Bersamin PDF

The Fraternal Order of St. Thomas More Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin Cases
(July 2016- April 2017)
TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU TAU MU
JULY 2016
TARCISIO S. CALILUNG, PETITIONER,

VS.
PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RP TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC., RENATO L. PUNZALAN AND JOSE MANALO,
JR., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 195641 JULY 11, 2016
FINALITY OF JUDGMENT
It is settled that upon the finality of the judgment, the prevailing party is entitled, as a matter of right, to a writ of execution to
enforce the judgment, the issuance of which is a ministerial duty of the court.
Being already final and executory, it is immutable, and can no longer be modified or otherwise disturbed. Its immutability is
grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, which demand that the judgment of the courts, at the
risk of occasional errors, must become final at some definite date set by law or rule. Indeed, the proper enforcement of the rule of
law and the administration of justice require that litigation must come to an end at some time; and that once the judgment attains
finality, the winning party should not be denied the fruits of his favorable result.
Verily, the execution must conform to, and not vary from, the decree in the final and immutable judgment.
INTEREST; MONETARY INTEREST; COMPENSATORY INTEREST
Interest is a compensation fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance of money. This is referred to as monetary interest.
Interest may also be imposed by law or by courts as penalty or indemnity for damages. This is called compensatory interest.
The right to interest arises only by virtue of a contract or by virtue of damages for delay or failure to pay the principal loan on which
interest is demanded.
GENERAL RULE: Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates that no interest shall be due
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. As can be gleaned from the foregoing provision, payment of monetary interest is
allowed only if:
(1) there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and
(2) the agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing.
The concurrence of the two conditions is required for the payment of monetary interest. Thus, we have held that collection of
interest without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law.
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 1 of 74

The Fraternal Order of St. Thomas More Justice Lucas P. Bersamin Cases
(July 2016- April 2017)
EXCEPTIONS: There are instances in which an interest may be imposed even in the absence of express stipulation, verbal or written,
regarding payment of interest. Article 2209 of the Civil Code states that if the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money,
and the debtor incurs delay, a legal interest of 12% per annum may be imposed as indemnity for damages if no stipulation on the
payment of interest was agreed upon. Likewise, Article 2212 of the Civil Code provides that interest due shall earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent on this point.
All the same, the interest under these two instances may be imposed only as a penalty or damages for breach of contractual
obligations. It cannot be charged as a compensation for the use or forbearance of money. In other words, the two instances apply
only to compensatory interest and not to monetary interest.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PETITIONER,

VS
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 213847 JULY 12, 2016
RESOLUTION
BAIL
Section 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court expressly states that one of the conditions of bail is for the accused to "appear before the
proper court whenever required by the court or these Rules." The practice of bail fixing supports this purpose.
Thus, in Villasenor v. Abano, the Court has pronounced that "the principal factor considered (in bail fixing), to the determination of
which most factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment." The Court
has given due regard to the primary but limited purpose of granting bail, which was to ensure that the petitioner would appear
during his trial and would continue to submit to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to answer the charges levelled against him.
Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer to a criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his or her
liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be presumed innocent. Hence, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in assuring his presence at trial.
Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight. This is the reason precisely why the probability or the
improbability of flight is an important factor to be taken into consideration in granting or denying bail, even in capital cases. The
exception to the fundamental right to bail should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.
Apparently, an accused's official and social standing and his other personal circumstances are considered and appreciated as tending
to render his flight improbable.

(July 2016- April 2017)
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, PETITIONER,
VS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.
X-----------------------X
G.R. NO. 220953
BENIGNO B. AGUAS, PETITIONER,

VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 220598 JULY 19, 2016
The Ombudsman charged former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo with plunder before the Sandiganbayan.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO CORRECT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of
the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment."
It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and
that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed.
In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case
'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result
of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII.
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience
of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of
discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the
demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

(July 2016- April 2017)
CONSPIRACY
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit
it. In this jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere means to commit a crime.
As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and prescribes a penalty for it. The exception is exemplified
in:
1. Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason),
2. Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection) and
3. Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of the Revised Penal Code.
When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the
conspirators, or their community of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown.
We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious one. Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or
acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation
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in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Hence, conspiracy must be
established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
EXPRESS CONSPIRACY VS IMPLIED CONSPIRACY
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms.
1. The first is the express form, which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the
crime.
2. However, conspiracies are not always shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the
implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the samse unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment. Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts
of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of
action and a community of interest.
OVERT OR EXTERNAL ACTS
But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have performed at least an overt act in
pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and

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each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts. In this connection, the character of the overt act has been
explained in People v. Lizada:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular
crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its
natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a
direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation
has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of
being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the
commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is
so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the
accused is.
It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was
the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are
made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must
have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to
the offense.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY SANDIGANBAYAN
It is in this regard that the Sandigabayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To start with, its
conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the
information did not aver at all that she had been the mastermind; hence, the Sandigabayan thereby acted capriciously and
arbitrarily. In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder
was absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying approval of a fund release
by the President. Indeed, pursuant to People v. Lizada, supra, an act or conduct becomes an overt act of a crime only when it evinces
a causal relation to the intended crime because the act or conduct will not be an overt act of the crime if it does not have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
WHEEL CONSPIRACY
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, the Court recognized two nuances of appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the wheel
conspiracy and the chain conspiracy.
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or
groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a
common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the
success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.
ILLUSTRATIONS:
An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was the conspiracy alleged in the
information for plunder filed against former President Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former President Estrada was the

(July 2016- April 2017)
hub while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the
overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
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On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United States illustrates a wheel conspiracy where multiple
conspiracies were established instead of one single conspiracy. There, Simon Brown, the hub, assisted 31 independent
individuals to obtain separate fraudulent loans from the US Government. Although all the defendants were engaged in the
same type of illegal activity, there was no common purpose or overall plan among them, and they were not liable for
involvement in a single conspiracy. Each loan was an end in itself, separate from all others, although all were alike in having
similar illegal objects. Except for Brown, the common figure, no conspirator was interested in whether any loan except his
own went through. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there existed 32 separate conspiracies involving Brown
rather than one common conspiracy.
CHAIN CONSPIRACY
The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists when there is successive communication and cooperation in
much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and
then retailer and consumer.
ILLUSTRATION:
36
This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal objective. Illustrative of chain conspiracy
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was that involved in United States v. Bruno, of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. There, 88 defendants were
indicted for a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess narcotics. This case involved several smugglers who had brought
narcotics to retailers who, in turn, had sold the narcotics to operatives in Texas and Louisiana for distribution to addicts. The
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that what transpired was a single chain conspiracy in which the smugglers
knew that the middlemen must sell to retailers for distribution to addicts, and the retailers knew that the middle men must
purchase drugs from smugglers. As reasoned by the court, "the conspirators at one end of the chain knew that the unlawful
business would not and could not, stop with their buyers; and those at the other end knew that it had not begun with their
sellers." Each conspirator knew that "the success of that part with which he was immediately concerned was dependent
upon success of the whole." This means, therefore, that "every member of the conspiracy was liable for every illegal
transaction carried out by other members of the conspiracy in Texas and in Louisiana."
Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the
act of one is the act of all. A co-conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither does he have to
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know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal act. Otherwise, the criminal liability of each
accused is individual and independent.
PLUNDER
The law on plunder(R.A. 7080) requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or
accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through
a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof.

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Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her
co-conspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate
because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main
plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.
41
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient
if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such
as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of
common understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently
enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to
the allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No.
7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law
required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed
of the charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be
set out in the information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.
DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
Lastly, the Prosecution's effort to show irregularities as badges of bad faith has led it to claim that GMA had known that Uriarte
would raid the public treasury, and would misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue of her
power of control over PCSO.
The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers to
GMA as the superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally unacceptable and
incomprehensible.
The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations. The Court ruled
44
in Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo that command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed
by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. The
doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human rights abuses. But this case involves neither a probe of GMA' s actions
as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As such, it is legally improper to
impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any conspiracy between them.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR PLUNDER
To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege and establish the following elements, namely:
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance with members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt
or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

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(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of
its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation
of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
46
P50,000,000.00.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not less than
P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least
P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had
amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented
by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or
Uriarte.
PREDICATE ACT OF RAIDING THE PUBLIC TREASURY
It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the enumeration of the possible predicate acts in the commission
of plunder did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to raids on the public
treasury, as a means to commit plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on the public treasury" is consummated where all
the acts necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the public treasury" can be said to have been
achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers either through misuse, misappropriation or conversion, without need of
establishing gain or profit to the "raider" gets material possession of a government asset through improper means and has free
disposal of the same, the raid or pillage is completed.
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was used to acquire real or personal properties or
used for any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a plunderer had already amassed, acquired or
accumulated P50 Million or more of government funds and just decide to keep it in his vault and never used such funds for any
purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing, the monies went up in flames or
recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the purpose to actually benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely, in such

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cases, a plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit should still be evidence-based must
fail.
RAIDS IN PUBLIC TREASURY
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides:
Section I .Definition of Terms. - x x x
xxxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying
words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the
maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase
that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company
of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a
statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or
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restricted by the latter.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to
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misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance,
51
privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;" and malversation occurs when "any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
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person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The common thread that binds all the four
terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in
the company of the four other terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public
treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public
treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the
property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To
justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to
having acted without jurisdiction.

(July 2016- April 2017)
VERLITA V. MERCULLO AND RAYMOND VEDANO, COMPLAINANTS,
VS.
ATTY. MARIE FRANCESE RAMON, RESPONDENT.
A.C. NO. 11078 JULY 19, 2016
The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer. Any violation of the oath may be punished with either
disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law, or other commensurate disciplinary action. Every lawyer must at no time be
wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his admission to the Bar, but are also essential for his
continued membership in the Law Profession. Any conduct unbecoming of a lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath.
As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in her dealings with
others, especially clients whom she should serve with competence and diligence. Her duty required her to maintain fealty to them,
binding her not to neglect the legal matter entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection therewith rendered her liable.
Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of returning the money and her refusal to communicate with the complainants on the matter of
her engagement aggravated the neglect and dishonesty attending her dealings with the complainants.
The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission of the respondent within the coverage of Rule 1. 01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code exacted from her not only a firm respect for the law and legal processes but also
the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.
Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. Such
disregard could only be wrong because it reflected her undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court
has invested with the authority to investigate the disbarment complaint against her. She thus exhibited her irresponsibility as well as
her utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary. It cannot be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should comply
with the orders of the Court and of the Court's duly constituted authorities, like the IBP, the office that the Court has particularly
tasked to carry out the specific function of investigating attorney misconduct.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,

VS.
HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND HON. RICARDO BLANCAFLOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

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G.R. NO. 204605 JULY 19, 2016
LEGAL STANDING TO SUE OR LOCU STANDI
Legal standing refers to "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."
According to Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., standing is "a peculiar concept in constitutional law
because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest."
It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions," Accordingly, it has been held that
the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute or act complained of.
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a
public action had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute must have "a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in
the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized the approach when the cases had
"transcendental importance."
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative
action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely
affected by the action complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is
entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication ofa public right.
Accordingly, we recognize IPAP's locus standi to bring the present challenge. Indeed, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude
towards locus standi whenever the issue presented for consideration has transcendental significance to the people, or whenever the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.

(July 2016- April 2017)
TREATIES VS. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Before going further, we have to distinguish between treaties and international agreements, which require the Senate's
concurrence, on one hand, and executive agreements, which may be validly entered into without the Senate's concurrence.
Executive Order No. 459, Series of 1997, notes the following definitions, to wit:
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms.
a. International agreement- shall refer to a contract or understanding, regardless of nomenclature, entered into between
the Philippines and another government in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments.
b. Treaties- international agreements entered into by the Philippines which require legislative concurrence after executive
ratification. This term may include compacts like conventions, declarations, covenants and acts.
c. Executive Agreements- similar to treaties except that they do not require legislative concurrence.
The Court has highlighted the difference between treaties and executive agreements in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
31
Trading, thusly:
International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements
embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.
32
In the Philippines, the DFA, by virtue of Section 9, Executive Order No. 459, is initially given the power to determine whether an
agreement is to be treated as a treaty or as an executive agreement. To determine the issue of whether DFA Secretary Del Rosario
gravely abused his discretion in making his determination relative to the Madrid Protocol, we review the jurisprudence on the nature
of executive agreements, as well as the subject matters to be covered by executive agreements.
The pronouncement in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading is instructive, to wit:
x x x The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the making of "treaties"
(Constitution of the Philippines; Article VII, Section 10[7]), which are, however, distinct and different from
"executive agreements," which may be validly entered into without such concurrence.
"Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive
agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.
xxxx
"x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered
into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation
rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement
of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
xxxx
Agreements with respect to the registration of trademarks have been concluded by the Executive with various
countries under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat. 502), x x x

(July 2016- April 2017)
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no
less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments - treaties and conventions. They sometimes take
the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that or more formal documents denominated 'agreements' or 'protocols'. The
point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements - whether denominated executive
agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise - begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to
undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive
agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. x x x It
would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that
they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore
entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation
dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,
international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights, etcetera. Some of them were concluded not by
specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject
matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect of the settlement of claims against foreign governments,
were concluded independently of any legislation. (Emphasis ours)
As the foregoing pronouncement indicates, the registration of trademarks and copyrights have been the subject of executive
agreements entered into without the concurrence of the Senate. Some executive agreements have been concluded in conformity
with the policies declared in the acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter.
In view of the expression of state policy having been made by the Congress itself, the IPAP is plainly mistaken in asserting that "there
34
was no Congressional act that authorized the accession of the Philippines to the Madrid Protocol."
Accordingly, DFA Secretary Del Rosarios determination and treatment of the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement; being in
apparent contemplation of the express state policies on intellectual property as well as within his power under Executive Order No.
459, are upheld.
We observe at this point that there are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering into a treaty or an executive agreement
on a given subject as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is
the parties' intent and desire to craft their international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. The
matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive
agreement; inasmuch as all the parties; regardless of the form, become obliged to comply conformably with the time-honored
35
principle of pacta sunt servanda. The principle binds the parties to perform in good faith their parts in the agreements.
MADRID PROTOCOL; IP CODE
The method of registration through the IPOPHL, as laid down by the IP Code, is distinct and separate from the method of registration
through the WIPO, as set in the Madrid Protocol. Comparing the two methods of registration despite their being governed by two
separate systems of registration is thus misplaced.
The Madrid Protocol accords with the intent and spirit of the IP Code, particularly on the subject of the registration of trademarks.
The Madrid Protocol does not amend or modify the IP Code on the acquisition of trademark rights considering that the applications

(July 2016- April 2017)
under the Madrid Protocol are still examined according to the relevant national law, In that regard, the IPOPHL will only grant
protection to a mark that meets the local registration requirements.
Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON AND HON. RICARDO G. ROSARIO.
OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J July 26, 2016
RESOLUTION
Nonetheless, we have frequently reminded that the power to punish for contempt must be used sparingly, with caution, restraint,
10
judiciousness, deliberation, and in due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. This
approach impels us now to hold Usita responsible for only one count of indirect contempt by considering his forthright compliance
with our directive for him to identify the members of AMALI' s Board of Directors who had caused him to bring the unfounded
charges as a mitigating circumstance.
Anent the liability of the abovenamed members of AMALI's Board of Directors, the general rule is that a corporation and its officers
and agents may be held liable for contempt of court for disobeying judgments, decrees, or orders of a court issued in a case within
11
its jurisdiction, or for committing any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
12
administration of justice. So it must be herein.
INDIRECT CONTEMPT
Any sanction, to be proper, should be commensurate to the contumacious conduct of Usita and the abovenamed members of
AMALI's Board of Directors. The sanction should be meaningful and condign; otherwise, it would be mocked and derided, rendering
it inutile for the purpose. It must also be within the bounds of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whose Section 7 relevantly provides:
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. - If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed
against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding
thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x
Although the conduct we hereby seek to punish tended to obstruct and degrade the administration of justice by respondent
Associate Justices of the CA, fine, instead of imprisonment, will suffice, provided the amount thereof is not petty or trivial. The need
to deter litigants and those acting upon their bidding from ever trying to intimidate or influence sitting judges in the performance of
their sworn duties should be recognized. This instance is a good occasion to do so.

(July 2016- April 2017)
SULPICIO LINES, INC., PETITIONER
VS.
NAPOLEON SESANTE, NOW SUBSTITUTED BY MARIBEL ATILANO, KRISTEN MARIE, CHRISTIAN IONE, KENNETH KERRN AND
KARISNA KATE, ALL SURNAMED SESANTE, RESPONDENTS
G.R. NO. 172682 JULY 27, 2016
An action for breach of contract of carriage survives the death of the plaintiff.
The petitioner urges that Sesante's complaint for damages was purely personal and cannot be transferred to his heirs upon his
death. Hence, the complaint should be dismissed because the death of the plaintiff abates a personal action.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper procedure in the event of the death of a litigant.
RULE ON SUBSTITUTION
The application of the rule on substitution depends on whether or not the action survives the death of the litigant. Section 1, Rule
87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the following actions that survive the death of a party, namely:
(1) recovery of real or personal property, or an interest from the estate;
(2) enforcement of liens on the estate; and
(3) recovery of damages for an injury to person or property.
On the one hand, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court lists the actions abated by death as including:
(1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent;
(2) judgments for money; and
(3) all claims for money against the deceased, arising from contract, express or implied.
A contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees and gives
19
ground for an action for damages. Sesante's claim against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused by the breach of the
contract of carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited rules, the complaint survived his death, and could be continued by his heirs following
the rule on substitution.
BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
Article 1759 of the Civil Code does not establish a presumption of negligence because it explicitly makes the common carrier liable in
the event of death or injury to passengers due to the negligence or fault of the common carrier's employees. It reads:

(July 2016- April 2017)
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful
acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common earners.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employees.
The liability of common carriers under Article 1759 is demanded by the duty of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers
20
in safely carrying their passengers.
On the other hand, Article 1756 of the Civil Code lays down the presumption of negligence against the common carrier in the event
of death or injury of its passenger, viz.:
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755.
Clearly, the trial court is not required to make an express finding of the common carrier's fault or negligence. Even the mere proof of
injury relieves the passengers from establishing the fault or negligence of the carrier or its employees. The presumption of
negligence applies so long as there is evidence showing that:
(a) a contract exists between the passenger and the common carrier; and
(b) the injury or death took place during the existence of such contract.
In such event, the burden shifts to the common carrier to prove its observance of extraordinary diligence, and that an unforeseen
event or force majeure had caused the injury.
The petitioner was directly liable to Sesante and his heirs.

25
A common carrier may be relieved of any liability arising from a fortuitous event pursuant to Article 1174 of the Civil Code. But
while it may free a common carrier from liability, the provision still requires exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or
26
loss. Else stated, for a common carrier to be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was
caused by a fortuitous event. The common carrier must still prove that it did not contribute to the occurrence of the incident due to
27 28
its own or its employees' negligence. We explained in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., as
follows:
In order to be considered a fortuitous event, however,
(1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligation, must be independent of human will;
(2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it must be
impossible to avoid;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
[T]he principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the
violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief.

(July 2016- April 2017)
When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention
or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the
29
acts of God. (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
The petitioner has attributed the sinking of the vessel to the storm notwithstanding its position on the seaworthiness of M/V
Princess of the Orient. Yet, the findings of the BMI directly contradicted the petitioner's attribution. The Captain's erroneous
maneuvers of the MIV Princess of the Orient minutes before she sunk [sic] had caused the accident.
MORAL DAMAGES
We agree with the petitioner that moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract of carriage only when:
(a) death of a passenger results, or
(b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not result.
However, moral damages may be awarded if the contractual breach is found to be wanton and deliberately injurious, or if the one
responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.
While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what is a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, the discretion to make
the determination is lodged in the trial court with the limitation that the amount should not be palpably and scandalously excessive.
The trial court then bears in mind that moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer, or to enrich the
37
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. The amount of the moral damages must always reasonably approximate the extent of
38
injury and be proportional to the wrong committed.
Is notification required before the common carrier becomes liable for lost belongings that remained in the custody of the
passenger? NO.
The rule that the common carrier is always responsible for the passenger's baggage during the voyage needs to be emphasized.
Article 1754 of the Civil Code does not exempt the common carrier from liability in case of loss, but only highlights the degree of
care required of it depending on who has the custody of the belongings. Hence, the law requires the common carrier to observe the
same diligence as the hotel keepers in case the baggage remains with the passenger; otherwise, extraordinary diligence must be
41
exercised. Furthermore, the liability of the common carrier attaches even if the loss or damage to the belongings resulted from the
acts of the common carrier's employees, the only exception being where such loss or damages is due to force majeure.
Accordingly, actual notification was not necessary to render the petitioner as the common carrier liable for the lost personal
belongings of Sesante. By allowing him to board the vessel with his belongings without any protest, the petitioner became
sufficiently notified of such belongings. So long as the belongings were brought inside the premises of the vessel, the petitioner was
thereby effectively notified and consequently duty-bound to observe the required diligence in ensuring the safety of the belongings
during the voyage. Applying Article 2000 of the Civil Code, the petitioner assumed the liability for loss of the belongings caused by
the negligence of its officers or crew. In view of our finding that the negligence of the officers and crew of the petitioner was the
immediate and proximate cause of the sinking of the M/V Princess of the Orient, its liability for Sesante' s lost personal belongings
was beyond question.

(July 2016- April 2017)
TEMPERATE DAMAGES
Temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the
45 46
case, be proven with certainty. Article 2224 of the Civil Code expressly authorizes the courts to award temperate damages
47
despite the lack of certain proof of actual damages.
Indubitably, Sesante suffered some pecuniary loss from the sinking of the vessel, but the value of the loss could not be established
with certainty.
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the Court has the discretion to award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton,
48
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Indeed, exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, and
49
it is left to the court to decide whether or not to award them. In consideration of these legal premises for the exercise of the
judicial discretion to grant or deny exemplary damages in contracts and quasi-contracts against a defendant who acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner, the Court hereby awards exemplary damages to Sesante.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Exemplary damages did not have to be specifically pleaded or proved, because the courts had the discretion to award them for as
long as the evidence so warranted.
Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to "permit the courts to reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its
consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behavior.
Also known as 'punitive' or 'vindictive' damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those
guilty of outrageous conduct.
Clearly, the petitioner and its agents on the scene acted wantonly and recklessly. Wanton and reckless are virtually synonymous in
54
meaning as respects liability for conduct towards others. Wanton means characterized by extreme recklessness and utter disregard
55
for the rights of others; or marked by or manifesting arrogant recklessness of justice or of rights or feelings of others. Conduct
is reckless when it is an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation in which a high degree of danger is apparent. It must be
more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or
56
inadvertence, or simple inattention.
MOMARCO IMPORT COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER

VS.
FELICIDAD VILLAMENA, RESPONDENT
G.R. NO. 192477 JULY 27, 2016

(July 2016- April 2017)
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
A default judgment is frowned upon because of the policy of the law to hear every litigated case on the merits. But the default
judgment will not be vacated unless the defendant satisfactorily explains the failure to file the answer, and shows that it has a
meritorious defense.
The petitioner claims denial of its right to due process, insisting that the service of summons and copy of the complaint was
defective, as, in fact, there was no sheriff's return filed; that the service of the alias summons on January 20, 1998 was also
defective; and that, accordingly, its reglementary period to file the answer did not start to run.
The claim of the petitioner is unfounded. The filing of the formal entry of appearance on May 5, 1998 indicated that it already
became aware of the complaint filed against it on September 23, 1997. Such act of counsel, because it was not for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the trial court, constituted the petitioner's voluntary appearance in the action, which was the
10
equivalent of the service of summons. Jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as the defendant became thereby vested in
11
the RTC, and cured any defect in the service of summons.
12
Under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the three requirements to be complied with by the claiming party before the
defending party can be declared in default are:
(1) that the claiming party must file a motion praying that the court declare the defending party in default;
(2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare it in default;
(3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party failed to answer the complaint within the period
provided by the rule.
It is plain, therefore, that the default of the defending party cannot be declared motu proprio.
Although the respondent filed her motion to declare the petitioner in default with notice to the petitioner only on August 19, 1998,
all the requisites for properly declaring the latter in default then existed. On October 15, 1998, therefore, the RTC appropriately
directed the answer filed to be stricken from the records and declared the petitioner in default. It also received ex parte the
respondent's evidence, pursuant to the relevant rule.
The petitioner's logical remedy was to have moved for the lifting of the declaration of its default but despite notice it did not do the
same before the RTC rendered the default judgment on August 23, 1999. Its motion for that purpose should have been under the
16
oath of one who had knowledge of the facts, and should show that it had a meritorious defense, and that its failure to file the
answer had been due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Its urgent purpose to move in the RTC is to avert the
rendition of the default judgment.
The policy of the law has been to have every litigated case tried on the merits. As a consequence, the courts have generally looked
upon a default judgment with disfavor because it is in violation of the right of a defending party to be heard.
DOCTRINE OF DEFAULT

(July 2016- April 2017)
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of default is that the defendant's failure to answer the complaint despite receiving copy
thereof together with summons, is attributable to one of two causes: either
(a) to his realization that he has no defenses to the plaintiff's cause and hence resolves not to oppose the
complaint, or,
(b) having good defenses to the suit, to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented him
from seasonably filing an answer setting forth those defenses.
It does make sense for a defendant without defenses, and who accepts the correctness of the specific relief prayed for in the
complaint, to forego the filing of the answer or any sort of intervention in the action at all. For even if he did intervene, the result
would be the same: since he would be unable to establish any good defense, having none in fact, judgment would inevitably go
against him. And this would be an acceptable result, if not being in his power to alter or prevent it, provided that the judgment did
not go beyond or differ from the specific relief stated in the complaint. It would moreover spare him from the embarrassment of
openly appearing to defend the indefensible.
On the other hand, if he did have good defenses, it would be unnatural for him not to set them up properly and timely, and if he did
not in fact set them up, it must be presumed that some insuperable cause prevented him from doing so: fraud, accident, mistake,
excusable negligence. In this event, the law will grant him relief; and the law is in truth quite liberal in the reliefs made available to
him: a motion to set aside the order of default prior to judgment, a motion for new trial to set aside the default judgment; an appeal
from the judgment by default even if no motion to set aside the order of default or motion for new trial had been previously
21
presented; a special civil action for certiorari impugning the court's jurisdiction.
VIRGILIO D. MAGAWAY AND CESARIO M. MAGAWAY, COMPLAINANTS

VS.
ATTY. MARIANO A. AVECILLA, RESPONDENT
A.C. NO. 7072 JULY 27, 2016
The complainants hereby seek the disbarment of the respondent for his violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the duties of attorneys under
Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the rules on notarial practice, and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements in the execution of public
10
documents. In this case, the respondent's affixing of his notarial seal on the documents and his signature on the notarial
11
acknowledgments transformed the deeds of sale from private into public documents, and rendered them admissible in court
without further proof of their authenticity because the certificate of acknowledgment constituted them the prima facie evidence of
12
their execution. In doing so, he proclaimed to the world that all the parties executing the same had personally appeared before
him; that they were all personally known to him; that they were the same persons who had executed the instruments; that he had
inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and that they had acknowledged personally before him that they had
13
voluntarily and freely executed the same.
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, the respondent was mandated to discharge his sacred duties with faithful
14
observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat. Indeed, such responsibility was
incumbent upon him by virtue of his solemn Lawyer's Oath to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any, and by virtue of his

(July 2016- April 2017)
undertaking, pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility, not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
15
and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. His failure to ascertain the identity of the person
16
executing the same constituted gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a notary public. As such, it is now unavoidable
for him to accept the commensurate consequences of his indiscretion.
Time and again, the Court has reminded notaries public of the importance attached to the act of notarization. We must stress yet
again that notarization is not an empty, or perfunctory, or meaningless act, for it is invested with substantial public interest. Courts
and other public offices, and the public at large could rely upon the recitals of the acknowledgment executed by the notary
20
public. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.

(July 2016- April 2017)
AUGUST 2016
JOCELYN S. LIMKAICHONG
-VERSUS
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, THROUGH THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN PROMULGATED: REFORM OFFICER
G.R. NO. 158464 , PROMULGATED AUGUST 2, 2016
REMEDIAL LAW - CERTIORARI
However, the petitioner would not be prevented from assailing the dismissal by petition for certiorari provided her resort complied
with the requirements of the Rules of Court for the bringing of the petition for certiorari. In that regard, the following requisites
must concur for certiorari to prosper, namely:
( 1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Without jurisdiction
means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority.
There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words,
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
SAME; SAME; AVAILABILITY OF AN APPEAL AS A REMEDY IS A BAR TO THE BRINGING OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ONLY
WHERE SUCH APPEAL IS IN ITSELF A SUFFICIENT AND ADEQUATE REMEDY.
Indeed, the Court has held that the availability of an appeal as a remedy is a bar to the bringing of the petition for certiorari only
where such appeal is in itself a sufficient and adequate remedy, in that it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious
effects of the judgment or final order complained of.28 The Court does not hesitate or halt on its tracks in granting the writ of
certiorari to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party in cases where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised
his judgment, or where there may be a failure of justice; or where the assailed order is a patent nullity; or where the grant of the
writ of certiorari will arrest future litigations; or for certain considerations, such as public welfare and public policy.

(July 2016- April 2017)
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[p ]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation determination of just compensation has been the subject of various discordant rulings of the Court. Although some of
the later rulings have supposedly settled the controversy of whether the courts or the DAR should have the final say on just
compensation, the conflict has continued, and has caused some confusion to the Bench and the Bar, as well as to the other
stakeholders in the expropriation of agricultural landholdings.
SAME; AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
Under existing law and regulation, respondent LBP is tasked with the responsibility of initially determining the value of lands placed
under land reform and the just compensation to be paid the landowners for their taking. By way of notice sent to the landowner
pursuant to Section 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer to acquire the land sought to be placed under agrarian reform. If
the concerned landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held, and thereafter the provincial adjudicator
(P ARAD), the regional adjudicator (RARAD) or the central adjudicator (DARAB), as the case may be, fixes the price to be paid for the
land, based on the various factors and criteria as determined by law or regulation. Should the landowner disagree with the
valuation, he/she may bring the matter to the RTC acting as the SAC, this is the procedure for the determination of just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657.
The decrees provided certain measures to the effect that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either
the assessment of the property by the Government or the sworn valuation of the property by the owner, whichever was lower. In
declaring the decrees unconstitutional, the Court cogently held:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation
for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private
property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the
strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only
to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The
court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just and fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute
for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
TERESITA I. BUENAVENTURA,
-VERSUS
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
G.R. NO. 167082. AUGUST 3, 2016

(July 2016- April 2017)
CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
As a rule, indeed, the contract of adhesion is no different from any other contract. Its interpretation still aligns with the literal
meaning of its terms and conditions absent any ambiguity, or with the intention of the parties. The terms and conditions of the
promissory notes involved herein, being clear and beyond doubt, should then be enforced accordingly. In this regard, we approve of
the observation by the CA, citing Cruz v. Court of Appeals, that the intention of the parties should be "deciphered not from the
unilateral post facto assertions of one of the parties, but from the language used in the contract." As fittingly declared in The Insular
Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals and Sun Brothers & Company,
"[w]hen the language of the contract is explicit leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters thereof, the
courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import." Accordingly, no court, even
this Court, can "make new contracts for the parties or ignore those already made by them, simply to avoid seeming
hardships. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of liberal construction justifies the creation of a contract for the
parties which they did not make themselves or the imposition upon one party to a contract of an obligation not
assumed."
SAME; SAME; SIMULATED CONTRACTS
Based on Article 134521 of the Civil Code, simulation of contracts is of two kinds, namely:
(1) absolute; and
(2) relative.
Simulation is absolute when there is color of contract but without any substance, the parties not intending to be
bound thereby. It is relative when the parties come to an agreement that they hide or conceal in the guise of
another contract.
The effects of simulated contracts are dealt with in Article 1346 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a
third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy binds the parties to their real agreement. The burden of showing that a contract is simulated rests on the
party impugning the contract. This is because of the presumed validity of the contract that has been duly executed.
The proof required to overcome the presumption of validity must be convincing and preponderant. Without such
proof, therefore, the petitioner's allegation that she had been made to believe that the promissory notes would be
guaranties for the rediscounted checks, not evidence of her primary and direct liability under loan agreements,
could not stand.
Moreover, the issue of simulation of contract was not brought up in the RTC. It was raised for the first time only in the CA. Such
belatedness forbids the consideration of simulation of contracts as an issue. Indeed, the appellate courts, including this Court,
should adhere to the rule that issues not raised below should not be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of due
process and fairness impel this adherence, for it would be violative of the right to be heard as well as unfair to the parties and to the
administration of justice if the points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower courts should
be considered and passed upon by the reviewing courts for the first time.

(July 2016- April 2017)
SAME; SAME; CONTRACTS OF GUARANTY
A contract of guaranty is one where a person, the guarantor, binds himself or herself to another, the creditor, to fulfill the obligation
of the principal debtor in case of failure of the latter to do so. It cannot be presumed, but must be express and in writing to be
enforceable, especially as it is considered a special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another. It being clear
that the promissory notes were entirely silent about the supposed guaranty in favor of Imperial, we must read the promissory notes
literally due to the absence of any ambiguities about their language and meaning. In other words, the petitioner could not validly
insist on the guaranty. In addition, the disclosure statements and the statements of loan release undeniably identified her, and no
other, as the borrower in the transactions. Under such established circumstances, she was directly and personally liable for the
obligations under the promissory notes.
TARCISIO S. CALILUNG,
-VERSUS
PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RP TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC., RENATO L. PUNZALAN AND
JOSE MANALO, JR
G.R. NO. 195641 REVISED AUGUST 5, 2016
CIVIL LAW; INTEREST; MONETARY INTEREST; COMPENSATORY INTEREST
An elucidation on the concept of interest is appropriate at this juncture. The kinds of interest that may be imposed in a judgment
are the monetary interest and the compensatory interest. In this regard, the Comi has expounded in Siga-an v. Villanueva:
Interest is a compensation fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance of money. This is referred to as
monetary interest. Interest may also be imposed by law or by courts as penalty or indemnity for damages. This is
called compensatory interest. The right to interest arises only by virtue of a contract or by virtue of damages for
delay or failure to pay the principal loan on which interest is demanded.
Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates that no interest shall be
due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. As can be gleaned from the foregoing provision, payment of
monetary interest is allowed only if:
(2) the agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing.
The concurrence of the two conditions is required for the payment of monetary interest. Thus,
we have held that collection of interest without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited
by law.
xx xx

(July 2016- April 2017)
There are instances in which an interest may be imposed even in the absence of express stipulation, verbal or
written, regarding payment of interest. Article 2209 of the Civil Code states that if the obligation consists in the
payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs delay, a legal interest of 12% per annum may be imposed as
indemnity for damages if no stipulation on the payment of interest was agreed upon. Likewise, Article 2212 of the
Civil Code provides that interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent on this point.
All the same, the interest under these two instances may be imposed only as a penalty or damages for breach of
contractual obligations. It cannot be charged as a compensation for the use or forbearance of money. In other
words, the two instances apply only to compensatory interest and not to monetary interest. x x x
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
-VERSUS
JUAN ANTONIO
G.R. NO. 207342. AUGUST 16, 2016
CRIMINAL LAW; BRIBERY
A careful reading shows that the foreign law subject-matter of this controversy deals with bribery in both public and private sectors.
However, it is also quite evident that the particular provision of the POBO allegedly violated by Munoz, i.e., Section 9(1)(a), deals
with private sector bribery this, despite the interpretation under Section 2 of the POBO that an "agent includes a public servant and
any person employed by or acting for another." The POBO clearly states that the interpretation shall apply unless the context
otherwise requires. It cannot be argued that Section 9(1)(a) of the POBO encompasses both private individuals and public servants.
A Section 9(1)(a) offense has a parallel POBO provision applicable to public servants, to wit:
Private Sector Bribery Public Sector Bribery
Section 9. Corrupt transactions with agents. Section 4. BRIBERY.xx xx
(2) Any public . Sf!rvant who, whether in Hong Kong or

elsewhere, without lawful authority or reasonable
(1) Any agent who, without lawfi.;l authority or
excuse, solicits or accepts any advantage as an
reasonable excuse, solicits or accepts any advantage
inducement to or reward for or otherwise on account
as an inducement to or reward for or otherwise on
of his-(Amended 28of1980 s. 3)
account of his
a. performing or abstaining from performing, or
(a) doing or forbearing to do, or having done or
having performed or abstained from performing, any
forborne to do, any act in relation to his principal's
act in his capacity as a public servant;
affairs or business; or
xx xx
shall be guilty of an offence.

(July 2016- April 2017)
NILO B. DIONGZON VERSUS ATTY. WILLIAMMIRANO
A.C. NO. 2404. AUGUST 17, 2016
LEGAL ETHICS LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
The lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's advice upon a legal concern. The seeking may be
for consultation on transactions or other legal concerns, or for representation of the client in an actual case in the courts or other
fora. From that moment on, the lawyer is bound to respect the relationship and to maintain the trust and confidence of his client.
No written agreement is necessary to generate a lawyer-client relationship, but in formalizing it, the lawyer may present a retainer
agreement to be considered and agreed to by the client. As with all contracts, the agreement must contain all the terms and
conditions agreed upon by the parties.
SAME. SAME.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and
transactions with their clients. Specifically, Canon 15.03 demands that:
"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."
A conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two opposing parties, like when the lawyer performs
an act that will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represented him, or when the lawyer uses any knowledge
he previously acquired from his first client against the latter.15 The prohibition against conflict of interest is founded on principles of
public policy and good taste, inasmuch as the lawyer-client relationship is based on trust and confidence.16 A lawyer has a duty to
preserve his client's confidence in him, even if their relationship ends. The purpose is to assure freedom of communication between
the lawyer and the client in order to enable the former to properly represent and serve the latter's interests. To use against the
latter any information the former gains during the relationship is deplorable and unethical.
MARY JANE G. DY CHIAO,
-VERSUS
SEBASTIAN BOLIVAR, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19 IN NAGA CITY
G.R. NO. 192491
AUGUST 17, 2016
REMEDIAL LAW

(July 2016- April 2017)
The petitioner was patently guilty of taking an erroneous appeal in view of her manifest intention to limit her appeal to questions of
law. Such an appeal would only be by petition for review on certiorari, to be filed in this Court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed
in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal raising only questions of law brought to the CA instead of to this
Court shall be dismissed. The same rule expressly forbids the erroneous appeal to be transferred to the Court.
SAME;
The petitioner, as the party appealing, had only a limited period of 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from
within which to perfect her appeal to the Court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 2. Time for filing; extension. -The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment
of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the
Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the
petition.
The petitioner obviously failed to perfect her appeal from the dismissal by the RTC (Branch 23) of the case commenced through her
so called Petition with Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The consequence of such failure to
perfect the appeal was to render the dismissal final and immutable. This meant that no court, including this Court, could thereafter
alter, modify or reverse the result. As such, her present appeal to this Court cannot but be viewed and condemned as a futile
attempt to resurrect the lost appeal.
SAME; JURISDICTION OF COURTS
Courts and tribunals with the same or equal authority -even those exercising concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction -are not
permitted to interfere with each other's respective cases, much less their orders or judgments therein. This is an elementary
principle of the highest importance essential to the orderly administration of justice. Its observance is not required on the grounds
of judicial comity and courtesy alone; it is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of
processes. A contrary rule would dangerously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.
SAME; TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

(July 2016- April 2017)
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the
issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a
sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not discretionary. As already mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the
implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a
higher judicial body.
EMILIO A. AQUINO, PETITIONER,
-VERSUS
CARMELITA TANGKENGKO, MORRIS TANGKENGKO AND RANILLO TANGKENGKO
G.R. NO. 197356 AUGUST 24, 2016
REMEDIAL LAW- ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
A petition for annulment of judgment initiated under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances provided the petitioner has failed to avail himself of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law
without fault on his part. It has often been stressed that such action is never resorted to as a substitute for the petitioner's own
neglect in not promptly availing himself of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.
Owing to the exceptional character of the remedy of annulment of judgment, the limitations and guidelines set forth by Rule 4 7
should be strictly complied with. Time and again, the Court has emphatically reminded litigants on this stricture; and on the dire
consequences of ignoring the limitations and guidelines. The Court has explained why in Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court
of Appeals:
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only
when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled
was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in
character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or
resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner
should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of
the safeguards cannot prosper.
INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK, PHIL., INC., REPRESENTED BY LUIS MARCO I. AVANCENA,

-VERSUS
ATTY. REBECCA S. FRANCISCO-SIMBILLO
A.C. NO. 9464. AUGUST 24, 2016

(July 2016- April 2017)
LEGAL ETHICS DISBARMENT
Under Section 27,8 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any of the following grounds, namely:
(1) deceit;
(2) malpractice;
(3) gross misconduct in office;
( 4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(6) violation of the lawyers oath;
(7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
(8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do.
In fine, in order to hold the lawyer amenable to disbarment by reason of his or her having committed a crime involving moral
turpitude, it is not enough to show that there is a pending case involving moral turpitude against him or her, because Section 27 of
Rule 138 expressly requires that he or she must have been found by final judgment guilty of the crime involving moral turpitude.
THE CHAIRMAN AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PALA WAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND THE PALA WAN
COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
-VERSUS
EJERCITO LIM, DOING BUSINESS AS BONANZA AIR SERVICES, AS REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CAPT. ERNESTO LIM
G.R. NO. 183173. AUGUST 24, 2016
POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative agencies possess two kinds of powers, the quasi legislative or rule-making power, and the quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory power. The first is the power to make rules and regulations that results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The issuance of the
assailed A.O. No. 00-05, Resolution. No. 03-211 and the other issuances by the PCSD was in the exercise of the agency's quasi
legislative powers. The second is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act that is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it

(July 2016- April 2017)
SAME; SAME;
We also need to remind that a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an administrative order issued in the
exercise of a quasi legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave
abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Its lies
against the exercise of judicial or ministerial functions, not against the exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally,
the purpose of the writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels. In other words, prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary
course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
-VERSUS
DELIA CAMANNONG,
G.R. NO. 199497, AUG. 24, 2016
CRIMINAL LAW; LABOR LAW; LARGE SCALE ESTAFA, REQUISITES
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are:
(1) that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b ) of
the Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities listed under Article 3410 of the Labor Code;
(2) that she had not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment with respect to
the requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and
(3) that she committed the unlawful acts against three or more persons.
DAMAGES
We uphold the payment of actual damages in that amount and legal interest. It is true that actual damages, to be recoverable, must
not only be capable of proof, but must also be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, for the courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. The courts have thus generally required
competent proof of the actual amount of loss, and for this reason have denied claims of actual damages not supported by
receipts.18 Such policy has eliminated the fabrication of claims for actual damages, or deterred judges from indulging in speculation,
conjecture or guesswork. Yet, in this case, despite the complainants uniformly testifying that they had parted with their money
without asking for receipts, 19 there seemed to be no dispute about each of them having actually paid to the accused-appellant that
amount for their processing and passport fees and other expenses including the amount necessary to open their bank accounts. To
still deny them their right to recover actual damages only because they had no receipts to show for their payments would be a

(July 2016- April 2017)
travesty of justice. For, if we are now affirming her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale for collecting the sums of money
from them, it would really be beyond understanding to reverse the assessment of actual damages by the trial judge just to serve the
general policy of limiting proof of actual damages to receipts.
One of the constant lessons from our experience as judges is that the non-issuance of receipts by the illegal recruiters was also
essential to the scheme to defraud the victims. By all means, then, should the lack of receipts not hinder the courts from vindicating
the victims of the fraud.
Moreover, the negation of the right to recover on that rigid basis would mock the Rules of Court, which has enshrined testimonial
evidence as one of the means sanctioned by it of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. Confining
the proof of actual damages to documentary evidence would definitely trench on the institutional wisdom of the Court in erecting
the triumvirate 9f evidence admissible in court.
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA, MARCELO VILLAGANES, JULIETALAWAGON, CRISPIN ALCOMENDRAS, CORAZON SABINADA, VIRGINIA
CATA-AG, FLORENCIA SABANDON, AND LEDEVINAADLAWAN, PETITIONERS,
-VERSUS
PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DAV AO FRUITS CORPORATION, AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, X
CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO,
-VERSUS
COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION (PBGEA), DAV AO FRUITS CORPORATION, AND
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
G.R. NO. 189185/G.R. NO. 189305. AUGUST 16, 2016
POLITICAL LAW; POLICE POWER
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged test:
the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local government unit, and whether it
is passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law); and
the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy).
SAME; SAME
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in order to promote the general welfare. Such legislative powers spring from the

(July 2016- April 2017)
delegation thereof by Congress through either the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare Clause in Section
16 of the Local Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the local government unit to effectively accomplish
and carry out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain local autonomy. Section 16 reads:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. -Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general legislative power and the police power proper.
General legislative power refers to the power delegated by Congress to the local legislative body, or the Sangguniang Panlungsod in
the case of Davao City, 105 to enable the local legislative body to enact ordinances and make regulations. This power is limited in
that the enacted ordinances must not be repugnant to law, and the power must be exercised to effectuate and discharge the
powers and duties legally conferred to the local legislative body. The police power proper, on the other hand. authorizes the local
government unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the local government unit and its constituents, and for the protection of their property.
SAME; SAME
In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill
the objectives of the Government. A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it
satisfies the following requisites, to wit:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
not unduly oppressive.
The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution.
SAME; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; LEGISLATIVE POWER
The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section 53 and Section 54 of The Local Government Code. These provisions
require the ordinance to be passed by the majority of the members of the sanggunian concerned, and to be presented to the mayor
for approval. With no issues regarding quorum during its deliberation having been raised, and with its approval of by City Mayor
Duterte not being disputed, we see no reason to strike down Ordinance No. 0309-07 for non-compliance with the formal requisites
under the Local Government Code.
SAME; SAME

(July 2016- April 2017)
Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the local government unit with the authority to enact legislation aimed at
promoting the general welfare, viz.:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. --(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, x x x
In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology, the local government unit takes its cue from
Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Following the provisions of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution, the acts of the local government unit designed to ensure the health and lives of its constituents and to promote a
balanced and healthful ecology are well within the corporate powers vested in the local government unit. Accordingly, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City is vested with the requisite authority to enact an ordinance that seeks to protect the health and
well-being of its constituents.
SAME; SAME; ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07 VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law. In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely:
(1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) it must be fair, not oppressive;
(3) it must not be partial or discriminatory;
( 4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
( 5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and
( 6) it must not be unreasonable.
SAME; DUE PROCESS
Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's action. This means
that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance
regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means
that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must
survive a due process challenge.
SAME; SAME; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
A serious challenge being posed against Ordinance No. 0309-07 rests on its supposed collision with the Equal Protection Clause. The
respondents submit that the ordinance transgresses this constitutional guaranty on two counts, to wit:

(July 2016- April 2017)
(1) by prohibiting aerial spraying per se, regardless of the substance or the level of concentration of the chemicals
to be applied; and
(2) by imposing the 30-meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the sizes of the
landholding.
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The guaranty of equal protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's duly
constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs impartially, and not to draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without distinction, nor intends to prohibit
legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection
envisions equality among equals determined according to. a valid. classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. In other words, a valid
classification must be:
(1) based on substantial distinctions;
(2) germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) not limited to existing conditions only; and
( 4) equally applicable to all members of the class.
The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the Government for its conduct is gauged by using the
means-end test. This test requires analysis of:
(1) the interests of the public that generally require its exercise, as distinguished from those of a particular class;
and
(2) the means.
Employee that are responsibly necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive upon individuals. To
determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny
and strict scrutiny.
The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis test) demands that the classification reasonably
relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in cases involving economics or social welfare, or to any other
case not involving a suspect class.
SAME; SAME; RATIONAL BASIS TEST

Under the rational basis test, we shall:
(1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and

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(2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable
distinction.
A reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
SAME; SAME; ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07 IS AN ULTRA VIRES ACT
An ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity on the basis that:
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things,
be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject,
and necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject, and necessitate
action. The local legislative
Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code accords a liberal interpretation to its general welfare provisions. The policy of liberal
construction is consistent with the spirit of local autonomy that endows local government units with sufficient power and discretion
to accelerate their economic development and uplift the quality of life for their constituents.
The power to legislate under the General Welfare Clause is not meant to be an invincible authority. In fact, Salaveria and Abendan
emphasized the reasonableness and consistency of the exercise by the local government units with the laws or policies of the State.
More importantly, because the police power of the local government units flows from the express delegation of the power by
Congress, its exercise is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting the
power should be construed against the local legislative units. Judicial scrutiny comes into play whenever the exercise of police
power affects life, liberty or property. The presumption of validity and the policy of liberality are not restraints on the power of
judicial review in the face of questions about whether an ordinance conforms with the Constitution, the laws or public policy, or if it
is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. The ordinance must pass the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws
NO SEPTEMBER 2016 CASES

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OCTOBER 2016
BENJAMIN RUSTIA, JR., BENJAMIN RUSTIA, SR., AND FAUSTINO "BONG" RUSTIA, PETITIONERS, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 208351, OCTOBER 05, 2016
TREACHERY
Treachery exists when the following elements are present:
(a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed
by him.
Thus, it is not sufficient that the victim was unable to defend himself. The Prosecution must show that the accused
consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.
To establish the attendance of treachery in such an environment, the State's evidence must competently and convincingly show that
the accused made some preparation to kill the victim; hence, a killing done at the spur of the moment cannot be treacherous. Even
where the victim was shot from behind, if the shooting was done in the course of a heated argument between the victim and the
assailant, treachery should not be appreciated, for in that situation, the assailant was filled with anger and rage and excitement, and
had no time to reflect on his actions; in other words, he could not be shown to have consciously adopted the mode of attacking the
victim from behind to facilitate the killing without risk to himself.
In the same manner, the petitioner's claim of incomplete self-defense must fail for being unsupported by the evidence. This
privileged mitigating circumstance requires the indispensable element of unlawful aggression, the nature of which we have
explained in People v. Dulin:
x x x The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether or not the aggression
from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of
unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault
must be actual, or, at least imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds:
(a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and
(b) imminent unlawful aggression.

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ACTUAL OR MATERIAL UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION
Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively
determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury.
IMMINENT UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION
Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another
with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an
angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
ACCOMPLICE
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code provides that accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. The principals included in Article 17 are:\
(1) those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
(2) those who directly force or induce others to commit it; and
(3) those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, three elements must be shown to concur, namely:
(1) that there be a community of design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or
moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and
(3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice.
SPOUSES EMILIO AND ALICIA JACINTO, COMPLAINANTS, V. ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR., RESPONDENT
A.C. NO. 8494, OCTOBER 05, 2016

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A lawyer shall observe candor, honesty and fairness in dealing with his clients, and shall only charge fair and reasonable fees for his
legal services. He should not excessively estimate the value of his professional services. In drawing up the terms of his professional
engagement, he should not practice deceit. The clients are entitled to rescind the written agreement on his professional fees if the
terms thereof contravened the true agreement of the parties.
REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
To determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees, the following factors as enumerated in Rule 20.1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility may serve as a guide, to wit:
(a) the time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) the importance of the subject matter;
(d) the skill demanded;
(e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
(g) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
(h) the contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and j) the professional standing of the
lawyer.
CONTINGENT FEE
A contingent fee arrangement is a contract in writing in which the fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the
action, is made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed right. The amount of the contingent fee
agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation
prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing
should the suit fail. Such arrangement is generally recognized as valid and binding in this jurisdiction but its terms must be
reasonable.
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states that "a contract for a contingent fee, when sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be
subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness."
A contract of this nature is permitted because it redounds to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where
the client has a meritorious cause of action but has no means with which to pay for the legal services unless he can, with the
sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, such arrangement
is the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated.
Considering that a contingent fee arrangement is susceptible to abuse, the courts should closely scrutinize it to protect the client
from unjust charges. The court looks in large measure at the reasonableness of the stipulated fee under the circumstances of each
case. Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:

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Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. -- An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation,
but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract
for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
every attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and
request of his client; and that for as long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of
the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. Yet, equally without question is that the attorney should not
accept the engagement that is way above his ability and competence to handle, for there will then be no basis for him to accept any
amount as attorney's fees; or that he should at least begin to perform the contemplated task undertaken for the client to entitle him
to be compensated on the basis of quantum meruit.
YOLANDA LUY Y GANUELAS, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 200087, OCTOBER 12, 2016
R. A. No. 9165
A successful prosecution for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 11 of R. A. No. 9165 requires that the
following essential elements of the offense be established, namely:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug;
(2) her possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) she freely and consciously possessed the drug.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
The penalty for the crime committed by the petitioner is provided for in Section 11(3) of R.A. No. 9165.
Based on the provision, the correct penalty was an indeterminate sentence whose minimum should not be less than the minimum of
12 years and one day prescribed by Section 11(3), R.A. No. 9165, supra, and whose maximum should not exceed the maximum of 20
years as also prescribed by Section 11(3), R.A. No. 9165, supra. The imposition of the indeterminate sentence was required by
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, viz.:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code

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for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225)
Considering that neither the offense committed nor the imposable penalty was expressly exempt from the coverage of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law pursuant to Section 220 thereof, the imposition of the indeterminate sentence was mandatory. The
minimum and the maximum periods had a worthy objective, for, as the Court expounded in Bacar v. Judge de Guzman, Jr.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he
may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and
moral record.
The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special laws,
with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law
must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.
SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT
The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment, which is a subsidiary personal liability of a person found guilty by final judgment who has
no property with which to meet the fine, is based on and in accord with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, a provision that is
supplementary to special laws (like R.A. No. 9165) unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.23 But subsidiary
imprisonment cannot be imposed on the petitioner because her principal penalty, supra, was higher then prision correccional or
imprisonment for six years.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER, V. HEIRS OF BENEDICTO AND AZUCENA ALONDAY, RESPONDENT
G.R. NO. 171865, OCTOBER 12, 2016
ALL-EMBRACING/BLANKET MORTGAGE/ DRAGNET CLAUSE
There is no question, indeed, that all-embracing or dragnet clauses have been recognized as valid means to secure debts of both
future and past origins. Even so, we have likewise emphasized that such clauses were an exceptional mode of securing obligations,
and have held that obligations could only be deemed secured by the mortgage if they came fairly within the terms of the mortgage
contract. For the all-embracing or dragnet clauses to secure future loans, therefore, such loans must be sufficiently described in the
mortgage contract. If the requirement could be imposed on a future loan that was uncertain to materialize, there is a greater reason
that it should be applicable to a past loan, which is already subsisting and known to the parties.
To reiterate, in order for the all-embracing or dragnet clauses to secure future and other loans, the loans thereby secured must be
sufficiently described in the mortgage contract.

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RELIANCE ON SECURITY TEST
The parties having conformed to the "blanket mortgage clause" or "dragnet clause," it is reasonable to conclude that they also
agreed to an implied understanding that subsequent loans need not be secured by other securities, as the subsequent loans will be
secured by the first mortgage. In other words, the sufficiency of the first security is a corollary component of the "dragnet clause."
But of course, there is no prohibition, as in the mortgage contract in issue, against contractually requiring other securities for the
subsequent loans. Thus, when the mortgagor takes another loan for which another security was given it could not be inferred that
such loan was made in reliance solely on the original security with the "dragnet clause," but rather, on the new security given. This is
the "reliance on the security test."
xxx Accordingly, finding a different security was taken for the second loan no intent that the parties relied on the security of the first
loan could be inferred, so it was held. The rationale involved, the court said, was that the "dragnet clause" in the first security
instrument constituted a continuing offer by the borrower to secure further loans under the security of the first security instrument,
and that when the lender accepted a different security he did not accept the offer.
CONTRACT OF ADHESION
Under Article 1306 of the Civil Code, the contracting parties "may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." This is an express
recognition by the law of the right of the people to enter into all manner of lawful conventions as part of their safeguarded liberties.
The objection against a contract of adhesion lies most often in its negation of the autonomy of the will of the parties in contracts. A
contract of adhesion, albeit valid, becomes objectionable only when it takes undue advantage of one of the parties the weaker
party- by having such party just adhere to the terms of the contract. In such situation, the courts go to the succor of the weaker
party by construing any obscurity in the contract against the party who prepared the contract, the latter being presumed as the
stronger party to the agreement, and as the party who caused the obscurity.
MONETARY INTEREST VS. COMPENSATORY INTEREST
Interest is a compensation fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance of money. This is referred to as monetary interest.
Interest may also be imposed by law or by courts as penalty or indemnity for damages. This is called compensatory interest. The
right to interest arises only by virtue of a contract or by virtue of damages for delay or failure to pay the principal loan on which
interest is demanded.
GENERAL RULE
Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates that no interest shall be due unless it has
been expressly stipulated in writing. As can be gleaned from the foregoing provision, payment of monetary interest is allowed only
if:
(2) the agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing. The concurrence of the two conditions is
required for the payment of monetary interest.
Thus, we have held that collection of interest without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law.

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EXCEPTIONS
There are instances in which an interest may be imposed even in the absence of express stipulation, verbal or written, regarding
payment of interest.
1. Article 2209 of the Civil Code states that if the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs
delay, a legal interest of 12% per annum may be imposed as indemnity for damages if no stipulation on the payment of
interest was agreed upon.
2. Likewise, Article 2212 of the Civil Code provides that interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded, although the obligation may be silent on this point.
All the same, the interest under these two instances may be imposed only as a penalty or damages for breach of contractual
obligations. It cannot be charged as a compensation for the use or forbearance of money. In other words, the two instances apply
only to compensatory interest and not to monetary interest.
VALENTIN S. LOZADA, PETITIONER, V. MAGTANGGOL MENDOZA, RESPONDENT
G.R. NO. 196134, OCTOBER 12, 2016
LIABILITY OF A CORPORATION
A corporation, as a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers and employees. Obligations incurred as a result of the
acts .of the directors and officers as the corporate agents are not their personal liability but the direct responsibility of the
corporation they represent. As a general rule, corporate officers are not held solidarily liable with the corporation for separation pay
because the corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it as well as
from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of
all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate
personality.
To hold a director or officer personally liable for corporate obligations, two requisites must concur, to wit:
(1) the complaint must allege that the director or officer assented to the patently unlawful acts of the corporation,
or that the director or officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and
(2) there must be proof that the director or officer acted in bad faith.
DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in three (3) basic areas, namely:

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1) defeat of public convenience as when the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
obligation;
2) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or
3) alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person,
or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an
instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.
In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate
officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities.
ANTONIO ESCOTO, PETITIONER, V. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, RESPONDENT
G.R. NO. 192679, OCTOBER 17, 2016
MODES OF APPEAL
The modes of appealing a judgment or final order of a court of law have been outlined in Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
viz.:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.-
(a) Ordinary appeal.- The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal
shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or
these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition/or review.- The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari.- In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (n)
For purposes of item (c), supra, a question of fact arises when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts, and a question of law exists when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts. The test of
whether the question is one of law or of fact is not met by considering the appellation given to such question by the party raising it;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. If no review or
evaluation of the evidence is necessary, the question is one of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
And, secondly, obviously decisive herein is the ascertainment of which law Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992) or Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) - would be controlling. This ascertainment

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involves a purely legal question. In view of such nature of the question being sought to be presented for review, the appeal to the CA
was improper. The dismissal of the appeal by the CA was the only proper and unavoidable outcome. Indeed, Section 2, Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court mandates the dismissal, viz.:
Section 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. -An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law
not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from
the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed
outright.
SANDY V. DOMINGO, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. PALMARIN E. RUBIO AND ATTY. NICASIO T. RUBIO, RESPONDENTS
A.C. NO. 7927, OCTOBER 19, 2016
Administrative charges against members of the Bar must not rest on frivolous matters. Otherwise, they shall be outrightly dismissed
because their aim is only to harass the respondents.
DISBARMENT
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction against a misbehaving member of the Integrated Bar; as such, the power
to disbar is always exercised with great caution only for the most imperative reasons and in cases of clear misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
We deem it timely and appropriate to remind that administrative proceedings brought against lawyers, including those in the public
service, to make them be accountable for their acts or omissions in the exercise of their profession are not alternatives to reliefs that
may be sought and obtained from the proper offices or agencies. The Court will exercise its disciplinary power only by observing due
process and if the lawyer's administrative guilt is proved by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. This norm is aimed at
preserving the integrity and reputation of the Law Profession, and at shielding lawyers, in general, due to their being officers
themselves of the Court. Any complaint for disbarment or other disciplinary sanction brought against lawyers that is based on
frivolous matters or proof, like this case, should be immediately dismissed because its plain objective is to harass or get even with
the respondent. The public must be reminded that lawyers are professionals bound to observe and follow the strictest ethical
canons, and to subject them to frivolous, unfounded and vexatious charges of misconduct and misbehavior is to do a disservice to
the ideals of justice, and to disregard the Constitution and the laws to which all lawyers vow their enduring fealty.
TAKENAKA CORPORATION-PHILIPPINE BRANCH, PETITIONER, V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

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G.R. NO. 193321, OCTOBER 19, 2016
JURISDICTION
Well-settled is the rule that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may at any time either be raised by the parties or
considered by the Court motu proprio. As such, the jurisdiction of the CTA over the appeal could still be determined by this Court
despite its not being raised as an issue by the parties.
In Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court has underscored that:
(1) An administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when
the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales were made.
(2) The CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the administrative
claim within which to decide whether to grant a refund or issue a tax credit certificate. The 120-day period may
extend beyond the two-year period from the filing of the administrative claim if the claim is filed in the later part
of the two-year period. If the 120-day period expires without any decision from the CIR, then the administrative
claim may be considered to be denied by inaction.
(3) A judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the CIR's decision denying the
administrative claim or from the expiration of the 120-day period without any action from the CIR.
(4) All taxpayers, however, can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December
2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, as an exception to the mandatory andjurisdictional
120+30 day periods.
INVOICE VS RECEIPT
A "sales or commercial invoice" is a written account of goods sold or services rendered indicating the prices charged therefor or a
list by whatever name it is known which is used in the ordinary course of business evidencing sale and transfer or agreement to sell
or transfer goods and services.
A "receipt" oh the other hand is a written acknowledgment of the fact of payment in money or other settlement between seller and
buyer of goods, debtor or creditor, or person rendering services and client or customer.
A VAT invoice is the seller's best proof of the sale of goods or services to the buyer, while a VAT receipt is the buyer's best evidence
of the payment of goods or services received from the seller. A VAT invoice and a VAT receipt should not be confused and made to
refer to one and the same thing. Certainly, neither does the law intend the two to be used alternatively.
CLAIM FOR TAX REFUND OR TAX CREDIT

In a claim for tax refund or tax credit, the applicant must prove not only entitlement to the grant of the claim under substantive law.
It must also show satisfaction of all the documentary and evidentiary requirements for an administrative claim for a refund or tax

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credit. Hence, the mere fact that petitioner's application for zero-rating has been approved by the CIR does not, by itself, justify the
grant of a refund or tax credit. The taxpayer claiming the refund must further comply with the invoicing and accounting
requirements mandated by the NIRC, as well as by revenue regulations implementing them.
ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS, RESPONDENT
A.C. NO. 7388, OCTOBER 19, 2016
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. JEHAR REYES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT
G.R. NO. 199271, OCTOBER 19, 2016
CHAIN OF CUSTODY IN THE PROSECUTION OF ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
Compliance with the guidelines on the preservation of the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs subject of a prosecution for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs must be clearly and convincingly established by the State. Any lapse in the chain of custody must be
affirmatively explained by the Prosecution; otherwise, the chain of custody will be held to be broken and insufficient to support a
conviction of the accused. The presumption of regularity of the performance of official duty in favor of the arresting officers cannot
prevail over the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
In order to charge a person with and convict him for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the State
must allege and establish the concurrence of the following essential elements, namely:
( 1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment.
The delivery of the illicit drugs to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate
the illegal sale of dangerous drugs during the buy-bust transaction.

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It is fundamental that a person is to be tried and found guilty only of the offense charged in the information, or of the offense
proved that is necessarily included in the offense charged, conformably with Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in
the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Based on the foregoing statutory rules, the manner and timing of the marking of the seized drugs or related items are crucial in
proving the chain of custody. Certainly, the marking after seizure by the arresting officer, being the starting point in the custodial
link, should be made immediately upon the seizure, or, if that is not possible, as close to the time and place of the seizure as
practicable under the obtaining circumstances. This stricture is essential because the succeeding handlers of the contraband would
use the markings as their reference to the seizure. The marking further serves to separate the marked seized drugs from all other
evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until the drugs are disposed of upon the termination of the criminal
proceedings. The deliberate taking of these identifying steps is statutorily aimed at obviating switching, "planting" or contamination
of the evidence. Indeed, the preservation of the chain of custody vis a-vis the contraband ensures the integrity of the evidence
incriminating the accused, and relates to the element of relevancy as one of the requisites for the admissibility of the evidence.

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NOVEMBER 2016
GUILLERMO SALVADOR, REMEDIOS CASTRO, REPRESENTED BY PAZ "CHIT" CASTRO, LEONILA GUEVARRA, FELIPE MARIANO,
RICARDO DE GUZMAN, VIRGILIO JIMENEZ, REPRESENTED BY JOSIE JIMENEZ, ASUNCION JUAMIZ, ROLANDO BATANG,
CARMENCITA SAMSON, AUGUSTO TORTOSA, REPRESENTED BY FERNANDO TORTOSA, SUSANA MORANTE, LUZVIMINDA
BULARAN, LUZ OROZCO, JOSE SAPICO, LEONARDO PALAD, ABEL BAKING, REPRESENTED BY ABELINA BAKING, GRACIANO
ARNALDO, REPRESENTED BY LUDY ARNALDO, JUDITH HIDALGO, AND IGMIDIO JUSTINIANO, CIRIACO MIJARES, REPRESENTED BY
FREDEZWINDA MIJARES, JENNIFER MORANTE, TERESITA DIALA, AND ANITA P. SALAR, PETITIONERS,
-VERSUS
PATRICIA, INC., RESPONDENT,
THE CITY OF MANILA AND CIRIACO C. MIJARES, INTERVENORS-APPELLEES.
G.R. NO. 195834. NOVEMBER 9, 2016
REMEDIAL LAW CIVIL PROCEDURE- JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over a real action depends on the assessed value of the property involved as alleged in the complaint.
The power of a court to hear and decide a controversy is called its jurisdiction, which includes the power to determine whether or
not it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether or not the statement of
facts that confer jurisdiction exists, as well as all other matters that arise in the case legitimately before the court. Jurisdiction
imports the power and authority to declare the law, to expound or to apply the laws exclusive of the idea of the power to make the
laws, to hear and determine issues of law and of fact, the power to hear, determine, and pronounce judgment on the issues before
the court, and the power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to pronounce the judgment.
But judicial power is to be distinguished from jurisdiction in that the former cannot exist without the latter and must of necessity be
exercised within the scope of the latter, not beyond it.
JURISDICTION VS. VENUE
Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law because it is conferred only by law, as distinguished from venue, which is a purely
procedural matter. The conferring law may be the Constitution, or the statute organizing the court or tribunal, or the special or
general statute defining the jurisdiction of an existing court or tribunal, but it must be in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. Jurisdiction cannot be presumed or implied, but must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist, 15 but it
may be conferred on a court or tribunal by necessary implication as well as by express terms. It cannot be conferred by the
agreement of the parties; or by the court's acquiescence; or by the erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction; 19 or by the
waiver of objections; or by the silence of the parties.

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The three essential elements of jurisdiction are:
one, that the court have cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs;
two, that the proper parties must be present; and,
three, that the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the issue.
The test for determining jurisdiction is ordinarily the nature of the case as made by the complaint and the relief sought; and
the primary and essential nature of the
12 21 CJS 15, p. 30. 13 Id. at 32. 14 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92326, June 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, 362; lee v.
Municipal Trial Court of Legaspi, 145 SCRA 408. 15 Tenorio v. Batangas Transportation Co., 90 Phil 804 (1952); Dimagiba v. Geraldez,
I 02 Phil I 016; De Jesus, et al. v. Garcia, et al., No. L-26816, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 554, 562. 16 21 CJS 29, p. 40; thus, a
statute declaring that there is a remedy for every wrong cannot be relied on to confer jurisdiction on a court in a particular case,
because the remedy may lie with the Legislature; also, a court has no jurisdiction over a matter that is not an action or special
proceeding provided by statute or the Rules of Court unless the matter involves a wrong that requires judicial action, and for which
there is no adequate remedy at law. 17 United States v. Castaiiares, 18 Phil 210, 214 (1911 ); unlike venue, which may be regulated
by the agreement of the parties 18 Molina v. De La Riva, 6 Phil 12, 15 (1906); Squillantini v. Republic, 88 Phil. 135 (1951). 19 Azarcon
v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No 116033, February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 747; Cruzcosa v. Concepcion, 101 Phil 146. 20 Sabulao v. De las
Angeles, 39 SCRA 94; Vargas v. Akai Phil., Inc., 156 SCRA 531. 21 United States v. De La Santa, 9 Phil 22, 26 ( 1907). ' Y)
SUIT, NOT ITS INCIDENTAL CHARACTER, DETERMINES THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT RELATIVE TO IT. Jurisdiction may be
classified into original and appellate, the former being the power to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for
the first time under conditions provided by law, and the latter being the authority of a court higher in rank to re-examine the final
order or judgment of a lower court that tried the case elevated for judicial review. Considering that the two classes of jurisdiction
are exclusive of each other, one must be expressly conferred by law. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other.
Jurisdiction is to be distinguished from its exercise.24 When there is jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision of
all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. Considering that jurisdiction over the subject matter
determines the power of a court or tribunal to hear and determine a particular case, its existence does not depend upon the
regularity of its exercise by the court or tribunal. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the court or tribunal had the power to
enter on the inquiry, not whether or not its conclusions in the course thereof were correct, for the power to decide necessarily
carries with it the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly. In a manner of speaking, the lack of the power to act at all results in a
judgment that is void; while the lack of the power to render an erroneous decision results in a judgment that is valid until set aside.
That the decision is erroneous does not divest the court or tribunal that rendered it of the jurisdiction conferred by law to try the
case. Hence, if the court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the civil action, whatever error may be attributed to it is simply one of
judgment, not of jurisdiction; appeal, not certiorari, lies to correct the error.
SAME; SAME; SAME; JURISDICTION OF RTC
The exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases is conferred and provided for in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
(Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), viz.:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. -Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(July 2016- April 2017)
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds twenty thousand pesos
(P.20,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds twenty
thousand pesos (P.20,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs or the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P.20,000.00).
SAME; JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTIONS
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court disallowed the joinder, viz.:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. -A party may in one pleading asse1t, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
( c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the
joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction
of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action arc principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall he the test of jurisdiction.
CIVIL LAW- QUIETING OF TITLE
"for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The first requisite is based on Article 477 of the Civil Code which requires that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title
means beneficial ownership,38 meaning a title derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on recognized equitable
principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred to him.

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SAME; LAND TITLES; COLLATERAL ATTACK
To allow the boundary dispute to be litigated in the action for quieting of title would violate Section 4846 of the Property
Registration Decree by virtue of its prohibition against collateral attacks on Torrens titles. A collateral attack takes place when, in
another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident in said action.
ALBERTO GARONG Y VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER,
-VERSUS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 172539 NOVEMBER 16, 2016
CRIMINAL LAW- PENALTIES
The penalty for falsification committed by a private individual is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and fine of
not more than PS,000.00.23 Having determined that taking advantage of his public office by the petitioner should not be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance, the CA fixed the indeterminate penalty of two years and four months of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to four years, nine months and 10 days of prision correccional, as the maximum, and fine of
PS,000.00. The CA thereby imposed the limit of the medium period of the penalty of imprisonment, and the maximum of the fine.
However, the CA should have tendered a justification for imposing the limits of the compound penalty. It should have done so,
considering that the seventh rule on the application of penalties containing three periods laid down in Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code expressly mandated that the courts "shall determine [within the limits of each period] the extent of the penalty
according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil
produced by the crime." Without tendering the requisite justification for imposing the limits of the penalties of imprisonment and
the fine, the floor of the penalties would be warranted;24 otherwise, the CA would be seen as arbitrary.
SAME; SAME; SUBSIDIARY PENALTIES
Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code states that "[i]f the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability xxxx." To conform with the provision,
the imposition of the subsidiary imprisonment was necessary in order not to trivialize the prescription of the fine as part of the
compound penalty for falsification. Accordingly, the subsidiary imprisonment is restored.
SAMSODEN PANGCATAN, PETITIONER,
-VERSUS

(July 2016- April 2017)
ALEXANDRO "DODONG" MAGHUYOP AND BELINDO BANKIAO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 194412
X----------------------------------------------X
ALEXANDRO"DODONG" MAGHUYOP AND BELINDO BANKIAO, PETITIONERS,
-VERSUS
SAMSODEN PANGCATAN,
G.R. NO. 194412/G.R. NO. 194566. NOVEMBER 16, 2016
REMEDIAL LAW- DOCKET FEES
The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the
requisite docket and filing fees. Section 1, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court expressly requires that upon the filing of the pleading or
other application that initiates an action or proceeding, the prescribed fees for such action or proceeding shall be paid in full. If the
complaint is filed but the prescribed fees are not paid at the time of filing, the courts acquire jurisdiction only upon the full payment
of such fees within a reasonable time as the courts may grant, barring prescription.19
Nonetheless, Section 11, Article III of the Constitution has guaranteed free access to the courts, to wit:
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.
This guarantee of free access to the courts is extended to litigants who may be indigent by exempting them from the obligation to
pay docket and filing fees. But not everyone who claims to be indigent may demand free access to the courts.
Same; same;
Pangcatan was represented from the start by the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). The exemption of the clients of the PAO like him
from the payment of the legal fees was expressly declared by law for the first time in Republic Act No. 9406,27 particularly its
amendment of Section 16-D of the Administrative Code of 1987, as follows:
Section 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit. -The clients of the PAO shall be exempt from payment of
docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasijudicial bodies, as an original
proceeding or on appeal. The costs of the suit, attorney's fees and contingent fees imposed upon the adversary of
the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be deposited in the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be
disbursed for special allowances of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO.
Such exemption by virtue of Republic Act No. 9406 was recognized by the Court Administrator through OCA Circular No. 67-2007,
but the clients of the PAO remained required to submit relevant documentation to comply with the conditions prescribed by Section
19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Later on, the Court Administrator removed the conditions prescribed under OCA Circular No. 67-
2007 by issuing Circular No. 121 2007. Since then until the present, all clients of the PAO have been exempt from the payment of
docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court whether as an original proceeding or on appeal.

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DECEMBER 2016
ARSENIO TABASONDRA, FERNANDO TABASONDRA, CORNELIO TABASONDRA, JR., MIRASOL TABASONDRAMARIANO, FAUSTA
TABASONDRA-TAP ACIO, GUILLERMO TABASONDRA, MYRASOL TABASONDRAROMERO, and MARLENE TABASONDRA-MANIQUIL,
Petitioners,
-versus
SPOUSES CONRADO CONSTANTINO and TARCILA TABASONDRACONSTANTINO,* PACITA ARELLANO-TABASONDRA and HEIRS OF
SEBASTIAN TABASONDRA,
G.R. No. 196403. December 7, 2016
CIVIL LAW CO-OWNERSHIP
According to Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner "shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved," but "the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership." Hence, the
petitioners as the successors-in-interest of Cornelio could not validly assail the alienation by Valentina and Valeriana of their shares
in favor of the respondents.
Accordingly, the Court declares the following disposition by the CA to be correct and in full accord with law, to wit:
x x x [T]here is no dispute that the subject property was owned in common by the siblings Cornelio, Valentina, and
Valeria. Corollarily, the records at bench glaringly show that the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Valeriana and Valentina in favor of the Defendants-Appellants was not rebutted by the
Plaintiffs-Appellees. A fortiori, such deed is prima facie evidence that a contract of sale was, indeed, entered into
and consummated between Valeriana and Valentina as sellers and the Defendants-Appellants as vendors.
The foregoing facts, juxtaposed with the laws and the jurisprudential precepts mentioned elsewhere herein, lead to no other
conclusion but that the sale by Valeriana and Valentina of their pro indiviso shares in favor of the Defendants-Appellants is valid. As
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Alejandrino v. CA, et al.:
x x x Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Each co-
owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy
the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying
rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner
exercises, together with his coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use
and enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of a heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and
partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.

(July 2016- April 2017)
JANUARY 2017
STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION, AND ADMIBROS SHIPMANAGEMENT CO, LTD., ,
-VERSUS
RODRIGO C. DOCTOLERO,
G.R. NO. 198968. JANUARY 18, 2017
LABOR LAW- PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
Permanent and total disability is defined in Article 198( c )( 1) of the Labor Code, to wit:
xx xx
( c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
( 1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise
provided for in the Rules.
xx xx
The relevant rule is Section 2, Rule X, of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the labor Code, which states:
Period of entitlement. -(a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning the first day of such disability. If caused by
an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than J 20 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still
requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case
benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent
status at anytime after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of
actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.
These provisions have to be read together with the POEA-SEC, whose Section 20(3) states:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty ( 120) days.
SAME; SAME; CONDITIONS FOR ENTITLEMENT
In order for a seafarer's claim for total and permanent disability benefits to prosper, any of the following conditions should be
present:
(a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or
disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment
would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;

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(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician;
( c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as
the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-8(3) of the PO EA-SEC are of a
contrary opinion;
(d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors
who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but
total as well;
( e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a
dispute on the disability grading;
(f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related
under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the PO EA-SEC
found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;
(g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to
pay him the corresponding benefits; and
(h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-
day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods.

(July 2016- April 2017)
FEBRUARY 2017
SPOUSES SERGIO C. PASCUAL AND EMMA SERVILLION PASCUAL,
-VERSUS - FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK (BOHOL), INC., ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION AND ATTY. ANTONIO P.
ESPINOSA, REGISTER OF DEEDS, BUTUAN CITY,
G.R. NO. 202597. FEBRUARY 8, 2017
REMEDIAL LAW- SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We remind that the summary judgment is a procedural technique that is proper under Section 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court only
if there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. It is a method intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on record. The term genuine issue is defined as an issue of fact that calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue that is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings, admissions,
documents, affidavits, and/or counteraffidavits submitted by the parties to the court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The party moving for the summary
judgment has the burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact. Upon the plaintiff rests the burden to
prove the cause of action, and to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After the plaintiffs burden has
been discharged, the defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend.
HON. CESAR D. BUENAFLOR, PETITIONER,
-VERSUS
JOSE R. RAMIREZ, JR.,
G.R. NO. 201607, FEBRUARY 15, 2017
REMEDIAL LAW- EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The filing of this case in court is not violative of the Rule on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, as there are several exceptions
in the exhaustion of administrative remedies enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Paat vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA
167, such as:
when there is a violation of due process; when the issue involved is purely a legal question; when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction; xx xx xx xx xxx; when there is irreparable injury; xx xx xx xx xxx; when to
require exhaustion of remedies would be unreasonable; xx xx xx xx xxx; xx xx xx xx xxx; when the rule docs not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; and when there arc circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

(July 2016- April 2017)
SAME; JURISDICTION
It is clarified that the CSC has jurisdiction over a case involving a civil servant if it can be regarded as equivalent to a labor dispute
resoluble under the Labor Code; conversely, the regular court has jurisdiction if the case can be decided under the general laws,
such as when the case is for the recovery of private debts, or for the recovery of damages due to slanderous remarks of the
employer, or for malicious prosecution of the employees. The mere fact that the parties are members of the Civil Service should not
remove the controversy from the general jurisdiction of the courts of justice and place them under the special jurisdiction of the
CSC.
SAME; SAME; JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law; it cannot be acquired through a waiver; it
cannot be enlarged by the omission of the parties; it cannot be conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Specifically, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, did not vest jurisdiction in the RTC over matters relating to the Civil Service. Consequently, the RTC
could not arrogate unto itself the hearing and decision of a subject matter outside of its jurisdiction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
- VERSUS
RODRIGO MACASPAC Y ISIP,
G.R. NO. 198954. FEBRUARY 22, 2017
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE;
It is settled that the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court because
of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. These factors are the most significant in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in
the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its personal observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected
to determine whose testimonies to accept and which witnesses to believe. Accordingly, the findings of the trial court on such
matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight were overlooked, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
CRIMINAL LAW; TREACHERY
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated, namely:

(July 2016- April 2017)
one, the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and
two, said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.
Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to the category
of murder.
SAME; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
The requisites for the appreciation of evident premeditation are: ( l) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2)
an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient
length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
SAME; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
The penalty for homicide, based on Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal. Under Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court , in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, is mandated to prescribe an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that" prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. In the absence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years, eight
months, and one day to 17 years and four months. This is pursuant to A1iicle 64 of the Revised Penal Code. It is such period that the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence is reckoned from. On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence is taken from the degree next lower to reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor.
Accordingly, Macaspac shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months
and one day of reclusion temporal.

(July 2016- April 2017)
MARCH 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDDIE BARTE Y MENDOZA
G.R. NO. 179749 MARCH 1, 2017
When there is failure to comply with the requirements for proving the chain of custody in the confiscation of contraband in a drug
buy-bust operation, the State has the obligation to credibly explain such noncompliance; otherwise, the proof of the corpus delicti is
doubtful, and the accused should be acquitted for failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
PROSECUTION OF THE CRIME OF SELLING/ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
In the prosecution of the crime of selling a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven, to wit:
( 1) the identities of the buyer, seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
On the other hand, the essential requisites of illegal possession of dangerous drugs that must be established are the following,
namely:
(1) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.
Inasmuch as the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of both offenses, its identity and integrity must definitely
be shown to have been preserved. This means that on top of the elements of possession or illegal sale, the fact that the substance
possessed or illegally sold was the very substance presented in court must be established with the same exacting degree of certitude
as that required sustaining a conviction. The prosecution must account for each link in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug,
from the moment of seizure from the accused until it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti. In short, the chain of
custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether
removed.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time or seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall

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include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
necessity of maintaining an unbroken chain of custody and the mechanics of the custodial chain requirement
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken
chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable,
or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering - without regard to whether the
same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
ROMULO ABROGAR AND ERLINDA ABROGAR VS. COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY AND INTERGAMES, INC.
G.R. NO. 164749 MARCH 15, 2017
APPEAL ON CERTIORARI
The Court can proceed to review the factual findings of the CA as an exception to the general rule that it should not review issues of
fact on appeal on certiorari.
We have recognized exceptions to the rule that the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding in the following instances:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
( 4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
( 6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(July 2016- April 2017)
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent;
( 10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and
( 11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
NEGLIGENCE
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
32
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it
consists of the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances
33 34
of the person, of the time and of the place." The Civil Code makes liability for negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article 20.
TEST TO DETERMINE EXISTENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in
the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much
value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or
known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only
when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee
harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given
case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.

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PROXIMATE CAUSE
Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces an event, and without
66
which the event would not have occurred." In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, the Court, borrowing from American
Jurisprudence, has more extensively defined proximate cause thusly:
"* * * 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
68
or default that an injury tomightsome person probably result therefrom. "
To be considered the proximate cause of the injury, the negligence need not be the event closest in time to the injury; a cause is
still proximate, although farther in time in relation to the injury, if the happening of it set other foreseeable events into motion
69 70
resulting ultimately in the damage. According to an authority on civil law: "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis
of an action, if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient
cause, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no damage exists in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such act or
condition is the proximate cause."
DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger
assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom. It rests on the fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the
defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from a known risk, and whether the former has
exercised proper caution or not is immaterial. In other words, it is based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger
of a known and appreciated risk; it may sometimes include acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's negligence, but one does
not ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he does not know and appreciate. As a defense in negligence cases, therefore,
the doctrine requires the concurrence of three elements, namely:
( 1) the plaintiff must know that the risk is present;
(2) he must further understand its nature; and
(3) his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary.
DAMAGES
Article 2202 of the Civil Code lists the damages that the plaintiffs in a suit upon crimes and quasi-delicts can recover from the
defendant, viz.:

(July 2016- April 2017)
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have
been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
DEMETRIO R. ALCANTARA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 192536 MARCH 15, 2017
The allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over the action. The nature of a pleading is determined by allegations therein made in good faith, the stage of the
proceeding at which it is filed, and the primary objective of the party filing the same.
12
The remedies available to a taxpayer like Alcantara were laid down by law. Section 229 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1158,
the law in effect at the time of the disputed assessment, stated that prior resort to the administrative remedies was necessary;
otherwise, the assessment would attain finality, viz.:
Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment. - When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized
representative finds that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a
period to be prescribed by implementing regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said notice. If the
taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner shall issue an assessment based on his findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation in such
form and manner as may be prescribed by implementing regulation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
assessment; otherwise, the assessment shall become final and unappealable.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association or corporation adversely affectedthe by
decision on the protest may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said
decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. [Emphasis Supplied]
Section 230 of P.D. No. 1158 allowed Alcantara to file his claim for refund for the erroneously or illegally paid taxes. In this regard,
such claim for refund was also a prerequisite before any resort to the courts could be made to recover the erroneously or illegally
paid taxes, to wit:
Sec. 230. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. - No suitproceedingor shall be maintained in any court
for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to
have been excessive orwrongfullyinanymanner collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with
the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has

(July 2016- April 2017)
been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date. of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That
the Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the
return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Forfeiture of refund. - A refund check or warrant issued in accordance with the pertinent provisions of this Code
which shall remain unclaimed or uncashed within five (5) years from the date the said warrant or check was mailed
or delivered shall be forfeited in favor of the government and the amount thereof shall revert to the General Fund.
ROSEMARIE B. BINTUDAN VS. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. NO. 211937 MARCH 21, 2017
An accountable officer who tolerated the posting of the number combination of the safety vault where the funds of
the office in her custody were kept is guilty of negligence, and cannot be relieved of her accountability.
RULE 45 VS. RULE 43
We emphasize that an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is available only as a remedy from a decision or final
order of a lower court. 'fhis limitation is imposed by Section 5 of Article Vll of the Constitution.
On the other hand, the review of the decisions, awards and final orders or resolutions of quasi-judicial offices or bodies is through
the petition for review under Rule 43.
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution governs the review of the COA, in that the COA's decisions. final orders or rulings may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. To differentiate
this review from the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the Court incorporated a new rule (Rule 64) in the 1997 revision
of the Rules of Court under the title Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit. Except for the period for bringing the petition for review, Rule 64 is a replication of the provisions of Rule 65
on the special civil action for certiorari.
The Constitution has made the COA "the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to
government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the
scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing
12
rules and regulations." Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion

(July 2016- April 2017)
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain and grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions.
The conclusion that the COA correctly denied the petitioner's request for relief from accountability is thus inescapable. Being an
officer of the Government having custody of public funds, she was fully accountable for the safekeeping of the funds under her
custody. Although she could be exonerated from liability in cases of theft and loss caused by force majeure, she must be able to
establish that the loss was not by reason of her negligence. She could have locked the safety vault, the steel cabinet, and the doors
and windows of the office where the safety vault was kept, but the fact that she had not denied having allowed the posting of the
number combination on the vault's door manifested her negligence. Indeed, they robbers did not anymore have to employ force to
open the vault and ransack the contents. That they had an easy time carting away the funds was due to her negligence. Her
contention that the loss of funds through robbery would still have happened even if she had removed the number combination from
the door of the vault is unworthy of consideration in the face of the obtrusive fact that her negligence had enabled the loss of the
funds under her safekeeping.
JOEL T. MATURAN VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALLAN PATINO
G.R. NO. 227155 MARCH 28, 2017
PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION TO HOLD OFFICE
The penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office may be properly imposed on a candidate for public office who
repeatedly fails to submit his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166.
1
The penalty does not amount to the cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment proscribed by the Bill of Rights.
In imposing the penalty, the COMELEC clearly acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction in view of the clear language of Section 14
of R.A. No. 7166, viz.:
Section 14. Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. - Every candidate
and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with
the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in
connection with the election.
xx xx
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with electoral
contributions and expenditures are required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the
offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One thousand pesos (Pl,000.00) to Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be
enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender
xx xx

(July 2016- April 2017)
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine shall be from
Two thousand pesos (!!2,000.00) to Sixty thousand pesos (!!60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In
addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill of Rights extends only to situations of extreme corporeal
or psychological punishment that strips the individual of his humanity. The proscription is aimed more at the form or character of
the punishment rather than at its severity, as the in Court has elucidated Lim v. People, to wit:
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the
nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this principle, the Court has
consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the
statute involved is cruel and degrading.
Moreover, that Congress has deemed fit to impose the penalty of perpetual disqualification on candidates who repeatedly failed to
file their SOCEs cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry. Congress has the absolute discretion to penalize by law with perpetual
disqualification from holding public office in addition to administrative fines the seekers of public office who fail more than once to
file their SOCEs. Such penalty is intended to underscore the need to file the SOCE as another means of ensuring the sanctity of the
electoral process.
In certiorari, the petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
12
or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the public respondent for its issuance of the impugned resolutions. Grave abuse of
discretion is committed "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law."

(July 2016- April 2017)
APRIL 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CARLITO CLARO Y MAHINAY
G.R. NO. 199894 APRIL 5, 2017
In every criminal case where the accused enjoys the presumption of innocence, he is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt.
SWEETHEART DEFENSE
9
The sweetheart defense is not usually regarded with favor in the absence of strong corroboration. This is because the mere fact
10
that the accused and the victim were lovers should not exculpate him from criminal liability for rape. In People v. Orquina, the
Court observed that an allegation of a "love relationship" between the parties, even if found to be true, did not eliminate the use
of force to consummate the crime because the gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her will and
without her consent. As declared in People v. Gecomo:
It should be borne in mind that love is not a license for carnal intercourse through force or intimidation. Even
granting that appellant and complainant were really sweethearts, that fact alone would not negate the
commission of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. From a mere fiancee, definitely a
man cannot demand sexual submission and, worse, employ violence upon her on a mere justification of love. A
man can even be convicted for the rape of his common-law wife.
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
In every criminal case, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily means that mere suspicion of the guilt of the accused, no matter how
strong, should not sway judgment against him. It further means that the courts should duly consider every evidence favoring him,
and that in the process the courts should persistently insist that accusation is not synonymous with guilt; hence, every circumstance
18
favoring his innocence should be fully taken into account. That is what we must be do herein, for he is entitled to nothing less.
Without the proof of his guilt being beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused
herein was not overcome. His acquittal should follow.

(July 2016- April 2017)
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. NO. 216538/G.R. NO. 216954 APRIL 18, 2017
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
Under Section 7, Rule IV of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, DBP has the duty to serve the copies of the Notice of
Disallowance, orders and/or decisions of the COA on the individuals to be held liable especially when there were several payees, to
wit:
Section 7. Service of Copies of ND/NC/NS, Order or Decision - The ND, NC, NS, order, or decision shall be served
to each of the persons liable/responsible by the Auditor, through personal service, or if not practicable through
registered mail. In case there are several payees, as in the case of a disallowed payroll, service to the accountant
who shall be responsible for informing all payees concerned, shall constitute constructive service to all payees
listed in the payroll.
We remind that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the
opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the
application of the guarantee of due process, indeed, what is sought to be safeguarded is not the lack of previous notice but the
denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as the party was afforded the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
was not denied due process.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
The right requires that proceedings should be conducted according to fixed rules, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays. The right is violated when unjustified postponements of the proceedings are sought and obtained, or when a long period of
time is allowed without justifiable cause or motive to elapse without the parties having their case tried.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
The Constitution vests enough latitude in the COA, as the guardian of public funds, to determine, prevent and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government fund. The COA is thus accorded the complete
discretion to exercise its constitutional duty. To accord with such constitutional empowerment, the Court generally sustains the
COA's decisions in recognition of its expertise in the implementation of the laws it has been entrusted to enforce. Only if the COA
acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Com1
intervene and correct the COA's actions. For this purpose, grave abuse of discretion means that there is on part of the COA an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the
assailed decision or resolution rendered is not based on law and the evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.

(July 2016- April 2017)
ESTOPPEL
The general rule is that the Government is never estopped by the mistake or error of its agents. If that were not so, the
Government would be tied down by the mistakes and blunders of its agents, and the public would unavoidably suffer. Neither the
erroneous application nor the erroneous enforcement of the statute by public officers can preclude the subsequent corrective
application of the statute. Exceptions to the general rule of non-estoppel may be allowed only in rare and unusual circumstances in
which the interests of justice clearly require the application of estoppel. For one, estoppel may not be invoked if its application will
operate to defeat the effective implementation of a policy adopted to protect the public.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO VS. PEOPLE AND SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NOS. 220598/220953 APRIL 18, 2017
RESOLUTION
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of
the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of
the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper
recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and
assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may
issue should not be limited, because to do so --
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the
com1 that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either
prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending cbntrol over other courts, we arc to
be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is
that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial
justice.
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct errors of
jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly incorporating in
Section 1 of Article VIII.
PLUNDER
The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal benefit in the predicate act of raids on the public
treasury have been written in R.A. No. 7080 itself as well as embedded in pertinent jurisprudence. This we made clear in the

(July 2016- April 2017)
decision, as follows:
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to
commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the
implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused
was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) states:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder: Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 ( d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court. The c;ourt shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or thereof investment forfeited
in favor of the State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-
gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for
plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other words, the allegation of the
wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in
either manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly
proven by the Prosecution.
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying words:
misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds.
This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of
a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by
considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified
or restricted by the latter.

(July 2016- April 2017)
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to
take something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforseeably, or not as
intended;" and malversation occurs when "any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence,
shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The common thread that binds all the four
terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of
the four other terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of
the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganhayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and gathering
constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury
requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
MALVERSATION
The elements of malversation are that:
(a) the offender is an accountable public officer;
(b) he/she is responsible for the misappropriation of public funds or property through intent or negligence; and
( c) he/she has custody of and received such funds and property by reason of his/her office.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a new and
14
independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had attached. As such, every acquittal becomes
final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment. With the acquittal being immediately
final, granting the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject the petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their
acquittal.
It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to the accused three
related protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; protection against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.
TGN REALTY CORPORATION VS. VILLA TERESA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
G.R. NO. 164795 APRIL 19, 2017

(July 2016- April 2017)
Ordinarily, the appeal by petition for review on certiorari should not involve the consideration and resolution of factual issues.
Section I, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court limits the appeal to questions of law because the Court, not being a trier of facts, should not
be expected to re-evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence introduced in the fora below.
There may be exceptions to the limitation of the review to question of law, such as the following:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
( 4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the CA' s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent;
( 10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or
( 11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
QUESTION OF FACT VS. QUESTION OF LAW
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when
the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any or them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the
same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
We note, too, that under Section 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1216, the registered owner developer of the subdivision who has secured the certificate of completion and
has executed the deed of donation in favor of the city or municipality "shall be deemed relieved of the responsibility of maintaining
the road lots and open space of the subdivision notwithstanding the refusal of [the] City/Municipality concerned to accept the
43
donation." Moreover, Section 1 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 953 specifically states: "(E)very owner of an existing subdivision shall
plant trees in the open spaces required to be reserved for the common use and enjoyment of the owners of the lots therein as well as
along all roads and service streets. The subdivision owner shall consult the Bureau of Forest Development as to the appropriate

(July 2016- April 2017)
species of trees to be planted and the manner of planting them."

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The Fraternal Order of St. Thomas More Justice Lucas P.

TARCISIO S. CALILUNG, PETITIONER,

G.R. NO. 195641 JULY 11, 2016

INTEREST; MONETARY INTEREST; COMPENSATORY INTEREST

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 1 of 74

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PETITIONER,

G.R. NO. 213847 JULY 12, 2016

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 2 of 74

G.R. NO. 220953

BENIGNO B. AGUAS, PETITIONER,

G.R. NO. 220598 JULY 19, 2016

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO CORRECT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 3 of 74

1. Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason),

3. Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of the Revised Penal Code.

EXPRESS CONSPIRACY VS IMPLIED CONSPIRACY

In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms.

OVERT OR EXTERNAL ACTS

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 4 of 74

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY SANDIGANBAYAN

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 5 of 74

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 6 of 74

DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR PLUNDER

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 7 of 74

PREDICATE ACT OF RAIDING THE PUBLIC TREASURY

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 8 of 74

RAIDS IN PUBLIC TREASURY

Section I .Definition of Terms. - x x x

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 9 of 74

A.C. NO. 11078 JULY 19, 2016

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 10 of 74

G.R. NO. 204605 JULY 19, 2016

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 11 of 74

TREATIES VS. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Sec. 2. Definition of Terms.

The pronouncement in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading is instructive, to wit:

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 12 of 74

MADRID PROTOCOL; IP CODE

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 13 of 74

OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J July 26, 2016

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 14 of 74

SULPICIO LINES, INC., PETITIONER

G.R. NO. 172682 JULY 27, 2016

(1) recovery of real or personal property, or an interest from the estate;

(2) enforcement of liens on the estate; and

(3) recovery of damages for an injury to person or property.

(2) judgments for money; and

BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 15 of 74

The petitioner was directly liable to Sesante and his heirs.

In order to be considered a fortuitous event, however,

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 16 of 74

(a) death of a passenger results, or

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 17 of 74

MOMARCO IMPORT COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 18 of 74

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 19 of 74

VIRGILIO D. MAGAWAY AND CESARIO M. MAGAWAY, COMPLAINANTS

A.C. NO. 7072 JULY 27, 2016

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE 2016-2017 Page 20 of 74