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No, those who are present cannot compel the attendance of a member unable
to attend the session due to incarceration pursuant to a criminal case.
In the case of Kida V. Senate, the Supreme Court nullified a law requiring a
supermajority vote of two thirds of all the members of congress for purposes of
amending or repealing. The said provision gave the said law the character of an
irrepealably law by requiring more than what the constitution demands. It
significantly constricts the future legislators' room for action and flexibility.
Thus, the congress cannot provide for a super-majority vote requirement
before statute be amended or repealed
C. Journals
6. In a court litigation, may the judge go beyond what is reflected in the journals of
the Houses of Congress and inquire into what really happened in the plenary?
No, the judge may not go beyond the journals. In the pronouncement in US
v. PONS the court did not look beyond the journals of congress because it is
already clear and explicit. To go inquire into the veracity of the journals would
mean interference to the legislative functions of congress.
7. What is meant by the enrolled bill doctrine? Is this still good law?
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, once a bill passes a legislative body and is
signed into law, the courts assume that all rules of procedure in the enactment
process were properly followed. ANSWER 7.2: Apparently, this rule is not
appropriate in today's modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the
number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if one is mindful
that the overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth and see
that justice is done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not deter
this pursuit and we reject any doctrine or presumption that so provides.
D. The Electoral Tribunals
8. What are the requisites for the exercise of the Electoral Tribunals of their
respective jurisdictions?
Section 17 of the Constitution provides that the exercise of the Electoral
Tribunals of their respective jurisdictions begins only after the candidate is
considered as either a Member of the House of Representatives or a Senator.
Jurisdiction also provides that a candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives with the concurrence of three requisites: (a) a valid proclamation;
(b) a proper oath; and (c) assumption of office.
9. May an issue previously raised before the COMELEC be raised again before the
Electoral Tribunals?
YES, issues raised before the COMELEC may be raised again before the
Electoral Tribunals.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17
thereof that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members.
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of
these Tribunals,[33] which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections
and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been
proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member
of the House of Representatives. In an existing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
a petition for quo warrant to is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, even
if, the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of
Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.
Ergo, issues raised before the COMELEC may be raised again before the
Electoral Tribunals.
10. Under Sec. 17 of Article VI, what is the composition of the Electoral
Tribunals? How are their respective legislative and judicial components chosen?
Under Sec. 17 of Article VI the electoral tribunals shall be composed of 9
members, 3 from the judiciary and 6 from the legislation.
The three components from the judiciary shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice and the remaining six components from
the legislative shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
11. May a member-legislator of an Electoral Tribunal be replaced by another
member-legislator at any time and for just any cause?
Replacing a member-legislator in the Electoral Tribunal cannot be done at
any time or just for any cause because in replacing its member, it must be done in
accordance with the Constitution. Under Article VIII Section 1 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the
courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Changes or replacement may also be acted in their own free will with valid reason
and must have no political implication and no covert design to derail the
disposition of a pending case in the Electoral Tribunal.
12. Do the respective leaderships of the Houses of Congress have control and
supervision over the Electoral Tribunals?
No, the respective leaderships of the House of Congress don't have control
and supervision over the Electoral Tribunal.
The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power to
propose or concur with amendments to the bills initiated by the House of
Representatives. A senate committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the
following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or
adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new
bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to
make no report at all.
20. What is meant by the one subject, one bill rule under Sec. 26(1) of Article
VI? Should the title of a bill comprehensively state all the contents of the bill?
a. The one subject, one bill rule in the Constitution is a necessary requirement
that all bills must hurdle in order to be constitutional. The one subject, one bill rule
means that the body of the bill must be in harmony of the title that is being used.
That the title is sufficient enough to gauge the possible contents of the provisions
that it seeks to represent. As such, any provision in any given bill or law that is
considered inconsistent with the title of the bill or law in question must be stricken
down.
The rule is in place so that the general populace will be fairly apprised of
such laws that are enacted. Fraud in the legislation process may also be avoided
with the usage of the one title, one bill rule. Without said rule, legislators might
approve a law without knowing that some of its provisions are totally unrelated to
the title and might be against their interest or the interest of the people. Finally, the
one subject, one bill rule is used in order to prevent hodgepodge or logrolling
legislation.
b. There is no need for the title of the bill to comprehensively state all the contents
of the bill. The Supreme Court has stated that it should be enough that the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general
subject (Tobias v. Abalos). As what can be surmised above, the provisions need
not even be exactly the same matter as of the title. It only needs to be germane, or
related to the title to satisfy the one subject, one bill rule.
21. Farias v. Executive Secretary: Does Sec. 14 of R.A. 9006, insofar as it
expressly repeals Sec. 67 of B.P. 881 violate the one subject, one bill rule?
No, it does not violate the one subject one title. The purported
dissimilarity of Section 67 of the omnibus election code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding to the other provisions of Republic Act No. 9006, which deals with the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda does not violate the
one subject one title rule. This court held that an act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The legislators
considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive
department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines
signed the measure into law.
22. Tobias v. Abalos: Does R.A. 7675entitled as An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Mandaluyongviolate the one subject, one bill rule?
No, R.A. 7675 does not violate the one subject, one bill rule.
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that, every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
In the case at bar, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Furthermore, the title of R.A. No. 7675,
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated
under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong. Lastly, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has
been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
This is promulgated in the case of Sumulong v. Comelec and further elucidated in
Lidasan v. Comelec, which the court ruled that, the constitutional requirement as
now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that
general subject.
Thus, R.A. 7675 does not violate the one subject, one bill rule.
23. What is the rationale behind the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in
Sec. 26(2) of Article VI?
The requirement that every bill should pass three readings on separate days
is enunciated by the constitution to ensure that legislators are fully informed on the
contents of a bill they are supposed to vote upon; more time and study are thus
devoted by the Congress in their deliberation and consideration of bills, thereby
enacting a more comprehensive, with very minimal flaws, if not flawless, well-
thought-out laws. Furthermore the legislators are notified that a measure is in
progress through the enactment process, sufficient to enable them and other parties
interested in the bill to intelligently respond thereto and to put them on guard
against individual personal interests of other legislators, which were easily
materialized under the 1935 Constitution wherein the three-readings-on-separate-
days requirement was not articulated. Bills were approved in the first, second, and
third readings all in one session day only. As a result, bills were passed into laws
without much deliberation, time and effort from the Congress which led to half-
baked legislation, incomplete and often carried with it flaws supposedly
discoverable under a more stringent measure of review.
In Tolentino vs Secretary the court held that the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of the
extraordinary powers of the President is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of the individuals may be of hazard.
25. May the Presidents certification that a bill is urgent be sent only to one House
of Congress?
Yes, the Presidents certification that a bill is urgent may be sent only to one
House of Congress.
Under the case of Kida v. Senate, it shows that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of R.A. No. 10153. In this case, the Presidents certification exempted
both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement which follows the ruling in Tolentino. The House of
Representative and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave
full recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted the said law.
Hence, the judiciary is not bound by the acceptance of the Presidents certification
by both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Therefore, the Presidents certification that a bill is urgent may be sent only
to one House of Congress.
26. What is meant by the no-amendment rule under Sec. 26(2) of Article VI? Do
amendments introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committeedone to thresh
out any variance between the Senate and House versions of the billviolate this
rule?
The "no-amendment rule" under Section 26(2) of Article VI refers only to
the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regards to bills
initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the
other house for its concurrence or amendment.
Although not provided for in the Constitution, Congress has established the
so-called Conference Committee, composed of representatives from the Senate and
the House of Representative, which is a "mechanism for compromising
differences" between their respective versions of a bill or joint resolution.
I. Power of inquiry
32. What are the distinctions between the power of legislative inquiry under Sec.
21 and the question hour under Sec. 22, both of Article VI?
Article VI, section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the
House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. This is
significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the
committees and it means that the means which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the Committees.
And that the contempt power of the Congress is founded upon reason and policy
and that the power of inquiry will not be complete if for every contumacious act,
Congress has to resort to judicial interference.
34. May a legislative inquiry be validly conducted even without a proposed
legislation stated in the resolution calling for such investigation?
No, the legislative inquiry must be in aid of legislation under doctrine of
Separation of Powers.
Jurisprudence teaches that legislative power remains limited in the sense that
it is substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise
of the power itself and allowable subjects of legislation.
J. Power of the purse
35. May Congress validly provide in the General Appropriations Act a much-
reduced budget for a government instrumentality (e.g., the proposed Php1,000.00
budget of the ERC for 2018)?
Yes, the Congress may validly provide in the General Appropriation Act a
much reduced budget for a governmental instrumentality.
The DAP is unconstitutional because the President cannot substitute his own
will for that of Congress to which the power to spend public wealth resides as
provided by law and furthermore the DAPs funding came from withdrawal of
unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the
withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior
to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts and the schematic
introduction of Cross-boarder transfers or augmentations which is prohibited due
to its being contradictory to the doctrine of separation of powers and Section 25(5)
of Article VI as provided by the 1987 Constitution.
37. How does the pork barrel system work in general? Why was it declared
unconstitutional in Belgica v. Secretary?
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the
members of the Congress. Since 2011, it is allocated as such:
1.) P70 million for each member of the lower house, broken down to 40 million for
"hard projects," and 30 million for "soft projects."
2.) P200 million for each senator, broken down to P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects.
3.) P200 million for the Vice President, broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects.
K. Power of taxation
38. What is meant by the terms uniform and equitable and progressive under
Sec. 28(1) of Article VI? (See Tolentino v. Secretary; Abakada Guro v. Ermita)
What about the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or religious purposes in Sec. 28(3) of Article VI?
The meaning of the terms "uniform and equitable" and "progressive" under
section 28 (1) of article VI are as follows;
First, the concept of uniformity in taxation implies that all taxable articles or
properties of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. It requires the uniform
application and operation, without discrimination, of the tax in every place where
the subject of the tax is found. It does not, however, require absolute identity or
equality under all circumstances, but subject to reasonable classification.
Second, the concept of equity in taxation requires that the appointment of the tax
burden be, more or less, just in the light of the tax payer's ability to shoulder the tax
burden, and if warranted on the benefits received from the government. It's
cornerstone is the taxpayer's ability to pay.
Third, the term "progressive", refers to the way the tax rate increases as the taxable
amount increases as a system of taxation. In which persons or corporations are
assessed at a greater percentage of their income according to the theoretical ability
to pay. That is, taxpayers pay more in taxes if they earn more in income.