[G.R. No. 122749.

July 31, 1996]

ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quohas failed to apply the correct law that
should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because
of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both of the parties to the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were
five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
102). After hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, [1] in its decision of 29 July 1994,
granted the petition; viz:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with
their essential marital obligations;
"(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent
they would want to stay with.
"Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-
Valdes.
"The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the other.
"(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles50, 51 and 52 of the same
code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper
recording in the registry of marriages."[2] (Italics ours)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51
and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the
children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by
both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through
the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will
own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares.
"In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on
co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."[3] (Italics supplied)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:
"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and
void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to the
procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the
liquidation of the absolute community of property."[4]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held
controlling; he argues that:
"I
"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated.
"II

1
"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family
dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.
"III
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
"IV
"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay." [5]
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted
and so applied in previous cases;[6] it provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of
this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"[7] of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household."[8] Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are
not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil
Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without
the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in
favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture
shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation[9] or declaration of nullity of the marriage.[10]
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively
with each other (as husband and wife ),only the property acquired by both of them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The
share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. [11]

2
 In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial
court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a
reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to
Articles 102 and 129,[12] of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),
(3 ),(4) and (5) of Article 43, [13] relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40[14] of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted
by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that
somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away
with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of
Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 [15] and 42,[16] of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In
all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one
hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law
spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject
to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may
merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in
Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel
Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh
Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his
petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.[1]
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and
defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorneys
fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the plaintiffs
separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding,
giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89
together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his
outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies;

3
 5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount
of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein
defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the appellate
court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh
Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral
argument.[3]
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente
lite to P20,000.[4] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.[5]
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit
and affirming in toto the trial courts decision. [6] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From
the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the son. [7] Petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari[8] and the Petition for Certiorari[9] were ordered
consolidated by this Court.[10]
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in
accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS
DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION,
PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF
OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK AND
TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND
ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES
OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE,
THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT
THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE
CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.[11]
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR HEARING. [12]
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY SUPPORT OF
P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.[13]
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE COURT OF
APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE
LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS
ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS TOO MINIMAL.[14]
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO
PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT.
[15]

With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:

4
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not only of the
parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on the
basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing
true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he
married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would
be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy,
as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest
way out, that of leaving defendantappellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their
son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned caused
defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years
the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary
contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet,
no decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital
obligations were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in the total
amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full justification of awarding at
least half of what was originally prayed for. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. [16]
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read
as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 [17] of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which
moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21
states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and
hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based were done willfully and freely,
otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code
states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .[18]
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his
psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting
moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond
the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as
willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on
the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering
into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had

5
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been
adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention
that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due
to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in
fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand
since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.[19]
With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission has compelled the defendant to
litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and
equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)[20]
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the award of attorneys
fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.[21]
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his
act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private
respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a
mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a
ground for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is
no longer justified, the award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the
Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal partnership in the
event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of
nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous
proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117
of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition
be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as
the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are the parties
conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in
this case that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust
Co. received separation/retirement package from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain
deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9,
1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said
retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code The net remainder of the conjugal partnership
properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or
forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. In this particular case, however, there had been no marriage
settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes

6
share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2)
share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved
by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all
demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff
husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
spouse with whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2)
portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the
other half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal properties, and it
is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the separation/retirement benefits received by the
plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor,
industry, work or profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For
the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the
Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies.[22]
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give one-half of his
separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his outstanding shares in Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latters share in the conjugal
partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise Agreement entered into by
the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is
dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-
appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of said company for
the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiffappellants service for the bank for a number of years, most of
which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the
outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies. As these
were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-
half thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. [23]
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in
relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case
a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed
is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,[24] this Court expounded on the consequences of a
void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the
case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so
applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.

7
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The
term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not
included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in
addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership property,
without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of
their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall
take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court
acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be
deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a
reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to
Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2),
(3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by
a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that
somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away
with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of
Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other
cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand,
between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law
spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject
to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may
merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in
Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
[25]

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-
ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said
distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties herein as

8
ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since
he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005[26] and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing
to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated
December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in
that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The
order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-
half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained
but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions of
September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in favor of the parties son,
Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146294 July 31, 2006
JOHN ABING, petitioner,
vs.
JULIET WAEYAN, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner John Abing (John,
hereafter) seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated October 24, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
48675, reversing that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet, Branch 64, which affirmed an earlier decision
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mankayan, Benguet in an ejectment suit thereat commenced by the petitioner
against the respondent.
In the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman who, during the good old days, lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired properties. Later, they
parted ways, and with it this litigation between them involving one of their common properties.
The facts:
Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet, for short) met and fell in love with each other. In
time, the duo cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, the couple bought a 2-storey
residential house from one Benjamin Macua which was erected on a lot owned by a certain Alejandro Dio on
Aurora Street, Mankayan, Benguet. Consequent to the purchase, the tax declaration of the 2-storey house was
transferred in the name of Juliet.
On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. She would send money to John who deposited
the same in their joint bank account.
In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it was annexed a new structure which
housed a sari-sari store. This new structure and the sari-sari store thereat are the properties involved in this case.
In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John. She managed the sari-sari store while John
worked as a mine employee of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining, Inc.
In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse. Hence, they decided to partition their
properties. For the purpose, they executed on October 7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately, the
document was left unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their unsigned
agreement, John shall leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount of P428,870.00 representing
John's share in all their properties. On the same date October 7, 1995 Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66 by
way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly
installment beginning November 1995.
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. On account thereof, John demanded of her to vacate the annex
structure housing the sari-sari store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her before the
MTC of Mankayan, Benguet.

9
In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the annex structure with his own funds and
thru money he borrowed from his relatives. In fact, he added that the tax declaration for the structure was under his
name. On this premise, John claimed exclusive ownership of the subject structure, which thereby gave him the right
to eject Juliet therefrom upon the latter's failure to pay the agreed balance due him under the
aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement.
In her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was renovated thru their common funds and that the subject
structure annexed thereto was merely an attachment or an extension of their original residential house, hence the
same pertained to the two of them in common.
In a decision2 dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the money used in the construction of the structure
in question solely came from John, ruled that the same exclusively pertained to the latter, and accordingly ordered
Juliet's eviction therefrom, including the sari-sari store thereat, and required her to surrender possession thereof to
John, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (John) and against the defendant (Juliet).
Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the store in litigation covered by Tax Declaration No.
96-001-00445 in the name of the Plaintiff and turn over possession thereof to the latter.
Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of P2,500.00 a month from the time she
withheld possession of the store in litigation in June 1996 until she vacates the same and turn over
possession thereof to the Plaintiff.
Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to the Plaintiff by way of Attorney's fees; and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On Juliet's appeal to the RTC, the latter, in its decision of July 29, 1995, affirmed that of the MTC. Undaunted, Juliet
then went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of October 24, 2000,3 reversed that of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
reversed and set aside. Petitioner, Juliet Waeyan is entitled to possess the property and maintain therein her
business.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:
It is undisputed that the parties lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage from
1986 to 1995 and that they acquired certain properties which must be divided between them upon the
termination of their common law relationship.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . their property relations cannot be governed by the provision of the Civil Code on conjugal partnership...
but by the rule on co-ownership.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the parties' share in respect of the properties they have accumulated during their cohabitation shall be
equal unless there is proof to the contrary.
To the CA, John's evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for the construction of the annex structure. Hence,
the same pertained to both, and being a co-owner herself, Juliet cannot be evicted therefrom, adding that if ever,
John's cause of action should have been for a sum of money "because he claims that Juliet still owes him the
payment for the extension." According to the CA, ejectment cannot lie against Juliet because Juliet's possession of
the premises in dispute was not by virtue of a contract, express or implied, nor did she obtain such possession thru
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Hence, John's present recourse, submitting that the CA erred in
1. not giving effect to the parties' Memorandum of Agreement which should have been binding between
them albeit unsigned by both;
2. in holding that the subject premises (annex structure housing the sari-sari store) is owned by the two of
them in common;
3. in ruling that the parties should settle their common properties in a separate action for partition even as
the community character of the subject premises has not been proven.
We AFFIRM with modification.
Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to
the exclusive ownership of petitioner, John. Departing from the factual findings of the two courts before it, the CA
found that the premises in dispute is owned in common by Juliet and John, the latter having failed to establish by the

10
required quantum of proof that the money spent for the construction thereof solely came from him. Being a co-
owner of the same structure, Juliet may not be ejected therefrom.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court normally eschews from, yet, given the
conflicting factual findings of the three courts below, the Court shall go by the exception 4 to the general rule and
proceed to make its own assessment of the evidence.
First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived together as husband and wife from 1986 to 1995
without the benefit of marriage. Neither is it disputed that sometime in December 1991, Juliet left for Korea and
worked thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint account. In fact, Juliet was still in
Korea when the annex structure was constructed in 1992.
Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent
for the construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked claim. For sure, John even
failed to reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the names of the alleged relatives from whom he
made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money he borrowed from them. All that petitioner could offer by way
of reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed money in putting up the subject structure was the
affidavit executed by a certain Manuel Macaraeg to the effect that petitioner borrowed P30,000.00 from him. Even
then, Macaraeg stated in his affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said amount from him. With
the petitioner's own admission that the subject structure was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he
borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the amount he allegedly borrowed from the latter
went into the construction of the structure in dispute. More, it is noted that while petitioner was able to present in
evidence the Macaraeg affidavit, he failed to introduce similar affidavits, if any, of his close relatives from whom he
claimed to have made similar borrowings. For sure, not a single relative came forward to confirm petitioner's tale. In
short, there is a paucity of evidence, testimonial or documentary, to support petitioner's self-serving allegation that
the annex structure which housed the sari-sari store was put up thru his own funds and/or money borrowed by him.
Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax declaration covering the subject structure. We have, however, ruled time and
again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of claims of ownership. 5 Payment of taxes is
not proof of ownership, any more than indicating possession in the concept of an owner. 6 Neither tax receipts nor
declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty when not
supported by other effective proofs.7
In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. It reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses
during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in
equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they
owned their properties in common "in equal shares." Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as
correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
True it is that under Article 4878 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner
who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property. It bears stressing, however,
that in this case, evidence is totally wanting to establish John's or Juliet's exclusive ownership of the property in
question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession thereof by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or thru intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth. As borne by the record, Juliet was in possession of the subject structure and the sari-
sari store thereat by virtue of her being a co-owner thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession
and ownership as John.
We, however, disagree with the ruling of the CA that the subject Memorandum of Agreement, being unsigned by
Juliet and John, has no binding effect between them.
It is a matter of record that pursuant to said Agreement, Juliet did pay John the amount of P232,397.66, as initial
payment for John's share in their common properties, with the balance of P196,472.34 payable in twelve monthly
installments beginning November 1995. It is also a matter of record that the Agreement was signed by the witnesses

11
thereto. Hence, the irrelevant circumstances that the Agreement was left unsigned by Juliet and John cannot
adversely affect its binding force or effect between them, as evidently, Juliet's initial payment of P232,397.66 to
John was in fulfillment of what the parties had agreed upon thereunder. However, and as correctly held by the CA,
Juliet's failure to pay John the balance of the latter's share in their common properties could at best give rise to an
action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision is AFFIRMED, except that portion thereof
denying effect to the parties' Memorandum of Agreement for being unsigned by both.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner,
vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the union,
Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing
thereon located in Makati City. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-101473/T-510 covering the
purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283 1 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City was
issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23533. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon City
rendered, on July 31, 1995, a Decision, 2 declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the
dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going
their separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan
from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses
Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one involving the lot covered
by TCT No. 156283. Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No.
156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document denominated as "Waiver" that
Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal
properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, on
November 29, 1999, initiated foreclosure proceedings under Act No. 3135, as amended, before the Office of the
Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale on three issues
of Remate.3 At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the RTC in Makati City, a
Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-789 and
eventually raffled to Branch 65 of the court. In it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal
property, was mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,4 alleged that the disputed lot, being registered in
Florencias name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and, hence, was subsequently declared in default.
The RTC Declared the REM Invalid
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered, on September 24, 2001, judgment finding for Nicholson. The fallo reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment declaring the real estate mortgage on the property
covered by [TCT] No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Makati as well as all proceedings
thereon null and void.
The Court further orders defendants [Metrobank and Florencia] jointly and severally to pay plaintiff
[Nicholson]:
1. PhP100,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. PhP75,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and
3. The costs.
SO ORDERED.5

12
Even as it declared the invalidity of the mortgage, the trial court found the said lot to be conjugal, the same having
been acquired during the existence of the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia. In so ruling, the RTC invoked Art.
116 of the Family Code, providing that "all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears
to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless
the contrary is proved." To the trial court, Metrobank had not overcome the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot.
And being conjugal, the RTC concluded that the disputed property may not be validly encumbered by Florencia
without Nicholsons consent.
The RTC also found the deed of waiver Florencia submitted to Metrobank to be fatally defective. For let alone the
fact that Nicholson denied executing the same and that the signature of the notarizing officer was a forgery, the
waiver document was allegedly executed on April 9, 1995 or a little over three months before the issuance of the
RTC decision declaring the nullity of marriage between Nicholson and Florencia.
The trial court also declared Metrobank as a mortgagee in bad faith on account of negligence, stating the observation
that certain data appeared in the supporting contract documents, which, if properly scrutinized, would have put the
bank on guard against approving the mortgage. Among the data referred to was the date of execution of the deed of
waiver.
The RTC dismissed Metrobanks counterclaim and cross-claim against the ex-spouses.
Metrobanks motion for reconsideration was denied. Undeterred, Metrobank appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74874.
The CA Affirmed with Modification the RTCs Decision
On January 28, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision affirmatory of that of the RTC, except for the award therein of
moral damages and attorneys fees which the CA ordered deleted. The dispositive portion of the CAs Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION with respect to the award of moral damages and attorneys fees which is hereby
DELETED.
SO ORDERED.6
Like the RTC earlier held, the CA ruled that Metrobank failed to overthrow the presumption established in Art. 116
of the Family Code. And also decreed as going against Metrobank was Florencias failure to comply with the
prescriptions of the succeeding Art. 124 of the Code on the disposition of conjugal partnership property. Art. 124
states:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy x x x.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
As to the deletion of the award of moral damages and attorneys fees, the CA, in gist, held that Metrobank did not
enter into the mortgage contract out of ill-will or for some fraudulent purpose, moral obliquity, or like dishonest
considerations as to justify damages.
Metrobank moved but was denied reconsideration by the CA.
Thus, Metrobank filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising the following issues for
consideration:
a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by applying Article 116 of the
Family Code.
b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage between the
respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of
property of the spouses.
c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value. 7
Our Ruling
A modification of the CAs Decision is in order.
The Disputed Property is Conjugal

13
It is Metrobanks threshold posture that Art. 160 of the Civil Code providing that "[a]ll property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife," applies. To Metrobank, Art. 116 of the Family Code could not be of governing application inasmuch as
Nicholson and Florencia contracted marriage before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Citing Manongsong v. Estimo,8 Metrobank asserts that the presumption of conjugal ownership under Art. 160 of the
Civil Code applies when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Metrobank adds,
however, that for the presumption of conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be adduced to prove that not
only was the property acquired during the marriage but that conjugal funds were used for the acquisition, a burden
Nicholson allegedly failed to discharge.
To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property, Metrobank cites Francisco v. Court of
Appeals9 and Jocson v. Court of Appeals,10 among other cases, where this Court held that a property registered in the
name of a certain person with a description of being married is no proof that the property was acquired during the
spouses marriage.
On the other hand, Nicholson, banking on De Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation 11 and Wong v.
IAC,12contends that Metrobank failed to overcome the legal presumption that the disputed property is conjugal. He
asserts that Metrobanks arguments on the matter of presumption are misleading as only one postulate needs to be
shown for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to arise, that is, the fact of acquisition during marriage.
Nicholson dismisses, as inapplicable, Francisco and Jocson, noting that they are relevant only when there is no
indication as to the exact date of acquisition of the property alleged to be conjugal.
As a final point, Nicholson invites attention to the fact that Metrobank had virtually recognized the conjugal nature
of the property in at least three instances. The first was when the bank lumped him with Florencia in Civil Case No.
00-789 as co-mortgagors and when they were referred to as "spouses" in the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage. Then came the published notice of foreclosure sale where Nicholson was again designated as co-
mortgagor. And third, in its demand-letter 13 to vacate the disputed lot, Metrobank addressed Nicholson and Florencia
as "spouses," albeit the finality of the decree of nullity of marriage between them had long set in.
We find for Nicholson.
First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the
applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its
theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, there must be a showing that the property was
acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. Contrary to Metrobanks submission, the Court did not,
in Manongsong,14 add the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an essential requirement for the presumption of
conjugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only proof of acquisition during the marriage is
needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still required
as a necessary condition before the presumption can arise, then the legal presumption set forth in the law would
veritably be a superfluity. As we stressed in Castro v. Miat:
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that "all property of the marriage is
presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife." This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not
appear.15(Emphasis supplied.)
Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobanks theory. Metrobank would thrust on the Court, invoking
the two cases, the argument that the registration of the property in the name of "Florencia Nevalga, married to
Nelson Pascual" operates to describe only the marital status of the title holder, but not as proof that the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage.
Metrobank is wrong. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of the property during the
existence of the marriage, then the presumption of conjugal ownership applies. The correct lesson
of Francisco and Jocson is that proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was
acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse.16
The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholsons arguments regarding Metrobank having implicitly
acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to question, the conjugal ownership of the disputed lot, the bank having
named the former in the foreclosure proceedings below as either the spouse of Florencia or her co-mortgagor. It is
felt, however, that there is no compelling reason to delve into the matter of estoppel, the same having been raised

14
only for the first time in this petition. Besides, however Nicholson was designated below does not really change, one
way or another, the classification of the lot in question.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does
not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership
Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to the CAs holding, Art. 129 of the Family Code is inapplicable. Art. 129 in
part reads:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
xxxx
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in
this Code.
Apropos the aforequoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver executed by Nicholson, effected as it
were before the dissolution of the conjugal property regime, vested on Florencia full ownership of all the
properties acquired during the marriage.
Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not automatically result in a
regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets.
We again find for Nicholson.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the
conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal
properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we
apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal partnerships assets and liabilities which is
generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on
the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of
the conjugal properties before a regime of separation of property reigns.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal
partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other
heirs of the deceased.17
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former
spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two
years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership.
Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the
aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest
in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee,
are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it
covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the
mortgage of his undivided half.
The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share in the conjugal
partnership. But, as found by the courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver allegedly executed by Nicholson
three months prior to the dissolution of the marriage and the conjugal partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his
forged signature, not to mention that of the notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any right
at all, albeit it may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent buyer for value.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobanks right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the auction of the
lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other
undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask
for the partition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank]
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership." 18 This disposition is in line with the well-established
principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do soquando res
non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.19

15
In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank, there is hardly a need to
discuss at length whether or not Metrobank was a mortgagee in good faith. Suffice it to state for the nonce that
where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not
look beyond the four corners of the title is inapplicable. 20 Unlike private individuals, it behooves banks to exercise
greater care and due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition
of the property offered as security and the validity of the mortgagors title must be standard and indispensable part
of the banks operation.21 A bank that failed to observe due diligence cannot be accorded the status of a bona
fide mortgagee,22 as here.
But as found by the CA, however, Metrobanks failure to comply with the due diligence requirement was not the
result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity or breach of a known duty for some interest or ill-will that
partakes of fraud that would justify damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the CA dated January 28, 2004,
upholding with modification the Decision of the RTC, Branch 65 in Makati City, in Civil Case No. 00-789,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the REM over the lot covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry
of Deeds of Makati City is hereby declared valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of Florencia thereon is
concerned.
As modified, the Decision of the RTC shall read:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the real estate mortgage on the property covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry
of Deeds of Makati City and all proceedings thereon are NULL and VOID with respect to the undivided 1/2 portion
of the disputed property owned by Nicholson, but VALID with respect to the other undivided 1/2 portion belonging
to Florencia.
The claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorneys fees are DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ALAIN M. DIO , G.R. No. 178044
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Promulgated:
Respondent. January 19, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision 2 and the 12 March 2007 Order 3 of
the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.

The Antecedent Facts

Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started
living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live
together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital

16
obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to
go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.

Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was
already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to
the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25
May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.

On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion
between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent
was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early
formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondents psychological
incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayagspsychological report, the allegations in the complaint,
substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial
court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and
that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family
Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and
married another man.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and
VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City
Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of
property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code.

In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October 2006 Decision
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

17
 1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on
January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and

2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and
guidance.5

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147
of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.

We agree with petitioner.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, 8 such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all
of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving

18
 descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be
issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147
and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.

The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:

Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall
also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45.10

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of
the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities,
unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.

The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime.

19
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was contracted. Under
Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus we ruled:

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid
until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. 12 In both instances under
Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property 13 or conjugal partnership of
gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 15 of the Family Code and not
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The
rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in
the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202370 September 23, 2013
JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the 16 March 2012 Decision 2 and the 28 June 2012 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322. The CA affirmed the 26 September 2008 Order 4 of the Regional
Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 787.
The Facts
On 7 September 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden Villena Aguila (Aguila) were
married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Joan Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their daughter.
On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition) citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they "have no conjugal properties
whatsoever."5 In the Return of Summons dated 13 October 2003, the sheriff narrated that Salas instructed his mother
Luisa Salas to receive the copy of summons and the petition.6
On 7 May 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision 7 declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila (RTC
Decision). The RTC Decision further provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, if any." 8

20
On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion 9 stating that she discovered: (a) two 200-square-
meter parcels of land with improvements located in San Bartolome, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. N-259299-A and TCT No. N-255497; and (b) a 108-square-meter parcel of land with improvement
located in Tondo, Manila, covered by TCT No. 243373 (collectively, "Discovered Properties"). The registered owner
of the Discovered Properties is "Juan S.Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." The manifestation was set for hearing on
21 September 2007. However, Salas notice of hearing was returned unserved with the remark, "RTS Refused To
Receive."
On 19 September 2007, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance 10 requesting for an Entry of Judgment
of the RTC Decision since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed and no conjugal property was involved.
On 21 September 2007, the hearing for Aguilas manifestation ensued, with Aguila, her counsel and the state
prosecutor present. During the hearing, Aguila testified that on 17 April 2007 someone informed her of the existence
of the Discovered Properties. Thereafter, she verified the information and secured copies of TCTs of the Discovered
Properties. When asked to clarify, Aguila testified that Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is Salas common-law wife. 11
On 8 February 2008, Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestation 12 alleging that there is no conjugal property to be
partitioned based on Aguilas petition. According to Salas, Aguilas statement was a judicial admission and was not
made through palpable mistake. Salas claimed that Aguila waived her right to the Discovered Properties. Salas
likewise enumerated properties he allegedly waived in favor of Aguila, to wit:(1) parcels of land with improvements
located in Sugar Landing Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City; No. 176 Brias Street, Nasugbu, Batangas; P.
Samaniego Street, Silangan, Nasugbu, Batangas; and Batangas City, financed by Filinvest; (2) cash amounting to
200,000.00; and (3) motor vehicles, specifically Honda City and Toyota Tamaraw FX(collectively, "Waived
Properties"). Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its 26 September 2008 Order, the RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being considered, the petitioner and the respondent are hereby directed to
partition between themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, the following properties, without prejudice to
the legitime of their legitimate child, Joan Jisselle Aguila Salas:
(1) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S. Salas married to Rubina C. Salas located in San
Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-259299-A marked as Exhibit "A" and its
improvements;
(2) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina C. Salas located in San
Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-255497 marked as Exhibit "B" and its improvements;
(3) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina Cortez Salas located in Tondo
and covered by TCT No. 243373-Ind. marked as Exhibit "D" and its improvements.
Thereafter, the Court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon bythe parties, and such partition, together with the
Order of the Court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the Registry of Deeds of the place in which the
property is situated.
SO ORDERED.13
The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules,14 even upon entry of judgment granting the annulment of marriage, the
court can proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the conjugal partnership of gains if it has not
been judicially adjudicated upon, as in this case. The RTC found that the Discovered Properties are among the
conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed between Salas and Aguila. However, the RTC held that Salas
failed to prove the existence of the Waived Properties.
On 11 November 2008, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that: (1) she is Rubina Cortez, a widow
and unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did not contribute
money to purchase the Discovered Properties as he had no permanent job in Japan; (4) the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in the case; and (5) she authorized her brother to purchase the Discovered
Properties but because he was not well-versed with legal documentation, he registered the properties in the name of
"Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas."
In its 16 December 2009 Order, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Salas. The RTC found that
Salas failed to prove his allegation that Aguila transferred the Waived Properties to third persons. The RTC
emphasized that it cannot go beyond the TCTs, which state that Salas is the registered owner of the Discovered
Properties. The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were at fault for failing to correct the TCTs, if they were not
married as they claimed.
Hence, Salas filed an appeal with the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

21
On 16 March 2012, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC.15 The CA ruled that Aguilas statement in her petition is
not a judicial admission. The CA pointed out that the petition was filed on 7 October 2003, but Aguila found the
Discovered Properties only on 17 April 2007 or before the promulgation of the RTC decision. Thus, the CA
concluded that Aguila was palpably mistaken in her petition and it would be unfair to punish her over a matter that
she had no knowledge of at the time she made the admission. The CA also ruled that Salas was not deprived of the
opportunity to refute Aguilas allegations in her manifestation, even though he was not present in its hearing. The
CA likewise held that Rubina cannot collaterally attack a certificate of title.
In a Resolution dated 28 June 2012,16 the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration 17 filed by Salas. Hence, this
petition.
The Issues
Salas seeks a reversal and raises the following issues for resolution:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision ordering the partition of the parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. N-259299-A and N-255497 in Quezon City and as well as the property in
Manila covered by TCT No. 243373 between petitioner and respondent.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision in not allowing Rubina C. Cortez to
intervene in this case18
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division of the property, unless
it first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-ownership. 19 Thus, the settlement of the issue of ownership
is the first stage in this action.20
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of
evidence.21 Salas alleged that contrary to Aguilas petition stating that they had no conjugal property, they actually
acquired the Waived Properties during their marriage. However, the RTC found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas
failed to prove the existence and acquisition of the Waived Properties during their marriage:
A perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted by [Salas] as the properties allegedly registered in the
name of [Aguila] are merely photocopies and not certified true copies, hence, this Court cannot admit the same as
part of the records of this case. These are the following:
(1) TCT No. T-65876 a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas, registered in the name of
Eden A. Salas, married to Juan Salas Jr. which is cancelled by TCT No. T-105443 in the name of Joan
Jiselle A. Salas, single;
(2) TCT No. T-68066 a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Landing, Nasugbu, Batangas, registered in
the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan S. Salas Jr.
Moreover, [Aguila] submitted original copy of Certification issued by Ms. Erlinda A. Dasal, Municipal Assessor of
Nasugbu, Batangas, certifying that [Aguila] has no real property (land and improvement) listed in the Assessment
Roll for taxation purposes, as of September 17, 2008.
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the presumption of regularity. x x x.
Suffice it to say that such real properties are existing and registered in the name of [Aguila], certified true copies
thereof should have been the ones submitted to this Court. Moreover, there is also a presumption that properties
registered in the Registry of Deeds are also declared in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes. 22
On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during their
marriage.1wphi1Both the RTC and the CA agreed that the Discovered Properties registered in Salas name were
acquired during his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and
29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and Aguilas marriage. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 23 we
held that the question of whether the properties were acquired during the marriage is a factual issue. Factual findings
of the RTC, particularly if affirmed by the CA, are binding on us, except under compelling circumstances not
present in this case.24
On Salas allegation that he was not accorded due process for failing to attend the hearing of Aguilas manifestation,
we find the allegation untenable. The essence of due process is opportunity to be heard. We hold that Salas was
given such opportunity when he filed his opposition to the manifestation, submitted evidence and filed his appeal.
On both Salas and Rubinas contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find the contention
unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is the registered owner of the
Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to,
because there is a strong presumption that it is valid and regularly issued. 25 The phrase "married to" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 26 Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of

22
the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas
supported Rubinas statement that she owns the Discovered Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she has no right to
intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action."27
In Dio v. Dio,28 we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Article147 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through the couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. 29 In the present case, Salas did not
rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity,
we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be
governed by co-ownership.30 Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the
CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 16 March 2012 and the Resolution dated 28
June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013
EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the Decision 1 dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 and the Resolution 2 dated 3 August 2012 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
Decision and Resolution dismissed the Appeal dated 23 October 2009 and affirmed with modification the
Decision3dated 24 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 (RTC-Manila).
The Facts
The RTC-Manila and the CA found the facts to be as follows:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980. Although Socorro and
Esteban never had common children, both of them had children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter named
Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto),
the petitioner in this case.

23
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she married Esteban.
Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of
Socorros marriage to Esteban.
Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wifes death in 1960. According to
Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street,
Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her fathers
behalf sometime in 1970.4 The Vitas property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11
December 1980, issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres." 5
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business establishments located at
903 and 905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property). 6
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda
(Paulino).7 According to Edilberto:
when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the Delpan and Vitas properties
to Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the amortizations on the two (2) properties situated in Delpan Street.
The amortizations, together with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 200,000.00), which Esteban
requested as advance payment, were considered part of the purchase price of the Delpan properties. Evangeline
likewise gave her father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for the purchase of the Vitas properties and she
shouldered his medical expenses.8
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto,
represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged
that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Estebans signature on the deeds of sale was forged.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage
to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties
purchased by Esteban and respondents.9
The Ruling of the RTC-Manila
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void from the beginning. 10 Article 83 of
the Civil Code, which was the governing law at the time Esteban and Socorro were married, provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
shall be illegal and void from its performance unless:
1. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
2. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void.
During trial, Edilberto offered the testimony of Socorros daughter-in-law Conchita Ventura (Conchita). In her first
affidavit, Conchita claimed that Crispin, who was a seaman, had been missing and unheard from for 35 years.
However, Conchita recanted her earlier testimony and executed an Affidavit of Retraction.11
The RTC-Manila ruled that the lack of a judicial decree of nullity does not affect the status of the union. It applied
our ruling in Nial v. Badayog:12
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. x x x
Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon
the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which [the] fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts.13
According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and Delpan properties are not conjugal, and are governed by Articles 144
and 485 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

24
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their
respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.
The RTC-Manila then determined the respective shares of Socorro and Esteban in the properties. It found that:
with respect to the property located at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio St. Vitas, Tondo, Manila covered by TCT No.
141782, formerly Marcos Road, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila, [Evangeline] declared that part of it was first
acquired by her father Esteban Abletes sometime in 1968 when he purchased the right of Ampiano Caballegan.
Then, in 1970, she x x x bought the right to one-half of the remaining property occupied by Ampiano Caballegan.
However, during the survey of the National Housing Authority, she allowed the whole lot to be registered in her
fathers name. As proof thereof, she presented Exhibits "8" to "11" x x x. These documents prove that that she has
been an occupant of the said property in Vitas, Tondo even before her father and Socorro Torres got married in June,
1980.14
Anent the parcels of land and improvements thereon 903 and 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, x x x Evangeline
professed that in 1978, before her father met Socorro Torres and before the construction of the BLISS Project
thereat, her father [already had] a bodega of canvas (lona) and a sewing machine to sew the canvas being sold at 903
Del Pan Street, Tondo Manila. In 1978, she was also operating Vangies Canvas Store at 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo,
Manila, which was evidenced by Certificate of Registration of Business Name issued in her favor on 09 November
1998 x x x. When the BLISS project was constructed in 1980, the property became known as Units D-9 and D-10.
At first, her father [paid] for the amortizations for these two (2) parcels of land but when he got sick with colon
cancer in 1993, he asked respondents to continue paying for the amortizations x x x. [Evangeline] paid a total of
195,259.52 for Unit D-9 as shown by the 37 pieces of receipts x x x and the aggregate amount of 188,596.09 for
Unit D-10, as evidenced by 36 receipts x x x.15
The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for the acquisition of the properties. Hence,
she cannot be considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties. 16
Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its Decision17 dated 9 March 2012, the CA sustained the decision of the RTC-Manila. The dispositive portion of
the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED and the challenged Decision of the court a quo STANDS.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-Manila should have applied Article 148 of the Family Code, and not Articles
144 and 485 of the Civil Code. Article 148 of the Family Code states that in unions between a man and a woman
who are incapacitated to marry each other:
x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof
to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
The CA applied our ruling in Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 19 and held that the foregoing provision applies "even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code." 20 The CA found
that Edilberto failed to prove that Socorro contributed to the purchase of the Vitas and Delpan properties. Edilberto
was unable to provide any documentation evidencing Socorros alleged contribution.21
On 2 April 2012, Edilberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 22 which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
3 August 2012.23
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of this Court
We deny the petition.
Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the
ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties. He even quoted our ruling in Borromeo v. Descallar24 in his petition:

25
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order
to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.25
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1) these
were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were
acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by
Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several
months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married
to Socorro Torres."26
We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone.1wphi1 The phrase "married
to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the
property.27The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his
marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration
under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page 9 of
his petition wherein he quotes an excerpt of our ruling in Borromeo:
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with
notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not
make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties
in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title
likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect,
absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a
holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not sufficiently
proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations. 28 Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro
jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan property.
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property was acquired
prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. 29 Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase price of the Delpan
property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a
donation, which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who has
accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan property would
be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations for the Delpan
property.1wphi1 On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro s alleged monetary
contributions. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here it is Appellant who is duty bound
to prove the allegations in the complaint which undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so.30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 92330 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

26
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of CoLlli assailing the October 8,
2009 Decision2 and January 24, 2011 Resolution3 of the court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940, which
affirmed the February 28, 2007 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 in Civil
Case No. I 2884. The foregoing rulings dissolved the conjugal partnership of gains of Willem Beumer (petitioner)
and Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the properties forming part of the said property regime.
The Factual Antecedents
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of
Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision 5 dated November 10, 2000 on the
basis of the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership 6 dated December 14, 2000 praying
for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of
their marriage, to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.), including a
residential house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of 806 sq.m.,
including a residential house constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of 756 sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by
TCT No. 21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.
By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23567, containing an area of 2,635
sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23575, containing an area of 360
sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.). 7
In defense,8 respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she
and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own
personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way
of inheritance.9 She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased
Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own money. 10 Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the
petition for dissolution as well as payment for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. 11
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these
properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit 12 since
respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence,
invalid.13
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively from her
personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and
Tupperware.14 She further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in 1996, petitioner transferred
to their second house and brought along with him certain personal properties, consisting of drills, a welding
machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00. 15
The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision, dissolving the parties conjugal
partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in
favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the
parties, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between
petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent Avelina Amores considering the fact that their marriage was previously
annulled by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 22846,

27
21974, 21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby declared paraphernal properties of respondent Avelina Amores
due to the fact that while these real properties were acquired by onerous title during their marital union, Willem
Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by law to acquire any private land in the Philippines, except through
inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which were brought out by Willem
from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21974 and 22846 are hereby
declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these were acquired during their marital union
and since there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential units. Petitioner and
respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for approval their project of partition on the two houses
aforementioned.
The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of respondent for attorneys fees considering
the well settled doctrine that there should be no premium on the right to litigate. The prayer for moral damages are
likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.16
It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner could not
have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them
notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands. 17 This
was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to show that the subject parcels of land
were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein respondent. 18 Petitioners plea for reimbursement for
the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not
having come to court with clean hands.
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTCs award of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in favor of
respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds
and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the
purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in favor of his estranged ex-wife. 19
On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision20 affirming in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC of Negros
Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for
aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines."21 Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for reimbursement.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision due to the
following error:
UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE PETITIONERS
ATTEMPT AT SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE
PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF THE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS
CASE.22 (Emphasis supplied)
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura
Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels
of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura
Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine
land24enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition" 25 and
even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latters
name.26 Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis
of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny
petitioners claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded

28
equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.27
In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of
land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondents
personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,28 he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to
acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the
Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-
established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly.29 Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void,
vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. 30 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of
the Civil Code,31 petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he
had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the
parties where it finds them.32 Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly
entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. 33 As held in
Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of
Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to
wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.1wphi1
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid
without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case,
the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and
unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the
money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The
objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill
in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in
general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him
and the plaintiff."34(Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. 35 Precisely, it is the
Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure,
the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements
built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned
by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national
patrimony36 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015
VIRGINIA OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 dated August 11, 2010 and Resolution2 dated October 5, 2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318, which denied the petitioner's appeal and motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her
Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the

29
ground of psychological incapacity, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-6616. 3redarclaw

On January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision 4 declaring the marriage between Virginia and Deogracio as
null and void, the dispositive portion of which reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is hereby
declared null and void from the beginning under Article 36 of the Family Code. The status of their children,
however, shall remain legitimate and their custody is hereby awarded to the petitioner.

As to the couple's property relations, their conjugal partnership of gains shall necessarily be dissolved and liquidated
but since the petitioner has not submitted any detailed and formal listing or inventory of such property, the court
cannot act now on the liquidation aspect. The parties are given thirty (30) days to submit an inventory of their
conjugal partnership for the purpose of liquidation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.5

The decision became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage.

On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties,
and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to
agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced evidence in
support of their respective stand.

On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order 6 stating that the properties declared by the parties
belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

On February 2, 2004, Virginia filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court.

On February 13, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion to Deny and/or Dismiss the Notice of Appeal and for immediate
execution pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-10.

On February 20, 2004, the trial court denied the aforesaid motion to deny and/or dismiss the notice of appeal for
lack of merit.

On March 4, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On March 22, 2004, the trial court denied anew
the motion for reconsideration.

In the disputed Decision dated August 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied Virginia's appeal. Virginia moved for
reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution dated October 5, 2011.

Thus, the instant petition for review substantially questioning whether respondent should be deprived of his share in
the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.

The petition lacks merit.

While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is still the Family Code provisions on
conjugal partnerships, however, which will govern the property relations between Deogracio and Virginia even if
they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code.

Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships
established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they
are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced
by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are
presumed conjugal.7redarclaw

30
The applicable law, however, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liability is concerned,
is Article 1298 of the Family Code in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code. 9redarclaw

The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 10 of the Family Code, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code.11 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the
Family Code provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.12

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry
each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It
is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage
or their marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains
to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed
on the part of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However,
their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13redarclaw

From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry should, therefore, be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry.14redarclaw

Citing Valdes v. RTC,15 the Court held that the court a quo did not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article 147
of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home and all their common property in
equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in
common, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. The rules which are set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages.

31
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on equal shares considering that
Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired solely on her own efforts, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court keenly observes that only testimonial evidence was presented by the parties respectively, to prove and
dispute the claim of the other with regard to the properties and assets acquired during the marriage. In the absence,
therefore, of any documentary evidence to prove the contrary, all the properties acquired by the spouses during the
marriage are presumed conjugal. Further, the testimonial evidence adduced by the petitioner aimed at establishing
that respondent took no part in acquiring said properties failed to convince this Court that the latter be given only a
meager share thereof.

While it may be true that management of the businesses referred to herein may have been actively undertaken by the
petitioner, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner was able to do so without the invaluable help of respondent. Even a
plain housewife who stays all the time in the house and take[s] care of the household while the husband indulges in
lucrative and gainful activities is entitled to a share in the same proportion the husband is, to the property or
properties acquired by the marriage. In the same breadth, respondent must be considered to be entitled to the same
extent. Petitioner's claim that the seed money in that business was provided by her mother and that, had it not been
for that reason, the properties now subject of controversy could not have been acquired. That may be true but the
Court is not prone to believe so because of insufficient evidence to prove such contention but petitioner's self-
serving allegations. Of course, attempts to establish respondent as an irresponsible and unfaithful husband, as well as
family man were made but the testimonies adduced towards that end, failed to fully convince the Court that
respondent should be punished by depriving him of his share of the conjugal property because of his indiscretion. 16

In the instant case, both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the subject properties were in fact acquired during
the marriage of Virginia and Deogracio. We give due deference to factual findings of trial courts, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court, as in this case. A reversal of this finding can only occur if petitioners show sufficient
reason for us to doubt its correctness. There is none, in this case.

Likewise, we note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the subject properties during
the subsistence of their marriage. 17 The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome
the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage,
regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. The
presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the
name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is
"registered in the name of one or both of the spouses." 18 Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said
properties were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal
shares. Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the
RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 11, 2010 and the Resolution dated October 5,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318 are AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the trial
court for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner,
vs.
CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled "Erlinda
Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz" dated June 22, 1994 involving the ownership of
two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and private respondent's legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia)
Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, in

32
October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12,
1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire duration of his
year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court
found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. 1 When he returned for
good in 1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old
Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the
Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with an
area of 10,080 square meters. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said rice land was
issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as
the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property was later issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement
to settle and end a case filed by the latter. 3 The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of
six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.4
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In 1979,
Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina's complaint. 5 Two years later, on February 15,
1981, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents,
instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private respondents sought to get back
the riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland covered by TCT No. 101736 is registered in their
names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She
added that the house and lot covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole property, having bought the same with her own
money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already
donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June 30, 1989 dismissing the complaint after
declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of
Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of
Kristopher Palang, Miguel's illegitimate son. The dispositive portion of the decision reads.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered
1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot located at Poblacion,
Binalonan, Pangasinan, as evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B including the old house standing
therein;
3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural land situated at Balisa,
San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square meters and as evidenced by TCT No.
101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;
4. Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his deceased father, Miguel Palang, the one-
half (1/2) of the agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, under TCT No.
101736 in the name of Miguel Palang, provided that the former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after
this decision becomes final and executory, a quit-claim forever renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the
donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal properties of her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina
Vallesterol Palang, dated October 30, 1975, otherwise, the estate of deceased Miguel Palang will have to be
settled in another separate action;
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July
22, 1994 with the following dispositive portion;
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision in hereby REVERSED and another one
entered:

33
 1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in question;
2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to herein plaintiffs-
appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 143120 and
101736 and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs-appellants.
No pronouncement as to costs.7
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering
the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the second, in favor of
Erlinda Agapay alone. Second, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred in not declaring Kristopher
A. Palang as Miguel Palang's illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel's estate. Third, respondent
court erred, according to petitioner, "in not finding that there is sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristopher A.
Palang or Christopher A. Palang should be considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial
court and in CA-G.R. No. 24199.8
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the pertinent provisions of law and jurisprudence, the Court
denies the petition and affirms the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this action. Petitioner assails
the validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of land. There is no dispute that the transfer of
ownership from the original owners of the riceland and the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the spouses Cespedes,
respectively, were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable
here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was
patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de
facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It
must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is
not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.9
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and
had a sari-sari store10 but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland.
Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of
age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of
subject property,11 there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the
nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148
of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been
adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any
case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still
apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan,
Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland
should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel
and private respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of
their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their compromise
agreement "in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and
the termination of the conjugal partnership."12 Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the
marriage settlements.13 The judgment which resulted from the parties' compromise was not specifically and
expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

34
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when
she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the
purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. 14
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent
by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that
the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage,15 for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out
to be better than those in legal union.16
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's estate is
here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements
regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of
filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be
ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated
in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession."17
As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should be considered as party-defendant in the
case at bar following the trial court's decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as
party defendant but theorized that he had submitted to the court's jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad
litem.18 The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at
bar. His mother, Erlinda cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. Petitioner
adds that there is no need for Kristopher to file another action to prove that he is illegitimate son of Miguel, in order
to avoid multiplicity of suits. 19 Petitioner's grave error has been discussed in the preceding paragraph where the need
for probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguel's estate and Kristopher's successional rights has been
pointed out.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the amended decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1998 in CA G.R. CV No.
48443 granting respondent's motion for reconsideration of its decision dated November 7, 1996, and of the
resolution dated December 21, 1998 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint 2 for "Partition and/or Payment of Co-
Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 93-656 at the Regional Trial Court in Makati City, alleged that petitioner and respondent, both
married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in
1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs
Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-
president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties
which were registered solely in respondent's name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated.
Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that said
properties had been registered solely in her name.
In her Amended Answer,3 respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage business with petitioner
but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with other individuals and duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987. She denied that she and petitioner lived as
husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses. She claimed to
be the exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on the ground that
they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name.

35
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,4 in accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules
of Court.5 She contended that summary judgment was proper, because the issues raised in the pleadings were sham
and not genuine, to wit:
A.
The main issue is Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or payment of co-ownership share,
accounting and damages, considering that plaintiff and defendant are admittedly both married to their
respective spouses under still valid and subsisting marriages, even assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that
they lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage? In other words, can the parties be
considered as co-owners of the properties, under the law, considering the present status of the parties as
both married and incapable of marrying each other, even assuming that they lived together as husband and
wife (?)
B.
As a collateral issue, can the plaintiff be considered as an unregistered co-owner of the real properties under
the Transfer Certificates of Title duly registered solely in the name of defendant Ma. Elvira Castillo? This
issue is also true as far as the motor vehicles in question are concerned which are also registered in the
name of defendant.6
On the first point, respondent contended that even if she and petitioner actually cohabited, petitioner could not
validly claim a part of the subject real and personal properties because Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which provides
that the rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as
husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which is void ab initio, applies only if the parties are not in
any way incapacitated to contract marriage.7 In the parties' case, their union suffered the legal impediment of a prior
subsisting marriage. Thus, the question of fact being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether they lived together as husband
and wife, was irrelevant as no co-ownership could exist between them.
As to the second issue, respondent maintained that petitioner cannot be considered an unregistered co-owner of the
subject properties on the ground that, since titles to the land are solely in her name, to grant petitioner's prayer would
be to allow a collateral attack on the validity of such titles.
Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 8 He contended that the case presented genuine
factual issues and that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by the Family Code which now allows, under
Art. 148, a limited co-ownership even though a man and a woman living together are not capacitated to marry each
other. Petitioner also asserted that an implied trust was constituted when he and respondent agreed to register the
properties solely in the latter's name although the same were acquired out of the profits made from their brokerage
business. Petitioner invoked the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal title is taken
in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in
proportion to the interest of each.
Art. 1453. When the property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intention to hold it for,
or transfer it to another grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the person whose benefit is
contemplated.
On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision 9 granting respondent's motion for summary judgment. It
ruled that an examination of the pleadings shows that the issues involved were purely legal. The trial court also
sustained respondent's contention that petitioner's action for partition amounted to a collateral attack on the validity
of the certificates of title covering the subject properties. It held that even if the parties really had cohabited, the
action for partition could not be allowed because an action for partition among co-owners ceases to be so and
becomes one for title if the defendant, as in the present case, alleges exclusive ownership of the properties in
question. For these reasons, the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 93-656.
On appeals, the Court of Appeals on November 7, 1996, ordered the case remanded to the court of origin for trial on
the merits. It cited the decision in Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court 10 to the effect that an action for partition is
at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
properties involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not be
dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-
owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists
for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. Resolving the issue whether petitioner's action for partition was a
collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of title, the Court of Appeals held that since petitioner sought to
compel respondent to execute documents necessary to effect transfer of what he claimed was his share, petitioner

36
was not actually attacking the validity of the titles but in fact, recognized their validity. Finally, the appellate court
upheld petitioner's position that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by Art. 148 of the Family Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of Court of Appeals. On May 7, 1998, nearly two years after
its first decision, the Court of Appeals granted respondent's motion and reconsidered its prior decision. In its
decision now challenged in the present petition, it held
Prefatorily, and to better clarify the controversy on whether this suit is a collateral attack on the titles in issue, it must
be underscored that plaintiff-appellant alleged in his complaint that all the nine (9) titles are registered in the name
of defendant-appellee, Ma. Elvira T. Castillo, except one which appears in the name of Eloisa Castillo (see par. 9,
Complaint). However, a verification of the annexes of such initiatory pleading shows some discrepancies, to wit:
1. TCT No. 149046 (Annex A) = Elvira T. Castillo, single
2. TCT No. 168208 (Annex B) = do
3. TCT No. 37046 (Annex C) = do
4. TCT No. 37047 (Annex D) = do
5. TCT No. 37048 (Annex E) = do
6. TCT No. 30368 (Annex F) = Steelhaus Realty & Dev. Corp.
7. TCT No. 30369 (Annex G) = do
8. TCT No. 30371 (Annex F) = do
9. TCT No. (92323) 67881 (Annex I) = Eloisa Castillo
In this action, plaintiff-appellant seeks to be declared as 1/2 co-owner of the real properties covered by the above
listed titles and eventually for their partition [par. (a), Prayer; p. 4 Records]. Notably, in order to achieve such prayer
for a joint co-ownership declaration, it is unavoidable that the individual titles involved be altered, changed,
cancelled or modified to include therein the name of the appellee as a registered 1/2 co-owner. Yet, no cause of
action or even a prayer is contained filed. Manifestly, absent any cause or prayer for the alteration, cancellation,
modification or changing of the titles involved, the desired declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition will
utterly be an indirect or collateral attack on the subject titled in this suit.
It is here that We fell into error, such that, if not rectified will surely lead to a procedural lapse and a possible
injustice. Well settled is the rules that a certificate of title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
In this jurisdiction, the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting it as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an action for reconveyance or, if the property had passed into
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. Verily, plaintiff-appellant should have first pursued such
remedy or any other relief directly attacking the subject titles before instituting the present partition
suit. Apropos, the case at bench appears to have been prematurely filed.
Lastly, to grant the partition prayed for by the appellant will in effect rule and decide against the properties
registered in the names of Steelhouse Realty and Development Corporation and Eloisa Castillo, who are not parties
in the case. To allow this to happen will surely result to injustice and denial of due process of law. . . . 11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
December 21, 1998. Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that: (1) the Court of Appeals, in its first decision of November 7, 1996, was correct in applying
the Roque ruling and in rejecting respondent's claim that she was the sole owner of the subject properties and that
the partition suit was a collateral attack on the titles; (2) the Court of Appeals correctly rules in its first decision that
Art. 148 of the Family Code governs the co-ownership between the parties, hence, the complaint for partition is
proper; (3) with respect to the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty, respondent admitted ownership
thereof and, at the very least, these properties could simply be excluded and the partition limited to the remaining
real and personal properties; and (4) the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that under the Civil Code, there is an
implied trust in his favor. 12
The issue in this case is really whether summary judgment, in accordance with Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, is
proper. We rule in the negative.
First. Rule 35, 3 of the Rules of Court provides that summary judgment is proper only when, based on the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, and after summary hearing, it is shown that except as to the amount
of damages, there is no veritable issue regarding any material fact in the action and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 1 Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, i.e., an issue of fact the
resolution of which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious,
contrived, set-up in bad faith, or patently unsubstantial, summary judgment is not proper. 14

37
In the present case, we are convinced that genuine issues exist. Petitioner anchors his claim of co-ownership on two
factual grounds: first, that said properties were acquired by him and respondent during their union from 1979 to
1992 from profits derived from their brokerage business; and second, that said properties were registered solely in
respondent's name only because they agreed to that arrangement, thereby giving rise to an implied trust in
accordance with Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code. These allegations are denied by respondent. She denies
that she and petitioner lived together as husband and wife. She also claims that the properties in question were
acquired solely by her with her own money and resources. With such conflicting positions, the only way to ascertain
the truth is obviously through the presentation of evidence by the parties.
The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties actually lived together as husband and wife because Art.
144 of the Civil Code can not be made to apply to them as they were both incapacitated to marry each other. Hence,
it was impossible for a co-ownership to exist between them.
We disagree.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a woman live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage provided they are not incapacitated or are without impediment to marry each
other, 15 or in which the marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous. Art. 144, therefore, does not cover
parties living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-
ownership in cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other. It states:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article, 16 only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credits.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not capacitated to marry each other at
the time that they were alleged to have been living together, they could not have owned properties in common. The
Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry
each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is
presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties herein. Consequently, whether petitioner and
respondent cohabited and whether the properties involved in the case are part of the alleged co-ownership are
genuine and material. All but one of the properties involved were alleged to have been acquired after the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired before the Family Code took effect if it is
shown that it was really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code, then it should be excluded.
Petitioner also alleged in paragraph 7 of his complaint that:
Due to the effective management, hardwork and enterprise of plaintiff assisted by defendant, their customs
brokerage business grew and out of the profits therefrom, the parties acquired real and personal properties
which were, upon agreement of the parties, listed and registered in defendant's name with plaintiff as the
unregistered co-owner of all said properties. 17
On the basis of this, he contends that an implied trust existed pursuant to Art. 1452 of the Civil Code which provides
that "(I)f two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal title is taken in the name
of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the
interest of each." We do not think this is correct. The legal relation of the parties is already specifically covered by
Art. 148 of the Family Code under which all the properties acquired by the parties out of their actual joint
contributions of money, property or industry shall constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a form of trust and
every co-owner is a trustee for the other. 18 The provisions of Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code, then are no

38
longer material since a trust relation already inheres in a co-ownership which is governed under Title III, Book II of
the Civil Code.
Second. The trial court likewise dismissed petitioner's action on the ground that the same amounted to a collateral
attack on the certificates of title involved. As already noted, at first, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner's
action does not challenge the validity of respondent's titles. However, on reconsideration, it reversed itself and
affirmed the trial court. It noted that petitioner's complaint failed to include a prayer for the alteration, cancellation,
modification, or changing of the titles involved. Absent such prayer, the appellate court ruled that a declaration of
co-ownership and eventual partition would involve an indirect or collateral attack on the titles. We disagree.
A torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D. No. 1529, 19 48 provides that a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and can not be altered, modified, or canceled except in a
direct proceeding. When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to
nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when
the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. 20
In his complaint for partition, consistent with our ruling in Roque regarding the nature of an action for partition,
petitioner seeks first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his
lawful shares. He does not attack respondent's titles. Petitioner alleges no fraud, mistake, or any other irregularity
that would justify a review of the registration decree in respondent's favor. His theory is that although the subject
properties were registered solely in respondent's name, but since by agreement between them as well as under the
Family Code, he is co-owner of these properties and as such is entitled to the conveyance of his shares. On the
premise that he is a co-owner, he can validly seek the partition of the properties in co-ownership and the conveyance
to him of his share.
Thus, in Guevara v. Guevara, 21 in which a parcel of land bequeathed in a last will and testament was registered in
the name of only one of the heirs, with the understanding that he would deliver to the others their shares after the
debts of the original owner had been paid, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the registration of the land in the
name of only one of the heirs, the other heirs can claim their shares in "such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may
be necessary to partition the estate of the testator." 22
Third. The Court of Appeals also reversed its first decision on the ground that to order partition will, in effect, rule
and decide against Steelhouse Realty Development Corporation and Eloisa Castillo, both strangers to the present
case, as to the properties registered in their names. This reasoning, however, ignores the fact that the majority of the
properties involved in the present case are registered in respondent's name, over which petitioner claims rights as a
co-owner. Besides, other than the real properties, petitioner also seeks partition of a substantial amount of personal
properties consisting of motor vehicles and several pieces of jewelry. By dismissing petitioner's complaint for
partition on grounds of due process and equity, the appellate court unwittingly denied petitioner his right to prove
ownership over the claimed real and personal properties. The dismissal of petitioner's complaint is unjustified since
both ends may be amply served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the
name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo.
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 7, 1998, is REVERSED and the case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City for further proceedings on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003
JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE
AND GINA S. REY, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.1
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, 2 but separated de facto from her husband, when she met petitioner
Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987. 3 After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as
husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father. 4 Their cohabitation was not blessed with any

39
children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid Brothers." 5 Gina, on the other hand,
worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with
Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict with petitioners
relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation.6
On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her
salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their
unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and
accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that
she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings account with First Allied
Development Bank.7 Her Pass Book shows that as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08. 8 She further
stated that she had a total of P35,465.00 9 share in the joint account deposit which she and the petitioner maintained
with the same bank.10 Gina declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of construction materials,
appliances and other personal properties.11
In his answer12 to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were
defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondents meager
income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house. Besides, selling fish was a
mere pastime to her; as such, she was contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from his fishing trips.
Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month
duration each year. When their house was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did not
share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her parents.
From his income in the fishing business, he claimed to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which was
placed in a joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was spent in
purchasing the disputed personal properties.
On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by
Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.13
On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 14 of the May 21, 1997 order, which was denied on
June 2, 1997, and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte.15 Petitioner filed another motion for
reconsideration but the same was also denied on October 8, 1997.
On July 15, 1998, a decision16 was rendered in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Gina S.
Rey against defendant Jacinto Saguid:
a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiffs Exhibit C and D and directing the defendant to
return and/or reimburse to the plaintiff the amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000,00) which the latter
actually contributed to its construction and completion;
b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal properties listed on Exhibit M;
c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid personal properties, to return and/or
deliver the same to the plaintiff; and
d) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.17
On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however, the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages
was deleted for lack of basis.18 The appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order which declared the petitioner
as in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained
that the new rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendants non-compliance therewith entitles the
plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition based on
the following assigned errors:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING
RETROACTIVELY THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT CASE AND
HOLDING THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR THEREIN MOOT AND ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO
RULE ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF

40
 DEFAULT DUE TO MISTAKE AND/OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY
PETITIONER.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING
ON THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RECEIVED THE EVIDENCE OF
HEREIN RESPONDENT ONLY EX PARTE.19
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to present
evidence ex parte; and (2) whether or not the trial courts decision is supported by evidence.
Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief
shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parteand
the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. 20 The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for
reconsideration21 showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect.22 The motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because
his answer which contains his defenses is already on record. 23
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not represented
by counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present
evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without
the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file answer, 24 the required answer
stating therein the special and affirmative defenses, 25 and several other motions.26 If it were true that petitioner did
not understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired
from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief. Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14
days from his alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his
failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. 27
In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the
application of the rules. There is nothing in the Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal
proceeding be represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to a denial of due process.
The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in the due
process clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. 28
However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically,
Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to
present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied
retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect
on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on
February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, "[f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the
failure to appear at the pre-trial," that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default. 29
Coming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each
other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 30 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, "only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ..."31 Proof of actual contribution is required.32
In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date of
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. 33 Before Article 148 of the Family Code was
enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs.34
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang,35 and Tumlos v. Fernandez,36 which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that
proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the
petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to

41
substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano
v. Court of Appeals,37 we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had
on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. 38 This applies with
more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the
plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is
convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. 39 Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden
of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.40
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent
alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her
testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts 41 in her name for the
purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of
P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties came partly
from their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that both parties contributed
in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at
P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is
equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which granted the reliefs prayed for by
private respondent. On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondents co-ownership over
the disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the construction thereof.
Anent the personal properties, her participation therein should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.
As regards the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the Court of Appeals correctly deleted the same
for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto
Saguid in the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent of P55,687.50.
Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which the house shall be
sold at public auction to satisfy private respondents claim.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169698 November 29, 2006
LUPO ATIENZA, Petitioner,
vs.
YOLANDA DE CASTRO, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision 1 dated April 29, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, as reiterated in its Resolution 2 of September 16, 2005,
reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61, in an action for Judicial
Partition of Real Property thereat commenced by the herein petitioner Lupo Atienza against respondent Yolanda de
Castro.
The facts:
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as
accountant for the two corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a married
man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their union,
two children were born. However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they parted
ways.

42
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition
between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City. In his complaint, docketed in said
court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that the subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda
as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them.
Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the property in question was acquired by Yolanda sometime in 1987
using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolandas name without his
knowledge and consent. He did not interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their affair was still thriving.
It was only after their separation and his receipt of information that Yolanda allowed her new live-in partner to live
in the disputed property, when he demanded his share thereat as a co-owner.
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos allegations. According to her, she acquired the same property for Two Million
Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds. She insisted having bought it thru her own
savings and earnings as a businesswoman.
In a decision3 dated December 11, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment for Lupo by declaring the contested
property as owned in common by him and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in equal shares, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City to be owned in common by plaintiff LUPO ATIENZA and the
defendant YOLANDA U. DE CASTRO share-and-share alike and ordering the partition of said property between
them. Upon the finality of this Decision, the parties are hereby directed to submit for the confirmation of the Court a
mutually agreed project of partition of said property or, in case the physical partition of said property is not feasible
because of its nature, that either the same be assigned to one of the parties who shall pay the value corresponding to
the share of the other or that the property to be sold and the proceeds thereof be divided equally between the parties
after deducting the expenses incident to said sale.
The parties shall bear their own attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.
From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, therein arguing
that the evidence on record preponderate that she purchased the disputed property in her own name with her own
money. She maintained that the documents appertaining to her acquisition thereof are the best evidence to prove
who actually bought it, and refuted the findings of the trial court, as well as Lupos assertions casting doubt as to her
financial capacity to acquire the disputed property.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision 4 of April 29, 2005, reversed and set aside that of
the trial court and adjudged the litigated property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The subject
property is hereby declared to be exclusively owned by defendant-appellant Yolanda U. De Castro. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In decreeing the disputed property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, the CA ruled that under the provisions of
Article 148 of the Family Code vis--vis the evidence on record and attending circumstances, Yolandas claim of
sole ownership is meritorious, as it has been substantiated by competent evidence. To the CA, Lupo failed to
overcome the burden of proving his allegation that the subject property was purchased by Yolanda thru his exclusive
funds.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Resolution of September 16, 2005, 5 Lupo is
now with this Court via the present recourse arguing that pursuant to Article 144 6 of the Civil Code, he was in no
way burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject property because with or without the
contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof, adding that under Article 484 7 of Civil Code, as long
as the property was acquired by either or both of them during their extramarital union, such property would be
legally owned by them in common and governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts,
or special provisions.
We DENY.
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Lupo Atienza
was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime,
therefore, is governed by Article 1488 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both

43
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions ...9 Proof of actual contribution is required.10
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.11
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up
the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. 12 Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no
provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 13
The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that here, as in other civil cases, the burden of proof
rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still
prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts
proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. 14 Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.15
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in question,
merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor.
Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to the property contradicts duly
written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated
March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and between the respondent and
the vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the petitioner. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court, [Lupo] failed to overcome this burden. Perusing the records of the
case, it is evident that the trial court committed errors of judgment in its findings of fact and appreciation of
evidence with regard to the source of the funds used for the purchase of the disputed property and ultimately the
rightful owner thereof. Factual findings of the trial court are indeed entitled to respect and shall not be disturbed,
unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked or misinterpreted that would
otherwise materially affect the disposition of the case.
In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered. Rather
than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase money used as consideration for the disputed
property, [Lupo] diverted the burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda] by painting her as a shrewd and scheming
woman without the capacity to purchase any property. Instead of proving his ownership, or the extent thereof, over
the subject property, [Lupo] relegated his complaint to a mere attack on the financial capacity of [Yolanda]. He
presented documents pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which
unfortunately failed to prove his actual contribution in the purchase of the said property. The fact that [Yolanda] had
a limited access to the funds of the said corporations and had repeatedly withdrawn money from their bank accounts
for their behalf do not prove that the money she used in buying the disputed property, or any property for that matter,
came from said withdrawals.
As it is, the disquisition of the court a quo heavily rested on the apparent financial capacity of the
parties.1wphi1 On one side, there is [Lupo], a retired sea captain and the President and General Manager of two
corporations and on the other is [Yolanda], a Certified Public Accountant. Surmising that [Lupo] is financially well
heeled than [Yolanda], the court a quo concluded, sans evidence, that [Yolanda] had taken advantage of [Lupo].
Clearly, the court a quo is in error. (Words in brackets supplied.)
As we see it, petitioners claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail
to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to
its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so
and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to
overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the

44
registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or
immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the
Family Code. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present
preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent
sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an
accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She
presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented
her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the
purchase price of the subject property.
All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no reversible error in rendering the herein challenged
decision and resolution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed issuances of the CA are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in the country as against
his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were registered under the Torrens system?
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his employer,
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to
Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he met respondent Antonietta
Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich
befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of additional income to support her
children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in Antoniettas residence at a squatters area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City.
Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the
Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 19851 and March 10, 19862 covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent
were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 3 was likewise issued in their
favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds,
registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. Consequently, Jambrichs name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that his signature
remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondents signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of
page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties
were issued in respondents name alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN, 4 and per Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988.5
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to
live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondents sons for only two months after the break
up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate business.
He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for
his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about 150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he
sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for 250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment."6 On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he
discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property
has already been mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10,
1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which identified both Jambrich

45
and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single
centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties
using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner
acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich
executed in his favor.
In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On the
contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the
purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own
real property in the Philippines.
At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed property with
money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and documentary
evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still employed by the Austrian company,
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under litigation
that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not only
supported by documentary evidence but also by the admission made by the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that,
Jambrichs financial capacity to acquire and purchase the properties . . . is not disputed. 7
xxx
On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter part of
1984, she was only working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of 1,000.00 a month and was . . .
renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at Gorordo Ave., Cebu City; that Jambrich took pity of
her and the situation of her children that he offered her a better life which she readily accepted. In fact, this
miserable financial situation of hers and her two children . . . are all stated and reflected in the Child Study Report
dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts she supplied to the Social Worker who prepared the same
when she was personally interviewed by her in connection with the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm
Jambrich. So that, if such facts were not true because these are now denied by her . . . and if it was also true that
during this time she was already earning as much as 8,000.00 to 9,000.00 as profit per month from her copra
business, it would be highly unbelievable and impossible for her to be living only in such a miserable condition
since it is the observation of this Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an expensive person and not
thrifty as she wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big saving as clearly shown by her actuation when she
was already cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her . . . the allowance given . . . by him in the
amount of $500.00 a month is not enough to maintain the education and maintenance of her children.8
This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the properties under litigation or
could contribute any amount for their acquisition which according to her is worth more than 700,000.00 when
while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning 1,000.00 a month as salary and tips of more or
less 2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of her family so much so that it is safe to conclude
that she was really in financial distress when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live with him
because that was a big financial opportunity for her and her children who were already abandoned by her husband. 9
xxx
The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell dated
November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] as buyer is
because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the
goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good attitude shown by her
to him since he could still very well provide for everything she needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time.
In fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation was at the time when their
relationship was still going smoothly and harmoniously.10 [Emphasis supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Antoniet[t]a
Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the residential house of strong materials and three
parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792
issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in the name of defendant
Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;

46
 3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in the
name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F.
Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I," "K" and "L" as avoided insofar as they appear to
convey rights and interests over the properties in question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar;
5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the amount of 25,000.00 and litigation
expenses in the amount of 10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs.11
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002, 12 the appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower courts conclusion. The circumstances involved in the case cited by the lower court and
similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of the subsequent Filipino
purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the title to the subject property has been
issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et al., vs. Fong Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko
vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phils. 461; United Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA
446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78).
In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-
appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto. 13
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENTS
JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING JAMBRICHS
PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY THE
HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JAMBRICH HAS NO
TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN ANY
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELL-REASONED
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER
(THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).14
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich possesses the
financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 1985 to
1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company. He was earning an
estimated monthly salary of 50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one year where his
monthly salary was approximately 90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of not more
than 1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by her during the
pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business were unsubstantiated. The supposed copra
business was actually the business of her mother and their family, with ten siblings. She has no license to sell copra,
and had not filed any income tax return. All the motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the last one left
standing was already scrap. Further, the Child Study Report 15 submitted by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondents two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant
in 1984. At first she had no problem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritz are (sic) foreigners and
they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more foreigners coming because of the situation in
the Philippines at that time. Her financial problem started then. She was even renting a small room in a squatters
area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was during her time of great financial distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich
who later offered her a decent place for herself and her children.16
The DSWD Home Study Report17 further disclosed that:
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses of the
said Restaurants. He made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the] English language. Antonietta
accepted the offer because she was in need of additional income to support [her] 2 young children who were
abandoned by their father. Their session was agreed to be scheduled every afternoon at the residence of Antonietta in

47
the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of the family particularly
the children who were malnourished. After a few months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a
decent place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good for the children. Antonietta who was miserable and
financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of the children.18
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to purchase the
three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct examination and during the
proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in
question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints.
Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated checks issued by
Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank. Receipts of the installment payments
were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for ten months, where she
was completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject properties to
respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject properties to
petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great
weight and respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the instant case, we find no
reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court did not controvert the factual
findings of the trial court. They differed only in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation also does not help
respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. 19 In the
instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove
his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it.
Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.20
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone. Having found that
the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of
registration of the properties in the name of respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. 21 It is only a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large. 22 Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a
title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the
disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on
indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, 23 and
that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. 24 However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the
transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration. 25 This
is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties.
She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully
supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution,26 which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution,27 and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 28 The capacity to acquire private land is
dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may be transferred only to
individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only Filipino citizens or
corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring
or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former
natural-born citizen.29
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is
an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner
who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, 30 the Court reiterated the

48
consistent ruling in a number of cases 31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab
initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of
these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the
title of the transferee is valid.
The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the
name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong materials and
three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to issue
new certificates of title in his name. The trial court likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner 25,000 as
attorneys fees and 10,000 as litigation expenses, as well as the costs of suit.
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The rationale behind the Courts ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent
cases,32 is this since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nations land for future generations of Filipinos,
that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands
of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929
dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-
LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any
settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets
of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on
November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on
August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City. 2 The CA thereby denied her right
in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired
during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna,
Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-
appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the
Justice of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the
Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs marriage to EUGENIA, they
begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria
L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2)
decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966
and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT
FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live
separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.

49
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage,
this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together
as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation
the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting
of 517.52 square meters, for 1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978.
Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale
over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983,
which was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ
SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share
of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT
No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the
same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA
over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm
with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm
lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and
equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z.
Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la
Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and
equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged
that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of pro-indiviso share consisting of her share in the said
properties plus her share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latters last will and
testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the
subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the portion of the subject
properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the
share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and
that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorneys feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD. 3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts, 4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been
acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil
status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are

50
 ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport
and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED
THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF
GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT,
BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY
DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE
DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE
NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION FOR
FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE
LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFFS MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY.
LUNAS LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR
THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND
BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latters death on July 12, 1997. The
absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage
with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138,
is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to
defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having
been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna
and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds

51
 ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are
hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership
was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic courts approval of
the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual
contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law
books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro
indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether
the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and,
secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any
rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September
10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the
nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad. 15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of
bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated
their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, 16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing
abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable
marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity
ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. 18 Conformably with the
nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the
Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution, 19 and regards it as a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. 20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital
union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded
only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy
on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given
legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval

52
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against
Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on
September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property
relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify
the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at
the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,
or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits
of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination enumerated in
Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and
Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse
of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent,
or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such
creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of
this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in
dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an incident ofthe
action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the
Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce. 21 With the divorce not being itself valid and
enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership
of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?

53
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being
bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce
Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty.
Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil
Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being
bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership,
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact.1wphi1 To
establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in
the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would
warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership ofproperties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners
therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate
their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had
on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. This applies with
more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1wphi1 The plaintiff
is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the
plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden
of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of the
condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least 306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of
159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling
146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of 306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty.
Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to 362,264.00 of the units purchase price of
1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds,
proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that she had the financial capacity to make the
contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness
of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioners assertions on her actual contributions through
the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were used to buy
the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this case proof that was required for
Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases where properties were
acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was

54
void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not
readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not
in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his
lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were
prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required.
The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties
was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his
or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture
applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains
was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in
the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No. L-19671,
November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she
made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she
presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was
aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for 55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27,
1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another
check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of 97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According
to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for 49,236.00 payable to
PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for
4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the
payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of 100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis
for SOLEDADs claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial court
correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together
with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna.
The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and
Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to
show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married
to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms
one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status
of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the
law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute
and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to
presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his
practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he
headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were substantiated by the
records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party
claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not
being evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership
of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna
in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

55
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

56