[G.R. No. 117056.

February 24, 1998]

ABD OVERSEAS MANPOWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
MARS INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER, INC. and MOHMINA MACARAYA, Respondents.
Can an accredited transferee recruitment agent of a foreign employer/recruitment office be held liable under
POEA Rules and Regulations (POEA Rules) for the illegal dismissal of an overseas worker who filed the case prior to
the transferee agents accreditation?
In December 1989, respondent Mohmina Macaraya applied for employment as a dressmaker with respondent
Mars International Manpower, Inc. (MARS). After paying MARS the amount of P12,000.00 as processing or
recruitment fee, she signed a two-year employment contract whereby she would earn a monthly salary of US$250.00.
Without her knowledge, however, MARS submitted to the POEA an overseas contract worker information sheet stating
that she would be employed as a domestic helper for two years with a monthly salary of US$200.00.
On January 30, 1990, Macaraya was deployed to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Her employer took the only copy of her
employment contract and never returned it to her. She was made to work as a domestic helper over her objections and
in violation of the contract she signed in Manila. After working for three months and thirteen days, Macaraya was
dismissed by her employer, paid merely 700.00 Saudi riyals, and repatriated to the Philippines on May 13, 1990.
Immediately upon her arrival in the Philippines, Macaraya filed with the POEA a complaint [1] for illegal dismissal
and salary underpayment/ nonpayment against MARS, M.S. Al Babtain Recruitment Office and Times Surety and
Insurance Co. Later, in her position paper, she included claims for overtime pay and attorneys fees. MARS filed an
answer to the complaint on July 5, 1990, through its president and general manager, Adelaida Manabat.
After several hearings, with hopes of an amicable settlement getting more remote, the case was submitted for
decision. On January 9, 1992, MARS filed a manifestation and motion praying that petitioner ABD Overseas
Manpower Corporation be impleaded in the case, because the latter apparently became the accredited recruitment
agency in this country of M.S. Al Babtain Recruitment Office on September 8, 1990. Thus, after being summoned,
petitioner filed an answer alleging affirmative and special defenses, notably, that MARS had no cause of action against
it. Petitioner also filed a cross-claim against MARS which the latter never answered.
On January 12, 1993, the POEA, ruling that Macaraya had been illegally dismissed as both her foreign employer
and recruitment agency failed to prove that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause, rendered a decision,[2] the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant Mohmina Macaraya and against respondents
ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation and M.S. Al Babtain Recruitment Office, ordering the latter to pay, jointly and
severally, to complainant the following amounts:

1. FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN & 39/100 US DOLLARS (US$4,113.39) or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency at the time of payment, representing the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of
complainants contract; and

2. SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX & 71/100 US DOLLARS (US$686.71) less SEVEN HUNDRED SAUDI RIYALS
(SR 700.00), or its equivalent in Philippine Currency, at the time of actual payment, representing the salary
differentials.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

The Complaint and the Cross-claim against Mars International Manpower Inc. is (sic) likewise dismissed for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

On the issue of whether or not petitioner should be liable with her foreign employer for the monetary awards, the
POEA, relying on Section 6, Rule I, Book III, of the POEA Rules, declared that:

(The r)ecords undisputably show that the foreign principal and now co-respondent M.S. Al Babtain Recruitment Office
of Saudi Arabia is presently accredited to ABD which is valid up to 06 August 1992. This fact was established by a
Certification dated 07 November 1991 issued by the Accreditation Branch, this Administration.

The Office is convinced that respondent ABD was not fully aware of the import and consequences of transfer of
accreditation it entered into and between the other respondents, which transfer was duly registered with and approved
by the Accreditation Branch. But ignorance of the same does not serve as a valid excuse in defeating its liability or
obligation to the complainant.

As a consequence, the transferee agency, ABD, now assumes full and complete responsibility to the contractual
obligation of the principal, M.S. Al Babtain Recruitment Office(,) to herein complainant originally recruited and
processed by the former agency, MARS.[3]
 On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, petitioner prayed for the reversal of the POEAs decision
and the invalidation of Section 6, Rule I, Book III of the POEA Rules, citing the rule against unjust enrichment. Thus,
it alleged:

14.1 Macaraya was deployed January 30, 1990 by MARS; she stayed and worked in Riyadh only for three (3) months
and 13 days and was repatriated on May 13, 1990. She filed the complaint against MARS on May 14, 1990. Hence,
her cause of action ripened and/or accrued as of that early date as against MARS, her placement agency. Further, it is
significant to state here that MARS filed its answer to the complaint on July 5, 1990 wherein it made admissions and
averred its affirmative defenses by way of confession and avoidance of liability. How then could ABD be made to
`assume full and complete responsibility to all contractual obligations under the aforecited Rule when the accreditation
of M.S. Al Babtain in its favor was made only on September 3, 1990 per POEA records, and was only `impleaded in
this case by motion of MARS on January 9, 1992?

14.2 When MARS filed its answer on July 5, 1990, long before ABD was made a party respondent, it caused a joinder
of issues in the case. Under the well-settled principle of estoppel, it cannot (after filing such answer) now be heard to
say one and a half years later (on January 9, 1992 when it impleaded ABD in the case) that ABD must `be summoned
to answer for the claims of herein Complainant. x x x. That late, and in filing its answer to the complaint, MARS is
certainly estopped from shifting to ABD whatever liability it had under the contract it entered into with Macaraya, or
for any violations thereof by its principal, or any POEA rules/regulations - - which all accrued/occurred when
accreditation was NOT yet transferred to ABD.Ignoring these facts/ circumstances constitute a clear case of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Hon. Administrator.[4] (Underscoring supplied)

By resolution dated March 21, 1994,[5] the NLRC dismissed the appeal. Petitioners motion for reconsideration met
the same fate on August 10, 1994.[6] Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner alleges that in the assailed resolution of March 21, 1994, the NLRC merely quoted the findings of the
POEA Administrator and concluded that it should assume full and complete responsibility to the contractual obligation
of the foreign principal to Macaraya. Petitioner questions the failure of the NLRC to make categorical rulings on the
issues it had raised in its memorandum on appeal and, therefore, the NLRC should be charged with evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law. MARS had allegedly already answered the complaint
when petitioner became the transferee recruitment agency. Petitioner was impleaded in the case one-and-a-half years
after the filing of MARS answer to the complaint. Hence, the failure of MARS to prove the legality of Macarayas
dismissal from employment should not mean that the same burden should fall upon petitioner who was not even privy
to Macarayas employment contract. If it were to be held liable for the monetary awards in favor of Macaraya, then it
would result in undue enrichment on the part of MARS. It must be noted that none of these allegations was mentioned
in the March 21, 1994, resolution.
Thus, after stating the facts that are clearly culled from the POEA decision, the questioned resolution of March 21,
1994, quotes the discussion of the POEA on the liabilities for monetary awards of petitioner and its foreign
principal. Consequently, in the nine-page resolution, the NLRC merely contributed two pages, including its
conclusions, viz.:

After a careful perusal of the records of the case, We agree with the POEA Administrator findings and conclusion
th(a)t the transferee agency, ABD must assume full and complete responsibility to the contractual obligation of the
principal, M.S. Al Babtain Recruitment Office to the complainant who was recruited by MARS.

Section 6, Rule I, Book III of the POEA Rules and Regulation provides:[7] x x x

It is clear from the aforementioned provision of the POEA Rules and Regulation that the transferee agency shall
assume full and complete responsibility to all contractual obligations of the principals to its workers originally
recruited and processed by its former agency.

In the case at bar, respondent ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation(,) being the transferee agency(,) must assume
(the) full liability of the principal, M.S. Al Babtain(,) to the complainant originally recruited and process(ed) by its
former agency(,) Mars International Manpower Inc.

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the POEA Administrator.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion for Reconsideration [8] is dismissed for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Section 13, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides as follows:

SEC. 13. Form of Decision/Resolution/Order. The Decision/ Resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the findings of
facts, issues and conclusions of law on which it is based and the relief granted, if any. If the decision or resolution
involves monetary awards, the same shall contain the specific amount awarded as of the date the decision is rendered.
 This provision of the Rules is obviously in consonance with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution providing
that (n)o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. Interpreting this constitutional provision, in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,[9] the Court said:

It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation
of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is
rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.

In this case, the NLRC left petitioner in the dark by its failure to discuss why the facts it pointed out in its
memorandum on appeal would not affect the unqualified application of Section 6, Rule I, Book III of the POEA
Rules. It is possible that the NLRC fully believed that said rule should be applied literally. This should not, however,
have given premium to brevity in its resolution[10] to the point that the very underpinnings for a partys appeal to it
would be completely disregarded and left unresolved. As this Court declared, (b)revity is doubtless an admirable trait,
but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance.[11] The need for a clear dissertation on the issues raised on
appeal was underscored in Francisco v. Permskul.[12]In said case, although the Court upheld the validity of Section 40
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 120, allowing the rendition of memorandum decisions, especially in appealed cases, it
nevertheless stated that:

Despite the convenience afforded by the memorandum decision, it is still desirable that the appellate judge exert some
effort in restating in his own words the findings of fact of the lower court and presenting his own interpretation of the
law instead of merely parroting the language of the court a quo as if he cannot do any better. There must be less
intellectual indolence and more pride of authorship in the writing of a decision, especially if it comes from an appellate
court.

It ill becomes an appellate judge to write his rulings with a pair of scissors and a pot of paste as if he were a mere
researcher. He is an innovator, not an echo. The case usually becomes progressively simpler as it passes through the
various levels of appeal and many issues become unimportant or moot and drop along the way. The appellate judge
should prune the cluttered record to make the issues clearer. He cannot usually do this by simply mimicking the lower
court. He must use his own perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the law. No
less importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his judgment. And in doing so, he should also guard
against torpidity lest his pronouncements excite no more fascination than a technical tract on the values of horse
manure as a fertilizer. A little style will help liven the opinion trapped in the tortuous lexicon of the law with all its
whereases and wherefores. A judicial decision does not have to be a bore.

We should add that much more than being stylish, a decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal,
should directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless. It is immaterial that the NLRC
is a quasi-judicial body and not a regular court. In any controversy, the appellant needs enlightenment on the issues that
befuddle him.Accordingly, assuming that petitioner should indeed be liable to Macaraya, the NLRC should have
discussed why Section 6, Rule I, Book III of the POEA Rules should be applied notwithstanding the factual
circumstances pointed out by petitioner. As it was, petitioners theory that the case does not merit the application of
Section 6, Rule I, Book III of the POEA Rules was merely glossed over, such that it was left with no other recourse but
to file a motion for reconsideration and, after its denial, the instant petition.
Worth stressing is the fact that petitioner does not question the validity of the monetary awards to Macaraya. The
basic issue here is: As between petitioner and MARS, who should be held liable for such awards? This can only be
resolved by interpreting Section 6, Rule I, Book III of the POEA Rules which states as follows:

SEC. 6. Transfer of Accreditation. The accreditation of a principal or a project may be transferred to another agency
provided that transfer shall not involve any diminution of wages and benefits of workers.

The transferee agency in these instances shall comply with the requirements for accreditation and shall assume full and
complete responsibility for all contractual obligations of the principals to its workers originally recruited and processed
by the former agency. Prior to the transfer of accreditation, the Administration shall notify the previous agency and
principal of such application.

A cursory reading of this provision lends the impression that an accreditation transferee assumes the contractual
responsibility of the transferor under all circumstances, without qualification. We find, however, that a strict
application of said proviso in this case may result in a grave injustice to petitioner which became liable only when it
stepped into the shoes, as it were, of its predecessor after the issues had been met in the illegal dismissal case filed
against the latter, and after the POEA had failed to discharge its duty of deciding the simple illegal dismissal case with
dispatch.
The rule on transfer of accreditation was prescribed under the general policies of the POEA to establish the
environment conducive to the continued operations of legitimate, responsible and professional private agencies and to
afford protection to Filipino workers and their families, promote their interests and safeguard their welfare. [13] In line
with these policies, Book III of the same rules provides for the accreditation of a principal or any foreign person,
partnership or corporation hiring Filipino workers through an agency.[14] Principals may be accredited in this country
only through licensed local agencies.[15] A land-based principal shall be accredited to only one agency but the POEA
may grant accreditation to a second agent as may be deemed necessary. [16] In the same manner, the accreditation of a
principal may be transferred to another agency under the aforequoted Section 6, Rule I, Book III of the POEA Rules.
In the case at bar, petitioner became the accredited recruitment agency of the principal, M.S. Al Babtain
Recruitment Office, on September 3, 1990, after MARS had filed on July 5, 1990, its answer to Macarayas complaint
for illegal dismissal. Petitioner got involved only on January 9, 1992, when it was impleaded in the case upon MARS
motion. The case having been submitted for decision long before it became a party, petitioner naturally filed an answer
alleging its own claims against MARS.
Under the Rules of Court which were then in effect and applicable to the case at bar, when MARS failed to file an
answer to petitioners cross-claim, it should have been declared in default with respect to such claim.[17] In labor cases,
however, technical rules of procedure are not applicable,[18] but may apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character,
for instance, when there is a need to attain substantial justice and an expeditious, practical and convenient solution to a
labor problem.[19] Hence, when the POEA opted to overlook petitioners cross-claim against MARS, petitioner
was denied substantial justice.
MARS impleaded petitioner in the case after it had been submitted for decision and one-and-a-half years after it
had filed its answer. During this hiatus, the case lay dormant in the POEA. It should be noted that petitioner became the
accredited recruitment agency on September 3, 1990, two months after MARS had filed its answer to the
complaint. The POEAs inaction ad interim provided MARS with an opportunity to escape liability.
Basic principles of justice and equity, however, dictate that MARS should not be totally cleared of its liability to
Macaraya under the peculiar circumstances of this case. Section 6, Rule II, Book III of the POEA Rules may not be
used as a shield against liability by a recruitment agency that has been substituted by a foreign principal as its local
recruitment agency after it has clearly incurred liability in favor of an overseas worker. After all, the POEA is
presumed by law to have intended right and justice to prevail[20] in promulgating its rules. Consequently, considering
that it was MARS with whom Macaraya entered into a contract and that it had been accorded due process at the
proceedings before the POEA, it is but meet and just that MARS be the one to be held accountable for her claims.
In so ruling, the Court is not in any way invalidating Section 6, Rule II, Book III of the POEA Rules. The
presumption of its validity remains. Its application in this case should, however, be an exception to the rule. Petitioner
shall pay Macaraya the amount due her under the assailed POEA decision, without prejudice to its right to be
reimbursed by MARS under the provision of the Civil Code that (w)hoever pays for another may demand from the
debtor what he has paid.[21]
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the NLRC dated March 21, 1994, and August 10,
1994, are hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that respondent Mars International Manpower, Inc. shall
reimburse petitioner ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation the amount awarded therein to respondent Mohmina
Macaraya. This Decision is immediately executory.No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 153942 June 29, 2005
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., petitioner, vs.
NOE LEVANTINO, IDG HUMAN RESOURCES, INC.,
(Formerly IDG TRADING AND GENERAL SERVICES, INC.), respondents.

Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. (Sameer) is engaged in the recruitment and placement of
Philippine Overseas Contract Workers, and duly licensed for that purpose by the Department of Labor and
Employment and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).1

A complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and illegal deductions was filed by respondent Noe
Levantino (Levantino). Hired and deployed by Sameer for and in behalf of its foreign principal, Arabian Fal Co., on 20
July 1994,2 Levantinos contract provided that his office employment was for twelve (12) months and fixed his basic
monthly salary at Two Hundred Seventy-Seven US Dollars (US$277.00). However, upon his arrival at the job site on
21 July 1994, Levantino was made to sign another contract of employment, this time with the basic monthly salary of
Six Hundred Seventy-Nine Saudi Rial (SR679.00), plus One Hundred Eighty Saudi Rial (SR180.00) as food
allowance.

On 4 January 1995, barely six (6) months after the start of his employment, Levantino was terminated by the foreign
employer and subsequently repatriated to the Philippines. He filed on 7 February 1995 the aforementioned complaint
with the POEA.

Sameer filed a third-party complaint against IDG Human Resources, Inc. (IDG), alleging that IDG should be held
liable for the claims of Levantino since Sameers accreditation for foreign principal, Arabian Fal Co., had already been
transferred to IDG pursuant to an affidavit of assumption of responsibility and quitclaims.3

The Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr., in a Decision dated 22 September 1997, ruled that Levantino was
terminated for just or authorized cause, the employee having been unable to rebut the allegations raised against him of
poor habits, disobedience of superiors, and low productivity.4 He concluded, however, that Levantino was not paid his
basic salary in accordance with his POEA approved contract of employment of Two Hundred Seventy-Seven US
Dollars (US$277.00), and illegal deductions were made by the foreign employer from the basic monthly salary for the
food allowance. Thus, the Labor Arbiter held that Levantino was entitled to a wage differential of Five Hundred
Seventy-Five US Dollars and Sixty Cents (US$575.60), and attorneys fees of Fifty-Seven US Dollars and Fifty-Six
Cents (US$57.56). The Labor Arbiter likewise held that Sameer and IDG were jointly and severally liable to pay
Levantino, citing the case of Mars International Manpower, Inc. v. NLRC.5 The dispositive portion reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondents Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. and IDG Trading & General
Services are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally complainant herein the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-
THREE US DOLLARS and 16/100 (US$633.16) or its peso equivalent as discussed above.

SO ORDERED.6

Having received a copy of the decision on 17 October 1997, Sameer had until 28 October 1997 to perfect the appeal,
27 October falling on a Sunday. It filed its notice of appeal and a memorandum of appeal on 27 October 1997, along
with a motion for extension of time to file a surety-appeal bond, alleging that it was still arranging for the issuance of
such with the bonding company. It was only on 3 November 1997 that it filed the appeal bond.7 Thus, the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) First Division, in an Order dated 16 June 1998, dismissed the appeal for failure
to perfect it within the ten (10)-day reglementary period. The Court of Appeals Sixteenth Division affirmed the
dismissal by the NLRC; hence, the present petition.

Before this Court, Sameer argues that since it subsequently submitted the appeal bond, the filing of the bond should
retroact to the date of the filing of the motion for reduction, which had been filed within the reglementary period to
perfect the appeal. It characterizes the appeal bond requirement as procedural, and urges that the case be decided on the
merits. It also claims that its late filing of the appeal bond does not damage or prejudice Levantino or the government,
as its late filing complies with the purpose of the law to guarantee the monetary award in favor of the plaintiff once it
becomes final and executory.8

These arguments aside, it is indisputable that the Labor Code is explicit in providing that the appeal from a decision of
the Labor Arbiter must be perfected within ten (10) days, and that such appeal is perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond.

ART 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or
orders. . .

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to Sameers suggestion, the appeal bond requirement is not merely procedural but jurisdictional, for without
it, the NLRC does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.9 Applying the express provisions of the law, the NLRC did
not acquire jurisdiction over Sameers appeal within the ten (10)-day reglementary period to perfect the appeal, for the
appeal bond was filed was filed six (6) days after the lapse of the reglementary period.

True enough, the Court has recognized leeway in the relaxation of this requirement, and even the NLRC Rules of
Procedure authorizes, upon justifiable causes, the reduction of the appeal bond. Yet the overpowering legislative intent
of Article 223 remains a strict application of the appeal bond requirement as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal
and as a burden imposed on the employer. As the Court held recently, thus:

The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the
employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond. The word "only" makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or
surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected.10

Even the NLRC Rules of Procedure plainly expects that the employer submit the entire cash or surety bond within the
reglementary period, even if there may be cause for its subsequent reduction, to wit:

RULE VI. APPEALS

....

Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. (a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as
provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the
posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a
statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the
other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite aforestated shall not stop the running of the
period for perfecting an appeal.

....

Section 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing
Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond, which shall be in effect until final disposition of the case, issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of
damages and attorneys fees.

The employer, his counsel, as well as the bonding company, shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that
the surety bond posted is genuine.

The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond.
The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal.11(Emphasis
supplied.)

The provisions being as they are, we cannot fault the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion, or the Court of Appeals
with reversible error of law in refusing to take cognizance of Sameers belatedly perfected appeal.

There is nothing peculiar or extraordinary in the factual milieu that obtains reversal of the assailed decisions. Had
Sameer been inclined to diligently comply with the requisites of appeal, as plainly stated in the Labor Code, it could
have, as early as 17 October 1998, undertaken steps to procure the appeal bond. There is nothing in the period between
17 October 1998 and 28 October 1998 that suggests innate difficulty in obtaining the said bond. In fact, Sameer, who
submitted the bond only on 3 November 1998, probably incurred further delay in submitting the appeal bond due to the
early November holidays, though such fact is of no moment considering that these holidays came only after the lapse
of the reglementary period.

Nor should have there been eminent difficulty in obtaining the said bond, considering that the amount of the monetary
judgment, Six Hundred Thirty-Three U.S. Dollars and Sixteen Cents (US$633.16), is relatively miniscule. It is not
even expected that Sameer itself expends from its own funds the entire amount of the monetary judgment for the appeal
bond. As the Court noted in Biogenerics Marketing and Research Corporation v. NLRC:12

. . . The mandatory filing of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is evident from the aforequoted provision that the
appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond. It is not an excuse that the over 2 million
award is too much for a small business enterprise, like the petitioner company, to shoulder. The law does not require
its outright payment, but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the
appeal fail. What petitioners have to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium for such
bond.13 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1.zw+
Sameer stressed that it already had a total of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (300,000.00) posted as bonds with the
POEA, in conformity with POEA Rules and Regulations. Yet to the Courts mind, the appellate courts comments on
this point are sufficiently responsive:

Petitioner lays emphasis on its compliance with the POEA Rules and Regulations with regard to the posting of the cash
and surety bonds and escrow deposit which amounted to 350,000.00. However, while it is true that the cash and
surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims
against the employer, the POEA can also go against these bonds for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its
license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing the POEA) and the POEA
Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur. Thus, the bonds posted with the POEA are
not limited to answer for monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated.14

The remaining arguments posed by Sameer pertain to the merits of the case, i.e., on whether it could be held jointly and
severally liable with IDG considering that it was no longer the agent of the foreign employer. We do not wish to
belabor any discussion on this point, considering that it has passed evaluation on three prior levels of review; but as
with the Court of Appeals, we agree that such ruling is supported by jurisprudence. In support of the holding on
Sameers liability, the Labor Arbiter cited the Courts ruling in ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. v. NLRC.15 We have
reviewed the citation, and find its application to the present case seemly. The Court therein accorded premium to the
fact that it had been the previous local recruitment agency of the foreign employer who had contracted with the
complainant therein, and that the POEA Rules on the assumption by the transferee agency of the contractual
obligations of the principal cannot be used as a shield against liability. Similarly in this case, it was Sameer, not IDG,
which had contracted with Levantino, and guaranteed the wages which were not eventually paid to the employer, and it
does not run contrary to justice that Sameer be absolved from liability to Levantino.

However, whatever merit Sameers case may have had, it cannot escape the fact that it inexcusably failed to perfect its
appeal within the mandated reglementary period, and thus should suffer the consequences for such failure. We cannot
respond with alacrity to every clamor of injustice and bend the rules to placate a vociferous protestor crying and
claiming to be a victim of a wrong. It is only in highly meritorious cases that this Court opts not to strictly apply the
rules and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done.16 This is not one of those cases.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 169158 July 1, 2015
PENTAGON INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, FILOMENO V. MADRIO, LUISITO G. RUBIANO, JDA INTER-PHIL. MARITIME
SERVICES CORPORATION, Respondent.

We review the decision promulgated on May 27, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) annulled and set aside the
resolutions dated June 30, 2003 and December 14, 2004 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC)2declaring respondent JDA Inter-Phil Maritime Services (JDA Inter-Phil) as the manning agency of Baleen
Marine Pte. Ltd. (Baleen Marine) liable to pay respondents Filomeno V. Madrio and Luisito G. Rubiano the total
amount of US$31,254.65 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment.

Antecedents

Pentagon International Shipping Services, Inc. (Pentagon), a domestic corporation,3 was a private manning agency
licensed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to engage in the recruitment of seafarers to
service the crewing and personnel management needs of shipping companies accredited to it. Respondent JDA Inter-
Phil, also a domestic corporation, was similarly engaged in the recruitment of seafarers.

On March 27, 1998, Pentagon hired respondents Madrio and Rubiano as chief officer and second engineer,
respectively, in behalf of its foreign principal, Baleen Marine, a corporation based in Singapore. When their 10-month
contract expired, they were repatriated to the Philippines.4 Alleging non-payment and underpayment of wages, and
claiming damages and attorney's fees, they separately brought claims against Pentagon and the owners and managers of
Baleen Marine on January 13, 2000 and January 31, 2000,5 stating that Pentagon and Baleen Marine had reduced their
monthly gross salary by 20% without the prior approval by the POEA; and that Pentagon and Baleen Marine had not
paid their salaries from November 1, 1998 until their repatriation on March 24, 1999.

Pentagon denied liability, countering that it had ceased to be the manning agency of Baleen Marine effective October
1, 1998;6 that on June 25, 1998, its Executive Vice-President, Meynardo Bugia, Jr., had met with Baleen Marine in
Singapore to notify the latter that it had been meanwhile appointed by Neptank Bunkering Services Pte., Ltd. as its
exclusive local manning agency; that as one of the conditions of its appointment, it was to immediately sever its
manning contract with Baleen Marine; and that on October 9, 1998, Baleen Marine had appointed JDA Inter-Phil as its
new local agent for Baleen Marine's vessels NP Trader No. 3 and NP Prima. 7 On its part, JDA Inter-Phil insisted that
although it had applied with the POEA for the transfer and accreditation of Baleen Marine' s vessels in its favor, it
withdrew the application and did not execute an affidavit of assumption and responsibility as required; that,
consequently, Pentagon continued to be jointly and severally liable with Baleen Marine for the money claims of
Madrio and Rubiano.8

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Pentagon, declaring JDA Inter-Phil jointly and solidarily liable with Baleen
Marine, citing the decision of Labor Arbiter Pati in Abrazado, et al. v. Pentagon International Shipping Services, et al.
and Pentagon International Shipping Services v. Baleen Marine PTE, Ltd., and/or Nicor Petroleum PTE, Ltd. that had
also involved both Pentagon and JDA Inter-Phil and their principal Baleen Marine.

However, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on December 26, 20029 on the ground that the NLRC's First Division
had overturned Labor Arbiter Pati's decision in Abrazado, et al. v. Pentagon International Shipping Services, et al. and
Pentagon International Shipping Services v. Baleen Marine PTE, Ltd., and/or Nicor Petroleum PTE, Ltd..10

Upon Pentagon's motion for reconsideration, the NLRC reversed itself and ruled in favor of Pentagon.

Subsequently, IDA Inter-Phil moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on December 14, 2004.11

JDA Inter-Phil brought a petition for certiorari in the CA, with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or
writ of preliminary injunction. The CA granted the TRO applied for on February 9, 2005.12

On May 27, 2005, the CA rendered its assailed decision,13 viz.:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the Resolutions of public respondent NLRC, dated June 30, 2003 and December
14, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.14

Issues

In its appeal, Pentagon posits as follows:

A THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ABSOLVING PRIVATE RESPONDENT JDA OF THE LIABILITIES
NOTWITHSTANDING THE AGREEMENT DATED OCTOBER 9, 1998.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THE APPARENT BAD FAITH OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT JDA WHEN IT DELIBERATELY AND MALICIOUSLY REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT DATED
OCTOBER 9, 1998.15
Pentagon assails the CA' s overturning of the congruent findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to the effect that it
could not be held solidarily liable with Baleen Marine for the money claims and other benefits of Madrio and Rubiano,
insisting that the minutes of the October 9, 1998 meeting partook of the nature of the agreement required by law to
effectively transfer the agency and the corresponding liability to IDA Inter-Phil.

In contrast, IDA Inter-Phil contends that it could not be held liable for the money claims and other benefits of Madrio
and Rubiano because it had withdrawn its application in the POEA.

It appears on record that neither Pentagon nor IDA Inter-Phil disputed the money claims and other benefits of Madrio
and Rubiano; instead, they were simply passing the liability for the claims to each other.

The pivotal issue is whether there was a valid substitution of the manning agent from Pentagon to IDA Inter-Phil.

Ruling of the Court

We deny the petition for review for its lack of merit.

To determine the pivotal issue, we review the guidelines set by law in the accreditation of a principal by a manning
agency.1wphi1 Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment states the following:

Section 2. Requirements for Accreditation. An agency applying for the accreditation of its principals or projects shall
submit the following:

xxxx

b. For a Manning Agency for its Principals

(1) Authenticated special power of attorney and manning agreement;
(2) Crew complement and wages;
(3) List of vessels and their particulars; and
(4) Other documents which the Administration may find necessary.

Section 3 Verification or Authentication of Documents. Whenever required and determined by the Secretary, verification or
authentication of documents for accreditation of principals or projects shall be undertaken by the following:

xxxx

b. Authentication of documents at the site of employment may be undertaken by the appropriate official of any of the
designated Ministries/Office of the Host countries.

Requirements for accreditation shall not be authenticated if basic documents are signed by the authorized officials of
both the hiring company and its local agent in the presence of any member of the POEA Directorate or duly designated
officers of the Administration.

xxxx

Section 8. Approval and Validity of Accreditation. The Administration shall issue to the agency an accreditation
certificate for its principal or project after approval of the accreditation request. Full accreditation shall be valid for a
maximum period of two (2) years from date of issuance, subject to renewal.

Provisional accreditation may be granted for a period of ninety (90) days for a principal or a project that meets the
accreditation requirements substantially. (Emphasis supplied)

A local manning agency seeking accreditation of its foreign principal is mandated to submit the requirements listed
under Section 2, supra. The use of the imperative word shall in the provision has the invariable significance to impose
the enforcement of an obligation especially where public interest is involved. While the list is not exhaustive, the
POEA identified the foremost requisite to be the authenticated special power of attorney and manning agreement. This
identification is primarily due to the onerous responsibility assumed by the manning agency under Section 10 of the
Migrant Workers' Act of 1995, to wit:

SEC. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. x x x

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section
shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a
condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be,
shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected
by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.

xxxx

The law clearly mandates that the special power of attorney and manning agreement should be authenticated, save only
when the authorized officials of both the principal or hiring company and its local agent signed the document in the
presence of any member of the POEA Directorate or duly designated officers of the POEA.16

As regards the transfer of accreditation, the following provisions apply, thus:

Section 6. Transfer of Accreditation. The accreditation of a principal may be transferred to another agency provided
that transfer shall not involve any diminution of wages and benefits of workers

The transferee agency in these instances shall comply with the requirements for accreditation and shall assume full and
complete responsibility to all contractual obligations of the principals to its workers originally recruited and processed
by the former agency.

Prior to the transfer of accreditation, the Administration shall notify the previous agency and principal of such
application.

Section 7. Actions on Applications for Accreditation of Projects Whose Contracting Partners or Principals Have
Outstanding Obligations. Applications for the transfer of accreditation of principals or projects shall be acted by the
Administration upon submission of all requirements by the new transferee agency.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing rules are clear to the effect that before a transfer of accreditation can be effected, the transferee agency
should likewise have to comply with the requirements for accreditation contained in Section 2, supra. The POEA can
act on the transfer of accreditation only after all the requirements shall have been submitted.

In light of the foregoing, there was no effective transfer of agency from Pentagon to JDA Inter-Phil. Even assuming
arguendo that JDA Inter-Phil did not withdraw its application for accreditation with the POEA, there was still no valid
transfer of agency to speak of in the first place because JDA Inter-Phil did not submit the required authenticated special
power of attorney and manning agreement. The minutes of the October 9, 1998 meeting could not, by any stretch of the
imagination, supplant this mandatory requirement.

Verily, the minutes of any meeting are simply the notes or written record of the meeting, which usually describe what
transpire during the meeting, identify the attendees, and present the statements and related responses or resolutions of
the issues discussed. Often, the minutes are terse and meant to record only the basic information, like the actions
discussed and the decisions made. In contrast, the special power of attorney is the grant of authority by the principal to
the agent to act on a particular or specific matter, while the manning agreement states, among others, the
responsibilities of both principal and manning agencies with respect to the employment of seafarers.

Considering that the minutes of the meeting neither contained in an unequivocal manner the important and distinct
elements of a special power of attorney and manning agreement, nor were the minutes duly authenticated as required
under the law, Pentagon's insistence upon an effective substitution must fail. To reiterate, the special power of attorney
and manning agreement were necessary for the validity or enforceability of the transfer of accreditation. We may not
easily do away with the requirement, for the transfer of the accreditation would surely impact on the employees in the
end even if they neither parties to the agreement nor were ever consulted on the intended transfer of Baleen Marine' s
local manning agency from Pentagon to JDA Inter-Phil. The law requires, indeed, that contracts that have for their
object an act that would prejudice a third person must appear in a public document. 17 Likewise, the signatures
appearing in the minutes of the meeting merely confirmed that the signatories were present during the meeting, and that
they agreed that the contents of the minutes were faithful to what had transpired during the meeting. It is erroneous to
construe the signatures to mean that the signatories intended the minutes of the meeting to be the document that would
embody their intention or agreement that should be submitted in compliance with the POEA's requirements for the
transfer of accreditation.

Although we do not preclude the possibility that, as Pentagon posits, JDA Inter-Phil had really agreed to the transfer of
accreditation, it remains that the agreement to do so did not ultimately come to fruition. We cannot but hold that the
agreement reached during the meeting was only a preliminary step in the transfer of accreditation, and would not have
standing in the POEA for the purpose intended.

It is relevant to observe that Pentagon cannot feign ignorance of Section 10, paragraph 2, of the Migrant Workers' Act
of 1995 to the effect that its liabilities would continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract,
and would not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification of the contract made either locally or in a
foreign country. The provisions of the POEA Rules and Regulations to the effect that the manning agreement extends
up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the
recruitment agreement are also clear enough.18 As such, Pentagon is not exempt from its liabilities and responsibilities
towards Madrio and Rubiano. In this regard, we reiterate the pronouncement in OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission,19 as follows:

x x x Joint and solidary liability is meant to assure aggrieved workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is
due them. The fact that petitioner and its principal have already terminated their agency agreement does not relieve the
former of its liability. The reason for this ruling was given by this Court in Catan vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, which we reproduce in part as follows:

This must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the [manning] agreement between the local agent and its
foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to
end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at
all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the, employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which
the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.

Although IDA Inter-Phil undertook in the meeting of October 1, 1998 to assume the responsibility as the local agent to
Baleen Marine, the actual transfer of the accreditation would not be completed without IDA Inter-Phil 's compliance
with the requirements under the aforementioned rules. What actually happened between the time the meeting took
place and the eventual withdrawal of the application by the JDA Inter-Phil remained to be mere conjecture.
Nevertheless, Madrio and Rubiano should not be prejudiced by any; purported transfer of accreditation or agreement
that they were not privy to. For sure, Pentagon remained under the law the only recognized manning agent of Baleen
Marine.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 27, 2005 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88301; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, vs. JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.

This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with shattered dreams. It is our duty, given the facts and the law, to
approximate justice for her.

We are asked to decide a petition for review1 on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals decision2 dated June 27,
2005. This decision partially affirmed the National Labor RelationsCommissions resolution dated March 31,
2004,3declaring respondents dismissal illegal, directing petitioner to pay respondents three-month salary equivalent to
New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 46,080.00, and ordering it to reimburse the NT$3,000.00 withheld from respondent, and pay
her NT$300.00 attorneys fees.4

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. 5 Responding to an ad it
published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan.6

Joys application was accepted.7 Joy was later asked to sign a oneyear employment contract for a monthly salary of
NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of 70,000.00 when she
signed the employment contract.9

Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. 10 She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. 11 In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a
cutter.12

Sameer Overseas Placement Agencyclaims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informedJoy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should immediately report to their office to get her salary
and passport."13 She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."14

Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000. 15 According to
her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.16

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint17 with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner and
Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed.18 She asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld
amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. 19 She
identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agencys foreign principal.20

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in
her duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign [employer]." 21 The agency also
claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of 70,000.00.22 As evidence, it showedOfficial Receipt No. 14860 dated
June 10, 1997, bearing the amount of 20,360.00.23 Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had
already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.24 Thus,
petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.25

Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioners claims against it. 26 It alleged that there was no employer-
employee relationship between them.27 Therefore, the claims against it were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.28 Pacific Manpower argued that the employment contract should first be presented so that the employers
contractual obligations might be identified.29 It further denied that it assumed liability for petitioners illegal acts.30

On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joys complaint.31 Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.Ramos ruled
that her complaint was based on mereallegations.32 The Labor Arbiter found that there was no excess payment of
placement fees, based on the official receipt presented by petitioner.33 The Labor Arbiter found unnecessary a
discussion on petitioners transfer of obligations to Pacific34 and considered the matter immaterial in view of the
dismissal of respondents complaint.35

Joy appealed36 to the National Labor Relations Commission.

In a resolution37 dated March 31, 2004, the National Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was illegally
dismissed.38 It reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or valid
cause belongs to the employer.39 It found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just
causes for termination.40 There was no sufficient proofto show that respondent was inefficient in her work and that she
failed to comply with company requirements.41 Furthermore, procedural dueprocess was not observed in terminating
respondent.42

The National Labor Relations Commission did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees for lack of
jurisdiction.43 It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific.44 It did not acquire
jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor Arbiters decision
not to rule on the matter.45

The National Labor Relations Commission awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of salaryin the amount of
NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her, and attorneys fees of NT$300.46
The Commission denied the agencys motion for reconsideration47 dated May 12, 2004 through a resolution48 dated
July 2, 2004.

Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition 49 for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor Relations Commissions resolutions dated March 31, 2004 and July 2,
2004.

The Court of Appeals50 affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with respect to the finding
of illegal dismissal, Joys entitlement to the equivalent of three months worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld
repatriation expense, and attorneys fees.51 The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the National Labor Relations
Commission to address the validity of petitioner's allegations against Pacific. 52 The Court of Appeals held, thus:
Although the public respondent found the dismissal of the complainant-respondent illegal, we should point out that the
NLRC merely awarded her three (3) months backwages or the amount of NT$46,080.00, which was based upon its
finding that she was dismissed without due process, a finding that we uphold, given petitioners lack of worthwhile
discussion upon the same in the proceedings below or before us. Likewise we sustain NLRCs finding in regard to the
reimbursement of her fare, which is squarely based on the law; as well as the award of attorneys fees.

But we do find it necessary to remand the instant case to the public respondent for further proceedings, for the purpose
of addressing the validity or propriety of petitioners third-party complaint against the transferee agent or the Pacific
Manpower & Management Services, Inc. and Lea G. Manabat. We should emphasize that as far as the decision of the
NLRC on the claims of Joy Cabiles, is concerned, the same is hereby affirmed with finality, and we hold petitioner
liable thereon, but without prejudice to further hearings on its third party complaint against Pacific for reimbursement.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions are hereby partly AFFIRMED in accordance with the
foregoing discussion, but subject to the caveat embodied inthe last sentence. No costs.

SO ORDERED.53

Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition.54

We are asked to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months worth of salary, the
reimbursement of the cost ofher repatriation, and attorneys fees despite the alleged existence of just causes of
termination.

Petitioner reiterates that there was just cause for termination because there was a finding of Wacoal that respondent
was inefficient in her work.55

Therefore, it claims that respondents dismissal was valid.56

Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoals accreditation was validly transferred to Pacific at the time respondent filed
her complaint, it should be Pacific that should now assume responsibility for Wacoals contractual obligations to the
workers originally recruited by petitioner.57

Sameer Overseas Placement Agencyspetition is without merit. We find for respondent.

I Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joys dismissal. The
employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.

Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work. 58 They may also impose
reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards.59 Failure to comply may be a just cause for
their dismissal.60 Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of anemployee who is guilty of acts
that are inimical to the interest of the employer.61 While the law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers,
it does not "authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer."62 Management prerogative is recognized in
law and in our jurisprudence.

This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the employees right to security of
tenure."63Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before termination. They may not be removed
from employment without a validor just cause as determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.

Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.64

Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction. With respect
to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of lex loci contractus.Thus, in Triple Eight Integrated
Services, Inc. v. NLRC,65 this court noted:

Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending that since Osdana was
working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes
tomake it appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a competent public health
authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.

Again, petitioners argument is without merit.

First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this
jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines.
Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this
case.Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forums public policy. Herein the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit:

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. Theyshall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

....

This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to determine for and by
themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage illegal or
arbitrary pretermination of employment contracts.66 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this court emphasized in PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v.
NLRC,67 to wit:

Petitioners admit that they did notinform private respondent in writing of the charges against him and that they failed to
conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners contend that the twin
requirements ofnotice and hearing applies strictly only when the employment is within the Philippines and that these
need not be strictly observed in cases of international maritime or overseas employment.

The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford protection to
labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci
contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the Contract of Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed
here in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the
Labor Code together with its implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this
case.68 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and after
compliance with procedural due process requirements.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:

Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative
in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of
his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Petitioners allegation that respondentwas inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties 69 may, therefore,
constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to prove it.

The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. "The employer must affirmatively
show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause." 70 Failure to show that there was valid
or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.71

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer has set
standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and
workmanship must have been communicated tothe employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time
prior to the employees performance assessment.
This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on probationary employees, which allow termination ofthe employee only
when there is "just cause or when [the probationary employee] fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance
with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his [or her] engagement." 72

However, we do not see why the application of that ruling should be limited to probationary employment. That rule is
basic to the idea of security of tenure and due process, which are guaranteed to all employees, whether their
employment is probationary or regular.

The pre-determined standards that the employer sets are the bases for determining the probationary employees fitness,
propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular employee. Due process requires that the probationary employee be
informed of such standards at the time of his or her engagement so he or she can adjusthis or her character or
workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment to fit the standards upon which the employees qualifications will be
evaluated will increase ones chances of being positively assessed for regularization by his or her employer.

Assessing an employees work performance does not stop after regularization. The employer, on a regular basis,
determines if an employee is still qualified and efficient, based on work standards. Based on that determination, and
after complying with the due process requirements of notice and hearing, the employer may exercise its management
prerogative of terminating the employee found unqualified.

The regular employee must constantlyattempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she meets all the standards for
employment. This time, however, the standards to be met are set for the purpose of retaining employment or
promotion. The employee cannot be expected to meet any standard of character or workmanship if such standards were
not communicated to him or her. Courts should remain vigilant on allegations of the employers failure to
communicatework standards that would govern ones employment "if [these are] to discharge in good faith [their] duty
to adjudicate."73

In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employers work requirements
and was inefficient in her work.74 No evidence was shown to support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to
specify what requirements were not met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent
constituted inefficiency.

There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against which her work
efficiency and performance were judged. The parties conflict as to the position held by respondent showed that even
the matter as basic as the job title was not clear.

The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just cause for termination. There is
no proof that respondent was legally terminated.

Petitioner failed to comply with the due process requirements

Respondents dismissal less than one year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day show not onlyfailure on the
partof petitioner to comply with the requirement of the existence of just cause for termination. They patently show that
the employersdid not comply with the due process requirement.

A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.75 The employer is
required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before termination. 76 One of the written notices must
inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal. 77 The other notice must "[inform] the
employee of the employers decision."78 Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an
opportunity to be heard."79

Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements. Respondent started working on June 26,
1997. She was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and barely a month from her
first workday. She was also repatriated on the same day that she was informed of her termination. The abruptness of
the termination negated any finding that she was properly notified and given the opportunity to be heard. Her
constitutional right to due process of law was violated.

II Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion
ofthe employment contract that was violated together with attorneys fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld
from her salary.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of1995,
states thatoverseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion
of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less."

Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or
by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section
shall be joint and several. This provisions [sic] shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall
be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placementagency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be,
shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation orpartnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages.

Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected
by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.

Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages under this section
shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority.

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.

....

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that "repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or her] personal
belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker overseas." The
exception is when "termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker,"80 which as we have established,
is not the case. It reads: SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND. The
repatriation of the worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency
which recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the
agency concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of
a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or local agency. However, in cases
where the termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency shall
not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.

....

The Labor Code81 also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as attorneys feeswhen the
withholding is unlawful.

The Court of Appeals affirmedthe National Labor Relations Commissions decision to award respondent
NT$46,080.00 or the threemonth equivalent of her salary, attorneys fees of NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the
withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her repatriation.

We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the three-month equivalent of
respondents salary should, however, be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment
contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., 82 this court ruled that the clause "or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" 83 is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause and substantive due process.84

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all." 85

We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"was
reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010. Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 10022 provides:

Section 7.Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship
or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damage. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and
keep abreast with the developments in the global services industry.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section
shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a
condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to de [sic] filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be,
shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages.

Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected
by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract.

Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of damages under this section
shall be paid within thirty (30) days from approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority.

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or
any unauthorized deductions from the migrant workers salary, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if
[sic] his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.

In case of a final and executory judgement against a foreign employer/principal, it shall be automatically disqualified,
without further proceedings, from participating in the Philippine Overseas Employment Program and from recruiting
and hiring Filipino workers until and unless it fully satisfies the judgement award.

Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of case providedunder this section shall subject the
responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the prescribed period shall be, or
caused to be, withheld until the said official complies therewith;
(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for five (5) years.

Provided, however,That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability which any such official
may have incured [sic] under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a consequence of violating the provisions
of this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)

Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the clause in
Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondents termination from work in 1997. 86 Republic Act
No. 8042 before it was amended byRepublic Act No. 10022 governs this case.

When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial positions in their proper context
before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional.

However, we are confronted with a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact clause already declared as
unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.

This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals.At
minimum, the existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may delay the execution of the judgment in this case, further
frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong done to petitioner.

Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue.

Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional duty to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights."87 When cases become mootand academic, we do not hesitate to provide for
guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same violations are capable of repetition but will evade review. This
is analogous to cases where there are millions of Filipinos working abroad who are bound to suffer from the lack of
protection because of the restoration of an identical clause in a provision previously declared as unconstitutional.

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in
any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The
Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is
inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,the nullity cannot be
cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was
already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have sochanged as to warrant a reverse
conclusion.
We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so changed so as to cause us to
reverse binding precedent.

Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial efficiency and economy that attend to these cases. The new law puts our
overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as they were prior to Serrano. Failure to reiterate the very ratio
decidendi of that case will result in the same untold economic hardships that our reading of the Constitution intended to
avoid. Obviously, we cannot countenance added expenses for further litigation thatwill reduce their hardearned wages
as well as add to the indignity of having been deprived of the protection of our laws simply because our precedents
have not been followed. There is no constitutional doctrine that causes injustice in the face of empty procedural
niceties. Constitutional interpretation is complex, but it is never unreasonable.

Thus, in a resolution88 dated October 22, 2013, we ordered the parties and the Office of the Solicitor General to
comment on the constitutionality of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 10022.

In its comment,89 petitioner argued that the clause was constitutional.90 The legislators intended a balance between the
employers and the employees rights by not unduly burdening the local recruitment agency. 91 Petitioner is also of the
view that the clause was already declared as constitutional in Serrano.92

The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the clause was valid and constitutional. 93 However, since the
parties never raised the issue of the constitutionality of the clause asreinstated in Republic Act No. 10022, its
contention is that it is beyond judicial review.94

On the other hand, respondentargued that the clause was unconstitutional because it infringed on workers right to
contract.95

We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional
rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any
compelling changein the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.

We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by anillegally
dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are
treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred and liabilities enforced."97 It is a guarantee against "undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality." 98

In creating laws, the legislature has the power "to make distinctions and classifications." 99

In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion.100

The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power.101 A law is void on this basis, only if
classifications are made arbitrarily.102 There is no violation of the equal protection clause if the law applies equally to
persons within the same class and if there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the
class and those who do not fall within the class.103 A law that does not violate the equal protection clause prescribesa
reasonable classification.104

A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class."105

The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification.

In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished between fixed-period
overseas workers and fixedperiod local workers.106 It also distinguished between overseas workers with employment
contracts of less than one year and overseas workers with employment contracts of at least one year. 107 Within the class
of overseas workers with at least one-year employment contracts, there was a distinction between those with at least a
year left in their contracts and those with less than a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed. 108

The Congress classification may be subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a "legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class."109

Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection.110 Thus, this court in Serrano, "[i]mbued with the same
sense of obligation to afford protection to labor, . . . employ[ed] the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it
perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs." 111

We also noted in Serranothat before the passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally terminated
overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment werecomputed in the same manner.112 Their money claims
were computed based onthe "unexpired portions of their contracts."113 The adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic
Act No. 8042 subjected the money claims of illegally dismissed overseas workers with an unexpired term of at least a
year to a cap of three months worth of their salary.114 There was no such limitation on the money claims of illegally
terminated local workers with fixed-term employment.115

We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a term of less than one year
were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. 116 Meanwhile, illegally
dismissed overseas workers with employment terms of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to three months of
their salary for the unexpired portions of their contracts.117

Observing the terminologies used inthe clause, we also found that "the subject clause creates a sub-layer of
discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with
less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while
those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the reinstated
clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only."118

We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these classifications do not rest on any real or substantial distinctions
that would justify different treatments in terms of the computation of money claims resulting from illegal termination.

Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to security of tenure, at least for the period agreed upon
in their contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed before the end of their contract terms without due process.
If they were illegally dismissed, the workers right to security of tenure is violated.

The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local worker is illegally terminated are neither greater than norless than
the rights violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally terminated. It is state policy to protect the rights of
workers withoutqualification as to the place of employment.119 In both cases, the workers are deprived of their
expected salary, which they could have earned had they not been illegally dismissed. For both workers, this deprivation
translates to economic insecurity and disparity.120 The same is true for the distinctions between overseas workers with
an employment contract of less than one year and overseas workers with at least one year of employment contract, and
between overseas workers with at least a year left in their contracts and overseas workers with less than a year left in
their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.

For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument that "[overseas workers] are contractual employeeswho can never
acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers"121 because it already justifies differentiated treatment in terms
ofthe computation of money claims.122

Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues on overseas workers money claims do not justify a differentiated
treatment in the computation of their money claims.123 If anything, these issues justify an equal, if not greater
protection and assistance to overseas workers who generally are more prone to exploitation given their physical
distance from our government.

We also find that the classificationsare not relevant to the purpose of the law, which is to "establish a higher standard of
protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for
other purposes."124 Further, we find specious the argument that reducing the liability of placement agencies "redounds
to the benefit of the [overseas] workers."125

Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the standard of protection afforded to
them. On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivizedby the reinstated clause to enter into contracts of at
least a year because it gives them more flexibility to violate our overseas workers rights. Their liability for arbitrarily
terminating overseas workers is decreased at the expense of the workers whose rights they violated. Meanwhile, these
overseas workers who are impressed with an expectation of a stable job overseas for the longer contract period
disregard other opportunities only to be terminated earlier. They are left with claims that are less than what others in
the same situation would receive. The reinstated clause, therefore, creates a situation where the law meant to protect
them makes violation of rights easier and simply benign to the violator.

As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in Serrano:

Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures, and in fact provides a hidden twist affecting the
principal/employers liability. While intended as an incentive accruing to recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as
worded, simply limits the OFWs recovery in wrongfuldismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever
may be liable, including the principal/employer the direct employer primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal. In
this sense, Section 10 read as a grant of incentives to recruitment/manning agencies oversteps what it aims to do by
effectively limiting what is otherwise the full liability of the foreign principals/employers. Section 10, in short, really
operates to benefit the wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to mitigate its liability for
wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the limitation ofliability under Section 10 cannot be an "appropriate"
incentive, to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to describe the incentive it envisions under its purpose
clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive: instead of a grant that, to encourage greater
efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts undertaken, the law simply limits their liability for the wrongful
dismissals of already deployed OFWs. This is effectively a legally-imposed partial condonation of their liability to
OFWs, justified solely by the laws intent to encourage greater deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive,from a more
practical and realistic view, is really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for purposes solely of
attracting the market. . . .

The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the OFWs the benefits accruing to the
recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are takenfrom the pockets of the OFWs to whom the full salaries for
the unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong. Thus, the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning
agencies even profit from their violation of the security of tenure that an employment contract embodies. Conversely,
lesser protection is afforded the OFW, not only because of the lessened recovery afforded him or her by operation of
law, but also because this same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal easier and less onerous to undertake;
the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino will always bea consideration a foreign employer will take into account in
termination of employment decisions. . . .126

Further, "[t]here can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector,
but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses
suchas placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed ofOFWs whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands. The idea thatprivate business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest
is odious."127

Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas
workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose.128

Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with Section 10
of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of respondents salary must be modified
accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to
her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs,
and would,in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an
OFWs security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an
unconstitutional provision of law."129

III On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of June 21, 2013, which revised the
interest rate for loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of stipulation,applies in this case. The pertinent
portions of Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, read: The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013,
approved the following revisions governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby
amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:

Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rateof interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum.

Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1,
4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions are hereby amended
accordingly.

This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.

Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado Peralta, we laid down the guidelines in computing legal interest in
Nacar v. Gallery Frames:130

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore,
the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount
of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty,
the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a
 sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1
or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be
disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein.131

Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and in judgments when there
is no stipulation on the applicable interest rate. Further, it is only applicable if the judgment did not become final and
executory before July 1, 2013.132

We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when there is a law that states otherwise. While the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest rates,133 these interest rates do not apply when the law provides that a
different interest rate shall be applied. "[A] Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another
law."134

For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that unlawfully terminated overseas workers are entitled to
the reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an interest of 12% per annum. Since Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
circulars cannotrepeal Republic Act No. 8042, the issuance of Circular No. 799 does not have the effect of changing
the interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees from 12% to 6%. This is despite Section 1 of Circular No.
799, which provides that the 6% interest rate applies even to judgments.

Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts. "The contracting parties need not repeat them. They do not even
have to be referred to. Every contract, thus, contains not only what has been explicitly stipulated, but the statutory
provisions that have any bearing on the matter."135 There is, therefore, an implied stipulation in contracts between the
placement agency and the overseasworker that in case the overseas worker is adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of
his or her placement fees, the amount shall be subject to a 12% interest per annum. This implied stipulation has the
effect of removing awards for reimbursement of placement fees from Circular No. 799s coverage.

The same cannot be said for awardsof salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract under Republic Act
No. 8042. These awards are covered by Circular No. 799 because the law does not provide for a specific interest rate
that should apply.

In sum, if judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013 and there was no stipulation in the contract
providing for a different interest rate, other money claims under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 shall be subject
to the 6% interest per annum in accordance with Circular No. 799.

This means that respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her money claims from the finality of this
judgment.

IV Finally, we clarify the liabilities ofWacoal as principal and petitioner as the employment agency that facilitated
respondents overseas employment.

Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer and the local
employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money claims including claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship and/or damages. This section also provides that the performance bond filed by the local agency
shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if they were awarded to the employee.

This provision is in line with the states policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating workers plight.136

In overseas employment, the filing of money claims against the foreign employer is attended by practical and legal
complications.1wphi1 The distance of the foreign employer alonemakes it difficult for an overseas worker to reach it
and make it liable for violations of the Labor Code. There are also possible conflict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and
procedural rules that may be raised to frustrate an overseas workersattempt to advance his or her claims.

It may be argued, for instance, that the foreign employer must be impleaded in the complaint as an indispensable party
without which no final determination can be had of an action.137

The provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 assures
overseas workers that their rights will not be frustrated with these complications. The fundamental effect of joint and
several liability is that "each of the debtors is liable for the entire obligation." 138 A final determination may, therefore,
be achieved even if only oneof the joint and several debtors are impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of overseas
employment, either the local agency or the foreign employer may be sued for all claims arising from the foreign
employers labor law violations. This way, the overseas workers are assured that someone the foreign employers
local agent may be made to answer for violationsthat the foreign employer may have committed.

The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers have recourse in law despite
the circumstances of their employment. By providing that the liability of the foreign employer may be "enforced to the
full extent"139 against the local agent,the overseas worker is assured of immediate and sufficientpayment of what is due
them.140

Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in law, the provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts the burden of going after the foreign employer from the overseas
worker to the local employment agency. However, it must be emphasized that the local agency that is held to answer
for the overseas workers money claims is not leftwithout remedy. The law does not preclude it from going after the
foreign employer for reimbursement of whatever payment it has made to the employee to answer for the money claims
against the foreign employer.

A further implication of making localagencies jointly and severally liable with the foreign employer is thatan additional
layer of protection is afforded to overseas workers. Local agencies, which are businesses by nature, are inoculated with
interest in being always on the lookout against foreign employers that tend to violate labor law. Lest they risk their
reputation or finances, local agenciesmust already have mechanisms for guarding against unscrupulous foreign
employers even at the level prior to overseas employment applications.

With the present state of the pleadings, it is not possible to determine whether there was indeed a transfer of obligations
from petitioner to Pacific. This should not be an obstacle for the respondent overseas worker to proceed with the
enforcement of this judgment. Petitioner is possessed with the resources to determine the proper legal remedies to
enforce its rights against Pacific, if any.

V Many times, this court has spoken on what Filipinos may encounter as they travel into the farthest and
mostdifficult reaches of our planet to provide for their families. In Prieto v. NLRC:141

The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land where they have
ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape,
insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane
acts towhich they are subjected by their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their own
country. Whilethese workers may indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that
disadvantage must not continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint.
There is no reason why, in their very own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full
measure for the redress of their grievances.142

But it seems that we have not said enough.

We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and their heroism can be told a million times over; each of their stories
as real as any other. Overseas Filipino workers brave alien cultures and the heartbreak of families left behind daily.
They would count the minutes, hours, days, months, and years yearning to see their sons and daughters. We all know of
the joy and sadness when they come home to see them all grown up and, being so, they remember what their work has
cost them. Twitter accounts, Facetime, and many other gadgets and online applications will never substitute for their
lost physical presence.

Unknown to them, they keep our economy afloat through the ebb and flow of political and economic crises. They are
our true diplomats, they who show the world the resilience, patience, and creativity of our people. Indeed, we are a
people who contribute much to the provision of material creations of this world.

This government loses its soul if we fail to ensure decent treatment for all Filipinos. We default by limiting the
contractual wages that should be paid to our workers when their contracts are breached by the foreign employers.
While we sit, this court will ensure that our laws will reward our overseas workers with what they deserve: their
dignity.

Inevitably, their dignity is ours as weil.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification.
Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent
to her salary for the unexpired portion of her employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay
respondent attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.

The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 190203, November 07, 2016
POWERHOUSE STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner, v. ROMELIA REY, LIZA CABAD,
EVANGELINE NICMIC, EVA LAMEYRA, ROSARIO ABORDAJE, LILYBETH MAGALANG, VENIA BUYAG,
JAYNALYN NOLLEDO, IREN NICOLAS, AILEEN SAMALEA, SUSAN YBAEZ; CHERYL ANN ORIA, MA.
LIZA SERASPI, KATHERINE ORACION, AND JEJ INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES
CORPORATION, Respondents.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Powerhouse Staffbuilders International, Inc. (Powerhouse), seeking the review and reversal of the Decision 2 dated
March 24, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated November 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
100196 which dismissed its petition for certiorari.

Facts

Powerhouse hired respondents Romelia Rey, Liza Cabad, Evangeline Nicmic, Eva Lameyra, Rosario Abordaje,
Lilybeth Magalang, Venia Buyag, Jaynalyn Nolledo, Iren Nicolas, Aileen Samalea, Susan Ybaez, Cheryl Ann Oria,
Ma. Liza Seraspi and Katherine Oracion (respondent employees) as operators for its foreign principal, Catcher
Technical Co. Ltd./Catcher Industrial Co. Ltd. (Catcher), based in Taiwan, each with a monthly salary of
NT$15,840.00 for the duration of two years commencing upon their arrival at the jobsite. They were deployed on June
2, 2000. Sometime in February 2001, Catcher informed respondent employees that they would be reducing their
working days due to low orders and financial difficulties. The respondent employees were repatriated to the Philippines
on March 11, 2001.

On March 22, 2001, respondent employees filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, refund of placement fees,
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, against Powerhouse and Catcher before the Labor
Arbiter5 (LA) which were later consolidated upon their motion.6 They alleged that on March 2, 2001, Catcher informed
them that they would all be repatriated due to low orders of Catcher. Initially, they refused to be repatriated but they
eventually gave in because Catcher stopped providing them food and they had to live by the donations/dole outs from
sympathetic friends and the church.7 Furthermore, during their employment with Catcher, the amount of NT$10,000.00
was unjustifiably deducted every month for eight to nine months from their individual salaries. 8

On the other hand, Powerhouse maintained that respondent employees voluntarily gave up their jobs following their
rejection of Catcher's proposal to reduce their working days. It contended that before their repatriation, each of the
respondents accepted payments by way of settlement, with the assistance of Labor Attache Romulo Salud. 9

During the proceedings before the LA, Powerhouse moved to implead JEJ International Manpower Services (JEJ) as
respondent on account of the alleged transfer to the latter of Catcher's accreditation. 10The motion was granted and JEJ
submitted its position paper, arguing that the supposed transfer of accreditation to it did not affect the joint and solidary
liability of Powerhouse in favor of respondent employees. It averred that any contract between JEJ and Powerhouse
could not be enforced in the case as it involved no employer-employee relationship and is therefore outside the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.12

The LA, in a Decision13 dated September 27, 2002, ruled in favor of the respondents, finding the respondent
employees' dismissal and/or pretermination of their employment contracts illegal. The dispositive portion of the LA's
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [Powerhouse], William Go, [Catcher], Chen Wei, [JEJ] and
Benedicto Javier to jointly and severally pay complainants the following amounts corresponding to the unexpired term
of their employment contracts or three (3) months salaries whichever is less and refund of illegally deducted amounts
in their wages:

Xxxxxx
Xxxxxx
Xxxxxx
xxxxxx

Respondents are further ordered to pay 10% attorney's fees.

The complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages and other money claims are hereby disallowed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14
The LA found that Powerhouse failed to substantiate its allegations that the respondent employees voluntarily pre-
terminated their respective contracts of employment and received payments in consideration thereof and it was also
unable to rebut respondents' alleged entitlement to refund of the amounts illegally deducted from their salaries.
However, the LA also ruled that in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, 15 the amount of
wages the respondent employees are entitled to by reason of the illegal dismissal/pre-termination of their employment
contracts is equivalent to the unexpired term thereof or to three months for every year of service whichever is less. 15

All the parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision16 dated July 31, 2006, affirmed the LA's Decision with modification. The NLRC
absolved JEJ from liability, upon the NLRC's findings that it was not privy to the respondents' deployment. 17 It also
held Powerhouse jointly and severally liable with William Go, Catcher, and Chen Wei to reimburse to respondents
Magalang, Nicolas, Ybaez and Oria their placement fee of P19,000.00 each and P17,000.00 each to respondents Rey,
Cabad, Nicmic, Lameyra, Abordaje, Buyag, Nolledo, Samalea, Seraspi and Oracion. 18

Powerhouse moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution19 dated May 31, 2007.

Aggrieved, Powerhouse elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari20 imputing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC in declaring the repatriation of respondent employees as an act of illegal dismissal, awarding
reimbursement of alleged salary deduction without factual basis or concrete and direct evidence, ordering the refund of
the placement fees which is subject to the jurisdiction of the POEA, and dropping JEJ as a party respondent in total
disregard of the POEA rules.21

On March 24, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision22 dismissing Powerhouse's petition. TheCA ruled that Powerhouse
failed to comply with the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. As alleged by Powerhouse itself, it received a copy of the May 31, 2007 Order of the NLRC on June 21, 2007;
thus, the Rule 65 petition filed before the CA on August 21, 2007 was filed a day late, warranting its dismissal.23 The
CA ruled that Powerhouse's failure to perfect its appeal is not a mere technicality as it raises a jurisdictional problem,
depriving it of jurisdiction.24 The CA also found that Powerhouse failed to substantially comply with the requirements
of certificate of forum shopping in its petition and ruled that the belated submission of the Secretary's Certificate in
compliance with the CA's resolution did not cure the defect of Powerhouse's petition. 25cralawred

Even on the merits, the CA found the petition deficient. It ruled that Powerhouse failed to prove that respondent
employees were not illegally dismissed, or that they voluntarily resigned. The CA found that respondent employees
were made to resign against their will as they were forced to sign resignation letters prepared by Catcher as an act of
self-preservation, since Catcher stopped providing them food for their subsistence nine days before they were finally
repatriated on March 11, 2001.26 Respondent employees' intention to leave their work, as well as their act of
relinquishment, is not present in this case. On the contrary, they vigorously pursued their complaint against
Powerhouse and resignation is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.27 Furthermore, the
photocopy of the undated and unsigned list supposedly furnished by Catcher to Powerhouse as proof that respondent
employees received the amounts stated therein was not considered by the CA because these were not authenticated and
are devoid of probative value.28

The CA likewise ruled that JEJ's liability for the monetary claims of respondent employees on account of the alleged
transfer of accreditation to it has not been established absent any substantial evidence to show that such transfer had in
fact been effected. Nothing in the letters attached by Powerhouse in its motion for reconsideration before the NLRC
shows or even remotely suggests that the transfer pushed through with POEA's imprimatur. Powerhouse presented the
Affidavit of Assumption of Responsibility executed by the president of respondent JEJ to the CA, but the CA ruled that
it could not consider the same without running afoul with the requirements of due process, as it would deprive the
respondents of the opportunity to examine and controvert the same.29

Powerhouse moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision but the same was denied in a Resolution 30dated November
10, 2009. Powerhouse's Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to Present Additional Evidence and to Set Case for Oral
Arguments was denied in the same resolution.

Hence, Powerhouse filed this petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
challenging the CA Decision. Powerhouse likewise sought injunctive relief in its petition which was granted by this
Court through the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order 31 on March 3, 2010, enjoining the CA, the NLRC, the
LA and the respondents from enforcing the assailed Decision and Resolution.

Issues

In assailing the CA Decision, the petition raises three issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IF WORKERS CHOOSE TO LEAVE THEIR PLACE OF WORK.
WHETHER OR NOT MONETARY AWARDS IN LABOR CASES MAY BE AWARDED BASED ON MERE
ALLEGATIONS.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRANSFER OF ACCREDITATION TO ANOTHER RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT
AGENCY, AS WELL AS THE ASSUMPTION OF ANY LIABILITY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS TRANSFER,
RELIEVED THE ORIGINAL RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT AGENCY FROM ANY LIABILITY. 32

Powerhouse, in questioning the appellate court's ruling, also calls the attention of this Court to their substantial
compliance with all the procedural requirements in filing their Petition for Certiorari before the CA and prays for a
liberal interpretation of the rules in the interest of substantial justice.

The Court's Ruling

Before going into the substantive merits of the case, we shall first resolve the procedural issues raised by respondents
in their respective Comments.
In their Comment,33 respondent employees assert that Powerhouse failed to show any justifiable reason why it should
be excused from the operation of the rules.34 Moreover, the CA actually resolved the petition on the merits but
Powerhouse showed nothing to earn a favorable ruling.35

On the other hand, JEJ, in its Comment,36 avers that Powerhouse failed to raise as an issue the dismissal of
Powerhouse's petition due to its gross and blatant violations of the requirements of Rule 65. Instead, Powerhouse made
assignments of errors, or what it called "novel questions of law," which is just a ploy to seek the review of the factual
findings of the CA and the NLRC.

The petition in the CA was timely filed.

Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,38 provides:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

xxx
In this case, Powerhouse received on June 21, 2007, a copy of the May 31, 2007 Order of the NLRC denying its
motion for reconsideration.39 Thus, it had 60 days, or until August 20, 2007, to file a petition for certiorari before the
CA. However, since August 20, 2007 was proclaimed by President Arroyo as a special non-working day pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1353, series of 2007, Powerhouse had until the next working day, August 21, 2007 to file its petition.
The relevant portion of Rule 22, Section 1 provides: "x x x If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working
day." Thus, the petition filed on August 21, 2007 was timely filed.

Powerhouse substantially complied with the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping.

In previous cases, we held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (2) the President of a
corporation; (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case.40 The rationale applied in these cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or
representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to
verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."41cralawred

In this case, the verification and certification42 attached to the petition before the CA was signed by William C. Go, the
President and General Manager of Powerhouse, one of the officers enumerated in the foregoing recognized exception.
While the petition was not accompanied by a Secretary's Certificate, his authority was ratified by the Board in its
Resolution adopted on October 24, 2007.43 Thus, even if he was not authorized to execute the Verification and
Certification at the time of the filing of the Petition, the ratification by the board of directors retroactively confirms and
affirms his authority and gives us more reason to uphold that authority. 44

Nevertheless, on the merits, the petition must fail.

It bears stressing that in a petition for review on certiorari, the scope of the Supreme Court's judicial review of
decisions of the CA is generally confined only to errors of law. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and this
doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve. 45

Respondents maintain that the petition, in the guise of raising novel questions of law, is in reality seeking a review of
the factual findings of the CA and the NLRC.46
We agree with the respondents.
In this case, although the three issues raised in the petition were stated in a manner in which they would appear to be
purely legal issues, they actually assume facts contrary to the factual findings of the LA, the NLRC, and the CA and
thus call for a re-examination of the evidence, which this Court cannot entertain.47 Thus, the three issues presented by
Powerhousethe liability of the transferee agency, the existence of illegal dismissal and the basis for the monetary
awards-are factual issues which have all been ruled upon by the LA, the NLRC, and the CA.
The well-entrenched rule, especially in labor cases, is that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are
accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. Particularly when passed upon and upheld by
the CA, they are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not normally be disturbed. 49
The Court finds no reason in this case to depart from such doctrine.
The evidence on record supports the findings of the CA and the NLRC.

Respondent employees were illegally dismissed.

The onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal, fully rests on
the employer, and the failure to discharge the onus would mean that the dismissal was not justified and was illegal. The
burden of proving the allegations rests ufon the party alleging and the proof must be clear, positive, and convincing. 50

Here, there is no reason to overturn the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA, all of which have
unanimously declared that respondent employees were made to resign against their will after the foreign principal,
Catcher, stopped providing them food for their subsistence as early as March 2, 2001, when they were informed that
they would be repatriated, until they were repatriated on March 11, 2001.

The filing of complaints for illegal dismissal immediately after repatriation belies the claim that respondent employees
voluntarily chose to be separated and repatriated. Voluntary repatriation, much like resignation, is inconsistent with the
filing of the complaints.51

Respondent employees are entitled to the payment of monetary claims.

We also agree that respondent employees are entitled to money claims and full reimbursement of their respective
placement fees. However, the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent employees' salaries should be
increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract in accordance with our rulings
in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.52 and Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles.53
In Serrano, we declared unconstitutional the clause in Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 limiting the wages that could be
recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months. We held that the clause "or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause) is both a violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.53 In 2010, upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022,54 the subject clause
was reinstated.55 Presented with the unique situation that the law passed incorporated the exact clause already declared
unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances, in Sameer, we, once again, declared
the reinstated clause unconstitutional, this time as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 10022. 56
We likewise affirm the refund to the respondent employees of the unauthorized monthly deductions in the amount of
NT$10,000.00. Contrary to Powerhouse's contention that the claim for refund was based merely on allegations,
respondent employees were able to present proof before the NLRC in the form of the two (2) passbooks given to each
of them by their foreign employer. According to respondent employees, the "First Passbooks," where their salaries,
including their overtime pay were deposited, were in the custody of the employer, while - the "Second Passbooks"
where their allowances were deposited, were in their custody. They were only able to make withdrawals from their
Second Passbooks, however, their foreign employer made illegal deductions from their First Passbooks. 57 The pertinent
pages of these First Passbooks are pmt of the record of this case.58 Considering that Powerhouse failed to dispute this
claim, the same is deemed admitted.59

It must be remembered that the burden of proving monetary claims rests on the employer. The reason for this rule is
that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents are not in the possession of
the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer.60 Thus, in failing to present evidence to prove that
Catcher, with whom it shares joint and several liability with under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, had paid all the
monetary claims of respondent employees, Powerhouse has, once again, failed to discharge the onus probandi; thus,
the LA and the NLRC properly awarded these claims to respondent employees.

Respondent employees are likewise entitled to the payment of interest over their monetary claims.

In the matter of the applicable interest rates over the monetary claims awarded to respondent employees, Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 provides that "[i]n case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause
as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest
of twelve percent (12%) per annum." However, this provision does not provide a specific interest rate for the award of
salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract nor for the other money claims the respondent employees
are entitled to.

In Sameer, we held that Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 issued on June 21, 2013,61 which revised the
interest rate for loan or forbearance of money from twelve percent (12%) to six percent (6%) in the absence of
stipulation, is not applicable when there is a law that states otherwise. Thus, Circular No. 799 does not have the effect
of changing the interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees from twelve percent (12%), as provided in
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, to six percent (6%). However, Circular No. 799 applies to the award of salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract and the other money claims of the employees since the law does not
provide a specific interest rate for these awards.62

Accordingly, the placement fees in the amount of P19,000.00 each which are to be reimbursed to respondents
Magalang, Nicolas, Ybaez and Oria, and the placement fees in the amount of P17,000.00 each which are to be
reimbursed to respondents Rey, Cabad, Nicmic, Lameyra, Abordaje, Buyag, Nolledo, Samalea, Seraspi and Oracion,
shall earn interest at a rate of twelve percent (12%) per annumfrom finality of this decision until full payment thereof.

On the other hand, the other monetary awards, specifically respondent employees' salaries for the unexpired term of their
employment contract, the illegal deductions which are to be refunded to them, and the award of attorney's fees in their favor,
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this decision until full payment thereof.64

Powerhouse is liable for the monetary claims.

We likewise agree with the CA and the NLRC that JEJ could not be held liable for the monetary claims of respondent
employees on account of the alleged transfer of accreditation to it. Nothing in the two letters attached by Powerhouse
in its motion for reconsideration before the NLRC proved that the alleged transfer pushed through with
POEA's imprimatur. At best, these show that Catcher intended to appoint JEJ as its new agent and Powerhouse had no
objection to such transfer.65

Even the Affidavit of Assumption of Responsibility submitted to the CA cannot absolve Powerhouse of its liability.

The terms of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 clearly states the solidary liability of the principal and the recruitment
agency to the employees and this liability shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification for the
entire duration of the employment contract, to wit:
Sec. 10. Monetary Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship
or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and
shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency,
as provided by law, shall be answerable for all monetary claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case
may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarity liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid
claims and damages.

Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be
affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said
contract.(Emphasis supplied.)

xxx
In Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad,65 we ruled that the provisions of the POEA Rules and Regulations are clear
enough that the manning agreement extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the
employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.66 In that case, we held that the
Affidavits of Assumption of Responsibility, though valid as between petitioner Skippers United Pacific Inc. and the
other two manning agencies, were not enforceable against the respondents (the employees) because the latter were not
parties to those agreements.67

In this case, even if there was transfer of accreditation by Catcher from Powerhouse to JEJ, Powerhouse's liability to
respondent employees remained intact because respondent employees are not privy to such contract, and in their
overseas employment contract approved by POEA, Powerhouse is the recruitment agency of Catcher. To relieve
Powerhouse from liability arising from the approved overseas employment contract is to change the contract without
the consent from the other contracting party, respondent employees in this case.

To rule otherwise and free Powerhouse of liability against respondent employees would go against the rationale of R.A.
No. 8042 to protect and safeguard the rights and interests of overseas Filipinos and overseas Filipino workers, in
particular, and run contrary to this law's intention to an additional layer of protection to overseas workers. 68 This
ensures that overseas workers have recourse in law despite the circumstances of their employment. By providing that
the liability of the foreign employer may be "enforced to the full extent" against the local agent, the overseas worker is
assured of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Corollarily, the provision on joint and several
liability in R.A. No. 8042 shifts the burden of going after the foreign employer from the overseas worker to the local
employment agency. However, the local agency that is held to answer for the overseas worker's money claims is not
left without remedy. The law does not preclude it from going after the foreign employer for reimbursement of whatever
payment it has made to the employee to answer for the money claims against the foreign employer. 69

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 24, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals DISMISSING the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 100196 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONthat each of the respondent employees are AWARDED their salaries for the entire unexpired
portion of their respective employment contracts computed at the rate of NT$15,840.00 per month at an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until full payment thereof.

Further, the award of placement fees in respondent employees' favor shall earn interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum from finality of this decision until full payment thereof.

Furthermore, the illegally deducted amounts which were ordered to be refunded to respondent employees, as well as
the attorney's fees awarded to respondent employees, shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
finality of this decision until full payment thereof.

The temporary restraining order issued on March 3, 2010 is hereby DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 164940 November 28, 2007
VARORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC., Petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION)and ROLANDO M.
PEREZ, Respondents.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Varorient Shipping Co., Inc.
(Varorient) seeking the reversal of the 25 May 2004 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83881
which dismissed its petition for certiorari and injunction and the 9 August 2004 Resolution 2 of the same court which
denied its motion for reconsideration.

The basic facts necessary for the resolution of the issues before this Court are not disputed. Varorient, acting in behalf
of Lagoa Shipping Corporation (Lagoa), employed private respondent Rolando Perez (Perez) as a "fitter" on board the
vessel M/V Sparrow. Perez and Varorient, the latter acting in the capacity as the local manning agent of its foreign
principal, executed a Contract of Employment dated 2 December 1998.3

Once deployed on the M/V Sparrow, Perez started to suffer from persistent back pains. Aboard the vessel, a foreign
doctor who treated Perez issued a medical report certifying that the latter was already fit for continued employment, but
recommending nonetheless that Perez be assigned to light work only. Perez was thus repatriated to the Philippines as
he could no longer perform his duties as a fitter.4

Once back in the Philippines, Perez was diagnosed with lumbosacral instability, a condition treatable by physical
therapy. The persistent back pains were caused by an injury in the lower spine causing Perezs lumbar curve to be
abnormally exaggerated due to his lifting and carrying of heavy objects as a fitter. 5 At the expense of Varorient, Perez
was placed by company-designated physicians under a physical therapy program consisting of 10-20 sessions. After
having completed 10 sessions, Perez abruptly discontinued his medical evaluation and treatment.6Instead, on 9
September 1999, he filed a Complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) 7 praying for disability
benefits, illness allowance, reimbursement of medical and medicine expenses, damages, and attorneys fees. Named as
respondents to the complaint were Varorient, Margarita Colarina (Colarina), and Lagoa.

The case was assigned to Labor Arbiter Antonio Cea and the parties duly filed their position papers. Eventually, the
Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision8 dated 20 January 2003 ordering the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. Perez
appealed the decision to the NLRC which, on 30 October 2003, rendered a Decision 9 vacating and setting aside the
Labor Arbiters ruling. The NLRC ratiocinated that Perez had already complied with the requirements to claim
compensation for his injury pursuant to the POEA Standard Employment Contract when he presented himself to the
company-designated physician for medical treatment within 120 days from the date of his repatriation, and that he was
not to be blamed for the failure of Varorient to make a disability assessment despite the fact that he had already
completed 10 physical therapy sessions.10

After its motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC, Varorient filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Injunction11 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

On 18 June 2004, Varorient received a copy of the first assailed Resolution dated 25 May 2004 dismissing its petition.
The Court of Appeals held:

There are three (3) petitioners in this petition for certiorari[:] Varorient Shipping Co., Inc., Margarita Colarina and
Lagoa Shipping Corporation. However, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping certification [were]
signed by a certain Ma. Luisa C. Isuga, Managing Director and Corporate Secretary of Petitioner Varorient Shipping
Co., Inc., without showing any authority to act for and in behalf of any of the petitioners. Absent such authority, the
petition is fatally flawed.

ACCORDINGLY, this petition is ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.12

On 4 July 2004, Varorient filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 with the Court of Appeals. Attached to the motion is
the Secretarys Certificate14 dated 7 May 2004, evincing the authority of Ma. Luisa C. Isuga, Varorients managing
director and corporate secretary, to represent Varorient in the certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals, and
"to sign for and in behalf of Varorient all pertinent documents, papers, pleadings, motions, petitions, and other related
incidents, in connection with the case against it, its President, Margarita Colarina, and its foreign principal, Lagoa
Shipping Corporation" filed by Perez.15

On 24 August 2004, Varorient received a copy of the second assailed Resolution 16 dated 9 August 2004, denying its
motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals ruled:

x x x In the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, it is insisted that Isuga, being the Managing Director
and Secretary of Varorient is duly authorized to represent and act in behalf of the corporation, its foreign principal
Lagoa and President Margarita Colarina. It is further alleged that even if there is no express authorization
from Varorient and the other petitioners, still Isuga is impliedly authorized to file the petition and sign the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping. The motion, nonetheless, attached a Secretarys Certificate dated May 7, 2004
which petitioners claim to have been inadvertently omitted in the course of filing the petition.
We cannot agree with the petitioners. Neither do [w]e find consistency in their ratiocination that even without
authorization, Isuga is authorized to act for the three (3) petitioners, and at the same time, presenting a Secretarys
Certificate on a supposed Board of Directors meeting of Varorient on May 5, 2004. It would seem to [o]ur mind, that
the Board Resolution and the Secretarys Certificate was just an afterthought. Otherwise, Ma. Luisa C. Isuga, the
Corporate Secretary who was allegedly given authority by the Board to act for and in behalf of Varorient could not
have missed to append or even mention it in the petition at bar. Moreover, the Secretarys Certificate is issued by the
Board of Directors of Varorient and not the two (2) other petitioners, Lagoa and its President, Margarita
Colarina. Apropos, the foregoing circumstances only confirm that Isuga was not duly authorized when she signed the
verification and non-forum shopping certification at the time the instant petition was filed.

Petitioner is hereby reminded that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board
of directors that exercises its corporate powers. In the absence of any authority from the board of directors, no person,
not even the officers of the corporation, can validly bind the corporation. [Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 264 SCRA 11 (1996); Esteban, Jr. v. Vda. de Ocampo, 360 SCRA 230 (2002); Social Security System v.
Commission on Audit, 384 SCRA 548 (2002)].

xxxx

ACCORDINGLY, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated June 29, 2004 is DENIED. SO ORDERED.17

Hence, the present petition.

Varorient argues that there is substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46, considering the submission of the secretarys
certificate showing the authority of Ma. Luisa C. Isuga to act for and in behalf of petitioner. Petitioner further argues that the
Court of Appeals should have upheld the primacy of substantial justice over technical rules of procedure.

There are three issues before us. The first, whether Varorient has substantially complied with the verification and
certification requirement, is ultimately less than decisive to this case. The more worthy questions for consideration
pertain to the effect of the respective failures to execute the prescribed verification and certification of Colarina, as a
corporate officer solidarily bound with Varorient in the payment of employment claims, and Lagoa, as the foreign
principal of Varorient.

There is sufficient jurisprudential justification to hold that Varorient has substantially complied with the verification
and certification requirements. We have held in a catena of cases18 with similar factual circumstance that there is
substantial compliance with the Rules of Court when there is a belated submission or filing of the secretarys certificate
through a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision dismissing the petition for certiorari.

The Court is not unmindful of the necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping in filing petitions for certiorari as
this is required under Section 1, Rule 65, in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. When
the petitioner is a corporation, the certification should obviously be executed by a natural person to whom the power to
execute such certification has been validly conferred by the corporate board of directors and/or duly authorized officers
and agents. Generally, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of
the signatorys authority.19

Still, a distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirements for certificate of non-forum shopping
and verification and substantial compliance with the requirements as provided in the Rules of Court. The Court has
allowed the belated filing of the certification on the justification that such act constitutes substantial compliance.
In Roadway Express, Inc. v. CA,20 the Court allowed the filing of the certification fourteen (14) days before the
dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. LandBank,21 the Court reinstated a petition on the ground of substantial compliance
even though the verification and certification were submitted only after the petition had already been originally
dismissed. In Havtor Management Philippines Inc. v. NLRC,22 we acknowledged substantial compliance when the
lacking secretarys certificate was submitted by the petitioners as an attachment to the motion for reconsideration
seeking reversal of the original decision dismissing the petition for its earlier failure to submit such requirement.

As with Havtor, Varorient rectified its failure to submit proof of its Corporate Secretarys authority to sign the
verification/certification on non-forum shopping on its behalf when the necessary document was attached to its motion
for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. The admission of these documents, and consequently, the petition
itself, is in line with the cases we have cited. It must be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of
non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the
objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping.23

We now turn to the more crucial and ultimately determinative issues.

The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition, cited the failure of Colarina, president of Varorient, to execute a separate
certification. We hold that this ground ultimately does not justify the dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals.

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers (POEA Rules) makes
clear that the corporate officers, directors and partners are required to execute a verified undertaking that they would be
jointly and severally liable with the company over claims arising from the employer-employee relationship.24 By legal
mandate, the interest of Colarina in this case, arising as it does from the employer-employee relationship, is intertwined
with that of Varorient.

We must examine the legal nature of the obligation for which Colarina is being held liable in the present case. The
POEA Rules holds her, as a corporate officer, solidarily liable with the local licensed manning agency. Her liability is
inseparable from those of Varorient and Lagoa. If anyone of them is held liable then all of them would be liable for the
same obligation. Each of the solidary debtors, insofar as the creditor/s is/are concerned, is the debtor of the entire
amount; it is only with respect to his co-debtors that he/she is liable to the extent of his/her share in the
obligation.25 Such being the case, the Civil Code allows each solidary debtor, in actions filed by the creditor/s, to avail
himself of all defenses which are derived from the nature of the obligation and of those which are personal to him, or
pertaining to his share.26 He may also avail of those defenses personally belonging to his co-debtors, but only to the
extent of their share in the debt.27 Thus, Varorient may set up all the defenses pertaining to Colarina and Lagoa;
whereas Colarina and Lagoa are liable only to the extent to which Varorient may be found liable by the court. The
complaint against Varorient, Lagoa and Colarina is founded on a common cause of action; hence, the defense or the
appeal by anyone of these solidary debtors would redound to the benefit of the others.28

De Leon v. Court of Appeals29 featured a husband and wife who were sued jointly for a sum of money. After the trial
court had ruled against the spouses, the husband through counsel timely filed a notice of appeal, while the wife,
through another counsel, attempted to submit a separate notice of appeal which was belatedly filed. The wifes notice
of appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals on account of its belatedness. Commenting on these circumstances, the
Court, through Justice Quisumbing, observed:

x x x Respondent spouses having been jointly sued under a common cause of action, an appeal made by the husband
inures to the benefit of the wife. The notice of appeal filed by Estelita was a superfluity, the appeal having been
perfected earlier by her husband.30

The passage finds persuasive application to the case at bar.1awphi1 As in this case, Varorient and Colarina were jointly
sued under a common cause of action. By virtue of the requisite undertaking under the POEA Rules, Colarina is
solidarily bound to Varorient for whatever liabilities may arise in this case. In De Leon, the timely filing by the husband
of the notice of appeal was deemed to have inured to the benefit of his wife, who had filed a tardy notice of appeal of her
own. Thus, in this case the substantial compliance by Varorient should likewise redound to the benefit of the other solidary
obligors, such as Colarina, who may have been independently deficient in the execution of their own requirements.

The Court is ready to arrive at such a conclusion because it sees that Colarinas participation in this case is ultimately
dispensable to its resolution. If Varorient were to be found liable and made to pay pursuant thereto, the entire
obligation would already be extinguished31 even if no attempt was made to enforce the judgment against Colarina.
Because there existed a common cause of action against the three solidary obligors, as the acts and omissions imputed
against them are one and the same, an ultimate finding that Varorient was not liable would, under these circumstances,
logically imply a similar exoneration from liability for Colarina and Lagoa, whether or not they interposed any defense.

The other contentious issue is whether the certificate of non-forum shopping filed by Varorient as a local manning
agent is sufficient to cover and benefit its foreign principal, Lagoa. On that score, the Court of Appeals again erred in
dismissing the petition since a very specific line of jurisprudence has emerged precisely to the effect that the foreign
principal need not execute a separate verification and certification from that of the local agent.

That issue was squarely resolved in the case of MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC.32 As in this case, the Court of Appeals
had dismissed a special civil action for certiorari on account of the failure of the foreign principal to execute a separate
verification and certification against forum shopping from that submitted by the local private employment agency. The
holding of the Court in MC Engineering may very well apply to this case, thus:

In the case at bar, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals contains a certification
against forum shopping. However, the said certification was signed only by the corporate secretary of petitioner MCEI.
No representative of petitioner Hanil signed the said certification. As such, the issue to be resolved is whether or not a
certification signed by one but not all of the parties in a petition constitutes substantial compliance with the
requirements regarding the certification of non-forum shopping.

xxxx

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration the fact that petitioner Hanil is being
sued by private respondent in its capacity as the foreign principal of petitioner MCEI. It was petitioner MCEI, as
the local private employment agency, who entered into contracts with potential overseas workers on behalf of
petitioner Hanil.

It must be borne in mind that local private employment agencies, before they can commence recruiting workers
for their foreign principal, must submit with the POEA a formal appointment or agency contract executed by
the foreign based employer empowering the local agent to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the
principal or foreign-based employer for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and contract of
employment. Considering that the local private employment agency may sue on behalf of its foreign principal on the
basis of its contractual undertakings submitted to the POEA, there is no reason why the said agency cannot likewise
sign or execute a certification of non-forum shopping for its own purposes and/or on behalf of its foreign principal.

It must likewise be stressed that the rationale behind the requirement that the petitioners or parties to the action
themselves must execute the certification of non-forum shopping is that the said petitioners or parties are in the best
position to know of the matters required by the Rules of Court in the said certification. Such requirement is not
circumvented and is substantially complied with when, as in this case, the local private employment agency signs the
said certification alone. It is the local private employment agency, in this case petitioner MCEI, who is in the best
position to know of the matters required in a certification of non-forum shopping.33

The conclusions reached by the Court in MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC34 are further supported by the relevant rules
and regulations adopted by the POEA, which establish in essence that the foreign principal does not have personality in
the Philippines unless it acts through a licensed local manning agent as its accredited principal. The POEA Rules
specifically ordains that the local manning agent is solidarily liable for every obligation that the foreign principal may
incur against the local worker:

Part I General Provisions

x x x Rule II Definition of Terms:

Joint and Solidary Liability refers to the nature of liability of the principal and the manning agency, for any
and all claims arising out of the implementation of the employment contract involving Filipino seafarers. It shall
likewise refer to the nature of liability of officers, directors, partners or sole proprietors with the company over claims
arising from employer-employee relationship.

xxxx

Part II Licensing and Regulation

RULE II Issuance of License

Section 1. Requirements for Licensing.

xxxx

e. A verified undertaking stating that the applicant shall: xxx xxx xxx 8. Assume joint and solidary liability with the
employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the employment
contract, including but not limited to wages, death and disability compensation and their repatriation;

xxxx

f. In case of corporation or partnership, verified undertaking by officers, directors and partners that they will be jointly
and severally liable with the company over claims arising from employer-employee relationship.

Further perusal of the POEA Rules indicates that the relationship between the local manning agent and the foreign
principal is so intertwined. Indeed, the foreign principal does not have any capacity to act in the Philippines, unless
through its accredited local manning agent. For example, an accredited foreign principal can only engage and employ
Filipino seafarers for specific ship/s through a licensed local manning agency; and foreign principals/employers who
wish to advertise job requirements using Philippine print media, broadcast, or television may do so only through a
POEA licensed local manning agency. Moreover, only duly licensed local manning agencies may file an application
for registration of principals; while registered foreign principals are required to enroll ships through their agencies.

We thus re-stress that a foreign principal that is acting only through its local manning agent has no need to file a
separate certificate of non-forum shopping.35

Clearly then, following stare decisis and even a cursory look at the POEA rules and regulations, the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error of law when it dismissed the petition because of the failure of Colarina and Lagoa to
execute the verification and certification of non-forum shopping independently of Varorient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 15 May 2004 and 09 August
2004 are SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.

SO ORDERED.
In addition to cases to be read for tomorrow from existing list please read the following also:

g.r. No. 117056; 2-24-1998, ADB overseas manpower vs. nlrc;

gr no. 153942; 6-29-05 sameer vs. levantino;

gr no. 169158, 7-1-15 pentagon int'l vs CA;

gr 170139, 8-5-14 sameer overseas placement vs joy cabiles;

gr no. 190203, 11-07-16 powerhouse staffbuilders intl vs. romelia rey, et al.;

varorient shipping vs. NLRC 11-28-07 gr no. 164940.

Cases pertain to solidary liability of principal and recruitment agency. Pls. Inform classmates and
acknowledge receipt hereof thanks Sent from my iPhone