01 TERESITA S. DAVID, et.
al (Heirs of AUTHOR: Adre Further, it ruled that the petitioners as the registered owners have a better right
Sps. David) vs. AGUSTIN RIVERA NOTES:
[G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159. January 16,
2004]
TOPIC: Prohibition
PONENTE: Tinga, J
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford
relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court. While appeal is the
recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior court, this does not detract from
the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the inferior court from
proceeding further on the ground that it hear and decided the case without jurisdiction.
ER: The case stems from conflicting claims of ownership over a land. Rivera filed a
complaint with PARAB while David filed with MCTC. Rivera claims that MCTC has no
jurisdiction due to the tenancy relationship between the parties and that he already filed with
PARAB. PARAB declared Rivera as tenant and peaceful possession be maintained. MCTC
ruled that Rivera must vacate the land. Without appealing MCTC decision, Rivera filed with
RTC Petition for Prohibition with PI and/or TRO stating that MCTC has no jurisdiction since
issue is agrarian in nature. RTC denied MTD of David so 65 with CA. CA no GAD
committed by RTC and Prohibition was proper. SC affirms CA. It is clear that the respondent
filed the petition for prohibition to correct what he perceived was an erroneous assumption
of jurisdiction by the MCTC. DARAB had primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters
which is present in the case. With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction,
it follows that Rivera has availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the
special civil action of prohibition.
FACTS:
Agustin Rivera claims ownership over the subject land located in Pampanga. Heirs of
Sps. David (petitioners) had been harassing him to vacate the subject land although it
had already been given to him sometime in 1957 by the parents of the Heirs as
disturbance compensation, in consideration of his renunciation of his tenurial rights
over the farmholding.
Rivera filed a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the Provincial
Adjudication Board (PARAB) of San Fernando, Pampanga
Heirs filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. They alleged that Rivera was
occupying the subject land without paying rentals and that they need the subject land
for their personal use but Rivera refused to vacate it despite repeated demands.
Riveras Answer in the Ejectment Case: MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in
light of the tenancy relationship between him and the parents of the petitioners, as
evidenced by the Certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) of Mabalacat, Pampanga. He likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over
the subject land and informed the court of the complaint he had earlier filed before the
PARAB.
(January 31, 1995) During the pendency of Ejectment Case, PARAB Decision:
Declared Rivera as tenant of the land and ordering that his peaceful possession be
maintained. Expectedly, the petitioners appealed the PARAB Decision to the
Department of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
(September 28, 1995) MCTC Decision: Rivera to vacate the subject land. The court
found that there was a dearth (lack of) of evidence supportive of Riveras claim
that the land is agricultural or that it is devoted to agricultural production.
to possession of the subject land.
Without appealing the MCTC Decision, Rivera filed a Petition for Prohibition with
PI and/or TRO for lack of jurisdiction before the RTC of Angeles Pampanga.
Rivera stated that MCTC had no jurisdiction as the issue before it was agrarian in
nature.
RTC issued TRO enjoining the petitioners from enforcing the MCTC Decision. It also
held a hearing for the Writ of PI, which it issued after the posting of the bond.
Trial ensued and when Rivera rested his case: Heirs filed a MTD on the grounds:
(1) Prohibition cannot substitute appeal;
(2) MCTC had jurisdiction which was determined by the averments of the complaint
RTC: MTD denied because it was filed after the presentation of the plaintiffs evidence,
partakes of a demurrer to evidence which under Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of
Court, may be granted only upon a showing that the plaintiff has shown no right to the
relief prayed for. Noting that the evidence presented by the petitioner establishes an
issue which is addressed to [the] court for resolution. . . whether or not the respondent
court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case filed before it. Heirs MR
was denied.
Heirs filed Petition for Certiorari with CA. CA: No grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in denying MTD and MR.
CA: ratiocinated that the order of denial is merely interlocutory and hence cannot be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In addition, it held that issues raised
in the petition for prohibition were genuine and substantial, necessitating the
presentation of evidence by both parties.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE(S): WON recourse to RTC for Writ of Prohibition was proper (issue related to topic)
HELD: Yes sir.
Issue in case: whether the denial of the MTD by way of demurrer to evidence was afflicted
with grave abuse of discretion. No.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
Heirs contention: They insist that appeal, not prohibition, is the proper remedy to question
the judgment of the MCTC and that the question of jurisdiction is one of law which may be
ruled upon without the evidence of the parties.
Courts Ruling:
It is clear that the respondent filed the petition for prohibition to correct what he
perceived was an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the MCTC.
Indeed, the propriety of the recourse to the RTC for a writ of prohibition is beyond
cavil in view of the following considerations:
Two tribunals exercised jurisdiction over two cases involving the same subject
matter, issue and parties and rendered conflicting decisions.
DARAB assumed the powers and functions with respect to adjudication of
agrarian reform cases. Based on the DARAB Rules of Procedure, it has primary
and exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction over all agrarian disputes (any
controversy relating to tenurial agreements). It is enough that the dispute
originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant although no longer
subsisting. As earlier pointed out, jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is
now expressly vested in the DAR, through the DARAB.
 Should tenancy relationship be duly proven, the respondent as a tenant should
be protected in keeping with the social justice precept enshrined in the
Constitution.
Also, the petition for prohibition was filed within the reglementary period to
appeal; hence, it cannot be claimed that the same was used as substitute for a
lost appeal.
With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction, it follows that Rivera
has availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the special civil action
of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief
against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there
is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such
relief can be obtained.
The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
While appeal is the recognized remedy to question the judgment of an inferior court,
this does not detract from the authority of a higher court to issue a writ of prohibition
to restrain the inferior court from proceeding further on the ground that it hear
and decided the case without jurisdiction.
It cannot be claimed that prohibition was used as a substitute for a lost appeal because
it was filed within the reglementary period to appeal.
SC stressed that they did not pass upon the propriety of the issuance of a writ of
prohibition. Such adjudication is best left to RTC.
o The issue determinative of jurisdiction is the real relationship between
the parties. Evidence must be presented before the question of
jurisdiction may be passed upon by the court.
o RTC was correct in denying the MTD (by way of Demurrer) because
Riveras evidence in support of his application for writ of prohibition
was sufficient to require the presentation of heirs presentation of
contravening proof.
o No grave abuse of discretion.
02. Longino v. General AUTHOR: Mendoza
[G.R. No. 147956. February 16, 2005 ] NOTES:
TOPIC: Prohibition
PONENTE: Callejo Sr
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The principal purpose for the writ of prohibition is to prevent an encroachment, excess,
usurpation or assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or quasi-judicial
tribunal.
For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground for prohibition, it must first be
demonstrated that the lower court or tribunal has exercised its power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and
gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court,
board or office has jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted
without authority. The writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.
However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
FACTS:
The PNR and Serrano executed Lease Contract over a portion its property in Bulacan.
Serrano won a civil case against the previous owner Estrella. Estrella failed to pay the
amount adjudged by the court in favor of Serrano. The Sheriff sold the house (subject
property of lease contract) owned by Estrella at public auction to Serrano as the winning
bidder.
Then, Serrano and her close friend, Esperanza S. Longino, a PNR retiree, executed an
Agreement in wherein she allowed her to occupy a portion of the property without
paying any rental therefor, on the latters promise to help her secure a lease contract
over a property.
Despite her agreement with Serrano, Longino filed an application with the PNR for a
lease of the property. Upon knowledge of the application, Serrano alleged that the
property applied for by Longino was part of the property on which the house she had
purchased at public auction from the Sheriff in the civil case against Estrella.
PNRs Real Estate Department recommended the denial of Longinos application. Then,
the PNRs Board of Directors made a resolution directing the PNR Management to
desist from selling or leasing its properties needed for the right-of-way of its North Rail
Project.
Despite the resolution, the General Manager of the PNR executed a contract of lease in
favor of Longino. Longino constructed a barber shop on said property and embarked to
construct her building on the property.
Serrano filed a handwritten Complaint against Longino, with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), demanding that the PNR lease the property to
her, and the eviction of Longino from the property on the ground that she had a
preferential right to lease the property. Serrano prayed that she be declared entitled to
lease the property and that her application for a lease contract over the property be
approved by the PNR.
The COSLAP opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint and issued summons on
the respondent. It also issued an Order directing the Real Estate Department of the PNR
to implement the Status Quo Order. Longinos motion to quash the case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction was also denied.
According to Longino, the complaint against her involved her lease contract with the
PNR over which the COSLAP had no jurisdiction. She maintained that only the regular
courts were vested with jurisdiction to resolve the issue of who, as between her and the
complainant, was entitled to lease the property.
COSLAP rendered a Resolution in favor of Serrano and against Longino, holding, inter
alia, that Serrano was the lawful possessor of the property and had a preferential right
to lease the same.
Longino received a copy of the Resolution and failed to appeal the same. Instead, she
sent a letter to the General Manager of the PNR, urging the latter to disregard the
resolution/recommendation of the COSLAP for being partially irregular. COSLAP
issued a Writ of Execution and Demolition.
Longino filed a petition for prohibition against the COSLAP and Serrano with the CA
for the nullification of the Resolution of the COSLAP and the Writ of Demolition issued
with a plea of injunctive relief.
Again, Longino alleged that in taking cognizance of Serranos complaint, the COSLAP
acted without jurisdiction; and, when it issued the said Resolutions, with grave abuse of
its discretion. She averred that the COSLAP had no jurisdiction to review the lease
contracts entered into between her and the PNR. She contended that she had the
preferential right to lease the property.
CA Ruling: Rendered judgment dismissing the petition. The appellate court held that
the COSLAP had jurisdiction over Serranos complaint because it merely determined
who had the preferential right over the property but did not review the lease contract
between the PNR and Longino. The CA also ruled that Serrano had the preferential right
over the disputed lot and that the Resolution of the COSLAP had already become final
and executory. Hence, the petition for prohibition was moot and academic.
Longino, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari for the
reversal of the decision of the CA
ISSUE(S): Whether the Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 was the proper remedy for
Longino.
HELD: Partially granted. Longinos petition for prohibition to enjoin the demolition of her
structures on the property is DENIED for being moot and academic.
RATIO:
In the present case, the petition for prohibition filed with the CA by the petitioner could
have been dismissed by the CA because the structures on the property had already been
demolished.
The writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. Hence, the acts sought
to be enjoined by the petitioner had already been effected by the respondent sheriff. For
another reason, the lease contract of the petitioner and the PNR had not been renewed
after its expiration. Manifestly, the petitioner was obliged to vacate the property and
remove her structures thereon.
Nevertheless, the CA took cognizance of the petition and resolved the same on its
merits, precisely because the issues raised therein, namely, whether the COSLAP had
jurisdiction over the complaint of the private respondent; and whether the COSLAP
exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the private respondent the legal possessor of the
property and of having priority in leasing the subject property raised in the petition, were
substantial.
SC agreed with the petitioner that the CA erred in ruling that the COSLAP had
jurisdiction on the complaint of the Serrano and that the latter was the legal possessor
and had preferential right to lease the property. Consequently, the Resolution of the
COSLAP as well as the writ issued by it are null and void.
The COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the complaint of the Serrano herein, who was the
complainant before the COSLAP. The rule is that jurisdiction over the nature and
 subject matter of the case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations of the
complaint.
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as
such, could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes.
That under paragraph 2(e) of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP is vested with jurisdiction over
complaints involving other similar land problems of grave urgency and is undisputable
should not be interpreted to apply to a dispute between two businesswomen claiming a
priority right to lease a property of the PNR, the petitioner claiming that the private
respondent is disqualified from leasing the property because she is indebted to the PNR
for back rentals, and the private respondent claiming that she has the preferential right
to lease the property merely because the house which she purchased from another was
near the subject property.
3. Holy Spirit Homeowners V. Defensor AUTHOR: REYES
TOPIC: Prohibition Notes:
PONENTE:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
- Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a
lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration
of justice in orderly channels.
- Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or
power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters
clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it
by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law
by which such relief can be obtained.
- Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR
issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course
to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
- Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.
Emergency Recit: Petitioners commenced an instant petition for Prohibition to prevent
respondent government instrumentality from enforcing the IRR of RA 9207 which would
affect their rights unfavorably. SC held that prohibition was not proper
FACTS:
- A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized
the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center
(NGC).
- On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826,
reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440
hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC.
- On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137,
excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation
No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale
to the bona fide residents therein.
- In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by
Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President
Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the
vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who
can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program.
- On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207.
- Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the West Side of the NGC.
- It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in
his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association.
- The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the "National
Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee
was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null
and void for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.
HELD: No, petition is dismissed.
RATIO:
- Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power
is the power to make rules and regulations, which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court.
- This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
- The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee
expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the
assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to
the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement.
- Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
- Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR
issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course
to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
- Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.
- A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from
further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entities or
persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
- Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative
or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to
keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels.
- Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction
or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
- Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court.
- In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to
perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be
enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
Substantive Portion
- According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be awarded to qualified
beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not in harmony with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates that the lot allocation to qualified
beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually used or occupied by bona fide residents
without limitation to area. The argument is utterly baseless.
- The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into two groups,
namely, the urban poor or the bona fide residents within the NGC site and certain
government institutions including the local government. Section 3, R.A. No. 9207
mandates the allocation of additional property within the NGC for disposition to its bona
fide residents and the manner by which this area may be distributed to qualified
beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A. No. 9207, on the other hand, governs the lot disposition
to government institutions. While it is true that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso
mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on the land area actually used or
occupied at the time of the laws effectivity, this proviso applies only to institutional
beneficiaries consisting of the local government, socioeconomic, charitable, educational
and religious institutions which do not have specific lot allocations, and not to the bona
fide residents of NGC.
- There is no proviso which even hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is likewise
entitled to the lot area actually occupied by him
04. Matuguina Integrated Wood Products AUTHOR: S A Y O In line with this, the Director of Forest Development issued an Order finding and
Inc. vs CA NOTES: Matuguina Integrated Wood declaring MLE to have encroached upon, and conducted illegal logging operations
TOPIC: Prohibition Products Inc. (MIWPI, for brevity) filed this within the licensed or concession area of DAVENCOR.
PONENTE: action for prohibition, Damages and MLE appealed the Order to the Ministry of Natural Resources. (Simultaneously,
Injunction, in order to prevent the respondent Milagros Matuguina disposed of her shares in petitioner MIWPI, thereby ceasing to be
Minister (now Secretary) of Natural a stockholder)
Resources from enforcing its Order of The Minister of Natural Resources, Hon. Ernesto M. Maceda rendered his Decision,
Execution against it, for liability arising from affirming the aforesaid order of the Director of Forest Development.
an alleged encroachment of the petitioner On February 11, 1987, MIWPI filed the instant complaint for prohibition, damages and
over the timber concession of respondent injunction, with prayer for restraining order with the RTC. MIWPI stated its primary
DAVENCOR located in Mati, Davao cause of action, the relevant portion of which reads, viz.:
Oriental. That plaintiff which has a distinct and separate personality of its own under the law,
and was never a party to the case between DAVENCOR and MLE, suddenly became
The Regional Trial Court, Branch a party to the case after the decision became final and executory.
17, Davao City, ruled in favor of the The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the next day, February 12, 1987,
petitioner, but on appeal, was reversed by the restraining and/or enjoining the private respondents and the Hon. Secretary of Natural
respondent Court of Appeals in its decision Resources from enforcing, implementing and/or carrying into effect, the decision of
dated February 25, 1991, which found the respondent Secretary dated October 1, 1986, as well as the order of execution dated
MIWPI, as an alter ego of Milagros January 6, 1987.
Matuguina and/or Matuguina Logging Private respondents filed MTD on the ground that the trial court has no JD but was
enterprises (MLE, to be liable to
denied hence pvt respondents filed their answer.
DAVENCOR for illegal encroachment.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Prohibition is a remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations,
RTC: issued writ of preliminary injunction + Decision in favor of the petitioner,
boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have
disposing of the action.
not been vested by law, and the issue of whether a party is an alter ego of another person is
one of fact which should be threshed out in the administrative proceedings and not in the
Private respondents appealed the trial courts decision.
prohibition proceedings in the trial court.
FACTS: CA rendered its Decision, reversing the lower courts pronouncement.
Petitioner Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. (MIWPI), was incorporated, In due time, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. (Denied)
having an authorized capital stock of 10M. Not content with the courts pronouncement, petitioner is now before us on a Petition
Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder of MIWPI on BoD approved by for Review on Certiorari, alleging that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of
Resolution the transfer of 1,000,000 shares from Henry Wee to Milagros Matuguina, discretion in rendering the questioned decision and its companion resolution, denying
thus giving her 70% stock ownership of MIWPI. the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE(S): WON Prohibition cured the defects of the issuance writ of execution- NO
In an undated letter to the Director of Forest Development (BFD) on November 26,
1974, Milagros Matuguina requested the Director for a change of name and transfer of
management of Provisional Timber License (PTL) No. 30, from a single proprietorship RATIO:
under her name, to that of MIWPI. (endorsed by BFD director, approved by the We do not agree. Essentially, Prohibition is a remedy to prevent inferior courts,
Secretary of Natural Resources) corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with
Milagros Matuguina and petitioner MIWPI executed a Deed of Transfer transferring which they have not been vested by law As we held in Mafinco Trading Corporation vs.
all of the formers rights, interests, ownership and participation in PTL No. 30 to the Ople, et al, in a certiorari or prohibition case, only issues affecting the jurisdiction of
latter for and in consideration of 148,000 shares of stocks in MIWPI. (deed was sent to the tribunal, board and offices involved may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts.
director of Forest Development) The issue of whether or not petitioner is an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is
Pending approval of the request to transfer the PTL to MIWPI, DAVENCOR, through one of fact, and which should have been threshed out in the administrative proceedings,
its Assistant General Manager, complained to the District Forester at Mati, Davao and not in the prohibition proceedings in the trial court, where it is precisely the failure
Oriental that Milagros Matuguina/MLE had encroached into and was conducting of the respondent Minister of Natural Resources to proceed as mandated by law in the
logging operations in DAVENCORs timber concession. execution of its order which is under scrutiny.
After investigation of DAVENCORs complaint, the Investigating Committee which
looked into DAVENCORs complaint submitted its report to the Director, finding that
MLE had encroached on the concession area of DAVENCOR.
5. TAN v. COMELEC [G.R. 73155; July AUTHOR: Ramos
11, 1986] NOTES: sorry ang haba :( see ER for the
TOPIC: Prohibition PONENTE: core facts and ruling
Alampay, J.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
BP 885 created a new province (Negros del Norte) on December 1985, carving out
territories from the existing Negros Occidental province.
Petitioners sought to have the plebiscite enjoined via prohibition since it lacked the LGC
requirement of land area as well as contravened the Constitutional requirement that
plebiscites should be participated by all units affected
Since the SC was on recess for the holidays, it failed to rule on the petition
Plebiscite (involving only inhabitants of Negros del Norte excluded the inhabitants
left in the remaining areas of Neg Occ) was held on Jan 3, 1986
Respondents argued that the fact that the plebiscite was held, the new province was
proclaimed, and its officials were appointed made the case moot and academic (FAIT
ACCOMPLI petitioners had no choice but to accept)
SC didnt just strike down the plebiscite, it struck down BP 885 for not meeting the
LGC criteria on land area and for contravening the constitution re: plebiscite
o Despite the law saying it had 4000 sq km of territory, the data from the
provincial treasurers certification and special report conclude that it only had
2765 sq km (short of the LGCs requirement of at least 3500 sq km for
provinces)
o The constitution requires a plebiscite involving all units affected by the
creation, abolition, or changing of boundaries of an LGU, which cannot be
trumped by a provision in the law stating that only inhabitants of the new LGU
would be involved in the plebiscite
o SC overturned a prior ruling that allowed only the inhabitants of a new LGU
to be part of the plebiscite (the parent LGU and the people left behind are also
affected by the creation of a new LGU boundaries are changed, constituent
LGUs are removed, territorial sources of revenue are also removed)
Fait Accompli was not favored here, since it was apparent that respondents were in a
hurry to avoid the injunction and to have the province legitimized, so that Marcos would
have a political machinery in time for the Feb 1986 elections (COMELEC had 120 days
from the enactment on Dec 3 why rush to Jan 3?)
FACTS:
BP 885 - An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the
Province of Negros del Norte (effective Dec 3, 1985)
1. SEC 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of
Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and
Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are
hereby separated from the province to be known as the Province of Negros
del Norte.
2. SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be xxx comprising a
territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.
3. SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which
are the areas affected within a period of 120 days from the approval of this
Act. After the ratification xxx by a majority of the votes cast xxx, the President
xxx shall appoint the first officials of the province.
4. SEC. 5. COMELEC shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite herein
provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds.
Dec 23, 1985: Petitioners (Negros Occidental residents) filed a case for Prohibition to
stop COMELEC from holding a plebiscite scheduled for Jan 3, 1986
1. BP 885 is unconstitutional and does not comply with the LGC
2. 1973 Consti Art XI, Sec. 3: No province, city, municipality or barrio may be
created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC, and subject
to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected.
3. LGC Sec 197: A province may be created if it has a territory of at least 3500
sq km xxx
Jan 3, 1986: Plebiscite was held as scheduled because the Court was in recess for the
holidays and was unable to consider the petition.
Jan 4, 1986: Petitioners filed a supplemental pleading, averring that though the
plebiscite sought to be restrained was held, there are still serious issues raised
affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which should
properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court
1. plebiscite was confined only to Negros del Norte inhabitants (excluded
voters from the rest of Negros Occidental)
2. petitioners changed the prayer of their petition "to the end that the
constitutional issues raised will be ventilated and given final resolution.
3. Petitioners plead
that a writ of Prohibition to desist from issuing official
proclamation of the results of the plebiscite be issued to
COMELEC
that a writ of Prohibition to desist from ordering the release of
any local funds to answer for expenses incurred in the holding of
such plebiscite be issued to the Provincial Treasurer until ordered
by the Court
that a writ of mandamus to schedule the holding of another
plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire Negros
Occidental province as now existing shall participate be issued to
COMELEC
for a pronouncement that the plebiscite held has no legal effect,
being a patent legal nullity
that COMELEC hold in abeyance the issuance of any official
proclamation of the results of the aforestated plebiscite
Jan 14, 1986: public respondents (via OSG) filed their Comment, arguing that BP 885
should be accorded the presumption of legality
1. law is not void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear,
categorical and undeniable infringement of the Constitution
2. the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to enact the law is beyond question
3. BP 885 does not infringe the Constitution
remaining cities and municipalities of the Negros Occidental
province NOT included in the area of the new Negros del Norte
province, do NOT fall within the meaning and scope of the term
"unit or units affected" in Sec 3, Art. XI of the Constitution
Paredes v. Executive Secretary: there is ambiguity in the expression
'unit or units affected. It is plausible to assert that when certain
Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new
one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much more persuasive,
 however, to construe that voters, who are NOT from the barangays
to be separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite.
Construe in favor of avoiding a finding of
unconstitutionality over one that results in
unconstitutionality
When there are indications that the inhabitants of several
barangays are inclined to separate from a parent
municipality they should be allowed to do so. Ascertain
their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they,
and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New
responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be
imposed. They should be left alone then to decide for
themselves.
To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true
expression of their will they may even frustrate it
Constitution promotes local autonomy, the preference
being for smaller units.
4. LGCs requisites have been complied with
Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the new
province of Negros del Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 sq km
(lesser than the minimum area of 3,500 sq km prescribed by the
LGC)
Section 2 of BP 885 declares that the territorial boundaries of
Negros del Norte comprise an area of 4,019.95 sq km
5. Case has become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new
Province of Negros del Norte
plebiscite already conducted on Jan 3, 1986; as a result thereof,
out of 195,134 total votes cast, 164,734 were in favor of the creation
Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new province;
thereafter, appointments of officials were announced
creation of the new province is now a "fait accompli." (no choice
but to accept)
Minor ruling re: Writ of Prohibition for Provincial Treasurer
1. Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental has not disbursed, nor was required
to disburse any public funds in connection with the plebiscite
2. SC: Petitioners prayer to issue a writ of prohibition vs. the Provincial
Treasurer falls here
ISSUES:
1. WON the case is moot and academic [NO gave an exception on the rule on fait
accompli]
2. WON the new province meets the LGCs criteria for land area [NO]
3. WON the Constitution contemplates the inclusion in the plebiscite of voters in the
remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental [YES]
HELD: BP 885 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Proclamation of the new province of Negros
del Norte and the appointment of its officials are NULL and VOID.
Case is NOT moot and academic
Plebiscite has been held, a new province has been proclaimed, and its officials have
been appointed; but the legality and constitutionality of the plebiscite itself is
challenged
1. If illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not
provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong.
2. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait
accompli then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing
situation is an UNACCEPTABLE suggestion
3. Failing the duty of interpreting what the law is and should be might tempt
those with ulterior motives to bring about a fait accompli.
Considering the circumstances attendant to the unusually rapid creation of the instant
province after a swiftly scheduled plebiscite, the Court will not look with favor upon
those who may be inclined to ram through all sorts of legislative measures and then
implement the same with indecent haste, in violation of our Constitution and laws.
1. Court still has the duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong brought
before it
New province does NOT meet the LGC criteria for land area
In Parliamentary Bill 3644 (precursor of BP 885), the area was 285,656 ha more or less,
which was changed to 4,019.95 sq km when it was enacted
Considering the data from the Provincial Treasurers certification and the Special Report
on land area, there is only 2,765.4 sq km of area
Respondent: law says that it has 4019.95 sq km area. Also, consider not just the land,
but also the territory from the sea and air
SC: NO MERIT.
1. The data speaks for itself that the new province only has an area of 2765.4
sq km, whatever the law may say
2. LGC Sec 197: "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands."
The use of territory here reflects that it refers only to the mass of
land area and excludes the waters of the political unit
no need for legislators to use contiguous if they had intended that
the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial
waters
Art XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution contemplates the inclusion in the plebiscite of voters
in the remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental
BASICALLY: the creation of a new political unit will affect not only the denizens of the
new unit, but also the people left behind in the remaining areas of the parent unit
from which the new unit was carved from. The parent unit is affected by the substantial
alterations made to its boundaries.
1. deprivation of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as
well as the municipality of Victorias
2. area of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 ha and it will
lose 7 of the 15 sugar mills which contribute to the economy
3. existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental will
be partitioned and dismembered
4. division, separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3, Art XI of the Constitution
anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary
Consti Art. XI, Sec 3 makes it imperative that "the approval of a majority of votes in the
plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must be obtained first whenever a province is
created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries
1. boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would
necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries
in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte
2. 2 political units would be affected (parent province of Negros Occidental
for altered boundaries and the proposed province of Negros del Norte)
 3. Intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the statute to carry out
what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local
government units CANNOT justify exclusion of the parent province in the
plebiscite
4. point raised by the petitioners does not assail the wisdom and motive of
enacting the law but its infringement of the Constitution
In ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the
intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari
materia.
1. PB 3644 only stated that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas
affected; but in BP 885, this was changed to shall be conducted in the
proposed new province which are the areas affected
It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite to cities
and towns of the new province that is assailed as unconstitutional
Petitioners: Consti Sec. 3, ART XI, contemplates a
plebiscite that would be held in the unit or units affected
by the creation of the new province as a result of the
consequent division of and substantial alteration of the
boundaries of the existing province
this draft legislation speaks of "areas," what was contemplated
evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite.
Those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living
in the area of the proposed new province and those in the parent
province.
2. No legal basis for the unexplained change made when PB 3644 was enacted
into BP 885, such that the plebiscite was limited to only the new area
3. The units affected referred in the fundamental law CANNOT be diminished
or restricted by the Batasang Pambansas legislative fiat to cities and
municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the reality that
other people are affected
On the Paredes v. Executive Secretary case [OVERTURNED here]: ruling there was
based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise its discretion on the matter.
It did NOT resolve the question of how to interpret the pertinent provision of the
Constitution
1. should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is
acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert that when certain
Barangays are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the
voters therein are affected."
2. Dissent of Justice Abad Santos (applicable here): when the Constitution
speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or
an of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger
3. ruling in the previous cases sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging
to an existing political unit from which the new political unit will be derived,
from participating in the plebiscite conducted for determining the formation
of another new political unit, is hereby ABANDONED
Here, the Court re-examined the views formerly held in said
cases. The reasons invoked by respondents were formerly
acceptable because of the view that local autonomy would be better
promoted. However, even this consideration is NO longer
persuasive
4. Subject matter under consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant
multifarious complicated problems
Paredes case: barangay is the smallest political unit, with few and
lesser problems involved
Here: province is the largest political unit. This involves the
removal of approximately 2,768.4 sq km from the land area of an
existing province the effects of the division of the parent province
will affect all the people living in the separated areas.
Jan 3, 1986 plebiscite is NULL and VOID for being violative of Sec. 3, Art XI of the
Constitution
BP 885 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL and also NOT in accordance with the LGC
criteria
1. Hence, there is NO legal basis to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite
2. Appointment of officials is also invalid
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
SPEC CIV: argument of fait accompli was NOT favored by the court as it was for the
purpose of beating an injunction or restraining order (fait accompli would have led
to the declaration that since the plebiscite was already held and the officials appointed,
nothing else could be done and Marcos would have had an additional political
machinery in time for the Feb 1986 elections). See Concurring Opinion.
LOC GOV: Plebiscite in the units or units affected includes not just the inhabitants of
the new territory, but also those from the area left behind from the parent territory
CONCURRING OPINION: Teehankee, C.J.
I congratulate my brethren for the unanimous decision striking down an Act approved
in "deep secrecy and inordinate haste" apparently on the last day of session of the
Batasang Pambansa on December 3, 1985 and signed on the same day by the then
President of the authoritarian regime
The discredited COMELEC of the time played its customary subservient role by setting
the plebiscite with equal "indecent haste" for Jan 3, 1986, notwithstanding that the Act
itself provided for an ample period of 120 days from its approval
transparent purpose of having the creation of the new province deemed a fait accompli
by the time of the elections (Feb 1986) is unmistakably so that the new Governor and
officials shall by then be installed in office, ready to help with the elections (political
machinery would deliver the 'solid North' to Marcos)
The argument of fait accompli viz. that the railroaded plebiscite of Jan 3, 1986 was held
and can no longer be enjoined and that the new province of Negros del Norte has been
constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of the challenged Act.
o SC does NOT look with favor upon parties 'racing to beat an injunction
or restraining order' which they have reason to believe might be
forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing and pendency of the
appropriate petition therefor.
o Where the restraining order or preliminary injunction are found to have
been properly issued, mandatory writs shall be issued by the Court to restore
matters to the status quo ante.
o Where there was a FAILURE to properly issue the restraining order
stopping the holding of the illegal plebiscite, the Court will issue the
mandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the status quo ante and
restore the territorial integrity of Negros Occidental by declaring the
unconstitutionality of the challenged Act and nullifying the invalid
proclamation of the proposed new province and the equally invalid
appointment of its officials.

06 Diaz vs. Sec. of Finance AUTHOR: SOLIS
[G.R. No. 193007 | July 19, 2011] NOTES:
TOPIC: Prohibition Renato V. DIAZ sponsored the approval of
PONENTE: Abad, J. R.A. 7716 (the 1994 EVAT Law) and R.A.
8424 (the 1997 NIRC) at the House of
Representatives
Aurora Ma. F. Timbol served as Assistant
Secretary of Department of Trade and
Industry and consultant of the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) in the pas6t
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: But there are precedents for treating a petition for declaratory
relief as one for prohibition if the case has far-reaching implications and raises questions that
need to be resolved for the public good. The Court has also held that a petition for prohibition
is a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation
of legislative authority.
Emergency Recit
Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief seeking validity of the impending imposition
of the VAT on the collections of tollway operators. SC issued TRO, enjoining the
implantation of the VAT but later on issued a resolution treating the petition as one for
prohibition. The petitioners questions WON the Court may treat the petition for declaratory
relief as one for prohibition.
FACTS:
Petitioners Diaz and Timbol filed a petition for declaratory relief seeking validity of
the impending imposition of Value-Added Tax (VAT) by the BIR on the collections of
tollway operators. Petitioners claim that, since the VAT would result in increased toll
fees, they have an interest as regular users of tollways in stopping the BIR action.
Petitioners allege the following:
(1) that the Congress did not, when it acted NIRC, intend to include toll fees within the
meaning of sale of services that are subject to VAT;
(2)that a toll fee is a users tax, not a sale of services;
(3) that to impose VAT on toll fees would amount to a tax on public service; and
(4) that, since VAT was never factored into the formula for computing toll fees, its
imposition would violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.
SC issued a TRO, enjoining the implementation of the VAT. Later, the Court issued
another resolution treating the petition as one for prohibition.
OSG avers and argues:
(1) that the NIRC imposes VAT on all kinds of services of franchise grantees, including
tollway operations, except where the law provides otherwise;
(2) that the Court should seek the meaning and intent of the law from the words used
in the statute;
(3) that the imposition of VAT on tollway operations has been the subject as early as
2003 of several BIR rulings and circulars;
(4) that petitioners have no right to invoke the non-impairment of contracts clause since
they clearly have no personal interest in existing toll operating agreements (TOAs)
between the government and tollway operators;
(5) that the non-inclusion of VAT in the parametric formula for computing toll rates
cannot exempt tollway operators from VAT
ISSUE(S): (NOTE: focused on procedural issues)
(1) WON the Court may treat the petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition.
(2) WON petitioners have legal standing to file the action.
HELD: The exception to the general rule applies.
Although the petition does not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 65, the Court
has ample power to waive such technical requirements when the legal questions to be
resolved are of great importance to the public. The same may be said of the requirement of
locus standi which is a mere procedural requisite.
RATIO:
On August 24, 2010 the Court issued a resolution, treating the petition as one for
prohibition rather than one for declaratory relief, the characterization that petitioners
Diaz and Timbol gave their action. The government has sought reconsideration of the
Courts resolution, however, arguing that petitioners allegations clearly made out a case
for declaratory relief, an action over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. The
government adds, moreover, that the petition does not meet the requirements of Rule 65
for actions for prohibition since the BIR did not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions when it sought to impose VAT on toll fees. Besides, petitioners
Diaz and Timbol has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
against the BIR action in the form of an appeal to the Secretary of Finance.
But there are precedents for treating a petition for declaratory relief as one for
prohibition if the case has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need
to be resolved for the public good. The Court has also held that a petition for
prohibition is a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that
amount to usurpation of legislative authority.
Here, the imposition of VAT on toll fees has far-reaching implications. Its
imposition would impact, not only on the more than half a million motorists who
use the tollways everyday, but more so on the governments effort to raise revenue
for funding various projects and for reducing budgetary deficits.
To dismiss the petition and resolve the issues later, after the challenged VAT has been
imposed, could cause more mischief both to the tax-paying public and the government.
A belated declaration of nullity of the BIR action would make any attempt to refund to
the motorists what they paid an administrative nightmare with no solution.
Consequently, it is not only the right, but the duty of the Court to take cognizance of
and resolve the issues that the petition raises.
Although the petition does not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 65, the
Court has ample power to waive such technical requirements when the legal questions
to be resolved are of great importance to the public. The same may be said of the
requirement of locus standi which is a mere procedural requisite.