Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands

FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of the General
Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457
authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which
he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance.
It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability
to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?

HELD:

1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.

2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by
law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
Government is not liable.
ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCIONSADAYA vs.

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU

40 scra 464

FACTS: Petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot alleging that in 1927 the National
Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the
widening of a national road, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal.
There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants
Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are immune from suit.

HOLDING: NO. Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the
property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should
be regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the
court except with the consent of said Government. In as much as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or
officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit
against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.

NOTE: When the government takes any property for public use, which is condition upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. The Court may
proceed with the complaint and determine the compensation to which the petitioner are entitle.
Republic v. Purisima
Facts:
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit
in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the
plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction
of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national
government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of
the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for
certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:
WON the respondents decision is valid

Ruling:
No.

Rationale:
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present
Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent." "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this
jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law
which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law
on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering
the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is
not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby
cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy
of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could
thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-
suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it
could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors,
minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government
is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a
fundamental postulate of constitutional law."
GSIS vs GROUP MANAGEMENT CORP. et. al. (JUNE 8, 2011)

FACTS: This case revolves around the petitions of the Lapu-Lapu Development & Housing Corporation (LLDHC),
Group Management Corporation (GMC) and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The three entities
consistently filed cases for the same subject lots from April 30, 1980, until this case. The cases were filed before both the
RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, where the subject lots are situated in, and the RTC of Manila.

LLDHC entered into a Project and Loan Agreement with GSIS on February 4, 1974, involving seventy-eight lots
situated in Barrio, Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City. GSIS agreed to a 25 million peso loan with LLDHC, the owner of the
lots. LLDHC failed to fulfill all of its obligations regarding the lots, which included the real estate mortgage in favor of
GSIS, and so, GSIS closed the mortgage. Being the only bidder in the public auction sale, GSIS won over the subject
lots, and in time secured its ownership over the lots with the transfer certificate of titles issued to its name. GMC offered
to purchase on installment the subject lots with a collective area specified as 423,177 square meters from GSIS, with the
amount of 1,100,000 pesos. GSIS accepted the offer through a Deed of Conditional Sale on February 26, 1980. GMC
then learned that the subject lots was only 298,504 square meters and requested GSIS to reduce the price according to
the actual proportion of the land. This proposal was approved with an Amendment to the Deed of Conditional Sale,
which reflected the agreement of GSIS and GMC. LLDHC filed a complaint against GSIS before the RTC of Manila on
April 23, 1980 for Foreclosure with Writ of Mandatory Injunction, known as Civil Case No. R-82-3429. GMC filed a
complaint also against GSIS on November 3, 1989, known as Civil Case No. 2203-L, for Specific Performance with
Damages before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. GSIS, in its defense, submitted a COA Memorandum dated April 3, 1989
disallowing in audit the sale of the subject to the court, stating that there were apparent inherent irregularities, and that
GMC bought the property at a value much lower than GSIS purchasing price.

On February 24, 1992, with regard to Civil Case No. 2203-L, the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City decided in favor of GMC, and
that GSIS was to execute order of the court pertaining to damages, and actions needed to finalize the deed of absolute
sale with GMC. On May 10, 1994, the RTC of Manila also rendered its judgment that, aside from court orders, all claims
and counterclaims by the parties against each other are dismissed in Civil Case No. R-82-3429. LLDHC now used the
Manila RTC decision as a means to file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision in Civil
Case No. 2203-L, named CA-GR SP No. 34696, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. After this was a series of
filing petitions to appeal the judgment. Throughout the years, eventually, the three parties approached the Supreme
Court, where, in G.R. No. 167000, GSIS seeks to reverse and set aside the decision made on November 25, 2004 and
January 20, 2005, and to annul and set aside the March 1, 2004 and May 7 2004 orders from the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil
Case No. 2203-L. And in G.R. No. 169971, GMC seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision made in September 23,
2005 and to annul and set aside the March 11, 2004 Lapu-Lapu RTC decision.

Issues: Whether or not the decisions of the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 shall be executory, despite the
decision of Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L. Whether or not the decision in CA GR SP No. 84382 and GSIS
Petition in 167000 are barred by Res Judicata. Whether or not due process was given to the parties/entities involved in
the case. Whether or not GSIS can be immune to acting out the orders of the court.

Ruling: The petition in G.R. No. 167000 was denied by the court, and the petition in G.R. No. 169971 is granted.

Ratio Decidendi: The decision of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L does not in any way affect the orders
from the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. R-82-3429, since the former has been finalized on January 28, 1995, while the
latter became final on May 30, 1997. Procedural due process was extended to all parties, that there was no immediate
dismissal of their cases before they were heard by the respective courts, even if they have already had a rendered
decision. However, the Supreme Court also recognized the doctrine of Finality of Judgment, where the decisions,
once final and executed cannot be appealed, unless of circumstances that happen after the finalization, void judgments,
correction of clerical errors and nunc pro tunc entries. The decision in CA GR SP No. 84382 and GSIS Petition in
167000 are barred by Res Judicata, which is one of the reasons why G.R. No. 167000 was denied. GSIS acted jure
gestonis, entering into a contract, and being solely liable for their irresponsibility. They are not immune from acting out
the orders of the court.
Municipality of Makati vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondent Admiral Finance
Creditors Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and
ordered petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private
respondent. It then issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the
petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the
PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public
funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence,
petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC.

Issue:

1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution?
2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?

Held:

1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are
necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the
municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from
execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public
funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under execution may be validly
effected on the public funds of petitioner.

2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality
fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant
may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor.

For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable
failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the
property since the same has been the site of Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will
not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact
initiated. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs. DUMDUM, JR.G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010, Peralta,J:

FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Lim Chao against the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan for collection of sum of money and
damages. The complaint alleged that a contract was entered into by Lim Chao and the Municipality for the delivery of
motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality. Lim
Chao then delivered to the Municipality of Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles amounting to P5,820,000.00. However, despite
having made several deliveries, the Municipality allegedly did not heed Lim Chaos claim for payment. Thus, she filed a
complaint for full payment of the said amount, with interest and damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the Municipality. The trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing the
sheriff "to attach the estate, real and personal properties" of the Municipality. The Municipality filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the claim on which the action had been brought was unenforceable under the statute of
frauds, pointing out that there was no written contract or document that would evince the supposed agreement they
entered into with respondent. It also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment
already issued, invoking, among others, immunity of the state from suit. The Municipality argued that as a municipal
corporation, it is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment. Lim
Chao on her part, counters that, the Municipalitys claim of immunityfrom suit is negated by the Local Government
Code, which vests municipal corporationswith the power to sue and be sued.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts order.

ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipalityof Hagonoy is valid.

HELD:
No. The universal rule is that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit claimants action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that
the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects.
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet
unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment
be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They alleged that they have a clear
and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust
for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforests?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court
ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony of
nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources
to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.
G.R. No. L-14639 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and
without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that
such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed
necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this
is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of
discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his
action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who
compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled
to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should not be a
cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to
compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their
liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without
even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban et al must be severely punished.
CASE DIGEST: PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT MANGGAGAWA
SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), etc. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, etc.

CONSOLIDATED WITH G.R. No. 147811

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain presidential decrees and executive orders of
the martial law era and under the incumbency of Pres. Estrada relating to the raising and use of coco-levy funds,
particularly: Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313.

On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that established a Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the
development of the coconut industry through capital financing. Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer the
Fund through the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) whose objective was, among others, to advance the coconut
farmers interests.For this purpose, the law imposed a levy ofP0.55on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of every
100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock.

In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of the
coconut farmersto enable such bank to promptly and efficiently realize the industry's credit policy.Thus, the PCA bought
72.2% of the shares of stock of First United Bank, headed by Pedro Cojuangco.Dueto changes in its corporate identity
and purpose, the banks articles of incorporation were amended in July 1975, resulting in a change in the banks name
from First United Bank United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).

In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312, establishing a Sagip Niyugan
Program which sought to provide immediate income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a
sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products.The Executive Order sought to establish
aP1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy funds or assets of entities supported by those funds.A
committee was created to manage the fund under this program.A majority vote of its members could engage the services
of a reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits.

At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which created an irrevocable trust fund known as the
Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund).This aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut
industry, and to other agri-related programs.The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Funds initial
capital.These shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock
of SMC.E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust Funds trustee bank.The Trust Fund
Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund. The Committee would designate
an external auditor to do an annual audit or as often as needed but it may also request the Commission on Audit (COA)
to intervene.

To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission on Good Government, the Office of the
Solicitor General, and other government agencies to exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033, entitled
Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,which was then pending before the Sandiganbayan and to
lift the sequestration over those shares.

On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the suspension of E.O.s 312 and
313. This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R.
147036-37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional.On April 24, 2001
the other sets of petitioner organizations and individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D. 755 and
Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also for being unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Are the coco-levy funds public funds?

Are (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313
unconstitutional?
Have petitioners legal standing to bring the same to court?

HELD: Coco-levy funds are public funds. The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law
to support a proper governmental purpose.They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for
the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. The COA reviewed the use of the funds.The BIR treated
them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character.

The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public
purpose.Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty for the support of the government and for all itspublic needs. Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed
pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276.The funds were collected and managed by the PCA,an independent
government corporation directly under the President.And, as the respondent public officials pointed out, thepertinent
laws used the termlevy, which meansto tax, in describing the exaction.

R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the governments general funds butto provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut industry, which is so affected with public interest as
to be within the police power of the State. The funds sought to support the coconut industry,one of the main economic
backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits for the coconut farmers and farm workers.

Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. Its character as such fund was made clear by the fact that they
were deposited in the PNB (then a wholly owned government bank) and not in the Philippine Treasury.

***

The Court has already passed upon this question in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v.
Republic of the Philippines. It held as unconstitutional Section 2 of P.D. 755 for effectively authorizing the PCA to
utilize portions of theCCS Fundto pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit
portions of the CCS Fund levies with UCPB interest free. And as there also provided, the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like
levies that PCA is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be transferred to the
general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be deemed private funds.

In any event, such declaration is void.There is ownership when a thing pertaining to a person is completely subjected to
his will in everything that is not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. An owner is free to
exercise all attributes ofownership: the right, among others, to possess, use and enjoy, abuse or consume, and dispose or
alienate the thing owned. The owner is free to waive all or some of these rights in favor of others.But in the case of the
coconut farmers, they could not, individually or collectively, waive what have not been and could not be legally imparted
to them.

Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III,Section 5of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact
that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation.And since taxes could be exacted only for a public purpose,
they cannot be declared private properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.

These assailed provisions,which removed the coco-levy funds from the general funds of the government and declared
them private properties of coconut farmers,do not appear to have a color of social justice for their purpose.The levy on
copra that farmers produce appears, in the first place, to be a business tax judging by its tax base.The concept of
farmers-businessmen is incompatible with the idea that coconut farmers are victims of social injustice and so should be
beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their earnings.

On another point, in stating that the coco-levy fund shall not be construed or interpreted, under any law or regulation, as
special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government,P.D.s 961 and 1468 seek to
remove such fund from COA scrutiny.
This is also the fault of President Estradas E.O. 312 which deals with P1 billion to be generated out of the sale of coco-
fund acquired assets.E.O. 313 has a substantially identical provision governing the management and disposition of the
Coconut Trust Fund capitalized with the substantial SMC shares of stock that the coco-fund acquired.

But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of P.D.s755,961 and 1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312 and 313 that
remove such funds and the assets acquired through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate Article IX-D, Section
2(1) of the 1987 Constitution.Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power and authority to examine uses of government
money and property.The cited P.D.s and E.O.s also contravene Section 2 of P.D. 898 (Providing for the Restructuring
of the Commission on Audit), which has the force of a statute.And there is no legitimate reason why such funds should
be shielded from COA review and audit.The PCA, which implements the coco-levy laws and collects the coco-levy
funds, is a government-owned and controlled corporation subject to COA review and audit.

E.O. 313 suffers from an additional infirmity.Apparently, it intends to create a trust fund out of the coco-levy funds to
provide economic assistance to the coconut farmers and, ultimately, benefit the coconut industry.But on closer look,
E.O. 313 strays from the special purpose for which the law raises coco-levy funds in that it permits the use of coco-levy
funds for improving productivity in other food areas.

Clearly, E.O.313 above runs counter to the constitutional provision which directs thatall money collected on any tax
levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.Assisting other
agriculturally-related programs is way off the coco-funds objective of promoting the general interests of the coconut
industry and its farmers.

A final point,the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445,Section 84(2),the first part by the previously mentioned sections of
E.O. 313 and the second part by Section 4 of E.O. 312 and Sections 6 and 7 of E.O. 313.E.O. 313 vests the power to
administer, manage, and supervise the operations and disbursements of the Trust Fund it established (capitalized with
SMC shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in a Coconut Trust Fund Committee.

Section 4 ofE.O. 312 does essentially the same thing.It vests the management and disposition of the assistance fund
generated from the sale of coco-levy fund-acquired assets into a Committee of five members.

In effect, the provision transfers the power to allocate, use, and disburse coco-levy funds that P.D. 232 vested in the
PCA and transferred the same, without legislative authorization and in violation of P.D. 232, to the Committees
mentioned above.An executive order cannot repeal a presidential decree which has the same standing as a statute
enacted by Congress.

***

The Court has to uphold petitioners right to institute these petitions.The petitioner organizations in these cases represent
coconut farmers on whom the burden of the coco-levies attaches.It is also primarily for their benefit that the levies were
imposed.

The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as taxpayers.The Court recognizes their right to restrain
officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.This so-called taxpayers suit
is based on the theory that expenditure of public funds for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act is a
misapplication of such funds.

The petition in G.R.147036-37 is granted; The petition in G.R. 147811 is partially granted; the following are declared
void: a) E.O. 312; and b)E.O. 313.

Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 have been previously unconstitutional.
KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA GR No. 113375, May 5 1994, 232 SCRA 110

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the
authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO decided to
establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds.
After learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, "a
multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, and who has been long engaged in
lottery operations in Asia, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya
Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine
corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the medium
through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.

Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line
lottery system for the PCSO. The bids submitted by PGMC were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and
Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the
President. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that respondent PGMC may finally operate the
country's on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted for final
clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.

On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting
up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Petitioners also submit that the
PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the
PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in
violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and
conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." Petitioner seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as
"lotto."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the oppositions made by the petitioner was valid.

HELD:

The Court agrees with the petitioners and the challenged Contract of Lease executed by respondent PCSO and
respondent PGMC is declared to be contrary to law and invalid. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the
petitioners which was raised by the respondents should be resolved in their favor. The Court finds this petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even
higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is
expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.

On the substantive issue regarding the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, is
indisputably clear with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and
other similar activities." Meaning, the PCSO cannot exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any
other party. Thus, the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A.
No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law.
Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195

Facts

This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a
distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the
Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.

This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional
as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.

Issue

Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not unconstitutional.
These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare and public
safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis,
the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the
United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or
parked vehicles on the streets and highways.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000

Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of Justice received
a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached
along with the request. Charges include:

Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

Attempt to evade or defeat tax
Fraud by wire, radio, or television
False statement or entries
Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment
of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for
copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The
Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds:

He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is
in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine
Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government.
Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.
The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request, as
Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez.
Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus,
this petition is now at bar.

Issue/s:
Whether or not respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute
a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local
state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law
should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.

Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual
deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This
is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
Bayan Muna vs Romulo
G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case.
Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and
shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered
grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its
terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition,
only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process.
The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between
the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by
then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted
to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and
defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between
the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33
other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former Government officials, employees (including
contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for
the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a third country, the [US]
will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such
tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will
not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such
tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other of its intent to
terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or
any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice
and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations that
are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03
cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and
jargonsis untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international
jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted
form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as
follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by
the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to
record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid
the process of legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have been used interchangeably,
exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On
the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. As former US High
Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether
denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement
itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be boundis a recognized mode of concluding
a legally binding international written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance
with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at
variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact
that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities
that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the
[ICC] x x x.63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the
RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty
obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x
The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its
national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect.
Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the
Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the
formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement
contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the
consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of
things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine
laws and the Rome Statute.
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation vs Voluntary Arbitrator Allan Montao

In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of their unborn child.
Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then filed death benefits claim from his employer,
the Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which denied the claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for
arbitration and both parties agreed to have Atty. Allan Montao act as the arbitrator. Montao ruled that Hortillano is
entitled to his claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Montao.

On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death benefits are awarded
if an employees legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no death has occurred because the fetus died
inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40
of the Civil Code which provides a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born
hence it is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as contemplated under civil
laws.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?

2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?

HELD:

1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in question, hence they are
presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Hence,
the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate dependent the moment it was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg
cell).

2. No. Death is defined as cessation of life. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no need to discuss whether
or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality that is not the issue here. But nevertheless, life should not be
equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished
by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case,
Hortillanos fetus had had life inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the
unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death
benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.
PT&T vs NLRC

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary
Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went
on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2
periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary
period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single
although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch
supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the
memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was
dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee.
Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation
of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by
reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment
from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful
discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the
right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record
discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that
married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment
or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to
be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to
good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an
individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals
and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such
policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the
laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.
Ondoy vs. Ignacio et. al. 97 SCRA 252 G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980

Facts: The petitioner, Estrella Ondoy, is a mother of one Jose Ondoy, an employee who worked under Virgilio Ignacio.
According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Andoy was aboard the ship of the respondents enterprise as part of the
workforce. He was invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the ship and thereafter was found dead due to drowning.
Thus the petitioner asked for compensation, however, the testimonies by the chief engineer were dismissed by the
hearing officer due to lack of merit. Afterwards, a motion for reconsideration was also filed before the Secretary of
Labor, but was denied again due to lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation for Joses death is constitutional. Whether or not Social Justice has a role in this
case.

Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition, granting Estrella Ondoy 6,000 pesos as compensation for Joses death,
300 pesos for burial fees and 600 pesos as attorneys fee with the costs against respondent, Ignacio.

Ratio Decidendi: The principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, and not equality. The
Supreme Court recognized the right of petitioner to claim a compensation from the respondent, as Jose did drown while
in the actual performance of his duty. To fortify this ruling, the SC cited cases wherein, with accordance to the
constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, Workmens Compensation Act, which dealt with the right
of workers for compensation for personal injury, was applied. Among them is a case where there was no direct
testimony attesting that the deceased drowned while in the performance of his duty, however, the compensation was
sustained. Lastly from another case, the SC quoted that as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the
employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter strict compliance.
Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.
PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT (PRRM), Petitioner, v. VIRGILIO E. PULGAR,
Respondent.

FACTS: Pulgar was the manager of PRRMs branch office in Quezon Province. When Pulgar was reassigned to PRRMs
central office, PRRM conducted an investigation into alleged financial anomalies committed at the TBFO.

In her investigation report, Solis stated that part of the funds allotted to the TBFO was missing or not properly
accounted for. The report also stated that some of the receipts that the TBFO submitted to liquidate the organizations
financial transactions were fictitious and manufactured.

PRRM maintains that while the investigation was ongoing, Pulgar went on leave. After the lapse of his last leave, Pulgar
no longer reported to work, leading PRRM to believe that Pulgar had abandoned his work to evade any liability arising
from the investigation. PRRM was therefore surprised to learn that Pulgar had filed an illegal dismissal case.

Pulgar tells another tale. According to him, he submitted a letter to PRRM to complain that he was not given the right to
confront and question Solis,but his letter went unanswered. Thereafter, he was not allowed to enter the premises of the
organization. Pulgar also alleges that PRRMs representatives removed his personal properties and records from his
office, placed them in boxes and kept them in storage. Believing he was constructively dismissed by PRRMs actions,
Pulgar filed a complaint against PRRM for illegal dismissal.

Labor Arbiter found in his decision that Pulgar had been illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiter in its decision and dismissed Pulgars complaint, giving more weight to PRRMs allegation that Pulgar abandoned
his work. CA rendered the assailed decision, granting Pulgars petition and reinstating the Labor Arbiters decision.

ISSUE:

Was Pulgar illegally dismissed?

HELD: While we recognize the rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause, in the present case, however, the facts and the evidence do not establish
a prima facie case that the employee was dismissed from employment. Before the employer must bear the burden of
proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal
from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to its legality or illegality. Bare
allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.

Although under normal circumstances, an employees act of filing an illegal dismissal complaint against his employer is
inconsistent with abandonment; in the present case, we simply cannot use that one act to conclude that Pulgar did not
terminate his employment with PRRM, and in the process ignore the clear, substantial evidence presented by PRRM that
proves otherwise. Our ruling on this point in Leopard Integrated Services, Inc. v. Macalinao is very relevant. We said:

The fact that respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, as noted by the CA, is not by itself sufficient indicator
that respondent had no intention of deserting his employment since the totality of respondent's antecedent acts palpably
display the contrary. In Abad v. Roselle Cinema, the Court ruled that:

The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal should be taken into account together with the surrounding circumstances
of a certain case. In Arc-Men Food Industries Inc. v. NLRC, the Court ruled that the substantial evidence proffered by
the employer that it had not, in the first place, terminated the employee, should not simply be ignored on the pretext that
the employee would not have filed the complaint for illegal dismissal if he had not really been dismissed. "This is clearly
a non-sequitur reasoning that can never validly take the place of the evidence of both the employer and the employee."

While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not
be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its rights
which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less
privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in his
conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case
for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.

***

We have previously ruled on the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction to rule on all money claims, including those of the employer,
arising out of the employer-employee relationship. Unfortunately for PRRM, it never raised as an issue the money
allegedly still in Pulgars custody in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, or even before the NLRC.

As a factual matter, this issue should have been raised at the earliest opportunity before the Labor Arbiter, to allow both
parties to present their evidence. The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process.
Austria v. NLRC
G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999

KTA: Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee is purely secular in nature because it
has no relation with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church, such affairs are governed by labor laws.
The Labor Code applies to all establishments, whether religious or not.

Facts:

The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner was a pastor of the
SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were terminated.

On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications form Ibesate, the
treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings
collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.

The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who
authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very ill to be able to do the collecting.

A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing:
1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;
2) Willful breach of trust;
3) Serious misconduct;
4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and
5) Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative as grounds for the
termination of his services.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for reinstatement and
backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner.

SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the
separation of church and state.

2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against
the SDA.

Held/Ratio:

1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is involved here is the relationship of
the church as an employer and the minister as an employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship with
the practice of faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioners dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of
Labor Code.

2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire an employee which it believes
is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria was expelled or excommunicated from the SDA
Gudani vs. Senga

Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, to
appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security to shed light on the Hello
Garci controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres.
Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from
appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen.
Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General
(OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military
service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on
willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking
that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3)
Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined
from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate.

Issue:

1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires
otherwise?
3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October 2005?

Held:

1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President
could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based
foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief.
Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will
without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the
President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still
subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries
in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-
chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries.
The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition.
Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may
be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the
Chief Executives prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to
any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between
the legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions.
Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other
to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar
dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its
inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the
Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.

3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of
military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service.
Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has
fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him
occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005.