G.R. No.

90501 August 5, 1991

ARIS (PHIL.) INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER FELIPE GARDUQUE III, LEODEGARIO DE GUZMAN, LILIA
PEREZ, ROBERTO BESTAMONTE, AIDA OPENA, REYNALDO TORIADO, APOLINARIO GAGAHINA, RUFINO DE CASTRO,
FLORDELIZA RAYOS DEL SOL, STEVE SANCHO, ESTER CAIRO, MARIETA MAGALAD, and MARY B. NADALA, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the amendment introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 to Article 223 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442, as amended) allowing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a
labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee and of Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under R.A. No.
6715 implementing the same. It also questions the validity of the Transitory Provision (Section 17) of the said Interim Rules.

The challenged portion of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on 21 March 1989, reads as follows:

SEC 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as follows:

ART. 223. Appeal.

xxx xxx xxx
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect
is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the
payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein.

This is a new paragraph ingrafted into the Article.

Sections 2 and 17 of the "NLRC Interim Rules On Appeals Under R.A. No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code", which the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on 8 August 1989, provide as follows:

Section 2. Order of Reinstatement and Effect of Bond. In so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, the decision of the
Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee shall immediately be executory even pending appeal. The employee
shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or, at the
option of the employer, merely be reinstated in the payroll.

The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 17. Transitory provision. Appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of these Interim Rules must
conform to the requirements as herein set forth or as may be directed by the Commission.

The antecedent facts and proceedings which gave rise to this petition are not disputed:

On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by management's failure to attend to their
complaints concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance conference.
As none was arranged, and believing that their appeal would be fruitless, they grouped together after the end of their work that day with
other employees and marched directly to the management's office to protest its long silence and inaction on their complaints.

On 12 April 1988, the management issued a memorandum to each of the private respondents, who were identified by the petitioner's
supervisors as the most active participants in the rally requiring them to explain why they should not be terminated from the service for
their conduct. Despite their explanation, private respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations, more
specifically of the provisions on security and public order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or concerted actions.

Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner and Mr. Gavino Bayan with the regional office
of the NLRC at the National Capital Region, Manila, which was docketed therein as NLRC-NCR-00-0401630-88.

After due trial, Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque III handed down on 22 June 1989 a decision' the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, herein
complainants Leodegario de Guzman, Rufino de Castro, Lilia M. Perez, Marieta Magalad, Flordeliza Rayos del Sol, Reynaldo
Toriado, Roberto Besmonte, Apolinario Gagahina, Aidam (sic) Opena, Steve C. Sancho Ester Cairo, and Mary B. Nadala to their
former respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but
with limited backwages of six (6) months except complainant Leodegario de Guzman.

All other claims and prayers are hereby denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On 19 July 1989, complainants (herein private respondents) filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution 2 pursuant to the above-
quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715.

On 21 July 1989, petitioner filed its Appeal.3

On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except Flor Rayos del Sol, filed a Partial Appeal. 4

On 10 August 1989, complainant Flor Rayos del Sol filed a Partial Appeal.5

On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition 6 to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution
pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of its effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it
shall be given retroactive effect7 and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 thereof to pending cases would not only result in the
imposition of an additional obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal since it would be burdened with the
consequences of reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment. In their Reply 8 filed on 1 September 1989, complainants argued
that R.A. No. 6715 is not sought to be given retroactive effect in this case since the decision to be executed pursuant to it was rendered
after the effectivity of the Act. The said law took effect on 21 March 1989, while the decision was rendered on 22 June 1989.

Petitioner submitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September 1989.9

On 5 October 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order granting the motion for execution and the issuance of a partial writ of execution 10
as far as reinstatement of herein complainants is concerned in consonance with the provision of Section 2 of the rules particularly the
last sentence thereof.

In this Order, the Labor Arbiter also made reference to Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules in this wise:

Since Section 17 of the said rules made mention of appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of these interim
rules which must conform with the requirements as therein set forth (Section 9) or as may be directed by the Commission, it obviously
treats of decisions of Labor Arbiters before March 21,1989. With more reason these interim rules be made to apply to the instant case
since the decision hereof (sic) was rendered thereafter.11

Unable to accept the above Order, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 October 1989 12 raising the issues adverted to in the
introductory portion of this decision under the following assignment of errors:

A. THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC, IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
PENDING APPEAL AND IN PROVIDING FOR SECTION 2 OF THE INTERIM RULES, RESPECTIVELY, ACTED WITHOUT AND
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION SINCE THE BASIS FOR SAID ORDER AND INTERIM RULE, i.e., SECTION 12 OF R.A. 6715 IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS IT BEING OPPRESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE.
B. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE PROVISION IN(SIC) REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS VALID, NONETHELESS,
THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC STILL ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RETROACTIVELY
APPLYING SAID PROVISION TO PENDING LABOR CASES.

In Our resolution of 7 March 1989, We required the respondents to comment on the petition.

Respondent NLRC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on 20 November 1989. 13 Meeting squarely the issues
raised by petitioner, it submits that the provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose
dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and the contested provision "is then
a police legislation.

As regards the retroactive application thereof, it maintains that being merely procedural in nature, it can apply to cases pending at the
time of its effectivity on the theory that no one can claim a vested right in a rule of procedure. Moreover, such a law is compatible with
the constitutional provision on protection to labor.

On 11 December 1989, private respondents filed a Manifestation 14 informing the Court that they are adopting the Comment filed by the
Solicitor General and stressing that petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for a valid petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

On 20 December 1989, petitioner filed a Rejoinder15 to the Comment of the Solicitor General.

In the resolution of 11 January 1990,16 We considered the Comments as respondents' Answers, gave due course to the petition, and
directed that the case be calendared for deliberation.

In urging Us to declare as unconstitutional that portion of Section 223 of the Labor Code introduced by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, as
well as the implementing provision covered by Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules, allowing immediate execution, even pending
appeal, of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, petitioner submits
that said portion violates the due process clause of the Constitution in that it is oppressive and unreasonable. It argues that a
reinstatement pending appeal negates the right of the employer to self-protection for it has been ruled that an employer cannot be
compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the employer; the right of an employer to
dismiss is consistent with the legal truism that the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither the oppression nor the
destruction of the employer. For, social justice should be implemented not through mistaken sympathy for or misplaced antipathy
against any group, but even-handedly and fairly.17

To clinch its case, petitioner tries to demonstrate the oppressiveness of reinstatement pending appeal by portraying the following
consequences: (a) the employer would be compelled to hire additional employees or adjust the duties of other employees simply to
have someone watch over the reinstated employee to prevent the commission of further acts prejudicial to the employer, (b)
reinstatement of an undeserving, if not undesirable, employee may demoralize the rank and file, and (c) it may encourage and
embolden not only the reinstated employees but also other employees to commit similar, if not graver infractions.

These rationalizations and portrayals are misplaced and are purely conjectural which, unfortunately, proceed from a misunderstanding
of the nature and scope of the relief of execution pending appeal.

Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by
the losing party or a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former may be applied for by the prevailing party during the
pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however, is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of
statutory origin18 and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly provide limitations or
qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party. Execution pending appeal is
one such relief long recognized in this jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal and the grant thereof is
left to the discretion of the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.19

Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, Article 223 of the Labor Code already allowed execution of decisions of the
NLRC pending their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the
1987 Constitution on labor and the working-man.
These provisions are the quintessence of the aspirations of the workingman for recognition of his role in the social and economic life of
the nation, for the protection of his rights, and the promotion of his welfare. Thus, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights of
the Constitution,20 which principally directs Congress to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good, the State is mandated to afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all; to guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law, security of tenure, human conditions of work, and a living wage, to participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law; and to promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes. Incidentally, a study of the Constitutions of
various nations readily reveals that it is only our Constitution which devotes a separate article on Social Justice and Human Rights.
Thus, by no less than its fundamental law, the Philippines has laid down the strong foundations of a truly just and humane society. This
Article addresses itself to specified areas of concern labor, agrarian and natural resources reform, urban land reform and housing,
health, working women, and people's organizations and reaches out to the underprivileged sector of society, for which reason the
President of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, former Associate Justice of this Court Cecilia Muoz-Palma, aptly describes this
Article as the "heart of the new Charter.21

These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and
meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms With equal
intensity.22 Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation's progress and stability.

If in ordinary civil actions execution of judgment pending appeal is authorized for reasons the determination of which is merely left to the
discretion of the judge, We find no plausible reason to withhold it in cases of decisions reinstating dismissed or separated employees. In
such cases, the poor employees had been deprived of their only source of livelihood, their only means of support for their family their
very lifeblood. To Us, this special circumstance is far better than any other which a judge, in his sound discretion, may determine. In
short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution
pending appeal.

The validity of the questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor
General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is
subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its permanent police power on the theory that the preservation of the lives
of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. 23 Then, by and pursuant to the
same power, the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a
continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its family.

The charge then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule are unconstitutional is absolutely baseless. Laws are
presumed constitutional.24 To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the constitution is clear beyond
reasonable doubt.25 In Parades, et al. vs. Executive Secretary26 We stated:

2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of
unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy,
commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The onerous task of proving
otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an
infringement of a constitutional provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is void on its face. Absent such a showing,
there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. Justice Malcolm's aphorism is apropos:
To doubt is to sustain.27

The reason for this:

... can be traced to the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins on each department a proper respect for the acts of the other
departments. ... The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been
carefully studied and determined to be constitution before it was finally enacted. Hence, as long as there is some other basis that
can be used by the courts for its decision, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be
decided on other available grounds.28

The issue concerning Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules does not deserve a measure of attention. The reference to it in the Order of
the Labor Arbiter of 5 October 1989 was unnecessary since the procedure of the appeal proper is not involved in this case. Moreover,
the questioned interim rules of the NLRC, promulgated on 8 August 1989, can validly be given retroactive effect. They are procedural or
remedial in character, promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended. Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect. 29 There are no vested rights in rules of procedure. 30 A
remedial statute may be made applicable to cases pending at the time of its enactment. 31

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995
HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and the City of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED CORPORATION,
respondents.
G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
These two (2) cases which are inter-related actually involve simple issues. if these issues have apparently become complicated, it is not
by reason of their nature because of the events and dramatis personae involved.

The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of this Court on 01 September 1994 based on a finding that there
was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the
questioned orders. Judge Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTC of Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which
were assailed by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, in said G.R. No. 115044:

a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of
Associated Development Corporation (ADC).
b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the
order dated 28 March 1994.
c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/license to Associated
Development Corporation (ADC).

The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September
1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila
Ordinance No. 7065.

On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and
Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to withdraw
such grant of authority, to Associated Development Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila, until the following legal
questions are properly resolved:

1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as of 20 August 1975 is
unconstitutional.
2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power on 7 September 1971 to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development
Corporation, whether the franchise granted is valied considering that the franchise has no duration, and appears to be granted
in perpetuity.
3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation on 7 September
1971 in view of executive Order No. 392 dated 1 January 1951 which transferred from local governments to the Games and
Amusements Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai.1

On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC) filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus, injunction
and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against petitioner Guingona and then GAB chairman Sumulong, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-71656, seeking to prevent GAB from
withdrawing the provisional authority that had earlier been granted to ADC. On the same day, the RTC of Manila, Branch 4, through
presiding Judge Vetino Reyes, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the GAB from withdrawing ADC's provisional authority.
This temporary restraining order was converted into a writ of preliminary injunction upon ADC's posting of a bond in the amount of
P2,000,000.00.2

Subsequently, also in G.R. No. 115044, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Games and Amusements Board, filed a "Motion for
Intervention; for Leave to File a Motion for reconsideration in Intervention; and to Refer the case to the Court En Banc" and later a
"Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention and to Admit Attached Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention.

In an En Banc Resolution dated 20 September 1994, this Court referred G.R. No. 115044 to the Court En Banc and required the
respondents therein to comment on the aforementioned motions.

Meanwhile, Judge Reyes on 19 October 1994 issued another order, this time, granting ADC a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against Guingona and GAB to compel them to issue in favor of ADC the authority to operate jai-alai.

Guingona, as executive secretary, and Dominador Cepeda, Jr. as the new GAB chairman, then filed the petition in G.R. No. 117263
assailing the abovementioned orders of respondent Judge Vetino Reyes.

On 25 October 1994, in G.R. No. 117263, this Court granted petitioner's motion for leave to file supplemental petition and to admit
attached supplemental petition with urgent prayer for restraining order. The Court further required respondents to file their comment on
the petition and supplemental petition with urgent prayer for restraining order. The Court likewise set the case and all incidents thereof
for hearing on 10 November 1994.

At the hearing on 10 November 1994, the issues to be resolved were formulated by the Court as follows:
1. whether or not intervention by the Republic of the Philippines at this stage of the proceedings is proper;
2. assuming such intervention is proper, whether or not the Associated Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting
franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai;
3. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned
temporary restraining order (later writ of preliminary injunction); and
4. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
On the issue of the propriety of the intervention by the Republic of the Philippines, a question was raised during the hearing on 10
November 1994 as to whether intervention in G.R. No. 115044 was the proper remedy for the national government to take in
questioning the existence of a valid ADC franchise to operate the jai-alai or whether a separate action for quo warranto under Section 2,
Rule 66 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy.

We need not belabor this issue since counsel for respondent ADC agreed to the suggestion that this Court once and for all settle all
substantive issues raised by the parties in these cases. Moreover, this Court can consider the petition filed in G.R. No. 117263 as one
for quo warranto which is within the original jurisdiction of the Court under section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution. 3

On the propriety of intervention by the Republic, however, it will be recalled that this Court in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals (93
SCRA 238) allowed intervention even beyond the period prescribed in Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled in said
case that a denial of the motions for intervention would "lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successor-
in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should
intervenors' claim be proven to be true.

In the present case, the resulting injustice and injury, should the national government's allegations be proven correct, are manifest, since
the latter has squarely questioned the very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai (which is a gambling
operation) in favor of ADC. As will be more extensively discussed later, the national government contends that Manila Ordinance No.
7065 which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct jai-alai operations is void and ultra vires since Republic Act No. 954,
approved on 20 June 1953, or very much earlier than said Ordinance No. 7065, the latter approved 7 September 1971, in Section 4
thereof, requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. Additionally, the national government
argues that even assuming, arguendo, that the abovementioned ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise was nonetheless effectively
revoked by Presidential decree No. 771, issued on 20 August 1975, Sec. 3 of which expressly revoked all existing franchises and
permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments.

On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance No. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila pursuant to its delegated
powers under it charter, Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal
protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In this connection, counsel for ADC contends that this Court should really
rule on the validity of PD No. 771 to be able to determine whether ADC continues to possess a valid franchise.

It will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties in this case if this Court were to shirk from ruling on the issue of constitutionality of
PD No. 771. Such issue has, in our view, become the very lis mota in resolving the present controversy, in view of ADC's insistence that
it was granted a valid and legal franchise by Ordinance No. 7065 to operate the jai-alai.

The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by
this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or
presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers).

Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC's franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD
No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court's First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot
have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2)
of the Constitution.4

And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise, the well-
settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents ( Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we conclude that the republic (in contra distinction to the City of Manila) may
be allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of its business or
proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its governmental functions to protect public morals and promote the general welfare.

II
Anent the question of whether ADC has a valid franchise to operate the Jai-Alai de Manila, a statement of the pertinent laws is in order.
1. The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949. Section 18 thereof provides:

Sec. 18. Legislative Powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(jj) To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public on boxing, sipa, bowling, billiards, pools, horse and dog
races, cockpits, jai-alai, roller or ice-skating on any sporting or athletic contests, as well as grant exclusive rights to establishments
for this purpose, notwithstanding any existing law to the contrary.

2. On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the
Games and Amusements Board (GAB).

3. On 20 June 1953, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954, entitled "An Act to Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque Pelota Games
(Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation". The provisions of Republic Act No. 954 relating to jai-alai are as follows:

Sec. 4. No person, or group of persons other than the operator or maintainer of a fronton with legislative franchise to conduct
basque pelota games (Jai-alai), shall offer, to take or arrange bets on any basque pelota game or event, or maintain or use a
totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or gamble on any basque pelota game or event. (emphasis supplied).
 Sec. 5. No person, operator or maintainer of a fronton with legislative franchise to conduct basque pelota games shall offer, take, or
arrange bets on any basque pelota game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or
gamble on any basque pelota game or event outside the place, enclosure, or fronton where the basque pelota game is held.
4. On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled "An Ordinance
Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In
The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.

5. On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled "Revoking All Powers
and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse
And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling", in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits issued by local governments.

6. On 16 October 1975, Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An Act granting The Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement Corporation A
Franchise To Operate, Construct And Maintain A Fronton For Basque Pelota And Similar Games of Skill In THE Greater Manila Area,"
was promulgated.

7 On 08 May 1987, then President Aquino, by virtue of Article XVIII, Section 6, of the Constitution, which allowed the incumbent
legislative powers until the first Congress was convened, issued Executive Order No. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 and revoking and
cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 117263 argue that Republic Act No. 954 effectively removed the power of the Municipal Board of Manila to grant
franchises for gambling operations. It is argued that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 is used to refer to franchises
issued by Congress.

On the other hand, ADC contends that Republic Act N. 409 (Manila Chapter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to grant
franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954 does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as referring exclusively to Congress, then
Rep. Act No. 954 did not remove the power of the Municipal Board under Section 18(jj) of Republic Act No. 409 and consequently it was
within the power of the City of Manila to allow ADC to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.

On this point, the government counter-argues that the term "legislative powers" is used in Rep. Act No. 409 merely to distinguish the
powers under Section 18 of the law from the other powers of the Municipal Board, but that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act
No. 954 refers to a franchise granted solely by Congress.

Further, the government argues that Executive Order No. 392 dated 01 January 1951 transferred even the power to regulate Jai-Alai
from the local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB), a national government agency.

It is worthy of note that neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC to support its alleged possession of a valid franchise, namely the
Charter of the City of Manila (Rep. Act No. 409) and Manila Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word "franchise". Rep. Act No. 409 empowers
the Municipal Board of Manila to "tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting" and to "grant exclusive rights to establishments",
while Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Manila City Mayor to "allow and permit" ADC to operate jai-alai facilities in the City of Manila.

It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting, including
the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise". What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with
respect to wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the
City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something
meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate. Moreover,
even this power to license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed from local governments, including the City of
Manila, and transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is that the authority to grant
franchises for the operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB.

In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate
even if its has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.

It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the Revised Penal Code punishes gambling and betting under Articles 195 to 199
thereof. Gambling is thus generally prohibited by law, unless another law is enacted by Congress expressly exempting or excluding
certain forms of gambling from the reach of criminal law. Among these form the reach of criminal law. Among these forms of gambling
allowed by special law are the horse races authorized by Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 983 and gambling casinos authorized under
Presidential Decree No. 1869.

While jai-alai as a sport is not illegal per se, the accepting of bets or wagers on the results of jai-alai games is undoubtedly gambling
and, therefore, a criminal offense punishable under Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code, unless it is shown that a later or special
law had been passed allowing it. ADC has not shown any such special law.

Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal
Board certain delegated legislative powers under Section 18. A perusal of the powers enumerated under Section 18 shows that these
powers are basically regulatory in nature. 5 The regulatory nature of these powers finds support not only in the plain words of the
enumerations under Section 28 but also in this Court's ruling in People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56).

In Vera, this Court declared that a law which gives the Provincial Board the discretion to determine whether or not a law of general
application (such as, the Probation law-Act No. 4221) would or would not be operative within the province, is unconstitutional for being
an undue delegation of legislative power.

From the ruling in Vera, it would be logical to conclude that, if ADC's arguments were to prevail, this Court would likewise declare
Section 18(jj) of the Revised Charter of Manila unconstitutional for the power it would delegate to the Municipal Board of Manila would
give the latter the absolute and unlimited discretion to render the penal code provisions on gambling inapplicable or inoperative to
persons or entities issued permits to operate gambling establishments in the City of Manila.

We need not go to this extent, however, since the rule is that laws must be presumed valid, constitutional and in harmony with other
laws. Thus, the relevant provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it should then
be clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board should be understood to be regulatory in nature and that Republic Act No.
954 should be understood to refer to congressional franchises, as a necessity for the operation of jai-alai.

We need not, however, again belabor this issue further since the task at hand which will ultimately, and with finality, decide the issues in
this case is to determine whether PD No. 771 validly revoked ADC's franchise to operate the jai-alai, assuming (without conceding) that
it indeed possessed such franchise under Ordinance No. 7065.

ADC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection and non-impairment provisions of the
Constitution. On the other hand, the government contends that PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State.

The police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State. It is based on the ancient doctrine
salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law.) In the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39
Phil. 660), this Court through Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus:

The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling
necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society. Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the
onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security
for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.

In the matter of PD No. 771, the purpose of the law is clearly stated in the "whereas clause" as follows:

WHEREAS, it has been reported that in spite of the current drive of our law enforcement agencies against vices and illegal
gambling, these social ills are still prevalent in many areas of the country;

WHEREAS, there is need to consolidate all the efforts of the government to eradicate and minimize vices and other forms of social
ills in pursuance of the social and economic development program under the new society;

WHEREAS, in order to effectively control and regulate wagers or betting by the public on horse and dog races, jai-alai and other
forms of gambling there is a necessity to transfer the issuance of permit and/or franchise from local government to the National
Government.

It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially
antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD
No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development.

In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation (20 July 1994, G.R. No. 111097), this Court stated thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:

In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislative power may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may
prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng
and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding wisdom, morality and
practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the executive and legislative departments, to
which the function belongs in our scheme of government. (Emphasis supplied)

Talks regarding the supposed vanishing line between right and privilege in American constitutional law has no relevance in the context
of these cases since the reference there is to economic regulations. On the other hand, jai-alai is not a mere economic activity which the
law seeks to regulate. It is essentially gambling and whether it should be permitted and, if so, under what conditions are questions
primarily for the lawmaking authority to determine, talking into account national and local interests. Here, it is the police power of the
State that is paramount.

ADC questions the motive for the issuance of PD Nos. 771. Clearly, however, this Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771
was enacted to benefit a select group which was later given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of
legislative motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black, J.) There is, the
first place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADC's allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second
place, as already averred, this Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable
and even laudable.

It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that the national government can subsequently grant franchises "upon proper
application and verification of the qualifications of the applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a franchise with the
national government subsequent to the enactment of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations abovementioned (of preference to a select
group) are based on conjectures, speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that while then president Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169 revoking PD No. 810 (which
granted a franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jai-alai), she did not scrap or repeal PD No. 771 which had revoked all franchises
to operate jai-alais issued by local governments, thereby re-affirming the government policy that franchises to operate jai-alais are for
the national government (not local governments) to consider and approve.

On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a
franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are
within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is
always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare.

In RCPI v. NTC (150 SCRA 450), we held that:

A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject." This
definition was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by every authority since . . . Today, a franchise being merely a
 privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state
itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies.

There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere privilege because jai-alai, when played for bets, is pure and simple
gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise for the operation of a public utility, such as public transportation company, is to trivialize the
great historic origin of this branch of royal privilege.
As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise under the provisions of PD No. 771. and yet, the purpose of PD No.
771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to the national government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises. Thus, all
franchises then existing were revoked but were made subject to reissuance by the national government upon compliance by the
applicant with government-set qualifications and requirements.

There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local
governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the
only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises
were revoked. Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have
raised these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty 920) years ago.

Finally, we do not agree that Section 3 of PD No. 771 and the requirement of a legislative franchise in Republic Act No. 954 are "riders"
to the two 92) laws and are violative of the rule that laws should embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title, as argued by
ADC. In Cordero v. Cabatuando (6 SCRA 418), this Court ruled that the requirement under the constitution that all laws should embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title is sufficiently met if the title is comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of the objective.

III
On the issue of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the temporary
restraining order (later converted to a writ of preliminary injunction) and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, we hold and rule
there was.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the rules of Court provides for the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. While ADC could allege
these grounds, respondent judge should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 rule 129 of the
Rules of court. These laws negate the existence of any legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. since PD No. 771 and Republic Act No. 954 are presumed valid and constitutional until ruled otherwise
by the Supreme Court after due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs issued and consequently there was grave abuse of discretion
in issuing them.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. allowing the Republic of the Philippines to intervene in G.R. No. 115044.
2. declaring Presidential Decree No. 771 valid and constitutional.
3. declaring that respondent Associated Development corporation (ADC) does not possess the required congressional franchise to
operate and conduct the jai-alai under Republic Act No. 954 and Presidential Decree No. 771.
4. setting aside the writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge Vetino Reyes in civil
Case No. 94-71656.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 149276. September 27, 2002]
JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND WILSON CHAM, respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties for estafa
committed by means of bouncing checks, is being challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative of the due process clause,
the right to bail and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the Constitution.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and documentary proofs, follow.

In December 1991, petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks, namely, Metrobank check no. 464728 dated
January 15, 1992 in the amount of P365,750 and Metrobank check no. 464743 dated January 22, 1992 in the amount of P429,000.
Check no. 464728 was dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against insufficient funds while check no. 464743 was not
presented for payment upon request of petitioners who promised to replace the dishonored check.

When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check no. 464728, the private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charging petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 818.

On February 16, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against petitioners and recommending the filing of
an information for estafa with no bail recommended. On the same day, an information for the crime of estafa was filed with Branch 217
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against petitioners. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-101574. Thereafter,
the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of herein petitioners, thus:

It appearing on the face of the information and from supporting affidavit of the complaining witness and its annexes that probable
cause exists, that the crime charged was committed and accused is probably guilty thereof, let a warrant for the arrest of the
accused be issued.

No Bail Recommended.

SO ORDERED.

On July 18, 2001, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest which was denied by the trial court.
Likewise, petitioners motion for bail filed on July 24, 2001 was denied by the trial court on the same day. Petitioner Jovencio Lim was
arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the trial court and was detained at the Quezon City Jail. However, petitioner Teresita
Lim remained at large.

On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court
and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due process, bail and
imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

In a resolution dated February 26, 2002, this Court granted the petition of Jovencio Lim to post bail pursuant to Department of Justice
Circular No. 74 dated November 6, 2001 which amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide involving estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d), and
qualified theft. Said Circular specifically provides as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, bail
shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par. 2 (a) of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an
additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00; Provided, however, that the total amount of bail shall not
exceed P60,000.00.

In view of the aforementioned resolution, the matter concerning bail shall no longer be discussed. Thus, this decision will focus on
whether or not PD 818 violates Sections 1 and 19 of Article III of the Constitution, which respectively provide:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
xxx
Section 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. x x x.

We shall deal first with the issue of whether PD 818 was enacted in contravention of Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution. In this
regard, the impugned provision of PD 818 reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the later sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall
be termed reclusion perpetua;
2nd. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos.
3rd. The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By prision mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos.
Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is P365,750, they can be penalized with reclusion perpetua or 30
years of imprisonment. This penalty, according to petitioners, is too severe and disproportionate to the crime they committed and
infringes on the express mandate of Article III, Section 19 of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment.
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless
it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] Based on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty
of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading.

In People vs. Tongko,this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or
character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which never existed
in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in
the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides
insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman.

Petitioners also argue that while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa committed under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the
Revised Penal Code, it did not increase the amounts corresponding to the said new penalties. Thus, the original amounts provided for in
the Revised Penal Code have remained the same notwithstanding that they have become negligible and insignificant compared to the
present value of the peso.

This argument is without merit. The primary purpose of PD 818 is emphatically and categorically stated in the following:

WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa (swindling) cases committed by means of bouncing checks;
WHEREAS, if not checked at once, these criminal acts would erode the peoples confidence in the use of negotiable instruments as
a medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the
banking system of the country;
WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this kind of estafa cases by increasing the existing penalties provided
therefor.

Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the
repression of an evil that undermines the countrys commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter
people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD 818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties only
proves that the amount is immaterial and inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed
by means of bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law was decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does
not violate Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.

Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The burden of proving the invalidity
of a law rests on those who challenge it. In this case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption
of constitutionality of PD 818.

With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution, petitioners claim that PD 818 is
violative of the due process clause of the Constitution as it was not published in the Official Gazette. This claim is incorrect and must be
rejected. Publication, being an indispensable part of due process, is imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees and
executive orders. PD 818 was published in the Official Gazette on December 1, 1975.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, this Court upholds the constitutionality of PD 818.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997]
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N.
SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT, respondents.

DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:

In our predisposition to discover the original intent of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize
that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the
statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.

The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:

a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;

b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:

1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provision of the Constitution, hence void; because
its provision that Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order to process of
any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever

i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy
the judgment rendered in petitioners favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution;
ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution;
iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape
civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign
currency deposit account with an authorized bank.

The antecedents facts:

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to
go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to
rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and
people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered
from Bartelli the following items:
1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20;
2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.);
3.) Dollar Account China Banking Corp., US $/A#54105028-2;
4.) ID-122-30-8877;
5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash;
6.) Door Keys 6 pieces;
7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.

On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious
Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24,
1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartellis petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.

On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscals Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure
Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28,
1989.

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting the application of herein petitioners,
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the
amount P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989.

On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March
13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of
garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking
Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a
garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to
this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.

This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section
113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said section has rendered
nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of
preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:

May 26, 1989

Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino
12 Pres. Osmea Avenue
South Admiral Village
Paranaque, Metro Manila
Dear Ms. Carolino:

This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).
The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor has the same been repealed nor amended.
The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the countrys banking system which would help in the development of
the economy. There is no intention to render futile the basic rights of a person as was suggested in your subject letter. The law may
be harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
Director

Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners motion for leave to serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No.
89-3214 entitled Karen Salvacion. et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott. Summons with the complaint was published in the Manila Times
once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August
7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the latter:
1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;
2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a
total of P300,000.00 for both of them;
3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and
4. To pay attorneys fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of damages herein awarded;
5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus
6. Costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.

The heinous acts of respondents Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision
as follows:

The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but was able to escape therefrom on February 24,
1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805).
Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a
newspaper of general circulation as attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said
newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the complaint despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the
last publication; hence, upon motion of the plaintiffs through counsel, defendant was declared in default and plaintiffs were
authorized to present their evidence ex parte.

In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witness the minor Karen E. Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salacion, Jr., a certain
Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato Mandulio, who gave the following testimony:

Karen took her first year high school in St. Marys Academy in Pasay City but has recently transferred to Arellano University for her
second year.

In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her
free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her.
She was then alone because Edna Tangile had already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)

The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when he talked to her. He said he was a Math
teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter who is about Karens age and
who was with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5).

The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him its Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house
where she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp.5-6)

They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the defendants house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p.6)

When they reached the apartment house, Karen notices that defendants alleged niece was not outside the house but defendant told her
maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was
upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)

Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous because his niece was not there. Defendant
got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karens hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her.
He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)

Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the
bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could
come out because there were tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain
after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p.8)

He then got a Johnsons Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to her sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into
her but he was not able to do so. While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe
pain. She merely presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long
the defendant was in that position. (Id., pp. 8-9)

After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could
only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a
shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After the shower,
Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen
had no way of determining the exact time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to give her food before she
went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00 oclock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after breakfast of biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen
while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m.
In the evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like
lugaw. For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night. During those three times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex
organ but she could not say whether the organ was inserted wholly.

Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth
anymore but she did not cry for help for fear that she might be killed; besides, all those windows and doors were closed. And even if she
shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able to call a police, it was
still possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out
her chance to call for help. At nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)

On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for thirty minutes after breakfast of biscuits; again in
the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen did not know that there was a window because everything was covered by a
carpet, until defendant opened the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window was
covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and
carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)

That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom
and saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help
through the hole. She cried: Maawa na po kayo sa akin. Tulungan nyo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako! Somebody heard her. It
was a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was istorbo. Karen pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep
and she will call the police. She finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)

She woke up at 6:00 oclock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up.
When he woke up, he again got some food but he always kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On
that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 9:00, and the
third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he
caught her shouting for help but he did not understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left the
house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroom and shouted for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she
heard many voices. The voices were asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice
of a woman saying they will just call the police. They were also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the bathroom to the
room but she did not change her clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call the police and the defendant see her in different
clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the American bacause the latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16)

Afterwards, defendant arrived and opened the door. He asked her if she had asked for help because there were many policemen
outside and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed
her to tell the police that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing
but she could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)

When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could.
She heard somebody going upstairs and when the door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and the
reason why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and the defendant
was talking to them. Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis, Karen added. The policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)

They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the house. They rode the car of a certain person she called
Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They
were brought to Sub-Station I and there she was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her
mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)

At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The written statement she gave to the police was marked
Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a
doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in early morning, of the following day when they reached
the NBI, (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal officer has been marked as Exhibit B.

She was studying at the St. Marys Academy in Pasay City at the time of the Incident but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario
Mabini, Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She
first applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station but she was
denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The reason for their denial was that they might be implicated
in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)

xxx xxx xxx

After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and sister anymore, and she is always in a state of
shock; she has been absent-minded and is ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be
restless or sad. (Id., p. 11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she
would always recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from this experience. (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989,
pp. 10-11)

Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three
consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of
the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartellis dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the
bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.

Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.

The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:

May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower
court? She Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the
Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?

Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing that Foreign currency deposits shall be
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds that:

1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the
judgment rendered in petitioners favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution;
2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege n violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution;
3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminal could escape civil liability
for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account
with an authorized bank; and
4.) The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi- legislative power
when it took away:
a.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary
attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court;
b.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the
judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do
so.

On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No.
960 did not exceed its power or authority because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended
by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits,
but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution because
a.) it was based on a law;
b.) the law seems to be reasonable;
c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and
d.) it applies to all members of a class.

Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any
other order process of any court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the
Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking
institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines,
thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country; that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure; and that it applies to all currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the public interest and the general welfare;
that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to
take some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to some kinds
of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57
of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and
R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever.

For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated
that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly
hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is not only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the
sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960; and that despite the harsh effect to these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.

This court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.

Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained
and treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declatory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been
recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as
one for mandamus.

Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged
niece the Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped
by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was
able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case
for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched
reputation she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the
money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the
favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision,

Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was indoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she
had undergone which could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in
fact she had been actually humiliated once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University,
where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because the school authorities of the said High School learned about what
happened to her and allegedly feared that they might be implicated in the case.
 xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial manner defendant had committed the
acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her
being so naive and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her nor
capable of committing such heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard
of an old Filipino adage that in every forest there is a snake, xxx.

If Karens sad fate had happened to anybodys own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency
deposit could be more important than his childs right to said award of damages; in this case, the victims claim for damages from this
alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the
questioned provisions.

It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the countrys economy was in a shambles; when foreign
investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times
show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law
for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the
inquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as as the case before us.

It has thus been said that-

But I also know, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more
developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change with the
change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times We might as well require a man to wear still
the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.

In his comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:

"The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who
takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged
by the allien. More specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or other
court process accorded to foreign currency deposits PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come
from a lender or investor but from a mere transient who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.

The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely
passing through.
xxx
xxx Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil
Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:

Sec. 113 Exemption from attachment. Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.

Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426:

Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the publication of such rules and regulations in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central
Bank promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules and regulations at the time the deposit
was made shall govern.

The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426. As amended by P.D. 1246, thus:

Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. -- All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby
declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no
instance shall such foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said
foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.

The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment, garnishment and other court process to foreign currency deposits
is stated in its whereases, viz.:

WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, certain Philippine banking institutions and
branches of foreign banks are authorized to accept deposits in foreign currency;

WHEREAS, under provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing the establishment of an offshore banking system in the
Philippines, offshore banking units are also authorized to receive foreign currency deposits in certain cases;

WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore
Banking System in the Philippines, certain incentives were provided for under the two Systems such as confidentiality subject to
certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest income of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or
business in the Philippines;

WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits
from tax, and guaranteeing the vested right of depositors would better encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the
banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a position to
properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the
country;
Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency deposits is to assure the development and speedy
growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines (3rd Whereas).

The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows:

WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an offshore banking system, such as political stability, a growing economy
and adequate communication facilities, among others, exist in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access as possible to the sources of capital funds for
economic development;

WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing
our links with foreign lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into the Philippines, creating employment opportunities and
expertise in international finance, and contributing to the national development effort.

WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and other positive factors provide the Philippines with the
clear potential to develop as another financial center in Asia;

On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD No. 1035. Its purpose are as follows:

WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines has been authorized under a separate decree;

WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have
the resources and managerial competence to more actively engage in foreign exchange transactions and participate in the grant of
foreign currency loans to resident corporations and firms;

WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the said depository banks under RA 6426 and apply to
their transactions the same taxes as would be applicable to transaction of the proposed offshore banking units;

It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were
designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It
is these depositors that are induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives by them.

Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encourage by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035
and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will
maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.

Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation
only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines.

For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court. Legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a
citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizerzmente con damo de otro. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of
those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377)

It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli
for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.

Call it what it may but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the
lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient
alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness legal tyranny.

We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A.
6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to
COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch
CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would
satisfy the judgment.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213330, November 16, 2015
ALELI C. ALMADOVAR, GENERAL MANAGER ISAWAD, ISABELA CITY, BASILAN PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. CHAIRPERSON MA.
GRACIA M. PULIDO-TAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the December 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Commission on Audit (COA) and the April 4, 2014 Resolution 2 of the COA En Bane which affirmed the October 28, 2010
Decision3 of the COA Regional Office No. IX (COA Regional Office) regarding Notices of Disallowances (NDs).

Isabela Water District (ISAWAD) is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, or the "Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973" (PWUA), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9286.4 Aleli G. Almadovar (petitioner) is the General Manager (GM) of ISAWAD.5

On January 25, 2007, Catalino S. Genel (Genel), Audit Team Leader for ISAWAD, Isabela City, issued the following NDs for ISAWAD's
various payments:6
ND No. Particulars Amount

2006-001 Payment of salary increase for the GM, P73,755.00

(2005)7 ISAWAD, from P20,823.00 to P35,574-00
per month, from August to December,
2005, without legal basis.

2006-002(2005)8 Payment of legal retainer's fee at P48,000.00

P4,000.00 per month for the period from of
January to December 2005 without proper
authority from the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
and the written concurrence of the COA.

2006-003(2005)9 Payment of honorarium to OGCC Lawyer P24,000.00

without express authority from the OGCC,
and proof of service rendered to the
ISAWAD

2006-004(2005)10 Payment of Representation and P6,000.00

Transportation Allowances (RATA) to the
GM, ISAWAD over and above the
authorized rate of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) under
Corporate Budget Circular (CBC) No. 18
and National Budget Circular (NBC) No.
498

On April 26, 2007, petitioner filed an appeal with the Regional Cluster Director, Cluster Ill-Public Utilities, Corporation Government
Sector, which was indorsed to the COA Regional Office. Petitioner insisted that the increase in her salary and her RATA was in
accordance with R.A. No. 9286, or the law which amended the PWUA.11

Petitioner further claimed that the engagement of a private counsel, Atty. Quirino Esguerra Jr. (Atty. Esguerra), and the designation of
OGCC lawyer, Atty. Fortunato G. Operario Jr. (Atty. Operario), were in accordance with the procedure set forth by law. Consequently, the
payments made to them were appropriate.12

The COA Regional Office Ruling

On October 28, 2010, the COA Regional Office rendered a decision affirming with modification the assailed NDs. It explained that the
compensation of the GMs of local water districts (LWDs) was still subject to the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, or the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL). Thus, it found that the increase in petitioner's salary was improper as it ran afoul with the provisions of R.A.
No. 6758. It also agreed that the disallowance of petitioner's RATA was correct because it exceeded the allowable RATA for her position
pursuant to CBC No. 18,13 dated April 1, 2005, and NBC No. 498,14 dated November 14, 2000.

The COA Regional Office also agreed that the payment of honoraria to Atty. Operario had no basis because it constituted an
unnecessary and excessive expenditure. The disallowed amount in ND No. 2006-002(2005), was reduced from P48,000.00 to
P40,000.00 because Atty. Esguerra's services from November to December 2005 were covered by a retainership contract duly
approved by the OGCC and with the written concurrence of the COA.

The case was automatically elevated for review to the COA pursuant to Section 7, Rule V of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedures of
the COA.

The COA Ruling

On December 29, 2011, the COA rendered the assailed decision affirming the ruling of the COA Regional Office. It stressed that before
a private lawyer may be hired by the GOCC, the written conformity of the OGCC and the written concurrence of the COA must first be
secured -which also applied in cases of contract renewal. The COA ruled that the payments to Atty. Esguerra from January to October
2005 were improper because his services were retained without the necessary conformity and concurrence of both the OGCC and the
COA. Only the retainership contract for a period of one year effective on November 1, 2005 was with the conformity and concurrence of
both the OGCC and the COA.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but her motion was denied by the COA En Banc in its assailed
resolution, dated April 4, 2014.

Hence, this present petition.

ISSUES

1] Whether or not the disbursements under the NDs were improper.

2] In the event the disbursements were improper, whether or not petitioner liable to refund the same.

Petitioner insists that her salary increase was proper because LWDs were exempt from the coverage of the SSL as Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9286, a later law, empowered the board of directors of LWDs to fix the salary of its GM, thereby impliedly repealing R.A. No. 6758;
that her salary was within the scale provided by the Office of the Philippine Association of Water Districts, Inc.; and that she need not
refund the alleged overpaid RATA because she acted in good faith as she stopped claiming the same after the NDs were issued. 15

Petitioner also claims that the payments to Atty. Esguerra from January to October 2005 were valid because the OGCC concurred with
the retainership contract for one year effective from November 1, 2004. She faults the COA for belatedly acting upon the request for
conformity. Likewise, petitioner posits that the written concurrence of the COA only applies to the engagement or hiring of a private
lawyer and not the renewal of the retainership. She argues that the retainership of Atty. Esguerra had been effected on a yearly basis
starting November 1, 2003, which necessarily follows that subsequent renewal should be in November of the succeeding year. 16

Petitioner also faults the OGCC for the delay in issuing the necessary authority for Atty. Operario, baring that as early as 2004 the board
of directors of ISAWAD already requested from the OGCC the necessary authority, but it was given only on July 11, 2006. She avers
that denying the lawyers the remuneration for their services will be tantamount to unjust enrichment. 17

Citing Mendoza v. COA18 (Mendoza), petitioner claims that she acted in good faith in making all the disbursements and, therefore, she
should not be made to refund them because they were given under an honest belief that the payees were entitled to the said
remunerations and these were in consideration for their services rendered. Petitioner likewise prays for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO because she stands to suffer grave injustice and great irreparable injury.

In its Comment,19 dated July 28, 2014, the COA countered that LWDs were covered by R.A. No. 6758 or the SSL. R.A. No. 9286 did not
expressly repeal it, and an implied repeal, as claimed by petitioner, was disfavored by law.

The COA also contended that the renewal of retainership contracts required the written concurrence of the COA. It is also insisted that
the payments of honorarium made to Atty. Operario were improper because at the time he rendered his services, the OGCC had yet to
issue any authority. It noted that the OGCC approval and the COA concurrence were required to ensure that there was basis for the
engagement of a private lawyer.

The COA argued that petitioner could not claim good faith because the case cited by her, allowing the defense of good faith, was
premised on the fact that there was no prior case or rule that settled the applicability of R.A. No. 6758 to LWDs. Finally, the COA opined
that petitioner failed to state factual allegations to support the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO.

In her Reply,20 dated March 13, 2015, petitioner merely reiterated her previous arguments.

The Court's Ruling

R.A. No. 6758 covers local water districts

The increase in the salary of the petitioner was correctly disallowed because it contravened the provisions of the SSL. In Mendoza,21 the
Court ruled that the salaries of GMs of LWDs were subject to the provision of the SSL, to wit:

The Salary Standardization Law applies to all government positions, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, without qualification. The exception to this rule is when the government-owned or controlled corporation's charter
specifically exempts the corporation from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law. xxx

We are not convinced that Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, or any of its provisions, exempts water
utilities from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law. In statutes subsequent to Republic Act No. 6758, Congress
consistently provided not only for the power to fix compensation but also the agency's or corporation's exemption from the Salary
Standardization Law. If Congress had intended to exempt water utilities from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law and
other laws on compensation and position classification, it could have expressly provided in Presidential Decree No. 198 an
exemption clause similar to those provided in the respective charters of the Philippine Postal Corporation, Trade Investment and
Development Corporation, Land Bank of the Philippines, Social Security System, Small Business Guarantee and Finance
Corporation, Government Service Insurance System, Development Bank of the Philippines, Home Guaranty Corporation, and the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Congress could have amended Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198 to expressly provide that the compensation of a general
manager is exempted from the Salary Standardization Law. However, Congress did not. Section 23 was amended to emphasize
that the general manager "shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process."

This does not mean that water utilities cannot fix the compensation of their respective general managers . Section 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 198 clearly provides that a water utility's board of directors has the power to define the duties and fix the
 compensation of a general manager. However, the compensation fixed must be in accordance with the position classification
system under the Salary Standardization Law. xxx22

Petitioner claims that R.A. No. 9286, being a later law, repealed the SSL. The Court, however, notes that R.A. No. 9286 did not
expressly repeal the SSL. Neither did R.A. No. 9286 impliedly repeal the SSL because repeal by implication is not favored by law and is
only resorted to in case of irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy between the new law and the old law. 23 As clearly pointed out in
Mendoza, there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between R.A. No. 9286 and the SSL. It is conceded though that the board of directors
has full discretion in fixing the salary of the GM, but it is always subject to the limits under the SSL, unless the charter of the LWD
exempts it from the coverage of the said law.

Engagements ofAtty. Esguerra

and Atty. Operario were unauthorized

COA Circular No. 95-011, dated December 4, 1995, provides that in the event that the need for the legal services of a private lawyer
cannot be avoided or is justified under extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, the written conformity and acquiescence of the
OGCC and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured. The failure to secure the written concurrence makes the
engagement of the private lawyer or law firm unauthorized.24

In the case at bench, petitioner does not deny that there was no written concurrence from the COA when Atty. Esguerra, a private
lawyer, rendered legal services from January to October 2005. She, instead, argues that it is not mandatory to secure the written
concurrence of COA because it only applies to the hiring or employment of a lawyer and not the renewal of a retainership contract.
Further, petitioner blames the COA because it belatedly acted on the request of ISAWAD for a written concurrence.

The arguments of petitioner fail to persuade.

ISAWAD first engaged Atty. Esguerra under a retainership contract 25 for a period of one year effective November 1, 2003, with the
written concurrence of the OGCC and the COA. The following year, another retainership contract 26 was executed, effective one year
from November 1, 2004, with the concurrence of the OGCC but not the COA. Again, in the following year, a retainership contract 27 was
executed for another one year effective on November 1, 2005, with the written concurrence of both the OGCC and the COA.

ISAWAD engaged Atty. Esguerra under a general retainer for a specific length of time, which was regularly renewed after its termination.
Each renewal constituted the hiring of Atty. Esguerra because after the lapse of one year, the engagement was terminated; and each
renewal for another one-year term required the written conformity of the COA.

Petitioner likewise faults the COA for failing to act on time on the request for concurrence. This, however, is a bare assertion as
petitioner failed to provide any document showing that a request for the COA's written concurrence was even made. Petitioner only
presented the OGCC's written approval,28 dated September 5, 2005, of the retainership contract effective November 1, 2004. The letter
significantly reminded ISAWAD to seek the conformity of the COA - which it failed to do.

With regard to Atty. Operario, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 878, series of 1983, allows any member of the OGCC's legal staff to be
designated in a concurrent capacity to act as a corporate officer of the GOCC being serviced by the OGCC when the exigency of the
service so requires, provided that the Government Corporate Counsel approves the designation.

Petitioner admits that it was only on July 11, 2006 that the authority of Atty. Operaria to render services for ISAWAD was issued.
Obviously, he had no authority to provide legal services to ISAWAD prior to the approval of the OGCC. Consequently, Atty. Operario was
not entitled to the honorarium given for the alleged services he had rendered.

Petitioner cannot argue that disallowing the payments made to Atty. Esguerra and Atty. Operario is tantamount to unjust enrichment. In
The Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v. COA,29 the Court, notwithstanding the fact that actual services had been
rendered, upheld the disallowance of payment made to a law firm, which was unauthorized to act in behalf of a GOCC, for failure to
secure the COA's concurrence. In the case at bench, there is no unjust enrichment because the NDs directed the responsible officers of
ISAWAD, who made the disbursements (including petitioner), and not the lawyers engaged, to make the refund.

Refund not necessary if the

disbursements were made
in good faith

In Mendoza, the Court excused the erring officials therein from refunding the amounts subject of the ND, to wit:

The salaries petitioner Mendoza received were fixed by the Talisay Water District's board of directors pursuant to Section 23 of the
Presidential Decree No. 198. Petitioner Mendoza had no hand in fixing the amount of compensation he received. Moreover, at the
time petitioner Mendoza received the disputed amount in 2005 and 2006, there was no jurisprudence yet ruling that water utilities
are not exempted from the Salary Standardization Law.

Pursuant to de Jesus v. Commission on Audit, petitioner Mendoza received the disallowed salaries in good faith. He need not refund
the disallowed amount.

In this case, the Court is of the view that the payment of the erroneous increase in petitioner's salary was nonetheless made in good
faith. The increase was computed in accordance with the scale provided by the Office of the Philippine Association of Water Districts,
Inc., which also made an erroneous opinion that R.A. No. 9286 repealed the SSL. Further, at the time the disbursement was made, no
categorical pronouncement, similar to Mendoza, that the LWDs are subject to the provisions of the SSL, had been issued.

Good faith, however, cannot be appreciated in petitioner's other disbursements. Petitioner knowingly approved the payments to Atty.
Esguerra and Atty. Operaria in spite of the lack of the necessary approval by the government offices concerned. Further, petitioner's
failure to claim her excessive RATA after the NDs were issued does not evince good faith because, at that time, CBC No. 18 and NBC
No. 498 already provided for the allowable RATA to be given to GMs of LWDs.
No basis for the issuance of a writ of injunction

In Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas,30 the Court ruled that the right sought to be protected must not be doubtful in order
for an injunctive relief to be issued, to wit:

To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, xxx the petitioners must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the
right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an
urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage, xxx When the complainant's right is thus doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper.

Here, petitioner failed to show sufficient reasons to justify the issuance of the injunctive relief. It has been thoroughly discussed that the
disbursements were without legal basis as they either were in excess of the limits provided for by law or were issued without authority.

WHEREFORE, the December 29, 2011 Decision of the Commission on Audit is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioner be
absolved from refunding the amount paid in the increase of her salary.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied
in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of P40,831.00.

Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April
7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he requested reimbursement for his
expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 6991 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:

Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. When a person in the service of the
national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to
receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any period of disability
thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize
the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in
the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.

xxx xxx xxx

In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head may
in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.

Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary of Justice, along with the
comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI, "recommending favorable action thereof". Finding
petitioner's illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably
recommended the payment of petitioner's claim.

However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated November 21, 1990, returned petitioner's
claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990,
to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 2 dated April 26, 1991 of then Secretary of
Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or
abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter.

On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew Mecano's claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable
consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2, 1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner's claim to the COA Chairman,
recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992, however,
denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for
the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the
claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the
effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director Lim under a 9th Indorsement
dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner "elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires.

On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC, this petition was
brought for the consideration of this Court.

Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on the aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of Secretary
Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim is filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, as suggested by
respondent, he would still not be barred from filing a claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or not there was a
repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for reimbursement.

The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated
to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the
new Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover, the COA questions
the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that employment-
related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees' Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow
simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government.

The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers
may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or
laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. 3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular
and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. 4

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to
supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is
found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. 5 Rather, it is an example of a general repealing
provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial
conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal
any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. 6 This latter situation
falls under the category of an implied repeal.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature
to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. 7 Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear
showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be
clear and manifest;8 otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for,
the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.9

There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later
act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. 10

Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly
inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is,
that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.11

Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old
Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public,
the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.

Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable
conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has
not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not
restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. It further maintained that to allow the
particular provisions not restated in the new Code to continue in force argues against the Code itself. The COA anchored this argument
on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:

WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx

It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.

The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an
implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. 12 What is necessary is
a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.13

We come now to the second category of repeal the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the former laws on the whole subject
matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system
in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the
former statute.14 When both intent and scope clearly evidence the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are
omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed. 15 Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal under this category, it must be
the clear intent of the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior act.16

According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of
government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in
the government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight that this opinion
carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as the body which had been entrusted with the implementation of this
particular provision has already rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in the case of Sison
vs. Pangramuyen17 that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be loathe to substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not hold water.
This principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the decision is
vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.18 It has been held that Opinions of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice are material in
the construction of statutes in pari materia.19

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes.21

This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed unless it
is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones
on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law
relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing
necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the
earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable
construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.22

Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees'
Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees'
Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment
of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to
petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay
election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition
for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on
October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well
above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On
December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall
election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No.
2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the
restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. 2

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence,
the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the
Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the
required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.3

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now
barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three
years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court
considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no
recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of
office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election.

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of
the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The
evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed
together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is,
during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include
the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public
officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three
years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase " regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner,
then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and
the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided
under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.6

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. 7 Thus, the
interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the
Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of
recall, initiative, and referendum . . . .

Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court
made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . . 8

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its
spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses,
hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is
due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the
official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It
would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring
to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that
the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on
May 1997. 9 ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-28502-03 April 18, 1989
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

In two (2) cases appealed to it 1 by the private respondent, hereafter simply referred to as ESSO, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered
judgment 2 sustaining the decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue excepted to, save "the refund-claim .. in the amount of
P39,787.94 as overpaid interest which it ordered refunded to ESSO

Reversal of this decision is sought by the Commissioner by a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. He ascribes to the Tax
Court one sole error: "of applying the tax credit for overpayment of the 1959 income tax of .. ESSO, granted by the petitioner
(Commissioner), to .. (ESSO's) basic 1960 deficiency income tax liability x x and imposing the 1-1/2% monthly interests 3 only on the
remaining balance thereof in the sum of P146,961.00" 4 (instead of the full amount of the 1960 deficiency liability in the amount of
P367,994.00). Reversal of the same judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals is also sought by ESSO in its own appeal (docketed as G.R.
Nos. L28508-09); but in the brief filed by it in this case, it indicates that it will not press its appeal in the event that "the instant petition for
review be denied and that judgment be rendered affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.

The facts are simple enough and are quite quickly recounted. ESSO overpaid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00. It was accordingly
granted a tax credit in this amount by the Comissioner on August 5,1964. However, ESSOs payment of its income tax for 1960 was
found to be short by P367,994.00. So, on July 10, 1964, the Commissioner wrote to ESSO demanding payment of the deficiency tax,
together with interest thereon for the period from April 18,1961 to April 18,1964. On August 10, 1964, ESSO paid under protest the
amount alleged to be due, including the interest as reckoned by the Commissioner. It protested the computation of interest, contending it
was more than that properly due. It claimed that it should not have been required to pay interest on the total amount of the deficiency
tax, P367,994.00, but only on the amount of P146,961.00representing the difference between said deficiency, P367,994.00, and
ESSOs earlier overpayment of P221,033.00 (for which it had been granted a tax credit). ESSO thus asked for a refund.

The Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the claim for refund. ESSO appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. As aforestated. that
Court ordered payment to ESSO of its "refund-claim x x in the amount of P39,787.94 as overpaid interest. Hence, this appeal by the
Commissioner. The CTA justified its award of the refund as follows:

... In the letter of August 5, 1964, .. (the Commissioner) admitted that .. ESSO had overpaid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00.
Accordingly .. (the Commissioner) granted to .. ESSO a tax credit of P221,033.00. In short, the said sum of P221,033.00 of ESSO's
money was in the Government's hands at the latest on July 15, 1960 when it ESSO paid in full its second installment of income tax
for 1959. On July 10, 1964 .. (the Commissioner) claimed that for 1960, .. ESSO underpaid its income tax by P367,994.00.
However, instead of deducting from P367,994.00 the tax credit of P221,033.00 which .. (the Commissioner) had already admitted
was due .. ESSO .. (the Commissioner) still insists in collecting the interest on the full amount of P367,994.00 for the period April 18,
1961 to April 18,1964 when the Government had already in its hands the sum of P221,033.00 of .. ESSOs money even before the
latter's income tax for 1960 was due and payable. If the imposition of interest does not amount to a penalty but merely a just
compensation to the State for the delay in paying the tax, and for the concomitant use by the taxpayer of funds that rightfully should
be in the Government's hand (Castro v. Collector, G.R. No. L-1274, Dec. 28, 1962), the collection of the interest on the full amount
of P367,994.00 without deducting first the tax credit of P221,033.00, which has long been in the hands of the Government, becomes
erroneous, illegal and arbitrary.

.. (ESSO) could hardly be charged of delinquency in paying P221,033.00 out of the deficiency income tax of P367,994.00, for which
the State should be compensated by the payment of interest, because the said amount of P221,033.00 was already in the coffers of
the Government. Neither could .. ESSO be charged for the concomitant use of funds that rightfully belong to the Government
because as early as July 15, 1960, it was the Government that was using .. ESSOs funds of P221,033.00. In the circumstances, we
find it unfair and unjust for .. (the Commissioner) to exact the interest on the said sum of P221,033.00 which, after all, was paid to
and received by the Government even before the incidence of the deficiency income tax of P367,994.00. (Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc.
v. Commissioner, C.T.A. Case No. 1327, Sept. 30,1965). On the contrary, the Government should be the first to blaze the trail and
set the example of fairness and honest dealing in the administration of tax laws.

Accordingly, we hold that the tax credit of P221,033.00 for 1959 should first be deducted from the basic deficiency tax of
P367,994.00 for 1960 and the resulting difference of P146,961.00 would be subject to the 18% interest prescribed by Section 51 (d)
of the Revenue Code. According to the prayer of ..(ESSO) .. (the Commissioner) is hereby ordered to refund to .. (ESSO) the
amount of P39,787.94 as overpaid interest in the settlement of its 1960 income tax liability. However, as the collection of the tax was
not attended with arbitrariness because .. (ESSO) itself followed x x (the Commissioner's) manner of computing the tax in paying the
sum of P213,189.93 on August 10, 1964, the prayer of .. (ESSO) that it be granted the legal rate of interest on its overpayment of
P39,787.94 from August 10, 1964 to the time it is actually refunded is denied. (See Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan
Estate, Inc., G.R. No. 1,12752, Jan. 30, 1965).

The Commissioner's position is that income taxes are determined and paid on an annual basis, and that such determination and
payment of annual taxes are separate and independent transactions; and that a tax credit could not be so considered until it has been
finally approved and the taxpayer duly notified thereof. Since in this case, he argues, the tax credit of P221,033.00 was approved only
on August 5, 1964, it could not be availed of in reduction of ESSOs earlier tax deficiency for the year 1960; as of that year, 1960, there
was as yet no tax credit to speak of, which would reduce the deficiency tax liability for 1960. In support of his position, the Commissioner
invokes the provisions of Section 51 of the Tax Code pertinently reading as follows:

(c) Definition of deficiency. As used in this Chapter in respect of tax imposed by this Title, the term 'deficiency' means:

(1) The amount by which the tax imposed by this Title exceeds the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return; but the
amount so shown on the return shall first be increased by the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a
deficiency, and decreased by the amount previously abated credited, returned, or otherwise in respect of such tax; ..
xxx xxx xxx
 (d) Interest on deficiency. Interest upon the amount determined as deficiency shall be assessed at the same time as the
deficiency and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and shall be collected as a part
of the tax, at the rate of six per centum per annum from the date prescribed for the payment of the tax (or, if the tax is paid in
installments, from the date prescribed for the payment of the first installment) to the date the deficiency is assessed; Provided, That
the amount that may be collected as interest on deficiency shall in no case exceed the amount corresponding to a period of three
years, the present provision regarding prescription to the contrary notwithstanding.

The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as early as July 15, 1960, the Government already had in its hands
the sum of P221,033.00 representing excess payment. Having been paid and received by mistake, as petitioner Commissioner
subsequently acknowledged, that sum unquestionably belonged to ESSO, and the Government had the obligation to return it to ESSO
That acknowledgment of the erroneous payment came some four (4) years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts from its actuality.
The obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee
admits the obligation to reimburse. The obligation of the payee to reimburse an amount paid to him results from the mistake, not from
the payee's confession of the mistake or recognition of the obligation to reimburse. In other words, since the amount of P221,033.00
belonging to ESSO was already in the hands of the Government as of July, 1960, although the latter had no right whatever to the
amount and indeed was bound to return it to ESSO, it was neither legally nor logically possible for ESSO thereafter to be considered a
debtor of the Government in that amount of P221,033.00; and whatever other obligation ESSO might subsequently incur in favor of the
Government would have to be reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be charged. To interpret the words of the
statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply can not and should not be countenanced. "Nothing is better settled than
that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. That is a principle that goes
back to In re Allen (2 Phil. 630) decided on October 29, 1903, where it was held that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be
unjust or lead to absurd results." 6 "Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention
and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion." 7

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dated October 28, 1967 subject of the
petition is AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:p

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of
Aliases". 1

Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May
1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint
for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution
advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-
cut logs in the area.2

On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he
be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office
of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the
Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since
he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez)
name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3

When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors'
logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the
Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative
Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name
"Oscar Perez.4

Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office.
They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually
petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman
who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.

On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a
demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name
in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the
registered name of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.

The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was
sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of
prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus
costs.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of
one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.

Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No.
142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to him, is a
term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as
"Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his
position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with
when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further
argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law.5

Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose. 6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 7

For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding
circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited.
C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the
Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:

Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to
obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set
forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings
and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil
register . . . .
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he
was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien,
with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been
baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain
judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The
petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his
immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason
or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall
be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless
the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business
Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its
Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and
amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.8 The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any
written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business
transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view
in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business
name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce
together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract, agreement,
business transaction, or business . . . .

For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of
adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost
bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese
who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias
name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.9

In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the
purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled

There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real name "Yu Cheng Chiau"
would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not
sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the
Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered
certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant
of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau.

The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for naturalization in
Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen,
there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of
using only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he
is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition for
change of name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name
Kheng Chiau Young.

All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds
under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the
use of an alias name.

Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in
business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows
and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence,
the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the
user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in
C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the
messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely
serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that
"Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as
his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction
where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could
not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No.
142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related
statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature
in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be
construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights
of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly
penalize the act done by him.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we
apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is
that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in
the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents under
OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1

On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by
way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an
instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3

By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.4

On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint
was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen . 5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her
own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. 6

The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days
from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the
co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 7

In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on
the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had
sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners
and the private respondents were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school together. 10

It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied
by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for
Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by them from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant
was the erection thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was done without objection on her part
or of any of the other co-heirs.

The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly
enough, by both the petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required by the said article was written notice and that actual
notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the
respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular
form was required.

Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the
property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner)
is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running.

In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice should
be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by
the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.

As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that
notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the
30-day period.

The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously
cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and
interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not
begun to run, much less expired in 1977.

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them
just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly may not
legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not
read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so,
we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent.
For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the
statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers. 14

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date
of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary,
as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes
consisting of only a day or two.

The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made
in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second
sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled
the running of the period of redemption.

Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming
there was a valid notice although it was not in writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired
long before the complaint was filed in 1977?

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by
their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in
favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make
sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed,
although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.

Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between
those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that
thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen
years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her
complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.

The following doctrine is also worth noting:

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have
knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the
means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with
laches, the same as if he had known the facts. 15

It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a
portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a
mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object
or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the
right of redemption, but then it was already too late.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court
understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning
the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt
either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." 16 That
wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated,
without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.