SANLAKAS Vs.

Executive Secretary Case Digest

SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary

421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085

February 3, 2004

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers
and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of
known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati.
Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their
withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a
violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of
Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in
the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and
General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of
the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending
that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a
state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such
proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law.
Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an
exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to
the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive
Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power
of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel
v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens
the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the
crime of rebellion.

Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit
declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief
Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that
the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have,
by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without
factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there
was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation
of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.
These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18,
Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any
person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless
arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas
and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners
Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to
challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is
the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO
Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 PM
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War
and Delegate Emergency Power]

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the

Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
[calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article
7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever
it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress.
. .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to
give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of
calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b
the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions,
thus:

First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII
do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the

decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration
allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and
deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a
state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17,
Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-
owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017
calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot
be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in
preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically
states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declarea state
of national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section
18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional
issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon
it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency
powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is
just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon
Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not
the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo
in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her
during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he
determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President
has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP

and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and
made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO
Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No.
146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were
begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11
senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to
be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He
added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the
seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his
post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for
judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:

EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and
freedom of assemblyto
petition the government for
exercise of the people power redress of grievances which
of revolution which overthrew only affected the office of the
the whole government. President.
extra constitutional and the intra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new resignation of the sitting
government that resulted President that it caused and
from it cannot be the subject the succession of the Vice
of judicial review President as President are
subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling
on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of

relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned
constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his
final statement:

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due
to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency
as soon as the disability disappears);

3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve

them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);

4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may
come in the same service of the country;

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive

national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission

before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr.

As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as

Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is
the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress
has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada
can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by
this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present
enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the
judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the
cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that
the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
Romualdez vs Sandiganbayan

Romualdez vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152259
July 29, 2004

Facts:

The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG) filed an information before the anti-graft court on July 12,
1989 charging Romualdez with violation of Sec. 5, Republic Act No. 3019 as
amended.

The information states that on or about and during the period from July 16 to
July 29, 1975, Romualdez, brother-in-law of President Marcos, former president
of the Philippines, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with evident of
bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interest and/or that of others,
intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation
and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private
corporation, the majority of stocks of which is owned by former Pres. Marcos,
whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership
and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including structures,
buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable
assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops
including some equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the
amount of P 5, 000, 000.00.

Romualdez argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly

served as a high-ranking naval officer ----- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp of
former President Marcos. He relies on Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended, which states that:
The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by other pursuant to his
specific orders during his tenure.
Issue:

Whether or not pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973 Constitution,
Romualdez is immune from criminal prosecution.

Ruling:

No. As aptly pointed out by Sandiganbayan, the provision in Sec. 17, Art Vii of
1973 Constitution is not applicable to Romualdez because the immunity
amendment became effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime happened in
1975.

In Estrada vs Desierto, the SC explained that executive immunity applied only

during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting
President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office.
Romualdezs reasoning fails since he derives his immunity from one who is no
longer sitting as president. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their
close relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.
RODRIGUEZ VS ARROYO

#7 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF
HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ
GR NO. 191805
NOVEMBER 15, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan
(Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he
refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a
Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents
and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al.
The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as
she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

Issue:
Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of
presidential immunity from suit

Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and

habeas data cases.

Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held

responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former

President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction.

Held:
No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil
or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as
far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance
or extrajudicial killing.

As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not
enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that
courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity,
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a
right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the
intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure and not his term. (The term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the
term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter
than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.)

Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from
judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context
of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez.

Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the

"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of
the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity,
the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for
human rights abuses. This development in the use of command responsibility in
civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally
extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command
responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of
the writ of amparo.

Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used
to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to
address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise
remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from
applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to
ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases

in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to
effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such
application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely
pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights
of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable
superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of
course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government
agency.

Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative

liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to
ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
Yes.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the
following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as
superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.84

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily

possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the
purview of the command responsibility doctrine.

No. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of
the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805
already had knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a
climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the
NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports,
Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the
perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing
enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not
automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every
count of forcible disappearance. Aside from Rodriguezs general averments, there
is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for
his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should
have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she
had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.
General v. Urro, et al.
G.R. No. 191560 : March 29, 2011.

HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, COMMISSIONER NATIONAL POLICE

COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, ET AL., Respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

When Roces, a former NAPOLCOM Commissioner, died in September 2007,

PGMA appointed the petitioner on July 21, 2008 as acting NAPOLCOM
Commissioner in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U.
Escueta (Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as
NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.

Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro(Urro) in place of the petitioner,

Constancia P.de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escuetaas permanent
NAPOLCOM Commissioners. In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head
Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate
congratulatory letters to the respondents, for being appointed as NAPOLCOM
Commissioners. The petitioner then filed the present quo warranto petition
questioning the validity of the respondents appointments mainly on the ground
that it violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. On
July 30, 2010, Pres. Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2)
"Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous
Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments."

The petitioner argues that the appointment issued to him was really a "regular"
appointment, and as such, he cannot be removed from office except for cause.
Since the appointment paper of respondent Urro, while bearing a date prior to
the effectivity of the constitutional ban on appointments,was officially released
(perthe congratulatory letter dated March 19, 2010 issued to Urro) when the
appointment ban was already in effect, then the petitioners appointment, though
temporary in nature, should remain effective as no new and valid appointment
was effectively made. The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of
respondents De Guzman and Escueta on the same grounds.
Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents
appointments in light of E.O. No. 2.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial review

HELD:

The petition lacks merit.

POLITICAL LAW: Judicial power; kinds of appointments.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and
substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3)recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. Lis mota literally means "the
cause of the suit or action. In the present case, the constitutionality of the
respondents appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted
pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a
cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition: a quo warranto
against respondent Urro.

The Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the
suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. Since the
petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he
clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The
essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent
revocability at any time by the appointing authority.

Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to
make temporary (acting) appointments,unless he is otherwise specifically
prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is
repugnant to the nature of the office involved. Here, nothing in the enumeration
of functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or
defeated by the President's appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner
pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee. Viewed as an
institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive issuances will show that the
NAPOLCOM has always remained as an office under or within the Executive
Department.Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the petitioners acting
appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the NAPOLCOM
Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.

Estoppel also clearly militates against the petitioner. From the time he was
appointed until apprised of the appointment of Urro, the petitioner discharged
the functions of his office without expressing any misgivings on his appointment.
He cannot later on be heard to say that the appointment was really a permanent
one so that he could not be removed except for cause.