POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Atty. Norieva de Vega

Second Trimester, SY 2016-2017
CASES DIGEST

Article I
National Territory

Magallona vs. Ermita - G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011

F: In 1961, Congress passed RA 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic
State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958
(UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth
of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in
Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five
decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah in North Bornero (RA 5446).

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522. The change was prompted by the need to make
RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the UNCLOS III, which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.
Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic
States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental
shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two
principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To buttress their
argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its
failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands
to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

I: Whether or not RA 9522, an act which is adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the
baseline regime of nearby territories is constitutional.

H: YES!

R: IT IS A STATUTORY TOOL TO DEMARCATE THE COUNTRYS MARITIME ZONES AND

CONTINENTAL SHELF UNDER UNCLOS III, NOT TO DELINEATE PHILIPPINE TERRITORY

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from
the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical
miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.

UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among UN members to codify norms regulating
the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic graduated
authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts. On the other hand, baselines
laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific base points along their
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to
measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.

Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction
to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to
exploit the living and nonliving resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56)
and continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioner's theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the
rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in
accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III.

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim,
diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose)
territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III and are instead governed by
the rules on general international law.

RA 9522S USE OF THE FRAMEWORK OF REGIME OF ISLANDS TO DETERMINE THE MARITIME ZO

NES OF THE KIG AND THE SCARBOROUGH SHOAL, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE PHILIPPINE
S CLAIM OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THESE AREAS

Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines,
and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that
area. The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed
the base points mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine base points that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the
location of base points and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III's limitation on
the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie
outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the

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wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over
the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.

RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its
internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.

Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA
9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the
Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under the Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III
requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three percent (3%) of the
total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for
several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will
inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.

Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III's limits. The need to shorten this
baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of base points using current maps, became
imperative as discussed by respondents:

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its
maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III].

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision
to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta
sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of
land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the
category of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

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UNCLOS III AND RA 9522 NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONS DELINEATION OF IN
TERNAL WATERS

Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters
under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward
of the baselines, including the airspace over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:

Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed
and subsoil:

1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the

archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
3. xxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects
affect the status of the archipelagic waters , including the sea lanes, or the exercise by
the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and
the resources contained therein.

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of
freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent
discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters
to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing
nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty's limitations and
conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty
to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without
risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage
and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis-a-vis continental coastal States which are subject,
in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international
straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession
by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless
of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More
importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one
cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands
generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles
beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under the UNCLOS
III.

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In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and nonliving resources within such zone. Such a maritime
delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime
space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to
coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III,
however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that
attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

RA 9522 AND THE PHILIPPINES MARITIME ZONES

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA
9522.We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III and we find petitioner's reading plausible.
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the
luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an
archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where
the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted
disaster: FIRST, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in
the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and SECOND, it weakens the country's case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

Article II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Section 1

A. Sovereignty

People v. Gozo - 53 SCRA 476

F: The Appellant (Loreta Gozo) bought a house and lot located inside the U.S. Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one in its place, without a
building permit from the City Mayor. She argues that she was not obligated to secure a building permit because
she was told by an assistant in the City Mayors Office as well as by her neighbors in the area that such permit
was unnecessary for the construction of the house. During the construction of the house, the city police
apprehended the carpenters found therein. After an investigation, appellant was charged with violation of the
Municipal Ordinance requiring a building permit. The City Court and Court of First Instance of Zambales found
her guilty. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court. On appeal, the appellant assailed the

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constitutionality of the Municipal Ordinance, arguing that the Ordinance did not apply to her dwelling, which
was within the US Naval Base.

I: Whether or not the Philippine Government had abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory and divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein?

H: No

R: The Supreme Court cited its decision in People v. Acierto and Raegan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
wherein the Supreme Court said that under the terms of the treaty, the U.S. government has prior or preferential
but not exclusive jurisdiction of offenses committed in such bases. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for
reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine
sovereignty over the bases the second from the express provisions of the treaty. There was a reiteration of such
a view in Reagan. Thus: Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign,
its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power.
Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.

Although a State may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights under the
principle of auto-limitation (exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction), it by no means
follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They
are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the
bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not
and cannot be foreign territory. If it were otherwise, what was aptly referred to by Justice Tuason as a matter
of comity, courtesy, or expediency becomes one of obeisance and submission. If on a concern purely domestic
in its implications, devoid of any connection with national security, the Military-Bases Agreement could be thus
interpreted, then sovereignty indeed becomes a mockery and an illusion.

ACCFA v. CUGCO - 30 SCRA 649

F: The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) was a government agency. Its
administrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA)
under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. .3844). On the other hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association
(ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), hereinafter referred to as the Unions, are labor
organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees, of ACCFA (now ACA). This
Decision involves a consolidation of two cases: 1) involving a ULP complaint by the UNIONS against ACCFA
and 2) involving a petition for certification election for an exclusive bargaining representative of ACCFA
employees. In both cases, ACCFA challenges the jurisdiction of the CIR based on the fact that ACCFA is engaged
in governmental functions, among others.

I: Whether or not the ACA exercises governmental functions?

H: YES

R: Aside from the governmental objectives, of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land
reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation

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of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in
the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to
Civil Service Laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt
as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.

The governmental functions of ACA may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent"
(as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of
crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the
determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under
this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the peoplethese latter
functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. The growing
complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete, The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if
it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. In the Philippines as almost everywhere else the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development
was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
concerning the promotion of social justice. It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was
enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes.

The implementation of the policy thus enunciated, insofar as the role of the ACA therein is concerned, is
spelled out in Sections 110 to 118, inclusive, of the Land Reform Code. Section 110 provides that "the
administrative machinery of the ACCFA shall be reorganized to enable it to align its activities with the
requirements and objective of this Code and shall be known as the Agricultural Credit Administration." Under
Section 112 the sum of P150,000,000 was appropriated out of national funds to finance the additional credit
functions of the ACA as a result of the land reform program laid down in the Code. Section 103 grants the ACA
the privilege of rediscounting with the Central Bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Bank. Section 105 directs the loaning activities of the ACA "to stimulate the development of
farmers' cooperatives," including those "relating to the production and marketing of agricultural products and
those formed to manage and/or own, on a cooperative basis, services and facilities, such as irrigation and
transport systems, established to support production and/or marketing of agricultural products." Section 106
deals with the extension by ACA of credit to small farmers in order to stimulate agricultural production. Sections
107 to 112 lay down certain guidelines to be followed in connection with the granting of loans, such as security,
interest and supervision of credit. Sections 113 to 118, inclusive, invest the ACA with certain rights and powers
not accorded to non-governmental entities.

The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as
given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which only a government
agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may legally exercise.

The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to Republic Act No. 3844
is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function and for that purpose Executive Order No. 75 has
placed the ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration together with the other member agencies, the
personnel complement of all of which are placed in one single pool and made available for assignment from one
agency to another, subject only to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, position
classification and wage structures.

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 The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These
functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from
"ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating
property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political
duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional
classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely
to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these latter
functions being ministrant he exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.

It was in furtherance of such policy (promotion of social justice) that the Land Reform Code was enacted
and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute
as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any
private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the
establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental
objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law
itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested
no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself
a government instrumentality and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of
standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any
vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.

In view of the foregoing premises, we hold that the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification
election sought in the Court below. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the
employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive
economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA (G.R. No. L-21824). This is
contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875 (Prohibition against strike in the government)

B. Government de jure and de facto

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez - 75 Phil. 113

F: The petition involved is one for mandamus against the respondent judge who refused to continue the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands. The respondent judge refused
to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on
October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that, "furthermore, the
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts
of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the
same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the governments established
in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were not de facto governments.

I: Whether or not the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during
the Japanese military occupation may be considered de facto governments?

H: YES
three kinds of de facto governments:

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R: The Supreme Court enumerated
There are several kinds of de facto governments. The firstis that government that gets possession and control
of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against
the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later
by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade
and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount
force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and of
Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that
established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the
parent state, such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of
secession.

Based on the above, thee Supreme Court held that: It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission,
which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942 by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was
a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the
second kind. It was not different from the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the
United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "the government established over an enemy's territory
during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the
conquered, and is subject to an restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such
government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the
same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of
such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p.
466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run
by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence.
It is a well-established doctrine in international law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hague Conventions
of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile
power), that belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the
territory controlled although the de jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to
exercise its rights as such. Even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the
Filipino people who, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, had organized
an independent government under that name with the support and backing of Japan, such government would
have been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state of
the United States. And, as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that organized by the
confederate states during the war of secession and recognized as such by the Supreme Court of the United States
in numerous cases; and similar to the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island
of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto government by same court in the case of
McCleod vs. United States (229 U. S., 416).
The governments of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good
and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino
forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. It is a legal maxim that, excepting that of a
political nature, "Law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. It is not
changed merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary section 9,
citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise 011 the Conflict of
Laws (Cambridge, 1916, section 131): "There can be no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes
into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of
human society. Once created, it persists until a change takes place, and when changed it continues in such

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changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to
amend; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative
act creates a change." As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence depends upon that of the laws which
create and confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being of a political nature, are not
abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by
legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not necessary in order that
they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of respecting and
not repealing those laws. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one
court be continued by or transferred to another court, are not required by the mere change of government or
sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the "former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so changed
that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order
that the new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings.

In re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno - 210 SCRA 589

F: Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter addressed to the Supreme Court, seeking the correction of his
seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals. Justice Puno was appointed to the Court of Appeals in 1980 and took
his oath in 1982 after serving as Assistant Solicitor General in the OSG. In 1983, the Court of Appeals became the
IAC pursuant to BP 129. In 1984, Justice Puno accepted an appointment to be Deputy Minister in the Ministry of
Justice. After the EDSA Revolution in 1986, a Screening Committee was created in order to implement the
reorganization of the government. The Screening Committee recommended the return of Justice Puno as
Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and assigned him rank 11. However, when the appointments were
signed by President Aquino, Justice Punos ranking was changed to 26. Justice Puno alleges that his seniority
ranking should be corrected as the change may be attributed to inadvertence and in order to correctly apply
Executive Order No. 33, which among others, provides that Any Member who is reappointed to the Court after
rendering service in any other position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled
under his original appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes be considered as
continuous and uninterrupted. The Supreme Court granted Justice Punos request. However, a Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by Justices Campos and Javellana of the Court of Appeals who would be affected by
the ordered correction. They allege that the present Court of Appeals is a new Court with fifty one (51) members
and that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he was returning
to his former court, for the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last
appointment.

I: Whether the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or
seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing
prior to Executive Order No. 33 or whether the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the Court of
Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to said Executive Order No. 33?

H: A new court

R: It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes in fact,
it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had
earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the
organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state
evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the

10
Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then
in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.
The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order
No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolution and that the Court of Appeals
established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court with appointments thereto having no relation
to earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to precedence in rank contained in the last
sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33 refers to prospective situations as
distinguished from retroactive ones.
But even assuming, arguendo, that Executive Order No. 33 did not abolish the precedence or seniority ranking
resulting from previous appointment to the Court of Appeals or Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
the 1986 revolution, it is believed that President Aquino as head of the then revolutionary government, could
disregard or set aside such precedence or seniority in ranking when she made her appointments to the
reorganized Court of Appeals in 1986.
It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. 33, President Aquino was still
exercising the powers of a revolutionary government, encompassing both executive and legislative powers, such
that she could, if she so desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her own Executive Order
No. 33. It should also be remembered that the same situation was still in force when she issued the 1986
appointments to the Court of Appeals. In other words, President Aquino, at the time of the issuance of the 1986
appointments, modified or disregarded the rule embodied in B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Executive Order No.
33, on precedence or seniority in the case of the petitioner, for reasons known only to her. Since the appointment
extended by the President to the petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new Court of Appeals with its implicit
ranking in the roster of justices, was a valid appointment anchored on the Presidents exercise of her then
revolutionary powers, it is not for the Court at this time to question or correct that exercise.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan- 407 SCRA 10

F: Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Pursuant to that E.O.,
the PCGG investigated and thereafter raided former Philippine Army Chief Major General Joseph Ramas house
and lot in Quezon City and that of his alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano, a confidential agent of the Military
Security Unit of the Philippine Army. The Solicitor General filed a complaint against MGEN Ramas and
Dimaano for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Among others, the Sandiganbayan found
that there was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated during the raids and thus inadmissible as
evidence. On appeal, the Republic argues that the search and seizure was conducted at a time when the
revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents exclusionary right.

I: Whether or not the revolutionary government was obligated to uphold the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights during the interregnum?

H: During the interregnum, the ICCPR and UDHR but not the BOR

R: During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the
1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders

11
of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary
right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant
and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility
for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of
the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant,
the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a
legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government
was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.
As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States
good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders
of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such
directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution. The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid
abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application,
specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically
described in the warrant.

Section 12
Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.

F: Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion
and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their
perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from
rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the clash between the
seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep
division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society
came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the
iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on
the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to

12
protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude,
among others.

(According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the
RH law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. )

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment
and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive
health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should
not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.

While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH
Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the
regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from
them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be
and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for
employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of
the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are
not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the
petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante
Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred
and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in
particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law,
violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.

I: Whether RH law is unconstitutional, (Right to life of the unborn)?

H: Not decisive, but only an opinion. Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage without
proper hearing and evidence.

R: Ponentes opinion: It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. Even
if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a

13
creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or
the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent
vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the ratification
of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control
through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development.

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being
a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall
promotion of the family's wellbeing.

Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift,
the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle
of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely
grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided
to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When life begins

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the
deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own
views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which
reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because
before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute
as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there

14
are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization.
They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the
female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers
to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.

Following verga legis construction: the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and
defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable
zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by
the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.

Looking at intent of framers: Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the
Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their
deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."

From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide
equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of
the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when
life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional
provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive
and thus prohibited.

Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those
that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly,
following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of
conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation. According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception
and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."

15
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain
to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object -it
is a living human being complete with DNA and chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not
only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

Section 16
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. - 224 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

F:The principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded
as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-prof
it corporation organized for the purpose of engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our envir
onment and natural resources.

Petitioners, representing their generation and that of those yet to be born, filed a complaint against the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Invoking their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, prayed that the Court order the DENR to 1) cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
and 2) cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs have no cause of action,
among others. The lower court granted the MTD. Petitioners filed for certiorari.

I: Whether or not the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is an actionable right?

H: YES

R: The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal rightthe right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for
it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuationaptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitionersthe advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of

16
the countrys forests. Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization
of the countrys natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192,
Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be the
primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
countrys environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation
of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos. Thus, the right of the petitioners
(and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs dutyunder its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the
TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.

Concerned Residents of Manila Bay v. MMDA, GR Nos. 171947-48, December 8, 2008

F: Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection
of the Manila Bay. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision. Respondents appeal is based on two arguments: 1) that there must be a specific pollution incident
before they are required to act; and 2) the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.

I: Whether or not the cleanup of Manila Bay is mandatory on the MMDA, et al.,?

H: YES

R: In light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for
all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official
duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance
and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices
and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be
over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back
the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could
only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would
put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take
the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay. The era of delays, procrastination, and ad
hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work
before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies
and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up
and rehabilitating the Manila Bay.
The Supreme Court discussed the provisions of Republic Act No. 9003, describing the same as a sweeping
piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art.

17
II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding
petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation
to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

Section 19

Garcia v. Board of Investments - 191 SCRA 288

F: This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the site of the proposed petro-chemical plant from Bataan to
Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG). The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned corporation, located at Bataan. It
produces 60% of the national output of naphtha.
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied
with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the
plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was the use of naphtha cracker and
naphtha as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture
with PNOC. However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor
in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989 advising him of
BPCs desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by changing the job site from Limay,
Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and
the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell
Corporation.
There is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be
transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha
and/or liquefied petroleum gas as the approved amended application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical
Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who
has the final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.

I: Whether or not the BOI commits grave abuse of discretion by granting a request to move a plant to another
location against the national interest?

H: YES

R: Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan produces 60% of the national
output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the plant in Bataan. It can provide the feedstock
requirement of the plant. On the other hand, the country is short of LPG and there is need to import the same
for use of the plant in Batangas. The local production thereof by Shell can hardly supply the needs of the
consumers for cooking purposes. Scarce dollars will be diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in
order to feed the furnaces of the transferred petrochemical plant.

18
Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by the approval of Republic Act
No. 6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption from ad valorem tax. The law was enacted
specifically for the petrochemical industry. The policy determination by both Congress and the President is clear.
Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock
from naphtha to LPG.
Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and
priorities. The development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II of the Constitution.
In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 the sound development of the national economy in
consonance with the principles and objectives of economic nationalism is the set goal of government. In the
light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plants remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown to
justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely
choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the least.
Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of
national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the States full control over the development and
utilization of our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments in accordance with national
goals and priorities are too explicit not to be noticed and understood.
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated like a
garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer
chips, where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical industry is essential
to the national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government superintends
the industry by controlling the upstream or cracker facility.
In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given unprecedented favors, but through
its regulatory agency, the BOI, it surrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initial choice, a
choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the
Filipino people.
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving
the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances
to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is
a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to
run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part said he would not mind having
a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not even a
foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do with our heritage.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS - 267 SCRA 408

F:A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a domestic co
rporation, to stop GSIS from selling the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corpor
ation. Allegedly, the sale violates the 60%-40% rule. Background:

In 1995, Manila hotel was included in the privatization program of the government.
GSIS, the sole owner of Manila Hotel, proposed to sell to interested buyers 30% to 51% of its shares.
Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT
Sheraton as operator, prequalified as bidders.
The GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder.

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 10 days after, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match the bid price of Renong Berhad. It requested t
hat the award be made to itself citing the second paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution
(60%-40% rule)
GSIS refused to entertain petitioner's request.
TRO was issued

I: (1)Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision and
does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect
(2)Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing whether the controlling shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation
(3)Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony , the constitutional provision invoked
is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the
hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony
(4)Whether GSIS failed to give preference to petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(5)Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong Berhad,
a foreign corporation

H: GSIS was directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and the ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner.

1)Sec. 10.The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national
interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60%of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of invest
ments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be
used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional
provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.

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 First and third paragraphs are not selfexecuting because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, and the State still needs legislation to regulate
and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction,

BUT as to the 2nd paragraph, it is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation.

2) YES. the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources , but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos
3) 5 1% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
4) In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of
a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity.
And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are
to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither
be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
5)The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad
since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless.
Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale
only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign
entity. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid
of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Section 26
Pamatong v. Comelec 427 SCRA 96

F: Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003.
Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include
petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy. On January 15, 2004,
petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. The COMELEC denied the same under the aegis
of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five
(35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner
Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.

I: Whether or not the resolutions were rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987.

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H: NO.

R: Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities
for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly
in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege
to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain
language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal
access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated
in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. An inquiry into the
intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The provision is
not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that woul accommodate as many people as possible
into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the
provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear
State burden.
Davide Amendment : I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is
important would be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the
government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as
are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should
not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may
be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the word broaden.

Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive
rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric
appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public
service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not
the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations .
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10,
2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to
give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause
is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be
borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is
no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed
validity stands and has to be accorded due weight. Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access

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clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is misplaced. The rationale behind the prohibition against
nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run
for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,
objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion,
not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical
difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the
same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and
proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that
erodes faith in our democratic institutions.

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions
because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are
allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information
Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For the official ballots in
automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00). I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates
to continue if they cannot wage a decent campaign
enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run
in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers
in every polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or even the receipt of electoral contributions.
Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent
on the number of candidates in a given election.

Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral
process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke.
The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most
probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a
senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

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