
the totality of the foreign law (internal law and conflicts of laws rule). Thus, the court will recognize the
referral back and apply local law.

3. Desistment Theory

The forum court upon reference to another states law sees that such law is limited in application
to its own nationals domiciled in its territory and has no provision for application to nationals domiciled
outside of the territory. Hence, the local court will apply local law.

This has the same result as the acceptance of the Renvoi but the process used by the forum
court is to desist applying the foreign law.

4. Foreign court assumes the same position that the foreign court would take if the case is
litigated in the foreign state. Hence:
 a. If the foreign court would accept the Renvoi, the local court shall apply the foreign law.

b. If the foreign court would reject the Renvoi, the local court shall apply Lex Fori.

c. If the foreign court would apply the Desistment Theory, the local court shall apply the foreign
law.

d. If the foreign court would use the foreign court theory, then international pingpong would
ensue.

B.2 Potential Problem with Renvoi Application

1. Renvoi would place the court in a perpetually-enclosed circle form which it would never emerge
and that it would never find a suitable body of substantive rules to apply to a particular case. The
theoretical problem presented is that Renvoi is workable only if one of the states rejects it and
that it achieves harmony of decisions only if the states concerned do not agree on applying it the
same way.

2. Courts may be unnecessarily burdened with the task of identifying the choice-of-law rules of
another state.

B.3 Remission vs. Transmission

Remission Transmission

Reference is made back to the law of the forum. Reference to a third state.

B.4 Case
Aznar vs. Garcia

FACTS:

Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and
consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of
his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California. In his will, he
instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of
some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had
been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16
(2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile,
that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of
successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter
Maria, in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the New Civil Code, the national of the deceased
must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are
no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in
absolute dominion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Philippine Law should apply?

RULING:

Philippine law should apply. Article 16 of the Philippine Civil Code provide that the national law of
the decedent governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions. Article 16 of the Civil Code provides
that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found. As explained in the various
authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of
laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question
to the law of the testators domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cant and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be
like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent
was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs
of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant
HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California.

Bellis vs. Bellis

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George
Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by
his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. Prior to his death, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are pai d
for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00
to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely:
Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The
Peoples Bank and Trust Company paid the entire bequest therein. Preparatory to closing its
administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration
and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by
the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00.
In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and
Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Texas Law should apply?

RULING:

Texas Law should apply. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has a
conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (Law of the Domicile) should govern, the same
would not result in a reference back (Renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (Lex Rei Sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, Renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict
of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants' position is therefore not
rested on the Doctrine of Renvoi. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

C. Notice and Proof of Foreign Law

1. Extent of Judicial Notice, Rule 129, Sec. 1

Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world
and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.

*When is Judicial Notice Mandatory?

A court shall take judicial notice mandatorily, without the introduction of evidence on the following
matters:

A. The existence and territorial extent of states;

B. Their political history;

C. Forms of government and symbols of nationality;

D. The law of nations;

E. The admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals;

F. The political constitution and history of the Philippines;

G. The official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines;
 H. The laws of nature;

I. The measure of time;

J. The geographical divisions.

2. Foreign Law, How proved, Rule 132, Secs. 19 & 24

Section 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation evidence,
documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered
therein.

All other writings are private.

* For the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents are either:

1. Public; or

2. Private.

*What are the documents which are considered public?

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered
therein.
 *What are the documents which are private?

Under the rules, all other writings not mentioned are private document.

Section 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph
(a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.

*How to prove public documents in the official record?

The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced:

1. By an official publication thereof; or

2. By a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody.

*Who are the persons authorized to issue a certification if the document is in a foreign country?

If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by :

1. Secretary of the embassy or legation;

2. Consul general, consul;

3. Vice consul;

4. Consular agent; or

5. By any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

3. Effects of Failure to Plead and Prove Foreign Law

Forum court may:

A. Dismiss the case for inability to establish cause of action.

B. Apply law of the forum (Courts conclude that by failing to adduce proof, parties acquiesce to the
application of the forum law since it is the basic law).

C. Assume foreign law is the same as law of the forum (Processual Presumption).

4. Doctrine of Processual Presumption, Definition

- The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law
shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.

5. Case

Zalamea vs. CA

FACTS:

Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3)
airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New
York to Los Angeles. The tickets of the spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations. While in New York, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter
received a notice of reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however,
the spouses Zalamea and their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the scheduled flight
at 11:00 am but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who checked in before
tem had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22
names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two
others, on the other hand, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-
fare ticket were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the
full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who
presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs.
Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was full booked. Thus, they were
constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for damages based on
breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in their favor
ordering the TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from American Airlines together with moral
damages and attorneys fees. On appeal, the CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage
suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. It further
stated that since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of
airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, neither fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was fraud or bad faith on the part of the TWA?

RULING:

Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary
of an embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated
by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her
deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows overbooking. Aside
from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CAs
finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in
fact.

That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners
to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or
regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that
such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in
her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking.
Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations
has no basis in fact. Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the
law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers
are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be
Philippine law.

Garcia vs. Recio

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court
issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian
citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their
application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 1995,
they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner
filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of
the respondents former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told
petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his
first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on
the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this
petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven?

RULING:

The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize
a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it.

In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic,
issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the rules
on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account
of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two types of
divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In
this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured. Even after the divorce becomes
absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce
decree a party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the
offense of bigamy. This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restricted.
Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status.
Together with other evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to the alleged foreign law.

Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent cant be
declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties
marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

Suntay vs. Suntay

FACTS:

Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien
province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy,
Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely,
Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named
Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and after hearing letters of
administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed
administrator of the estate. The surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines
by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the
petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the
said will. An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the will and this Court held the
evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and remanded the case to the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings. In spite of the fact that a commission from
the probate court was issued for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will,
the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the
surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation,
claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament
in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased and that the same was filed, recorded and
probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the
intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines or of the will executed
in Amoy, Fookien, China.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last will and testament executed in Amoy, China should be allowed and
recorded by the CFI?

RULING:

As to the will claimed to have been executed on in Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule 78.
Section 1 of the rule provides that wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of
such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The
law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent
evidence. There is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions propounded by
counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2,
objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of
Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on
procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his right to
confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it
appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking
the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of
Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy
is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our
laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or
by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were
known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the
interested parties residing in the Philippines. The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy,
China, may be likened toe or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of
notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, does not purport to probate or allow the
will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof
cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and
principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as
proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot
be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.

6. Exceptions to the Application of Foreign Law

(a) The foreign law is contrary to the public policy of the forum.

(b) The foreign law is procedural in nature.

(c) The case involves issues related to property, real or personal (Lex Situs).

(d) The issue involved in the enforcement of foreign claim is fiscal or administrative.

(e) The foreign law or judgment is contrary to good morals (Contra Bonos Mores).

(f) The foreign law is penal in character.

(g) When application of the foreign law may work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the
forum.

(h) When application of the foreign law might endanger the vital interest of the state.

V. Personal Law

Nationality That quality or character which arises from the fact of a persons belonging to a nation or
state. (Blacks Law Dictionary)

A. Importance of Personal Law

The individuals nationality or domicile serves as permanent connection by which individual &
state. Thus, what is assigned him is a personal law allowing courts to exercise or determine the governing
choice-of-law rule on a specific situation or transaction involving him. Personal law follows the individual.
It governs transactions affecting him most (Marriage, Divorce, Legitimacy, Capacity to Contract).

A.1 Article 15, Civil Code

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family right and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
 A.2 Article IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution

ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

B. Natural Born Citizen, Definition

- Citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect citizenship.

- Two principles which may be followed:

1. Jus Soli Looks to the law of the place of ones birth to determine ones nationality. Followed in many
Common Law Countries.

2. Jus Sanguinis Rule of descent or blood. Followed in the Philippines as articulated in the
Constitution.

B.1 Cases
Tecson vs. COMELEC
FACTS:

Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier,
initiated a petition before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject.
Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to
a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. The COMELEC dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. 3 days later, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was
denied on by the COMELEC en banc. Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the
Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not FPJ was a natural born citizen so as to be allowed to run for the office of the
President of the Philippines?

RULING:

This case governs the Section 1, Article III of the 1935 Constitution. It provides that the he
following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution; (2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands; (3) Those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines; (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship or (5) Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
 Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write,
at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
Naturalization, Jus Soli, Res Judicata and Jus Sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., Jus Soli and
Jus Sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa
vs. Collector of Customs, did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of
Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, Jus Sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the
birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo
Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate
of Lorenzo Poe are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But
while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material,
but also deliberate and willful.

Poe-Llamanzares vs. Elamparo

FACTS:

In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-
born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years
and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005. May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after
deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and
from between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was
legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On
July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under
RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming
her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy
the RA 9225 requirement. From then on, she stopped using her American passport. Petitions were filed
before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that she
cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or
either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is
in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in
her COC. On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a
candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship
issue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Poe-Llamanzares is a natural born citizen?

RULING:

The Court ruled in the Affirmative. Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born
Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may
run for presidency. First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. She also has
typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval
face. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born
in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That probability
and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the
framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC
felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some
of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in
which the foundling is found.

C. Naturalization, Definition

- It confers to an alien a nationality after birth by any means provided by the law. In the Philippines,
naturalization is by judicial method, under CA 473, as amended RA 530.
- The act of adopting an alien into a nation, and clothing him with all the rights possessed by a natural-
born citizen. (Blacks Law Dictionary)

C.1 Sections 2, 3, & 4 of CA No. 473

AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION,

AND TO REPEAL ACTS NUMBERED TWENTY-NINE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN AND
THIRTY-FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT.

Section 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:

First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;

Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten
years;

Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living.

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal
Philippine languages; and

Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or
private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education1 of the Philippines, where the
Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the
hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence required under the second
condition of the last preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner
having any of the following qualifications:

1. Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the
provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof;
2. Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines;
3. Being married to a Filipino woman;
4. Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not
established for the exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in
any of the branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two years;
5. Having been born in the Philippines.

Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:

a. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
b. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
c. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
d. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
e. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
f. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially
with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
g. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during
the period of such war;
h. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

C.2 Sections 2, 3, & 4 of RA No. 9139

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FOR CERTAIN ALIENS
BY ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall control and regulate the admission and integration of
aliens into its territory and body politic including the grant of citizenship to aliens. Towards this end, aliens
born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings
subject to certain requirements dictated by national security and interest.
Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section, any person desiring to
avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the following qualifications:

(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;

(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition;

(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of the
Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as
well as with the community in which he/she is living;

(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school or
private educational institution dully recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports,
where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school
curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she
have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;

(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she
derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of
his/her family: Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders
but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their
citizenship;

(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines;
and

(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.

Section 4. Disqualifications - The following are not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under
this Act:

(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;

(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and
ideals of the Filipinos;

(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and

(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof.

CA NO. 473 RA NO. 9139

Covers all aliens regardless of class. Covers native-born aliens who lived here in the
Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other
country and all along thought that they were
Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty
to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and
traditions. It also applies only to aliens who were
born in the Philippines and have been residing here.

Judicial in nature Administrative in nature

C.3 Cases

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC (174 SCRA 245)

FACTS:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon and
assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its
President Estuve, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having
been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer, Frivaldo admitted that he was
naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had
sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said,
was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial
law Dictators agents abroad. He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution
to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their
assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship
on the day of the election on January 18,1 988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected
governor. They also argued that their petition in the COMELEC was not really for quo warranto under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing
as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking
for the public respondent, the SOLGEN supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American Citizen. As an alien, he
was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the
electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus
Election Code. He also joined in the private respondents argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuve were seeking was not only the
annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the
termination of Frivaldos incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on
1988 as provincial governor?

RULING:
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Art. XI, Sec. 9 of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution allegiance at all times and the specific
requirement in Sec. 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Sec.
117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications a
citizen of the Philippines this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage. In the certificate of
candidacy he filed, Frivaldo described himself as a natural born citizen of the Philippines omitting mention
of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows however that he was naturalized as a citizen
of the United States in 1983. The court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the
enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was
coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the
result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. This
court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing
exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not
excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of
the country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. Obviously this rule requires strict application when
the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

Petitioner Frivaldo is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified
from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is order to vacate his office and
surrender the same to the duly elected Vice Governor of the said province.

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC (257 SCRA 727)

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Certiorari. Frivaldo, J. was elected as a Governor of the province of
Sorsogon. The League of Cities of Sorsogon President Salvador Estuye filed a petition to COMELEC
requesting to disqualify Frivaldo from his office on the grounds that he was a naturalized citizen of the
United States of America. Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen in 1983. Frivaldo admitted but
said that he was only forced to do so since the time of Marcos regime he was considered as an enemy
and he went to USA seeking refuge and his naturalization is not impressed with voluntariness as he went
back after the Marcos Regime to the country to help the restoration of democracy. He implies that he
reacquired his Philippine citizenship by participating in the election. The case was approved by
COMELEC and motion to dismiss filed by Frivaldo was denied to which Frivaldo filed a motion for
certiorari and prohibition to the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on
1988?

RULING:

Juan G. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines and disqualified from serving as the Governor
of the Province of Sorsogon, vacancy shall be filled by the elected Vice-Governor. Local Government
Code, Section 42 indicates that a candidate for local elective office must be a citizen of the Philippines
and a qualified voter of the constituency where is running. Omnibus Election Code, Section 117 states
that a qualified voter, among other qualifications, must be a citizen of the Philippines. The Court rules that
Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as the evidence shown from the
certification of US District Court of North California stating that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Frivaldos
argument that he reacquire his Philippine citizenship through the participation in the election which in his
view repatriated him to which the Court refutes that there are proper methods to which one can reacquire
citizen ship either through Direct Act of Congress, Naturalization or Repatriation to which Frivaldo did not
access to. Only citizens of the Philippines which have one allegiance can run in local elective office.

Aznar vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for
the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the 1988 local elections. The Cebu PDP-Laban
Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his
capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification
of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United
States of America. Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent
is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila, respectively. The petitioner also filed a
Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily
enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of
private respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition. Thus, the
COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits
tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form
No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent; Alien Certificate of Registration No.
015356 in the name of private respondent; Permit to Re-enter the Philippines; and Immigration Certificate
of Clearance. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that
he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio
Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103; that he has
been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than
six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. The COMELEC (First
Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the
highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. Thereafter,
the COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed
and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmena has lost his Filipino citizenship
and thus he is disqualified as a candidate for the Provincial Governor of Cebu Province?

RULING:

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among
others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and
(3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From
the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of
the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. In concluding that
Osmena had been naturalized as a citizen of the USA, Aznar merely relied on the fact that Osmena was
issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Aznar assumed that because of the foregoing, Osmena
is an American and "being an American", Osmena must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance
required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws. The Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are
Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of
the United States does not concern us here. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the
presumption that Osmena is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon Aznar to prove that Osmena had
lost his Philippine citizenship however, he failed to positively establish this fact. Osmena vehemently
denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the US. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the
present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, Osmena remains a Filipino and the loss of his
Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

C.4 Sections 2 5 of RA No. 9225

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN

CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:

"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act
shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section
1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that
oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
 (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) Are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) Are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed

forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

D. Dual Citizenship

- It refers to the possession of two citizenships by an individual, that is of his original citizenship and that
of the country where he became a naturalized citizens.

D.1 Case

Nottebehn Case (Liechtenstein vs. Guatemala)

FACTS:

Nottebohn (Plaintiff), a German by birth, lived in Guatemala (Defendant) for 34 years, retaining
his German citizenship and family and business ties with it. He however applied for Liechtenstein
citizenship a month after the outbreak of World War II. Nottebohm had no ties with Liechtenstein but
intended to remain in Guatemala. The naturalization application was approved by Liechtenstein and
impliedly waived its three-year. After this approval, Nottebohm travelled to Liechtenstein and upon his
return to Guatemala, he was refused entry because he was deemed to be a German citizen. His
Liechtenstein citizenship was not honored. Liechtenstein thereby filed a suit before the International
Court to compel Guatemala to recognize him as one of its national. Guatemala challenged the validity of
Nottebohms citizenship, the right of Liechtenstein to bring the action and alleged its belief that Nottebohm
remained a German national.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nationality must be disregarded by other states where it is clear that it was a mere
device since the nationality conferred on a party is normally the concerns of that nation?

RULING:

The Court ruled in the Negative. Nationality may be disregarded by other states where it is clear
that it was a mere device since the nationality conferred on a party is normally only the concerns of that
nation. Issues relating to citizenship are solely the concern of the granting nation. This is the general rule.
But it does not mean that other states will automatically accept the conferring states designation unless it
has acted in conformity with the general aim of forging a genuine bond between it and its national aim. In
this case, there was no relationship between Liechtenstein and Nottebohm. The change of nationality was
merely a subterfuge mandated by the war. Under this circumstance, Guatemala was not forced to
recognize it.

Oh Hek Haw vs. Republic

FACTS:

Petitioner Oh Hek How, a Chinese Citizen, applied for naturalization in the Philippines which was
granted. A certificate of naturalization was issue in his favor but the Government appealed, claiming that it
was issued before the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China issued the permission for a valid
renunciation of Chinese citizenship. Having been granted naturalization, he filed a motion alleging that he
had complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his
oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. The Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the taking of said oath. On
that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of naturalization was issued to him. The Government
seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order filed its record on appeal among the
grounds that the oath was taken prior to judgment having been final and executory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the Minister of the Interior
of Nationalist China?

RULING:

It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an alien,
as a citizen of the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled by any
foreign law. However, the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily
governed pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code by the laws of China, not by those of
the Philippines. As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of
the Philippines, unless he has complied with the Laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission
of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality.

Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides, however, that before the naturalization
certificate is issued, the petitioner shall "solemnly swear," inter alia, that he renounces "absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the state "of which"
he is "a subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former
nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have two nationalities
and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the
Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his
Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been
agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is
acquired."

E. Statelessness

- It refers to the lack of citizenship. A stateless person is someone who is not considered as a national by
any state under the operation of its law.

- Two Senses:

1. De Jure Stateless Person It refers to an individual who has been stripped of his nationality by his
own former government without having opportunity to acquire another.

2. De Facto Stateless Person It refers to individual possessed of a nationality but whose country does
not give them protection outside their own territory. It is commonly called refugees.