PAGE 7 CASES

NAVARRO VS ERMITA
April 12, 2011
G.R. No. 180050; 612 SCRA 131

Petitioners: Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, And Rene O. Medina,

Respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Representing The President Of The Philippines;
Senate Of The Philippines, Represented By The Senate President; House Of Representatives, Represented
By The House Speaker; Governor Robert Ace S. Barbers, Representing The Mother Province Of Surigao
Del Norte; Governor Geraldine Ecleo Villaroman, Representing The New Province Of Dinagat Islands,

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Rodolfo, Victor and Rene, as taxpayers, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court to
declare as unconstitutional Republic Act 9355, which created the Province of Dinagat.

According to them, the province, which is composed of more than one island, is exempted from
the land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 which states that [t]he land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
certificate of compliance issued by the Lands Management Bureau was also based on the exemption
under paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR.

They allege that the province did not meet the requirements of the Local Government Code,
Republic Act 7160 in terms of population and territory. The creation of the province will unjustly deprive
the people of Surigao del Norte a large chunk of territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and rich resources
from the area. Whereas RA 7610 mandates that a province to be created should have a population of at
least 250,000, the Province of Dinagat, as of the 2000 NSO Census only had 106,591; whereas the law
requires a new province to have at least 2,000 square kilometres of contiguous area, the new province will
only have a land area of 802.12 square kilometres. Further, the act of creating the province was an act of
gerrymandering.

In their defense, the respondents posited that the law is constitutional. Dinagat as a new province
complied with the requirements of Republic Act 7610 in terms of population and land area. The 2003
population of Dinagat Islands based on the special census ordered by the then governor of Surigao del
Norte, Lyndon Barbers, was 371, 576 inhabitants; it is exempt from the land area requirement because it
is composed of several islands, which exception is provided for under the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act 7160.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. No. 9355 has failed to comply with either the territorial or population requirement
contained in Section 461 of the LGC

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RULING:

The Supreme Court granted the petition and invalidated the law:

There are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous; and (2) the land
area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace. A sufficient land area in the creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as
provided by Section 461 of the Local Government Code . Paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two
instances of exemption from the requirement of territorial contiguity, thus:(b) The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do
not contribute to the income of the province.

However, said exemption pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states
that the requirement of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising
two or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of
the province

The Province of Dinagat Islands failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than
250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the
NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.

Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of
population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not
certified by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code. Moreover, respondents failed to prove
that with the population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao
del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of
the creation of the new province.

R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population requirement for the
creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands.

The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the
criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria
prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the creation
of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code. (by: PENAMANTE)

Aquino III v. COMELEC

April 7, 2010
G.R. No. 189793, 617 SCRA 623

Petitioners: SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO,

Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL

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PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:
In this case, Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.
Meanwhile, Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and
second legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four
(4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province.
Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando
were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less
than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE
WON a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province?

RULING
No. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
In fact, there is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each province point to no other conclusion than that the
250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
In the case at bar, apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation
of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:
a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
In conclusion, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. (by:PICOT)

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 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC
586 SCRA 210 (2009)

NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2%
of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled
to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans
Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast
for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional
seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the
Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with
the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20%
share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be
discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides
that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will
be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution

4
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there
were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats
allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to
Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-
list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than
2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-
20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes,
gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50
parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and
even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two
percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get
a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing
for a rounding off of fractional seats.

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In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-
lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each.
The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats
for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available
for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation
for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of
seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the
party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total
votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional
seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter
which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so
happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in
the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections
as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations
deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his
separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the
framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution
and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-
list system. (SOURCE: INTERNET-UBER DIGEST)

ABAYON V. HRET
612 SCRA 375 (2010)

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FACTS: (consolidated case)

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed
a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat
Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.

It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just
its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns
of Aangat Tayo.

In G.R.
189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat
in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that
Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of
communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security
guards.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the
party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives.
Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility
as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that
party-list group, not before the HRET.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan.

HELD:

although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits
as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the

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Constitution,5 identifies who the members of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since,
as pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives no less
than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. 10

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions
for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan. (SOUCRE: INTERNET)
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v COMELEC
April 8, 2010
G.R. No. 190582; 618 SCRA 32

Petitioner: ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts: Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and
transgender) community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this
Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections Ang Ladlad laid out its
national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined
its platform of governance.
On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC. On
November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends
religious beliefs, and advocates sexual immorality.

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 Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but
likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have
not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulation relating to the elections. Furthermore,
states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the
teachings of our faith. When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16,
2010, upheld the First Assailed Resolution.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed a Petition, praying that the Supreme Court annul the
Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang
Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC,
which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections
by January 25, 2010.
Issue: Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. In so far as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma.
Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation
Ruling: The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT
sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of
the sectors in the enumeration. Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the
party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it
had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that
upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the country,
petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it
said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious,
considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC
prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a
belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to
procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial
petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged
that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it
had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion

9
group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates
around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no
surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs
findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang
Ladlads principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or
the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality,
or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for
is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead,
on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity
to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects.
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct
may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The
COMELEC argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of
the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector
which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender
is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any
society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind
this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation,
even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall
that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these
generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.

10
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group
members have committed or are committing immoral acts. The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more
than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between
thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would
have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the straights and the gays. Certainly this is not the
intendment of the law.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a
civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It
hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as
a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates
our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall any person
be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute
prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of similar persons.
The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end. In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, we declared
that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the
rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to
invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

11
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as
immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately
for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize
homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to
assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral
disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational
basis review under the equal protection clause.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same
interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should
apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same
basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals
insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between
heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or
disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this
country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a
political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and
their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the
same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express
that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or
moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of
the community.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human
rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to
electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26 All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other statu

12
The UDHR provides:
Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states: Article 25 Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any
of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally
charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in
opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the
Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge
that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.

LOKIN, JR. V. COMELEC

621 SCRA 285 (2010)

FACTS:

Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941,
otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its constitution and bylaws, the platform of
CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the countrys public service.
Under the leadership of the National Council, its highest policymaking and governing body, the party
participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections. On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both
purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in
the Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010 Elections.

The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the partys acting
secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another Manifestation6 was submitted by herein
respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and secretary-general,
respectively.

On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due course to CIBACs
Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination which of the two factions of the registered
party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the
official representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations.

On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva,
submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department. The nomination

13
was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second
Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin and Teresita Planas as party-list
nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as acting secretary-general of CIBAC.

Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed
with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to
nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as
acting secretary-general, when she was not even

a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted were
unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to
file the Certificate of Nomination on its behalf.

In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the Petition, ordered the
Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and declared respondents faction as the true
nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the
COMELEC en banc affirmed the Divisions findings.

Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the partys Certificate of Nomination is
an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts, and over which the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction; and

2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing
respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.

HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for being filed outside the requisite period.
The review by this Court of judgments and final orders of the COMELEC is governed specifically
by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which states:

REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
COA

Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under
Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the immediately succeeding
provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for the allowable period within which to file petitions for
certiorari from judgments of both the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Thus, while Rule 64
refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot be equated, as they
provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a period of 60 days from notice of
judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while Section 3 expressly provides for only 30
days, viz:

14
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment
or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration
of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned
from notice of denial.

Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued the second assailed
Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on 1 September
2010.16 Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three days it took petitioners to file the Motion
for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of 27 days or until 28 September 2010 within which to
file the Petition for Certiorari with this Court.

However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly outside the required
period.

POLITICAL LAW: COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes

In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled that the COMELEC
possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally
mandated power to enforce election laws and register political parties. The Court therein cited Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections and Palmares v. Commission on Elections, which uniformly upheld the
COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court.
The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party
and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case that the
COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who
must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper
case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

ELECTION LAW: party-list system law

Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as well as their individual
qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law. Sections 8 and 9 thereof state:

Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number
of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent
sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall
not be considered resigned.

15
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write,
a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with jurisdiction over
the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee, the
COMELEC promulgated its Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/
Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Adopting the
same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of these Rules also required that:

The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in consonance with the
Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent, which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of the nominee/s in the
undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the advancement of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations (prior
declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other positive actions on the part of the
nominee/sshowing his/her adherence to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list group/ organization for at
least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of the party-list/organization
but is/are also a bona fide member/s of said marginalized and underrepresented sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the foregoing documentary
evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of this resolution not later than three (3) days from
the last day of filing of the list of nominees.

Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC First
Division and the COMELEC en banc.

The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged authority as acting secretary-general was an
unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence. Petitioners did not submit any documentary
evidence that Derla was a member of CIBAC, let alone the representative authorized by the party to
submit its Certificate of Nomination.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the
assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the
COMELEC expunging from its records the Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by
Pia B. Derla. (SOURCE: INTERNET LAWPHIL BLOG)

Party-list Representatives:
AMORES v HRET
GR 189600, 6/29/2010

16
SUMMARY:
Petition to declare Villanueva as ineligible to hold office as representative of CIBAC for being overage to
represent youth. Change of affiliation must be made six months before elections. Youth sector is
represented by 25 30.

FACTS:

5/14/2009: Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office of one Emmanuel Joel
Villanueva as representative of CIBAC in the House of Representatives (HoR)
Petitioner argues:
o Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of nomination, beyond the age limit of 30 which
was the limit imposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector".
o Villanueva's change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW and families not affected six
months prior to elections.
Respondent argues:
o RA 7941 requirement for "age" for youth sector representative only applicable to first
three elections after the party list act.
o There was no resultant change in affiliation.

ISSUE:
Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to respondent Villanueva

RULING:
Villauneva ineligible to hold office as a member of HoR representing CIBAC

Villanueva's arguments are invalid. The law is clear. If representative of youth sector, should be
between 25 to 30.
Villanueva is ineligible to also represent OFW. Sectoral representation should be changed SIX
MONTHS prior to elections.(SOUCE: SCRBD MAO LANG GYUD NI AKO NAKITA)

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. V. COMELEC

694 SCRA 477 (2013)

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs
COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said
party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

17
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political
constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined
political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must
be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from
participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a
statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when
they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that
it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political
system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of
the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. It is
also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack well-defined political constituencies. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot,
they do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the
legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list
system of elections.

18
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral
representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies as
they are ideologically marginalized. (SOURCE: UBER DIGEST)

ABANG LINGKOD v COMELEC

October 22, 2013
G.R. No. 206952; 708 SCRA 636
Topic: Composition, Qualifications and Term of Office (House of Representatives)

Petitioner: Abang Lingkod PartyList Abang Lingkod

Respondent: Commission On Elections (COMELEC)

EN BANC

Reyes,J.

FACTS:
ABANG LINGKOD filed a petition for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling its registration under the partylist system.

ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant fanners and
fisherfolks, and was registered under the partylist system on December 22, 2009. It participated in the
May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the House of
Representatives.

On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the
May 2013 elections. On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, filed with the COMELEC pertinent
documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.

After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc on November 7, 2012, cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's
registration as a partylist group. The COMELEC En Banc pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to
establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely
offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC
En Banc further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves
marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the
plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.

ISSUE:
1. Whether ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation
of its registration under the partylist system

19
2. Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKODs registration
under the partylist system.
RULING:
1. No, the Court finds that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity
to present evidence establishing its qualification as a partylist group. It was notified through
Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG
LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove its
continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for
summary hearing on three separate dates, belies its claim that it was denied due process.
2. Yes,the Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the
registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the partylist system.
The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it
declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a partylist group in the May 2013 elections,
pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that
it had a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG
LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track
record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring partylist groups to
present evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the partylist system to submit proof of
their track record as a group.

NOTES:

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 however provides:

Sec. 5 Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the partylist system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the partylist
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by laws, platform or program of government list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
New parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or associations
seeking registration under the partylist system, 2 of which are:
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in "well
defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas

20
workers. The sectors that lack "welldefined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the ''marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "welldefined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. (LABRADOR)
ALDOVINO VS COMELEC
December 23, 2009
G.R. No. 184836; 609 SCRA 636

Petitioners: Mon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller And Ferdinand N. Talabong,

Respondents: Commission On Elections And Wilfredo F. Asilo

BRION, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during
his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with
a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension
order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr.,et al. sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it
on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term
therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELEC in Asilos favour. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as
Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the
Sandiganbayan had ordered.
Furthermore, respondent ruled that the preventive suspension is an effective interruption because
it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such
term should not be counted for the purpose of the term limit rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the preventive suspension of an elected public official constitutes an interruption
of the officials term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution.
HELD:
No. Asilos preventive suspension does not constitute an effective interruption of the three-term
limit rule.
The only interruption of a term that can exempt an elective official from the three-term limit rule
is involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length
of time, however short, for an effective interruption to the three-limit rule to occur.

21
 However, a preventive suspension, by its nature, is only a temporary incapacity to render service
during an unbroken term. It does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from
holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his
office for a reason provided by law.
The official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is
lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, the official I barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but no position is
vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.
Asilo is disqualified by the Court to run in the immediate subsequent election following his three
consecutive terms of service. (by PENAMANTE)

Abundo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, Jan. 8, 2013

Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and
2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served
the corresponding terms as mayor.

In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed
as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the
2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until
the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.

Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres lost no time in seeking the formers disqualification to run, the corresponding petition, predicated
on the three-consecutive term limit rule.

ISSUE #1: Is the service of a term less than the full three years by Mayor Abundo, in view of an election
protest, considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term
limit for elective local officials?

RULING: No. Abundo cannot plausibly claim,even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the
mayor as a matterof right during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May
8, 2006. Neither can heassert title to the same nor serve the functions ofthe said elective office. The
reason is that during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the
functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo
actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the
resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one
year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is
three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007.

ISSUE #2: Under what instances are the consecutive terms not involuntary broken or interrupted?

RULING: The instance swherein such consecutive terms are not considered as having been
involuntarily interrupted or broken are as follows:

22
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law;
(2) Recall Election;
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City;
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension; and
(5) Election Protest
(SOURCE: SCRIBD , MAO RA PUD NI AKO NAKITA )

Tolentino vs. COMELEC

Jan 21 2004

Parties: - Petitioners: Arturo Tolentino, Arturo Mojica

- Respondents: COMELEC, Ralph Recto, Gregorio Honasan
- Ponente: Carpio

Background:
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside the COMELECs Resolutions which proclaimed official and
final the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the May 14 2001 elections.

Facts of the Case

In Feb 2001, a Senate seat for a term expiring on June 30 2004 was vacated w/ the appointment of then
Sen. Guingona as VP of the PI.

The Senate then adopted Resolution #84 wc: 1) certified the existence of a vacancy in the Senate & 2)
called the COMELEC to fill up the said vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously w/
the regular election on May 14 2001, and 3) declared the senatorial candidate garnering the 13 th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Sen. Guingona. Accdg to the Senate,
this Resolutn is for the guidance & implementatn of the COMELEC, &that it had NO discretion to
alter the said procedure.

Nobody filed a certificate of candidacy to fill the position of senator to serve the unexpired 3yr term in the
special electn. All the senatorial candidates filed the certificates of candidacy for the 12 regular Senate
seats w/ a 6yr term each. COMELEC distributed nationwide official documents (eg Voter Info Sheet, List
of Candidates, Sample Ballot). The List of Candidates DID NOT provide 2 different categories of Senate
seats to be voted, namely the 12 regular 6-year term seats & the single 3-year term seat. Nor did the
ballots provide a separate space for the candidate to be voted in the special election & instead provided 13
spaces for 13 senatorial seats.

23
Without any COMELEC resolution/notice on the time, place & manner of the special election, the special
election was held on the scheduled May 14 2001 regular elections.

A single canvassing of votes for a single list of senatorial candidates was also done.

Petitioners assailed the manner by which the special election was conducted for violating the precedents
set by the 1951 & 1955 special elections, both of wc were held simultaneously & yet distinctly w/ the
regular general elections.

Thus, they pray that the Court declare that 1) NO special elections were held & that 2) Comelecs
Resolutions that proclaim the Senatorial candidate who obtained the 13 th highest # of votes as a duly
elected be declared NULL&VOID

Issue/s
Procedural Issues: 1) WON the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter bec respondents say
it is a quo warranto proceeding (a proceeding wc determines the right of a public officer in the exercise
of his office & to oust him from it if his claim is not well-founded), where only the Senate Electoral
Tribunal can serve as judge.
2) WON the petition is MOOT
3) WON the petitioner have locus standi
Substantive Issue: WON a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly
held on May 14 2001, despite the lack of a call for such an election & for lack of notice from
COMELEC

RULING:

The petition HAS NO MERIT.

Procedural Issues: 1) YES, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction bec what the petitioners are
questioning here is the validity of the special election in wc Honasan was elected, NOT his right in the
exercise of his office as Senator. His election is merely incidental to the petitioners case of action.
2) Although the petition may be moot, it is no bar for the Court to decide on its resolution bec the
question of the validity of a special election is likely to be repeated

24
3) YES, the Court shall be liberal in applying its rule of locus standi bec the issues raised are of
transcendental significance & paramount importance to the people, for it involves the peoples right for
suffrage.

Substantive Issue:
YES, a special election to fill a vacant 3-yr term Senate seat was validly held on May 14 2001. Although
COMELEC DID NOT COMPLY w/ the requirements of RA 6645, either strictly or substantially, it does
NOT invalidate the special election. WHY?

A) Bec although no calls for special election were made by COMELEC, Sec 2 of RA 6645, as amended
by RA 7166 already provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such
vacancy shall be held simultaneously w/ the next succeeding regular election. The law already charges the
voters w/ knowledge of this statutory notice & COMELECs failure to give additional notice did not
negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.

B) Moreover, there is no proof that the COMELECs failure to give a formal notice of the Office to be
filled & the manner of determining the winner in the special election actually misled voters & thereby
changed the results of the election. After all, the voters can be duly notified through other sources such as
media reports & election propaganda during the campaign.

C) Our election laws DO NOT require that a separate documentation or canvassing of votes be made for a
special election. COMELEC acted w/in its constitutional powers when it chose to abandon the precedents
of the 1951 &1955 special elections & instead adopted the Senates Resolution 84 wc shall award to the
senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes, the unexpired Senate term of Sen.
Guingona. The Court shall not interfere.
note: the Senate (through Rocos suggestion), in Resolution 84 felt that giving the 3year term to the
candidate w/ the 13th highest number of votes was being practical & economical)

In fine, the Court is loathe to annul elections despite certain irregularities unless it is impossible to
distinguish wc laws are lawful & wc are not. This is to acknowledge the fact that suffrage is one form of
peoples direct participation in government, & it is thus indispensable in a democratic society like ours.
***REMINDER to COMELEC*** : the Court however, reminded the COMELEC to not take chances
anymore in future elections. COMELEC reminded to next time, comply strictly w/ all the requirements of
the law regarding both regular & special elections. (SOURCE: SCRIBD)
PHILCONSA V. MATHAY
Facts:
The PHILCONSA, an association whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, questioned
the constitutionality of the law RA 4134, implementing the increase of salaries as violative of Art. VI,

25
Sec. 14 of the Constitution which provides: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. On June 10 1964, Congress passed RA 4134 providing for the increase of the
annual salary of the Senate President and of the Speaker of the house; and of Senators and members of the
House. Sec. 1 of the Act provides that the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance
with the provisions of the constitution and Section 7 provides that the increase of the salary increase of
the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House shall take effect on the effectivity of the salary
increase of Congressman and Senators. In 1965, RA 4642 implemented the increase pursuant to RA
4134, approved just the preceding year. According to petitioner, the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963,
and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, will expire only on Dec. 30, 1969, while the term of the
members of the House who participated in the approval of the Act expired on Dec. 300, 1965. Petitioner
seeks to permanently enjoin the respondent officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of
the increased salaries before Dec. 30, 1969.
Issues:
(1) WON the term of all the Senators and members of the House who approved the increase must
have fully expire before the increase becomes effective.

(2) WON the members of the House who were elected after the expiration of term of the
members of the House who approved the increase be subject to the payment of the increased
compensation, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of the Senator who also participated in the
approval of the increase.
Held:
The court agrees with the petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until Dec. 30, 1969, when the full term of all the members of the Senate and House that
approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. As RA 4642 authorizes the disbursement of the increase
compensation prior to the date of Dec. 30, 1969, it also violates the Constitution and shall be null and
void. The expiration of terms of ALL the members approving the increase is required before such
increase will take effect, despite the difference in the terms of office. (BY: JAMORA)
LIGOT V. MATHAY

Facts:
Petitioner, Benjamin Ligot, served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to
December 30, 1969.
On July 1, 1964, R.A. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other
officials of the national government" took effect increasing the salary of the members of Congress from P7,200 to P32,000.
The Act expressly provided that the increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."
When Ligot was elected for his third four-year term, he was not entitled to the salary increase by virtue of the Courts
unanimous decision in Philconsa v. Mathay

26
 "that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until
December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on
June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution..
Ligot lost in the 1969 elections and filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by
Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity.
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum ofP122,429.86 in Ligot's
favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of
Congress.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant due to a pending resolution by the Auditor General
of a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman also expired on December
30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and its supporting papers
for a recomputation of his retirement claim by virtue of the Auditor-
Generals adverse decision to Singsons claim

On January 20, 1972, the Auditor General through Velasco denied Ligots request for reconsideration.
Ligot then filed a petition for review appealing the decision of the Auditor-General alleging that
at the time of his retirement, the salary for members of Congess as provided by law was already
P32,000 per annum, so, he should receive his retirement gratuity based on that salary increase.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Ligot is entitled to retirement benefits based on the salary increase of the memberof Congress
HELD:
The petition was dismissed.
There is no question that Ligot is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on Commonwealth Act186, section 12 as
amended by RA4968. The issue is whether or not he can claim in based on theP32,000 per annum salary of the members of
Congress. The Court decided that to grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30,
1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution
from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them more than what is constitutionally allowed.
Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides that: No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such increase.
The ruling of the court was on retirement pay. Even in retirement benefits, you are supposed to receive retirement
benefits based on your last salary, not on the salary increased by law during your term. (BY: JAMORA)
PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS

27
Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at

the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House

of Representatives

Held:

Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by
law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law,
it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. (BY:
JAMORA)

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS

PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al.
556 SCRA 471 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.

FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of
negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.

28
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged with coup dtat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained
in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.

Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC
however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside
orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to
work and serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of
detention prisoners who are held without bail
HELD:

No distinction between Trillanes case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited
provisions apply equally to rape and coup dtat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is
beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v.
Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a
plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's

29
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the
people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of
law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed
to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006,
file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands
of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these
prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations. (SOURCE:
INTERNET )

JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG
17 SCRA 876 (1996)

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee
on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed
to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious
study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such
strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was
planning a coup dtat to place him as the president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez,
among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used
as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general
circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against
Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be
dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is
covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

30
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made,
or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the
same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court
the said communication is not absolutely privileged. (SOURCE: INTERNET)

OSMENA V. PENDATUN
109 PHIL 863
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled A Message to Garcia. In the
said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House
Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmea
during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected
to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmea avers that
the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman
Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the
matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon
members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic
world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible
in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it
does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.
(SOURCE: INTERNET-UBER DIGEST)
LIBAN V. GORDON

This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration filed on August 10, 2009 by
respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009
(the Decision), the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on August 27, 2009 by movant-
intervenor Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the latters Manifestation and Motion to Admit
Attached Position Paper filed on December 23, 2009.
FACTS
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon

31
as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that [n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners
cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that
the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his
seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. XXX XXX XXX Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and
1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the
1935 Constitution states that:

[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government
or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The
PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the
PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

ISSUES:
WON it was correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter.

Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

HELD:

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision
by deleting the second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was
not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a
private corporation.

32
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues
defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case.

As held by the court in ALVAREZ V. PICOP,

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a
well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law
to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration
until such question will be unavoidable.

Under the rule quoted above, therefore, this Court should not have declared void certain sections
of R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC
Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there
was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment.
Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality,
which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the
Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60)
years of existence in this country.
(SIDE ISSUE: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF PNRC)
PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional
ban. A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in terms of
structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and
the international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis.By
requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the
Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs special status under international humanitarian law
and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions. (BY: BABAN)

In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries.
The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were
not properly counted hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of
Aceros group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-
31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as
counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as
counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez
inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and
in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC
case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in
such courts or bodies?

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HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a
counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is
still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference
he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution
he instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act
after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done
directly could not likewise be done indirectly.
NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise
or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or
jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative
bodies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission.
Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative agencies, are included. (SOURCEl
INTERNET-UBER DIGEST)

PAGE 8
BELGICA V OCHOA

These are consolidated petitions which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation,
Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be
charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and
other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by
Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional

ISSUES
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation
of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e)

34
political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy. (NAA SA ACCOUNTABILITY ANG MAIN TOPIC
WHICH IS ARTICLE VI SEC. 14)
HELD:
1. Separation of Powers.
At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects
they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. These post-enactment
measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing,
legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in as Guingona, Jr. puts it "the
various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers
principle.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, 194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by
the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum.1

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled
in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.

3. Checks and Balances. Item-Veto Power.

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents power to veto an item
written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a
process known as "bill presentment.

petitioners claim that the legislators identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the
President the chance to veto that item later on. The Court agrees with petitioners. Actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration since the amount of 24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation. It
would be constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation which does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents
power of item veto.

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional.

4. Accountability

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Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate
defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. The Court
agrees in part.

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that
individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult
for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as
said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities
in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a matter before
another office of government renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed,
while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislators use thereof may be linked to this area of interest,
the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts
and on a case-to-case basis.

Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between
legislators and the Executive department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect
the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly
concern the Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial
assessment.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and
other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.

5. Political Dynasties.

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of
political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.

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In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has
not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political
dynasties.

6. Local Autonomy

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to
substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development. 230 The Court agrees with
petitioners.

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his
own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project
identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby
subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional. (by BABAN)

AVELINO VS CUENCO

FACTS: Senator Taada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator Taada could deliver
his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu
propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers, leaving twelve other
members who continued meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as Acting
President. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco, contending that the latter
had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum the majority required
of the 24-member Senate.

ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
(2)If It has, were resolution Nos.68 and 67 validly approved?

HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political question. In
view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president.

Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the minority of ten senators
who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their
unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or
less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia that there was a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose
of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate. Firstly because
the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators

37
including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of
Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not
mean "all" the members. A majority of all the members constitute "the House". Thus, the Court found it
injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office depends
exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.

In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this
decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino,
it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the
Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any
session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators
who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond
the shadow of a doubt.

As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.
(byBABAN)

Osmea v. Pendatun

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a petition against
Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
FACTS
Congressman Osmea took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled A Message to
Garcia wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery against the President. Being unable
to produce evidence thereof, Osmea was then found to be guilty of serious disorderly behaviour by the
House of Representatives by the special committee created by house resolution No. 59.
Osmea argues that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words
spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary
immunity.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not said disciplinary action by the House is in violation of Section 15, Article VI of
the Constitution.
HELD

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Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place."
This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that
although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the
members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they
shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that they shall not be questioned
in any other place in Congress.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. But is does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

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