ROMAN R.

SANTOS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public
Works and Communications and JULIAN C.
CARGULLO, respondents-appellants
G.R. No. L-15829 December 4, 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Facts:

The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of

marshland in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga
province. Called Hacienda San Esteban, it was administered
and managed by the Ayala y Cia. From the year 1860 to
about the year 1924 Ayala y Cia., devoted the hacienda to
the planting and cultivation of nipa palms from which it
gathered nipa sap or "tuba." It operated a distillery plant in
barrio San Esteban to turn nipa tuba into potable alcohol,
which was in turn manufactured into liquor.
Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda
posed as a problem. Ayala y Cia., therefore dug canals
leading towards the hacienda's interior where most of them
interlinked with each other. The canals facilitated the
gathering of tuba and the guarding and patrolling of the
hacienda by security guards called "arundines." By the
gradual process of erosion these canals acquired the
characteristics and dimensions of rivers.
In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of alcohol
production to bangus culture. It converted Hacienda San
Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web of fishponds.
To do so, it cut down the nipa palm, constructed dikes and
closed the canals criss-crossing the hacienda.

Sometime in 1925 or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of

Hacienda San Esteban to Roman Santos who also
transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In so doing, he
closed and built dikes across Sapang Malauling Maragul, Qui
orang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi.

The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San

Esteban drew complaints from residents of the surrounding
communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals caused
floods during the rainy season, and that it deprived them of
their means of transportation and fishing grounds, said
residents demanded re-opening of those canals.
Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe,
accompanied by policemen and some residents went to
Hacienda San Esteban and opened the closure dikes at
Sapang Malauling Maragul Nigui and Qui orang Silab.
Whereupon, Roman Santos filed Civil Case No. 4488 in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga which preliminarily
enjoined Mayor Yambao and others from demolishing the
dikes across the canals. The municipal officials of Macabebe
countered by filing a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No.
4527) in the same court. The Pampanga Court of First
Instance rendered judgment in both cases against Roman
Santos who immediately elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Do the streams involved in this case belong to the public
domain or to the owner of Hacienda San Esteban according
to law and the evidence submitted to the Department of
Public Works and Communications?

Ruling:
A private person may take possession of a watercourse if he
constructed the same within his property.
One and all, the evidence, oral and documentary, presented
by Roman Santos in the administrative proceedings
supports the conclusion of the lower court that the streams
involved in this case were originally man-made canals
constructed by the former owners of Hacienda San Esteban
and that said streams were not held open for public use.
This same conclusion was reached 27 years earlier by an
investigator of the Bureau of Public Works whose report and
recommendations were approved by the Director of Public
Works and submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications.
The streams in question were artificially made, hence of
private ownership.
Pursuant to Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866, and Article 408(5) of the Spanish Civil Code,
channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of
estates over which they flow. The channels, therefore, of
the streams in question, which may be classified creeks,
belong to the owners of Hacienda San Esteban.

With the exception of Sapang Cansusu, being a natural

stream and a continuation of the Cansusu River, admittedly
a public stream, belongs to the public domain. Its closure
therefore by the predecessors of Roman Santos was illegal.
All the other streams, being artificial and devoted
exclusively for the use of the hacienda owner and his
personnel, are declared of private ownership. Hence, the
dams across them should not he ordered demolished as
public nuisances.
 MANUEL ALMAGRO, ELIZABETH ALMAGRO,
Petitioners, versus
SALVACION C. KWAN, WILLIAM C. KWAN, VICTORIA
C. KWAN,, JOSE A. ARBAS, and CECILIA C. KWAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 175806/175810/ Oct. 20, 2010
CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

Respondents are the successors- in- interest of the Lot No.

6278-M, a 17,181 square meter parcel of land located at
Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental. On 18 September 1996,
they filed with the MTC an action for recovery of possession
and damages against the occupants, on of which are the
Petitioners. MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the remaining dry portion of Lot No. 6278-M has
become foreshore land and should be returned to the public
domain.

Respondents appealed to the RTC. The RTC conducted

ocular inspections of subject lot on two separate dates: on 5
October 2001 during low tide and on 15 October 2001 when
the high tide registered 1.5 meters. RTC concluded that the
small portion of respondents property which remains as dry
land is not within the scope of the well-settled definition of
foreshore and foreshore land; the small dry portion is not
adjacent to the sea; thus Respondent have the right to
recover possession of the remaining small dry portion of the
subject property in question. CA affirmed said decision.

Issue:

WON the disputed portion of Lot is no longer private land

but has become foreshore land and is now part of the public
domain?

Held:

The disputed land is not foreshore land. To qualify as

foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between
the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.[The land's proximity to the
waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore
land.
Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court
held that although the two corners of the subject lot adjoins
the sea, the lot cannot be considered as foreshore land
since it has not been proven that the lot was covered by
water during high tide.

Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed

land remained dry even during high tide. Indeed, all the
evidence supports the conclusion that the disputed portion
of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore land but remains private
land owned by respondents.
 BINALAY VS. MANALO
G.R. No. 92161 March 18, 1991
FELICIANO, J.:

A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not the

alluvial process contemplated in Art. 457. The accumulation
of the soil deposits must be slow and hardly imperceptible in
order for the riparian owner to acquire ownership thereof.
Also, the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to
the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast).

FACTS
Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by
Judge Taccad from 2 different people (the latters daughter
and from an earlier purchaser). These lots were later
consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45 hectares. The lot
was beside the Cagayan River, which, due to flooding,
would place a portion of the land underwater during the
rainy season (September to December). On sunny days,
however, the land would be dried up for the entire dry
season (January to August). When a survey of the land was
conducted on a rainy month, a portion of the land that
Manalo bought was then underwater and was thus left
unsurveyed and excluded from Lot 307.

The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to

north, forks at a certain point to form two braches (western
and eastern) and then unites at the other end, further north,
to form a narrower strip of land. The eastern branch of the
river cuts through Lot 307, and is flooded during the rainy
season. The unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the
bed of the eastern branch. Note that the fork exists only
during the rainy season while the island/elongated strip of
land formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry and
perfect for cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its
ordinary depth. The strip of land in the middle of the fork
totaled 22.7 hectares and was labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821
is directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated by the eastern
branch of the rivers fork.

Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of

accretion to the submerged portion of the land to which it is
adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess the Lot
821, on the other hand, insist that they own it. They occupy
the other edges of the lot along the river bank (i.e. the
fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other
agricultural products) and also cultivate the western strip
during the summer.

Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both

dismissed. Later on, he filed a complaint for quieting of title,
possession, and damages against petitioner. The trial court
and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot 821 and
Lot 307 cannot be considered separate and distinct from
each other. They reasoned that when the land dries up for
the most part of the year, the two are connected. [Note:
The CA applied the ruling in Govt of the Phil Islands vs.
Colegio de San Jose, which was actually inappropriate
because the subject matter in this case was a lake so that
the definition of a bed was different.]

ISSUE:

Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion

RULING:

No.
The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of
the heavy rains that cause the highest ordinary level of
waters of the Cagayan River during the rainy season. The
depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered
property of public domain.
The SC observed the following:
a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct
examination depict the depressed portion as a river bed.
The dried up portion had dike-like slopes (around 8m) on
both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are
vertical and very prominent.
b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo
bought the land. It was called Rio Muerte de Cagayan.
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land
because article 420 of the civil code states that rivers are
property of public dominion. The word river includes the
running waters, the bed, and the banks. [The seller never
actually owned that part of the land since it was public
property]
d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the
land he actually bought. It is difficult to suppose that such a
sizable area could have been brought about by accretion.
More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457
were not satisfied. These are: 1) that the deposition of the
soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea);
and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent
to the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast). The accretion
shouldve been attached to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its
ownership. BUT, the claimed accretion lies on the bank of
the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite it
across the river. Aside from that, the dike-like slopes which
were very steep may only be formed by a sudden and
forceful action like flooding. The steep slopes could not have
been formed by the river in a slow and gradual manner.
 Hilario v. City of Manila
GR No. L-19570 April 27, 1967
Jun28
Bengzon JP (J):

Facts:

Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of

land around 49 hectares in area (Barrio Guinayang, San
Mateo, Rizal). Upon his death this property was inherited by
his son, Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of title
was issued. During the lifetime of plaintiffs father, the
Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San
Mateo River.3 To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo
and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the
northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall
built on the northern side. For years, these safeguards
served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great and
extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire
place including the neighboring barrios and municipalities.

The River destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its

original bed and meandered into the Hilario estate,
segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular piece of land.
The disputed area is on the eastern side of this lenticular
strip which now stands between the old riverbed site and
the new course. In 1945, the US Army opened a sand and
gravel plant within the premises, and started scraping,
excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the
nearby areas along the River.

The operations eventually extended northward into the

strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages was filed
with the US War Department by Luis Hidalgo, the then
administrator of Dr. Hilarios estate. The US Army paid. In
1947, the plant was turned over to herein
defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its
operations.

On 22 October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint for

injunction and damages against the defendants City
Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the Director of
Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-charge of
the plant. Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty.
Maximo Calalang were respectively allowed to join the
litigation as intervenors; as per issue of fees and penalties
for materials (sand and gravel) extracted. On 14 March
1954, defendants filed a petition for injunction against
plaintiff and intervenor Calalang in the same case, alleging
that the latter have fenced off the disputed area in
contravention of an agreement had between the latter and
the Director of Public Works wherein the defendants were
allowed to continue their operations but subject to the final
outcome of the pending suit.

On 13 May 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint and

impleaded as additional defendants the City of Manila, the
Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, and Engr. Eulogio Sese, the
new Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also converted
his claim to one purely for damages directed against the
City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in
the amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials
taken since 1949, as well as those to be extracted
therefrom until defendants stop their operations. On 21
December 1956, the lower court rendered its decision,
ordering the City of Manila and Director of Public Works to
pay Hilario in solidum the sum of P376,989.60 as cost of
gravel and sand extracted from the plaintiffs land, plus
costs; and ordering the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal to
reimburse intervenor Calalang of P36.80 representing
gravel fees illegally collected.

None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this

decision and they all sought a reconsideration of the same.
On August 30, 1957, the lower court resolved the motions
to reconsider with an order, holding that the 2/5 portion of
the area in controversy to Hilario, and dismissing the case
against the Bureau of Public Works insofar as money claims
are concerned without prejudice to Hilario taking action
against proper party in such claim. Hilario and Calalang filed
a second motion for reconsideration, which the lower court
denied. Hence, the appeal.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision and orders

appealed from, and entered another judgment to the effect
that the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, and
his agent and employees, are absolved of liability from
extracting materials from subject property (of public
domain); and the portion within the strip of land question
declared not part of public domain and confirmed as part of
Hilarios private property. No Costs.
Manila International Airport Authority vs. CAG.R. No.
155650 July 20, 2006
 CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

The Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due

to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of
the amount.

Now when MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the

officers of Paranaque city threatened to levy and subject to
auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which they did.

MIAA then sought for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)

from the CA but failed to do so within the 60 days
reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed.

MIAA then sought for the TRO with the Supreme Court a day
before the public auction, MIAA was granted with the TRO
but unfortunately the TRO was received by the Paranaque
City officers 3 hours after the public auction. See what I
told you? See how original this case was? I mean what on
earth was MIAA doing?? Talk about all the right moves.

MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title
of the land and building are with MIAA still the ownership is
with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends
that it is an instrumentality of the government and as such
exempted from real estate tax. So in other words, MIAA's
bone of contention and defense lie solely on the principle
that the land and buildings of MIAA are of public
dominion and therefore cannot be subjected
to levy and auction sale.

Let's see if it will hold.

On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim that

MIAA is a GOCC (government owned and controlled
corporation) therefore not exempted to real estate tax.

ISSUE:

Whether or not:

1. MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a

government owned and controlled corporationand as such
exempted from tax.

2. The land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public

dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and
auction sale.

RULING:

1. Under the Local government code, (GOCCs) government

owned and controlled corporation are NOT exempted from
real estate tax.

MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation,

for to become one MIAA should either be a stock or non
stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its
capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non stock
corporation since it has no members.

MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with

corporate powers and government functions. Under the civil
code, property may either be under public dominion or
private ownership. Those under public dominion are owned
by the State and are utilized for public use, public service
and for the development of national wealth. When
properties under public dominion cease to be for public use
and service, they form part of the patrimonial property of
the State.

2. The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are
part of the public dominion. Since the airport is devoted for
public use, for the domestic and international travel and
transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support
of its operation and for regulation and does not change the
character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of the
public dominion.

As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of

MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject them to
levy and public auction is contrary to public policy. Unless
the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport
land and buildings from public use, these properties remain
to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As long as the
land and buildings are for public use the ownership is with
the Republic of the Philippines