Persons Full Text Cases Part 2 Prelim Psychological Incapacity

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PERSONS FULL TEXT CASES, PART TWO PRELIM (ART 36. PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY)
Article 36, Psychological Incapacity "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as
a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
VITUG, J.: departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 the United States, where he underwent a training program under the
dated 17 July 1987), which declares: auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August
1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the but all his efforts were of no avail.
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the
becomes manifest only after its solemnization. regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of
marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. circulation in Negros Oriental.
Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2
Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed
marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the
declared a nullity. petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their
in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report
eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged to the court).
vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City,
followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set,
the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation,
1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for
young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a lack of merit. 3
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mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
the trial court. 4
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.)
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice
Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
lack of merit. other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient
life. In his own words, Leouel asserts: use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void
and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent (7) be modified to read:
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her "That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
incapacitated. even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to
which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
of the provision. subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for
xxx xxx xxx declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity,
there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for
Art. 36. . . . voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to
the very essence of marital obligations.
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
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Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines- really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and
) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency. to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in way of providing for divorce.
inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used
a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil xxx xxx xxx
Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages
under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by
this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction. reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is
a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
cured. capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to
void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
xxx xxx xxx
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack
or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do
incapacity becomes manifest." not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are
really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that
apparent. it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen
of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno,
and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and
marriage. that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of
convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription.
xxx xxx xxx In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a
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right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however,
be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one
might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to
brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
marriage. psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may
defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision
cured. is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help. is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case
is to allow him to remarry. 6
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in
insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding xxx xxx xxx
of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked
that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of
marriage. 5 Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential
xxx xxx xxx obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among
the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On
instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may
they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity.
"incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on
the basis of abuse.
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ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, other members replied negatively.
which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent. prospective in application.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer
February 9, 1984 meeting: to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under
the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or concerned about the avalanche of cases.
mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee
Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental approved.
incapacity to discharge . . ."
The members voted as follows:
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological (1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of
marriage. (2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because (3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case. Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years
within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law
should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
Canon Law. ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected,
has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has
and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R.
the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
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The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear
that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are
judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, then a broader one followed:
may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law. . . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, 9 which reads: then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf.
SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
finally, a new version was promulgated:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually; So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the
term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind
essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.) of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able
to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive
for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise
prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation
or construction of the codal provision. In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by
Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how explanation appears:
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
was proposed first: described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real
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inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code
essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties. significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.
former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) marriage to be "legitimate."
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
the means of the party involved. addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychological incapacity.
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
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conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily specific answers to every individual problem.
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
desirable.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL
to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that PANGANIBAN, J.:
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still
Code. (Emphasis supplied.) many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Our Constitution is no less emphatic: Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled
exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific
total development. guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution). Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the
January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel
on to. Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close
to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and The Facts
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
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This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent 1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel
and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in 2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and
a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on 3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, 4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February
1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had 5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had
a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; 6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live petitioner wife.
with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel
and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
the start.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their The Issue
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made
finances. an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated: incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
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In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than
broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that
added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that: demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding
a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates. more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences"
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made. and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr.
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which Sison testified: 8
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties." COURT
The Court's Ruling Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
The petition is meritorious.
11
A Yes, Your Honor. Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these
friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during
Q There is no hope for the marriage? the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
parties?
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
A Yes, Your Honor. the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions? rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
A Yes, Your Honor. Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
The Court has no more questions. dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits
were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically
facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family
12
illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists. petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
attached at such moment, or prior thereto. Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against nature. 14
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
obligation of marriage. civilly void.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
13
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another woman
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different
women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease
the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and
foregoing guidelines. unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having
abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be
SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole
remains valid. SO ORDERED. owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal,
Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which
G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999 private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and 12, 1992. 6
MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.: On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to file his answer,
the trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion between the
Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial parties. 7 Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992.
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and
petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. recommended that the case be set for trial. 8
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:
Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite 9
on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A). 2 Three children were born to them, namely,
Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B), 3 Lyra, born on May 22, 1985 Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian
(Exh. C), 4 and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D). 5 University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than
private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany.
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive
Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no
respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She longer private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.
alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the
suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid
and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other
time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that financial needs. The family income came from petitioner's salary as a faculty
14
member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her at the Road Master Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom
earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy- he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter
and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron. named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E). 10 When
petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University
was agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral
orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and concussion (Exh. F). 11
had other women, petitioner's business suffered. Private respondent often
had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous
In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent
letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment
Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia. at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from
When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H). 12
extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end
her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private
said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private
left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate
private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite and hardly spent time with them.
private respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J) 13 with F
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to & C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of
get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias,
1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after
because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly
company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending installments, a deed of absolute sale(Exh. K) 14 was executed in her favor and
the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M) 15 was duly issued.
on himself and consumed the entire amount within four months of his According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten
retirement. letter 16 to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that
her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney 17 and to
drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told
that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He private respondent of her intention to fill a petition for the annulment of their
had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an marriage.
operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary
15
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) not
By this time, he had already abandoned petitioner and their children. In as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof.
October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:
East. Since then, private respondent's whereabouts had been unknown.
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine grounds:
Christian University, testified during the hearing on the petition for
annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in
accounting. She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most xxx xxx xxx
of his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked
Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding
because she thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he xxx xxx xxx
was then unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared happy
during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at night.
Alfaro corroborated petitioner's claim that private respondent was a habitual xxx xxx xxx
drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and continued
hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was once (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause
hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first for more than one year.
year of petitioner's marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but
the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that xxx xxx xxx
private respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions
petitioner. 18 psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a
marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision 19 dismissing the constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been
petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
of the decision reads: 20
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the
petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was "psychologically Philippines, as there is no dispute that the "gonorrhea" transmitted to the
incapacitated" to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after
16
petitioner's marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological
of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the
two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this ground Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of
(fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment Appeals erred
of petitioner's marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and
proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court. I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling
in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 21 the Court of Appeals held: 22 II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity
of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE
the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se,
of psychological incapacity of a spouse. IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE
PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000,00 PER
that her respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time CHILD.
of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellant's
declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband's V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER
character was on the "borderline between a responsible person and the AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
happy-go-lucky," could not constitute the psychological incapacity in
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and
herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husband's youth and very private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private
good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner- respondent's psychological incapacity.
appellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her
respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondent- Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner
husband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992). failed to show that private respondent's psychological incapacity existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the
the marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed at the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their
marriage.
17
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder,
Art. 36 of the Family Code states: indicia of psychological incapacity.
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
only after its solemnization. 23 evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 24 we held: persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the his family. Private respondent's parents and petitioner supported him
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent
void marriage to be "legitimate." the entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital
life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating
marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug the very objectives of marriage.
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, for finding that he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are
18
manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, can these be overturned.
and not merely due to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling
of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in Republic of The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: 25 petitioner's contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the
amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation,
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner
requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although may bring.
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
ill to such an extent that the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004
incapacity need given here so as not to limit the application of the provision DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L.
under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salaita v. Magtolis, supra) CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents.
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by DECISION
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the
precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he
to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof was working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to
to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The Court is courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil marriage
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.2
foundation of the family. 26 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage. 27 The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September
18, 1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of born on April 24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal
Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
the non-existence of private respondent's psychological incapacity at the
time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality. 28 Only Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an
irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs
19
with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to
national. perform the essential obligations of marriage.8
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the
treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages
national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September
two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground
returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the
accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join
Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is
return to the country on special occasions. dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property
between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired
April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on by creditors.
the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and
could not be found in the Philippines.7 SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be appealed alleging that
conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and
projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE
he does. ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-
Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE
she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner.
Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
20
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE. the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.10 considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant petition. The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the
manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2) addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not
submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
suffered by respondent. themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other
respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
incapacity?" evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled: persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.13
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family analysis and definition. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that respondents
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is,
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and
21
in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149,
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004
not merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity. JOSE LAM, petitioner, vs. ADRIANA CHUA, respondent.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal DECISION
separation under Article 5517 of the Family Code. However, we pointed out AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal
separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug dated June 11, 1997 and the Resolution dated October 27, 1997 of the Court
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107, entitled, "Adriana Chua, Petitioner-
In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal Appellee vs. Jose Lam, Respondent-Appellant."
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition for
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition
authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the that: she and Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage,
Roman Catholic Church. they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose
court.1wphi1 We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he
petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible
in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains; in order to
to every individual problem.19 While we sympathize with petitioners marital save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with
predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the
harsh it may be.20 separation of present and future properties; said agreement was approved
by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated
February 28, 1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they have
22
agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to visitation On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision6 the dispositive
rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be portion of which reads as follows:
declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their
child, John Paul. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares the marriage
between petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null and void for
Summons was duly served on Jose Lam on March 22, 1994. Despite the lapse being bigamous by nature. The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
of fifteen days after service of summons, no responsive pleading was filed by Office of the Civil Registrar General are hereby ordered to cancel the marriage
him. Hence, the trial court issued an Order dated April 13, 1994, directing between Adriana Chua and Jose Lam celebrated on January 13, 1984 by Hon.
Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio Barrera to conduct an investigation for Guillermo L. Loja of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City.
determination whether or not there was collusion between the parties and
to submit his report thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor Barrera Likewise, respondent Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a monthly support
filed his Report stating that "there seems to be no collusion between the to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the amount of P20,000.00.
parties".2
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana
herself. She testified that her marriage with Jose was arranged by her parents On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 thereof but
in the traditional Chinese way; that her married life was abnormal because only insofar as the decision awarded monthly support to his son in the
Jose very seldom came home, never worked for a living and instead kept amount of P20,000.00. He argued that there was already a provision for
asking for money from her to buy his sports cars; that she was also the one support of the child as embodied in the decision9 dated February 28, 1994 of
spending for all the expenses of their only child, John Paul.3 After her the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute P250,000.00
testimony, counsel for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence. each to a common fund for the benefit of the child, to wit:
No evidence was presented regarding the amount of support needed by John
Paul or the capacity of Jose to give support. 8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with
respect to their son. In the best interest of the child, the Second Party shall
On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open4 on the ground retain care and custody, subject to visitation rights by the First Party to be
that she was able to secure additional new evidence which were significant, exercised through mutual arrangements.
material and indispensable. On July 6, 1994, the trial court granted the
motion to re-open the case and held a hearing for the reception of additional 9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First
evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract dated Party and the Second Party shall initially contribute P250,000.00 each to a
May 25, 1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago, and another Marriage common fund, to be increased as required, to be used solely and exclusively
Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock,5 showing that for the benefit of their son. Said common fund shall be managed and
Jose had been married twice before he married Adriana in 1984. administered by the Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until the
son reaches majority age.10
23
Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common fund THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) TO A COMMON FUND FOR THE BENEFIT OF
had even amounted to P500,000.00. THEIR CHILD DOES NOT BAR THE TRIAL COURT IN ANNULMENT CASE TO
AGAIN AWARD SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF THE CHILD.
On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lams
motion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they ruled
into by the parties and approved by the Makati RTC before the marriage was that the amount of support is by no means permanent. In Advincula vs.
declared null and void ab initio by the Pasay RTC, is of no moment and cannot Advincula,12 we held that another action for support could be filed again by
limit and/or affect the support ordered by the latter court. the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for support
filed against the same defendant was dismissed. We further held in said case
Jose then appealed the Pasay RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals, that:
assigning only a single error of the trial court:
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO GIVE A . . . Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of
MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P20,000.00 TO HIS SON BECAUSE THIS WOULD, IN such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire
EFFECT, REQUIRE APPELLANT TO PAY TWICE THE MONTHLY SUPPORT FOR period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be
HIS CHILD. BESIDES, THE LOWER COURT HAS DULY ADMITTED THE FACT THAT modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs,
THERE WAS A DECISION ISSUED BY ANOTHER COURT REQUIRING APPELLANT and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
TO CONTRIBUTE THE AMOUNT OF P250,000.00 AS THE LATTERS SHARE IN determination.13
THE COMMON FUND FOR SUPPORT OF THE CHILD, SUBJECT TO PERIODIC
ACCOUNTING AND TO BE MANAGED BY APPELLEE.11 Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement
between him and Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in
On June 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the its decision dated February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of
Pasay RTCs decision in all respects. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration of conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor
the Decision but in a Resolution dated October 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals of their child John Paul. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of
denied the same. their child John Paul, as embodied in the compromise agreement between
herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be
Hence, Jose filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always
of the Rules of Court, likewise raising a single error of the appellate court, to subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the
wit: capabilities of the parents to give support.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING LEGAL QUESTIONS Having settled the issue on the authority of the trial court to award support
OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN for the child in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of the childs
FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURTS RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE parents, this Court will now discuss the propriety of the proceedings
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT WHERE THEY BOUND conducted by the Pasay RTC and the decision it rendered, as affirmed by the
THEMSELVES TO CONTRIBUTE THE AMOUNT OF TWO HUNDRED FIFTY Court of Appeals.
24
the subsequent hearing held on July 6, 1994 where Adriana presented the
The Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of the marriage certificates and claimed for the support of their child sans the
proceedings and the decision rendered by the trial court. presence of Jose.
First, the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of Third, the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of the Order
marriage filed by Adriana with the Pasay RTC is the psychological incapacity dated July 6, 1994 wherein the trial court granted the Urgent Motion to Re-
of Jose without any prayer for the support of her child. Adriana presented, Open of respondent Adriana and forthwith allowed her to present her
formally offered her evidence in support of the petition and submitted the evidence to prove that petitioner herein contracted previous marriages with
case for decision as of May 12, 1994.14 But on a motion to re-open filed by different women.
her on June 23, 1994, the trial court set the case for reception of evidence on
July 6, 1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to present evidence of two Fourth, the evidence presented by respondent regarding her claim for
previous marriages contracted by Jose with other women to prove that the support for John Paul is glaringly insufficient and cannot be made a valid basis
marriage between Adriana and Jose was null and void for being bigamous. It upon which the Pasay RTC could have determined the monthly amount of
is only at the July 6, 1994 hearing that respondent Adriana first claimed P20,000.00 for the support to be given to John Paul by petitioner Jose.
support for John Paul when she testified in open court.
A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of substantially
The petition of Adriana was, in effect, substantially changed by the admission amended or supplemental pleadings.16 Considering that in cases of
of the additional evidence. The ground relied on for nullity of the marriage declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage, there can be no
was changed from the psychological incapacity of Jose to that of existence of default pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court17 in
previous marriages of Jose with two different women with an additional claim relation to Article 48 of the Family Code,18 it is with more reason that
for support of the child. Such substantial changes were not reflected in the petitioner should likewise be entitled to notice of all proceedings.
petition filed with the trial court, as no formal amendment was ever made by
Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten phrase "And for respondent Furthermore, the lower courts are reminded of the ruling of the Court in
to support the child of petitioner in an amount this Honorable Court may Asian Transmission Corporation vs. Canlubang Sugar Estates,19 to wit:
deem just and reasonable"15 found at the ultimate paragraph of the petition,
as allowed by the Pasay RTC. There is nothing on record to show that It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion, nor
petitioner Jose was notified of the substantial changes in the petition of has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their
Adriana. pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond them is coram non-judice and
void. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or awards relief beyond the
Second, the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be present on July prayer of the complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is
6, 1994 for the presentation of evidence by Adriana and to refute the same. not merely irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to
Although copy of the motion filed on June 23, 1994 with a notice of hearing collateral attack.
on June 27, 1994 was sent to Jose, the record does not show that he received
the notice in due time; neither does the record show that he was notified of
25
The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court upon a subject Consequently, the Court will only resolve the lone issue raised by Jose in the
within its general jurisdiction, but which is not brought before it by any present petition for review on certiorari which is the award of support for his
statement or claim of the parties, and is foreign to the issues submitted for child, John Paul.
its determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis supplied)
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of
Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial court to support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources
have rendered judgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it was or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles
beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The amendment of the petition to reflect the 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code, to wit:
new issues and claims against Jose was, therefore, indispensable so as to
authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage of Jose and Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should have dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
been awarded for the support of John Paul. When the trial court rendered keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served
upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
petitioner Lam of due process. preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana and Jose Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and
for being bigamous is concerned, the decision rendered by the Pasay RTC from place of work.
could be declared as invalid for having been issued beyond its jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, considering that Jose, did not assail the declaration of nullity of Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 19521
his marriage with Adriana in his motion for reconsideration which he filed and 196,22 shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
with the Pasay RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court of Appeals and with to the necessities of the recipient.
us, he likewise did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to
receive evidence and render judgment on his previous marriages with other Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be
woman which were not alleged in the petition filed by Adriana. Petitioner reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase
Jose is estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
with Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo the judgment of the obliged to furnish the same.
Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for being
bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional question may be It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the
raised at any time, this, however, admits of an exception where estoppel has evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or
supervened.20 resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children as
provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses
incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation of the child.
26
A - Yes, Your Honor.23
In this case, the only evidence presented by respondent Adriana regarding
her claim for support of the child is her testimony, which is quoted below in Evidently, such testimony does not establish the amount needed by the child
verbatim: nor the amount that the parents are reasonably able to give.
Atty. Lorbes: We take note of the Compromise Agreement, approved by and embodied in
the decision of the Makati RTC, portions of which read as follows:
Q - After discovering that your husband had contracted two valid marriages
prior to your marriage, how do you feel about it? 8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with
respect to their son. In the best interest of the child, the Second Party shall
A - I felt it is unfair to my life. retain care and custody, subject to visitation rights by the First Party to be
exercised through mutual arrangements.
Q - Considering the bigamous marriage contract by your husband with you,
what do you want to request to the Honorable Court? 9. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First
Party and the Second Party shall initially contribute P250,000.00 each to a
A - I want to request the Court that the respondent be ordered to support my common fund, to be increased as required, to be used solely and exclusively
little boy. for the benefit of their son. Said common fund shall be managed and
Court: administered by the Second Party, subject to periodic accounting, until the
son reaches majority age.
Q - How much support do you want?
WHEREFORE, finding the aforequoted agreement to be in order, and not
A - P20,000.00 to P25,000.00 being contrary to law, morals or public policy, the same is hereby APPROVED.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the said
Q - Is there a prayer for support? spouses is dissolved and a decree of complete separation is established in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Family Code of the
Atty. Lorbes: Philippines. The parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully comply with the
conditions of their Agreement as embodied in this petition and the same
A - None, Your Honor. shall, as between the parties, be deemed to be a decision and/or award in
the matters treated in the aforesaid settlement.
Court:
Let a copy of this petition as well as the foregoing Decision be recorded in the
Get the original copy of the complaint, add and sign it for the support of the proper local civil registries and registries of property at the expense of the
boy. herein petitioners pursuant to Article 139 of the Family Code.
27
SO ORDERED. (Branch 109), dated August 22, 1995, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for being
null and void, likewise only insofar as the matter on support is concerned.
GIVEN this 28th day of February, 1994 at Makati, Metro Manila.24
Let the records of Civil Case No. 94-0331 be remanded to the Regional Trial
The matter of support is a question that may be raised and threshed out Court of Pasay City (Branch 109) which is DIRECTED to reopen the trial of Civil
before the Makati RTC as it was the court that approved the Compromise Case No. 94-0331 with respect to the claim of Adriana Chua against Jose Lam
Agreement, or before the Pasay RTC where the petition for declaration of for the support of John Paul Chua Lam and conduct hearings for further
nullity or annulment of marriage is filed. In the interest of orderly reception of evidence for the proper determination of the proper amount of
administration of justice, the Court deems it proper that the issue on support support to be awarded to the child John Paul Chua Lam. SO ORDERED.
should be resolved by the Pasay RTC where the claim for support of the child
was initiated by Adriana. G.R. No. 141528 October 31, 2006
OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, vs. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.
The trial courts action of merely ordering in open court during the July 6, DECISION
1994 hearing that a prayer for support be written and inserted in the petition AZCUNA, J.:
filed by respondent Adriana does not constitute proper amendment and
notice upon petitioner Jose. Consequently, herein petitioner Jose was This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
deprived of due process when the trial court proceeded to hear the case on raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition
a motion to re-open and render judgment without giving Jose the requisite for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a
notice and the opportunity to refute the new claim against him. subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of
marriage license?
Verily, the manner by which the trial court arrived at the amount of support
awarded to John Paul was whimsical, arbitrary and without any basis. The facts are not disputed:
Such being the case, the Court has no other recourse but to reverse the On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition1 with the
decision of the Court of Appeals and Pasay RTC insofar as the award of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration
support is concerned and order the remand of the case to Pasay RTC for of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of
further proceedings as to the issue regarding support. Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the Family Code,
citing respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The case was docketed
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 51107, dated June petition in a decision2 dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that
11, 1997 and October 27, 1997, dismissing the appeal and denying the motion petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of
for reconsideration, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE but only insofar as the the relief he is seeking."3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was
award of support in favor of John Paul Chua Lam is concerned. The Decision likewise dismissed in a resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of
dated August 4, 1994 and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
28
petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY
period. OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE
TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A
filed on July 12, 1999 another petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM SHOPPING.10
with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with
respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the
a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the
motion to dismiss6 dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause
petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. of action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they
were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different.
In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondents motion to Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that
dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads: res judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. In this connection,
petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum
WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000,
SO ORDERED.8 counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still
involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order9 dated of petitioner and respondents marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that
January 21, 2000. is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that
petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows: asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground
he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case
A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS No. SP 4341-95.
MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION The petition lacks merit.
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND
OF HIS WIFES PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the
FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite
WHICH HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding
AND DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a partys
ACCORD WITH LAW. psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?
29
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order
on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the
nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will
separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of
prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the death of the testator or intestate;
the principle of res judicata.
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
The contention is untenable. directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction same capacity; and,
is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on
points and matters determined in the former suit."11 (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law, was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47 (b)
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary pertains to it in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by
doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other
of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.12 hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness
of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again
and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus: be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different
cause of action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or obtains in the present case.
final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second
or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.15
30
matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is matters that could have been adjudged in that case.18
in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of
the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different
in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts method of presenting his case. 19 As this Court stated in Perez v. Court of
or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, Appeals:20
and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.16
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress
by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action
separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under
petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second
respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present action after the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited
petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license. theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A
the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing
by which a party violates the right of another.17 In both petitions, petitioner when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is
has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims
What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them
These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the by piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury.
pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is,
the actual status of petitioner and respondents marriage. A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the
court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands,
null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon
alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a
petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. piecemeal presentation is allowed. (Citations omitted.)
The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could
have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take
parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is
sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues
31
therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life
controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the
resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all
all over again.21 throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish
attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything
marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office
therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs,
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no
barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge
San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw
objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give
SO ORDERED. him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity
arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004 vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and
respondent. incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and
DECISION expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her
for twenty-two (22) years.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented
dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour;
respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel"). that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was
remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a
Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in
Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child the complaint.
of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they
named Jeremy. In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;

32
she was there, she would call witness to complain about the curtains and the
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old. cleanliness of the office.20 One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita
rummaging through respondent Manuels drawer looking for his address
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the book while the latter was in Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner
witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling the latter
that his parents never approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope that she was looking for the telephone number of respondents hotel room
that he would return to the seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a
difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and wife by locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita
his parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting signs of ordered him to open the locked drawer. On another occasion, particularly in
being irritable and temperamental5 to him and his parents.6 She was also August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to
obsessive about cleanliness which became the common source of their respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan
quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy during that period sa labas?"22
of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in
furnishing their new house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law school As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA
and with various community organizations, it was then that he felt that he whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by
and his wife started to drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents during their petitioner Juanita.23 From her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia
marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., concluded:
when his wife quarreled with an elderly neighbor;10 when she would visit
him in his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco
kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem
table;11 when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love, support
was away;12 when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the and understanding.
tenant of having an affair with him;13 and other incidents reported to him
which would show her jealous nature. Money matters continued to be a The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the
source of bitter quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary
not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged
approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous when it themselves in a defective communication pattern which is characteristically
came to celebrations of their parish priest.15 Respondent Manuel then negative and deformed. This affected their competence to maintain the love
denied that he was a womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, and respect that they should give to each other.
respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and
obligations.18 Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are
expected to use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences.
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court, testified that Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive
petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuels office.19 But when and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression.
33
In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more
his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental than enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term
effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage. Both heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful of
spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was also
other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of
and sensitive) to each others needs and feelings. The matrimonial plot is not enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is
conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have reality-oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision.
shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the
fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be
traits, which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations
specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about of marriage.32
more emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits
which were in existence before the marriage will tend to be pervasive and CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the
impervious to recovery.25 Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other.33 The couple would
religiously attend prayer meetings in the community.34 Both were likewise
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuels allegations. leaders in their community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go
She insisted that they were a normal couple who had their own share of to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw
fights; that they were happily married until respondent Manuel started respondent Manuel there.36
having extra-marital affairs26 which he had admitted to her.27 Petitioner
Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage and that she On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for
truly loved her husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that:
supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law school
to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the present case, The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly
she would still attend to his needs.29 She remembered that after the pre- supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily married and after four years
trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life together continued years
him a chance to have a new family.30 thereafter in peace and prosperity.
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and
respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties relationship sometime in the
on petitioner Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report. Said early 90s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters that the plaintiff
report stated in part: is playing footsy.
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests, xxx xxx xxx
respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature,
34
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but
to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the also of himself.40
instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant
delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In
contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound like INCAPACITATED
a firetruck.37
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS
May 2001.38 HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO
THE PRESENT
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying
mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME
Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
of Appeals.39 Thus:
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER
incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having The Courts Ruling
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each others Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that
feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the
the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the
consenting adults who view the relationship with love "amore gignit case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own
amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court
of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, of Appeals did not heed.
266 SCRA 324). The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite
a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi,
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties the couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989,
marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of
the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a the nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her
35
husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an essential marital
obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the senseless and (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by
is equivalent to psychological incapacity." experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically
his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
as a Judge. In our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations. illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic v.
Court of Appeals44 we expounded: (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be obligation of marriage.
"protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
solidarity. to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
36
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own evidence, contains
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby of marriage:
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool,
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest problem is
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl now. He
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the
car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, still is willing to pursue it.
should be given great respect by our courts.45
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy
of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a should give me a chance to have a new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw
finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage
respondent Manuel. natin."48
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the
rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.46 psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It
With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court of must be shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation
Appeals47 that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge
to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in the essential obligations of the marital state51 and not merely due to his
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case,
dissolution and nullity. respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because
I wanted to have a child at that particular point."52
37
strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA and wanting a way out.
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her wise constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v.
jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling Marcos:60
nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear
herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests
showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
obligations of marriage.54
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel
The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, on the might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no
other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctors longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither
conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual
contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas problem.61
behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required
by law but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood,55 her 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
husbands philandering, admitted no less by him,56 and her inability to Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
conceive.57 Dr. Garcias report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs. SO
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to ORDERED.
the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and
togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself G.R. No. 162049 April 13, 2007
during his direct examination.58 NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., Petitioner, vs. CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO,
Respondent.
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have DECISION
been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived QUISUMBING, J.:
therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming
38
For review is the Decision1 dated January 8, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in professionals are per se incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
CA-G.R. CV No. 65677, reversing the Regional Trial Courts declaration of marriage because they spend a lot of time in the pursuit of their profession
nullity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent. Likewise assailed is the and have very little time to spend with their family. She concluded that
Court of Appeals Resolution dated February 4, 2004 denying respondent was also psychologically incapacitated to perform the marital
reconsideration. obligations because she knew, from the start, that her husband was going to
be a doctor, yet she did not give him the support and understanding that was
In Civil Case No. 94-70727, filed by petitioner Narciso Navarro, Jr. with the expected of a doctors wife.
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, he sought the declaration of nullity
of his marriage to respondent. Lilia Tayco, the housemaid of petitioners parents also testified that petitioner
and respondent were always quarreling because respondent was always
As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as follows: jealous of petitioners classmates.
Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts. At the time they got A psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan, who conducted a psychiatric test on
married, both in civil and church ceremonies, they were awaiting their first petitioner, testified that tests showed that petitioner was a perfectionist,
child. Since petitioner was still a medical student, while respondent was a short-tempered, critical, argumentative and irritable when people do not
student of pharmacy, they lived with petitioners parents, on whom they meet his expectations. He married Cynthia only after he got her pregnant. He
were financially dependent. Eventually, their union bore four children. had depressions and tended to escapism when beset with problems. He was
vocal about his marital problems. He believed that the lack of
Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he didnt have communication, absence of quality time, inadequacy in problem-solving, and
time for her; and that she constantly quarreled with him even before many problems caused the failure of the marriage.
marriage when he could not give her the things she wanted. He added that
she was not supportive of his career. Even marriage counseling did not work. For her part, respondent refused to submit to the psychiatric examination
Petitioner stated that when they quarreled, she refused to have sex with him asked by the petitioner, but said she would do so only when her defense
and even told him to look for other women. He filed the petition for requires it. She averred that she had no marital problems, not until petitioner
nullification of their marriage when he found out their eldest daughter had had an illicit affair with a certain Dr. Lucila Posadas. Petitioner denied the
been made pregnant by a man whom respondent hired to follow him. affair. Respondent narrated that early 1984, she caught petitioner and Lucila
inside the Harana Motel in Sta. Mesa where a confrontation ensued. After
Abdona T. de Castro, a marriage counselor duly accredited by the Department the incident, petitioner seldom went home until he permanently left his
of Social Welfare and Development, testified that when petitioner saw her on family sometime in 1986. Respondent claimed petitioner and Lucila
April 6, 1994, he was distraught, harassed, and unhappy. She concluded from continued to see each other and had gone abroad together several times. She
meetings with the petitioner that the marriage was dysfunctional, explained that she uttered she would not make love with her husband and
destructive, and reconciliation was out of the question since he claims he dared him to look for other women only out of frustration and anger upon
would go insane if he were to go back to his wife. Relying on the view of discovery of the affair. She admitted hiring someone to spy on petitioner, but
another expert, one Dr. Gerardo Velasco, witness de Castro opined that added that she still loved her husband.
39
Respondent appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. She averred that the
Cynthias friend since high school, Miraflor Respicio testified that Cynthia was trial court erred when it annulled their marriage instead of decreeing their
a good, stable, and mature person; that she was a loving and caring mother legal separation, with the ruling that petitioner was the guilty spouse.
who gave up her career to take care of her children; and that petitioner and
respondent were happy during the early days of the marriage. In a Decision dated January 8, 2003, the Court of Appeals held that the
constant arguments, bickerings and conflicts between the spouses did not
On August 21, 1998, the trial court held that petitioner and respondent were constitute psychological incapacity. It ruled that petitioner failed to show that
both psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations. The any psychological incapacity in either of the two parties existed at the time
dispositive portion of the courts decision reads: of the celebration of marriage. The appellate court reversed the decision of
the trial court and declared that the marriage still subsists.
WHEREFORE, the marriage between the parties is (sic) dated June 2, 1973 is
hereby declared null and void with the following effects: Petitioner now comes before us raising the following as issues:
1. The Plaintiff is hereby directed to support his children with the Defendant (1) Are the decision and resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals proper
in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) a month, which sum shall subject for review by the Honorable Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
be payable on or before the 5th day of each month, effective September, Civil Procedure?
1998;
(2) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals that the lower court
2. The parties are hereby disqualified from inheriting from each other by way (RTC) erred in finding the parties (petitioner and respondent) both
of testate or intestate succession; psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of The Family Code correct
or not?
3. Either of the parties may revoke the designation of the other as beneficiary
in a life insurance policy; (3) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals that the evidence
failed to show that the parties (petitioner and respondent) were completely
4. The parties children are hereby declared legitimate, and the custody of the unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage correct or not?
parties minor children is hereby awarded to the Defendant with the Plaintiff and
exercising his right to visit them at least once a week;
(4) Which is more in accord with existing law and settled jurisprudence, the
5. The properties in the name of the parties consisting of a house and lot decision of the Court of Appeals or the decision of the trial court?3
located at 15 Bronze Street, Filinvest, Quezon City are hereby deemed as their
advance legitime to their children. Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on the
ground of the parties psychological incapacity.
SO ORDERED.2
40
Petitioner contends that the decision of the trial court was well-founded, (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
based on the evidence indicating that the marriage was beyond plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
reconciliation, and allowing the marriage to subsist would only prolong the continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity...
spouses agony. Respondent counters that petitioner failed to prove
psychological incapacity, and that their psychological incapacities existed as (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
early as the time of the celebration of their marriage. clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision...
We shall now resolve the issue.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
Article 36 of the Family Code states: celebration" of the marriage.
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations permanent or incurable...
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage...
In addition, as early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,4 we categorically
said that psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Psychological up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
marriage. These include the obligations to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.5 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
We likewise have repeatedly reminded that the intention of the law is to should be given great respect by our courts...
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.6 In Republic v. Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
Court of Appeals,7 the Court gave the guidelines in the interpretation and handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
application of Art. 36 which are as follows: quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition...8
41
In the present case, the spouses frequent squabbles and respondents
refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
psychological incapacity. The records show that petitioner and respondent LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore DECISION
them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a TINGA, J.:
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations,9 it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has
so, due to some psychological illness10 existing at the time of the celebration unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception
of the marriage. between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the
depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in
It will be noted that respondent did not undergo psychological tests. Witness the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses
de Castros diagnosis was based solely on petitioners avowals and not on capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
personal knowledge of the spouses relationship. Hence, de Castros
diagnosis is based on hearsay and has no probative value.11 The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The
Further, de Castros statement that professionals are per se incapacitated to Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court
perform the essential obligations of marriage because their profession allows (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and
them little time for family life is highly debatable. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Lastly, petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on the
part of both spouses, existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Antecedent Facts
Their bickerings and arguments even before their marriage and respondents
scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show their immaturity, and Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years
immaturity does not constitute psychological incapacity.12 Thus so far, both old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first
petitioner and respondent have not shown proof of a natal or supervening meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City
disabling factor, an adverse integral element in their personality structure Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima
that effectively incapacitates them from accepting and complying with the Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their
obligations essential to marriage.13 union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to
January 8, 2003 and the Resolution dated February 4, 2004 of the Court of respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 65677 are hereby AFFIRMED. Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
42
asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8 they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, (6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a
around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a
events or things, 9 to wit: famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and
ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling
her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take
petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11 her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to her for good in November 1991.21
rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a
degree in psychology, when she was neither.13 Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her respondents persistent and constant lying
family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the
same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further
but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached
hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15 the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold perform her essential marital obligations.23
and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial
industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital
herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that
the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos
43
there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior
invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus: to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly
hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her
afraid of losing her husband.25 part.32
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr.
from head to foot.26 Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33 together
with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27 respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited
for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal from respondent.34
Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she
was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation
office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and
in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28 interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of
only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and can fake the results of such test.35
the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto
political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held
employed with Saniwares.29 that respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation,
state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to
that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
whereabouts.30 incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial
court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost void.
ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
44
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the
of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of
on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These
Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v.
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court
impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to
the Vatican.39 squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases
of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the
incapacity had not been satisfied. petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of
nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence
conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity. Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party
credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity
candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by
petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons
sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43 "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting
marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the
45
same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would
among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were
the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court,
unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should
marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified
under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to
capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to
for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the
classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that
by a party of unsound mind.58 "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined about to assume."68
that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the
spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity
nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code "psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently
obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61 recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to
design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the
phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision
"psychologically incapacity to comply would not be juridically different from committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in
only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to the provision was taken from Canon Law."70
46
psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71 admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled
by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has
on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive,
In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized
it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived
as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent
court.72 judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while
Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity
as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. are binding on lower courts.76
Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by
evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide
trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the
has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an
clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the
There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of
this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to marriage.
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based
of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course
Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
47
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the
enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account "protected" by the state.
in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its
family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
marriage. assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
petition. psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the
48
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto. "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent nature."
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and civilly void.77
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition
for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity
of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
49
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked
to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2)
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel
Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing WITNESS:
career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of
psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the
considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over
court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and
petitioner.80 repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of
normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered
as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the
interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her
through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to marriage?
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another.
psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also
finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs. something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based
on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly
by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be
abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, based on love, trust and respect.
and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner
using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the
educational attainment, and family background, among others.81 respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable
of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
50
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on
xxx the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony,
as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v.
Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We
witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up deem the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis
the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common
petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since
can you say about this, Mr. witness? the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises,
there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is
having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is
abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has
is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy. that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation,
her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give
marriage? meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and
constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of
A- Yes, Maam.83 relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As
concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of
petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84 existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She
fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before
she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
51
natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had
found out the truth after their marriage. At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which
states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity
of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment
such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under
the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of
dubitable. the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying
spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological
as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More incapacity under Article 36.
disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish
truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
the trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in
lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect
were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform the and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court,
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love,
legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the trust and respect.
corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One
unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
or emotional commitments. consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed
perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88
her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence given great respect by our courts.
convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals
as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
52
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only
decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper
March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90 import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold
Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the
Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated
respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such
restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial
consent. trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded
significant recognition by this Court.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal pronounced: Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear
elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the not testify to such effect.95
practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from
the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated,
marriage vows. he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However,
respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact,
that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable.
testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made
the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that
markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat.
matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses
afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained
judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial
consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity
the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94 on this point.
53
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical
that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically averment from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
36 or any other provision of the Family Code. necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was
not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina
began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably
committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as
did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable,
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate
doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101 incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently
court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has
respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled
not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract
promulgation of the trial courts decision that required a medical finding of marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when
this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence. All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does
that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that
constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner,
approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
54
appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending
legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together. support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 but he did not bother to see her and their child.
August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs. The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer
SO ORDERED. residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed
an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004 trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of
respondent. general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio
DECISION failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication,
CORONA, J.: respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the
prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of 7, 1996.
the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding
marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano that no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of
and her husband Toshio Hamano. the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on
Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary
evidence to support her testimony.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-
law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On portion of which read:
November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and
Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to VOID.
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage.
55
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted
ordered to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
SO ORDERED.4 incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support"
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate
psychological incapacity, the trial court held that: court rhetorically asked:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to
his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why
Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is
welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with
manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into
marital life.5 The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and error:
jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo is I The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
AFFIRMED. No costs. psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations,
despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the
SO ORDERED.6 Molina case.10
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his
month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological
promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent
with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines
56
failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina. manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition. obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
We rule in favor of petitioner. here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994),
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
of the validity of the marriage.12
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the
provides that: illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
becomes manifest only after its solemnization. only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar: to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is obligation of marriage.
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. x x x (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
57
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that not be resorted to.15
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles and support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot
(emphasis supplied) presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his
family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical,
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the obligations essential to marriage.18
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
58
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do
not apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena (petitioner) and Jesse Lauro Laurena
husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological (respondent) met in January 1983.[4] They were married on 19 December
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino 1983 at the Church of Saint Augustine in Intramuros, Manila. They have two
spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because children, Mark Jordan who was born on 2 July 1985 and Michael Joseph who
the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a was born on 11 November 1987.
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological
incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in On 19 October 1993, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity marriage against respondent. Petitioner alleged that respondent was
should apply to any person regardless of nationality. psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage,
and the incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social although she discovered it only after the marriage.
institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with
respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be Petitioner alleged that after their wedding, she and respondent went to
the fitting denouement. Baguio City for their honeymoon. They were accompanied by a 15-year old
boy, the son of one of respondents house helpers, who respondent invited to
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated sleep in their hotel suite. After their honeymoon, they settled in respondents
August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. house in Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City. Petitioner became
SO ORDERED. pregnant in March 1984 but suffered a miscarriage. According to petitioner,
she almost bled to death while respondent continued watching a television
G.R. No. 159220 September 22, 2008 show at the foot of their matrimonial bed.
MA. DARLENE DIMAYUGA-LAURENA, Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF
APPEALS and JESSE LAURO LAURENA, Respondents. Petitioner alleged that respondent gave priority to the needs of his parents;
DECISION would come home past midnight; and even tried to convert her to his religion.
CARPIO, J.: In addition, respondent was a womanizer. Petitioner lived in Batangas for
three years while she tended to their gasoline station while respondent
The Case remained in Paraaque City. She discovered that respondent had been living a
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 6 June 2003 bachelors life while she was away. Petitioner also noticed that respondent
Decision[2] and 1 August 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA- had feminine tendencies. They would frequently quarrel and one time,
G.R. CV No. 58458. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the 25 respondent hit her face. Petitioner alleged that in September 1990,
March 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 respondent abandoned their conjugal home and stopped supporting their
(trial court) in Civil Case No. 93-3754. children. Petitioner alleged that respondents psychological incapacity was
manifested by his infidelity, utter neglect of his familys needs, irresponsibility,
The Antecedent Facts insensitivity, and tendency to lead a bachelors life.
59
Petitioner further alleged that during their marriage, she and respondent a) DENYING the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Ma.
acquired the following properties which were all part of their conjugal Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena on the ground of psychological incapacity;
partnership of gains:
b) DECLARING the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and
1. duplex house and lot located at 4402 Dayap Street, Palanan, Makati City; respondent Dissolved with all the effects provided by law; and further
2. house and lot on Palaspas Street, Tanauan, Batangas; AFFIRMING the petitioners claim that all the properties acquired during the
3. dealership of Jeddah Caltex Service Station in Pres. Laurel Highway, marriage are conjugal properties;
Tanauan, Batangas (Jeddah Caltex Station);
4. Personal vehicles consisting of a Mitsubishi Lancer, Safari pick-up, L-300 c) AWARDING the custody of the children to the parent chosen by the said
van and L-200 pick-up; and minors considering that they are over seven (7) years of age;
5. Jeddah Trucking. Support of said minors shall be borne by the parents in proportion to their
respective incomes.
Petitioner prayed for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, for
custody of their children, and for monthly support of P25,000. After this decision becomes final, let copies thereof be furnished the Register
of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas and Makati City for their information.
Respondent denied petitioners allegations. He asserted that petitioner was
emotionally immature, stubborn, unstable, unreasonable, and extremely SO ORDERED.[6]
jealous. Respondent alleged that some of the properties claimed by
petitioner were not part of their conjugal partnership of gains. Respondent Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision insofar as the trial court
prayed for the dismissal of the petition. denied her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Respondent
appealed from the trial courts Decision insofar as the trial court declared
The Ruling of the Trial Court some of his parents properties as part of the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Decision[5] dated 25 March 1997, the trial court denied the petition for The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
declaration of nullity of marriage. The trial court found that the
manifestations of respondents psychological incapacity alleged by petitioner In its 6 June 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification
were not so serious as to consider respondent psychologically incapacitated. the trial courts Decision.
The trial court ruled that petitioners evidence only showed that she could not The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to prove that the root cause
get along with respondent. of respondents psychological incapacity was medically or clinically identified
and sufficiently proven by experts. The Court of Appeals noted that Dr.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads: Lourdes Lapuz (Dr. Lapuz), the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, was not
able to talk to respondent and simply based her conclusions and impressions
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: of respondent from her two-hour session with petitioner. The Court of
60
Appeals ruled that Dr. Lapuzs testimony was vague and ambiguous on the The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
matter of respondents personality disorder which would render him
psychologically incapacitated. The Court of Appeals further ruled that WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED
petitioner was not able to prove that respondents alleged psychological with regard to the denial of the petition for annulment of marriage and the
incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage. The dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The adjudication respecting
Court of Appeals further ruled that in her complaint, petitioners bases were the properties which comprise the conjugal partnership is MODIFIED to
respondents irresponsibility, insensitivity, and infidelity. During the trial, she exclude the properties belonging to the parents of respondent, i.e., the
claimed that the root of her husbands incapacity was his homosexuality. The ancestral house and lot in Tanauan, Batangas, the duplex house and lot at
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners allegations in her complaint and Dayap Street, Makati, as well as the properties acquired through the
during the trial lacked factual and evidentiary bases. The Court of Appeals operation of the Caltex station and Jeddah Trucking. No costs.
ruled that the totality of respondents acts could not lead to the conclusion
that he was psychologically incapacitated; that his incapacity was existing at SO ORDERED.[7]
the time of the celebration of the marriage; and that it was incurable.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals also sustained the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent. The Court of In its 1 August 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Appeals rejected respondents argument that the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains should also be denied because of the denial of the Hence, the petition before this Court.
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that
respondents abandonment of his family and the fact that petitioner and The Issues
respondent had been separated for more than a year prior to the filing of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage were sufficient grounds for the The issues in this case are the following:
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.
However, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court included as part of 1. Whether respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
the conjugal partnership of gains properties and businesses, particularly the essential marital obligations; and
ancestral house and lot in Tanauan, Batangas; the duplex house and lot on
Dayap Street, Makati City; the Jeddah Caltex Station; and Jeddah Trucking, 2. Whether the properties excluded by the Court of Appeals form part of
which all belonged to respondents parents. The Court of Appeals found that the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent.
the rentals derived from the properties and the income from the businesses
were deposited in the account of respondents parents. The Court of Appeals The Ruling of this Court
excluded the properties and businesses derived from the operations of the The petition has no merit.
Jeddah Caltex Station and Jeddah Trucking from the conjugal partnership of
gains. Petitioner Failed to Prove Respondents Psychological Incapacity
61
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
of the Family Code which provides that [a] marriage contracted by any party Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. In Santos v. state.
Court of Appeals,[8] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
incurability.[9] It should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
parties to the marriage.[10] It must be confined to the most serious cases of clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[11] Finally, the requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.[12] manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
The Court explained: convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
(a) Gravity It must be grave and serious such that the party would be obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
(b) Judicial Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
after the marriage; and evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(c) Incurability It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
would be beyond the means of the party involved.[13] of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when
the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not
In Republic v. Court of Appeals[14] (Molina case), the Court laid down the be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family moment, or prior thereto.
Code as follows:
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
62
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and civilly void.[15]
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party satisfy the guidelines in the Molina case.
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner anchored her petition on
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity respondents irresponsibility, infidelity, and homosexual tendencies.
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other Petitioner likewise alleged that respondent tried to compel her to change her
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an religious belief, and in one of their arguments, respondent also hit her.
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively However, sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence, homosexuality,
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with physical violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to change religious
the obligations essential to marriage. affiliation, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation[16] but not for
declaring a marriage void.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles In Marcos v. Marcos,[17] the Court ruled that if the totalities of the evidence
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. presented are enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, there
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, is no need to resort to the actual medical examination of the person
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. concerned. However, while an actual medical, psychiatric, or psychological
examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of incapacity, an expert witness would have strengthened petitioners claim of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, respondents psychological incapacity.[18] While the examination by a
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was physician of a person to declare him or her psychologically incapacitated is
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New not required, the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: clinically identified.[19] In this case, the testimony of Dr. Lapuz on
respondents psychological incapacity was based only on her two-hour session
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable with petitioner. Her testimony was characterized by the Court of Appeals as
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological vague and ambiguous. She failed to prove psychological incapacity or identify
nature. its root cause. She failed to establish that respondents psychological
incapacity is incurable. Dr. Lapuz testified:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to Q- What, in your opinion are the causes of this incapacity?
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
63
A- I feel, your Honor, that there is some personality agenda on his part that I responsible.[21] She also found that the couple separated because of
do not know because he has not come to see me but there are such men who respondents infidelity.[22]
can be very ardent lovers but suddenly will completely turn over...
Petitioner also failed to prove that respondents psychological incapacity was
Q- Is this a sort of personality disorder? existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Petitioner only cited
A- Yes, your Honor. that during their honeymoon, she found it strange that respondent allowed
their 15-year old companion, the son of one of respondents house helpers,
Q- Is that inherited or could have been acquired even before marriage? to sleep in their room. However, respondent explained that he and petitioner
A- It was there on the time of the inception of his personality, it was there. already stayed in a hotel for one night before they went to Baguio City and
And my feeling is that these things do not happen overnight, one does not that they had sexual relations even before their marriage. Respondent
change spot overnight but that thing, like marriage, can completely turn-table explained that the boy was with them to take pictures and videos of their stay
his behavior. in Baguio City and had to stay with them in the room due to monetary
constraints.
Q- Doctora, do you think this kind of incapacity, this personality disorder, is
there any possibility of curing it? In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioner failed to show
A- Very little at this time and sometimes, when they become older, like when that respondent was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity
they reach the age of 50s or 60s, they may settle down and finally give out was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their
and reveal interest in their families. marriage.
Q- In short, there is possibility that this incapacity of the respondent could be Properties of Respondents Parents Do Not Form Part of Conjugal Partnership
cured? of Gains
A- Only respondents physical decline of sexual urge, if the sexual urge would
not decline, the incapacity will continue. Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals exclusion of the properties of
respondents parents from their conjugal partnership of gains. In particular,
Q- Is there no medicine or is there any kind of medicine that can cure this the Court of Appeals excluded the ancestral house and lot in Tanauan,
kind of disorder? Batangas; the duplex house and lot on Dayap Street, Makati City; and the
A- None to my knowledge, your Honor. There is no magic feather in the properties acquired through the operations of the Jeddah Caltex Station and
psychiatric treatment. Perhaps, if the person would be willing and open Jeddah Trucking.
enough and interested enough...[20]
Even the recommendation in the Social Case Study Report submitted by We sustain in part the Court of Appeals Decision.
Social Welfare Officer Marissa P. Obrero-Ballon, who was assigned by the trial
court to conduct a social case study on the parties, failed to show the As early as 15 July 1978, respondents parents already executed a General
existence of respondents psychological incapacity. The Social Welfare Officer Power of Attorney[23] in favor of respondent covering all their properties and
instead found that petitioner was immature while respondent was businesses. Several Special Powers of Attorney were also executed by
64
respondents parents in favor of respondent. On 14 April 1987, respondents NACHURA, J.:
parents executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[24] covering two parcels of land
located in Tanauan, Batangas, with a total area of 966 square meters, for Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity,
P40,000. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the transfer was merely an since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion
accommodation so that petitioner, who was then working at the Bangko in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), could acquire a loan from BSP at a lower rate[25] having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily
using the properties as collateral. The loan proceeds were used as additional imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed,
capital for the Jeddah Caltex Station. As found by the Court of Appeals, the totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form
loan was still being paid from the income from the Jeddah Caltex Station. The and devoid of any definition.
Lease Contract[26] on the Jeddah Caltex Station was signed by respondent as
attorney-in-fact of his mother Juanita Laurena, leaving no doubt that it was For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
the business of respondents parents. Jeddah Trucking was established from 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of the Court
the proceeds and income of the Jeddah Caltex Station. of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the
January 19, 2004 Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of
As regards the duplex house and lot in Makati City, the Deed of Absolute the challenged decision.
Sale[27] was executed by Manuela C. Felix in favor of respondent. The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Respondent claimed that the duplex house was purchased from the income
of the Jeddah Caltex Station. However, we find no sufficient proof to sustain Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena
this allegation. In fact, respondent testified that he received a series of Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese
promotions during their marriage until we can afford to buy that duplex [on] association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas
Dayap.[28] Hence, the duplex house on Dayap Street, Makati City should be close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man
included in the conjugal partnership of gains. decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.3
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the 6 June 2003
Decision and 1 August 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another
No. 58458 with MODIFICATION by including the duplex house and lot on and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March
Dayap Street, Makati City in the conjugal partnership of gains. No costs. SO 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward
ORDERED. that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless.
Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009 to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner, vs. ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU- boat ticket.4
TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor. However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house
DECISION accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not
65
find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and
proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him hearings.13
that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it
uncles place.5 could not determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it
recommended trial on the merits.14
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married.
He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.6 The two then continued to stay at The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties
her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not psychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and
allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns conclusions:
and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able
to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
their parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who,
however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and
on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at
mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married
must go home.8 to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at
my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological
stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by whom he
that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to
live separate lives. They then parted ways.10 be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to
be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as
of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest
This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11 lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is]
said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether
there was collusion between the parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27,
66
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and
a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract
shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
petitioner.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner
became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was
dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns.
his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will
that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made
respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should
together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses. Sometime in June of
young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents
because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him
seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a
boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner
eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to
respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of
compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea
not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and and claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate
seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of home of their own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to
petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit
decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these
behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own
petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for
immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his
petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does
and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that
home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped
became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate
the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his lives.
family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make
amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly
Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[]
67
unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-
finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her
involved with herself. [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage
as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune
TESTS ADMINISTERED: because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she
used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed.
Revised Beta Examination Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test her way out of the relationship.
Draw A Person Test REMARKS:
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry
himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out
Sachs Sentence Completion Test of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and
law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently
MMPI clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they
are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION: weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the
other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful,
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is
recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
motivated by different notions on marriage. Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood
and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.15
and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on
the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision16 declaring the
not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were
mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship obligations.17 The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of
especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive appeal.18
moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer
to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone. On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision19 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.20 It
ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of
68
respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36
and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.31
psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the I. We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the
requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina21 needed for development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.22 The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:
the required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons
for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.23 Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24 marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review
on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.25 drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the
Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate
In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:33
own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the
marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of
that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family
OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.27 Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present
Article 36 in the Family Code.
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,28 that the annulment
petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital "During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law
it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of
was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation,
clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a
OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30 proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof
based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the
69
spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the
whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present
divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result
divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration
Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter. of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family (7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
marriage as
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and as well as the following implementing provisions:
family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without
within the limits provided by law.
prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept
of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also marriage shall not prescribe.
realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry xxxxxxxxx
to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today
opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus
not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting
recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been
of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion"
marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some
70
personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage."
refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they
have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34 As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental
impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984
In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded: session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists
but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read: the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over: The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of
the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration." that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest
after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to spouse to remarry.
understand the essential nature of marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of marriages, viz.:
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it
is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the 1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason
71
2. reasons of public policy; recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the
3. special cases and special situations. marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be
and special situations," hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal
Code as finally enacted. procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as
avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into
in nature. another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being
congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict,
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to
ratification or convalidation. contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
some marriages are void from the beginning. relationships.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the
the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Codeand
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law. classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable
of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the
the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081
by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
solemnization." category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for
consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types related grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due
of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the
72
ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of
union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality
incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
during the wedding ceremony." meaning and significance to the marriage.41 This interpretation is, in fact,
consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the 3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for must be made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to
time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the
marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to
short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious positive law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract,
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the
after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to
problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of
an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.36 the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process
of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their
incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because
the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the
was taken from the Canon Law.37 The law is then so designed as to allow object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of
some resiliency in its application.38 consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as
a result of the consent he elicits.
Yet, as held in Santos,39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant
to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand as
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 6840 ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
73
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously
studied under this rubric. under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and
certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite
and in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be
the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of
sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may
condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to
are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by
is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may fire.
impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with
respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the 3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen
activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these his way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear
anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one hand,
remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion
understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they
fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty
person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable
may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in
assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal
posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself. judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and
the act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually
regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What
this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the
intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly 3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain
that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the
irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent)
made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an
would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a
74
spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the
also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for
the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in detained and individual description.
understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and
evaluating of those same obligations. A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances
of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have understood,
unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not
similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies capable of assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality."
and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of
the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards
distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of
by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision.
binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that
renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person
impossibile tenetur. was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place.
When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the
xxxx obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially
at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential
the contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on
One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self- the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards
centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are
begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of
relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common.
are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve
party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum ones ends.
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the
good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial
deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their
75
corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of the Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the
spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to
be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche
several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that
interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis
inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense
immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits. only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic
constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what deeply engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a
rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems
to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then that the
Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit
incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella of some degree of freedom.42
was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground
of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis,
the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of
but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43 ruled that the findings of the trial
[incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems court are final and binding on the appellate courts.44
to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was
impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45
usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the
infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware
the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of
consent. The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set
source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. of strict standards in Molina,46 thus:
76
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
"protected" by the state. obligation of marriage.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or the obligations essential to marriage.
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
77
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts.
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage,
nature." it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must,
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to court."48
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49 the Court has applied
on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention
civilly void. that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be church tribunals."
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Churchwhile remaining
independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk together in In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be world."50 The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.47 schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) individuals.51
Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another
78
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the
by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.
guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-
evidence.52 The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
rape.
II. We now examine the instant case.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological
incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and
person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56
anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.53 Let it be
noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
the same is void from the very beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
stillborn marriage. temperaments of the parties.57
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of
its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about
normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented
with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were
their marriage. rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of
valid consent.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina
in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not
in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during
79
the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes. "The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations
of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that
prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. might lead to the failure of a marriage:
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological "At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic expectations.
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to xxxx
each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must
be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of fits very easily into the psychological category.
marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume
to the other spouse. or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of
mature marital relationship: the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital
80
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a
into."581avvphi1 persons recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and
thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained,
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59 emphasizes the importance of presenting inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or
as Marcos v. Marcos60 asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity.61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders,
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to
psychological disorder itself. pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals
with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or
incapacity.62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits
the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,63 an option for the trial judge to refer with life.
the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose
assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an a variety of causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic
intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
not dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own expert
witnesses. Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of
development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d
consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types.
with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive)
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of
We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
disorders as follows fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to
shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships.lawphil.net
81
However, later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood
events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-
personality patterns. aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear anxious or fearful.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor
involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise
there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some specified," that can be used for other specific personality disorders or for
family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality
related to genetic factors. disorders.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term
researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.64
acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past
history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit
eye movement. A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others
reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through
widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38 a quest for overprotection.
percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent
in a control group. Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals
who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even
DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major clusters: when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone
Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.65 and antisocial
habits and traits. personality disorder described, as follows
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to
emotional, erratic and dramatic. sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either
82
through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case,
blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him.
masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has
control others. no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent.
befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her
prior to a public scandal. disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of
others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover,
moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
accompanied by impairments in reasoning.lawphil.net qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality disorders, the others being incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996
borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66 is thus, declared null and void.
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution
the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses deportment,
arrived at the same conclusion. G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, DECISION
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing NACHURA, J.:
love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with November 17, 2003 Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its
people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court,
his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision3
83
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his
36 of the Family Code.4 friends.14 But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink
regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee
The facts follow. hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult
respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their
(Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.5 house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist
They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his
respondent was already pregnant with their first child. fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons
even stopped calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner
At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latters
When their second child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmens drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16
family home in Cebu City.7 In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical
board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to take a residency program Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial
to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, support to their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked
Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said field9 and, in for money for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would
1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive
member of its active staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospitals equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed home18 and even neglected his
Treasurer.11 obligation to his children.19
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.20 He would
James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his friends,
Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes,
and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12 Benjamin would pawn his wifes own jewelry to finance his gambling.21
There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to
and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified pay off his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in
petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which
their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the
Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the gambling establishments.23
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest
thereafter. 13 In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted
of the following manifestations:
84
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a
his profession; psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates
evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular taken during Benjamins deposition because the latter had already gone to
drinking; work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the
transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent
necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.32
father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay
the same; and To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a
psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated
refusal to give regular financial support to his family.24 Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic
notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz,
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr.
maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oates
said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioners
and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a personality, considering the latters good relationship with his fellow doctors
violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.25 As for his alleged and his good track record as anesthesiologist.35
failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen
herself who would collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the
was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave
Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his credence to Dr. Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the
means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated
spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial
out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone
Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.28 who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with
violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the
gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, decision reads:
who served as nanny to the spouses children from 1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas
stated that she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated
Carmen even in front of their children.30
85
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio Hence, this petition.
pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
For our resolution are the following issues:
xxxx
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow
SO ORDERED.37 the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
rendered a Decision38 reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
courts finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and
that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories and not on respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of
Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.41 We find merit in the petition.
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the I. On the issue of stare decisis.
Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision
was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal
she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina ruling rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle
could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for deemed settled and closed to further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. attempt to relitigate the same issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons:
Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in
prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Article 8 of the Civil Code.51
Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari43 with this Court. In a
Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the
directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration.45 On English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice
review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos discussion on the historical
17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46 reversing its first ruling and development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v.
sustaining the trial courts decision.47 Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing
was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48 and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts.
86
Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important
established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in
again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose,
where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command.
binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision." departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which
is again called upon to consider a question once decided." In the same vein,
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of
of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about
are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of
but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has
or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by
Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as
considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This
that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the
required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. courts' limited resources.
It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with
for over two centuries." In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons,
viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy;
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound
observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and
Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and
known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can
second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are
follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stuck agreeing with them.
stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis,
has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare
stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution. decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these
reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law
constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the
decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently
87
unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and
Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex
Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain prospicit, non respicit."
provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage
reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and under Article 36.
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that
courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before We have not.
overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening
developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared
balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
decision and its merits. rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving
rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only
a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with
to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all
the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to fours" with another.57
the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation;
(3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical
have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by
find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to
have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.53 determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of
the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable,
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being of marriage.58 At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if
was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,54 and again in Antonio the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of
construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the the person concerned need not be resorted to.59 The trial court, as in any
88
other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely
on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to
each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly,
and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the and the appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by and respondent null and void ab initio.
decisions of church tribunals.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.: deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.621avvphi1.zw+
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of
the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners "defects" were
of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that
for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally
also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient
Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband.
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive
conference.60 evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the
parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present provided by these experts strengthened respondents allegation of
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
gravity and incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity, then such contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners
expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder,63 while Dr. Obra
court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage. maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality.
89
Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A.
aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to legal separation, but not
Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview The facts are as follows:
with Benjamins brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of
Dr. Obras findings. On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite
gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.1
excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes
love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon,
to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as the Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the United States of America
totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro Palinar,
declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36. Jr. at the Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.2 They are
childless.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent
presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail. was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is marriage as shown by the following facts:
GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13,
2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are (a) At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the
accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while
respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough effort to find a job and was
G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009 dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder
DIGNA A. NAJERA, Petitioner, vs. EDUARDO J. NAJERA, Respondent. brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a seaman
DECISION in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
PERALTA, J.:
(b) While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, financial support and she had to rely on her own efforts and the help of her
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053 and its Resolution parents in order to live.
August 5, 2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
90
(c) As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said properties pursuant to
each year. In May 1989, when he came home from his ship voyage, he started Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family Code; and (4) granting petitioner other
to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of having an affair with just and equitable reliefs.
another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into
it. When she refused, he insulted her and uttered "unprintable words" against On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner
her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always to effect service by publication as provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the
drunk. Rules of Court.
(d) When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer3 wherein he denied the
been happening every year, he quarreled with petitioner. He continued to be material allegations in the petition and averred that petitioner was incurably
jealous, he arrived home drunk and he smoked marijuana. On July 3, 1994, immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of infidelity.
while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted He claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his sole
physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able effort and money. As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the award of
to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on P200,000.00 as moral damages, P45,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P1,000.00
different parts of her body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident as appearance fee for every scheduled hearing.
was reported at the Bugallon Police Station.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of
(e) Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal Appearance.
belongings. He lived with his mother at Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he
abandoned petitioner. On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order4 terminating the pre-trial
conference after the parties signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains
in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. and divide equally their conjugal properties.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a
appointing her as the sole administrator of their conjugal properties; and that Compliance manifesting that after conducting an investigation, he found that
after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1) declaring their marriage no collusion existed between the parties.5 The initial hearing of the case was
void ab initio in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the held on November 23, 1998.
alternative, decreeing legal separation of petitioner and respondent pursuant
to Title II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her
partnership of petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture in mother, Celedonia Aldana; psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police
Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), Bugallon, Pangasinan.
91
Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place and proceeded to
accounting clerk in a government agency in Manila. She and respondent Gomez Street toward the highway. At the highway, she boarded a bus and
married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by their marriage contract.6 At the asked the conductor to stop at a clinic or hospital. She alighted in
time of their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who
employed as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the Provincial sutured her wounds. After a few hours, she went home.9
Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of P5,000.00. It was
petitioners brother who helped respondent find a job as a seaman at the When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her
Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was parents who were residing about 300 meters away. She then asked her
employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of brother to enter the house through the ceiling in order to open the door. She
P1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went home in 1989 and then found that their personal belongings were gone, including her Automated
returned to work after three months. Every time respondent was home, he Teller Machine card and jewelry.10
quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another
man. Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and every Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon,
time he went out of the house and returned home, he was drunk. However, Pangasinan.11
there was no record in their barangay that respondent was involved in
drugs.7 Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in
Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that he went abroad again,
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their but she no longer received any allotment from him.12
earnings. In 1991, they constructed a house on the lot.8
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the respondents parents were separated. Respondents brothers were also
boyfriend of petitioners sister. Respondent, however, did not allow separated from their respective wives.13
petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home at around
midnight, petitioner asked him about the party, the persons who attended it, Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her
and the ladies he danced with, but he did not answer her. Instead, marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos,
respondent went to the kitchen. She asked him again about what happened Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent.14
at the party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she was the one
having an affair and suddenly slapped and boxed her, causing her eyes to be Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but
bloodied. When she opened her eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, not respondent who was abroad. She confirmed her Psychological Report,
and he attempted to kill her. However, she was able to parry his attack with the conclusion of which reads:
her left arm, causing her to sustain injuries on different parts of her body.
When respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got nervous and went out. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:
After 10 minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find
her because she had gone out and was hiding from him. When she heard
92
It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological
hang-ups which are rooted in the kind of family background he has. His Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
mother had an extramarital affair and separated from Respondents father. testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that
This turn of events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging from respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and mauled
his alcoholic and marijuana habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill
double bind where he both deeply loved and resented his mother. her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.17
His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal
appears to be an offshoot of deep-seated feelings and recurrent thoughts separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their
towards his own mother. Unable to resolve his childhood conflicts and anger, marriage. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
he turned to his wife as the scapegoat for all his troubles.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is follows:
afflicted with a Borderline Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of
instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image and self- 1. Decreeing legal separation of Petitioner/Plaintiff Digna Najera and
destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo Najeras respondent/defendant Eduardo Najera;
psychological impairment as traced to his parents separation, aggravated by
the continued meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage 2. Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the
to Petitioner Digna Aldana. petitioner/plaintiff and respondent/defendant, and to divide the same
equally between themselves pursuant to their Joint Manifestation/Motion
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), dated April 27, 1998.18
known to cause irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution19 dated
of his violent and abusive behavior across time render his impairment grave May 2, 2000.
and irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is recommended that parties
marriage be annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part of Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties and
responsibilities to Digna Aldana-Najera.15 In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of
respondents psychological disorder were nil. Its curability depended on WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and
whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the judgment of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.20
malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual
drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals
personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses.16 in a Resolution dated August 5, 2004.
93
Hence, this petition raising the following issues: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
1. The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
198. Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
2. The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
incapacity of respondent Eduardo Najera. "protected" by the state.
3. The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial xxxx
Tribunal is practically the same set of facts established by petitioners
evidence submitted before the trial court and therefore the same conclusion (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
ought to be rendered by the Court. clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
4. Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although
Gates as an expert in Psychology.21 its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
under Article 36 of the Family Code.22 here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
psychological incapacity of respondent which is his dysfunctional family evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
background. With such background, respondent could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
obligations essential to marriage. celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the
The Court is not persuaded. illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
Republic v. Court of Appeals23 laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:
94
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against nature.
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential on evidence -- what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
obligation of marriage. civilly void.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church -- while remaining
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together in
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
complying with the obligations essential to marriage. handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.1avvphi1 function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."24
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New to be declared psychologically incapacitated.25 In fact, the root cause may be
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: "medically or clinically identified."26 What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
95
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.27 Q Have you [seen] the respondent?
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the A He is not in the country, sir.
evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the
obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological respondent is allegedly affected, is this curable?
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. A The chances are nil.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that Q But it is curable?
respondent was psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to
her by petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge and A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.
evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable.28
Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with Q What is this organic damage?
certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable
as may be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates testimony: A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline
personality disorder. [D]id you find any organic cause? Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him
(respondent)?
A No, sir.
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent
Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the with borderline personality disorder. This [is] based on his interpersonal
marriage of the respondent? relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, and his
uncontrollable impulses.
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondents family]
background, there was strong basis that respondent developed mal-adoptive Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?
pattern.
A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.29
Q Did you interview the respondents family?
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by
A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic). petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of
respondent toward petitioner and respondents abandonment of petitioner
xxxx without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal
96
separation30 only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did
not have the opportunity to consider the decision of the National Appellate
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal which her counsel sought to be considered the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August
admitted by the Court of Appeals on February 11, 2004, twelve days before 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration. In the said
the decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now
Court of Appeals failed to follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioners motion for
Appeals, thus: reconsideration was devoid of merit. It stated:
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2,
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, 2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was follows:
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which
include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this
nature. Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have
on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother
civilly void. with whom [he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he
was according to his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage;
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the this affected his conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be talkative, peaceful but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining infidelity of his mother who now lives with her paramour, also married and a
independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in policeman; Finally, into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing abuse until one time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. attacked her with a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.
Petitioners argument is without merit.

97
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.
relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares
and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us
of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2 to give credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of
which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other
than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the
persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellants mother), Sonny evidence presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430
de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma. Cristina R. Gates [2001]). And based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to
(psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.31
July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of
the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Santos v. Santos32 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and friends of the opposing Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on
parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the
veracity of the latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue.1avvphi1 provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon
Law, which reads:
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the
Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. However, 1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to accepted;
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law 3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
on evidence what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed assume the essential obligations of marriage.
civilly void x x x.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states: of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature,
but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer
98
from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the G.R. No. 165424 June 9, 2009
pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner, vs. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and
Tribunal reads: THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which CORONA, J.:
include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated
June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his right This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution
to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this of this Court denying petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule
Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January 26,
that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave 2004 decision1 and September 24, 2004 resolution2 of the Court of
lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital
contract x x x. Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to
invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his
relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in
and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2
of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a "joke."
After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started
established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only
by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."
Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist
Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality
supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as
diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC. that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to
CA-G.R. CV No. 68053, dated February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void.3
August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
99
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the
ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed
petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It personality disorder from self-defeating personality disorder to [dependent]
was denied. personality disorder and this is brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that
petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. marriage with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage,
We affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the sir.
marriage.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument incapacity to handle the essential obligations of marriage?
that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the
basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable.
presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than It was a very impulsive decision. I dont think he understood what it meant to
enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was really be married and after the marriage, there was no consummation, there
and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after
obligations of marriage. three months he refused to see or talk with the respondent and afterwards,
I guess the relationship died a natural death, and he never thought it was a
We grant the motion for reconsideration. really serious matter at all.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,4 this xx xx xx
Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological
incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case- Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and
to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers respondent suffered from a grave lack of discretionary judgment. Can you
in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals. expound on this?
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must undergone. [It was] just a spur of the moment decision that they should get
consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental married xx xx I dont think they truly considered themselves married.
disposition of the parties.5
xx xx xx
In this case, the testimony6 of petitioners expert witness revealed that
petitioner was suffering from dependent personality disorder. Thus: Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conclude xx xx that petitioner and respondent are suffering from
conducted, can you briefly tell this court your findings [and] conclusions? psychological incapacity?
100
seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his
A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never father who treated his family like robots12 and, later, by respondent who was
consummated the marriage. During the very short relationship they had, as domineering as his father.13 When petitioner could no longer take
there were frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem also of lack of respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than
respect [for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment. confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage.14
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder7 as Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family
life, to wit:15
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?
belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others
comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The father
a quest for overprotection. was very abusive, very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and
the children never had affirmation. They might [have been] x x x given
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals financial support because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was
who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without never an intact family. x x x The wife and the children were practically robots.
advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their And so, I would say Lester grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even and somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband,
when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing what [it] meant to have a real family life.
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to
get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was
and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.1avvphil grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of his
marriage to respondent.16
In her psychological report,8 Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent
personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological
attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions.9 Petitioners condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This
mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt Court, in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable
confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may
respondent was for real.10 be long-term.17 Particularly, personality disorders are "long-standing,
inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning
dependent personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self- and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who
denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive display them and for others."18
attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him.11 This could be
101
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering
from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April

16, 2008 resolution of this Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and
September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
60010 are SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17,
1998 is hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

Persons Full Text Cases Part 2 Prelim Psychological Incapacity

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Persons Full Text Cases Part 2 Prelim Psychological Incapacity

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1

1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;

Draw A Person Test REMARKS:

Petitioners argument is without merit.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April

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