Title Facts
Johnson & Johnson (P) claimed title to property conveyed under two grants, one in 1773 and the other in 1775, by the
Graham's chiefs of the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations. P contends superior title because his title came directly from
Lessee v. the Indian nations who owned the land. D claims superior title due to a direct conveyance from the United
McIntosh States government. District Court held for D. P appeals.
Carino v. This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for the registration of certain land. The
Insular application was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance
Government, of the Province of Benguet on behalf of the government of the Philippines, and also on behalf of the United
212 U.S. 449 States, those governments having taken possession of the property for public and military purposes. The
(1909) Court of First Instance found the facts and dismissed the application upon grounds of law. This judgment
was affirmed by the supreme court, 7 Phil. 132, and the case then was brought here by writ of error.
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the Province of
Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, as far
back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather had
lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of the
country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and
had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized
as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot
custom. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894
and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems
to have come of it, unless, perhaps, information that lands in Benguet could not be conceded until those to
be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated -- a purpose that has been carried out by the
Philippine government and the United States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under
the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process, however, establishing only a
possessory title, it is said.
Cruz vs. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on
DENR the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public
Secretary domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in
turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public
lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but
community property of the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development
and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than
25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.
Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.
Jones vs. On the 16th day of January, 1904 F. Stewart Jones presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration
Insular Govt asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a certain tract of land situated in the Province of Benguet, and
within the reservation defined in Act No. 636. The Solicitor-General appeared in the court below and
opposed the inscription upon the ground that the property was public land. At the trial he objected to any
consideration of the case on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to register land situated in that
Issue Ruling
Whether a title NO. Title to lands is and must be admitted to depend entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie.
conveyed by the Native Discovery of America by Great Britain gave them the exclusive right to settle, possess, and govern the new land, and the
Americans can be absolute title to the soil, subject to certain rights of occupancy of the Native Indians.
recognized by the By treaty between Great Britain and the United States, the powers of government, and the right to the soil, passed to the
Federal Courts. United States, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and the exclusive power to extinguish that right was vested in
that government which might constitutionally exercise it.
Conquest gives a title that the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, respecting the original justice of the claim that has
been successfully asserted.
The United States holds absolute title with the exclusive right to convey land while the Native Indians only had a right of
occupancy that can be extinguished at any time. Conquest gives title that the Courts cannot deny; therefore property
rights are defined by law.
Whether the plaintiff Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the Philippine Commission which
owns the land. provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one who actually owns property in such province is entitled to
registration under Act No. 496 of 1902, which applies to the whole archipelago.
While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically it is a question of strength and of
varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the
former sovereign and how far it will recognize actual facts.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under
the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit
of the inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain
ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and against the government
which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition
by the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of
Paris is entitled to the continued possession thereof.
WON IPRA is After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
unconstitutional. Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and
should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza
voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not
have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
1. ACTS OF THE COMMISSION; RESERVATION OF LANDS FOR PUBLIC USE. Where lands have been reserved
by act of the Commission, a notice by the Governor-General to the Court of Land Registration is sufficient to five that
court jurisdiction of the cases mentioned in Act No. 648.
2. ID.; PRESCRIPTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. The prescription of ten years mentioned in Act No. 648 runs
against the Government.
 reservation. The objections were overruled and judgment entered in favor of the petitioner, from which 3. ID.; ADVERSE POSSESSION FOR TEN YEARS. Held, That the evidence in the case proved an adverse
judgment the Government appealed to this court. possession of the land in question for ten years.
The evidence shows that Sioco Cario was born upon the premises in question; that his grandfather, 4. ID.; NULLITY; ACTS OF CONGRESS. Act No. 648 is not void because not previously submitted to the President
Ortega, during the life of the latter, made a gift of the property to Sioco. This gift was made more than and Congress. It is not included in the provisions of section 13 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
twelve years before the filing of the petition in this case that is, before the 16th day of January, 1904. 5. ID.; PHILIPPINE COMMISSION; GRANTING OF LAND. The provisions of section 14 authorizing the Commission to
Siocos grandfather, Ortega, was in possession of the land at the time the gift was made, and has been in issue a patent for 16 hectares of land to a native of the Islands who was in possession thereof on August 13, 1898, did
possession thereof for many years prior to said time. Upon the gift being made Sioco took possession of the not prohibit the Commission from extending the provisions of Act No. 648 to foreigners.
property, and continued in such possession until his sale to Jones, the petitioner. Since such sale Jones
has been in possession of the land, and is now in such possession. For more than twelve years prior to the
presentation of the petition the land had been cultivated by the owners thereof, and the evidence is
sufficient, in our opinion, to bring the case within section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to show
such an adverse possession thereof for ten years as is required by the section. The evidence of Sioco
Cario shows that what he did in the way of presenting a petition to the Spanish Government in regard to a
deed of the land was done by order of the then comandante, and was limited to securing a measurement
thereof, as he then believed. These acts did not interrupt the running of the statute of limitations.
Acts Nos. 627 and 648 provide that the provisions of section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be
applicable to all proceedings taken under either one of these acts. These acts in effect provide that in
determining whether the applicant is the owner of the land or not, the general statute of limitations shall be
considered, and shall be applied against the Government. The evidence showing, as we have said, such an
adverse possession, the petitioner proved his ownership of the land if the Commission had authority to
make the statute of limitations applicable to these proceedings.
The claim of the Government is that this provision is void; that the act thereby disposes of public lands; that
Congress is the only authority that can take such action, and that it has never authorized or approved the
action of the Commission in applying the statute of limitations to proceedings under Acts Nos. 648 and 627.
Mapa vs. This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The petitioner sought to have registered a tract of The only question 1. AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LANDS DEFINED. The phrase "agricultural public lands" defined by the act of Congress
Insular Govt land of about 16 hectares in extent, situated in the barrio of San Antonio, in the district of Mandurriao, in the submitted to the court of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means those public
municipality of Iloilo. Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner and the Government has appealed. A below or to this court by lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands.
motion for a new trial was made and denied in the court below, but no exception was taken to the order the Attorney-General is
denying it, and we therefore can not review the evidence. the question whether
The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54, paragraph 6 which follows: the land in controversy
"All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous is agricultural land
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of within the meaning of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the section above
the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act, except when quoted.
prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
to such land under the provisions of this chapter."
Govt of the On the 21st day of September, 1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario presented a petition in the Court of After a careful examination of the entire record and the evidence adduced during the trial of this cause as well as that
Philippine First Instance for the registration under the Torrens system, of the very land now in question by virtue of her adduced during the trial of the first cause, we are fully persuaded that no error has been committed. Whether particular
Islands vs. appeal. In that case, after issue joined and after hearing the evidence, the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be
Abella judge, denied the registration of all of the northern portion of the land included in her petition represented by established during the trial of the cause. Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to be
Exhibit 1, which was the plan presented in that action, upon the ground that said portion was more valuable settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the authority conferred upon it, prior to the
for timber purposes than for agricultural purposes. From that judgment Maria del Rosario appealed. intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the particular land in question. (Ankron vs.
The Supreme Court after a consideration of the evidence affirmed the decision of the lower court. In the Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of the present cause the appellant made no effort to
course of that decision the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moir, said: "We have examined show that the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been decreed in her favor, was more valuable for
the plans and all the evidence presented in this case and are of the opinion that the trial court was correct in agricultural than forestry purposes. For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
its declaration that this send a did not mean the old road to Bogabon. The fact that nearly all the northern
property is forestry land is a further indication that the applicant's possessory information title did not include
the land running up to the road to Bongabon, because all the papers which the applicant has regarding this
property call the land palayero."
Judge Nepomuceno in his decision directed that the appellant herein present an amended plan in that case,
showing the particular part or parcel of the land in question which she was entitled to have registered. We
have no evidence before us showing that order of Judge Nepomuceno was ever complied with.
Nothing further seems to have occurred with reference to the registration of the land included in the former
case until the 26th day of April, 1921, when the Acting Director of Lands presented the petition in the
present case for the registration, under the cadastral survey, of a portion of land located in the municipality
of San Jose, which included the very land claimed by Maria del Rosario in the former action. She presented
her opposition in the present action, claiming the very land which she claimed in the former action. The only
proof which she presented in support of her claim in the present action was the proof which she had
presented in the former action. No proof was adduced in addition thereto, which in the slightest degree
showed that she was entitled to the registration of any other parcel of land than those which had been
conceded to her in the first action.
 In this court she presented a motion for rehearing and in support thereof presents some proof to show that
the northern portion of the land in question is not forestry land but that much of it is agricultural land. With
reference to said motion for rehearing, it may be said that all of the proof which is presented in support
thereof existed at the time of the trial and might, with reasonable diligence, have been presented. It cannot,
therefore, be considered now. It is not newly discovered evidence. And moreover if it should be accepted it
would not be sufficient to justify the granting of a new trial.
Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the Honorable C. Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of the
Sixth Judicial District, ordered registered in the name of Maria del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots
3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243, which are the very lots which had been ordered registered in her name in the
former action. From that judgment she appealed to this court upon the ground that the lower court
committed an error in not registering all of the land included in her opposition in her name.
Cornelio This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ramos vs. Ecija, denying the registration of the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the petitioner), marked by
Director of the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of the Government.
Lands One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in the
municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory information title to the land, registered as such on
February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory information title of Restituto
Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia
Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was entered by the
Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and
by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the
objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration.
Ankron vs. This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao, Department of
Govt of the Mindanao and Sulu. Its purpose was to have registered, under the Torrens system, a certain piece or parcel
Philippine of land situated, bounded and particularly described in the plan and technical description attached to the
Islands complaint and made a part thereof.
The only opposition which was presented was on the part of the Director of Lands. The oppositor [objector]
alleged that the land in question was the property of the Government of the United States under the control
and administration of the Government of the Philippine Islands.
The lower court ordered and decreed that said parcel of land be registered in the name of the said
applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject, however, to the right of the Government of the Philippine Islands to open a
road thereon in the manner and conditions mentioned in said decision.
From that decree the Director of Lands appealed to this court.
The appellant argues, first, that the applicant did not sufficiently identify the land in question.
The appellant, in his second assignment of error, contends that the appellant failed to prove his possession
and occupation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926.
Under the third assignment of error the appellant contends that portions of said land cannot be registered in
accordance with the existing Land Registration Law for the reason that they are manglares. That question is
not discussed in the present brief.
DENR vs. Yap On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of
PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor .
Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their
lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No.
1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island
The question at once
arises: Is that actual
occupancy of a part of
the land described in
the instrument giving
color of title sufficient to
give title to the entire
tract of land?
agricultural land and that he and his predecessors in interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for a period
Whether private
claimants have a right
to secure titles over
their occupied portions
in Boracay.
We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following the doctrine laid down by the United
States Supreme Court with reference to Mexican and Spanish grantes within the United States, where some recital is
claimed to be false, to say that the possessory information, apparently having taken cognizance of the requisites for title,
should not now be disturbed. (Hancock vs. McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland vs. United States [1869],
10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will later appear, merely to notice that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least
held this tract of land under color of title.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property. Relative to actuality of possession, it is admitted that the petitioner has cultivated
only about one fourth of the entire tract.
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a
portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse
possession of another. (Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs. Gale
[1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of course, there are a number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to the size of
the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. It is here only necessary to
apply the general rule.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a
portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. (See arts.
446, 448, Civil Code.) Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the
requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural public land.
In the present case the applicant proved, and there was no effort to dispute said proof, that the land in question was
of more than forty years prior to the commencement of the present action.
Accepting the undisputed proof, we are of the opinion that said paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 has been fully
complied with and that the petitioner, so far as the second assignment of error is concerned, is entitled to have his land
registered under the Torrens system.
Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or
the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the
lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands, that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved
in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for
one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a
manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It
may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the
provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry
land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue
of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and
reserved as forestry or mineral land.
Petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section
3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not.
Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests.
PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified
by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
 was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified
as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry
Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land
Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable
and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On
In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it
was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes)
and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
De Aldecoa On the 8th of March, 1904, in accordance with the new Land Registration Act, Juan Ibaez de Aldecoa
vs. Insular applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land, 3,375 square meters in extent, situated in the town
Govt of Surigao.
After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an opinion of the examiner of titles opposing the
request of the applicant, had been rendered, the Attorney-General by a writing dated March 21, 1905,
objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the land in question was the property of the
Government of the United States, and is now under the control of the Insular Government; that the title of
ownership issued by the politico-militar governor of Surigao, Mindanao, issued on the 19th of June, 1889, to
Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa, antecessor of the petitioner with respect to the land in question, was entirely
null and void, for the reason that said grant had not been made in accordance with the laws then in force on
the subject, and because the said governor had no authority to make such a grant.
As the case stood the applicant, Aldecoa, on the 8th of April, 1905, amended his former petition, and relying
upon the provisions of paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, alleged that at the time he requested
the registration of the land in question, comprised in the plan then submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was
not yet in force, and as the latter affords better facilities for securing titles to property unprovided with them,
as in the case with the land in question, the applicant availing himself of the benefits granted by the said
Act, prayed that the same be applied to the inscription of his land, inasmuch as it was included within
paragraphs 5 and 6 of section 54, Chapter VI, thereof.
Krivenko vs. Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of
Register of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said
Deeds of registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot
Manila acquire land in this jurisdiction.
Lepanto This is a petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, Branch I, dismissing the
Consolidated three complaints for annulment of titles in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 entitled "Republic of the
such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable.
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Whether or not a parcel YES. If the land sought to be registered is neither mineral nor timber land, and on the other hand is susceptible of
of land that is
susceptible of being land, and assuming that it falls within that classification, the benefits of paragraph 6, section 54, of Act No. 926, must
cultivated, and, ceasing
to be agricultural land,
was converted into a
building lot, is subject to
the legal provisions in
force regarding
Government public
lands which may be
alienated in favor of
private individuals or
corporations.
Whether or not an alien
under our Constitution
may acquire residential
land.
WON:
I. THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to
have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied
by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified
the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No.
1801.
cultivation the Act of Congress contains no provision whatever that would exclude it from being classified as agricultural
forthwith be applied for the reason that it has been fully proven that the applicant was in possession thereof for more than
13 years prior to the 26th of July, 1904, when the said Act went into effect. Furthermore, there is no legal reason or cause
to exclude urban lands from the benefits of the aforesaid Act; on the contrary, the interpretation that urban real estate,
that is not mineral or forestall in character, be understood to fall within the classification of agricultural land, is deemed to
be most rational and beneficial to public interests.
NO. Aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same
"public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for
other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning.
Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral.
This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands"
for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for
agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these
lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive
indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens
could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under
section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out,
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public
Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to
aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but
not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The
exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another
legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
REMANDED. Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable.
There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the National Cultural Minorities; that they have
continously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest the lands in question
Mining Co. vs. Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Manuel Dumyung, et al., Defendants, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,
Dumyung Intervenor" for being without merit.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 for annulment of Free Patents Nos. V-
152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-210
and P-209, on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and informations furnished by the
defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, respectively. the land
embraced in the patents and titles are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3 of survey plan Psu-181763 containing a
total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and situated in the Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-
province of Benguet, Mountain Province.
Before the hearing on the merits of the three (3) civil cases, the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director of Lands, filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City three (3) criminal
cases for falsification of public document. 9, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2358, 2359 and 2360,
against the defendants Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, private respondents
herein, for allegedly making untrue statements in their applications for free patents over the lands in
question.
After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three (3) criminal cases, the defense filed a
motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal requirements in
the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty
of the alleged falsification of public documents.
In an order dated December 6, 1967, the trial court sustained the theory of the defense and dismissed the
three (3) criminal cases, with costs de officio, for insufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction of the
three (3) accused.
Thereupon, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss dated October 12, 1968 in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069
and 1070.
The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed the three (3) civil cases because: After a careful
examination and deliberation of the MOTION TO DISMISS, these civil cases filed by the defendants as well
as the two OPPOSITIONS TO MOTION TO DISMISS filed by both plaintiff and intervenor Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company and the of all the three civil cases, it clearly shows that upon the issuance of
said Free Patents on November 26, 1960, the same were duly registered with the office of the Register of
Deeds of Baguio and Benguet, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 122 of Act 496, as amended, and
consequently, these properties became the private properties of the defendants, under the operation of
Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens titles (Director
of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1964). It is therefore clear that OCT Nos. P-
208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants are now indefeasible and this Court has no power to
disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel the same.
Republic vs. These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by
Court of Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The
Appeals and land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009.
dela Rosa According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya
Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.
She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. 4
Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was
planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was
enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who
recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in
1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty
tax receipts from that year to 1964.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September
1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of
adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side
cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931,
in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on
November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of
OF TITLE OF PRIVATE since July 4, 1955; and that they are not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act at the
RESPONDENTS WERE
'INDEFEASIBLE' SIMPLY time they filed the free patent applications. These qualifications must be established by evidence. Precisely, the
BECAUSE THEY WERE intervenor, petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession of the lands in question when the private respondents
ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE applied for free patents thereon.
REGISTRATION OF THE
FREE PATENTS OF THE It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the patents awarded to the private
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public
II. THE LOWER COURT domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE PRIVATE alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.
RESPONDENTS ARE The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their
ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS titles. The only issue in the criminal cases for falsification was whether there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3872.
III. THE LOWER COURT the private respondents had committed the acts of falsification alleged in the informations. The factual issues of whether
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands and whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the
THE ACQUITTAL OF THE benefits of Republic Act No. 3872 were not in issue in the criminal case.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN
THE CRIMINAL CASES FOR There is need to remand these cases to the trial court for the reception of evidence on (1) whether or not the lands in
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC question are timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether the private respondents belong to the cultural minorities and are
DOCUMENTS BARRED THE qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be issued free patents on said lands.
CIVIL ACTIONS FOR
ANNULMENT OF THE FREE
PATENTS AND
CANCELLATION OF THE
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
WON the CA is correct. NO. The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth even if the
land where the discovery is made be private.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In
the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became
mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it
was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of
private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land
devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the
owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to
extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both
mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the
land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and
may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the
mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
 the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and
its payment of annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the
respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to
the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Carino v.
Insular
Government
Cruz vs.
DENR
Secretary
Republic vs.
Peralta
Sta. Monica This case arose from proceedings to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court.
Industrial and In 1912
Development > The Tribuna del Registro de la Propiedad (Court of Land Registration) of Zambales, through Judge James
Corporation v. Ostrand, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 6431, confirmed the title of Justo de Perio over two (2)
Court of parcels of land in Zambales.
Appeals On August 28, 1912
> Decree No. 9328 was issued by the court ordering the registration of the two (2) parcels of land in the
name of De Perio.
On December 6, 1912
> Original Certificate of Title No. 48 of the Registry of Deeds of Zambales was issued to De Perio. Parcel
No. 1 consists of an area of eleven thousand six hundred ninety-seven square meters (11,697 sq.m.) while
Parcel No. 2 consists of three hundred forty thousand eight hundred twenty square meters (340,820 sq.m.).
In 1936
> A portion consisting of ten thousand four hundred square meters (10,400 sq.m.) of Parcel No. 2 was sold
to the Province of Zambales. The sale was annotated at the back of OCT No. 48.
In 1954
> OCT No. 48 was cancelled and TCT No. T-1369 was issued to Mercedes de Valencia pursuant to an
extrajudicial settlement of De Perio's estate.
In 1962
> De Valencia sold Parcel No. 1 to Ricardo Baloy. Baloy was issued TCT No. T-7696 in 1966. In 1967, De
Valencia subdivided Parcel No. 2 into five (5) lots (Lots 2-A to 2-E). TCT No. T-1369 was cancelled and
TCT Nos. 11865, 11866, 11867, and 11869 were issued to De Valencia. TCT No. 11 868, corresponding to
the portion previously sold to the Province of Zambales, was issued to the Republic of the Philippines.
In 1970
> De Valencia sold the lots covered by TCT Nos. 11865 and 11866 to petitioner Sta. Monica Industrial and
Development Corporation. TCT Nos. 11865 and 11866 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-12054 and T-12055
were issued to petitioner. Petitioner consolidated the two (2) parcels of land and subdivided them into five
hundred thirty-six (536) residential lots which it sold to individual buyers.
In 1985
> Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed with the Court of Appeals a
complaint for the annulment of the decree in LRC No. 6431, OCT No. 48 (issued to De Perio), TCT No. T-
1369 (issued to De Valencia) and TCT No. T-7696 (issued to Baloy). Respondent alleged that the decree in
LRC No. 6431 was null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the land was inside the U.S. naval
reservation and that it was still within the forest zone in 1912, having been released therefrom only in 1961,
and hence cannot be the subject of disposition or alienation as private property. Named defendants were
De Valencia and her husband, Baloy and his wife and the Register of Deeds of Zambales.
Petitioner filed its first motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of res judicata, which the
Court of Appeals denied.
Whether or not the land YES. Records disclose that by virtue of Proclamation dated November 11, 1908, then Governor-General James F. Smith
registration court had reserved for naval purposes certain lands of the public domain in Subic, Zambales which included the parcels of land
jurisdiction over the two embraced under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 48 secured by De Perio in 1912. It was only in 1961 that such
(2) parcels of land Proclamation was revoked by a subsequent issuance, Proclamation No. 731, issued by then President Garcia on
claimed by De Perio, February 2, 1961 and such portions already classified as alienable and disposable and not needed for government
the predecessor-in- purposes were declared open for disposition under R.A. No. 274, in relation to C.A. 141 and Act No. 3038. This means
interest of the petitioner that the lands, subject matter of the case, were portions of the U.S. naval reservation and were declared open for
herein. disposition only on February 2, 1961.
Weighing the arguments raised by the parties, we find that the Republic has failed to make out a convincing case for the
annulment of the decree in Land Registration Case No. 6431. It has been established that the land registration court had
jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels of land, and that OCT No. 48 and the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) derived from
OCT No. 48 are valid.
Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into law on October 7, 1903 but which took effect on July
26, 1904, was the law applicable to De Perio's petition for confirmation of his title to the two (2) parcels of land.
A person who had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious session and occupation of public agricultural land
for a period of at least ten (10) years prior to July 24, 1904 could petition for the confirmation of his title over the land he
had so possessed and occupied.
The land registration court confirmed De Perio's title to the two (2) parcels of land after due notice and hearing. From this,
the following conclusions may be derived:
1. that the two (2) parcels of land are agricultural as defined by law;
2. that De Perio had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the two (2) parcels
of land for at least ten (10) years prior to 1904;
3. that his possession and occupancy was under a bona fide claim of ownership; and
4. that under the law De Perio had title to the land as of 1904, although it was confirmed only later in 1912.
If the land is agricultural as defined by law, and as confirmed by Judge Ostrand, it could not have been forest land as
claimed by public respondent, the subsequent land classification map notwithstanding. This conclusion is supported by
the fact that the two (2) parcels of land were in the Olongapo townsite and were bounded by privately-owned land.
If De Perio had title to the land in 1904, although still imperfect, then it could not have been prejudiced by the
proclamation of Governor-General Smith in 1908 which reserved for naval purposes land in Subic, Zambales. Said
proclamation recognized the existence of private rights.
Public respondent has also failed to explain the Republic's sudden interest in the annulment of the decree and the
certificate of title issued to De Perio and the subsequent titles issued to his successors after some seventy-three (73)
years of inaction and after a portion of the land has been developed by petitioner into a subdivision and hundreds of
residences have been built thereon. At this point in time, that portion of land developed into a subdivision cannot, by any
stretch of imagination, be conceived as forest land. Anyway, the area wherein the two (2) parcels of land are found, were
released from the unclassified public forest and the territory comprising the Subic naval reservation way back in 1961.
Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30) years since the land was released in 1961. In a few more months, the possessors of
the land would acquire title to the portions they adversely possess through acquisitive prescription, without need of title or
of good faith, pursuant to the Civil Code [Art. 1137].
Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the judgment's nullity
rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment is fatally
defective. When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner
contended that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still

Director of The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Forestry vs. Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his
Villareal predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by
several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the
application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming
that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the
registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is
mangrove land.
Republic vs. On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No. 381928[4] in
Court of favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private
Appeals respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land
(2008) identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property),
situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585[5] (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag.
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree
No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,[6] issued
in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,[7] issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot
2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition
requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the
ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was
allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.
part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several
years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps fail to conclusively establish the actual classification of the
land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said 'contention and refers, for the first
time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels
of land are parts thereof. These, for reasons discussed earlier, are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor
of the decree's regularity, more so when we consider that notice of the application for registration and the date of hearing
thereof, addressed to the Attorney General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works and the Director of
Forestry, among others, was published in the Official Gazette and that Governor General Smith's Proclamation of 1908
itself recognizes private rights.
The basic question Mangroves are forest lands. For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902,
before the Court is the one of the earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands
legal classification of were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was
mangrove swamps, or maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of
manglares, as they are 1973. That new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential,
commonly known. If resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This provision has
they are part of our been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution.
public forest lands, they Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural lands were
are not alienable under allowed to be alienated. Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were
the Constitution. If they not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
are considered public Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as
agricultural lands, they defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have
may be acquired under no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory
private ownership. definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department.
More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the
requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be
respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That
determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but
to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood as covering
only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective.
Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property
right protected by the due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later
classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for
which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered
forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the
private respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and
reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to prove
that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect
of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is
clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the
Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than
forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.
WON the "Complaint for NO. Unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in
Annulment of Decree" accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.
has merit. In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved
for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps[24]
petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or
reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated
27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.[25]
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,[26] which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
government and disposition.
 The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground verification
and ocular inspection of the subject property.
The investigating team reported that:
A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under
LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the
issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was
only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the
NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.
B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves
and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC
Map 2999, since time immemorial.[8]
Golloy vs. CA Herein petitioner, for more than twenty (20) years, has been the registered owner and in possession of a
41,545-square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 45764. The Southwest
portion of this land is bounded by herein private respondents' land which is covered by Certificate of Title
No. 8565. Sometime in February, 1966, private respondents subdivided their land among themselves. In
the course of the subdivision, private respondents caused to be placed two (2) monuments inside the
Southwest, portion of petitioner's land. Hence, petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
presided over by Judge Arturo B. Santos an action to quiet title. The same was docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 4312. .
Private respondents, in their filed motion to dismiss with counterclaim, alleged that they never encroached
upon the landholding of petitioner and nothing has been placed on his land which would create any cloud
thereon; and that the truth of the matter was that they merely subdivided their own land according to their
title and therefore there was nothing for petitioner to quiet or remove cloud on his title.
In the pre-trial of December 12, 1967, the parties agreed that inasmuch as the only issue in dispute referred
ultimately to the question of the boundaries of their respective lots, the same might be resolved by
appointing a public surveyor of the Bureau of Lands to relocate the disputed area with the end in view of
determining the true and correct boundaries of their parcels. .
The trial court, in line with the above-said agreement, in an Order dated December 13, 1968, ordered the
Director of Lands to appoint an impartial public land surveyor to conduct the relocation survey on the
disputed area.
On May 20, 1968, Jovino B. Dauz, Surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, Dagupan City, submitted his Report
(Record on Appeal, pp. 21-28, Rollo, p. 34), which states in substance, that petitioner's land is Lot A of the
Subdivision plan, Psd-1413, being a portion of the land described in Original Certificate of Title No. 126 in
the name of Agustin Golloy (No. 11, Record on Appeal, p. 23); that the land titled under OCT No. 126 was
surveyed on March 18, 1918 and subsequently titled and registered on August 15, 1919 (No. 12, Ibid); that
on the other hand, private respondents' land is Lot No. 1, 11-8218 in the name of Domingo Balanga,
surveyed on March 11, 1913 and originally titled and registered on March 1, 1918 (No. 15, Ibid.); that there
are overlappings on the boundaries of the two (2) lands (Nos. 226, 27, 28 and 29, Ibid.); and that the
overlappings are due to the defect in the survey on petitioner's land since it did not duly conform with the
previously approved survey of Lot 1, 11-3218 under OCT 8565 (No. 25, lbid). He ended his report by
submitting that private respondents' land, TCT No. 8565, prevails over petitioner's land, TCT No. 45764,
since the former was surveyed and titled ahead.
Cambridge Petitioner CAMBRIDGE is the registered owner of a 9,992-square meter lot, covered by Transfer Certificate
Realty and of Title No. (TCT) 367213 (the CAMBRIDGE title/property),[6] in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
Resources Respondent ERIDANUS is the registered owner of a 2,794 square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer
Corporation Certificate of Title No. (TCT) RT-38481 (the ERIDANUS title/property),[7] in the Registry of Deeds of
vs. Eridanus Quezon City.
Development, On the other hand, respondent CHITON is the registered owner of a 2,563 square meter lot, covered by
Inc. and Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 12667 (the CHITON title/property),[8] in the Registry of Deeds of
Chiton Realty Quezon City.
Corp. The foregoing properties are adjoining lots located in Barangay Valencia, Quezon City, and constitute the
subject matter of the present controversy.
Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) 362[10] was issued under Act 496 (The Land Registration Act) by
virtue of Decree of Registration 1425, GLRO No. 917, based on the original survey conducted on November
17, 1906. It was subdivided into three portions: Lots 27-A, 27-B and 27-C. Lot 27-C was titled in the name
of Rafael Reyes, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 5506[11] issued on September 23, 1920. TCT
5506, in turn, appears to have been transferred in the name of Susana Realty, Inc. (SUSANA) under
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or
mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or
disposable.
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be
made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This
exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under
timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to
adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private
property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on
which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time.
The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the
decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as
required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and
beyond review.
The sole issue in this It must be stated that private respondents and their predecessor or predecessors never possessed, much less, claimed
case is who between the overlapped portions. Petitioner has been always in possession of the same in the concept of an owner, and his
the two title holders is possession was disturbed only in February, 1966, when the private respondents caused to be placed two (2) monuments
entitled to the land in inside his land. It will be recalled that, as per report of Surveyor Jovino B. Dauz (Record on Appeal, pp. 21-28), private
dispute? respondents' land (TCT-8565 is Lot No. 1, 11- 8218) was surveyed on March 11, 1913 and originally titled and registered
on March 1, 1918 in the name of Dominga Balanga. On the other hand, petitioner's land (TCT No. 45764) is Lot-A of
Subdivision plan, Psd-14013, a portion of land described in OCT No. 126) was surveyed on March 18, 1918 and
subsequently titled and registered in the name of Agustin Golloy. The said lands, having been surveyed and thereafter
registered, it follows that monuments were placed therein to indicate their respective boundaries. It is hardly persuasive
that private respondents' predecessor, Dominga Balanga, believing that she has a rightful claim to the overlapped
portions, did not make any move to question the placement of the monuments. She could have easily objected to the
placement and pointed out that the placement of the monuments excluded the overlapped portions from her property.
However, no such objection was made. These facts could only be construed to mean that private respondents'
predecessor, Dominga Balanga, never believed that she has a right and legal claim to the overlapped portion. There
appears to be no evidence to support claims of repeated demands against petitioner to refrain from cultivating the
contested portion, much less an action filed in court to enforce such demands.
Besides, considering that petitioner and his predecessor or predecessors have been in continuous possession in the
concept of an owner, for almost fifty (50) years (from August 15, 1919, when the property was registered, up to February,
1966, when the private respondents caused the placement of two (2) monuments inside his land), the latter if they have
any right at all to the overlapped portion, are guilty of laches. .
The crux of the matter, It was the duty of the trial court, considering the magnitude and extent of the issues presented and the questions that
however, lies in arose from a careful examination of the parties respective certificates of title, to have required the appointed surveyors of
ascertaining whether the DENR to investigate and trace the parties respective titles, conduct a comprehensive survey, study and analysis of
there really is the boundaries, distances and bearings thereof, and submit an exhaustive report thereon. Given their expertise and
overlapping of experience, they would have been able to satisfactorily perform the required task. Yet the court did not. As a matter of
boundaries of the fact, the services of the government surveyors were not even secured by court initiative; the trial court even threatened to
properties of the do away with the testimonies of the state surveyors when their presence in court could not be guaranteed. It was through
movants for intervention the auspices of the respondents that they were brought to court. To make matters worse, the parties did not even pay the
and that of the private required fees for the survey; the court did not compel them.
respondent. In overlapping of titles disputes, it has always been the practice for the court to appoint a surveyor from the government
land agencies the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to act as commissioner. Given that the trial court here did not,
we are now left to make do with the two-page report of the state surveyors and decide the case with what evidence is
made available to us by the parties respective expert witnesses as well, which for the most part must be received with
caution as their testimonies are understandably self-serving.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 18250.[12] TCT 18250 was then subdivided into eight (8) lots, of
which the ERIDANUS lot is claimed to be Lot 3 thereof and CHITONs is Lot 4.
The subdivision of TCT 18250 (or Lot 27-C) was claimed to have been made by geodetic surveyor Jaime V.
Nerit (Nerit). Nerit said he began computing the boundaries based on the SUSANA title. He noticed that the
tie point[13] of the property was not fixed and there were no fixed or permanent markers, so he conducted
research and obtained from the Bureau of Lands the approved consolidated subdivision plan of an adjoining
property, Gilmore Townhouses[14] located on the western side and owned by Ayala Investments and
Development Corporation (the AYALA property) which had fixed monuments to which Nerit could establish
and connect with those of TCT 18250. He found a fixed tie point therein, BLLM 1, Marikina[15] (S. 6819 W.
Pt. 6785 from BLLM Marikina I, Marikina, Rizal), and from there he next computed the relation between
corner 1 as described in the technical description of TCT 18250, and corner 1 as described in that of the
Ayala property. In this manner, Nerit said he was able to establish the position of respondents property and
prepare the subdivision plan of TCT 18250, which was subsequently approved by the Land Registration
Commission.[16]
Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) 355[17] was registered under Act 496 on August 21, 1907, based on
the original survey conducted on June 16 to August 16, 1907. It was registered in the name of La Compania
Agricola de Ultramar (AGRICOLA). Lot 21 thereof was subdivided and a portion thereof Lot 21-A was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 578,[18] from which TCT 367213, the CAMBRIDGE title,
was allegedly derived.
On May 30, 1989, ERIDANUS filed Civil Case No. Q-89-2636 to enjoin CAMBRIDGE from pursuing the
planned subdivision and development of its property, which ERIDANUS claims encroached upon its own.
On June 15, 1989, CHITON instituted Civil Case No. Q-89-2750, with a similar prayer for relief as in Civil
Case No. Q-89-2636.
Both complaints were subsequently consolidated in Civil Case No. Q-89-2636 upon motion of CHITON.
The civil complaints were triggered by a previous verification survey conducted on respondents respective
properties, where the results allegedly showed that the CAMBRIDGE property encroached or overlapped
upon respondents lots, to the extent of 357 square meters for ERIDANUS and 177 square meters for
CHITON.
Upon motion of the respondents, surveyors from the Survey Division of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Lands Management Services conducted a relocation survey of the subject
properties, pursuant to an Order of the trial court dated May 8, 1992.
Respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, presented Nerit, who claimed to have conducted a survey of the
respondents properties, as well as a study of the CAMBRIDGE property and its alleged predecessor title
(TCT 578). He testified that in the course of his work, he found out that the CAMBRIDGE property
overlapped that of ERIDANUS at the north with a distance of eight (8) linear meters;[20] that although the
CAMBRIDGE property was formerly a portion of TCT 578, the former does not conform to the latter;[21] that
when it was segregated from TCT 578, the bearings on the side abutting the respondents property were
altered;[22] that TCT 578 was issued in 1907, yet the original survey of the property covered by the
CAMBRIDGE title was made in 1920;[23] that there is no record of the subdivision plan of the CAMBRIDGE
lot;[24] and that it does not appear that the CAMBRIDGE lot came from TCT 578 (despite stating previously
that the former used to be a portion of the latter).[25]
The petitioner, as defendant a quo, presented geodetic engineer Emilia Rivera Sison, who testified that the
ERIDANUS and CHITON titles lack material data in their covering titles, such that it appears that they did
not undergo proper registration proceedings and that they do not have a mother title;[64] the CAMBRIDGE
title, on the other hand, has a complete covering title, showing that it has a mother title (OCT 355) and that
it underwent registration proceedings;[65] that it is impossible to plot the relative position of the ERIDANUS
and CHITON properties using the SUSANA title because the tie point appearing in the latter title is a PLS
which has no known geographic position, or is floating, which means that the property could not be located
in a fixed place;[66] that Engr. Lims verification survey plan (Exh. BB) did not use tie points, nor did it
indicate what titles were plotted therein as to show the fact of overlapping, since the said plan could not be
compared with the titles plotted therein.[67]
The present petition calls only for the settlement of the overlapping issue, barring direct and collateral attacks on each of
the parties respective certificates of title, which require different proceedings for the ventilation thereof.[78]
The trial court, in dismissing the case, held primarily that respondents failed to overcome the burden of establishing their
claim of overlapping. It stated that the respondents titles whose tie points are based on mere PLS monuments (which are
not fixed, and are therefore not in accordance with Sec. 36 of the Manual for Land Surveys in the Philippines[79]) cannot
prevail as against the petitioners, which has a fixed tie or reference point. Simply put, a PLS monument is not one of the
reference points enumerated in Section 36 of the Manual, and cannot be used to defeat petitioners title. Secondly, the
trial court held that Nerit, given his training and expertise as surveyor, should have detected the overlap if there was one
in his 1960 survey of TCT 18250, and not suddenly discover it only in 1990. Thirdly, the presence of the old adobe wall as
early as the 1960s and the absence of any protest or objection from Nerit or the Madrigals (then owner of the SUSANA
title) militate against the present claim of overlap and encroachment.
The appellate court, however, found that there is an encroachment, and the cause thereof may be traced to a change in
the technical description of the petitioners title (which was derived from TCT 578) when it was subdivided on November
10, 1920.
What the trial and appellate courts overlooked, however, was that out of the four expert witnesses presented, three of
them (the government surveyor De Lara, respondents witness Lim, and petitioners witness Sison) categorically admitted
that a change in the tie or reference point results in an overlap; or, more accurately, that a change in the tie or reference
point has a corresponding effect on the survey.
What has been made clear by the law and practice is that PLS monuments have given way to Bureau of Lands Location
Monument (BLLM) No. 1, which shall always be used as the tie point.[80] In so doing (disregarding PLS monuments for
the BLLM), such process somehow affects the integrity of the survey.
Thus, De Lara testified that if he plotted the respondents properties on the basis of the common boundary (lines 1 to 2)
between the adjacent AYALA and SUSANA properties as stated in the technical description of the SUSANA title, there
would be no overlapping of boundaries between petitioners and respondents titles;[81] on the other hand, if the survey
were conducted based on the respondents respective titles which do not have a tie line or tie point, there would be an
overlap.[82] De Lara claims, moreover, that the alleged encroachment is really a technical overlapping.[83] Lim, on the
other hand, testified on re-direct examination that when the reference point or tie point is changed, the azimuth lines and
azimuth tie lines of the (respondents) property are likewise changed, but not the location thereof.[84] Sison, witness for
the petitioner, testified on cross-examination that when a tie point is changed, an overlapping is caused.[85]
A case of overlapping of boundaries or encroachment depends on a reliable, if not accurate, verification survey; barring
one, no overlapping or encroachment may be proved successfully, for obvious reasons. In the wake of the majority expert
opinion that by changing the tie or reference point from a PLS to a BLLM 1 monument, a corresponding effect on the
survey occurs which can include a change in boundaries and, at worst, an overlap the Court is not prepared to declare
that an accurate survey of the respondents properties has been made as to be a proper basis of the present claim of
encroachment or overlap.
Likewise, we cannot see how a change in the bearings of the CAMBRIDGE property from S.21deg.5655E in TCT 578 to
N.25 deg. 07W in the CAMBRIDGE title can cause an overlap of respondents properties. This has not been sufficiently
shown by respondents evidence to be the cause of the overlap. Respondents key witness Nerit does not believe that the
CAMBRIDGE title was a derivative of TCT 578, because there is nothing in the title thereof which indicates that it was
derived from the latter; he was ambivalent, if not ambiguous, and definitely far from categorical, in this respect.[86] State
surveyor De Laras testimony and Report inconclusive and incomplete as it is does not help or indicate any. Likewise, a
thorough examination of TCT 578 shows that it has no similar boundary and bearings with the CAMBRIDGE title. Finally,
the CAMBRIDGE title explicitly declares that it is derived from TCT No. 363717/T-1823, and not TCT 578.
Thus, for failure of the respondents to prove that the CAMBRIDGE title is a derivative of TCT 578, the conclusion that a
change in the technical description of the former as compared to that of the latter is the reason for the overlap, simply
does not follow. The appellate court is in clear error.
Finally, we agree with the trial courts observation that the continuous presence of the old adobe wall diminishes the case
for the respondents. It was only in 1989 that the wall became an ungainly sight for respondents. Previous owners of what
now constitutes the respondents respective lots did not complain of its presence. The wall appears to have been built in
the 1960s, and yet the Madrigals (SUSANA title owners) did not complain about it; if they did, Nerit would have known
and testified to the same since he was responsible for the subdivision of the lot. Only respondents complain about it now.
In one overlapping of boundaries case,[87] the Court held that a land owner may not now claim that his property has been
encroached upon when his predecessor did not register any objections at the time the monuments were being placed on
the claimed encroached area; nor did the latter make any move to question the placement of said monuments at the time.
In every land dispute, the aim of the courts is to protect the integrity of and maintain inviolate the Torrens system of land
registration, as well as to uphold the law; a resolution of the parties dispute is merely a necessary consequence. Taking
this to mind, we cannot grant the respondents prayer without violating the very principles of the Torrens system. They
have failed to lay the proper foundation for their claim of overlap. This is precisely the reason why the trial court should
have officially appointed a commissioner or panel of commissioners and not leave the initiative to secure one to the
parties: so that a thorough investigation, study and analysis of the parties titles could be made in order to provide, in a
comprehensive report, the necessary information that will guide it in resolving the case completely, and not merely leave
the determination of the case to a consideration of the parties more often than not self-serving evidence.
Republic vs. Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private
De Guzman respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the merits, the
lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman.
In affirming that private respondents' possession of the subject property complied with law, the Court of
Appeals reasoned out that "(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in
December, 1965, however, records indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitao, appellees' predecessor-
in-interest, was already in possession of the property, cultivating it and planting various crops thereon. It
follows that appellees' possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in 1991 when tacked to Pedro
Ermitao's possession is 63 years or more than the required 30 years period of possession. The land, which
is agricultural, has been converted to private property ."[7]
The subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in 1965[5] while the petition for
confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private respondents only in 1991.[6] Thus the period of
occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the application was filed in 1991 was only
twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period possession requirement
under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 and R.A. No. 6940.
Tan, et al. vs. On June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, an application
Republic of for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9972, Cad-459-D of Indang Cadastre,
the Philippines situated in Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite and with an area of 6,920 square meters.[3] The petitioners
alleged that they acquired the subject property from Gregonio Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated April 25, 1996; and they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.[4]
After trial and hearing, the RTC issued a Decision on July 29, 2006, granting the petitioners application.
The CA gave due course to the appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines. By way of the assailed
Decision, the CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the subject property for the requisite period of 30 years. The CA posit: We now
determine if appellees have the right to register their title on such land despite the fact that their possession
commenced only after 12 June 1945. Records show that the appellees possession over the subject
property can be reckoned only from 21 June 1983, the date when according to evidence, the subject
property became alienable and disposable. From said date up to the filing of the application for registration
of title over the subject property on 14 June 2001, only eighteen (18) years had lapsed. Thus, appellees
possession of the subject property fell short of the requirement of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least 30 years. Moreover, there was no adequate evidence which would show that
appellees and their predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject land as to indicate
possession in the concept of owner. The testimonies of appellees witnesses regarding actual possession
are belied by the absence of evidence on actual use of or improvements on the subject property. Appellees
presented only various tax declarations to prove possession. However, except for the Certification, showing
payment of tax due on tax declaration for the year 2003, there are no other evidence showing that all the
taxes due corresponding to the rest of the tax declarations were in fact paid by appellees or their
predecessors-in-interest.
Maximo On the 26th of September, 1906, Maximo Cortes filed a written application for the registration of a parcel of
Cortes vs. City land owned by him, free of all incumbrances, situated in Calle Aguilar, corner of Calle Cecilia in the district
Of Manila of Binondo, this city, together with the buildings erected thereon, which land has an area of 1,172.21 square
meters, its boundaries being stated in the application. The land was acquired by the applicant by purchase
from Higinio Francisco y Prospero, according to a deed of sale dated July 3, 1894, recorded in the registry
of property, no other person having any title to or interest therein, and the property was assessed, for the
purpose of taxation of the last fiscal year, at $1,444, United States currency. The buildings erected thereon
The Court of Appeals' consideration of the period of possession prior to the time the subject land was released as
agricultural is in direct contravention of the pronouncement in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit -
"The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or before it was declared
alienable and disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and
should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession in concept of owner required
under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et
al., 178 SCRA 708, that: 'Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689;
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679). 'Thus possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Vamo vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 17 Phil. 410 [1960]). A parcel of
forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera,
120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984])."
So, too, is the Court of Appeals' reliance on the case of Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals[9] misplaced.
There, while the period of possession of the applicant's predecessor-in-interest was tacked to his own possession to
comply with the required thirty year period possession requirement, the land involved therein was not forest land but
alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case before us, the property subject of private respondents' application
was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It
was not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property, (unless) and
until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.[10]
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be
considered in the counting of the thirty year possession requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court
of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land
classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.[11]
Whether the petitioners This Court finds the evidence presented by the petitioners to be wanting.
have proven It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession
themselves qualified to should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent,
the benefits under the visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
relevant laws on the occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it
confirmation of to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public
imperfect or incomplete or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of
titles. the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.[18]
Tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent evidence of actual possession for purposes of prescription. More so,
if the payment of the taxes due on the property is episodic, irregular and random such as in this case. Indeed, how can
the petitioners claim of possession for the entire prescriptive period be ascribed any ounce of credibility when taxes were
paid only on eleven (11) occasions within the 40-year period from 1961 to 2001?
Adverse, continuous, open, public possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law and the burden to prove it
by clear, positive and convincing evidence is on the applicant. A claim of ownership will not proper on the basis of tax
declarations if unaccompanied by proof of actual possession.[21]
While there was an attempt to supplement the tax declaration by testimonial evidence, the same is futile and frivolous.
The testimonies of Margarito Pena and Ma. Wilhelmina Tobias do not merit consideration and do not make up for the
inherent inadequacy of the eleven (11) tax declarations submitted by the petitioners. Such witnesses did not state what
specific acts of ownership or dominion were performed by the petitioners and predecessors-in-interest and simply made
that general assertion that the latter possessed and occupied the subject property for more than thirty (30) years, which,
by all means, is a mere conclusion of law. The RTC should have tackled evidence of such nature with a disposition to
incredulity, if not with an outright rejection.
Furthermore, the petitioners application was filed after only (1) year from the time the subject property may be considered
patrimonial. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99, Series of 2000, was issued by the DAR only on July 13,
2000, which means that the counting of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring ownership of a
public land under Section 14(2) can only start from such date. Before the property was declared patrimonial by virtue of
such conversion order, it cannot be acquired by prescription.
The Law of Waters, promulgated by royal decree of the 3d of August, 1866, and extended to these Islands by a royal
decree dated April 8, 1873, provides in article 84 that The accretion resulting from the gradual deposit by or
sedimentation from the waters belongs to the owners of land bordering on streams, torrents, lakes, and rivers.
Article 366 of the Civil Code provides that The accretions which banks of rivers may gradually received from the effects
of the currents belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.
There is no evidence whatever to prove that the addition to the said property was made artificially by the owner; therefore,
the facts alleged and proven in the proceedings must stand. The increase or accretion which in a latent, incessant, and
spontaneous manner is received by the land from the effects of the current depositing, in the course of time, sediment
were paid for by the applicant with his own money, and the application is accompanied by the deed of sale, and alluvial matter along the shore, is undeniably the work of nature and lawfully belongs to the owner of the property;
plan, and technical description of the land. and from the fact that all or almost the whole area of said increased portion is soft and unsettled, one is naturally
The examiner of titles reported, in due course, that the said building lot was attached by reason of certain convinced that it was formed by alluvion, and that for such reason it appertains to the owner of the land bordering thereon
proceedings instituted against the applicant for reason and rebellion, yet, inasmuch as the land was by virtue of the right of accretion recognized by the law.
acquired by him more than ten years previously, he could be considered the real owner thereof by The reason therefore is quite evident because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage
prescription; but that, in order to obtain title, it was necessary for him to show that said attachment had been due to destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of
discharged or canceled, for which reason he considered the title of the applicant to be defective and that it easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be
could not be registered. compensated by the right of accretion.
Against the claim of the applicant the attorney for the city of Manila objected and reproduced the verbal And, although the acts of possession exercised over the bordering land are always understood legally to cover that
opposition offered in the case, alleging that both the plan and the technical description exhibited contained portion added to the property by accretion, in this case shrubs have been planted there, which furnish additional proof that
errors; that there was an excess in the measurement which affected the interests of the city, and that, Maximo Cortes has exercised rights of ownership and possession over the whole area of the property the registration of
should the application be granted, an area of 33.40 square meters of the Meisic Creek would become the which he requests.
property of Maximo Cortes, when, as a matter of fact, the said creek was one of public use and belonged to For the reasons above set forth it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, as we do hereby
the city of manila. reverse the same, and that the court below should direct that the land to which the appellant refers be recorded in the
The judge rendered his decision on the 11th of March, sustaining the opposition of the city of Manila. The registry of property in accordance with the law, including that portion of the same added by accretion up to the water line
applicant asked that the case be reopened on account that he learned the whereabouts of the original of the Meisic River.
owner of the land, who was better informed with respect to its conditions and location.
The dominion of the applicant, Maximo Cortes, over the land or building lot acquired by him from Higinio
Francisco y Prospero, according to the public deed executed before a notary on the 3rd of July, 1894,
registered in the registry of property, is unquestionable and has been fully proven; and, in view of the
validity of his title, the city attorney had to limit his opposition to the registration simply to its effect upon the
Meisic Creek.
Having been satisfactorily shown that the portion of land included in the technical description presented by
the applicant, situated between the lot to which said instrument refers and the bed of the Meisic Creek, has
been gradually formed by alluvion, as the result of the current in the said stream, it can not be denied that
said portion of land with an area of 33.40 square meters, belongs by right accretion to the owner of the land
referred to in the instrument of the 3rd of July, 1894.