INTRODUCTION TO LAND OWNERSHIP

AND REGISTRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

Atty. Pedro Jose F. Bernardo

This text is for limited and exclusive use, and is

intended only for the class in Land Titles and
Deeds taught by Atty. Bernardo at the FEU
La Salle Joint MBA-JD Program. It is still a
work-in-progress. Unauthorized copying and
distribution is strictly prohibited.
 PART I
INTRODUCTION TO LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES

I. The Regalian Doctrine and the Constitution

THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE

The Regalian Doctrine is the foremost legal principle introduced in the political
system upon the Spanish Conquest of the Philippine Islands in 1521. This
doctrine assumes that the King, as the Head of State, has the supreme power
over the land, waters, and of the country under jurisdiction. Thus, by virtue of
discovery and conquest of the Philippine Islands, the King of Spain acquired
exclusive dominion over the Islands.

As adopted in our republican system of government, however, this medieval

concept of jura regalia has been stripped of its royal overtones: ownership is
vested in the State. Such ownership, according to the case of Lee Hong Hok v.
David, reflects the capacity of state to own or acquire property and is understood
under the concept of dominium. Thus, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution provides: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests
or time, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State.

Lee Hong Hok v. David

G.R. No. L-30389, December 27, 1972

DOCTRINE: Imperium distinguished from dominum. The

government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty comes under
the heading of imperium; and its capacity to own or acquire
property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with
reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In
such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands
and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as
limited by the Constitution.

FACTS: Petitioners Lee Hong Hok et al. claim that the Torrens Title
of Respondent David over the disputed land (which is part of the
Naga Cadastre) should be declared null and void. The CA found
no legal justification for nullifying the right of David over the
disputed land arising from the grant made in his favor by
appropriate public officials.

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David had acquired lawful title over said land. The Director of
Lands awarded him an order for issuance of a sales patent
pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. Subsequently, on
the basis of such order, the Undersecretary of Agricultural and
Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an OCT
was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City in favor of the
respondent.

ISSUE: WON the State can dispose of lands which have not passed
into private ownership.

HELD: In this case the land in question is not private property as

the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources have always sustained the public character thereof for
having been formed by reclamation.

It is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by private

persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government." It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a
title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by
law.

In the case at bar, a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT was issued
in favor of respondent David by competent public officials. He had
acquired the grant and title legally. The notices regarding the
auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award
thereof to David were not clandestine but open and public official
acts of an officer of the Government. The application was merely a
renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the said deceased
occupied the land since 1938.

(The first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII says that all lands of
the public domain x x x and other natural resources are owned by
the state,)

A grant by the government through duly competent public officials

cannot be disregarded on the premise that land not passing into
private ownership may not be disposed of by the state.

In discussing the concept of jura regalia, the Supreme Court said:

2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of

outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law

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 between the government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its
capacity to own or acquire property, it is not inappropriate to
pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading of
imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including
their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean
Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval
era between such two concepts, but did note the existence of res
publicae as a corollary to dominium. As far as the Philippines was
concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cario v.
Insular Government, a case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its
earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands
were held from the Crown . . ." That was a manifestation of the
concept of jura regalia, which was adopted by the present
Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such
rather than the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to
confirm a much more extensive discussion of the matter in the
leading case of Valenton v. Murciano, decided in 1904. One of the
royal decrees cited was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de
las Indias in these words: "We having acquired in sovereignty over
the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore
ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name,
still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that
all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be
restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after
reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures,
and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into
consideration not only their present condition, but also their future
and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives
what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them
in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the
rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
dispose of as we may wish."

It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government that

"as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public
domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, . . ."
They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by
state grant. Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court of
Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its

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 being correctly categorized as public land is undeniable. What was
held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands finds
application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the
property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government
or by possessory information title or by any other means for the
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public
domain." For it is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired
by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government." It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a
title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by
law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: "The applicant, having
failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot
No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no
showing that the same has been acquired by any private person
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property
is and remains part of the public domain." To repeat, the second
assignment of error is devoid of merit.

The application of Regalian Doctrine on the ownership by the State of the public
domain therefore implies that any person claiming ownership of a portion of the
public domain must be able to show title from the state according to any of the
recognized modes of acquisition of title. Thus, all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

Collado v. Court of Appeals

390 SCRA 343

DOCTRINE: All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within

private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the land registration court an

application for registration of a parcel of land, alleging that they
had occupied the land since time immemorial and that their
possession had been open, public, notorious and in the concept of
owners. The court rendered a decision confirming the imperfect
title of petitioners, holding that petitioners had adduced sufficient
evidence to establish their registrable rights over the Lot. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared the
decision of the trial court null and void. It cited the Regalian
Doctrine, enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV,

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 Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), which states that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State. An applicant, like
the private respondents herein, bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain.In the case at bar, private respondents failed to
present any evidence whatsoever that the land applied for has been
segregated from the bulk of the public domain and declared by
competent authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse, the
technical description signed by the officer in charge of the survey
division in the Bureau of Lands categorically stated that the survey
was inside Marikina Watershed. The main thrust of petitioners
claim over the Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like the
proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are
subject to private rights. They claim that the presumption of law
then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land
Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by
individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore
alienable and disposable.

HELD: The Court finds the petition bereft of merit. It was

erroneous for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands
are alienable and disposable. The term public land referred to all
lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands. The 1987 Constitution prohibits
the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of
the public domain. Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource.

It can therefore be concluded that petitioners did not acquire

private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33
segregating the same as a watershed reservation. An imperfect title
may be derived from old Spanish grants or a continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least
thirty years preceding the filing of his application as provided by
Section 48 (b) CA 141. The petitioners were unable to acquire a
valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to
complete the required period of possession, whether under the
original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or
under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.

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At the same time, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since
then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could
no longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot
was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or
alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land.

A positive act of the Executive Department is needed to declassify

land which had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation
and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes. Once a parcel of land is included within a
watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation,
as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues
to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence
of subsequent declassification is shown.

Evidence on record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to

show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released
from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, neither
petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title.

Pangkatipuran v. Court of Appeals

379 SCRA 621

DOCTRINE: Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public

domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that
all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. To overcome such
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance an

application for judicial confirmation and registration of title to
certain lots. The Court of First Instance promulgated a decision
confirming petitioners title to the property. The Official Certificate
Title was issued in the name of the petitioners. Republic of the

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 Philippines filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court an action to
declare the proceedings and titles derived therefrom as null and
void, to direct the register of deeds to annul said certificates of title,
and to confirm the subject land as part of the public domain. The
Court of Appeals set aside the June 15, 1967 decision of the court a
quo and ordered that the subject lot be reverted back to the public
domain.

HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. Unless public land is shown

to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the
State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title.

Evidence on record showed that at the time of filing of the

application for land registration and issuance of the certificate of
title over the disputed land in the name of petitioners, the same
was timberland and formed part of the public domain. Based on a
wrong concept of what is forest land, the court a quo found
registrable title in favor of petitioners based on the Republics
failure to show that the land is more valuable as forest land than for
agricultural purposes.

There was no evidence showing that the land has been reclassified
as disposable or alienable. Before any land may be declassified
from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act
from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect
titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land
is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of
Government. It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored
nor deemed waived.

Since the land in question is unregistrable, the land registration

court did not acquire jurisdiction over the same. Any proceedings
had or judgment rendered therein is void and is not entitled to the
respect accorded to a valid judgment.

(Petitioners contention that the Republic is now barred from

questioning the validity of the certificate of title issued to them
considering that it took the government almost eighteen (18) years
to assail the same is erroneous. It is a basic precept that

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 prescription does not run against the State. The lengthy occupation
of the disputed land by petitioners cannot be counted in their favor,
as it remained part of the patrimonial property of the State, which
property, as stated earlier, is inalienable and indisposable.)

LIMITATIONS ON THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE

By virtue of the States power of ownership over the public domain, it could
thereby exercise its rights of ownership, which include the power to exploit,
develop and alienate such natural resources. The Constitution, however,
provides for specific limitations to such power. These are enumerated in
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII.

Because we are now only concerned with the Constitutional limitations on the
power of the State to dispose of lands of the public domain, we note the following
specific provisions:

SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain . . . are owned by the

State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. . .

SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into

agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified
by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by
purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and

development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform,
the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the
conditions therefor.

Thus, with reference to the Regalian Doctrine, these provisions provide that
while no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the government, only alienable and disposable lands of

9
the public domain may nonetheless be subject of such grant. Furthermore, the
grantees of such land, even if alienable, must similarly comply with the
citizenship requirements prescribed by the Constitution.

It must also be noted that notwithstanding the application of the Regalian

Doctrine, the colonizers applying the doctrine did not intend to strip the natives
of their ownership of lands already belonging to them. This was the ruling in the
landmark case of Cario v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935 (1909), where the
Supreme Court said: when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest
and never have been public land. Consequently, such land, if not owned by the
State at the time of the Spanish conquest, could not have been ceded by Spain to
the United States through the Treaty of Paris, and later, to the Philippine
Government by the time of the Commonwealth.

The doctrine of immemorial possession set forth in Cario was also recognized in
the opinion defending the constitutionality Republic Act No. 8371 or Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). In the case of Cruz v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
135385, 6 December 2000, Republic Act No. 8371 said was assailed as
unconstitutional on the ground that it deprived the state of ownership over lands
of public domain and natural resources contained therein. The votes were
deadlocked at 7-7 which meant that the validity of the IPRA was upheld. The
opinion defending the validity of the IPRA held that ancestral domain and
ancestral lands are private and belong to the indigenous people.

Cario v. Insular Government

41 Phil. 936

FACTS: An Igorot applied to the Philippine court for registration of

a certain parcel of land. The plaintiff and his ancestors held the
land since time immemorial. The Philippine government opposed
such application saying that there is no prescription against the
crown, and even if there was, the land is not registered therefore it
is public land by virtue of the Decree of June 25, 1880 which
required registration for good title; and because of such the U.S. is
the owner of the property by succeeding Spain by virtue of the
Treaty of Paris.

ISSUE: WON the land is public or not.

HELD: It is not public. In this case, every presumption must be in

favor of the individual and against the government. Therefore, it
can be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as

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testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and
never to have been public land. With this, it can be inferred that
immemorial possession is an exception from the Regalian Doctrine
because it is considered private land even before the Spaniards
came, when the regalia doctrine was introduced into the
Philippines by colonizers, the colonizers did not intend to strip the
natives of their ownership of lands already belonging to them.

With regards to the Decree of June 25, 1880, it intended to correct

the wrongful occupation by Filipinos of land belonging to the
crown. There is no evidence that the possession of the petitioner is
wrongful.

Cruz v. Executive Secretary

347 SCRA 128

FACTS: RA 8371 was assailed as unconstitutional on the ground

that it deprived the State of its ownership over lands of the public
domain and the natural resources in them. RA 8371 defined what
are ancestral domains and ancestral lands.

HELD: The vote was 7-7 which meant that validity was upheld.
The opinion defending constitutionality held the following: (1)
ancestral domain and ancestral lands are not part of lands of the
public domain. They are private and belong to indigenous people.
Section 5 commands the state to protect the rights of indigenous
people. Cario v. Insular Government recognized native title held by
Filipinos from time immemorial and excluded them from the
coverage of jura regalia. (2) The right of ownership granted does not
include natural resources. The right to negotiate terms and
conditions over natural resources covers only exploration to ensure
environmental protection. It is not a grant of exploration rights. (3)
The limited right of management refers to utilization as expressly
allowed in Section 2, Article XII. (4) What is given is priority right,
not exclusive right. It does not preclude the State from entering into
co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements
with private entities.

The opinion assailing the constitutionality of the law held the

following: (1) the law amounts to an abdication of state authority
over a significant area of the countrys patrimony; (2) it
relinquishes full control of natural resources in favor of indigenous

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 people; (3) the law contravenes the provision which says that all
natural resources belong to the state.

In addition, Philippine jurisprudence has also recognized that aside from lands
held by person through immemorial possession, properties of the State, even if
administered by the Spanish colonizers, are also not considered public land. It
was not the King of Spain who was the owner of ecclesiastical property during
the time of the Spanish occupation; these lands were owned by the Roman
Catholic Church. Therefore ecclesiastical property was never public land and
could not have been transferred to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of
Paris.

Barlin v. Ramirez
7 Phil. 41

FACTS: Barlin appointed Ramirez to administer Church property.

When the former asked the latter to return the said property, the
latter refused. He said that the property belongs to the State, and
the same is granted to him by the State.

ISSUE: WON Barlin should return the said property?

HELD: Yes, he should return the said property. First, he is stopped

by recognizing that the said property was only entrusted to him.
Second the land belongs to the Roman Catholic Church. Since it
belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, it was never public and
therefore it was not included to the property ceded by Spain to the
U.S. by virtue of the Treaty of Paris.

Roman Catholic Church v. Municipal of Tarlac

9 Phil. 450

FACTS: Prior to the Revolution, the Church and cemetery is

controlled and administered by the Roman Catholic Church. The
said properties where destroyed during the revolution. On January
10, 1903, by virtue of the circular, the Insular Government
conveyed the land to the Independent Filipino Church for the
purpose of administration in favor of the Municipality of Tarlac.
The Roman Catholic Church seeks to get the property back. The
respondent said that the RCC only administered the property but
does not own it because it belongs to the State.

ISSUE: WON the property involved belonged to the State.

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 HELD: No, it belongs to the Church. As it was held in Barlin v.
Ramirez, even though the property is administered by the Spanish
government it belonged to the RCC and therefore private property.
It could not have been part of the lands ceded to the U.S. by Spain.
And because it is not part of the property ceded, it is not a property
of the State and cannot by conveyed by it.

Friar lands were also an exception to the Regalian Doctrine because they are
private lands at the time Spain ceded to the United States the Philippine Islands
and by the time they were purchased by the government they were patrimonial
property.1

II. Lands of the Public Domain

The term public lands refer to such lands of the public domain as are subject to
alienation and disposal by the State in accordance with Commonwealth Act No.
141, of the Public Land Act. It does not include all lands of government
ownership, but only so much of said lands as are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement. Accordingly, government land and public
land are not synonymous terms; the first is more extensive and embraces not
only the second by also other lands of the government already reserved to public
use or subject to private right.2

GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

As already set forth above, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain as (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber, (3)
mineral and (4) national parks. The classification is descriptive of the legal nature
of the land and not of what it looks like. Furthermore, under Section 2, Article
XII, alienable lands of the public domain under the Constitution are limited only
to agricultural lands.

This is reflected in Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Public Land
Act. While the Public Land Act generally deals only with alienable lands of the
public domain,3 it nonetheless provides the following specific provision:

SECTION 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the

Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time
classify the lands of the public domain into
1
Jacinto v. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853.
2
NARCISO PEA, PHILIPPINE LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES 17 (1997). [hereinafter PEA, NATURAL
RESOURCES].
3
See Section 2 of the Public Land Act.

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 (a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from
one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.

Notably, the power to classify lands of the public domain is vested in the
President. In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,4 the Supreme Court, applying
the foregoing provision, ruled that the classification of public land is an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of
the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the lands remain as unclassified
land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This should
be so under time honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance
with the Regalian Doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in the land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

Such classifications, however, must be categorical: that is, land is either

completely agricultural or completely mineral or completely forest or park. 5 A
land cannot have a mixed classification. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,6 the
Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself
cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical: the land must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural.

Furthermore, the Court ruled in Director of Lands v. Judge Aquino,7 that the
classification of land does not change when the nature of the land changes. A
positive act of the executive is nonetheless needed. Anyone who claims that the
classification has been changed must be able to show the positive act of the
President indicating such positive act.

Director of Lands v. Aquino

192 SCRA 296

FACTS: Abra industrial Corporation sought to register a

limestone-rich 70 hectar land in Bucay, Abra 66 hectars of which
4
129 SCRA 689
5
BERNAS, COMMENTARY supra note 13, at 1145.
6
160 SCRA 228 (1988).
7
G.R. No. 31688, December 17, 1990.

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 allegedly belongs to the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. The
lower court gave due course to the application. It ruled that
although part of the land is within the forest reserve the Bureau of
Forestry offered no objection to exclude the same area from the
forest reserve. The Director Lands contends such ruling as
incorrect.

ISSUE: WON the Lower Court is correct in granting the application

for registration.

HELD: No, The lack of objection on the part of the Bureau of

Forestry is of no moment because the classification of lands is
privilege given only to the President. Without any positive act from
him, a land cannot be classified nor re-classified.In the present case,
there was no positive act whatsoever from the executive
department classifying such land an alienable or disposable.
Therefore, the application for registration must be denied because
the land involved cannot be alienated because it is Forest Land.

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals

211 SCRA 869

FACTS: Respondents tried to register a certain parcel of land. They

have used the said land for raising livestock for many years. The
government opposed stating the land is classified as a forest land.

ISSUE: WON the registration proper.

HELD: No. The power to classify lands of public domain resides in

the executive department. And if there is proof the executive
department that such land is classified as a forest land therefore the
burden of proof is upon the applicant to show that the involved
land is already classified as alienable. In the present case, the
applicant failed to show such proof. The Court also held that the
word timber land in the Public Land Act is the same as forest
land in the Constitution. And even if the land does not look like a
forest it is still forest land as long as it is classified as such.

It should also be stressed, however, that, by virtue of the Regalian Doctrine, the
power of the executive to classify lands of the public domain is only a delegated
power by the Philippine legislature. Thus, under Section 6 of the Public Land
Act, both the President and Congress are empowered to declare what public
lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.

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In addition to the power to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timer, mineral lands and, through the Nipas Act, national parks, the
President also has the power to declare otherwise alienable or disposable lands
as reservations, for town sites and for other public and semi-public purposes. 8
The effect of such reservation is that such land, while alienable, cannot be
transferred to public individuals, and must be held by the State, either through
the national government or a corresponding local government unit.

THE PUBLIC LAND ACT AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF ALIENABLE LANDS

OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Public lands, or those lands of the public domain which are open to disposition
and alienation, are governed by Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land
Act. Passed into law in 1983, the Act sought to codify all laws relating to public
lands then existing at the time of its enactment. Thus, Section 2 of the Public
Land Act provides for the laws coverage:

SECTION 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of

the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed
by special laws and nothing in this Act provided shall be
understood or construed to change or modify the administration
and disposition of the lands commonly called "friar lands" and
those which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become
the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which
administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at
present in force or which may hereafter be enacted.

Excepted from the Act were timber and mineral lands, which were to be
governed by special laws, as well as friar lands9 and those which, being
privately owned, have reverted back to the government.

Friar lands, which are different from lands owned by the Church, are those lands
of certain haciendas which were acquired by the government from religious
orders/corporations or organizations in 1902. However, even though they were
bought by the Philippine Government they are not considered public lands. 10

8
See Title V of the Public Land Act.
9
Friar lands, which are different from lands owned by the Church, are those lands of certain
haciendas which were acquired by the government from religious orders/corporations or organizations
in 1902. However, even though they were bought by the Philippine Government they are not
considered public lands (Act 1120).
10
WHEREAS, the said lands are not "public lands" in the sense in which those words are used in the
Public Land Act, Number Nine Hundred and twenty-six, and cannot be acquired or leased under the
provisions thereof, and it is necessary to provide proper agencies for carrying out the terms of said
contracts of purchase and the requirements of said Act of Congress with preference to the leasing and
selling of said lands and the creation of a sinking fund to secure the payment of the bonds so issued

16
Notably, once public lands acquired under any of the methods provided by the
Public Land Act, these are no longer to be governed by the provisions of the said
Act. Thus, it was held that where part of the public lands has been legally
appropriated or acquired by a private individual, the same shall be deemed
segregated from the mass of the public lands and no law or proclamation
thereafter made or issued relating to public lands shall operate upon it inasmuch
as the subject of such free-hold or private land is not embraced in nor covered by
the title of said Act.11

Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain are further classified as (a) Agricultural, (b) Residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) Educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; and (d) Reservations for town sites and for
public and quasi-public uses.

SECTION 9. For the purpose of their administration and

disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to
which such lands are destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
uses.

The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of

Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time make the
classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time
and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.

It should be stressed that while Section 9 classifies agricultural land separate

from residential, commercial, educational, reservations, etc., all lands
enumerated under the said provision all correspond to agricultural land as
understood within Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution as open to alienation
or disposition. The classification under Section 9, therefore, is for purposes of
administration and disposition, according to the purpose to which said lands are
especially adapted. But notwithstanding this classification, all of said lands are
essentially agricultural lands which may be alienated.

(Act 1120).
11
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, GR No. 40399, 40 Phil. 883 (1990).

17
MODES OF DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC LANDS

As we have learned under the Regalian Doctrine, no public land can be acquired
by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government.
In other words, it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title form the
state. One claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with the
Public Land Act which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural
requirements for acquisition of public lands.12

Furthermore, only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or

concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-
public uses, nor appropriated by the government, nor in any manner become
private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized
by the Act or any valid law may be claimed or which, having been reserved or
appropriated have ceased to be so. In the absence of such classification, the land
remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition.13 In Menguito v. Republic,14 it was held that unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.

A. Agricultural Lands

Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as

follows, and not otherwise:15

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization;
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

Homestead Settlement

By homestead is meant the home, the house and the adjoining land where the
head of the family dwells; the home farm; the fixed residence of the head of a
12
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES supra note 15, at 19.
13
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES supra note 15, at 20.
14
348 SCRA 128 (2000).
15
Section 11, Public Land Act.

18
family, with the land and buildings surrounding the main house. 16 Technically,
and under the modern homestead laws, it is an artificial estate in land, devised to
protect the possession and enjoyment of the owner against the claims of his
creditors, by withdrawing the property from execution and forced sale, so long
as the land is occupied as a home.17

To qualify for a homestead settlement, the applicant must show that he is a

citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years, or is the head of a
family, and does not own, or has not received by gratuitous allotment from the
government, more than twenty-four hectares of land in the Philippines. Such
homestead settlement must not exceed twenty-four hectares of agricultural land
of the public domain.18 In order to be entitled to a land grant, the applicant is
required to cultivate and improve at least 1/5 of the land continuously since the
approval of the application and has resided therein for at least one year in the
municipality in which the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the
same.19

Should the applicant comply with the foregoing obligations, he shall acquire a
vested right to the land, and will be entitled to receive a final deed of conveyance
called a homestead patent. The execution and delivery of the patent, after the
right to a particular parcel of land has become complete, are the mere ministerial
acts of the officer charged with that duty. Even without a patent, a perfected
homestead is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the
paramount title to the land is still in the government. Such land may be
conveyed or inherited. No subsequent law can deprive him of that vested right. 20

The Supreme Court has held that once a homestead applicant has complied with
all the conditions essential to a government grant, he acquires not only a right to
a grant, but a grant of the government. Thus, where all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual
physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land, the possessor is deemed to have already acquired
by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for
it is not necessary that a certificate of title to be issued in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts an application therefore being sufficient under
the Public Land Act.21

16
Oliver v. Snowden, 18 Fla. 825, 43 Am. Rep. 388.
17
Buckingham v. Buckingham, 8 Mich. 89, 45 N.W. 504.
18
Section 12, Public Land Act. Note, however, that under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution,
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire more than
twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
19
Section 14, Id.
20
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 15, at 21-22.
21
Mesina v. Sonza, G.R. No. L-14722, May 25, 1960, 108 Phil. 251.

19
As explained in Lahora v. Dayanghirang,22 where disposable public land is granted
by the government by virtue of a public land patent (like homestead, sales or free
patent), the patent is recorded and the corresponding certificate of title is issued
to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation
of the Property Registration Decree, entitled to all the safeguards of a veritable
Torrens title. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the
certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate
issued in a registration proceeding.

In Pajomayo v. Manipon,23 it was held that once a homestead patent granted in

accordance with the Public Land Act is registered, the certificate of title issued by
virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens title issued through
judicial registration proceedings. This principle is applicable to certificates of title
issued by virtue of other land patents under the Public Land Act.

Sale

Agricultural lands may also be disposed of through sale in favor of any citizen of
the Philippines over 18 years of age or the head of a family, but not to exceed
twelve hectares.24 The sale is required to be made through seal public bidding
whereby the land sought to be purchased shall be awarded to the highest bidder,
but the applicant may equal the highest bid. 25 The purchase price may be paid in
full upon the making of the award or in not more than ten equal annual
installments from the date of the award. It is required that the purchaser shall
have not less than one-fifth of the land cultivated within five years from the date
of the award, and before any patent is issued, he must show actual occupancy,
cultivation and improvement of at least one-fifth of the land until the date of
final payment.26

In addition to the foregoing obligations, the grantee is also not permitted to

convey or encumber any of his rights over the land to any person, corporation, or
association without the approval of the Secretary of Environment and National
Resources. This limitation shall subsist for a period of ten (10) years from the
title is granted to the patentee. Notably, any sale or encumbrance made in
violation of the provisions of this section shall be null and void, and shall
procedure the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and
all rights thereto to the State, and all payments on the purchase price made to the
government shall be forfeited.27

22
37 SCRA 346 (1971).
23
39 SCRA 676 (1971).
24
Supra note 137.
25

26
Sections 22, 26 and 28, Public Land Act.
27
Section 29, Id.

20
Lease

Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippines, and any corporation or association
of which at least sixty per centum of the capital stock or of any interest in said
capital stock belongs wholly to citizens of the Philippines, may lease any tract of
agricultural public land available for lease under Chapter VI (Lease) of the Act. 28
Pursuant to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, private corporations may
lease alienable lands of the public domain for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years, and not to exceed 1,000 hectares. Citizens
of the Philippines may lease not more than 500 hectares, or acquire no more than
12 hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.29

It shall be an inherent and essential condition of the lease that the lessee shall
have not less than one-third of the land broken and cultivated within five years
after the date of the approval of the lease. However, in case the land leased is to
be devoted to pasture, it shall be sufficient compliance with this condition if the
lessee shall graze on the land as many heads of cattle as will occupy at least one-
half of the entire area at the rate of one head per hectare. 30

Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title

Under the Public Land Act, persons already in possession of alienable lands of
the public domain may, by the mere passage of time or failure to obtain title
through no fault of their own, be constituted owners of the said parcels of land,
subject to the qualifications and limitations set forth therein.

Thus, when an applicant conforms to all the requisites of confirmation prescribed

under the Public Land Act, he obtains the right to a grant without the necessity
of a certificate of title being issued. The application for confirmation becomes a
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title
as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent.31

Susi v. Razon
48 Phil. 424 (1925)

Petitioner Susi has been in open, continuous, adverse and public

possession, personally and through his predecessors, of a certain
parcel of land since 1880. Then the Director of Lands sold the said
land to the respondent by virtue of an application for purchase
filed on August 15, 1914. The court ruled that by the time the
28
Sec. 33, Ibid.
29
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 15, at 24-25.
30
Sec. 39, Commonwealth Act No. 141.
31
Herico v. DAR, 95 SCRA 437 (1980).

21
 respondent filed his application for purchase the petitioner has
already possessed the land for thirty-four years, the petitioner
already had a right over the land. By that time ,the land ceased to
be public and therefore removing it from the disposition of the
Director of Lands therefore making the sale between the Director of
Lands and Razon invalid.

Confirmation of imperfect title over alienable lands of the public domain may be
achieved judicially, or through administrative confirmation via the issuance of
free patents.

i. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title

The Public Land Act, and subsequent amendments thereto, 32 enumerate the
following requirements necessary for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title:

(1) The land sought to be registered must form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.

The current state of law requires that the land sought to be registered must be
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. As provided in Presidential
Decree No. 1073, which amends Section 48(b) and (c) of the Act:

Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and (c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the application himself or
thru his predessessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

Thus, lands classified as forest or timber lands, mineral lands and lands within
national parks are excluded. This is due to the rule in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, limiting alienable and disposable public lands only to agricultural
lands. The rule on confirmation of imperfect title does not apply unless and until
the land classified as, say, a forest land is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain.33 There must be a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or

32
Republic Act No. 3872, Presidential Decree No. 1073, Republic Act 9176.
33
Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 323 SCRA 193 (2000).

22
statute.34 Hence, the applicant must secure a certification from the government
that the land applied for by the applicant is alienable and disposable.35

It must be noted, however, that Republic Act No. 3872, which amended Section
48 of the Public Land Act on 18 June 1964, added a new sub-section thereto
which recognized the right of cultural minorities to seek judicial confirmation
even over lands which were not considered alienable or disposable. This right
was limited by Presidential Decree No. 1073 which, as earlier mentioned,
reiterated that only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain may be
the subject of judicial confirmation. Notwithstanding the enactment of
Presidential Decree No. 1073, however, the Supreme Court affirmed in Republic
v. Court of Appeals36 that members of cultural minorities were entitled to apply for
judicial confirmation between 18 June 1964 through the enactment of Republic
Act No. 3872, until 25 January 1977 when Presidential Decree No. 1073 was
issued.

While the present state of the law requires that only alienable and disposable
land of the public domain may be the subject of judicial confirmation
proceedings, there is authority to hold that the land subject of the claim of
ownership must be alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the
application for registration of title, and not for the entire period of possession.

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit:37

the phrase since June 12, 1945 qualifies its antecedent phrase
under a bona fide claim of ownership. Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to
which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or
remotely located. Hence, what the law merely requires is that the
property sought to be registered is already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. In other words, it is not necessary that the land be first
classified as bona fide claim of ownership could start. If the State,
at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption
is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, then there is already an intention on the

34
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ceniza, 392 SCRA 190 (2002).
35
Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 (1991).
36
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48327, August 21, 1991.
37
G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 442

23
 part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.38

(2) The applicant must be a Filipino citizen, who must have, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, possessed and occupied the land in
the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945

Aliens are barred from applying for the benefits of Chapter VIII of
Commonwealth Act 141 for they are barred by the Constitution from owning
alienable lands of the public domain. In Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,39 a Chinese
national was denied from applying for judicial confirmation because he was a
foreign national.

Similarly, the constitution limits ownership of lands of the public domain to

individuals and not corporation, even if they be Filipino corporations. Thus,
corporations are also prohibited from applying for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title over public lands. The exception to this rule, however, is found in
the case of Susi v. Razo,40 where the Supreme Court allowed a Filipino
corporation to apply for judicial confirmation. The reason is because compliance
with all the requirements for a Government grant, i.e., possession in the manner
and for the period required by law, the land ipso jure ceased to be public land and
became private property. Thus, provided that the Filipino corporations
predecessor-in-interest had been in possession and occupation thereof in the
manner and for the period prescribed by law as to entitle him to registration in
his name, the ban against corporations acquiring lands of the public domain does
not apply.41

It must also be underscored that acquisition of alienable and disposable lands of

the public domain through judicial confirmation of imperfect title may be
considered an exception to the general rule about prescription running against
properties of the State provided in Article 1113 of the Civil Code, which
provides:

Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.

(3) The application must be filed before 31 December 2020.

38
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE supra note 121, at 72.
39
75 Phil. 890 (1946).
40
48 Phil. 424 (1925).
41
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Veneer & Plywood co., Inc., 146
SCRA 509 (1986).

24
Under the original provisions of the Public Land Act, actions for judicial
confirmation were only allowed until 31 December 1938. Subsequent enacts
extended this period until the most recent legislation, which sets the deadline at
21 December 2020 (Republic Act No. 9176). The filing of the application within
the foregoing time period, however, is not a jurisdictional requirement, only a
time limitation. Thus, an application filed beyond the foregoing period, but not
objected to by the State either in a Motion to Dismiss or Answer, does not
prevent the Court from granting such application.42

ii. administrative confirmation of imperfect title: Free Patents

Under Section 44 of the Public Land Act, any natural born citizen of the
Philippines who does not yet own more than 12 hectares of agricultural land
may apply for a free patent, provided that he, by himself, or by his predecessors-
in-interest, has continuously occupied and cultivated agricultural land of the
public domain for at least thirty (30) years since 4 July 1945. In lieu of continuous
cultivation, it may be sufficient for the applicant to show that he has paid real
estate taxes on the property for the same period and that the same has not been
occupied by any other person.43 The land grant, conformably with the
Constitution, cannot exceed 12 hectares.

If the applicant is a member of a national cultural minority and has continuously

occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, a tract or tracts of land whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, he
shall also be entitled to a free patent not exceeding 12 hectares.. 44

Similar to applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, all application

for free patents must be filed before 31 December 2020, in accordance with
Republic Act No. 9176. Also, the land subject of possession must, at least at the
time of the application, be classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.

Special patents

Aside from the foregoing land patents enumerated under the Public Land Act,
special patents may also be issued over lands formerly reserved or considered
inalienable. These patents are generally issued upon the promulgation of a
special law or act of Congress or by the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources as authorized by an Executive Order of the President and, in
themselves, already provide for the reclassification of the land.45
42
Director of Lands v. Danao, 96 SCRA 161 (1980).
43
C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 782, Sec. 44.
44
C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 3872, Sec. 44.
45
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 15, at 55.

25
Special patents may be granted to Non-Christian Filipinos 46 so long as the
Secretary of Local Government has certified that the majority of the non-
Christian inhabitants of any given reservation have advanced sufficiently in
civilization. After which, the President may order that the lands of the public
domain within such reservation be granted to them pursuant to the provisions
of the Public Land Act. 47 Special patents involving lands sold under the
provisions of Article 60 and 70 of the Public Land Act may likewise be issued to
authorize concession of lands of the public domain for educational, charitable or
any of the like purposes.48 Furthermore, they also may be issued in favor of the
owner of the landed estate acquired by the Government. Republic Act No. 926
authorizes the President to convey public lands and other properties of a public
nature as payment for the acquisition of such estates.49

Emancipation patents

Emancipation patents are patents issued pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos. 27

and 266 in furtherance of the governments policy of agrarian reform. Unlike the
land patents enumerated under the Public Land Act, emancipation patents do
not cover lands of the public domain, but instead, private agricultural lands.
However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, the provisions of Presidential Decree Nos. 27 and 266
have generally been superseded.50

B. Sale or Lease of Public Lands for Residential, Commercial or Industrial Purposes.

Under Chapter IX of the Public Land Act, lands intended for residential,
commercial, industrial and similar productive purposes may be disposed of by
sale or lease thru public bidding, generally following the procedure prescribed
for agricultural lands. The land or the right to lease is acquired also in a public
auction thru bidding. The difference, however, lies in the fact that where in
agricultural sales, the auction sale is thru sealed bidding with the applicant
enjoying the right to equal the highest bid, the auction sale of residential,
commercial and industrial lands is thru oral bidding where the applicant has to
outbid the other bidders in order to be successful bidder. In other words, the
applicant does not have preferential right, unless he is an applicant who has
introduced improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to him by the
Bureau of Lands, in which case he has the right to a sealed bidding.
46
AMADO D. AQUINO( LAND REGISTRATION AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS 149 (200). [hereinafter
AQUINK, LAND REGISTRATION]
47
C.A. 141, Sec. 84.
48
Supra note 193.
49
ALUINO, LAND REGISTRATION, supra 193, at 150.
50
Supra note 200.

26
Lands disposable for residential, commercial or industrial purposes are classified
as:

a. Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filing, or other

means
b. Foreshore
c. Marshy land or lands covered with water bordering upon the
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers.

The conditions of the sale are as follows:

a. The purchaser shall enter the land and introduce suitable

improvements thereon within six (6) months, and complete such
improvements not later than 18 months from the date of the award.
b. The purchaser shall pay the purchase price of the land in ten (10)
equal annual installments.

In case of lease, the rental shall be 3% of the value of the land plus 1% of the
value of the improvements. Every ten (10) years, the land and improvements
shall be reappraised but the rental shall not be increased by more than 100%
every ten years.

The duration of the lease is 25 years renewable for another 25 years at the
governments option.

Under R.A. No. 730 direct or negotiated sale of public land may be resorted to if:
(a) the applicant has occupied the same and has in good faith built a residential
house thereon where he lives, (b) he is not the owner of any residential lot, and
(c) the land is not needed by the government for any public purpose.

Development of the laws governing foreshore/reclaimed areas

The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 is the first statutory law governing the
ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. Under this law,
the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of the
Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use. This law allowed
the reclamation of the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or
by the provinces, pueblos or private persons.51 It also provided that the reclaimed
land from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the reclamation, provided
the government issues the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership over
such land.

51
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, seb. 5.

27
Act No. 1654 was enacted by the Philippine Commission on May 18, 1907, which
provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. This act mandated that the government should
retain title to, and exercise control and disposition of, all reclaimed lands. Private
parties could lease these lands only if they were no longer needed for public use.
Public bidding for the lease of these lands was also prescribed.

Act No. 2874 also known as the Public Land Act, was approved by the Philippine
Legislature in Nov. 29, 1919. It authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed
lands of government to corporations and individuals. Under this law, the
Governor-General was authorized to: (1) classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands (2) declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession and (3) to classify further such lands into government, reclaimed,
foreshore, marshy, and other classes of lands. It also limited alienable lands to
those which have been officially delimited and classified. The land must first be
declared not necessary for public use before allowing lease to private parties. 52

Commonwealth Act No. 141 also known as the Public Land Act, was passed by
the National Assembly which also authorized the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. C.A. No. 141
continues to be the general law governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain. Under this law, the President had the same powers
as those of the Governor-General under Act No. 2874 except that the President is
not authorized, under this law, to reclassify reclaimed lands into non
agricultural lands. The sale of lands of public domain was likewise prohibited,
only lease was allowed subject to the same conditions prescribed in Act No. 2874.
The government could sell to private parties only those agricultural lands for
non-agricultural purposes not classified as disposable lands of the public
domain.

State policy prohibits the sale of these lands, as they are part of public dominion
intended for public use. This state policy has been embodied in the 1935 , 1973 as
well as in the 1987 Constitution. Since then and until now, the only way the
government could sell government reclaimed areas to private properties is
through a legislative enactment allowing such sale. The reason behind this
requirement is that government units and entities should not just turn around
and sell these lands to private properties in violation of constitutional or
statutory limitations.

C. Disposition of Public Lands for Educational, Charitable and Similar Purposes

52

Aat No. 2874, secs. 6, 7, 8, 56 and 58.

28
Lands under this category may be disposed of by the Government in favor of a
province, city, municipality or other branches of the Government in the form of
donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any form.

Such lands may also be sold or leased to qualified private persons for the
purpose of founding a cemetery, church, college, school, university or other
educational institutions for educational, charitable or philantrophical purposes
or scientific research. The Secretary of the DENR has the discretion to sell the
land without auction and to waive the condition requiring cultivation.

D. Townsite Reservations

The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and

Natural Resources, may, if public interest so requires, issue a proclamation
reserving lands for townsite purposes to found a new town.

Procedure:

a. Survey of the exterior boundaries of the site

b. Drafting the proclamation
c. Signing of the proclamation
d. Transmittal of copies of the proclamation to the Director of Lands
and the Register of Deeds
e. Filing of compulsory registration proceedings to settle and
adjudicate private claims within the townsite
f. Subdivision of the land according to development plans
g. Sale of residential lots by oral bidding to the highest bidder

Reservations of Public and Quasi-Public Purposes

The President also has the power to designate by proclamation any tract or tracts
of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its branches or of the inhabitants thereof, of for quasi-public
uses or purposes when public interest requires it, including reservations for
highways, rights-of-way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems,
communal pasture or legua communales, public parks, public quarries, public
fishponds, workingmens village and other improvements for public benefit.

Preferential Rights of Actual Occupants

If, before the delimitation and survey of a tract of public land and before its
classification as alienable and disposable, such land shall be actually occupied by
a person other than the applicant, the Director of Lands shall inform the
occupant of his preferential right to apply for the land and shall give him 120

29
days time in which to file the application or apply for the concession by any of
the forms of disposition authorized by this Act, if such occupant is qualified to
receive a concession under this Act.

Legal Restrictions and Encumbrances

Homestead and Free Patent grants are subject to the following restrictions:

a. Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units,
or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions
shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the
approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the
date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period,
but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.

No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years

and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which
approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.

b. Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the
date of the conveyance.

c. Sec. 120. Conveyance and encumbrance made by persons belonging to

the so-called "non-Christian Filipinos" or national cultural minorities,
when proper, shall be valid if the person making the conveyance or
encumbrance is able to read and can understand the language in which
the instrument or conveyance or encumbrances is written. Conveyances
and encumbrances made by illiterate non-Christian or literate non-
Christians where the instrument of conveyance or encumbrance is in a
language not understood by the said literate non-Christians shall not be
valid unless duly approved by the Chairman of the Commission on
National Integration.

d. Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the
Secretary of Natural Resources, and solely for commercial, industrial,
educational, religious or charitable purposes or for a right of way, no
corporation, association, or partnership may acquire or have any right,
title, interest, or property right whatsoever to any land granted under the

30
 free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act or to any
permanent improvement on such land.

The provisions of Section 124 of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding,

any acquisition of such land, rights thereto or improvements thereon by a
corporation, association, or partnership prior to the promulgation of this
Decree for the purposes herein stated is deemed valid and binding;
Provided, That no final decision of reversion of such land to the State has
been rendered by a court; And Provided, further, That such acquisition is
approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources within six (6) months
from the effectivity of this Decree.

e. Sec. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions
of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall
encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized
therefor by their charters.

Except in cases of hereditary succession, no land or any portion thereof

originally acquired under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale
provisions of this Act, or any permanent improvement on such land, shall
be transferred or assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any
permanent improvement thereon be leased to such individual, when the
area of said land, added to that of his own, shall exceed one hundred and
forty-four hectares. Any transfer, assignment, or lease made in violation
hereof, shall be null and void.

E. Lands not susceptible of private ownership

The following properties cannot be the subject of private ownership, and

therefore, cannot be registered in the name of a private person. Thus, i a person
obtains title under the Torrens System which includes lands which cannot be
registered under the Torrens system, he does not by virtue of said title become
the owner of the land illegally included thereon. Those titles are void ab initio
and any title issued over non-disposable lots, even in the hands of an alleged
innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled. 53

Property of public dominion

Article 419 of the Civil Code provides that the following are properties of public
dominion:

53
AGCAOILI, NATURAL RESOURCES supra note 15, at 30.

31
 (a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads and others of similar character;

(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.

These properties are parts of the public domain and are outside the commerce of
men and are therefore, not subject to private appropriation. These properties,
being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through
public or private sale.

All other properties of the State, which are not of the character mentioned above,
form part of its patrimonial property. Property of public dominion, when no
longer needed for public use or for public service, shall also form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.

According to Article 5 of the Water Code of the Philippines, the following belong
to the State as well: (1) rivers and their natural beds; (2) continuous or
intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the
bed themselves; (3) natural lakes and lagoons; (4) all other categories of surface
waters such as water flowing over lands, water from rainfall whether natural, or
artificial, and water form agriculture run-off, seepage and drainage; (5)
atmospheric water; (6) subterranean or ground waters and; (7) seawater.

Article 6 of the same Code provides that even the following waters found in
private lands belong to the state: (1) continuous or intermittent waters rising on
such lands; (2) lakes and lagoons naturally occurring on such lands; (3) rain
water falling on such lands; (4) subterranean or ground waters and; (5) waters in
swamps and marshes.

Forest lands

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution, do not
necessarily refer to a large tract of wooden land or an expanse covered by dense
growth of trees and underbrush. 54 The fact that the disputed land is not thickly
forested and, in any event, it has been in the actual possession of many persons
for many years, it was already private land which is better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public
interests to be kept under forest classification. Furthermore, the mere fact that a
tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to
declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some
54
Naguit, G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005.

32
proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the
minerals, which it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it
contains than it is for agricultural purposes.55

The power to convert a land which forms part of public forest into private
property is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development
and beyond the power of the registration court. 56 Possession thereof, however
long, cannot convert it into private property.

Ankron v. Government of the Philippines

40 Phil. 10

Facts: An action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of

the Province of Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Its
purpose was to have registered, under the Torrens system, a certain
piece or parcel of land with the following description:

That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at the north,
the exact description and extension of which does not appear, has
been cultivated and planted for more than forty-four years prior to
the date of this decision.

That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted by

Moros, Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership, and that
they lived thereon and had their houses thereon, and that portion
of the land which was not planted or cultivated was used as
pasture land whereon they pastured their carabaos, cattle, and
horses;

That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills of
hemp, some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a dwelling
house, various laborers' quarters, store-building, large camarin
(storehouse of wood, a galvanized iron and other buildings and
improvements on said land.

The appellant contends that portions of said land cannot be

registered in accordance with the existing Land Registration Law
for the reason that they are manglares. That question is not
discussed in the present brief. The appellant, however., refers the
court to his discussion of that question in the case of Jocson vs.
Director of Forestry (39 Phil. Rep., 560). By reference to the

55
Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 14213, Aug. 23, 1919, 40 Phil. 10.
56
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lastimado, 89 SCRA 648 (1979); Director of Lands v. Abanzado,
65 SCRA 5 (1975); Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals and Gallo, 153 SCRA 351 (1987).

33
 argument in the brief in the case, it is found that the appellant
relied upon the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1148 in relation
with section 1820 of Act No. 2711 (second Administrative Code).
Section 3 of Act No. 1148 provides that "the public forests shall
include all unreserved lands covered with trees of whatever age."
Said section 1820 (Act No. 2711) provides that "for the purpose of
this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially
indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove
swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character."

HELD: Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the

registration, under the conditions therein mentioned, of "public
agricultural lands." It must follow, therefore, that the moment that
it appears that the land is not agricultural, the petition for
registration must be denied. If the evidence shows that it is public
forestry land or public mineral land, the petition for registration
must be denied. Many definitions have been given for
"agricultural," "forestry," and "mineral" lands. These definitions are
valuable so far as they establish general rules. In this relation we
think the executive department of the Government, through the
Bureau of Forestry, may, and should, in view especially of the
provisions of section 4, 8, and 20 of Act No. 1148, define what shall
be considered forestry lands, to the end that the people of the
Philippine Islands shall be guaranteed in "the future a continued
supply of valuable timber and other forest products." (Sec. 8, Act
No. 1148.) If the Bureau of Forestry should accurately and
definitely define what lands are forestry, occupants in the future
would be greatly assisted in their proof and the courts would be
greatly aided in determining the question whether the particular
land is forestry or other class of lands.

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-

General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in
question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The
mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within
it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and
the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and
present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as
we have just said, many definitions have been given for
"agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case
it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be
forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more
valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is
for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient

34
 to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears
some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today,
and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason
of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals,
lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified
tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one
or the other purposes.

The courts, however, has the right to presume in the absence of

evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must,
therefore, be a matter of proof.

Watersheds

A watershed is an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a

boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds. 57 Protection of
the watersheds is an inter-generational responsibility. Watershed reservation is
not susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation.58

Mangrove swamps

Section 4 of the Philippine Fisheries Code defines mangroves as a community of

intertidal plants including all species of trees, shrubs, vines and herbs found on
coasts, swamp or border camps. It is now settled that mangroves are forestal, not
alienable agricultural land and are, therefore, not subject to disposition.59

Mineral lands

DENR defines mineral land as any area where mineral resources are found
and mineral resources as any concentration of mineral /rocks with potential
economic value.60 Ownership by a person of agricultural land in which minerals
are discovered does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals
without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong. 61

National parks

57
Sta. Rosa Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 367 SCRA 175 (2001).
58
Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764, Oct. 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 343.
59
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. L-32266, Feb. 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598.
60
Sec 4(aj) and (an), DENR Administrative Order No. 95-936, as amended.
61
Republic v. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa, G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1980, 160 SCRA 228.

35
Lands reserved for a national park, as well as those within the protected areas
under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act, like the
Bataan Natural Park, are inalienable are cannot be registered.62

Military or naval reservation

Lands inside a military or naval reservation cannot be the object of registration. It

was held in Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc.,63 that a military
reservation, like the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation or a part thereof is not
open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable,
unless it is reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public land.
Foreshore lands and reclaimed lands64

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate Corporation,65 foreshore

land has been invariably defined as that strip of land that lies between the high
and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow
of the tide or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternatively
covered by the ordinary flow of the tides.

Republic. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 103882, November 25, 1998

Facts: Republic Act No. 1899 ("RA 1899"), which was approved on
June 22, 1957, authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by
chartered cities and municipalities. Section I of said law, reads:

Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and

chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the
reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore
lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct,
maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor
facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine
in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.

On May 6, 1958, invoking the a forecited provision of RA 1899, the

Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation
of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City,
empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation
contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said
62
Cham v. Pizarro, A.C. No. 5499, August 16, 2005.
63
G.R. No. 156951, Septempber 22, 2006.
64
OSWALDO D. AGCAOLI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE AND RELATED LAWS (LAND TITLES AND
DEEDS) 225-235, (2006 ed.). [hereinafter AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE]
65
299 SCRA 199 (1998).

36
Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by Ordinance No. 158,
which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation ("RREC") to
reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and
conditions. Certain portions of the said lands are submerged lands

On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement
for the reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay City.

The Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended Complaint

questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC
(Exhibit "P") on the grounds that the subject-matter of such
Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and
conditions are violative of RA 1899 with regard to the phrase
foreshore lands

Issue: WON the lands in dispute are considered foreshore lands

and cannot, therefore, be alienated

HELD: The CA ruled erroneously when it opinioned that under RA

1899, the term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas. As can
be gleaned from its disquisition and rationalization aforequoted,
the respondent court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning
of "foreshore lands", beyond the intentment of the law, and against
the recognized legal connotation of "foreshore lands". Well
entrenched, to the point of being elementary, is the rule that when
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason
for interpretation or construction, but only for application. So also,
resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional
convention, is unwarranted, the language of the law being plain
and unambiguous. Then, too, opinions of the Secretary of Justice
are unavailing to supplant or rectify any mistake or omission in the
law. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
(Words and Phrases, "Foreshore")

A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the

part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the
seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave
wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)

37
 The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so
doing, we cannot broaden its meaning, much less widen the
coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include
submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress
did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged
areas from the term "foreshore lands.

Submerged lands

Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution,
waters. . . owned by the State forming part of the public domain and
consequently inalienable. These areas, after reclamation, can be classified as
public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural
resources that the State can alienate. Thereafter, the government may declare
these lands no longer needed for public service and therefore, alienable and
disposable lands open disposition.66

Republic Act 4850 was passed on June 22, 1957 which authorized the reclamation
of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. On January 11, 1973,
Presidential Decree No. 3-A was issued, repealing all laws on reclamation of
areas under water and vesting solely in the government the power to reclaim
lands.

On February 4, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1084 was issued, creating the Public
Estates Authority (PEA) which was renamed as Philippine Reclamation
Authority in 2004. It authorized PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged
areas of the public domain. It also empowers PEA to hold lands of public domain
even in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute. Thus, PEA
can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of public domain.

Executive Order 525 was issued on 1979 which designated PEA as the national
governments implementing arm to undertake all reclamation projects of the
government which shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity. Under such contract,
reclamation services rendered to PEA by private parties shall be compensated.
PEA becomes primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating
all reclamation projects and on behalf of the National Government.

However, reclaimed areas do not automatically become alienable or disposable

upon acquisition by the PEA. Two official acts are needed before reclaimed lands
become alienable lands of public domain. First, there must be a classification that
these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition; and second, there
must be a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service. Absent
66
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152.

38
these two official acts, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the
public domain.

Nevertheless the requirement of a legislative enactment allowing the sale of

reclaimed disposable lands still applies to reclaimed areas of the PEA. The PEAs
power is further subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of public domain.

However, in a May 6, 2003 Resolution, the court clarified that reclaimed lands of
the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or municipal corporation for a
monetary consideration become patrimonial property[and] may be soldto
private properties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified corporations.67

Lakes

Republic Act No. 4850 prescribes that lands located at and below the maximum
lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are public lands which form part of
the bed of the said lake. 68 Areas forming part of the Laguna de Bay are neither
agricultural nor disposable lands of the public domain.

Navigable rivers

If the land forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek or river, the decree
and title in the name of the applicants would not give them any right or title to it.
Like the rest of the non-disposable properties, a land registration court has no
jurisdiction over navigable rivers and cannot validly adjudge the registration of
title thereof in favor of a private applicant. Ownership of a navigable stream may
not be acquired under a free patent and the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title does not change its public character. 69 It is part of public
property and cannot be acquired by adverse possession.70

Creeks

A creek has been defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. Under the Civil Code, a creek,
including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. 71 It is only after
the government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural

67
BERNAS, PRIMER, supra note 11 at 457.
68
Sec. 41, par. 11, Republic Act No. 4850, An Act Creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
Prescribing its Powers, Functions and Duties, Providing Funds Therefor, and for other purposes.
69
Mateo v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-21024, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 796.
70
Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557.
71
An Act to ordain and institute the Civil Code of the Philippines [Civil Code] arts. 420(1) and 502(1).

39
land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can
be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.72
Constructions of a creek which prevent the water from flowing or convert it into
a fishpond do not alter the nature of the creek as a public property.73

Reservation for public and semi-public purposes

The Public Land Act prescribes that a tract or tracks of land of the public domain
may be designated by the President as reservations for the use of the Republic of
the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in
accordance with the regulations prescribed for this purpose. Until again declared
alienable by the President, under Section 83 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or by
proclamation, these lands remain part of the pubic domain and shall not be
subject to disposition.

The President may likewise reserve other lands, the use of which is not otherwise
declared by law, for settlement or public use. He shall also have the power to
reserve from sale or disposition any land belonging to the private domain of the
government, or any of the friar lands, the use of which is not otherwise declared
by law. These lands shall thereafter remain directed to the public use designated
by the President.74

Pursuant to Section 9 of the Public Land Act, the President, upon

recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time make the classification provided for in this section, and may, at
any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another. 75

NOTE: CAN BE REGISTERED AND BROUGHT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF

PD1529 (consistent with the fact that technically, it is alienable), BUT
REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT.

III. Private Lands

A. Distinction between Lands of the Public Domain and Private Lands

According to Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,

72
Celestial v. Cachopero, G.R. No. 142595, October 15, 2003.
73
Mangaldan v. Manaoag, 38 Phil. 455 (1918).
74
Section 14, Chapter 4, Book III, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987.
75
Republic v. Octobre, 123 SCRA 698 (1966).

40
 Sec. 7 Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall
be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Our ancestors acquired and physically possessed and held lands which they
considered belong to them. Nobody bothered them. Upon the Spanish conquest
and occupation of the Islands, all lands within the territory of the Philippine
Islands automatically belonged to the Crown of Spain. And, the land and
property laws of Spain, ipso jure, took effect therein. This is the Regalian
Doctrine.76

The Crown Lands were distributed to the inhabitants in accordance with the
laws of Spain, principally the laws of the Indias (Recopilacion de las Leyes de
Indias),77 and became lands of private ownership or private lands.

This transformation transpired once more during the American Occupation of

the Philippine Islands in 1898, by way of (1) State Grant the Homestead Patent;
(2) Sale the Sales Patent; and (3) Administrative and Judicial Confirmation of
Imperfect title the Free Patent. All Free Patent were available as they are now,
under the Public Land Act.78

Agricultural lands of the public domain are deemed alienable and disposable
and by the foregoing methods of land acquisition, public lands ceased as such
and became private lands of the purchaser, or occupants and possessors.79

Therefore, private land, may be as it has been, defined as any land of private
ownership. This includes both lands owned by private individuals and lands
which are patrimonial property of the state or of municipal corporations. 80
Property of private ownership includes (1) the patrimonial property of the State,
and (2) property belonging to private persons, either individually or
collectively.81 Most of these private lands emanated from private agricultural
lands that had been, or may still be, sold or granted by the State to individual
citizens, associations and corporation qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain and subject to the limitations provided by law.82

Private property and patrimonial property

76
Piero v. Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386 (1974).
77
Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572 (1908).
78
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 168.
79
Id.
80
BERNAS, PRIMER, supra note 11, at 469.
81
CIVIL CODE, art. 425.
82
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 80.

41
Private property connotes ownership of an immovable or real property,
and/or a movable or personal property. As abovementioned, it specifically is
comprised of all property that belongs to private persons, natural or juridical,
either judicially or collectively. And real property is described in the Civil Code
as (1) the immovable or property which consists principally of land; (2) those
movables as the buildings, trees plants, statues or other objects placed on land
that reveals the intention to have them permanently attached to the land; and
(3) the real rights over the immovable property.83

Property ownership, or land of private ownership and private property are

synonymous. It also means, and includes the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities. These are property of public dominion that
are no longer intended or needed: (1) for public use; (2) for public service; or (3)
for the development of national wealth. Some of these are rivers shores, banks,
ports fortresses, roads and street, parks and others.84

A stone fort on land by the sea, constructed since time immemorial as a defense
against the Moro invasion, that had not been used for many years for that
purpose became private or patrimonial property of the State.85
San Lazaro Estate in Manila on which stood the San Lazaro Hospital is private or
patrimonial property of the State under Articles 340 and 345 of the Spanish Civil
Code (now Articles 421 and 425 of the Civil Code).86

Friar lands are patrimonial property of the State under Act No. 1120 and
Commonwealth Act no. 141. In 1906, the Philippine Commission headed by
Governor William H. Taft proposed the purchase of Friar Lands, belonging to the
Dominica, Augustinian and Recoletos Mission. The Philippine Bill of 1902
authorized the purchase of friar lands to be sold to actual occupants and settlers.
Accordingly, Governor Taft proceeded to Rome in 1903, and purchased form the
highest ecclesiastical authorities 410,000 acres of Friar Lands at $7,230,000.
Sometime in 1938, the Philippine Government bought another Friar Land, a big
run-down Riceland, the Buenavista Estate, near Manila at $1,500,000 from San
Juan de Dios Hospital.87

In Cruz v. Secretary,88 the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act or IPRA was assailed as
unconstitutional on the ground that it deprives the State of its ownership over
lands of the public domain and the natural resources in them. The vote of the
Supreme Court was equally divided, 7-7. The opinion defending
83
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 169.
84
Id.
85
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES & JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
VOL. II 32 (1963).
86
Id. at 34.
87
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 170.
88
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000.

42
constitutionality held the following: (1) Ancestral domain and ancestral lands are
not part of lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to
indigenous people. Cario v. Insular Government89 recognized native title held by
Filipinos from time immemorial and excluded from the concept of jura regalia.
(2) The right of ownership granted does not include natural resources. The right
to negotiate terms and conditions over natural resources covers only exploration
to ensure environmental protection. It is not a grant of exploration rights. (3) The
limited right of management refers to utilization as expressly allowed in Section
2, Article XII. (4) What is given is priority right, not exclusive right. It does not
preclude the State from entering into co-production, joint venture, or production
sharing agreements with private entities.

On the other hand, the opinion assailing the constitutionality of the law held the
following: (1) the law amounts to abdication of the authority over a significant
area of the countrys patrimony; (2) it relinquishes full control of natural
resources in favor of indigenous people; (3) the law contravenes the provision
which says that all natural resources belong to the state.

Classification of private lands

The phrase private lands or lands of private ownership have been defined in
our jurisprudence as those lands of the public domain: (1) That are, or has been
in the possession of occupants and their predecessors-in-interest since time
immemorial.90 (2) That had been awarded to an applicant with (a) Sales or
Homestead Patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 19-32), or Title
issued by virtue of the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754; or (b) Free Patent under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 47-56); (c) Title by Composition with the State
pursuant to the Mauras Royal Decreed; (4) Possessor Information issued under
the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1893 after the composition or confirmation of
imperfect title held by the occupant with claim of ownership. Private lands may
be classified in the same manner as those of public lands.91

B. Constitutional Restrictions

As a general rule, only the following may acquire private lands pursuant to
Section 7:

(1) Filipino citizens and

(2) Corporations or associations incorporated in the Philippines, at
least 60% of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens as defined
in Section 2.

89
212 U.S. 449.
90
Cario v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 936 (1909).
91
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW supra note 1, at 184-185.

43
Exception to the rule

However, by exception the following may also acquire private lands:

(1) Aliens, but only by hereditary succession.

(2) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost Philippine
citizenship but only under the terms provided in Section 8, Article
XII which states that, Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7
of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost
his Philippine citizenship maybe a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law.92
(3) Foreign states may acquire land but only for embassy and staff
residence purposes.

In Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez, the Court held to extend the exception to

testamentary succession for otherwise the provision will be for naught and
meaningless.93 Another jurisprudential exception is when an alien acquires land
by hereditary succession, such alien cannot renounce the right to inherit in favor
of one who is not qualified. 94 In the case of Moss v. Director of lands, the
Ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution provided that until final
withdrawal of the United States, Americans and American Corporations enjoyed
the same civil rights as Filipino citizens and could therefore acquire private lands
until July 4, 1946.95

As mentioned previously, private land means any land of private ownership.

This includes both lands owned by private individuals and lands which are
patrimonial property of the State or of municipal corporations. 96 In the case of
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, the term private agricultural lands meant any
private land that was neither timber nor mineral land. 97 Again, the capacity to
acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. This is because aliens were disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain (since the 1935 Constitution), aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, were also disqualified from acquiring
private lands. The prohibition applies even to a regime of conjugal partnership in
marriage. Thus, an alien spouse in a conjugal partnership does not have the right
to give or not to give consent in the disposition of the land. 98

92
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 470.
93
111 SCRA 704.
94
Halili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113539, March 12, 1998.
95
80 SCRA 269.
96
BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1157.
97
79 Phil. 461.
98
BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1158.

44
Exception for former Filipino Citizens:

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 7 of this article, a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to the
limitations provided by law.

A 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution created another exception in favor of

a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship. He or she
may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the
Batasang Pambansa may provide. This now embodied in Sec. 8. The 1987
provision, however, not longer contains the phrase for use by him as
residence.99

A Filipino corporation can acquire land

Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution makes the capacity to acquire private land
dependent on capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private
corporations can hold lands of the public domain only by lease. They are thus
not in the same position as aliens who cannot even lease land of the public
domain.100 By analogy, Filipino Corporations, as a creation of the legislature (The
Corporation Code, Batas Pambansa 68) also has Filipino citizenships as a
juridical person. It is also one of the expressed powers of a corporation as
provided by Sec. 36 to wit:

(g) To purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell, lease,

pledge, mortgage and otherwise deal with such real and personal
property, including securities and bonds of other corporations, as
the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may
reasonably require.101

In contrast with public lands

The term public lands refer to such lands of the public domain as are subject to
alienation and disposal by the State in accordance with the Public Land Act. The
phrase public land was held to be equivalent to public domain. It does not
by any means include all lands of government ownership, but only so much of
said lands as are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement by
homestead and other similar laws. Accordingly, government land and public
land are not synonymous terms; the first is more extensive and embraces not

99
BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1166.
100
Id. at 1161.
101
The Corporation Code, 36, g

45
only the second by also other lands of the government already reserved to public
use or subject to private right.102

The rules for the disposition of lands of the public domain are the ff: 103

(1) Only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated. All
others are inalienable and may be developed and utilized only
according to the rules established in Sec. 2 of the Constitution.

(2) Only public corporations and qualified individuals may acquire

alienable lands of the public domain. Corporations can hold
alienable land of the public domain only by lease.

(3) Private corporations are allowed to lease no more than one

thousand hectares.

(4) The congress shall determine by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the
conditions therefor.

Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that the acquisition of public agricultural
lands by purchase is governed by Chapter V (Sale). Any citizen of the Philippines
of lawful age of the head of a family may purchase any tract of public
agricultural land not to exceed twelve hectares104 which shall be sold thru sealed
bidding. The land shall be awarded to the highest bidder, but the applicant may
equal the highest bid. The purchase price may be paid in full upon the making of
the award or in not more than ten equal annual installments from the date of the
award. It is required that the purchaser shall have not less than one-fifth of the
land cultivated within five years from the date of the award, and before any
patent is issued, he must show actual occupancy, cultivation and improvement
of at least one-fifth of the land until the date of final payment.105

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila

79 Phil. 461

FACTS: Krivenko bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate,

Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of w/c was interrupted
by the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration
but it was denied on the ground that Krivenko is an alien. Krivenko
then brought the case to the CFI of Manila by means of a consulta.
The court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal.
102
Supra note 30.
103
BERNAS, COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 1145-1146.
104
PHIL. CONST. art. 12, 3
105
Public Land Act, 22, 26 & 28

46
 HELD: The 1935 Constitution classified lands namely as
agricultural, timber and mineral since this was the basic
classification existing in laws and jurisprudence at that time. The
phrase public agricultural lands includes residential lot & their
alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. To construe this phrase as
not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the
result would be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but also other forms of
public agricultural lands.

Director of Lands v. Lood

124 SCRA 460

FACTS: Quezon City Development & Financing Corp filed an

application with the CFI of Rizal, seeking the registration of title
under Act. 496, claiming to be the owner in fee simple of a parcel of
land in Taytay, Rizal. The Director of Lands, filed an opposition, on
the ground that the applicant has no sufficient title to the land, not
having acquired the same by composition title from the Spanish
Govt or by possessory information title pursuant to Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894. The CFI ruled that the applicant has a registrable
title over the parcel of land.

HELD: The applicant, being a juridical person, is disqualified to

apply subject property for registration. Limiting the mode of
acquisition of corporations, by purchase, but not by homestead,
free patent or judicial confirmation, does not offend the
Constitution. Corporations were never intended to acquire lands
by such modes. Further, corporations, as product of statutory
action, the legislative can define the powers of a corporation.

C. Modes of Acquisition

The conveyance of public land by the government to a private individual is

generally known as a public grant. How the government makes such grant is
well illustrated by what actually took place in the Philippines after its discovery
by Magellan in 1521. It was held by the discovery and conquest of the entire
Philippine territory became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the
Spanish Crown. With this as basis, the Spanish government began to handle the
direct distribution of public lands to settlers, vassals and other people by the
issuance of royal grants and concessions in varied forms.

47
It seems but only logical that tile to land must emanate from some source for it
cannot just issue forth from nowhere. And consistent with the general tendency
observed in different countries, the government or head of state is vested with
such power to make public land grants according to existing statutes.

Republic v. Lee
197 SCRA 13

FACTS: On June 29, 1976, Lee filed before the CFI of Pangasinan, an
application for registration in her favor of a parcel of land at
Magaldan, Pangasinan. The Director of Lands, filed an opposition,
alleging that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest
have acquired the land under any of the Spanish titles or any other
recognized mode for the acquisition of title. The CFI rendered
judgment confirming the title of the applicants over the said parcel
of land pursuant to the Land Registration Law.

ISSUE: WON public land can be acquired by a private person

without any grant.

HELD: No public land can be acquired by private persons without

any grant, express or implied, for government. A grant is
conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26,
1894 or prior thereto.

(1) Acquisition by Public Grant106

The Spanish Government, during their colonial rule, issued Royal Grants as title
to the lands, to discoverers, settlers, vassals, and other people in varied forms.

During the Commonwealth Government, the Public Land Act was passed and by
virtue thereof public agricultural lands were distributed to citizens under certain
conditions specified therein. These lands so distributed became ultimately the
property of the distributees.

In, Aureus v. Secretary of Agriculture & Commerce,107 it was held that the mere filing
by an individual of an application for a permit to occupy a piece of public land
does not create an obligation on the part of the administrative officer concerned
to grant his application. If it does, the Director of Lands or the Secretary of
Agriculture, will be a mere robot of every such applicant. It is discretionary in

106
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND, supra note 199, at 15.
107
85 Phil. 1.

48
the said officials to grant or not to grant such application. While in Luzuriaga v.
Director of Lands,108 it was held that when a municipality has used a land from
time immemorial for recognized public purposes based upon a public necessity,
which purposes and necessity were formerly recognized by the Government as a
basis for a grant of land to a municipality, a grant from the State in favor of the
municipality is presumed.

Proof of acquisition from the state

No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government, it is indispensable that there be a showing of title
from the State. One claiming rights must prove that he has complied with the
Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural
requirements for acquisition of public land. 109

Private Grants of Land Titles

The transfer of title to land by the owner himself or his duly authorized
representative to another by mutual consent is recognized by law. Consent of the
grantor is an essential element. To give effect to the transfer, a deed of
conveyance must be executed to be followed by its registration at the Registry of
Deeds.110

(2) Prescription

Land ownership and other real rights or obligations may be acquired through the
lapse of time, in the manner and action laid down by law. 111 All things which are
within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Thus, the peaceful and adverse possession of land that is continuous
and uninterrupted for a certain period of time may be converted into ownership
of the land.112 However, property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. 113

The claim of ownership114 must be in the concept of owners, adverse, public and
peaceful.115 Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. 116 The
law fixes ten (10) years by ordinary prescription, that is, without need of title and
108
24 Phil. 193.
109
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND, supra note 199, at 16.
110
Id. at 17.
111
CIVIL CODE, art. 1106.
112
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 53.
113
CIVIL CODE, art. 1113.
114
Supra note 246.
115
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 17.
116
DESIDERIO P. JURADO, COMMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS 653 (7 th
rev. ed, 1980). [hereinafter JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS].

49
good faith,117 and thirty (30) years by extraordinary prescription, without need of
title and good faith.118

For ordinary prescription, the following requisites must concur: (1) Capacity to
acquire by prescription; (2) the object must be susceptible of prescription; (3) The
possession must be in concept of owner, public, peaceful, continuous and
uninterrupted; (4) The possession must be in good faith; (5) The possession must
be by virtue of a just title; and (6) The period of possession must be 4 years if the
object is movable or ten years if it is immovable.

In extraordinary acquisitive prescription, the following must concur: (1) Capacity

to acquire by prescription; (2) The object must be susceptible of prescription; (3)
The possession must be in the concept of owner, public, peaceful, continuous,
and uninterrupted; and (4) The period of possession must be 8 years if the object
is movable or 30 years if it is immovable.119

The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership.120 In its negative aspect, it consists in the ignorance of the possessor of
any flaw which would invalidate his title or mode of acquisition.121

For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right. 122 Its requisites are: (1) It must be just; (2)
it must be true; (3) it must be valid; (4) it must be proved. 123 Actual possession of
land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property. The general rule is that
the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of
all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse
possession of another.124 However, the period of possession in acquisitive
prescription may be interrupted naturally, civilly, or by express or tacit
recognition by the possessor of the ownership. 125 In extinctive prescription,
interruption may occur (1) when they are filed before the court, (2) when there is
a written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and (3) when there is any

117
CIVIL CODE, art. 1137.
118
CIVIL CODE, art. 1496.
119
JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 656-657.
120
CIVIL CODE, art. 1127.
121
JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 657.
122
CIVIL CODE, art. 1129.
123
CIVIL CODE, arts. 1117, 1130-1131.
124
Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil 175 (1918).
125
JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 657.

50
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. 126 With such conversion,
property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section
14(2), and may be registered even if the possession commenced on a date later
than the date of enactment of the Property Registration Decree. 127

Such does not preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced after the abovementioned
date, considering Section 14(2) of the Decree which governs and authorizes the
application of those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws. While as a rule, prescription
does not run against the State, the exception is where the law itself expressly
provides. An example is said Section 14 (2) which specifically allows qualified
individuals to apply for the registration of property, ownership of which he has
acquired by prescription under existing laws.128 However, a property registered
under the provisions of P.D. 1529 is not subject to prescription. Also, prescription
is unavailing not only against his hereditary successors because the latter merely
step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the
continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest. 129

Moreover, it was held that a persons possession of a parcel of land covered by a

TCT cannot render nugatory the right of the holders of a certificate of title. The
reason is that prescription does not run against registered land. A title, once
registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open, and notorious possession.
Moreover, in asserting ownership by donation, petitioners were in effect
assailing the title of respondents. A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked,
the issue on its validity can only be raised in an action expressly institute for that
purpose.130 A possessor of land who may not be the owner, after a lapse of a
certain period prescribed in the law, may assert ownership thereof as against
anyone except the true owner or one with a better title based on an earlier
possession which he had not abandoned. Adverse possession or prescription
does not run against private lands brought under the operation of the Torrens
system, nor against public land except where the law expressly so provides. 131

For purposes of prescriptive possession, there is just title (mode) when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property thru any of the modes
allowed by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. These are
enumerated in Titles 1 to 5, Book III of the Civil Code, namely; (a) occupation, (b)

126
CIVIL CODE, ART. 1155.
127
G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005.
128
AGCAOILI, PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE, supra note 121, at 657.
129
Simeona Barcelona, et al. v. Hilarion Barcelon and the Honorable Court o Appeals, 100 Phil. 251
(1956).
130
Ong, et al. v. Sps. Cabucos, 356 SCRA 786 (2001).
131
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES, supra note 199, at 15-16.

51
intellectual creation, (c) law, (d) donation, (e) succession (testate or intestate), (f)
in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition, and (g) prescription. 132

In computing for prescription, the present possessor may complete the period
necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or
predecessor-in-interest. It is presumed that the present possessor who was also
the possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in possession during the
intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary. 133 Possession in wartime,
when the civil courts are not open, shall not be counted in favor of the adverse
claimant.134

Prescription does not run between husband and wife. Even though there be a
separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlement or by judicial
decree. Neither does prescription run between parents and children during the
minority or insanity of the latter, and between guardian and ward during the
continuance of the guardianship.135

While prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-owner as long as he

expressly or impliedly recognized the co-ownership, it may take place where it is
clearly shown that the co-owner has repudiated the co-owership, and that the
other co-owners were appraised of the repudiation.136

Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already

obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future. Prescription is deemed to
have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts which
imply the abandonment of the right acquired. 137

Laches should not be confused with prescription. Laches is different from, and
applies independently of, prescription. While prescription is concerned with the
fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter
of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be
enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the
property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not.
Laches apllies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is
based on a fixed time; laches is not.138

(3) Accretion

132
CIVIL CODE, art. 712.
133
CIVIL CODE, art. 1138.
134
CIVIL CODE, art. 1136.
135
JURADO, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, supra note 256, at 654.
136
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 19.
137
CIVIL CODE, art. 1112.
138
Heirs of Batiof Lacamen v. Heirs of Laman, 65 SCRA 605 (1975).

52
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited. 139 It is the act by which the
land bordering a stream or other body of water increases its area by the gradual
deposit of soil or seaweeds by the current of the river or other natural process.140

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the waters. As a mode of acquiring property under Article 457
of the Civil Code, there are three requisites which must concur before an
accretion is said to have taken place:

(a) The accumulation of soil or sediment must be gradual and

imperceptible;
(b) That it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and
(c) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
the rivers.141

These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to owners of
lands adjoining he banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received
from the effects of the current waters.142 Alluvion is the soil deposited on the
estate fronting the river bank.143

In order to acquire land by accretion, there should be a natural and actual

continuity of the accretion to the land of the riparian owner. 144 The requirement
that the deposit should be due to the effects of the current of the river is
indispensable. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. 145 A riparian
owner then does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works
expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. 146 There must be
evidence to prove that the addition to the property was made gradually through
the effects of the current of the river.147

In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden
or that it occurred though avulsion, the presumption is that the change was
gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. 148 Acts of possession exercised over
bordering land are always understood legally to cover that portion added to the

139
Navarro v Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68166, February 12, 1997.
140
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES , supra note 199, at 39.
141
Navarro, G.R. No. 68166.
142
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES , supra note 199, at 35.
143
Navarro, G.R. No. 68166.
144
PEA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES , supra note 199, at 35.
145
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 109.
146
Republic v Court of Appeals and Tancinco, GR No. L-61647, October 12, 1984
147
NOBLEJAS, supra note 285.
148
Hodges v Garcia, G.R. No. L-12730, Aug. 22, 1960.

53
property by accretion.149 One must prove his claim by a preponderance of
evidence.150

The fact that the accretion to ones land used to pertain to anothers estate, which
is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude the former from being
the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the
adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive
from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks.
Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and
the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Property
Registration Decree.151

Riparian owners are unquestionably owners of the alluvial deposits on their

lands caused by the current of the river, and the area within the boundaries
thereof prevail over that which the title shows. 152 The reason behind the law
giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is
to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of
his land. 153

Accretion does not become automatically registered land just because the lot
which received such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. Ownership of a piece
of land is one thing, registration under the Torrens System of ownership is
another.154 As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens
system.155

Alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and, therefore,
not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private persons. Since the land
is foreshore land or property of public dominion, its disposition falls under the
exclusive supervision and control of the Lands Management Bureau. Until a
formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive
department or the legislature, to the effect that land is no longer needed for coast
guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of
the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership. The
adjoining registered owner of foreshore land cannot claim ownership thereof by
right of accretion.156

149
Cortes v City of Manila, G.R. No. L-4012, March 25, 1908
150
65 C.J.S. 183
151
Hodges, G.R. No. L-12730.
152
Government of the Philippines v. Abaja, 52 Phil. 261 (1928).
153
Cortes, G.R. No. L-4012.
154
Grande v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17652 (1962)
155
Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. 73465, September 7, 1989
156
Ignacio v. Director of Lands, GR. No. L-12958, May 30, 1960.

54
(4) Reclamation157

This method suggests the filling of submerged land by deliberate act and
reclaiming title thereto. In the Philippines, there is no law, express or implied
which grants to owners of adjacent upland the right to fill the adjacent land
under water. Reclaimed lands may however, be declared by the government as
property of the adjoining owners and as such increment thereto only when it is
no longer necessary for public use. Reclamation projects may be undertaken for
the establishment of residential, commercial or industrial sites, construction or
extension of roads, wharves or piers, airfields, parks, playgrounds, plazas,
market places, etc.

Republic Act No. 2264, entitled AN ACT AMENDING THE LAWS

GOVERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY CREATING THEIR AUTONOMY
AND REORGANIZING PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS, does not expressly
authorize local governments to undertake or carry out reclamation projects.
However, such authority is believed to be included in the general authority
granted local governments to undertake and carry out any public works
projects. This view is grounded on Section 12 of said Act.158

The reclamation projects in Manila Bay and the coastal municipalities extending
from Pasay City to Cavite City are being undertaken pursuant to the authority
granted by R.A. 2264 to local governments.

Under R.A. 1899, the National Government granted to all municipalities and
chartered cities, the authority to carry out at their own expense, the reclamation
by dredging, filling, and other means of any foreshore lands bordering on them,
and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate
docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities or chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Public
Works and Highways. Any and all such lands reclaimed will become property of
the respective municipalities and chartered cities; but the new foreshore along
the reclaimed areas shall continue to become property of the National
Government.

(5) Voluntary Transfer

157
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 42.
158
R.A. No. 2264, Sec. 12 provides that the implied power of a province, a city or municipality shall
be liberally construed in its favor, and that any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the
power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist. It also
provided that the general welfare clause shall be liberally interpreted in case of doubt so as to give more
power to local governments in promoting the economic condition, social welfare and material progress
of the people in the community.

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A private grant is the usual means by which title to land is transferred by the
owner himself or his duly authorized representative. Here the consent or
cooperation of the grantor is an essential element. This transfer is given effect by
the voluntary execution of deed of conveyance in certain prescribed form,
completed by the recording or registration thereof in a public office. The purpose
of such registration is to serve public notice at least constructively and thereby
legally bind third persons. Under the Torrens system, it is the registration that is
the operative act to convey the land and affect title thereto. In other words, the
legal title to the land does not pass until the conveyance shall have been duly
registered or made of public record.159

Filamore called this transfer Tradition. Tradition is the act of delivering the thing
sold to the buyer or vendee by (a) turning over material possession of the thing
sold, or (b) symbolic transfer of ownership thereof. 160 The former transfers actual
and physical control over the buyer, while the other is done by executing a
public instrument. Filmore said that, according to Melquiades J. Gamboa, the
requisites of tradition are: (1) the transferor is the owner of the property
transferred and has the capacity and intention to grant; (2) the transferee has the
capacity to acquire the property; (3) there is justa causa or valid means of transfer
such as the contract of sale, barter or legacy; and (4) the actual transfer of
possession to the transferee is manifested by some outward act.161

(6) Involuntary Alienation

This method of transfer does not require the consent or cooperation of the owner
of the land, and, in fact, is usually carried out against his will. For the more
common forms of involuntary alienation, we have them in connection with
judgments of the courts in expropriation or condemnation proceedings. Land is
forcibly acquired by the state through the exercise of eminent domain, or by way
of escheat or forfeiture. It may also be confiscated, seized or attached, and
subsequently sold at public auction to the highest bidder. We have the execution
sale by the sheriff to satisfy a money judgment, the tax sale to satisfy unpaid
taxes and penalties, the auction sale by a public officer in foreclosure of
mortgage. Some authorities even consider the sale of property under special
order of the court for and in behalf of a minor or a person under legal disability
as falling within the category of involuntary alienation in the same way as a sale
by judicial administrator or executor of an estate of a decedent. Under this mode
of acquiring land, the purchasers are generally subject to the rule of caveat
emptor.162

(7) Testate and Intestate Succession

159
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 20.
160
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 53.
161
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 1, at 54.
162
NOBLEJAS, REGISTRATION, supra note 3, at 299.

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Transfer of title by testate or intestate succession is governed by the Civil Law.
Title to land is acquired by descent in case an heir succeeds the deceased owner
in intestacy or by reasons of certain relationship which entitles him to succeed by
operation of law. To be an heir, it requires a certain degree or relationship with
the decedent.

A landowner may execute his last will and testament designating his heir and
legatee who shall receive the respective portions of his estate pursuant to law. 163

The testator cannot dispose of that portion of his estate called Legitime which is
reserved for his compulsory heirs, namely: the legitimate children or
descendants, legitimate parents and ascendants, his widow; acknowledged
natural children, and natural children by legal fiction as well as illegitimate
children. 164

When a person dies without a will, or the will does not institute an heir to the
property or the testator, or no one succeeds under the will, intestate succession
shall take place.165 Under this system, his legitimate children and descendants
succeed him, followed by his parents, mother and father, who inherit in equal
shares; or when they are both dead, the illegitimate children, or acknowledged
natural children, the natural children by legal fiction and adulterous children
succeed in this order. Finally, the State inherits when the ascendants and
descendants of the testator do not exist.166

Professor Gamboa summarizes the order of intestate succession, thus: (1)

legitimate children and their descendants; (2) legitimate parents and
descendants; (3) illegitimate children and their descendants; (4) surviving spouse
without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters; (5) collateral relatives
within the fifth (5th) degree; and (6) the State.167

In Austria v. Reyes 168 the Supreme Court enunciated that testacy is favored and
doubts are resolved on the side, especially where the will evinces an intention on
the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. Furthermore, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of
the testator allowed prevailing, that we could even vary the language of the will
for the purpose of giving it effect.

Succession by Devise
163
CIVIL CODE, arts. 884-914.
164
CIVIL CODE, arts. 886-887.
165
CIVIL CODE, art. 968.
166
Arts. 963-1014, ibid.
167
FILAMOR, REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 19, at 204.
168
31 SCRA 754 (1970).

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One succeeds by devise when he acquires land from one who may not be a
relative, if he is named by the latter in his last will and testament to succeed as
such. Even a stranger may acquire title by devise if appropriate disposition has
been made in his favor by the testator in the latters will. Where the heirs
entitled would so prefer, title to land under this method may formally be
transferred without proceeding in court. Under the provisions of Rule 74,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, they may agree upon an extrajudicial settlement
or partition of the estate of the decedent, provided there are no debts left by him
which remain unsettled.

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