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RULE 57 PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

Section 1
Calo and San Jose vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445, No. L-252 March 30, 1946
ACTIONS; WHAT DETERMINES NATURE OF.It is a truism in legal procedure that what determines the nature of an action filed in the courts are
the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of the action. The facts averred as a defense in the defendant's answer do not and
can not determine or change the nature of the plaintiff's action. The theory adopted by the plaintiff in his complaint is one thing, and that of the
defendant in his answer is another. The plaintiff has to establish or prove his theory or cause of action in order to obtain the remedy he prays for;
and the defendant his theory, if necessary, in order to defeat the claim or action of the plaintiff.

ID.; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; WHEN TO BE APPLIED FOR AND GRANTED.The provisional remedies denominated attachment, preliminary
injunction, receivership, and delivery of personal property, provided in Rules 59, 60, 61 and 62 of the Rules of Court, respectively, are remedies
to which parties litigant may resort for the preservation or protection of their rights or interests, and for no other purpose, during the pendency
of the principal action. If an action, by its nature, does not require such protection or preservation, said remedies can not be applied for and
granted. To each kind of action or actions a proper provisional remedy is provided for by law. The Rules of Court clearly specify the cases in which
they may be properly granted. Calo and San Jose vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445, No. L-252 March 30, 1946

RECEIVERSHIP ; APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER IN ACTION OF INJUNCTION; CASE AT BAR.The respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction
in appointing a receiver in case No. 7951 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Appointment of a receiver is not proper or does not lie in an
action of injunction such as the one filed by the plaintiff. Calo and San Jose vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445, No. L-252 March 30, 1946

Glass Construction Co., Inc. vs. Valenzuela, 116 SCRA 563, No. L-48756 September 11, 1982
Pleadings and Practice; Attachment; In pleading for attachment against a foreigner, allegation must not be merely that defendant is a foreigner.
Pinzon, however, did not allege that the defendant Kenneth O. Glass is a foreigner (who) may, at any time, depart from the Philippines with
intent to defraud his creditors including the plaintiff. He merely stated that the defendant Kenneth O. Glass is a foreigner. K.O.

Same; Same; Same.There being no showing, much less an allegation, that the defendants are about to depart from the Philippines with intent
to defraud their creditor, or that they are nonresident aliens, the attachment of their properties is not justified. K.O. Glass Construction Co., Inc.
vs. Valenzuela, 116 SCRA 563, No. L-48756 September 11, 1982

Same; Same; Requisites for issuance of writ of attachment.Second, the affidavit submitted by Pinzon does not comply with the Rules. Under
the Rules, an affidavit for attachment must state that (a) a sufficient cause of action exists; (b) the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 (b)
of Rule 57; (c) there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action; and (c) the amount due to the applicant for
attachment or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted
above all legal counterclaims.

Same; Same; Same.While Pinzon may have stated in his affidavit that a sufficient cause of action exists against the defendant Kenneth O. Glass,
he did not state therein that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 hereof; that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought
to be enforced by the action; and that the amount due to the applicant is as much as the sum for which the order granted above all legal
counterclaims. It has been held that the failure to allege in the affidavit the requisites prescribed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment, renders the writ of preliminary attachment issued against the property of the defendant fatally defective, and the judge issuing it is
deemed to have acted in excess of his jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Writ of attachment should be dissolved once defendant files a counterbond.Finally, it appears that the petitioner has filed a
counter-bond in the amount of P37,190.00 to answer for any judgment that may be rendered against the defendant. Upon receipt of the counter-
bond, the respondent Judge should have discharged the attachment pursuant to Section 12, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. K.O. Glass
Construction Co., Inc. vs. Valenzuela, 116 SCRA 563, No. L-48756 September 11, 1982

General vs. De Venecia and Vda. de Ruedas, 78 Phil. 780, No. L-894 July 30, 1947
ACTIONS; MONETARY OBLIGATION-; MORATORIUM ORDERS; ATTACHMENT.Upon objection by the debtor, no court may now proceed to hear
a complaint that seeks to compel payment of a monetary obligation coming within the purview of the moratorium. And the issuance of a writ of
attachment upon such complaint may not be allowed, such levy being necessarily one step in the enforcement of the obligation.

ATTACHMENTS; ABSENCE OF DEMANDABLE OBLIGATION FATAL TO.The remedy by attachment is not available in respect to a demand which
is not due and payable.

Miailhe vs. De Lencquesaing, 142 SCRA 694, No. L-67715 July 11, 1986
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Attachment; Sec. 1, par. (f), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, referring to an action against a party who resides
out of the Philippines, applies where plaintiffs claim is for liquidated damages, not to unliquidated damages.While it is true that from the
aforequoted provision attachment may issue in an action against a party who resides out of the Philippines, irrespective of the nature of the
action or suit, and while it is also true that in the case of Cu Unjieng et al v. Albert, 58 Phil. 495, it was held that each of the six grounds treated
ante is independent of the others, still it is imperative that the amount sought be liquidated. Miailhe vs. De Lencquesaing, 142 SCRA 694, No. L-
67715 July 11, 1986

Insular Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 460 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 123638 June 15, 2005
Actions; Attachments; Attachment Bonds; There can be no serious objection to the proposition that the attached propertyand logically the
counter-bond necessary to discharge the lien on such propertyshould as much as possible correspond in value to, or approximately match the
attaching creditors principal claim.As may be noted, the amount of the counter-attachment bond is, under the terms of the aforequoted
Section 12, to be measured against the value of the attached property, as determined by the judge to secure the payment of any judgment that
the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Albeit not explicitly stated in the same section and without necessarily diminishing the sound
discretion of the issuing judge on matters of bond approval, there can be no serious objection, in turn, to the proposition that the attached
propertyand logically the counter-bond necessary to discharge the lien on such propertyshould as much as possible correspond in value to,
or approximately match the attaching creditors principal claim. Else, excessive attachment, which ought to be avoided at all times, shall ensue.

Same; Same; Same; A writ of attachment cannot be issued for moral and exemplary damages, and other unliquidated or contingent claims.
Turning to the case at bar, the records show that the principal claim of respondent, as plaintiff a quo, is in the amount of P25,200,000.00,
representing the three (3) unfunded checks drawn against, and presented for clearing to, respondent bank. Jurisprudence teaches that a writ of
attachment cannot be issued for moral and exemplary damages, and other unliquidated or contingent claim.

Same; Same; Same; If a portion of a claim is already secured, there is no justifiable reason why such portion should still be subject of counter-
bondsimple common sense, if not consideration of fair play, dictates that a part of a possible judgment that has veritably been preemptively
satisfied or secured need not be covered by the counter-bond.As things stood, therefore, respondents principal claim against petitioner
immediately prior to the filing of the motion to discharge attachment has effectively been pruned down to P12,600,000.00. The trial court was
fully aware of this reality. Accordingly, it should have allowed a total discharge of the attachment on a counter-bond based on the reduced claim
of respondent. If a portion of the claim is already secured, we see no justifiable reason why such portion should still be subject of counter-bond.
It may be that a counter-bond is intended to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the main action. Simple
common sense, if not consideration of fair play, however, dictates that a part of a possible judgment that has veritably been preemptively satisfied
or secured need not be covered by the counter-bond.

Same; Same; Same; Unlike the former Section 12 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court where the value of the property attached shall be the defining
measure in the computation of the discharging counterattachment bond, the present less stringent Section 12 of Rule 57 provides that the court
shall order the discharge of attachment if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond . . . in an amount equal to that fixed by the
court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs.It bears to stress, as a final consideration, that the certiorari proceedings before the
appellate court and the denial of the motion to discharge attachment subject of such proceedings, transpired under the old rules on preliminary
attachment which has since been revised. And unlike the former Section 12 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court where the value of the property
attached shall be the defining measure in the computation of the discharging counterattachment bond, the present less stringent Section 12 of
Rule 57 provides that the court shall order the discharge of attachment if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond . . . in an
amount equal to that fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs. Not being in the nature of a penal statute, the Rules of
Court cannot be given retroactive effect. Insular Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 460 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 123638 June 15, 2005

Tan vs. Zandueta and Tiu Chay, 61 Phil., 526, No. 43721 June 15, 1935
ATTACHMENT; UNLAWFUL APPROPRIATION OF, THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF A SWEEPSTAKES PRIZE.The writ of preliminary attachment in this
case was issued in strict conformity to the law, because the complaint wherein it was issued alleged that the petitioner, after collecting the prize
of a ticket in the last sweepstakes, consisting of the amount of P50,000, belonging to the two, that is, the petitioner and the respondent T. C.
(alias T. K.) appropriated the entire prize exclusively for himself, in complete disregard of said T. C. (alias T. K.) knowing that one-half thereof did
not belong to him but to said respondent; that he was merely a depository or agent of the latter as to said half, and that the petitioner acted in
the manner stated notwithstanding the fact that he was required to turn over to the respondent the part of the prize won corresponding to the
latter. The allegations to this effect are found in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the complaint of said T. C. (alias T. K.).

2.ID.; DlSSOLUTION OF A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT; DlSCRETIONARY POWER; SECTION 441, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.The respondent judge
had discretionary power, according to section 441 of Act No. 190, to dissolve or to leave in force the said attachment, and it was precisely in the
exercise of this power, after hearing the parties, as may be deduced from the orders issued and now of record, that he decided to dissolve the
attachment but conditioned on petitioner's filing a counter bond f or P5,000; and this was voluntarily done by the petitioner, thereby enabling
him to withdraw, as in fact he did withdraw, the amount he had on deposit in the Philippine National Bank which was a part of the money won
in the last sweepstakes. On this sole ground, therefore, the writ of certiorari will not lie. Tan vs. Zandueta and Tiu Chay, 61 Phil., 526, No. 43721
June 15, 1935

Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Olsen, 48 Phil. 238, No. 23237 November 14, 1925
CORPORATIONS; ClVIL FRAUD; ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE OF OFFICERS. He who has almost an exclusive control over the function of the
corporation and its funds on account of his triple capacity as president, treasurer and general manager must be very scrupulous in the application
of the funds of said corporation to his own use. The act of taking money of the corporation for his personal use without being duly authorized
therefor constitutes such an irregularity that, while it does not amount to a criminal fraud, is undoubtedly a fraud of a civil character, because it
is an abuse of confidence to the damage of the corporation and its stockholders and constitutes one of the grounds enumerated in section 424,
in connection with 412, of the Code of Civil Procedure for the issuance of a preliminary attachment.

Santos vs. Bernabe, 54 Phil. 19, No. 31163 November 6, 1929


1.MANUAL DELIVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY; LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF PROVISIONS OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PURSUANT TO SECTION
2 THEREOF.Plaintiff S and defendant T deposited some palay with defendant B. T sues B to recover his portion, and succeeds in obtaining a
preliminary attachment and subsequent sale of B's property, despite S's third-party claim. The sacks of palay bore no marks or signs to distinguish
T's from S's. S now contends that T cannot claim the palay attached and sold because in soliciting the attachment, he impliedly admitted that the
palay belonged to B. But, giving section 262 of the Code of Civil Procedure a liberal construction, in pursuance of section 2 thereof, the application
for a preliminary attachment of B's property filed by T, was a claim for the delivery of personal property deposited by him with the former.

2.MIXTURE OF TWO SlMILAR THINGS; PROPORTIONAL RlGHT OF EACH OWNER.There being no means, in the instant case, to separate out of
the palay attached and sold, the portion corresponding to plaintiff S and that corresponding to defendant T, the rule prescribed in article 381 of
the Civil Code for cases of this nature must be applied. Said rule is as follows: "If, by the will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar
nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire
a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or commingled."

State Investment House, Inc. vs. Court ofAppeals, 163 SCRA 799, No. L-82446 July 29, 1988
Attachment; Preliminary Attachment; Lack of fraud.Where petitioner failed to prove that private respondent received from it independent
consideration for the "sale" of Pedro Valdez' checks to it, apart from the loan previously extended to the corporation, the Court of Appeals
correctly found that Valdez' checks are "mere evidence of the outstanding obligation of P.O. Valdez, Inc. to the petitioner." The petitioner was
not defrauded by their issuance because the loans had been contracted and released to P.O. Valdez, Inc. long before the checks were issued.

Aboitiz & Company, Inc. vs. Cotabato Bus Company, Inc., 105 SCRA 88, No. L-35990 June 17, 1981
Attachment; Insolvency is not a proper ground for issuance of a writ of attachment.Going forthwith to this question of whether insolvency,
which petitioners in effect claims to have been proven by the evidence, particularly by companys bank account which has been reduced to nil,
may be a ground for the issuance of a writ of attachment, the respondent Court of Appeals correctly took its position in the negative on the
strength of the explicit ruling of this Court in Max Chamorro & Co. vs. Philippine Ready Mix Concrete Company, Inc. and Hon. Manuel P. Barcelona.

Same; Facts of this case do not warrant issuance of the writ of attachment.It is an undisputed fact that, as averred by petitioner itself, the
several buses attached are nearly junks. However, upon permission by the sheriff, five of them were repaired, but they were substituted with
five buses which were also in the same condition as the five repaired ones before the repair. This cannot be the removal intended as ground for
the issuance of a writ of attachment under Section 1(e), Rule 57, of the Rules of Court. The repair of the five buses was evidently motivated by a
desire to serve the interest of the riding public, clearly not to defraud its creditors, as there is no showing that they were not put on the run after
their repairs, as was the obvious purpose of their substitution to be placed in running condition.

Same; Same.Moreover, as the buses were mortgaged to the DPB, their removal or disposal as alleged by petitioner to provide the basis for its
prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment should be very remote, if not nil. If removal of the buses had in fact been committed, which seems
to exist only in petitioners apprehensive imagination, the DBP should not have failed to take proper court action, both civil and criminal, which
apparently has not been done.

Same; Same.The dwindling of respondents bank account despite its daily income of from P10,000.00 to P14,000.00 is easily explained by its
having to meet heavy operating expenses, which include salaries and wages of employees and workers. If, indeed the income of the company
were sufficiently profitable, it should not allow its buses to fall into disuse by lack of repairs. It should also maintain a good credit standing with
its suppliers of equipment and other needs of the company to keep its business a going concern. Petitioner is only one of the suppliers.

Same; Same.It is, indeed, extremely hard to remove the buses, machinery and other equipments which respondent company have to own and
keep to be able to engage and continue in the operation of its transportation business. The sale or other form of disposition of any of this kind of
property is not difficult of detection or discovery, and strangely, petitioner has adduced no proof of any sale or transfer of any of them, which
should have been easily obtainable.
Peoples Bank and Trust Co. vs. Syvels Incorporated, 164 SCRA 247, No. L-29280 August 11, 1988
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Attachment; Grant or denial of a writ of attachment rests upon the sound discretion of the court.In the
determination of the legality of the writ of attachment by the Court of First Instance of Manila, it is a well established rule that the grant or denial
of a writ of attachment rests upon the sound discretion of the court. Records are bereft of any evidence that grave abuse of discretion was
committed by respondent judge in the issuance of the writ of attachment.

The attachment grounded on the actual removal of property is justified when there is physical removal thereof by the debtor.Appellants
contend that the affidavits of Messrs. Rivera and Berenguer on which the lower court based the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment
relied on the reports of credit investigators sent to the field and not on the personal knowledge of the affiants. Such contention deserves scant
consideration. Evidence adduced during the trial strongly shows that the witnesses have personal knowledge of the facts stated in their affidavits
in support of the application for the writ. They testified that Syvels Inc. had disposed of all the articles covered by the chattel mortgage but had
not remitted the proceeds to appellee bank; that the Syvels Stores at the Escolta, Rizal Avenue and Morayta Street were no longer operated by
appellants and that the latter were disposing of their properties to defraud appellee bank. Such testimonies and circumstances were given full
credit by the trial court in its decision (Brief for Appellee, p. 14). Hence, the attachment sought on the ground of actual removal of property is
justified where there is physical removal thereof by the debtor, as shown by the records (McTaggert v. Putnam Corset Co., 8 N.Y. S 800 cited in
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., Vol. 3, p. 7.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Fraudulent concealment of property to delay and defraud creditors supports the attachment.Besides, the actuations
of appellants were clearly seen by the witnesses who saw a Fiat Bantam Carfiat Car, a small car and about three or four persons hurrying; they
were carrying goods coming from the back portion of this store of Syvels at the Escolta, between 5:30 and 6:30 oclock in the evening. (Record
on Appeals, pp. 45-46). Therefore, the act of debtor (appellant) in taking his stock of goods from the rear of his store at night, is sufficient to
support an attachment upon the ground of the fraudulent concealment of property for the purpose of delaying and defrauding creditors. (4 am.
Jur., 841 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, Second Edition, 1985, p. 24).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Intent to defraud is inferred from facts and circumstances of the case; Principle that every person is presumed
to intend the natural consequences of his acts.In any case, intent to defraud may be and usually is inferred from the facts and circumstances
of the case; it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. It may be gleaned also from the statements and conduct of the debtor, and in this
connection, the principle may be applied that every person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts (Francisco, Revised Rules
of Court, supra, pp. 24-25). In fact the trial court is impressed that not only has the plaintiff acted in perfect good faith but also on facts sufficient
in themselves to convince an ordinary man that the defendants were obviously trying to spirit away a portion of the stocks of Syvels Incorporated
in order to render ineffectual at least partially any judgment that may be ren dered in favor of the plaintiff. (Decision, Civil Case No. 68095;
Record on Appeal, pp. 88-89).

Same; Same; Same; Damages; Where evidence of bad faith or malice in the procurement of the writ of preliminary attachment is absent, the
claim for damages is not proper.Appellants having failed to adduce evidence of bad faith or malice on the part of appellee in the procurement
of the writ of preliminary attachment, the claim of the former for damages is evidently negated. In fact, the allegations in the appellees complaint
more than justify the issuance of the writ of attachment.

Adlawan vs. Torres, 233 SCRA 645, G.R. Nos. 65957-58 July 5, 1994
Attachment; Affidavit must clearly allege the factual basis in support of the prayer for the writ of attachment if not so specifically alleged in the
verified complaint.The affidavit submitted by respondent Aboitiz in support of its prayer for the writ of attachment does not meet the
requirements of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court regarding the allegations on impending fraudulent removal, concealment and disposition
of defendants property. As held in Carpio v. Macadaeg, 9 SCRA 552 (1963), to justify a preliminary attachment, the removal or disposal must
have been made with intent to defraud defendants creditors. Proof of fraud is mandated by paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 1, Rule 57 of the
Revised Rules of Court on the grounds upon which attachment may issue. Thus, the factual basis on defendants intent to defraud must be clearly
alleged in the affidavit in support of the prayer for the writ of attachment if not so specifically alleged in the verified complaint.

Same; Bare allegation that an encumbrance of a property is in fraud of the creditor does not suffice since factual bases for such conclusion must
be clearly averred.It is evident from said affidavit that the prayer for attachment rests on the mortgage by petitioners of 11 parcels of land in
Cebu, which encumbrance respondent Aboitiz considered as fraudulent concealment of property to its prejudice. We find, however, that there
is no factual allegation which may constitute as a valid basis for the contention that the mortgage was in fraud of respondent Aboitiz. As this
Court said in Jardine-Manila Finance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 636 (1989). [T]he general rule is that the affidavit is the foundation of
the writ, and if none be filed or one be filed which wholly fails to set out some facts required by law to be stated therein, there is no jurisdiction
and the proceedings are null and void. Bare allegation that an encumbrance of a property is in fraud of the creditor does not suffice. Factual
bases for such conclusion must be clearly averred.

Same; Mortgage; By mortgaging a piece of property, a debtor merely subjects it to a lien but ownership thereof is not parted with.The execution
of a mortgage in favor of another creditor is not conceived by the Rules as one of the means of fraudulently disposing of ones property. By
mortgaging a piece of property, a debtor merely subjects it to a lien but ownership thereof is not parted with.
Same; Inability to pay ones creditors is not necessarily synonymous with fraudulent intent not to honor an obligation.Furthermore, the inability
to pay ones creditors is not necessarily synonymous with fraudulent intent not to honor an obligation (Insular Bank of Asia & America, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 629 [1990]).

Same; A writ of attachment can only be granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averment quoting perfunctorily the words
of the Rules.Consequently, when petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order directing the issuance of the writ of attachment,
respondent Judge should have considered it as a motion for the discharge of the attachment and should have conducted a hearing or required
submission of counter-affidavits from the petitioners, if only to gather facts in support of the allegation of fraud (Jopillo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
167 SCRA 247 [1988]). This is what Section 13 of Rule 57 mandates. This procedure should be followed because, as the Court has time and again
said, attachment is a harsh, extraordinary and summary remedy and the rules governing its issuance must be construed strictly against the
applicant. Verily, a writ of attachment can only be granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments quoting perfunctorily
the words of the Rules (D.P. Lub Oil Marketing Center, Inc. v. Nicolas, 191 SCRA 423 [1990]).

Same; A writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the termination of the
suit.The judge before whom the application is made exercises full discretion in considering the supporting evidence proffered by the applicant.
One overriding consideration is that a writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of
at the termination of the suit

Claude Neon Lights, Fed. Inc., vs. Phil. Adv. Corp., 57 Phil., 607, No. 37682 November 26, 1932
Corporations; Foreign and Domestic Corporations.The words of section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure refer to a phys-ical defendant who
is capable of being "arrested" or who is "not residing in the Philippine Islands". Only by fiction can it be held that a corporation is "not residing in
the Philippine Islands". A corporation has no home or residence in the sense in which those terms are applied to natural persons. It can not be
said that every statute applicable to natural persons is applicable to corporations.

2.Id.; Id.; Attachment of Property.There is not the same reason for subjecting a duly licensed foreign corporation to the at-tachment of its
property by a plaintiff, under said section 424, paragraph 2, as may exist in the case of a natural person not residing in the Philippine Islands.
Corporations, as a rule, are less mobile than individuals. This is specially true of foreign corporations that are carrying on business by proper
authority in these Islands.

3.Id.; Id.; Id.Said section 424, paragraph 2, should not be held applicable to foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippine
Islands both because the language and the reason of the statute limit it to natural persons.

State Investment House, Inc. vs. Citibank, N.A., 203 SCRA 9, G.R. Nos. 79926-27 October 17, 1991
Attachment; A foreign corporation licitly doing business in the Philippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit, may not be considered a non-
resident within the scope of the legal corporation authorizing attachment against a defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands.This Court
itself has already had occasion to hold that a foreign corporation licitly doing business in the Philippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit, may
not be considered a non-resident within the scope of the legal provision authorizing attachment against a defendant not residing in the Philippine
Islands; in other words, a preliminary attachment may not be applied for and granted solely on the asserted fact that the defendant is a foreign
corporation authorized to do business in the Philippinesand is consequently and necessarily, a party who resides out of the Philippines.
Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a party not residing in the Philippines, or as a party who resides out of the country, then, logically,
it must be considered a party who does reside in the Philippines, who is a resident of the country. Be this as it may, this Court pointed out that:
x x Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the status of domestic
corporations. (Cf. Section 73, Act No. 1459, and Marshall Wells Co. vs. Henry W. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu; Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil.
385, 411) We think it would be entirely out of line with this policy should we make a discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the
petitioner, and subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied not only with every requirement of law made
specially of foreign corporations, but in addition with every requirement of law made of domestic corporations. xx.

Same; Same; Insolvency Law; The law grants to a juridical person as well as to natural persons the power to petition for the adjudication of
bankruptcy of any natural or judicial, provided it is a resident corporation.Neither can the Court accept the theory that the omission by the
banks in their petition for involuntary insolvency of an explicit and categorical statement that they are residents of the Philippine Islands, is
fatal to their cause. In truth, in light of the concept of resident foreign corporations just expounded, when they alleged in that petition that they
are foreign banking corporations, licensed to do business in the Philippines, and actually doing business in this country through branch offices or
agencies, they were in effect stating that they are resident foreign corporations in the Philippines. There is, of course, as petitioners argue, no
substantive law explicitly granting foreign banks the power to petition for the adjudication of a Philippine corporation as a bankrupt. This is
inconsequential, for neither is there any legal provision expressly giving domestic banks the same power, although their capacity to petition for
insolvency can scarcely be disputed and is not in truth disputed by petitioners. The law plainly grants to a juridical person, whether it be a bank
or not or it be a foreign or domestic corporation, as to natural persons as well, such a power to petition for the adjudication of bankruptcy of any
person, natural or juridical, provided that it is a resident corporation and joins at least two other residents in presenting the petition to the
Bankruptcy Court.

Mabanag vs. Gallemore, 81 Phil. 254, No. L-825 July 20, 1948
COURTS; JURISDICTION ; NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT; EFFECT OF ATTACHMENT OR GARNISHMENT.Attachment or garnishment of property of
a non-resident defendant located in the Philippines confers jurisdiction on the court in an otherwise personal action. In other words, though no
jurisdiction is obtained over the debtors person, the case may proceed to judgment if there is property in the custody of the court that can be
applied to its satisfaction.

Professional Video, Inc. vs. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, 591 SCRA 83, G.R. No. 155504 June 26, 2009
Absent any actual disbursement, these funds form part of and Technical Education and Skills Development Authoritys (TESDAs) public funds,
and TESDAs failure to pay Professional Video, Inc. (PROVI) the amount stated in the Certificate cannot be construed as an act of fraudulent
misapplication or embezzlement.Section 1(b), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, that PROVI relied upon, applies only where money or property has
been embezzled or converted by a public officer, an officer of a corporation, or some other person who took advantage of his fiduciary position
or who willfully violated his duty. PROVI, in this case, never entrusted any money or property to TESDA. While the Contract Agreement is
supported by a Certificate as to Availability of Funds (Certificate) issued by the Chief of TESDAs Accounting Division, this Certificate does not
automatically confer ownership over the funds to PROVI. Absent any actual disbursement, these funds form part of TESDAs public funds, and
TESDAs failure to pay PROVI the amount stated in the Certificate cannot be construed as an act of fraudulent misapplication or embezzlement.

Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 616, G.R. No. 115678, G.R. No. 119723 February 23, 2001
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Attachment; An order of attachment cannot be issued on a general averment, such as one ceremoniously
quoting from a pertinent rule.While the Motion refers to the transaction complained of as involving trust receipts, the violation of the terms
of which is qualified by law as constituting estafa, it does not follow that a writ of attachment can and should automatically issue. Petitioner
cannot merely cite Section 1(b) and (d), Rule 57, of the Revised Rules of Court, as mere reproduction of the rules, without more, cannot serve as
good ground for issuing a writ of attachment. An order of attachment cannot be issued on a general averment, such as one ceremoniously quoting
from a pertinent rule.

Same; Same; Same; A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay.
To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud
the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into giving
consent which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud
should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has
a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case. Fraud is a state of mind and need not be proved by direct evidence but may be
inferred from the circumstances attendant in each case (Republic v. Gonzales, 13 SCRA 633). (Emphasis ours)

Same; Same; Same; Fraudulent intent not to honor the admitted obligation cannot be inferred from the debtors inability to pay or to comply
with the obligations.We find an absence of factual allegations as to how the fraud alleged by petitioner was committed. As correctly held by
respondent Court of Appeals, such fraudulent intent not to honor the admitted obligation cannot be inferred from the debtors inability to pay
or to comply with the obligations. On the other hand, as stressed, above, fraud may be gleaned from a preconceived plan or intention not to pay.
This does not appear to be so in the case at bar.

Same; Same; Same; Rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment must be construed strictly against the applicants.Time and again, we have
held that the rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment must be construed strictly against the applicants. This stringency is required because
the remedy of attachment is harsh, extraordinary and summary in nature. If all the requisites for the granting of the writ are not present, then
the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 616, G.R. No. 115678,
G.R. No. 119723 February 23, 2001

Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Alejandro, 533 SCRA 738, G.R. No. 175587 September 21, 2007
Attachments; Purposes of Preliminary Attachment.The purposes of preliminary attachment are: (1) to seize the property of the debtor in
advance of final judgment and to hold it for purposes of satisfying said judgment, as in the grounds stated in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 1,
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; or (2) to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances
where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected, as in paragraph (f) of the same provision.

Same; Same; Summons; Jurisdictions; In order to acquire jurisdiction in actions in personam where defendant resides out of and is not found in
the Philippines, it becomes a matter of course for the court to convert the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the
defendants property; The service of summons in this case (which may be by publication coupled with the sending by registered mail of the copy
of the summons and the court order to the last known address of the defendant) is no longer for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction but for
compliance with the requirements of due process.In actions in personam, such as the instant case for collection of sum of money, summons
must be served by personal or substituted service, otherwise the court will not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant. In case the defendant
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines (and hence personal and substituted service cannot be effected), the remedy of the plaintiff
in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to convert the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the
property of the defendant. Thus, in order to acquire jurisdiction in actions in per sonam where defendant resides out of and is not found in the
Philippines, it becomes a matter of course for the court to convert the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the defendants
property. The service of summons in this case (which may be by publication coupled with the sending by registered mail of the copy of the
summons and the court order to the last known address of the defendant), is no longer for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction but for compliance
with the requirements of due process.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the defendant is a resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines, attachment of his/her property in an
action in personam, is not always necessary in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.Where the defendant is a resident
who is temporarily out of the Philippines, attachment of his/her property in an action in personam, is not always necessary in order for the court
to acquire jurisdiction to hear the case. Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court reads: Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines.
When an action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may,
by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section. The preceding section referred to in the above provision
is Section 15 which provides for extraterritorial service(a) personal service out of the Philippines, (b) publication coupled with the sending by
registered mail of the copy of the summons and the court order to the last known address of the defendant; or (c) in any other manner which
the court may deem sufficient.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Substituted service of summons is the normal mode of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court
over the person of residents temporarily out of the Philippines; The court may acquire jurisdiction over an action in personam by mere substituted
service without need of attaching the property of the defendant.In Montalban v. Maximo,22 SCRA 1070, (1968), however, the Court held that
substituted service of summons (under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court) is the normal mode of service of summons that will
confer jurisdiction on the court over the person of residents temporarily out of the Philippines. Meaning, service of summons may be effected by
(a) leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable discretion residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies
at the defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Hence, the court may acquire jurisdiction
over an action in personam by mere substituted service without need of attaching the property of the defendant.

Ng Wee vs. Tankiansee, 545 SCRA 263, G.R. No. 171124 February 13, 2008
Remedial Law; Attachment; For a writ of attachment to issue under Section 1(d) of Rule 57, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual
circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtors mere non-payment of the debt or failure to
comply with his obligation.For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of
the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtors mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his
obligation. The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.

Same; Same; The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was
committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ.The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars
as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ. Absent any statement of
other factual circumstances to show that respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay,
or without any showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the affidavit that respondent is an officer and
director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to support the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. In the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what constituted the
fraud and how it was perpetrated because established is the rule that fraud is never presumed.

Same; Same; The rules governing its issuance are strictly construed against the applicant.Let it be stressed that the provisional remedy of
preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous for it exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. The rules governing its issuance are,
therefore, strictly construed against the applicant, such that if the requisites for its grant are not shown to be all present, the court shall refrain
from issuing it, for, otherwise, the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. Likewise, the writ should not be abused to cause
unnecessary prejudice. If it is wrongfully issued on the basis of false or insufficient allegations, it should at once be corrected.

Metro, Inc. vs. Lara's Gifts and Decors, Inc., 606 SCRA 175, G.R. No. 171741 November 27, 2009
Remedial Law; Attachment; Fraud to constitute a ground for attachment.In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 37
(1993), we explained: To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation
intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the
other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of
contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case.

Same; Same; Applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud.The applicant
for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be
inferred from the debtors mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation.
Same; Same; Way of dissolving a writ of preliminary attachment; Since the writ of preliminary attachment was properly issued, the only way it
can be dissolved is by filing a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.We rule that respondents allegation
that petitioners undertook to sell exclusively and only through JRP/LGD for Target Stores Corporation but that petitioners transacted directly with
respon dents foreign buyer is sufficient allegation of fraud to support their application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Since the writ of
preliminary attachment was properly issued, the only way it can be dissolved is by filing a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12, Rule 57
of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; The rule that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of action, the
only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counter-bond is applicable in this case.The reliance of the Court of Appeals in the
cases of Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan, 349 SCRA 745 (2001), FCY Construction Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 270 (2000), and Liberty
Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 37 (1993), is proper. The rule that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground
which is at the same time the applicants cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counter-bond is applicable
in this case. It is clear that in respondents amended complaint of fraud is not only alleged as a ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment, but it is also the core of respondents complaint.
Section 2

Sievert vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 692, No. L-84034 December 22, 1988
Attachment; Jurisdiction; The critical time when the trial court acquires authority under the law to act coercively against the defendant or his
property in a proceeding in attachment is the time of the vesting of jurisdiction in the court over the person of the defendant in the main case.
There is no question that a writ of preliminary attachment may be applied for a plaintiff at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter in the cases enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The issue posed in this case, however, is not to be
resolved by determining when an action may be regarded as having been commenced, a point in time which, in any case, is not necessarily fixed
and identical regardless of the specific purpose for which the determination is to be made. The critical time which must be identified is, rather,
when the trial court acquires authority under law to act coercively against the defendant or his property in a proceeding in attachment. We
believe and so hold that that critical time is the time of the vesting of jurisdiction in the court over the person of the defendant in the main case.

Same; Same; Same; Attachment, as an ancillary remedy; Nature of.Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but
rather to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. A court which has
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant, cannot bind that defendant whether in the main case or in any ancillary proceeding such
as attachment proceedings. The service of a petition for preliminary attachment without the prior or simultaneous service of summons and a
copy of the complaint in the main caseand that is what happened in this casedoes not of course confer jurisdiction upon the issuing court
over the person of the defendant.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Summons; Valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint will vest jurisdiction in the court over the defendant
both for the purposes of the main case and for purposes of the ancillary remedy of attachment.Ordinarily, the prayer in a petition for a writ of
preliminary attachment is embodied or incorporated in the main complaint itself as one of the forms of relief sought in such complaint. Thus,
valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint will in such case vest jurisdiction in the court over the defendant both for purposes of the
main case and for purposes of the ancillary remedy of attachment. In such case, notice of the main case is at the same time notice of the auxiliary
proceeding in attachment. Where, however, the petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied in a discrete pleading, such petition
must be served either simultaneously with service of summons and a copy of the main complaint, or after jurisdiction over the defendant has
already been acquired by such service of summons. Notice of the separate attachment petition is not notice of the main action. Put a little
differently, jurisdiction whether ratione personae or ratione materiae in an attachment proceeding is ancillary to jurisdiction ratione personae or
ratione materiae in the main action against the defendant. If a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant in the principal action, it simply has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendant or his property.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Fundamental requisite is the jurisdiction of the court issuing attachment over the person of the defendant; Case
at bar.It is basic that the requirements of the Rules of Court for issuance of preliminary attachment must be strictly and faithfully complied
with in view of the nature of this provisional remedy. In Salas v. Adil, this Court described preliminary attachment asa rigorous remedy which
exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance, such [that] it should not be abused as to cause unnecessary prejudice. It is, therefore; the
duty of the court, before issuing the writ, to ensure that all the requisites of the law have been complied with; otherwise the judge acts in excess
of his jurisdiction and the writ so issued shall be null and void. The above words apply with greater force in respect of that most fundamental of
requisites, the jurisdiction of the court issuing attachment over the person of the defendant. In the case at bar, the want of jurisdiction of the
trial court to proceed in the main case against the defendant is quite clear. It is not disputed that neither service of summons with a copy of the
complaint nor voluntary appearance of petitioner Sievert was had in this case. Yet, the trial court proceeded to hear the petition for issuance of
the writ. This is reversible error and must be corrected on certiorari.

Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 343, G.R. No. 93262 November 29, 1991
Preliminary attachment may be validly applied for and granted before defendant is summoned or is heard from.Rule 57 xxx speaks of the grant
of the remedy at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter. The phrase, at the commencement of the action, obviously
refers to the date of the filing of the complaintwhich, as above pointed out, is the date that marks the commencement of the action; and the
reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly
is that after an action is properly commencedby the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other feesthe plaintiff
may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so
at any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the
courts: for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading
(counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement of the action if it finds. the
application otherwise sufficient in form and substance.

Same; Writs of attachment may properly issue ex parte.For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition
that writs of attachment may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites therefor have been fulfilled
by the applicant, although it may, in its discretion, require prior hearing on the application with notice to the defendant; but that levy on property
pursuant to the writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service on the defendant
of summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the application for attachment (if not incorporated in
but submitted separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the plaintiff s attachment bond.
Cuartero vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 260, G.R. No. 102448 August 5, 1992
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Preliminary Attachment; Notice to the adverse party or hearing of the application is not required inasmuch as the
time which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment
issues.Under section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the only requisites for the issuance of the writ are the affidavit and bond of the applicant.
As has been expressly ruled in BF Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 262 (1990), citing Mindanao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 480 (1989), no notice to the adverse party or hearing of the application is required inasmuch as the time which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment issues. In such a
case, a hearing would render nugatory the purpose of this provisional remedy. The ruling remains good law. There is, thus, no merit in the private
respondents claim of violation of their constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over the defendant; Once the implementation of the writ commences, it is required that the court must have
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the
defendant.It must be emphasized that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment practically involves three stages: first, the court issues
the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should first be obtained. However,
once the implementation commences, it is required that the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such
jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the
defendant.

Same; Same; Same; Irregular or improper issuance of attachment; An attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper
issuance if it is upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of action in the main case since an anomalous situa-tion would
result if the issues of the main case would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion.Moreover, an attachment may not be
dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper issuance if it is upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of action in the
main case since an anomalous situation would result if the issues of the main case would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion
(Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra, The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. (Solidbank) v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663
[1991]). In the present case, one of the allegations in petitioners complaint below is that the defendant spouses induced the plaintiff to grant
the loan by issuing postdated checks to cover the installment payments and a separate set of postdated checks for payment of the stipulated
interest (Annex B). The issue of fraud, then, is clearly within the competence of the lower court in the main action.

Salas vs. Adil, 90 SCRA 121, No. L-46009 May 14, 1979
Attachment; Remedy of a party to contest issuance of ex-parte writ of attachment is not certiorari but by application with the court for discharge
of attachment.In the instant case, it appears that petitioners have adequate remedy under the law. They could have filed an application with
the court a quo for the discharge of the attachment for improper or irregular issuance under Section 13, Rule 57, of the Revised Rules of Court, x
x x.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Preliminary Attachment; Nature of Preliminary Attachment when it shall issue.A preliminary attachment is a rigorous
remedy, which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance, such it should not be abused as to cause unnecessary prejudice. It is, therefore,
the duty of the court, before issuing the writ, to ensure that alt the requisites of the law have been complied with; otherwise the judge acts in
excess of his jurisdiction and the writ so issued shall be null and void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Allegations that debtors were removing or disposing some of the properties with intent to defraud creditors
must be specific, not general: Evidence must be presented by the parties to support allegations of fraud to creditors.Considering the gravity of
the alienation that herein petitioners have removed or disposed of their properties or are about to do so with intent to defraud their creditors,
and further considering that the affidavit in support of the preliminary attachment merely states such ground in general terms, without specific
allegations of circumstances to show the reason why plaintiffs believe that defendants are disposing of their properties in fraud of creditors, it
was incumbent upon respondent Judge to give notice to petitioners and to allow them to present their position at a hearing wherein evidence is
to be received.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Writ of attachment not available in suit for damages when amount is contigent or unliquidated.Moreover, it appears
from the records that private respondent are claiming unliquidated damages, including moral damages, from petitioners. The authorities agree
that the writ of attachment is not available in a suit for damages where the amount claimed is contigent or unliquidated.

La Granja, Inc., vs. Samson, 58 Phil. 378, No. 40054 September 14, 1933
ATTACHMENT; AFFIDAVIT TO OBTAIN ISSUANCE OF ORDER OF; JUDICIAL DISCRETION.The mere filing of an affidavit executed in due form is
not sufficient to compel a judge to issue an order of attachment, but it is necessary that by such affidavit it be made to appear to the court that
there exists sufficient cause for the issuance thereof, the determination of such sufficiency being discretionary on the part of the court.
Section 6
Roque vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 540, No. L-42594 October 18, 1979
Attachment; Actual or constructive levy on attachment.As a general rule, however, a levy of an attachment upon personal property may be
either actual or constructive. In this case, levy had been constructively made by the registration of the same with the Philippine Coast Guard on
February 7, 1974. Constructive possession should be held sufficient where actual possession is not feasible, particularly when it was followed up
by the actual seizure of the property as soon as that could possibly be effected.

Distinguished; Writ of Execution from Writ of Attachment.Petitioners further argue that the levy was illegal because the Writ was implemented
more than sixty days after the issuance so that they need not have complied with Section 14, Rule 57, supra. The Rules do not provide any lifetime
for a Writ of Attachment unlike a Writ of Execution. But even granting that a Writ of Attachment is valid for only sixty days, yet, since there was
constructive levy within that period the fact that actual seizure was effected only thereafter cannot affect the validity of that levy.

Section 7
Siari Valley Estates, Inc. vs. Lucasan, et al., 109 Phil. 294, No. L-13281 August 31, 1960
LEVY AND EXECUTION; NOTICES; REQUIREMENT IF LAND IS REGISTERED; PURPOSE.The requirement that the notice of levy should contain a
reference to the number of the certificate of title and the volume and page in the registration book where the certificate is registered is made in
order that the debtor as well as a third person may be properly informed of the particular land or property that is under the custody of the court.
This can only be accompanied by making a reference to the certificate of title covering the property. The situation differs if the land is
unregistered, in which case it is enough that the notice be registered under Act 3344.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN NOTICE IS LEGALLY INEFFECTIVE.A notice of levy as regards a registered land which contains no reference to the number
of its certificate of title and the volume and page in the registry book where the title is registered is legally ineffective and as such does not have
the effect of binding the property for purposes of execution. Consequently, a sale carried out by virtue of said levy is invalid and of no legal effect.
3.ID.; ID.; WHEN FAMILY HOME NOT EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION.A family home constituted after a debt had been incurred, whether the debt
is undisputed or inchoate, is not exempt from execution. The reason behind this ruling is to protect the creditor against a debtor who may act in
bad faith by constituting such family home just to defeat the claim against him.

Ravanera vs. Imperial, 93 SCRA 589, No. L-34657 October 23, 1979
Attachment; Levy; Register of Deeds; Auction Sale; Notice; Requirement of notice to judgment debtor before auction sale.It appears in this
case that the notice of levy was registered with the Register of Deeds on September 29, 1969. From a certification of the Postmaster at Naga
City, it also appears that registered letter No. 13687 containing the notice of levy and the notice of auction sale addressed to respondent Felipe
Imperial was delivered on October 15, 1969 to Pelaguia Comba, member of the household of the addressee. Respondent Imperial was, therefore,
notified by registered mail of the levy and the auction sale long before November 3, 1969, the date of the auction sale. What is required is that
the judgment debtor must be notified of the auction sale before the actual date of sale which was done in the case at bar.

LAND REGISTRATION ACT; REGISTRATION BOOK; REQUIREMENT THAT THE NOTICE OF LEVY CONTAIN THE VOLUME AND PAGE IN THE
REGISTRATION BOOK OF LANDS REGISTERED UNDER THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT APPLY ONLY TO LANDS REGISTERED THEREUNDER.
Seetion 7 (paragraph a) of Rule 57 is so explicit that only as to property which has been brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act
should the notice of levy contain the volume and page in the registration book where the certificate is registered. Impliedly, the requirement
does not apply to property not registered under the said Act. It is enough that the notice of levy upon unregistered land be registered under Act
3344, as was done in this case. x x x The requirement that the notice of levy should contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title
and the volume and page in the registration book where the certificate is registered is made in order that the debtor as well as a third person
may be properly informed of the particular land or property that is under the custody of the court. This can only be accomplished by makinr a
reference to the certificate of title covering the property. The situation differs if the land is unregistered, in which case it is enough that the notice
be registered under Act 3344. x x x Reference to the number of the certificate of title of every registered land in the notice of levy, together with
the technical description thereof, would cer-tainly suffice to inform the debtor, as well as third persons what particular land or property is brought
to the custody of the court, as is the purpose of the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court.

Sale; Purchase Price; Validity of Sale; Inadequacy of price is not a ground to assail validity of the sale.The alleged inadequacy of the purchase
price of the properties sold in the execution sale is no ground to assail the validity of the sale, for the judgment debtor has the right to redeem
the property, and the smaller the price, the easier is it for him to buy back the property.

Execution; Appeals; Alias Writ; Execution pending appeal; Clerk of Court may issue ordinary writs and processes under the authority of the
court.The original order of execution pending appeal was perfectly valid, and the issuance of alias writ when the original writ was not acted
upon at the instance of the plaintiff for the reason that amicable settlement between the parties was proposed but failed to materialize, did not
affect the validity of either the original or alias writ of execution. Accordingly, We rule that contrary to the contention of respondent Imperial
(see pages 22-23, Brief for the Respondent), the writ of execution that gave rise to the levy of the properties in question and their sale in a public
auction is valid and regular in all respects. That the alias writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of Court and not by the judge is no ground tor
holding invalid said alias writ, considering that the Clerk of Court is not without authority to issue ordinary writs and processes, under the seal of
the Court.

Obaa vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 866, G.R. No. 78635 April 27, 1989
It should be noted that Section 7 of Rule 57 requires that in attaching real property a copy of the order, description, and notice must be served
on the occupant, in this case the occupant at 48 Damortiz Street, Damar Village, Quezon City. The trial court in the annulment case ruled that the
attachment was void from the beginning. The action in personam which required personal service was never converted into an action in rem
where service by publication would have been valid. Obaa vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 866, G.R. No. 78635 April 27, 1989

Du vs. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., 432 SCRA 43, G.R. No. 156580 June 14, 2004
Attachment; An attachment that is duly annotated on a certificate of title is superior to the right of a prior but unregistered buyer.The
preference given to a duly registered levy on attachment or execution over a prior unregistered sale is well-settled in our jurisdiction. As early as
Gomez v. Levy Hermanos, this Court has held that an attachment that is duly annotated on a certificate of title is superior to the right of a prior
but unregistered buyer.

Same; Same; Levy; The subsequent sale of the property to the attaching creditor must, of necessity, retroact to the date of the levy.The
subsequent sale of the property to the attaching creditor must, of necessity, retroact to the date of the levy. Otherwise, the preference created
by the levy would be meaningless and illusory, as reiterated in Defensor v. Brillo: x x x. The doctrine is well-settled that a levy on execution duly
registered takes preference over a prior unregistered sale; and that even if the prior sale is subsequently registered before the sale in execution
but after the levy was duly made, the validity of the execution sale should be maintained, because it retroacts to the date of the levy; otherwise,
the preference created by the levy would be meaningless and illusory.

Same; Same; Same; Precedence should be given to a levy on attachment or execution, whose registration was before that of the prior sale.The
preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale. That was the import of
Capistrano v. PNB, which held that precedence should be given to a levy on attachment or execution, whose registration was before that of the
prior sale.

Same; Same; Same; It is settled that a person dealing with registered property may rely on the title and be charged with notice of only such
burdens and claims as are annotated thereon.Suffice it to say that when Stronghold registered its notice of attachment, it did not know that
the land being attached had been sold to petitioner. It had no such knowledge precisely because the sale, unlike the attachment, had not been
registered. It is settled that a person dealing with registered property may rely on the title and be charged with notice of only such burdens and
claims as are annotated thereon. This principle applies with more force to this case, absent any allegation or proof that Stronghold had actual
knowledge of the sale to petitioner before the registration of its attachment. Du vs. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., 432 SCRA 43, G.R. No. 156580
June 14, 2004

Valdevieso vs. Damalerio, 451 SCRA 664, G.R. No. 133303 February 17, 2005
Attachments; A levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered sale, and the preference is not diminished even
by the subsequent registration of the prior sale since an attachment is a proceeding in rem.The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly
registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the property involved was duly
covered by the Torrens system which works under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land. The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration
of the prior sale. This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole
world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution
of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation
of it to pay the owners debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment
is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. Valdevieso vs. Damalerio, 451 SCRA 664, G.R. No. 133303
February 17, 2005

ATTACHMENT; SHERIFF'S LIABILITY.Defendant as sheriff attached certain property under a writ of execution. The attachment became invalid
because the defendant did not maintain control over the property, either personally or by his representative. Plaintiffs innocently, in good faith,
and under a right acquired possession of the property. Subsequently defendant obtained possession of and sold the property: Held, That the
defendant is liable either to return the property or its value. Walker vs. McMicking., 14 Phil. 668, No. 5534 December 23, 1909

Personnel; Sheriffs; Attachments; A sheriffs act of leaving personal property in the possession and control of the creditor does not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.Clearly, respondents act of leaving the passenger jeep in the possession and control of the
creditor did not satisfy the foregoing requirements of the Rules; neither did it conform to the plainly worded RTC order. The note in the receipt
that imposed on Ignacio the obligation to produce the same whenever required by the court was no compliance either, because it did not establish
that the property was in respondent sheriffs substantial presence and possession. Respondent fell short of his obligation to take and safely keep
the attached property in his capacity.
Same; Same; Same; Where a court has no storage facility to house a property attached, the sheriff should deposit such property in a bonded
warehouse.His claim that the regional trial court did not have any storage facility to house said property is no justification. He could have
deposited it in a bonded warehouse.

Same; Same; Same; The attaching creditor is not authorized to have possession of the attached property.Contrary to respondent sheriffs
contention, compelling the attaching creditor to release the property in question was not in order, because the proper remedy provided by the
Rules of Court was for the party whose property had been attached to apply for the discharge of the attachment by filing a counterbond. The
effect of this remedy is the delivery of possession of the attached property to the party giving the counterbond. The attaching creditor was not
authorized to have possession of the attached property, contrary to the insistence of respondent sheriff.

Same; Same; Same; When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed
with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.Leaving the attached property in the possession of the attaching
creditor makes a farce of the attachment. This is not compliance with the issuing courts order. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it
is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its
mandate. He is supposed to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. If he fails to comply, he is liable to the person in whose favor the
process or writ runs.
Same; Same; Same; A sheriffs prerogatives do not give him any discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of the
attached property.By acceding to the request of Ignacio, respondent sheriff actually extended an undue favor which prejudiced the complainant
as well as the orderly administration of justice. He exceeded his powers which were limited to the faithful execution of the courts orders and
service of its processes. His prerogatives did not give him any discretion to determine who among the parties was entitled to possession of the
attached property. National Bureau of Investigation vs. Tuliao, 270 SCRA 351, A.M. No. P-96-1184 March 24, 1997

Sheriffs; In enforcing a writ of attachment, a sheriff who takes personal property capable of manual delivery shall safely keep it in custody after
issuing the corresponding receipt therefor.We find that the charges against respondent sheriff have bases. Verily, he blatantly violated Section
_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.
441

VOL. 419, JANUARY 15, 2004


441
Villanueva-Fabella vs. Lee
7(b) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court when he deposited the machine in the warehouse of the plaintiff. In enforcing a writ of attachment, a sheriff
who takes personal property capable of manual delivery shall safely keep it in custody after issuing the corresponding receipt therefor.
Respondent sheriff failed to do so.
Same; Same; Sheriffs have to perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon them and show at all times a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of their duties.Sheriffs are officers of the court who serve and execute writs addressed to them by the
court, and who prepare and submit returns of their proceedings. They also keep custody of attached properties. As officers of the court, they
must discharge their duties with great care and diligence. They have to perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon [them] and
show at all times a high degree of professionalism in the performance of [their] duties.
Same; Same; Sheriffs must keep the levied property safely in their custody, not in that of any of the parties.The duty of sheriffs to execute a
writ issued by a court is purely ministerial, not discretionary. Clearly, they must keep the levied property safely in their custody, not in that of any
of the parties. They exercise no discretion in this regard, for attachment is harsh, extraordinary and summary in naturea rigorous remedy
which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. Villanueva-Fabella vs. Lee, 419 SCRA 440, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518 January 15, 2004

Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must
retain it in his custody for five days and he shall return it to the defendant, if the latter, as in the instant case, requires its return and files a
counterbond.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; His claim that the Office of the Regional Sheriff did not have a place to store the seized items cannot justify his
violation of the Rule.In violation of said Rule, respondent immediately turned over the seized articles to PDCP. His claim that the Office of the
Regional Sheriff did not have a place to store the seized items, cannot justify his violation of the Rule. As aptly noted by the Investigating Judge,
the articles could have been deposited in a bonded warehouse. guilty of serious misconduct and RESOLVED to impose upon him the penalty of
FOUR (4) MONTHS SUSPENSION without pay, the period of which Sebastian vs. Valino, 224 SCRA 256, A.M. No. P-91-549 July 5, 1993

Sheriff has no authority to implement a writ of execution against a person even if named as a defendant where there is no judgment against her
and the writ is directed only against another defendant.While there is evidence to show that indeed complainant Marianette Villareal is the
principal debtor while Felimon Cangrejo is merely a co-maker, the fact remains that Cangrejo was the sole debtor adjudged liable for the loan
obtained from the Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. and the alias writ of execution was directed only against him. Hence, respondent
Rarama had no authority to implement the same against herein complainant considering that, although she was named as a defendant in the
collection case, there was no judgment against her as of the date of the incident.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary,
to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.The sheriff, as an officer of the court upon whom
the execution of a final judgment depends, must necessarily be circumspect and proper in his behavior. Execution is the fruit and end of the suit
and is the life of the law. Thus, when a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate. He is to execute the directives of the court therein
strictly in accordance with the letter thereof and without any deviation therefrom.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A sheriff has no authority to levy on execution upon the property of any person other than that of the judgment
debtor, because if an execution against one man would excuse the sheriff for taking the property of another, every citizen would be at his mercy
and none could call his estate his own.Hence, a sheriff has no authority to levy on execution upon the property of any person other than that
of the judgment debtor. If he does so, the writ of execution affords him no justification, for such act is not in obedience to the mandate of the
writ. As long as the sheriff confines his acts to the authority of the process, he is not liable, but all of his acts which are not justified by the writ
are without authority of law. This is so because if an execution against one man would excuse the sheriff for taking the property of another, every
citizen would be at his mercy and none could call his estate his own.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; That the title of a case specifically names a person as a defendant is of no moment as execution must conform
to that which is directed in the dispositive portion and not what appears in the title of the case.Respondent Raramas improvidence in enforcing
a judgment against complainant who is not the judgment debtor in the case calls for disciplinary action. Considering the ministerial nature of his
duty in enforcing writs of execution, it is incumbent upon him to ensure that only that part of a decision ordained or decreed in the dispositive
portion should be the subject of execution, no more and no less. That the title of the case specifically names complainant as one of the defendants
is of no moment as execution must conform to that which is directed in the dispositive portion and not what appears in the title of the case.

Same; Same; Same; Pursuant to the policy adopted by the Supreme Court, the recommended penalty of suspension against a sheriff guilty of
serious misconduct converted to a fine equivalent to the salary corresponding to the period of suspension.We find the recommended penalty
of three months suspension proper and commensurate under the circumstances obtaining in this case. However, pursuant to the policy adopted
by the Court, a fine equivalent to the salary of respondent for three months should instead be imposed, but with some mitigation considering
the nominal extent of the damages sustained by complainant who, to a certain extent, also contributed in bringing about the situation which
gave rise to the incident. Villareal vs. Rarama, 247 SCRA 493, A.M. No. P-94-1108 August 23, 1995

The rule is that when a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity
and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.As regards the charge against respondent Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Lilia S.
Buena, the same is dismissed, it appearing from the certification she issued that the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the RTC, Branch 27,
Naga City was received by her on September 2, 1992 at 2:15 p.m., after the demolition had been completely effected and the premises delivered
to the plaintiff at 1:30 p.m. of same date. It appears that respondent Buena was not aware of the existing TRO which she received within the hour
after the demolition had taken place, thus rendering said restraining order a fait accompli. The rule is that when a writ is placed in the hands of a
sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.
He may not apply his discretion as to whether to execute it or not. Balantes vs. Ocampo III, 242 SCRA 327, A.M. No. MTJ-93-853, A.M. No. P-94-
1013 March 14, 1995

Sheriffs; Execution; A sheriff, to whom a valid writ or process is delivered to be levied upon a property within his jurisdiction, is liable to the person
in whose favor the process or writ runs if he fails to make a levy upon property owned by the judgment debtor within his jurisdiction.Indeed,
as clearly stated in the Manual for Clerks of Court, a sheriff, to whom a valid writ or process is delivered to be levied upon a property within his
jurisdiction, is liable to the person in whose favor the process or writ runs if he fails to make a levy upon property owned by the judgment debtor
within his jurisdiction and by reason thereof the judgment creditor is injured. It is not dependent upon intentional wrong or negligent omission
to seize property of judgment debtor.
Same; Same; The sheriff, an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in his
behavior.Respondent ought to have known the correct procedure to be followed in order to ensure proper administration of justice, especially
in its concluding stage. He failed to observe that degree of dedication to the duties and responsibilities required of him as a sheriff. He is bound
to discharge his duties with prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. The sheriff,
an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in his behavior. Execution is the
fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law.
Same; Same; Respondent's lackadaisical attitude betrays his inefficiency and incompetence which in accordance with Sec. 46(b)(8) of the Civil
Service Law is a ground for disciplinary action.The fact is that he has shown himself to be less than energetic and zealous in the performance
of his duty. His lackadaisical attitude betrays his inefficiency and incompetence which in accordance with Sec. 46(b)(8) of the Civil Service Law is
a ground for disciplinary action.
Elipe vs. Fabre, 241 SCRA 249, A.M. No. P-94-1068 February 13, 1995

Attachment; Actual or constructive levy on attachment.As a general rule, however, a levy of an attachment upon personal property may be
either actual or constructive. In this case, levy had been constructively made by the registration of the same with the Philippine Coast Guard on
February 7, 1974. Constructive possession should be held sufficient where actual possession is not feasible, particularly when it was followed up
by the actual seizure of the property as soon as that could possibly be effected.
Same; Same; Distinguished; Writ of Execution from Writ of Attachment.Petitioners further argue that the levy was illegal because the Writ was
implemented more than sixty days after the issuance so that they need not have complied with Section 14, Rule 57, supra. The Rules do not
provide any lifetime for a Writ of Attachment unlike a Writ of Execution. But even granting that a Writ of Attachment is valid for only sixty days,
yet, since there was constructive levy within that period the fact that actual seizure was effected only thereafter cannot affect the validity of that
levy. Roque vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 540, No. L-42594 October 18, 1979

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Service of summons upon a corporation through the secretary of the president of the corporation,
valid; Secretary considered as agent of the corporation under Sec. 13 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.It is true that Saquilayan is not among
the persons mentioned in section 13. However, she, being under the control of Summit Trading, has not explained what she has done with the
summons and complaint. The logical assumption is that she delivered it to her boss, the president of Summit Trading. As already stated, she
received a copy of the decision and Summit Trading became aware of it. Summit Tradings motion for reconsideration was denied. While Summit
Trading is technically correct in contending that there was no strict compliance with section 13, we cannot close our eyes to the realities of the
situation. Under the facts of this case, Saquilayan, being the secretary of the president (whose contact with the outside world is normally through
his secretary), may be regarded as an agent within the meaning of section 13. (See Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Far East Motor Corporation, L-
31339, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 298; Filoil Marketing Corporation vs. Marine Development Corporation of the Phil., L-29636, September 30,
1982, 117 SCRA 86.) Hence summons was validly served upon Summit Trading. Its negligence in not answering the complaint was inexcusable, In
fact, up to this time, Summit Trading has not bothered to state its defenses to the action nor stated whether it has a meritorious case warranting
the setting aside of the default judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; General rule that service on a secretary of the president of a corporation, is improper, as summons must be
served personally on the president himself; Exception is, when the presidents secretary is regarded as agent under Sec. 13, Rule 14, Rules of
Court.We are not saying that service on such a secretary is always proper. Generally, it is improper. The president himself must be served
personally with the summons if it is desired to effect the service on that particular officer. But, as already stated, under the facts of this case, the
presidents secretary may be regarded as the agent within the meaning of section 13 since service upon her of the judgment itself came to the
notice of Summit Trading.Summit Trading and Development Corp. vs. Avendao, 135 SCRA 397, No. L-60038 March 18, 1985

Attachment; Corporations; Both the Revised Rules of Court and the Corporation Code do not require annotation in the corporations stock and
transfer books for the attachment of shares of stock to be valid and binding on the corporation and third parties.The attachment lien acquired
by the consortium is valid and effective. Both the Revised Rules of Court and the Corporation Code do not require annotation in the corporations
stock and transfer books for the attachment of shares of stock to be valid and binding on the corporation and third party.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Attachments of shares of stock are not included in the term transfer as provided in Sec. 63 of the Corporation
Code.Are attachments of shares of stock included in the term transfer as provided in Sec. 63 of the Corporation Code? We rule in the negative.
As succinctly declared in the case of Monserrat v. Ceron, chattel mortgage over shares of stock need not be registered in the corporations stock
and transfer book inasmuch as chattel mortgage over shares of stock does not involve a transfer of shares, and that only absolute transfers of
shares of stock are required to be recorded in the corporations stock and transfer book in order to have force and effect as against third
persons.
Same; Same; An attachment does not constitute an absolute conveyance of property but is primarily used as a means to seize the debtors
property in order to secure the debt or claim of the creditor in the event that a judgment is rendered.Although the Monserrat case refers to
a chattel mortgage over shares of stock, the same may be applied to the attachment of the disputed shares of stock in the present controversy
since an attachment does not constitute an absolute conveyance of property but is primarily used as a means to seize the debtors property in
order to secure the debt or claim of the creditor in the event that a judgment is rendered.

Same; Sales; A purchaser of attached property acquires it subject to an attachment legally and validly levied thereon.The only basis, then, for
petitioner CEICs claim is the Deed of Sale under which it purchased the disputed shares. It is, however, a settled rule that a purchaser of attached
property acquires it subject to an attachment legally and validly levied thereon.

Same; Actions; Garnishments; Corporations; Secretaries; A notice of garnishment served on the secretary of the president binds the
corporation.CEIC vigorously argues that the consortiums writ of attachment over the disputed shares of Chemphil is null and void, insisting as
it does, that the notice of garnishment was not validly served on the designated officers on 19 July 1985. It was served on Thelly Ruiz who was
neither the president nor the managing agent of Chemphil. It makes no difference, CEIC further avers, that Thelly Ruiz was the secretary of the
President of Chemphil, for under the above-quoted provision she is not among the officers so authorized or designated to be served with the
notice of garnishment.
HELD: We cannot subscribe to such a narrow view of the rule on proper service of writs of attachment. A secretarys major function is to assist
his or her superior. He/ she is in effect an extension of the latter. Obviously, as such, one of her duties is to receive letters and notices for and in
behalf of her superior, as in the case at bench. The notice of garnishment was addressed to and was actually received by Chemphils president
through his secretary who formally received it for him. Thus, in one case, we ruled that the secretary of the president may be considered an
agent of the corporation and held that service of summons on him is binding on the corporation.

Same; Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; A writ of attachment is not extinguished by the execution of a compromise agreement among the
parties.CEIC argues that a writ of attachment is a mere auxiliary remedy which, upon the dismissal of the case, dies a natural death. Thus, when
the consortium entered into a compromise agreement, which resulted in the termination of their case, the disputed shares were released from
garnishment. We disagree. To subscribe to CEICs contentions would be to totally disregard the concept and purpose of a preliminary attachment.
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property
or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the Sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might
be secured in said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.

Same; Same; Same; Same; An attachment lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until
judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.We reiterate the rule laid down in BF
Homes, Inc. v. CA that an attachment lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until judgment
is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The parties to the compromise agreement should not be deprived of the protection provided by an attachment lien
especially in an instance where one reneges on his obligations under the agreement.The case at bench admits of a peculiar character in the
sense that it involves a compromise agreement. Nonetheless, the rule established in the aforequoted cases still applies, even more so since the
terms of the agreement have to be complied with in full by the parties thereto. The parties to the compromise agreement should not be deprived
of the protection provided by an attachment lien especially in an instance where one reneges on his obligations under the agreement, as in the
case at bench, where Antonio Garcia failed to hold up his own end of the deal, so to speak. Chemphil Export & Import Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 251 SCRA 257, G.R. Nos. 112438-39, G.R. No. 113394 December 12, 1995

UDGMENT; EXECUTION AGAINST JUDGMENT CREDITOR; JUDGMENT NOT TO BE SOLD UPON EXECUTION.A judgment for a sum of money is, as
to the party entitled to payment, a credit; and as to the party who ought to pay the money a debt; and although it constitutes property in the
sense necessary to make it liable to be taken for the payment of the judgment obtained in another action, nevertheless, being property which is
incapable of manual delivery, it cannot be sold by the sheriff at public auction under section 457 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2.EXECUTION; JUDGMENT; GARNISHMENT.While a judgment cannot be sold upon execution, it may be "attached upon execution in like manner
as upon writs of attachment" (sec. 450, Code of Civ. Proc.), that is it must be reached by process of garnishment in the same way that debt's and
credits are attached under section 431 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3.GARNISHMENT; NATURE OF PROCESS.The proceeding by garnishment is a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the
judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. By means of the citation the stranger becomes a forced intervenor; and the
court, having acquired jurisdiction over him by means of the citation, requires him to pay his debt, not to his former creditor, but to the new
creditor, who is creditor in the main litigation. It is merely a case of involuntary novation by the substitution of one creditor for another.
4.JUDGMENT; SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT BY THIRD PERSON.Any person indebted to another against whom an execution has been issued
may pay the amount of his indebtedness, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution, to the officer holding the execution,
or to the judgment creditor himself, thereby merging the credit in his own indebtedness and absolving himself pro tanto from his obligation to
the execution debtor. Tayabas Land Co. vs. Sharruf., 41 Phil. 382, No. 15499 February 9, 1921

WRIT OF EXECUTION; INSCRIPTION BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS.The register of deeds in this case denied the inscription of a levy of execution
because the title to the property was in the name of another person and not in the name of the judgment debtor, no evidence having been
submitted that the latter had any interest in the property. It having been afterwards shown that the judicial debtor was one of the heirs of the
person in whose name the property appeared, and there being nothing to indicate that the judicial debtor, being sui juris, could not dispose of
his interest as an heir in the estate, by a conveyance, thus defeating, pro tanto, the provisions of section 450, Code of Civil Procedure, judgment
in this consulta was reversed,
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Albert, J. Gotauco & Co. vs. Register of Deeds of Tayabas, 59 Phil. 756, No. 39596
March 23, 1934

UNLIKE IN THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY, AN ATTACHING CREDITOR IS NOT EXPECTED TO INSPECT THE PROPERTY BEING ATTACHED, AS IT IS
THE SHERIFF WHO DOES THE ACTUAL ACT OF ATTACHING THE PROPERTY.If the allegation of respondent Manila Mission anent the building
of the chapel even before the issuance of the writ of attachment is true, this case would be similar to Ruiz where the vendee of the subject
property was able to introduce improvements. However, respondent Manila Mission presented no evidence of the building of the chapel other
than its bare allegation thereof. More importantly, even assuming for the sake of argument that the chapel was indeed being built at the time of
the attachment of the property, we cannot simply apply Ruiz and conclude that this confirms knowledge of a previous conveyance of the property
at that time. In Ruiz, the attaching party was the wife of the vendor of the subject property, whom she sued for support. It was thus very probable
that she knew of the sale of the property to the vendee therein, considering that the vendee had already introduced improvements thereon. In
the case at bar, there is no special relationship between petitioner Rural Bank and the spouses Soliven sufficient to charge the former with an
implied knowledge of the state of the latters properties. Unlike in the sale of real property, an attaching creditor is not expected to inspect the
property being attached, as it is the sheriff who does the actual act of attaching the property.

Same; Attachment; Since such notice, which was deemed in Ruiz as constructive registration of the sale, was effected only after the attachment
of the subject property, it could not affect the validity of the attachment lien.The Motion, however, merely mentions the construction of the
chapel and does not charge petitioner Rural Bank with knowledge of the construction. There was, therefore, nothing to deny on the part of
petitioner Rural Bank, as the mere existence of such construction at that time would not affect the right of petitioner Rural Bank to its lien over
the subject property. Also, the mention in the Motion of the construction of the chapel would have the effect of being a notice of an adverse
third-party claim only at the time of such Motion. Since such notice, which was deemed in Ruiz as constructive registration of the sale, was
effected only after the attachment of the subject property, it could not affect the validity of the attachment lien.
Same; Levy; Attachment; Sales; Our decision in Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 40 (2001) and Valdevieso v. Damalerio, 451 SCRA 664 (2005),
oblige us to rule that the duly registered levy on attachment by petitioner Rural Bank takes preference over the prior but then unregistered sale
of respondent Manila Mission.In sum, our decisions in Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 40 (2001), and Valdevieso v. Damalerio, 451 SCRA
664 (2005), oblige us to rule that the duly registered levy on attachment by petitioner Rural Bank takes preference over the prior but then
unregistered sale of respondent Manila Mission. There was likewise no evidence of knowledge on the part of petitioner Rural Bank of any third-
party interest in the subject property at the time of the attachment. We are, therefore, constrained to grant the instant Petition for Review and
nullify the Orders of the RTC discharging the subject property from attachment. Rural Bank of Sta. BARBARA [Pangasinan], Inc. vs. Manila Mission
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc., 596 SCRA 415, G.R. No. 130223 August 19, 2009