INTERNATIONALISM

Pogge World Poverty and Human Rights 2008

Socioeconomic rights are the most frequently unfulfilled human rights

UDHR Article 25.1 sets them out

Earlier European generations

1. Industrial societies then much less affluent relatively and absolutely
- This means that eradication of poverty completely would have been a MASSIVE
opportunity cost, which so so so so isnt the case now e.g. US debt
2. Earlier generations werent committed to moral unversalism
- Whereas now the equal moral status of human beings is widely accepted in the
developed west

So how does our tolerance of poverty fit with our commitment to moral universalism?

Moral universalism

Moral universalist iff:

1. Subjects all persons to same system of fundamental moral principles
2. Principles assign the same fundamental moral benefits and burdens
3. Benefits and burdens are formulated in general terms

(1) Does allow special moral preference to arise i.e. contracts etc, but the fundamentals
are still the same
(2) Opens up questions about how UNIVERSAL MORAL CONCEPTION (UMC) can respond
to pragmatic pressures allowing assignment of lesser fundamental benefits and
burdens (BB) to children, mentally disabled etc
- Could be adapted to allow some change, but fundamental has to be equality

So there are a few ambiguities universalism is thus not a moral position with a clearly
defined content, but merely an approach

Our moral assessments of national and global economic orders

2 key qs about economic justice (EJ)
1. What fundamental moral claims do persons have on global economic order and what
fundamental responsibilities do these claims entail for those who impose it?
2. apart from national economic order

prevailing opinion is that moral claims are considerably weaker under the first statement
- but upon examination the discrepancy seems arbitrary
in such discussions national economic orders (NEOs) nations are commonly understood as
solidaristic or fraternal communities
such ties therefore generate specific moral claims
but this doesnt invalidate universalism it just makes it
1. now relates to moral constrants on claims to the GEO
2. now relates to moral constraints on claims to the NEO, when there is a strong bond
with a smaller unit

most people in rich countries would think of our global economic order as basically just
but GEO doesnt meet these criteria that are minimal requirements on NEO
1. social rules should be liable to peaceful change
- GEO relies on latent violence in military powers and set ups that prevent and
deter rule violations
- It is determined by a teeeeeny minority of its participants G8, P5, IMF etc
2. Avoidable life threatening poverty should be avoided
- Surely any just EO needs to provide all with basic means and needs
- But in GEO most citizens reject this

Then gives facts about GEO and world poverty that are probs now out of date so look some
up before collections

Conceptions of national and global economic justice contrasted

- No national society displays anything like the global inequality that we see
globally
- We would probably consider a national society with that kind of income
inequality unjust

Could say that this wouldnt be unjust because if we thought it was then we would change it
through ballot box
But this falls foul of minimum requirement (1) that there is peaceful means to change which
there isnt
Also surely we dont just accept an NEO because it is approved by the majority

Imagine subbrazil where there NEO produces life-threatening poverty and not subject to
peaceful change by majority
Could we justify this state of affairs?
1. Evade demand by surrendering the discrepancy i.e. strengthen the minimal criteria
applied to GEO or weaken the minimal criteria for NEO
2. Defend a discrepancy of minimal criteria i.e. justify GEO unjust even if it fails to
meet NEO criteria
3. Insist on a discrepancy while rejecting the universalist demand to justify this
discrepancy i.e says that neo is subject to a min criteria, geo isnt, but you dont
need to justify this
Moral universalism and david millers contextualism

3rd response can simply point to our intuition

- Our discrepant criteria of neo and geo are moral points that need to be
confirmed
- An account that doesnt vindicate these intuitions should be rejected on these
grounds alone
- Miller was actually more complex, arguing that we should allow diverse moral
principles to hold in different contexts without demanding any justification for
such diversity
- But this is quite unconvincing, those who simply state different contexts will
often fail to convince and often seem offensive
- Miller does recognise this but argues that contextualism can still be helpful

But lets move beyond this dogmatic contextualisms and the unsupported endorsements
or rejections it takes to be appropriate

But also shouldnt go for complete moral universalism

It permits highly unified anti-contextualist moral conceptions
But also permits critical contextualist alternatives

So converge on critical contextualism

Contextualist moral universalism and John Rawls moral conception

Rawls wants to confine is distributive justice requirements to the basic structure of a self-
contained society existing under the circumstances of justice

Rawls gives reasons like pluralism, avoiding demandingness, stability etc, for why basic
institutions are treated separately
But Rawls insists fundamental principles are different for national and institutional schemes

Rawls doesnt justify this well enough

1. Rejects the difference principle (DP) for global justice as it is unacceptable for people
to bear costs of decisions made by others
- But doesnt really explain why this doesnt apply on a national level
2. Fails to explain rejection of DP as global order across with argument
- discusses how population of indeterminate size and as a self-contained and closed
system should organise itself
takes this principle to apply to the US but the US is not self contained by any stretch
of imagination
Rawls does then conclude that a national society need merely endorse and
(approximately) satisfy some not-unreasonable liberal standard of EJ

3. This new minimal criterion defies the second challenge from moral universalism
 - But rawls should surely hold that the geo must meet this standard, otherwise it is
an unqualified and unjustified double standard
- Also vague what even counts as an NEO and a GEO

Rationalising divergent moral assessments through a double standard

Easiest way is to subject the GEO to a weaker moral demand than the NEO
Rawls doesnt do it

Arguments for weak criterion usually apply to cultural diversity or autonomy, or special ties
to smaller groups

but all three factors exist within nations as well

only be defence of double standard if show that they are less relevant domestically
we owe the global poor an account of why we take ourselves to be entitled to impose on
them a global economic order in violation of the minimal moral constraints we ourselves
place on the imposition of any national economic order

rationalising divergent moral assessments without a double standard

basically argue that even with a change in GEO there wouldnt be a massive impact on the
lives of the poor
how is the quality of the order related causally to this starvation

argue that it is mostly to do with flawed economic regimes and their corrupt and
incompetent elits
this doesnt reflect a double standard, it just depends on economic causality

so this is one main reasons to convince ourselves that the GEO isnt actually morally
significant

a) Would be wrong to impose ourselves upon countries

b) Interference could be counter productive
c) Can give development assistance but this may not be successful due to corrupt
elites

Does this work? Well probably not because it takes national systems, corrupt elites and
things like that as solely exogenous factors let alone the economic problems and
unliklehoods of the actual arguments

The causal role of global institutions in the persistence of severe poverty

- Strong case for GEO being important

1. International resource privilege
 - Control by coercion over your own resources, and there is therefore powerful
incentives for coups etc in resources driven economies
2. International borrowing privilege
- Any group holding power entitled to borrow funds in name of whole society
- Important negative effects on corruption and poverty because it puts credit at
the hands of rulers (often dicks)
- Again coups and civil wars etc
- So 1&2 come together to severely increase poverty at the hands of the GEO

Easier to detach ourselves when not to blame, but we share causal and moral responsibility
Also increasing interdependency is massive because it makes the weaker countries even
more vunerable to exogenous shocks through decision and policies made

Conclusion

The rules structuring the world econonomy have a profound impact on the global
economic distribution
the empirical rationalisation is not empirically sustainable

if economic rationalisation fails then we are employing a double standard

without a plausible rationale, our discrepand assessments constitute covert arbitrary

discrimination in facour of the wealthy societies against the global poor

JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS Caney 2005

What does a theory of distributive justice require (DJ)?

1. What sorts of entities are included?
2. Who are the rightful recipients of goods, and who is obligated to distribute these
goods?
3. What should people have fair shares of?
4. What criterion for distributive justice

(1) And (2) are scope of justice

If someone gives an individualistic account of 1 then you need to know which groups
are included in 2 i.e. everyone in the world, within nations? What?

There are also questions not tied to justice about distribution i.e. benevolence

II
Cosmopolitan approaches to DJ
1. Who is entitled most contemporary cosmopolitans affirm that the duties are owed
to individuals
2. Fundamental and derivative principles:
- Fundamental: all persons should be included in the scope of distributive justice
 - Derivative: fundamental may be best realised if people comply with special
duties to some i.e. global utilitarianism that enforces family relations (as long
as everyone has a family)

3. Modest vs ambitious cosmopolitanism

- modest makes a positive claim that all persons should be included in the scope of
distributive justice
- ambitious makes the positive claim, and the negative claim that persons dont have
any obligation of distributive justice to fellow nationals or fellow citizens to a greater
extent

4. Institutional vs interactions
- Institutional = apply to institutions (Pogge says trade, communication and
interdependence)
- Interactional= principles would apply even in absence of institutional background
- But as we are increasingly interdependent this falls away
5. Principles lead to policies
POGGE: people should be taxed for using resources in their territory and distributing
to the worldwide poor
SHUE AND JONES: human right to subsistence
STEINER: natural right to equal portion of Earths resources
RAWLS DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE APPLIES GLOBALLY: Beitz

Scope2 claim the standard justifications of principles of distributive justice entail that
there are cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice

III

Beitz argues from Rawlsian point of view but seeks to show that it implies cosmopolitan DJ
Rawls has an institutionalist position that maintains states are reasonably self-contained
- Does argue for some global principles but argues that the original position
wouldnt create international DJ, only rights to self-determination and defence

Version A

Beitz says that there are 2 reasons for Rawls theory supporting cosmopolitcan DJ:
1. Natural resources
- The distribution is entirely arbitrary so surely cant be beneficiaries by right
- If you apply this to OP (original position) states would surely give themselves a
fair chance at getting some natural resources
2. Insitutionalist framework
- The degree of international economic interdependence constitutes a scheme of
social cooperation

SO beitz proposes an internation DJ based on Rawls DP which supersedes any questions

about international justice concerning natural resources
Two criticisms of Beitz:
1. No global interdependence of the appropriate kind
- Rawls famously says that his theory applies to mutually advantageous schemes
and international economy just isnt like that really? Trade? The UN? Extradition
treaties?
- This is true when country A exploits country B but really peoples actions are
affected by those living abroad
- Surely to this just argue that yes there is interdependence like this

2. DJ not concerned with moral claim that it applies within scheme of cooperation i.e.
that economic interactions dont really have any moral relevance to DJ

- DJ could mean a) entitlement perspective or b) duty bearer i.e. who has a duty
to whom
- And it is difficult to see why interaction economically has any affect on this
- So insitutionalist has a morally arbitrary connection to entitlement making
properties

Replies:
1) Impact:
- Morally relevant because they have HUGE impact on peoples lives and the
outcomes it produces
- But actually this only justifies making duties to all who can make a difference and
that is an interactional position
2) Pogge argues that there is a distinction between negative and positive duties
- Persons have a negative duty not to sustain unjust structures, and membership
of institutions is important because as a member one is subject to a negative
duty not to uphold unjust institutions
- This is quite good but if poverty results from things separate to instutionalism
there is no answer
- Caney sees this as fatal

Version B

Beitz and Pogges argument unconvincing as moral premise is implausible

Richards develops GOP on grounds that persons are entitled to be included in the contract
in virtue of their rights and interests as human beings

Fair principles are the ones that you would get in the OP
In virtue of having as sense of justice and capacity for a conception of the good, all should
be represented in GOP

There are problem siwth the GOP but these arent problems with Beitzs cosmopolitanism
per se
IV
Alternative to contractarian theories of DJ
Outcome centred
Singer says:
- Poverty is bad
- Persons have duties to prevent bad things
- Concludes that affluent persons have obligations to aid the impoverished,
wherever they live and whatever their nationality
- Does this equate acts and ommissions
- But even then one can argue that if not the same, not saving a life is still deeply
morally wrong

Is the scheme arduous

1. Well morality might be highly demanding
2. Also surely not doing something is highly onerous for the weak and defenceless
3. More moderate lines are taken than singer Goodin says there needs to be aid but
not necessarily complete

Strength of the consequentialist outcomes is that it would seem implausible to claim that
principles of distributive justice should be utterly indifferent to the outcomes they generate

Problems
1. Incomplete maximising consequentialism has troubling outcomes (hence core and
basic rights i.e. poverty isnt complete redistribution
2. Indeterminate above threshold, complete? Difficult to tell which GDJ would be
chosen

Consequentialist approach fails to provide a convincing answer to the question of how

burdens and benefits should be divdied, even if they provide a good answer to the question
of what we judge to be a benefits and a burden

Rights based cosmopolitan perspective from rights based approaches

Held derives 7 types of human rights and three economic rights health, social and
economic
Shue defends human right to subsistence as necessary to enjoy other rights
inherent necessities for the exercise of any right
Jones says rights should protect important human interests

Plausible as any credible account of peoples rights reflects what is important to persons
their fundamental interests
Objection in that it fails to produce adequate account of duties
But you can surely put political insitutions in place to protect rights and then infer duties to
support institutional arrangements that protect rights
VI

General nature of cosmopolitan arguments

Contractarian+consequentialist+rights based = prinicples of justice that all lead to rome
i.e. a global cosmopolitan account

But still need to prove scope/specific principles

4 principles we might consider adopting:
1. Persons have a human right to subsisence
2. Persons of different nations should enjoy equal opportunities: no one should face
worse ops because of their nationality (follows straightforwardly from domestic
equality of opportunity
3. UNHDR declares everyone without any discrimination has the right to equal pay for
equal work (but what is relevant, quality of work or demand for product, also seems
to be problematic with gifted people for example)
4. Benefitting people matters more the worse off the people are (Parfit)

These statements arent too onerous they strike a good balance of basic rights and undue
strenuessness of maximising consequentialist view

Ecumenical appeal variety of perspectives can agree on these

If scope2 (standard justifications of DJ theories entail cosmopolitanism) claim is true then no

option but to accept these

VII

Rawls argues for international OP contract with representatives of states

But argues that they wouldnt chose principles of international distribution

Makes 3 claims for this:

1. Negative claim that cosmopolitan DJ is innapropriate because it would exhibit
tolerance to non-liberal states
2. All persons must have some basic economic rights
3. Parties would accept duties of assistance to burdened socieities

Objections to contractarian theory

1. Use of peoples questionable as they arent homogenous
2. It fails to derive human rights (surely they could have just stemmed from something
different though_
3. Ad hoc basis
4. Incoherence arguments for civil and political liberties entail global equivalents
5. Incogernece 2 rejects some proposed preconditions for other human rights
(DONT GET THIS READ THE ACTUAL BOOKS FOR FINALS)
why would people agree to more global redistribution?
Rawls defines people in a way such that they will not
But why assume liberal societies have no interest in having more resources rather than less?
why do they want more for themselves at a domestic level and not internationall?
3 reasons why they would:
1. Rawls says parties wish to preserve equal standing
2. Rawls says parties wish to preserve self respect (international inequalities could
easily corrode this)
3. Rawls says parties will be concerned about stability and will only be secured if
parties enjoy decent economic well-being of all its people
So on Rawls own position he seem to commit to some form of global DJ

VIII

Rawls second challenge to GDJ is that it doesnt recognise the importance of moral self
governance/autonomy

Basically argues that where people are self governing they are responsible for ensuring that
their members receive just entitlements
e.g. one society industrialises whilst the other doesnt
and the wealthier nation shouldnt have to redistribute because of the decisions that they
make because this violates autonomy
feels quite like a Nozickian argument scaled up)

but this is a shit argument

1. Unjust towards individuals
- Why should a member of a third world country be econonmically disadvantaged
by the decisions a member of the econ/political elite made?
2. Intuition that with self determination comes responsibility that doesnt always apply
3. Nature of position criticising
Regects egalitarian cosmopolitanism but then accepts the minimal economic
rights thing
But this is surely weird
must either abandon their argument against egalitarian conceptions of
cosmopolitan distributive justice, or abandon their commitment to any economic
human rights, or provide some explanation as to why their economic human
rights are immune to their argument whereas other economic human rigths
arent

IX

Argues agains GDJ on the grounds that the principles of DJ must be able to motivate people
to comply with them and because of nationalist grounding you cannot do this

1. individualistic version
- individuals cannot be swayed so lack of obligation
 2. societal version
- claim about necessary preconditions for scheme of DJ
- system of justice must be one with which participants identify otherwise social
support collapses
- people identify with fellow nationals but not at a supranational level

well 1. Is ridic because it assumes you only have obligatios if motivated to comply

against 2. A) overstates necessity of national sentiments i.e. there are huge forms of social
unity apart from national ones b) dispute model of human motivation ahistorical and
unchanging account of human nature assuming we are only willing to make sacrifices for
fellow-nationals
relies on an impoverished moral psychology

Assess the argument that ambitious cosmopolitanism is incorrect for people to have special
obligations for fellow nationals

the claim is that membership of a nation generates duties to ones fellow nationals and also
entitlements one can claim of them

two reason:
1. intuitive
a) drawns on peoples moral convictions making the claim that correct moral
principles have to match intuition
b) people have a strong intuition that you should favour nationsals
objection: why do we make intuition authoritative? Not obvious that people do
think we have special obligations to nationals? Even if people do have these
intuitions it isnt necessarily an obligation of DJ

2. Reciprocity argument
- People who engage in a system of cooperation acquire special rights to goods
produced by cooperation and entitlements that non-participants laxk
- Nations are systems of social cooperation and therefore duties and rights are
generated
Objections 1. Do not comprise schemes of reciprocity interdependency and nationals
abroad mean that a nation isnt just or even at all a system of cooperation between
members of one nation 2. No force when social institution isnt cooperative 3. Denies rights
to those unable to cooperate i.e. the disabled or future generations

XII

Realist perspective that CDJ is utopian and unworkable

Systemic argument that international systems are such that states cannot act to bring about
CDJ no coercive global authority
But surely this a) isnt a moral fact and b) depends on the character of the international
system and assumes that it has a statis character

Also dont necessarily need cooperation like this i.e. if the US wiped its debts it wouldnt be
a huge cost, but big impact for beneficiary

Also can be based on cooperation

The other is the one dealt with by Pogge that actually aid is ineffective and goes to corrupt
leaders and it badly organised anyway etc

Two points against this a) dispute empirical point, and b) doesnt alter fundamentally moral
claims

XIV SUMMARY

So
1. Contractarian accounts of cosmopolitan justice can overcome 2 challenges but prove
unconvinging
2. Consequentialist accounts overcome some difficulties but are incomplete and
indeterminate
3. Existing rights based conceptions are plausible but unconvincing
4. Rationale underlying traditional domestic theories of justice actually justifies the
global application of their theories (scope2 claim) and this is because they are based
on universalised principles
5. Rawls appeal to toleration fails to invalidate CDJ
6. Rawls and Millers responsibility argument rests on a dubious analogy (will need to
read book for this)
7. Arguments that CDJ is unfeasible is unconvincing
8. Both arguments that persons have special obligations of dj to fellow nationals are
unconvincing
9. The claim that persons have cosmo rights but that th duty to uphold them falls on
fellow nationals is poor
10. Realist arguments are stupid

WOW HELPFUL

Nagel The Problem of Global Justice 2005

2 issues that will focus on

1. Justice and sovereignty (Hobbes argued actual justice needs a sovereign state)
 2. Limits of equality as a demand of justice (Is Rawls consistent, can you have an
egalitarian structure of states, can you be consistent if you dont require this?

Argues that sovereignty is linked to justice as a) it coordinates conduct and b) is an enabler

because it is backed by force and therefore can cut out free riders

There is a kind of agreement that there are some conditions of fairness/equality that should
be employed when thinking of the way a just society treats its citizens and this is what
creates the unrest when there is an absence of these comparable relations with other
societies

It is also clearly a humanitarian disaster let alone justice so surely some kind of humane
assistance from the well off is clearly called for even apart from any claim of justice
And surely these duties exist in virtue of absolute, not relative, need

2 principle conceptions:
1. Cosmopolitanism that individual sovereign states is an unfortunate obstance to the
establishment of global justice
2. Political derives from Rawls view that justice is strictly political- argues that it is a
states existence that gives the value of justice its application
Dworkin argues that equal concern is the special and indispensable virtue of
sovereigns so global justice isnt necessarily distressing
If it turns out that in an essay I conclude that we shouldnt go for global justice, make
sure you make the humanitarian point i.e. that it is humane to transfer, and it isnt
a condonement

IV

On either view, though, global justice would require sovereignty

Then looks at rawls just in less depth than caney

Cosmo has moral appeal as birth place does seem completely arbitrary
points us toward the utopian goal of trying to extend legitimate democratic government to
ever-larger domains in pursuit of more global justice

socioeconomic justice
depends on positive rights which can only arise upon joining together (claim to right to
democracy if we are a unit of people)
Rawls appeal to elimination of morally arbitrary sources of wealth and to the extent that
these factors create differences, the system needs justification

So there is a kind of set of rights that are crucial to being in a society so it isnt just a
cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage
It is that we are both putative joint authors of the coercively imposed system, and subject
to its norms that creates the special presumption against arbitrary inequalities in our
treatment by the system

So does this membership mean we can do what we want to other groups? Well no states
can be left to their own devices as long as they dont harm others most our basic rights
and duties are universal

the state makes unique demands on the will of its members and those exceptional
demands bring with them exceptional obligations, the positive obligations of justice

perhaps arguing that because you do not sign up to be a member of the human race, these
special obligations arent generated

however the political conception doesnt take content from universal moral relation, it
doesnt deny it i.e. minimum morality and human standards
and this doesnt necessarily depend on institutions but it might be practically impossible
to maintain these without institutions

but we do not have an obligation to live in a just society with everyone

so there is a big difference here

cosmo argues that the formation of the state as answering also a universal demand for
equality
whereas pol argues that universal requirement of equality is conditional
we are required to accord equal status to anyone with whom we are joined in a strong
and coercively imposed political community

VII

Rawls is slightly different, talking not of general international obligation but about what
principles should govern the foreign policy of a liberal society
So it is more an elaboration of the account of a just society rather than an independent
account of a just world
And the moral units, therefore, arent individuals they are societies

So perhaps a rawlsian would say things about international justice like Caney outlines but
he actually considers a different question, so trying to force a rawlsian into this mode may
not be the best way around it

Says there needs to be equal respect enough for liberal societies to tolerate nonliberal
societies that meet the condition of decency

it is surpising that internationally, equal respect should result precisely in toleration for the
absence of such restraint in nonliberal societies

the claims of individuals come in at a far lower level basically claims of human rights
but he argues that this is silly, and that there is no real reason for the principled toleration
of nonliberal societies
there are practical reasons for them to show restraint, ut there are no moral reasons for
restraint of the kind Rawls offers

more plausible perhaps that liberal states not obliged to either tolerate or to transform

that there is a respect for autonomy of other societies

argues that interdependence doesnt bring in a political conception of justice, because these
institutions dont rise to a level of statehood
they are still not appropriate sites for justice

surely this is misunderstanding, bodies like the EU directly take sovereignty, and even things
like the IMF remove certain decision making powers
so perhaps a good way would be to marry them to the extent that there is sovereignty,
there is obligations, so there may be weak obligations owed due to international
interdependence

argues against this (the red thing) saying that international institutions act in the name of
the state
but again surely this is a misunderstanding of the way bodies work internationally, if they
were simply arms of our existing sovereign states then they wouldnt be international
also do not buy the argument that the correct constituents of these are countries, because
the country doesnt exist independent of the people ffs

sliding scale of degrees of co-membership

natural suggestion in light of clearly multi-layered morality
Miller Citizenship and National Identity 2000

Nationality under attack

Starts from a humean kind of argument that says ordinary sentiments should be left in place
until strong arguments for rejection appear
- correcting them only when they are inconsistent or plainly flawed in some other
way
- we dont aspire to some universal and rational foundation such as kant

so from this view Miller is going to seek to defend nationality doesnt need to justify this
standpoint (he says) so will do a) examine arguments against nationality and b) assuage
tension between the ethical particularism implied by such commitments and ethical
universalism

i.e. philosophers often give weight to agent-neutral justifications of stuff but nationality
seems to present competition to this

- seems as though nationality is seen as backward looking or a reactionary

notion

so there is the philosophical challenge and a progressive challenge to nationalism

nationality has 3 interconnected propositions

1. personal identity
- it may properly be part of someones identity that they belong to this or that
national grouping i.e. it may be, but it may not be part of personal identity
2. bounded duties
- contour lines in the ethical landscape the duties we owe our fellow-nationals
are different from, and more extensive than the duties that we owe to human
beings as such
3. political self-determination
- people who form a national community in a particular territory have a good
claim to self determination needs an institutional structure for collective
decisions primarily governing own community

argues that these propositions are linked together in such a way that it is difficult to feel the
force of any one of them without acknowledging the others

feels a bit weird though. Take (1) for example this is slightly chicken and egg if it can be
shown that national identity breaks down/is arbitrary, then we are basing something moral
on an arbitrary assumption for example I may think that ginger people are ethically
superior, but and I therefore have more moral standing with them hm not sure about this
but something doesnt feel right
features of nationality
1. national communities are constituted by belief: a nationality exists when its
members believe that it does
- features like race or language only feature when nationality takes it as a defining
feature i.e. for everything that people say links a national community there are
clear counter examples
2. identity embodies historical continuity
- nations stretch back into the past and the historic community is a community
of obligation i.e. because of what those before us did we are obliged to
continue their work historical and intergenerational continuity again weird
how could a nation become independent then this is a very statist model of
nationhood

3. national identity is an active identity

- communities that do things together there is a proxy that we think acts on our
behalf and expresses the national will
4. connects a group of people with a particular geographical place
5. essential that people who compose the nationa are believed ot share certain traits
that mark them off from other peoples
- national divisions must be natural ones; they must correspond to real
differences between peoples
- immigration not excluded but they must take on the essential elements of
national character

and it is these 5 things that distinguish nationality from other collective sources of personal
identity

nationality defended

but the real question is if this performs enough value that we should be positive towards
nationalism or at least acquiescent

could argue that it performs a very very valuable service in that there is a need for solidarity
among populations of states that are large and anonymous need for collective goods for
example

also because of the mythical nature of national identity it can be changed very easily
i.e. doesnt necessarily need to be a conservative thing, national ideas often quite liberal or
socialist programmes

liberal objection

liberal critique is that nationality is detrimental to the cultural pluralism that liberals hold
dear
this derives from the assumption that national identities are exlusive in their nature
where a state embodies a single nationality, the culture that makes up that nationality
must drive out everything else

but nationality isnt an all-embracing identity

need not extend to all cultural attributes but the liberal argument assumes no line can be
drawn

liberals could admit that a line is drawn, but say that it is drawn by the dominant cultural
group
- empirically this is probably true but it is integral that it is loaded this way
- also nationality can be an inclusive identity which can incorporate sub groups

also agues that a distinct and clear national identity that stands over and above the specific
cultural traits of all the groups in society in question

it wont be painless though like some things will have to go

is this convincing surely for a national identity to become recognised the dominant group
will be the ones calling the shots?

The Balkan objection

Argues that the principle of nationality cannot in practice be realised but the belief that it
can leads to bloodshed
- i.e. would be nationalities so entangled that there is no way of drawing
boundaries so as to satisfy all claims
- nationality holds that those who form a national community have good claim to
self-determination says that this isnt consent theory because it isnt about
individual will its about individual identity

if the group is dissatisfied you need to ask does the group have a collective identity which is
or has become incompatible with the national identity of the majority in the state?

3 answers
1. dissatisfied group is ethnic and it isnt getting a good deal
- black Americans, needed domestic reform but not secession
2. group has national identity but is radically incompatible with identity of majority,
where elements of commonality and difference
- shared common historical identity, but with distinct national character (Scotland
and wales)
- not secession but an arrangement that gives the sub-community right of self-
determination in those areas of decision which are especially central to its own
sense of nationhood
3. state contains two or more nations with radically incompatible identities
- no realistic possibility of shared identity
- prima facie case for secession
so the pricniples of nationality doesnt generate an unlimited right of secession

justice and sentiment

objection that duties of justice dont depend on feeling towards others

true but national identity marks out to whom special duties are owed
- may do so without determining the content of these special duties
- doesnt mean htat they are based on sentiment though (like family for example)
but obligations nationally can seem sentiment based
therefore nation with less sentiment would have less obligations
I feel bound to them as sharing in a certain way of life, epressed by the public culture
and the content of the obligations depend on that public culture

so this means that a swede may feel more bound than an American
this may seem uncomfortably relativistic but yeah

CHAPTER 10
National self-determination and global justice

Big tension seems to be no theory that makes belonging to one or other society itself a
relevant consideration in deciding what is due

Principle of national self determination is that people who inhabit continuous piece of
territory form a national community who have right to determine their own future
In many cases this is achieved by having an independent state

National self-determination

Assume it is possible (NSD)

Why might it be intrinsically valuable?
Well just as SD is important for people it is important for groups

Self evident for a tennis club that was set up

Self-evidence falls away for nations
Compatriots are thrown together (unlike the tennis club) national boundaries are arbitrary,
nationals dont sign up (tennis members do)

Case for NSD most obvious if

1. communities institutions are as near as possible to deliberative democracy
2. the standard range of civil and political rights should be constitutionally entrenched
3. legal right of emigration

the demands of justice

appealing solution perhaps that national self-determination is valuable so long as it remains

within the bounds laid down by justice
i.e. justice demands certain requirements and as long as NSD conforms to these, it is a good
things, analougous to individuals within a state

this solution though varies completely based on the DJ theory you pick some may be very
demanding leaving little room for NSD, some might not giving a lot of space

also the analogy between individual and group doesnt quite hold firm because nation-
states are engated in the pursuit of an important form of justice social

but could social justice simply be global justice on a smaller scale (basically the scope2 claim
from Caney)

argument goes:
- justice is a matter of entitlement
- social justice within society means state ensures access
- global justice demands ensemble of states ensure access

but this assumes that we can give a spec of the demands of justice in advance of the
articulation of those demands within the many different political communities that make up
the world we inhabit

but surely it is more reasonable that conceptions differ slightly in different cultural milieux
thus under NSD policies of social justice will vary

three reasons for divergence

1. justice is about the way valued goods are allocated
- how these goods are conceived will vary
- point can be missed in talking of basic goods
- the meaning of such goods is socially constittuied
2. criterion of distribution varies
- almost all societies discriminate on the basis of merit but different qualities
make the merit
- basic needs are universal but most other things will depend on social goods
- potential to marry this with Rawls ideas about universal goods or primary goods
surely if they are truly primary goods it will work across borders

3. context in which criteria applied is different

societies have a free hand in deciding how to arrange the social contexts
simply that where contxts differ, so will conceptions of justice

argues that this is contextualist rather than subjectivist (are these really that different ngl)

is this really good enough? It is quite wishy washy? And also the current global injustice
would certainly not be permitted within a state, not only that but it goes far beyond
distribution it is highly unlikely that any conception of justie would allow babies to live and
die in adverse and extreme poverty
against global egalitarianism

clear that global justice cannot require that people everywhere should enjoy the same
resources and advantages regardless of their membership in particular political
communities
so membership must make a difference (well only if you accept the premise)

perhaps works in a more abstract way like EAA or something like that
argues that it is wrong to see inequality as the problem (unless you use Cohen type thing) so
have to see the problem of poverty

global justice

what are the positive requirements of global justice?

1. Must respect the conditions that are universally necessary for human beings to lead
minimally adequate lives
- Negative answer of not infringing rights
- Positive of access to rights
2. Individuals and collectives should refrain from exploitation
3. Obligation to ensure that all political communities have the opportunity to
determine their own future and practise justice among their members
- If we value NSD we have to value others NSD as well
- Could we provide the resources needed to achieve justice internally?
- Well argues that the injustice may have arisen from NSD based decisions, so we
cannot value NSD and then seek to nullify the effects if it goes wrong (CANEY
REFUTES THIS REALLY WELL)

So basically concludes that NSD allows social justice to be reached in each community with a
shared understanding global justice must be spelt out so that it doesnt rely on thick
conceptions

SANGIOVANNI GLOBAL JUSTICE, RECIPROCITY AND THE STATE

2007

All cosmopolitans have to hold:

1. Human beings are the ultimate units of moral concern family, tribes, states etc
only become concerns indirectly
2. Status of an ultimate unit of concern extends to all human beings equally
3. Human beings should be treated as ultimate units of concern by everyone
Remember this formulation of cosmopolitanism

She accepts these but outlines the conflict that you ordinarily believe that fundamentally
different principles of DJ apply to the NEO and the GEO
She is going to try and show that it is not an arbitrary distinction to make defending the
idea that equality is a demand of justice only among citizens of a state
- This isnt down to the difference in coercion

Will argue that:

- Equality as a demand of justice is a requirement of reciprocity in the mutual
provision of a central class of collective goods, namely those goods necessary for
developing and acting on a plan of life
- Because these states provide these goods not the global order we have special
obligations of egalitarian justice to fellow citizens and residents who together
sustain the state
- Again, stresses the point that this doesnt mean we have no obligations of
distributive justice at the global level, only that these are different in form and
content
1. Will draw distinctions necessary to understand cosmo
2. Two recent attempts to bound the scope of justice within cosmo sphere
3. Sets out her own

I:
Relational and non relational
Relational: holds that the practice-mediated relations in which individuals stand condition
the content, scope and justification of those principles
The content is varied, as is the scope and justification
i.e. some say that social goods (health, leisure) gain their value and meaning from the
culturally distinct practices through which they are distributed, and these culturally
contingent values and meanings that give content to and bound the scope of distributive
justice
others (still relational) hold that it isnt the social meanings that matter it is the institutions
social and political institutions fundamentally alter the relations in which people stand and
therefore alter the principles of distributive justice that are appropriate to them

but they basically all share the idea that principles of DJ cannot be formulated or justified
independently of the practices they are intended to regulate

nonrelational: reject the idea that practice-mediated relations matter for DJ

the point is not that social practices dont play a role
its more that they dont play a role in the justification and formulation of a given set of
principles they might condition the way they are applied
the idea is that concpetions of DJ are grounded on the basic intuition that no one should be
worse off through no fauly of their own, whether or not thehy share in practices or
institutions

hmmmm perhaps ask Ian about this

this distinction cuts across internationalism and globalism

globalists equality of justce has a global scope
internationalists equality as a demand of justice applies only among members of a state

internationalists arent committed to the idea that there arent other principles of DJ at
global level only that these distributive justice pricniples arent derived from DE with a
global scope

so you can therefore take a few routes to the globalist conclusion

1. All participate in a global order with profound and pervasive effects on the life
prospects of all human beings so domestic demands apply internationally
This is relational because the content and scope of DJ is born out of the current
extent and degree of interaction
2. Non relational to globalist
Argue that extent/depth of interaction doesnt matter to the nonrelational globalist

So internationalist must therefore fight a battle on two fronts

II: coercion-based internationalism

Blake says that the autonomy-restricting character of a state that demands special
justiciation in terms of a conception of social equality
Nagel says that it is our joint authorship of coercively backed laws that generates the concer
for equality

But they all agree on state coercion being a necessary condition for equality as a demand of
justice
Will argue that this premise is false
Then tries to revise Nagel so it avoids this

ANY ARGUMENT FOR INTERNATIONALISM has to have an empirical claim about why states
differ from trans, supra or sub national bodies
Then they have to have a normative claim about what makes this special

Empirical - Blake says that this is the coercive enforcement

She says that this is straightforwardly false (pain of sanctions etc)
So he qualifies that it isnt the fact of coercion that marks the boundary between domestic
and international society it is also the domain over which coercion is applied
i.e. it goes over a lot more, like private law, taxation and respect to individuals

the normative premise Blake this kind of coercion compromises autonomy as it

subordinates the will of the person to the will of others
so they need a special justification consent is one way, and to get consent you must
plausibly show that the worse off could hypothetically consent to it because any departure
would make them worse off
and because the international system doesnt do this it doesnt need to be justified in the
same terms
so egalitarian justice is only relevant nationally
doesnt really apply to some kind of sufficientarianism though that could be seen to be key
B
Going to argue that coercion isnt necessary
Imagines a terror attack that disables the whole coercive apparatus but the state continues
to function as normal does this mean the justification is mooted?
Well following Blake yes the coercion and therefore autonomy breach is no longer present

But imagine a band of rich people cite Blake and argue that norms of egalitarian justice no
longer apply to them - they reform the tax structure to make it less progressive
Why do the principles of distributive justice act differently in this case?
They could argue that just as churches and universities (due to their voluntary natures)
dont have to be egalitarian justice oriented, the legal system is now voluntary so they are
fine

The problem she argues is the ambiguous use of the word voluntary
The analogy with the church and uni doesnt work because opting out isnt very
burdensome
However the postattack state isnt really like this it is excessively burdensome, they lose
access to basic goods and services etc

C recast the coercion argument

If you change it to include the authority of the state rather than its capacity to coerce this is
better
So two premises
1) Subjection to state law is nonvoluntary;
2) States exercise of de facto legal authority therefore requires special justification to
those subject to it the same is not true of inter, supra and transnational institutions

This doesnt rely on coercive norms, and doesnt rely on the tough intracacies about
whether inter, supra and transnational orders regulate property

But now still needs a link to a content, scope and justification of a conception of distributive
justice

D Authorship and nonvoluntariness

Nagel comes close but no cigar
Equality as a demand of justice:
- Special involvement of agency or the will that is inseperable from membership in
a political society
- Not to become a member, bit the engagement of the will in being a subject of
society and being the citizen in whose name authority is exercised
- Sovereign state more than just cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage it
is coercively imposed
- We are assigned a role in the collective life of society
- This makes us responsible for its act and holds us responsible for obeying its laws
and conforming to its norms supporting the institutions through which
advantages and disadvantages are created and distributed
 - We are therefore responsible for asking why we should accept arbitrary
inequalities that they produce
This claims to give us, the, an account of why in a nonvoluntary, authoritative system of
legal norms there are presumptions against arbitrary inequalities and it doesnt depend on
the coercion/legal point

but does this account free us from the idea that we are just as tied to trans, supra and
international orders?
And more so, are these voluntary in a meaningful sense that state apparatus isnt
The notions of authorship and general will dont help us much
Well it doesnt seem so
So tweak it a little

Make the argument

1. Our subjection to nonstate institutional orders is voluntary but our subjection to
state laws is not
2. Voluntary associations need not meet the same stringent standards as nonvoluntary
ones because you cannot opt out of imposed disadvantages
But still weak on the nonstate order things
Opting out of WTO is more of a take it or leave it option (Cohen and Sable)

So surely you need a kind of traceable scale the more significant the costs of exit the more
stringent the justice norms which should apply
- This isnt an approach available to Nagel so this is the tweak
Nagel believes extra rempublicam nulla justitia

So concludes that a far better way to view internationalism isnt interjection with the will it
is more of a concern about what the state does rather than how it engages, constrains or
thwarts the will
Feels like a lot of this can be put to the criticism in red below these notes but check with
Ian

Reciprocity based internationalism

Argues that equality is a relational ideal of reciprocity among those who support and
maintain the states capacity to provide basic collective goods necessary to protect us from
physical attack and to maintain and reproduce a stable system of property rights and
entitlements
We therefore owe obligations of egalitarian reciprocity to fellow citizens and residents in
the state who provide us ith the basic conditions and guarantees necessary to develop and
act on a plan of life

For reciprocity-based internationalism (RBI) coercion is relevant because it is a useful way to

preserve autonomy (rather than the Nagel view of it violating it)

Basic things
Police, courts, administration, military, markets property rights and entitlments

But the global order (in all but failed states) doesnt provide these
This is maintained by the people within the state (there is support, yes, but dont overstate
the IMF role for example)

Moral arbitrariness?
Two nations A is poor B is rich
Is there a claim if the difference is purely down to brute luck?
Well she says no because there are no distributive institutions regarding the production and
sharing of basic collective goods

Says that the interdependence argument doesnt really work because although a worker in
a particular country is dependent on another, this isnt the kind of basic goods (physical
protection, property rights etc) that matter

Conclusion:
We should give priority to the interests of fellow citizens and we owe them unequal concern

Okay criticisms
How do we make the move to distributive justice (normally thought of in terms of goods
and things) simply by providing national security and property rights?
Well, you could say that the conditions created by these things allow for the distribution of
goods? But this would seem to allow for the interdependency argument to come into it
i.e. the distribution of goods is also determined by international trade laws and to get
round this objection she limits it to freedom from physical attack etc

So limiting it to these kinds of basic goods it doesnt really go very far in coming up with a
principle of distributive justice, it simply proves that we need to give priority to our own
citizens in as far as it helps to uphold the apparatus that frees us from certain things and
guarantees us property rights (i.e. minimum level of taxes)

But this seems to be more a theory of political obligation what we are interested in is
whether the vast inequalities are justified across borders?

ASK IAN ABOUT THIS how does she move from a theory of political obligation to one of
distributive justice, she says things like limit the amount of permissible inequalities but
does the size of inequality harm the workings of the apparatus she says is necessary? Not
really so does it really offer us any kind of answers to the question we are looking
for??????

BROCK GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN ACCOUNT

What does cosmopolitanism imply for questions like human rights, poverty etc?
The equal moral worth of people doesnt necessarily imply any account
but just as clear is the pervasive influence of national ethnic or religious identity but in
some respects it seems to stand in the way of overcoming injustice

can we adequately roll the two together?

Thesis is that one should appreciate that one is a member of a global community of human
beings as such one has responsibilities to other members of that community

Varieties of cosmopolitanism:
Moral and institutional
Moral cosmo is the ultimate unit thing
Pogge
1) Individualism
2) Universality
3) Generality

It is attractive because
- Rules out valuing people differently on race, ethnicity, gender etc

Doesnt imply the need for a world state/government

Institutional cosmo maintains that there are deep institutional changes that are needed to
reach the cosmo ideal
- But some cosmos reject this some just reckon that our global obligations are
effectively discharged but a number of solutions are available to this end
doesnt have to be institutional changes

Extreme vs moderate cosmo

Introduced by Scheffler needs to distinguish between these two things:
1. Justificatory basis of cosmo
2. Content of cosmo justice
Extreme would say that the underlying source of value is cosmopolitan and it is with respect
to cosmopolitan principles, goals or values that all other principles of morality must be
justified

Moderate can take a more pluralistic line on the source of value, admitting that some non-
cosmo goals have ultimate moral worth and this is the type that doesnt necessarily
devalue the meaning of special attachments

The difference is amplified in considering whether there is norms of justice that apply only
within individual socieites and not to the global population at large
Extreme says no
Moderate says that this may be possible

Also distinction between weak/strong cosmo i.e. conditions that are necessary for people to
live universally decent lives, vs more demanding account aimed at what is sufficient to live a
minimally decent life
Cosmo justice
Different conceptions of what it consists in which is unsurprising as there is different
concpetions of justice (util, Kantian, Aristotelian etc)
Most popular is contractarian from rawls

Reconciling cosmopolitanism with other commitments

Can it be done?
Common misconception that cosmopolitans have to eschew such attachments in favour of
some kind of notion of impartial justice that the individual must apply directly to all, no
matter where they are
But this isnt entailed by a lot of sophisticated accounts of cosmopolitanism

Recognise that for a lot of people some of their most meaningful attachment in life derive
from their allegiances to particular communities

For example cosmopolitan justice principles should govern global institutions, such that
these treat people as equals in terms of their entitlements
However once people have discharged their obligations to support the background global
institutional structure, you may then favour your compatriots so long as they dont conflict

That is, cosmopolitan ideals provide a floor not a ceiling of commitment

Allows scope for some discretionary resources and time on particular communities or
attachments important to their life plans or projects

Very strong forms of egalitarian duties might leave little room, weaker ones might leave
more

She argues that you need at least the kinds of resources etc to enjoy relevant prospects for
a good life
Combined with some kind of prioritarianism

ASK IAN
Can see how questions about owing more to citizens of your own take shape i.e. the
arguments stack up towards owing foreigners the same
With questions about the justness of nation states and other things like that do you have
to come up with theories of political obligation, egalitarianism etc. I assume not so how
can this be avoided????????

Theories of democratic equality like arneson dworkin cohen