1. [G.R. No. 102858.

July 28, 1997]

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. CA and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA,
MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory
or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication
did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed
and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision[1] promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent
Resolution[2] promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. CV
No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:[4]
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one
entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7,
Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and
Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of
evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance
of a decree be issued."

The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of
his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.[5] The application
was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial
Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.[6] However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant
died. Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado --
represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted
as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:[7]
"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529,
requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently, the Court is of
the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance
with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion
provides:[8]
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first,
which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is
jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication
not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the
other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it,
the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second,
publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a
requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be
legally infirm.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained,
set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro
Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dated
November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court
notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should
be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we
shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. [9]
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion[10] in holding
x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper
of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be published
both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. According to petitioner,
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and xxx in xxx
a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process.[11]
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural defect. They add that publication
in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.[12]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:[13]
x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is
couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to explain matters
fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise:[14]
x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover,
the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and
other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any
objection of the application for registration.

The Courts Ruling

We find for petitioner.
 Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of
initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing of the application,
issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than fortyfive days nor later
than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication;
(2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. -Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said
notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the
prayer of said application shall not be granted.

xxx xxx xxx

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official
Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down
to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can
validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction
and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word
denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.[15] While concededly
such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends
upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood
in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,[16] the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1)
publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law
were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to
all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining
properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of
reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law
included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.[17] Being in rem, such
proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who
have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be
interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application
which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of
realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his
ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an
action for recovery of realty.[18] He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests
upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned -- nay, the whole world -- who
have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court
and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process
require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of
the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory
when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and
posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process
and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature
of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction
of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private
respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the
statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared
that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.[19] There is no alternative. Thus, the
application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to
reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without
prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.

2. G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL vs. E SPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA,
MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUALBAUTISTA, ERLINDA C.
PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL,
AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA
PASCUALNER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-
DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC,
Pasig, Metro Manila
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and
Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C.
Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition
and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the
late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo,
petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged
natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista M anuel C. Pascual J ose C. Pascual S usana C. Pascual-
Bautista E rlinda C. Pascual W enceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit: Avelino Pascual
I soceles Pascual L oida Pascual-Martinez V irginia Pascual-Ner N ona Pascual-Fernando O
ctavio Pascual G eranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to
wit: Olivia S. Pascual H ermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented
by the following: Dominga M. Pascual M amerta P. Fugoso A braham S. Sarmiento, III R egina
Sarmiento-Macaibay E leuterio P. Sarmiento D omiga P. San Diego N elia P. Marquez S ilvestre
M. Pascual E leuterio M. Pascual ( Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554,
for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for
letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are
among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her
own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres
Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs
of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over
the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although
paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled proceedings
until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims
of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners
Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).

On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-
114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued
an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion
reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such
motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of
Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC
(150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to
the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly
construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of
Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled
that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
 nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners
herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate
of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil
Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the
successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the
petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may
inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should
not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners,
that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article
982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation."
Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982
is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to
state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to
their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to
the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may
not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA
233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless
of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil.
42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly
but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general
rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication
(Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one
category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children
should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

3. [G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, pl-app, vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, def-app.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R.
Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the
appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute
a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We
hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section
878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That
on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-
made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first
having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary
to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun
involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can
submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without
a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that
he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of
law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret
agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their
authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22
revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on
August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically:
"Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his
counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the
Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and
Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a
certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4
Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to
submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such
of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits
were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and
one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are
forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to .
. . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued
to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such
officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our
task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on
appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered
by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear
and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with
what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur .
 4. [G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966]
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., pet-app, vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE
POSTMASTER GENERAL, rest-app.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the
groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products.
Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.
Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate
families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or
licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no
purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request
at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer Contest", the
contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump
thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at
this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern
for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The
first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different
regions. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can
from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional
first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila,
accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The
regional secondprize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively.
At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed
can from which the drawing for the final firstprize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be made.
Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for
third; and P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest
but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex
with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections
1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as
follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following classes,
whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be
deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or
purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in
whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property
of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in
conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
 property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other
officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word
"fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class
mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.The
Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting
any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise
for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal money order or
telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or company, whether such
agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by
regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in
favor of such person or company or its agent.

The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in
which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its
position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the
then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions
aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960,
Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no
consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling authorities,
condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an
unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained
his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise"
which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the
use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was
conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief against
Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use
of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the
respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest'
announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not
violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.

The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether the
petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable
legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person
"whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity
arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64,
Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on
the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue
involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R.
No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2,
pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the
appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of
significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some
consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail
of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast,
the appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the
power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof particularly thru the issuance of fraud
orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against legally
nonmailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the
sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination
of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the
appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the
premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation
thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to
the correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in
which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with
which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the
appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the
appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against
it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent
assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and
consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live
controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a
mere theoretical question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are substantial.
To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of construction
hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the
appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an
unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a
fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an
imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing
declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955).
And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that
merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others" which
admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable
controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is
actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing:
Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of
construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given
set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief.
The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the
circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the
matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the
art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law
with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black,
Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed
by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably
requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as
much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand
can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a
declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet,
the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a
fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution.
With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of setting
the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion and violence of
a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132
and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59
Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny
declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to
choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement
as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be
faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not
only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with
its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it
abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect
a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these
considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be
interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) which, in
the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights
and duties under a law we can see in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or
any futility or prematurity in our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand down
in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory
judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than
this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial
decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case will
terminate the controversy at hand.
 It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not
without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a
corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its
proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion
were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the
corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to
determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17
App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J.
Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology
in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and
empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the
facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme
for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any
kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc.
vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities
under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that
of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States
Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by
chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of
gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third,
chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497;
U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs.
Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)

Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too
obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant
himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of
consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the
same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance,
but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly
or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.

Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in which
the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy anything?
Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex
dealer will dispense from to , and win valuable prizes . . . ." .

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any
service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective
contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand,
 and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned
inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in
order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent"
("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not
only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex
products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege to
join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the use of
any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs
reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of value.
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would
naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged to
prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The
required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the
contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788,
is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those
conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize.
Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the
sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive, some benefit
in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not supply the element of
consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).

Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed
by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal
Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of
any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed?
Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of consideration, this
aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as
an instrument of both curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was
predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which
opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a
gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the determination of whether or not the proposed
contest wanting in consideration as we have found it to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot
be passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words,
there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is
commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way
of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black,
Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail
Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs.
State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus
conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of
anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is
open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed within
the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that the
appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are
indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of
consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178
So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-
Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of
the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the
prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.:
Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash.,
297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394,
39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E.,
605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of
opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In
some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used
interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of consideration or
chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra;
State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from
this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the
particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the
word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar
as the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to
eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the
determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is
axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters
which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises
and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame
the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208).
Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger
amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the
reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a
device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the
chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286,
41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).

We find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to
hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift
enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they
involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the
appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief,
and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does
not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

5. [G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988]

RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG,
petitioners, vs. T HE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY
and AMANDA RAMOSAGONOY, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the
respondent judge * in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In
re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy,
petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:
Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all
legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda
R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents,
Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for
Wilson Marcos and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be changed with "Agonoy", which is the family
name of the petitioners.
Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be governed by the pertinent
provisions of the New Civil Code.
Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the petitioners.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos,
Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37.
The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon
the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper
of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City.
On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad
litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming
that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy,
oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt
under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter,
the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the petition for adoption.
Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).
The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero
Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil
Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;
xxx xxx xxx

In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to add
grandchildren in this article where no grandchil is included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that
what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included".
But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez, that the adoption
of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family unit,
but would result in the reduction of their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and
irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation
between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders
ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating
the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a
clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include
grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on
its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.
Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended
that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code
of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code
of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants
from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been
disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil
Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph
(1) of Article 335.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no
child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity
and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. 8 The present tendency, however, is geared more
towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful
and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective.9 Under the law now in
force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no
longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

6. [G.R. No. 189600 June 29, 2010]

MILAGROS E. AMORES, Petitioner, v s. H OUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14, 2009
and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public
respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the
legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as
representative of the party-list organization Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of
Representatives, and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
In her Petition for Quo Warranto1 seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner alleged that,
among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of
CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already
31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector
to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to
the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA
No. 7941.
Not having filed his Answer despite due notice, private respondent was deemed to have entered a
general denial pursuant to public respondents Rules.
As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009,3 dismissed petitioners Petition
for Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations which the COMELEC had
partially proclaimed as entitled to at least one seat in the House of Representatives through National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which
was filed on October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10 days from private
respondents proclamation.
Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941, public
respondent held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the first three congressional
terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter
registered exclusively as representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral organization, is
not.
In the matter of private respondents shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply
as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.
Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution No. 09-130 dated August 6, 2009,4
petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner contends that, among other things, public respondent created distinctions in the application
of Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 that are not found in the subject provisions, fostering
interpretations at war with equal protection of the laws; and NBC Resolution No. 07-60, which was a
partial proclamation of winning party-list organizations, was not enough basis for private respondent to
assume office on July 10, 2007, especially considering that he admitted receiving his own Certificate
of Proclamation only on December 13, 2007.
In his Comment, private respondent avers in the main that petitioner has not substantiated her claims
of grave abuse of discretion against public respondent; and that he became a member of the overseas
Filipinos and their families sector years before the 2007 elections.
It bears noting that the term of office of party-list representatives elected in the May, 2007 elections will
expire on June 30, 2010. While the petition has, thus, become moot and academic, rendering of a
decision on the merits in this case would still be of practical value.
The Court adopts the issues framed by public respondent, to wit: (1) whether petitioners Petition for
Quo Warranto was dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and (2) whether Sections 9 and 15
of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
considering petitioners Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its counting of the 10-day
reglementary period provided in its Rules8 from the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9,
2007 is erroneous.
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May, 2007
elections, along with other party-list organizations,9 it was by no measure a proclamation of private
respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by
the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to
the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC10 after revisiting the formula for allocation of additional
seats to party-list organizations.
Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private respondents
proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the merits. Alternatively,
since petitioners challenge goes into private respondents qualifications, it may be filed at anytime
during his term.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.

On the second and more substantial issue, the Court shall first discuss the age requirement for youth
sector nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
 bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

The Court finds no textual support for public respondents interpretation that Section 9 applied only to
those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or
until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-
five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a
candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this
mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees
vying for party-list representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no reason to
apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first three congressional
terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last elections where
Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two months after the law was enacted. This is certainly
not sound legislative intent, and could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondents ratiocination that after the third
congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No.
7941 would apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. This
distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the
law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for public
respondents ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondents shift of affiliation from
CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there was no resultant
change in party-list affiliation. Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political
party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)

What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral
affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations
are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his
sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral
affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since the
statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index
animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or
the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it
being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.15 Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation
at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBACs
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17, 2007.
That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is of no moment.
A party-list organizations ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference, their qualifications
according to law are a different matter.
It not being contested, however, that private respondent was eventually proclaimed as a party-list
representative of CIBAC and rendered services as such, he is entitled to keep the compensation and
emoluments provided by law for the position until he is properly declared ineligible to hold the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-
130 dated August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET ASIDE.
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of
Representatives representing the party-list organization CIBAC.
SO ORDERED.

7. [G.R. No. L-28463 May 31, 1971]

REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., petitioner, v s. T HE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
Agrava & Agrava for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Santiago
M. Kapunan for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
It is a novel question that this petition for the review of a decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals
presents. Petitioner Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would have this Court construe the words "products of
the Philippines" found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code1 as excluding bran (ipa) and
pollard (darak) on the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the
Philippines, they are merely waste and not the products, which is the flour produced.2 That way, it
would not be liable at all for the wharfage dues assessed under such section by respondent
Commission of Customs. It elevated the matter to respondent Court, as the construction it would place
on the aforesaid section appears too strained and far remote from the ordinary meaning of the text, not
to mention the policy of the Act. We affirm.
In the decision of respondent Court now sought to be reviewed, after stating that what was before it
was an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Customs holding petitioner liable for the sum of
P7,948.00 as wharfage due the facts were set forth as follows: "Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is
a domestic corporation, primarily engaged in the manufacture of wheat flour, and produces pollard
(darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of milling. During the period from December, 1963 to July, 1964,
inclusive, petitioner exported Pollard and/or bran which was loaded from lighters alongside vessels
engaged in foreign trade while anchored near the breakwater The respondent assessed the petitioner
by way of wharfage dues on the said exportations in the sum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid
by petitioner under protest."3 The only issue, in the opinion of respondent Court, is whether or not such
collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law. The main contention before respondent Court
of petitioner was "that inasmuch as no government or private wharves or government facilities [were]
utilized in exporting the pollard and/or bran, the collection of wharfage dues is contrary to law."4 On the
other hand, the stand of respondent Commissioner of Customs was that petitioner was liable for
wharfage dues "upon receipt or discharge of the exported goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade
regardless of the non-use of government-owned or private wharves."5 Respondent Court of Tax
Appeals sustained the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs under the appropriate provision
of the Tariff and Customs Code, relying on our decision in Procter & Gamble Phil. Manufacturing Corp.
v. Commissioner of Customs.6 It did not feel called upon to answer the question now before us as, in
its opinion, petitioner only called its attention to it for the first time in its memorandum.
Hence, this petition for review. The sole error assigned by petitioner is that it should not, under its
construction of the Act, be liable for wharfage dues on its exportation of bran and pollard as they are
not "products of the Philippines", coming as they did from wheat grain which were imported from
abroad, and being "merely parts of the wheat grain milled by Petitioner to produce flour which had
become waste."7 We find, to repeat, such contention unpersuasive and affirm the decision of
respondent Court of Tax Appeals.
1. The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be levied, collected and
paid on all articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines ...
exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage ...."
One category refers to what is imported. The other mentions products of the Philippines that are
exported. Even without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are
produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. Petitioner appeared to have
entertained such a nation. In its petition for review before respondent Court, it categorically asserted:
"Petitioner is primarily engaged in the manufacture of flour from wheat grain. In the process of milling
the wheat grain into flour, petitioner also produces 'bran' and 'pollard' which it exports abroad."8 It
does take a certain amount of hair-splitting to exclude from its operation what petitioner calls "waste"
resulting from the production of flour processed from the wheat grain in petitioner's flour mills in the
Philippines. It is always timely to remember that, as stressed by Justice Moreland: "The first and
fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them."9 Petitioner ought to have been aware that deference to such a doctrine precludes an
affirmative response to its contention. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. It is as simple, as that.

2. There is need of confining familiar language of a statute to its usual signification. While statutory
construction involves the exercise of choice, the temptation to roam at will and rely on one's
predilections as to what policy should prevail is to be resisted. The search must be for a reasonable
interpretation. It is best to keep in mind the reminder from Holmes that "there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what obviously means." 11 To paraphrase
Frankfurter, interpolation must be eschewed but evisceration avoided. Certainly, the utmost effort
should be exerted lest the interpretation arrived at does violence to the statutory language in its total
context. It would be then to ignore what has been stressed time and time again as to limits of judicial
freedom in the construction of statutes to accept their view advanced by petitioner.

3. Then, again, there is the fundamental postulate in statutory construction requiring fidelity to the
legislative purpose. What Congress intended is not to be frustrates. Its objective must be carried
out. Even if there be doubt as to the meaning of the language employed, the interpretation should
not be at war with the end sought to be attained. No undue reflection is needed to show that if
 through an ingenious argument, the scope of a statute may be contracted, the probability that other
exceptions may be thought of is not remote. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated
by the same desire to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise
be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It is desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue
restriction of the coverage of the Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect
for, but defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. That kind of approach in statutory construction has
never recommended itself. It does not now.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed.
With costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Castro, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., took no part.

8. [G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979]

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC.,
petitioner appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent appellee.
Gregorio E. Fajardo for appellant.
Gregorio Baroque for appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:
In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of
such decision relying on what it considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No.
2023, more specifically the first two paragraphs thereof: "... (1) A member of a cooperative may,
notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative
authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such
amount as may be specified in the agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative
in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member to the cooperative. (2) Upon the
exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a request in
writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make the claimant
and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the co-operative."
To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, as quoted in the brief for petitioner-appellant, stated
the following: "Then petitioner contends that under the above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans
granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent's
employees' wages and salaries. As can be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act
2023 hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit
unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries. The only effect
of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct from the salaries or wages payable to members
of the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to pay the same to
the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had been enacted, the employer could not be
compelled to act as the collecting agent of the employees' credit union for the employees' debt to his
credit union but to contend that the debt of a member of the employees cooperative credit union as
having first priority in the matter of deduction, is to write something into the law which does not appear.
In other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the
deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit
union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit union's credit into a first priority credit.
If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first priority in
the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law
would have so expressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241,
2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of credits.
Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the respondent-appellee, which, in its
brief, succinctly pointed out "that there is nothing in said provision from which it could be implied that it
gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent
company, in issuing the documents known as Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "P", which establish the order of
priority of payment out of the salaries of the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate the
above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023. In promulgating Exhibit "3", [and] Exhibit "P"
respondent, in effect, implemented the said provision of law.
This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it
would appear that no favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.
1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no
ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid
objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That cannot be
done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains to the legislative branch. As was
pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals: 4 "It has been repeated time and time again that where
the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The
law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisions have consistently
born to that effect.
2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right.
The very law on which he would base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more
rigorous analysis would have prevented him from instituting a a suit of this character. In J.R.S. Business
Corporation v. Montesa, 6 this Court held. "Mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that
there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the law
enjoins as a duty or an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he
is entitled. The opinion continued in this wise: "According to former Chief Justice Moran," only specific
legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights are of the
petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. In support of the
above view, Viuda e Hijos de Crispulo Zamora v. Wright was cited. As was there categorically stated:
"This court has held that it is fundamental that the duties to be enforced by mandamus must be those
which are clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must have a
clear, legal right to the thing and that it must be the legal duty of the defendant to perform the required
act.' As expressed by the then Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion: "It is well establish that only
specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain
and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful." To the same effect is the
formulation of such doctrine by former Justice Barrera: "Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in
doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a
power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed." 8 So it has been since then. 9 The
latest reported case, Province. of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, 10 this court speaking
through Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has also been held that it is
essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded, and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It
never issues in doubtful cases.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., concur. Aquino, J., took no part.

9. [G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987]

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. N ATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and KAYUMANGGI RADIO NETWORK
INCORPORATED, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR, J.:
This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
which ordered petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Incorporated (RCPI) to desist from
operating its radio telephone services in Catarman, Northern Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro;
and Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Petitioner has been operating a radio communications system since 1957 under its legislative franchise
granted by Republic Act No. 2036 which was enacted on June 23, 1957.
In 1968, the petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon, Sorsogon. In 1971, another
radio telegraph service was put up in San Jose, Mindoro followed by another in Catarman, Samar in
1976. The installation of radio telephone services started in 1971 in San Jose, Mindoro; then in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983.
In a decision dated June 24, 1980 in NTC Case No. 80-08, private respondent Kayumanggi Radio
Network Incorporated was authorized by the public respondent to operate radio communications
systems in Catarman, Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro.
On December 14, 1983, the private respondent filed a complaint with the NTC alleging that the
petitioner was operating in Catarman, Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro without a certificate of public
covenience and necessity. The petitioner, on the other hand, counter-alleged that its telephone services
in the places subject of the complaint are covered by the legislative franchise recognized by both the
public respondent and its predecessor, the Public Service Commission. In its supplemental reply, the
petitioner further stated that it has been in operation in the questioned places long before private
respondent Kayumanggi filed its application to operate in the same places.
After conducting a hearing, NTC, in its decision dated August 22, 1984 ordered petitioner RCPI to
immediately cease or desist from the operation of its radio telephone services in Catarman Northern
Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating that under Executive Order
No. 546, a certificate of public convenience and necessity is mandatory for the operation of
communication utilities and services including radio communications.
On September 4, 1984, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an order
dated September 12, 1984.
On October 1, 1984, the present petition was filed raising the issue of whether or not petitioner RCPI,
a grantee of a legislative franchise to operate a radio company, is required to secure a certificate of
public convenience and necessity before it can validly operate its radio stations including radio
telephone services in Catarman, Northern Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon,
Sorsogon.
The petitioner's main argument states that the abolition of the Public Service Commission under
Presidential Decree No. 1 and the creation of the National Telecommunications Commission under
Executive Order No. 546 to replace the defunct Public Service Commission did not affect sections 14
and 15 of the Public Service Law (Commonwealth Act. No. 146, as amended).
The provisions of the Public Service Law pertinent to the petitioner's allegation are as follows:
Section 13. (a) the Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public services and
their franchises, equipment and other properties, and in the exercise of its authority, it shall have the necessary
powers and the aid of public force: ...
Section 14. The following are exempted from the provisions of the preceding section:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Radio companies except with respect to the fixing of rates;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 15. With the exception of those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall operate
in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission,
known as "certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public necessity," as the case
may be, to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will promote the
public interests in a proper and suitable manner. ...

We find no merit in the petitioner's contention.

Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23,1972, reorganizing the executive branch of
the National Government, the Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions were
transferred to three specialized regulatory boards, as follows: the Board of Transportation, the Board
of Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks. The functions so transferred were still
subject to the limitations provided in sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law, as amended. With
the enactment of Executive Order No. 546 on July 23, 1979 implementing P.D. No.1, the Board of
Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau were abolished and their functions were
transferred to the National Telecommunications Commission (Sec. 19(d), Executive Order No. 546).
Section 15 of said Executive Order spells out the functions of the National Telecommunications
Commission as follows
Sec. 15. Functions of the Commission.-The Commission shall exercise the following functions:
a. Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of communications utilities and services, radio
communications petitions systems, wire or wireless telephone or telegraph system, radio and television
broadcasting system and other similar public utilities;
b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public service
communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such public utility
facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates are established by international bodies or
associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies recognized by the Philippine
Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;
c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph systems and radio
communication systems including amateur radio stations and radio and television broadcasting systems;
d. Sub-allocate series of frequencies of bands allocated by the International Telecommunications Union to the
specific services;
e. Establish and prescribe rules, regulations, standards, specifications in all cases related to the issued
Certificate of Public Convenience and administer and enforce the same;
 f. Coordinate and cooperate with government agencies and other entities concerned with any aspect involving
communications with a view to continuously improve the communications service in the country;
g. Promulgate such rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require, to encourage a larger
and more effective use of communications, radio and television broadcasting facilities, and to maintain
effective competition among private entities in these activities whenever the Commission finds it reasonably
feasible;
h. Supervise and inspect the operation of radio stations and telecommunications facilities;
i. Undertake the examination and licensing of radio operators;
j. Undertake, whenever necessary, the registration of radio transmitters and transceivers; and

k. Perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.

It is clear from the aforequoted provision that the exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and the Board of Communications no longer exists
because of the changes effected by the Reorganization Law and implementing executive orders. The
petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive Order No. 546 on the ground that it
has long been in operation since 1957 cannot be sustained.
A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the
hands of a subject." This definition was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by every
authority since (State v. Twin Village Water Co., 98 Me 214, 56 A 763 (1903)). Today, a franchise,
being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a
grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative
agencies. We ruled in Pangasinan transportation Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission (70 Phil. 221)
that:
... statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the State of its police
power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise
to those already established and in operation ...

Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends the Public
Service Law (CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its
provisions. The petitioner cannot install and operate radio telephone services on the basis of its
legislative franchise alone.
The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can operate
a radio communications system anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous. Section 1 of said statute
reads:
Section 1. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and to the provisions, not inconsistent herewith, of
Act Numbered Three thousand eight hundred and forty-six, entitled.' An Act providing for the regulation of
radio stations and radio communications in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes;' Commonwealth
Act Numbered One hundred forty-six, known as the Public Service Act, and their amendments, and other
applicable laws, there is hereby granted to the Radio Communications of the Philippines, its successors or
assigns, the right and privilege of constructing, installing, establishing and operating in the Philippines, at such
places as the said corporation may select and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications may
approve, radio stations for the reception and transmission of wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or
radiotelephone, including both coastal and marine telecommunications, each station to consist of two radio
apparatus comprising of a receiving and sending radio apparatus. (Emphasis supplied).

Section 4(a) of the same Act further provides that:

 Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder be exercised by the grantee
until the Secretary of Public works and Communications shall have allotted to the grantee the frequencies and
wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee a license for such case. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it
desires to operate. It has been repeated time and again that where the statutory norm speaks
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to
the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. (Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 381).
The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public Works
and Communications before the petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San
Jose, Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio telephone services opened in Sorsogon,
Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and necessity appears
to have been secured by the petitioner from the public respondent when such certificate,was required
by the applicable public utility regulations (See executive Order No. 546, sec. 15, supra.; Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co. v. City of Davao, 15 SCRA 75; Olongapo Electric Light and Power Corp.
v. National Power Corporation, et al., G.R. No. L-24912, promulgated April 9, 1987.)
It was well within the powers of the public respondent to authorize the installation by the private
respondent network of radio communications systems in Catarman, Samar and San Jose, Mindoro.
Under the circumstances of this case, the mere fact that the petitioner possesses a franchise to put up
and operate a radio communications system in certain areas is not an insuperable obstacle to the public
respondent's issuing the proper certificate to an applicant desiring to extend the same services to those
areas. The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise
be granted except that it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature
when the common good so requires. (Art. XII, sec. 11 of the 1986 Constitution). There is an express
provision in the petitioner's franchise which provides compliance with the above mandate R.A. 2036,
sec. 15).
In view of the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the public respondent's findings of fact, and
conclusions of law insofar as the private respondent was authorized to operate in Catarman, Samar
and San Jose, Mindoro. As a rule, the Commission's findings of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive upon this Court. We may modify or ignore them only when it clearly appears
that there is no evidence to support reasonably such a conclusion. (Halili v. Daplas, 14 SCRA 14). The
petitioner has not shown why the private respondent should be denied the authority to operate its
services in Samar and Mindoro. It has not overcome the presumption that when the public respondent
disturbed the petitioner's monopoly in certain areas, it was doing so pursuant to public interest and the
common good.
WHEREFORE, the challenged order of the public respondent dated August 22, 1984 is hereby
AFFIRMED. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 10. [G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. H ONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba,
Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
R.M. Blanco for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of
the Minor named Solomon Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of law.
The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and
Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.
There is no controversy as to the facts.
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger
brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was
set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks.
The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the
United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August
19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are
physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and
has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the
adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and
inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably
recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
by law and that the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge
rendered a decision on June 20, 1990, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for adoption filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A.
Clouse and decrees that the said minor be considered as their child by adoption. To this effect, the Court
gives the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners. Henceforth, he shall be
known as SOLOMON ALCALA CLOUSE.
The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his natural parents and vests parental authority to
the herein petitioners and makes him their legal heir. Pursuant to Article 36 of P.D. 603 as amended, the
decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date when the petition was filed. In accordance with Article
53 of the same decree, let this decree of adoption be recorded in the corresponding government agency,
particularly the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte where the minor was born.
 The said office of the Local Civil Registrar is hereby directed to issue an amended certificate of live birth
to the minor adopted by the petitioners.
Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the petitioners, DSWD, Zambales Branch, Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for relief, contending:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND
EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW .

We rule for petitioner.

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code
of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon
Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not
qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon
Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is
not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second
place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United
States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph
3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating
Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184.
The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare
Code), provides that husband and wife "may" jointly adopt.4 Executive Order No. 91 issued on
December 17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall"
jointly adopt if one of them is an alien.5 It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for
adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt,
except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory.6 This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is
the ideal situation.7 As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.8
In a distinctly similar case, we held:
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both
the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were
of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof expresses the necessity for
a joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the parental authority, can aptly find
governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other,
jointly parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.

Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its interpretation. There is only room
for application.
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote that objective.11 Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of
the welfare of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life.12 It is not the
bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption
cases.13 Executive Order 209 likewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be adopted
should be the paramount consideration. These considerations notwithstanding, the records of the case
do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala,
by private respondents who are aliens.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.