Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CASTRO, J.:
"... the applicant Nieves Cruz has likewise sold her one-half
(1/2) undivided share to the spouses Atanacio Valenzuela
and Maxima (Maximina) Victorio and to Liberata Santos from
whom she had received partial payments thereof in the sum
of P22,000.00;" (Exhibit 4-a).
decreed, on July 15, 1960, the registration of the land in the names
of the applicants aforesaid
In due season, the trial court finding for plaintiff Nieves Cruz and
her buyer, Barbara Lombos Rodriguez, and against defendants
rendered judgment thus
This case is before us for the second time. In L-28462, the heirs of
Nieves Cruz and the present petitioner (Barbara Lombos Rodriguez)
filed a joint petition for certiorari as an original action under Rule 65
and, simultaneously, as an appeal under Rule 45. As the former, it
sought redress against the refuse of the respondent Court of Appeals to
consider a motion for reconsideration filed beyond the reglementary
period. As the latter, it sought a review of the respondent Court's findings
of fact and conclusions of law. On January 3, 1968 we denied the joint
petition; the joint petition was thereafter amended, and this amended
petition we likewise denied on January 26, 1968; on February 20, 1968
we denied the motion for reconsideration filed solely by Rodriguez.
On July 20, 1968, Rodriguez alone filed the present petition for
mandamus and certiorari. She prays for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the respondents from enforcing the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 35084-R and from entering
into any negotiation or transaction or otherwise exercising acts of
ownership over the parcel of land covered by transfer certificate of title
91135 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. She also prays that
preliminary injunction issue to restrain the Register of Deeds of Rizal
from registering any documents affecting the subject parcel of land. No
injunction, however, was issued by us.
The petition in the present case, L-29264, while again assailing the
findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the respondent Court,
adds two new grounds. The first is the allegation that the land involved in
CA-G.R. 35084-R has a value in excess of P200,000. The petitioner
complains that the Court of Appeals should have certified the appeal to
us, pursuant to section 3 of Rule 50 in relation to section 17(5) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, 1 as she had asked the said Court to do in her
supplemental motion of June 14, 1968. The second ground is the claim
that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying her
May 14, 1968 motion for new trial, based on alleged newly discovered
evidence.
It is our considered view that the petitioner's claim of grave abuse by the
respondent Court in denying her motion for new trial is devoid of merit. It
is not disputed that, on the assumption that the respondent Court had
jurisdiction over the appeal, the petitioner had already lost her right to
appeal from the decision of October 4, 1967 when the petition in L-
28462 was filed in January 1968. It logically follows that the case had
passed the stage for new trial on newly discovered evidence when the
petitioner filed her motion for new trial on May 14, 1968.
Two issues remain, to wit, (1) the value of the land in controversy; and
(2) estoppel.
At the time appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals. section 17(5) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, provided:
(5) All civil cases in which the value in controversy exceeds two
hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs or in
which the title or possession of real estate exceeding in value the
sum of two hundred thousand pesos to be ascertained by the oath
of a party to the cause or by other competent evidence, is involved
or brought in question. The Supreme Court shall likewise have
exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in civil cases, even though
the value in controversy, exclusive of interests and costs, is two
hundred thousand pesos or less, when the evidence involved in
said cases is the same as the evidence submitted in an appealed
civil case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided herein.
The petitioner would have us believe that, other than a realtor's sworn
statement dated June 14, 1968, which was filed with the respondent
Court together with her supplemental motion, there is nothing in the
records that would indicate the value of the litigated parcel. We disagree.
The "Kasunduan" (annex A to the petition) dated December 31, 1958
executed by and between Nieves Cruz and Atanacio Valenzuela, et al.
fixed the value of the land (of an area of 44,634 square meters) at P1.60
per square meter. The decision (annex B) of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal dated August 12, 1964 assessed the value of the land at P3.00
per square meter. The decision (annex D) dated October 4, 1967 of the
respondent Court of Appeals pointed out that the consideration stated in
the deed of sale of the land executed by Nieves Cruz in favor of
Rodriguez, the petitioner herein, is P77,216. Moreover, until June 14,
1968, no party to the cause questioned the valuation of P3.00 per
square meter made by the trial court. The records, therefore,
overwhelmingly refute the petitioner's allegation. They also prove that
the value of the entire parcel of land had been impliedly admitted by the
parties as being below P200,000.
We do not here rule that where the pleadings or other documents in the
records of a case state a value of a real estate in controversy, a party to
the cause may not show that the true value thereof is more or is less
than that stated in the records. Section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948
precisely allows a party to submit a sworn statement of such higher or
lower value. This is not to say, of course, that the court is bound by a
party's sworn statement, for where more than one party submit materially
differing statements of value, or where a party's sworn statement
conflicts with other competent evidence, the true value is to be
determined by the trial court as an issue of fact before it.
The time when the issue of the value of a real estate in controversy is to
be resolved is prior to, or simultaneously with, the approval of the record
on appeal and appeal bond, for it is upon the perfection of the appeal
that the appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the case (Rule 41,
section 9). It is at this time that a party to the cause, be he the intended
appellant or the intended appellee, must raise the issue of value before
the trial court, for said court to allow appeal involving a question of fact
either to this Court or to the Court of Appeals, depending on its finding
on the value of the realty. Failure to raise this issue before the trial court
amounts to a submission of the issue solely on the basis of the
pleadings and evidence a quo and is equivalent to a waiver of the right
to present the statement under oath or to adduce the other competent
evidence referred to in section 17(b) of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Other issues, both of fact and of law, are raised in the pleadings.
Considering our conclusion that the respondent Court had jurisdiction
over the appeal, it is not necessary to discuss, much less resolve, any of
those other issues. However, because the petitioner and the heirs of
Nieves Cruz have hammered on the twin issues of the existence of an
oral contract of sale and of the efficacy of an oral novatory contract of
sale, a brief discussion of these issues would not be amiss.
The parties and the lower courts are agreed that Nieves Cruz had
received P20,000 from Atanacio Valenzuela, et al., by January 5, 1959
and that the payment of this total sum was in accordance with the
agency agreement. The parties and the lower courts, however, are at
variance on the basis or reason for the subsequent payments. The
petitioner herein, the heirs of Nieves Cruz and the Court of First Instance
of Rizal take the position that the payments after January 5, 1959 were
received by Nieves Cruz as partial or installment payments of the
purchase price on the representations of Atanacio Valenzuela, et al., that
they had a buyer for the property from whom these payments came, all
pursuant to the agency agreement. The respondents Atanacio
Valenzuela, et al., on the other hand, assert that those amounts were
paid by them, as disclosed buyers, to Nieves Cruz and her children,
pursuant to a novatory verbal contract of sale entered into with Nieves
Cruz, subsequent to the agency agreement and prior to the issuance of
the decree of registration of July 15, 1960.
It is thus clear that the decisive issues are (a) whether or not Nieves
Cruz did agree to sell to Atanacio Valenzuela, et al., the litigated parcel
of land sometime after January 5, 1959, and (b) whether or not the said
agreement is enforceable or can be proved under the law. The fact that
Atanacio Valenzuela, et al. were agents of Nieves Cruz under the
agency agreement of December 31, 1958 is not material, for if it is true
that Nieves Cruz did agree to sell to her agents the real estate subject of
the agency, her consent took the transaction out of the prohibition
contained in article 1491(2) of the Civil Code. Neither are articles 1874
and 1878(5) and (12) of the Civil Code relevant, for they refer to sales
made by an agent for a principal and not to sales made by the owner
personally to another, whether that other be acting personally or through
a representative.
Was there a novatory oral contract to sell entered into by Nieves in favor
of Atanacio Valenzuela, et al.? In resolving this question, the respondent
Court pointed to significant facts and circumstances sustaining an
affirmative answer.
The pertinent certificates of title bear the annotation of the aforesaid right
of Atanacio Valenzuela, et al. The final decision of the land court to
the effect that Nieves Cruz had sold her undivided share to Atanacio
Valenzuela, et al., and had received a partial payment of P22,000 is
now beyond judicial review, and, because a land registration case is a
proceeding in rem, binds even Rodriguez.
1wph1.t
Fernandez, et al. vs. CA, et al. 230 SCRA 130, February 16, 1994 48
SCAD 333
PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed
Civil Case No. Q-45567 for support against the private respondent
before the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed on
December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P. Solano,1 who found that "(t)here
is nothing in the material allegations in the complaint that seeks to
compel (private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge (petitioners)
as his illegitimate children," and that there was no sufficient and
competent evidence to prove the petitioners filiation.2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case at
bench, another action for recognition and support against the private
respondent before another branch of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
87. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50111.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that
they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first
meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on
March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was
married until the birth of her two children. She averred they were married
in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered
that the marriage license which they used was spurious.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in
favor of petitioners, viz.:
SO ORDERED.
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may
be reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One
such situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash with those
of the trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to
exercise our extraordinary power, and settle the issue of whether the
ruling of the appellate court that private respondent is not the father of
the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners
identifying private respondent as their father are not also competent
evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show
that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates.
In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in
accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102
Phil. 1050 (1958), viz:
. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines explicity prohibited, not only the
naming of the father or the child born outside wedlock, when
the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by
him, but, also, the statement of any information or
circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly,
the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a
third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child,
when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent
evidence of fathership of said child. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth
certificate no signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not
competent evidence of paternity."
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the
petitioners and we are satisfied that the respondent appellate court
properly calibrated their weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of
Father Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of
petitioner Claro. He declared on the witness stand:
A Yes.
A Yes.
A Yes, I do.
A I am sure.
A I cannot recall.
A It must be in 1986.
A It is difficult. . .
Q When was the first time you know you are going
to testify here?
A Yes.
A Yes, sir.
A Yes.
We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent
appellate court applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason
in dismissing petitioners action for recognition and support. It is
unnecessary considering our findings that petitioners evidence failed to
substantiate their cause of action.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the
respondent court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Subject:
Facts:
Held:
1. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate. (par. 1, Article 255, Civil Code)
5. The Supreme Court found that from the evidence presented and the
fact that respondent and her husband continued to live in the same
province, there was always the possibility of access to each other. As
has already been pointed out, respondent's self-serving statements were
never corroborated nor confirmed by any other evidence.
7. Rolando has no birth certificate nor any other official record of birth.
His birth is attested to merely by oral declarations of witnesses and by a
Certificate of Baptism, which was prepared in the absence of the alleged
father, the petitioner.
8. The Court reiterated the ruling that while baptismal and marriage
certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only
to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified - but not the veracity of the states or declarations made therein
with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship.
11. It has been held or recognized that the evidence or proof to prove
impotency must be clear or satisfactory: clear, satisfactory and
convincing, irresistible or positive.
Only the Husband can Contest the Legitimacy of a Child Born to his
Wife
14. It must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces;
and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in
view of the moral or economic interest involved.
17. The Court ruled that as between the paternity by the husband and
the paternity by the paramour, all the circumstances being equal, the law
is inclined to follow the former. Hence, the child is thus given the benefit
of legitimacy.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner further prays for any other and further relief which this
Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.
The Local Civil Registrar of Manila filed an answer stating that he had no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth af the
averments contrained in the petition by the court, pursuant to Article
412of said Code, he would effect the correction prayed for in the petition.
Thus, both legal provisions explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the
father of a child born outside wedlock when the birth certificate, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of "any
information" or "circumstance" by which he "could be
identified."Accordingly, in Crisolo vs. Macadaeg * (G.R. No. L-7017,
decided April 29, 1954), we held that "the Local Civil Registrar had no
authority to make of record the paternity of an illegitimate child "upon the
information of aperson"; that "records of public officers which are
admissible 'are limited to those matters which the public officer has
authority to record,"; that "it is essential authorize admission of a copy of
the record of a privateinstrument that such instrument 'be made in
accordance with statutory requirement"' (see also, 20 Am. Jur., p. 880);
was signed by the mother of and that the certificate of birth of an
illegitimate was signed by the mother of the latter, "is undoubtedly
incompetent evidence of fathership of said child."
DECISION
GUERRERO, J p:
77/
134 Berciles;
134 Berciles;
is erroneous in view of the rule We laid down in Re: Claims for Benefits
of the Heirs of the Late Mario V. Chanliongco, et al., 79 SCRA 364; Vda.
de Consuegra, et al. vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315 that retirement benefits
shall accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his legal heirs in
accordance with the law on intestate succession, as in the case of a life
insurance if no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy, and that the
money value of the unused vacation and sick leave, and unpaid salary
form part of the conjugal estate of the married employee.
Iluminada Ponce of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, and her four children, Ilona,
Ellery, England and Ione, filed with Us an application for survivors
benefits under Republic Act 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 effective
August 21, 1979 as the legal spouse and legitimate children of the late
Judge Pascual G. Berciles, duly supported by the required documents.
The other set of claimants are Flor Fuentebella, and her four children,
namely Pascual Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda, all surnamed
Berciles, the latter filing her family's claim by means of a letter dated
November 10, 1979 and supporting documents were also submitted with
their claim. The matter of these two (2) conflicting claims was first
docketed before this Court as Administrative Matter No. 1337-Ret. and in
a Resolution of the Court En Banc dated April 10, 1980, We resolved to
APPROVE the application of Ms. Iluminada P. Berciles for survivor's
benefits under the above-cited law, effective August 21, 1979, subject to
(a) the proper determination of the rightful beneficiaries and their
corresponding shares in accordance with law, it appearing that there are
two claimant families thereto, and (b) the usual clearance requirements.
Thereupon, Atty. Quilala sent on December 22, 1980 to all the alleged
heirs a notice of hearing set for January 26, 1981 and the following days
thereafter for the reception of evidence in support of their respective
claims. None of the parties, however, appeared. Records from the
Retirement Section, Administrative Services Office of this Court show
that the claim of Iluminada Ponce and her children was already
approved by the GSIS as of October 9, 1980 and that in fact, the five
years lump sum equivalent to P301,760.00 (gratuity less the retirement
premiums paid under R.A. 910, as amended, which was to be returned
to the retiree by the GSIS) under Check No. 04824308 as retirement
gratuity of the deceased had been remitted by the Budget and Finance
Office of this Court to the GSIS for payment to the heir-beneficiaries on
October 15, 1980.
"1. It is recommended that the death benefits under PD 626 due to the
death of the deceased of a compensable contingency, be awarded to
Iluminada Ponce having established her marriage to the deceased and
had been living with the deceased up to the time of the latter's death.
"2. In the same light, the claim of Flor Fuentebella be denied for two
reasons: (a) She has not clearly established her legitimate relationship
with the deceased and, (b) She was not living with the deceased at the
time of his death as required by the rules and regulation of P.D. 626, as
amended. (Rule XIV, Section 1(b), No. 1 the legitimate spouse living with
the employee at the time of employee's death . . .)."
and (B) Certified Xerox copies of the late Judge Berciles' Income Tax
Returns for 1975, 1976 and 1979 where he listed Mrs. Iluminada P.
Berciles as his wife or spouse; also submitted in addition to the foregoing
documents, is a certified xerox copy of the application for optional
insurance filed with the GSIS by the late Judge Berciles, dated
November 19, 1956, wherein the deceased listed as his beneficiaries
therein the following persons:.
"the alleged marital relationship between the late Judge Berciles and Ms.
Flor Fuentebella Berciles has no leg to stand on. It should be stated in
this connection that there was no marriage contract submitted by Miss
Rhoda F. Berciles in her claim-letter, dated October 29, 1979, nor was
there any certification from the Local Civil Registrar certifying to the fact
that the deceased Judge was actually married to Miss Flor Fuentebella.
It can, therefore, be assumed that Miss Flor Fuentebella was not legally
married to the late Judge Pascual Berciles. Necessarily, it follows that
the innocent children that came into being out of the alleged marital
union of the deceased Judge and Ms. Flor Fuentebella Berciles are
spurious and have no established family filiation with the said Judge. We
can, therefore, rule that the attached papers/documents in the letter of
Miss Rhoda F. Berciles, dated October 29, 1979 relative to their claim as
the surviving heirs of the late CFI Judge Pascual Berciles are mere
scrap of papers unworthy of credence, there being no substantiating
evidence to corroborate the same, especially so in the face of the
adverse claim of Mrs. Iluminada Ponce Berciles as the rightful surviving
spouse and with whom the deceased Judge was living with at the time of
his untimely demise."
"Re: Claim of the heirs of the late Pascual G. Berciles, former District
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Cebu City, for the unpaid
salary, money value of terminal leave and representation and
transportation allowances of the deceased Judge. - Considering the
memorandum of Deputy Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea,
recommending that the unpaid salary, money value of terminal leave and
representation and transportation allowances of the late District Judge
Pascual G. Berciles be awarded and correspondingly distributed to his
lawful heirs, the Court Resolved to AWARD and CORRESPONDINGLY
DISTRIBUTE aforesaid benefits to his lawful heirs, namely: Mrs.
Iluminada Ponce Berciles, surviving spouse; Mrs. Ilona Berciles Alvarez,
daughter; Ellery Berciles, son; England P. Berciles, son; and Ione P.
Berciles, daughter."
On April 23, 1981, Flor Fuentebella and her four children, Pascual
Voltaire, Ma. Luisa, Mercy, and Rhoda, through counsel, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration praying that the resolution of March 17, 1981 be set
aside; that they be allowed to present their evidence; and that, after due
hearing, the benefits be awarded and distributed to them as lawful heirs.
In support of their motion, the movants alleged that they did not receive
the Resolution of March 17, 1981 nor the letter or notice of hearing sent
by Atty. Quilala on December 22, 1980, the same having been sent to
their old address at 6069-B, Palma St., Makati; that all of the movants
have left the Philippines to reside in the United States of America and
that the aunts and cousins residing at the old address moved to a new
address at GSIS Village, Project 8, Quezon City; that before they moved
to the new address, these relatives left a forwarding address at the
Makati Post Office; and, that they did not receive the aforementioned
mail. The fact of non-receipt was confirmed by one Domingo P. Raiz,
letter carrier of the Post Office of Makati, who executed an affidavit to
that effect, which affidavit We admitted in Our resolution of July 9, 1981.
The matter of the Fuentebella Motion for Reconsideration is docketed
before Us as Administrative Matter No. 10468-CFI.
This Court in its resolution of April 10, 1980 approved the grant of
survivors' benefits subject to the proper determination of the rightful
beneficiaries and their corresponding shares in accordance with law, it
appearing that there are two claimant families. (Adm. Matter No. 1337 -
Ret. re Gratuity of Judge Berciles).
Atty. Luzel D. Demasu-ay, counsel for Flor Fuentebella and her four
children, in his motion for reconsideration dated April 21, 1981, alleged
that his clients were not heard before that payment was made. He said
that the payment was being capitalized upon by Iluminada Ponce and
her children in the GSIS as the basis for the payment to them of the
retirement gratuity of Judge Berciles.
Considering that the issue as to who are the legal heirs of Judge
Berciles is still being litigated in the Social Security Services of the GSIS
(according to Atty. Felicisimo Fernandez of that unit), and the survivors'
benefits have not yet been paid to Iluminada Ponce and her children,
and considering that the children of Flor Fuentebella, even as illegitimate
children of Judge Berciles, would be entitled to a share in his terminal
leave pay, allowance and unpaid salary (In re Chanliongco, Adm. Matter
No. 190-Ret., October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 364), the Court Resolved (1)
to require Iluminada Ponce and her children, c/o Ione P. Berciles, 9
Jersey Street, Toro Hills, Project 8, Quezon City, to COMMENT on the
said motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from notice and (2)
to direct Atty. Juan P. Enriquez, Jr., Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of
the Administrative Division, to advise the GSIS that, should Flor
Fuentebella and her children be ultimately adjudged as legal heirs of
Judge Berciles, their share in the sum of P60,817.50 (terminal leave pay,
etc.) would be taken from the survivors' benefits amounting to P301,760,
already remitted to the GSIS and, consequently, the shares of Iluminada
Ponce and her children in the said gratuity would answer for the portions
due to Flor Fuentebella, et al. in the terminal leave pay, etc., if adjudged
entitled thereto.
"As may be seen from this Court's resolution of April 10, 1980 in
Administrative Matter No. 1337-Ret. regarding the gratuity of Judge
Berciles, this Court has not finally and conclusively decided that the
children of Flor Fuentebella are not the heirs of the late Judge Berciles.
PD 626, as amended.
I Medical Evaluation -.
II Legal Evaluation
A. Documents Submitted:
It appears that there are two claimants - both surviving spouse namely
FLOR FUENTEBELLA and ILUMINADA PONCE, who alleged to have
been married to the deceased.
(1.) Documents submitted by Flor Fuentebella:
(b) Affidavit of Pascual Berciles dated May 22, 1972 that he and Flor
were married by the late Judge J. Vicente Mapa.
(e) Birth certificate of Pascual Voltaire Berciles - Aug. 30, 1938; Maria
Luisa, June 27, 1943; Mercy, July 23, 1947; Rhoda, Feb. 7, 1949.
(f) Xerox copy of Income Tax Return for 1972 of Pascual showing Flor
as the wife.
(b) Birth certificate of Ilona May 15, 1945; Ellery - Sept. 21, 1946;
England Nov. 14, 1948; Ione Ainee Aug. 25, 1955.
(e) Affidavit of Pascual Berciles dated April 21, 1978 mentioning Ione
and Iluminada as his daughter and wife respectively.
(a) Affidavit dated Feb. 14, 1980, of City Judge Rafael Lavente rectifying
his previous affidavit that he was not present in the wedding of Flor and
Pascual.
(b) Certification dated Feb. 4, 1980, from Ministry of Justice that there is
no record of one J. Mapa as Municipal Judge of Iloilo from 1935 to 1945.
B. Findings
3. Iluminada and the deceased were living together at the time of the
latter's death (August 21, 1979).
Recommendation
2. In the same light, the claim of Flor Fuentebella be denied for two
reasons:
(a) She has not clearly established her legitimate relationship with the
deceased and,
(b) She was not living with the deceased at the time of his death as
required by the rules and regulation of PD 626, as amended. (Rule XIV,
Section 1(b), No. 1 the legitimate spouse living with the employee at the
time of employee's death . . .).
APPROVED:
CONFIRMED:
In denying the above approval, the GSIS in its Memorandum claims that
the matter was elevated sometime in October 1980 to the Committee on
Claims Settlement for the proper determination of the legal heirs of the
late Judge Berciles. The two sets of claimants having failed to reach an
amicable settlement, the GSIS advised the parties to submit the
necessary documents to prove their relationship or filiation to the
deceased.
(Arts. 148 (2), 153 (2), 895, 983, 999, New Civil Code)
xxx xxx xxx"
We note that private respondents in their Comment dated July 27, 1981
to the petition herein, while pointing out that the Supreme Court is not
the proper forum for the original determination of the legal heirs of a
deceased judge who is covered by R.A. 910 as amended and that the
determination of the question of heirship can be appropriately
considered only in our regular courts of justice where private
respondents actually did file a Special Civil Action No. 13966 for
"Mandamus with Prayer for a Restraining Order" in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, a copy of which is attached to the Comment
as Annex "A", raised the same issue of illegality as may be seen clearly
in par. 8 of the petition as follows:
And like the petitioners herein, private respondents contend that the
GSIS patently and gravely abused its discretion in denying the latter's
claim to the death benefits of the late Judge Pascual Berciles as the
legal and lawful heirs as may also be clearly seen in par. 10 of the
Mandamus Petition in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 13966, which
reads thus:
"10. That in denying petitioners claim on the death benefit of the late
Judge Pascual Berciles of whom petitioners are the legal and lawful
heirs and in neglecting and refusing to issue forthwith a resolution
adjudicating the death benefit amounting to P311,460.00 in favor of the
petitioners as legal heirs, the respondent Board of Trustees of the GSIS
patently and gravely abused its discretion and unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which is specifically enjoined upon it by Sec. 5 of
R.A. 910, as amended by R.A. 1057, R.A. 1797, R.A. 2614, R.A. 4627
and R.A. 5095;
But to set the records straight, We quote hereunder the findings of the
Committee on Claims Settlement which the GSIS Board of Trustees
adopted and approved under its Resolution No. 431:
"The evidence for claimant Flor Fuentebella Berciles and her children
may also be briefly described as follows: She claims to have been
married to the late Judge Pascual Berciles on March 28, 1937 in Iloilo
City before Justice of the Peace Jose Vicente Mapa. In other words, she
professes to be the first wife of the deceased Judge. Flor Fuentebella
was, however, not able to present her marriage contract or certificate of
marriage. Instead she submitted a certification of the Local Civil Registar
of Iloilo City (Exh. "1") attesting to the loss or destruction of the records
of marriage for the year 1944 and previous years and another
certification issued by the Office of Civil Registrar General of the
National Census and Statistics Office (Exh. "2") stating the non-
availability of the record of marriage between Pascual Berciles and Flor
Fuentebella.
"In concrete support of her claim of marriage to the late Judge Berciles,
Flor Fuentebella presented to the Committee sworn statements of
several persons. Of the several sworn statements, at least two or three
deserve serious consideration. The first is the one executed by
Concepcion M. Gonzales (Exh. "31") of 46 South Mapa, Philam Homes,
Quezon City, who stated that she knew for a fact that Flor Fuentebella
was married to Pascual Berciles in 1937 at Iloilo City. It was represented
to the Committee that she was present as a guest in the marriage
ceremony. Due to importance of her testimony, the Committee
requested her actual presence in the hearing. However, due to her
advanced age of 89 years and her other physical infirmity, her
attendance at the hearing was dispensed with instead, the Committee
directed the Manager, Survivorship Department to secure her deposition
on questions prepared in advance by the Committee. In his report to the
Committee, the Manager stated that the old lady is already blind, quite
hard of hearing and her memory already weak. In the Answers (Exh.
"31-A") to the questions written by the Manager, Survivorship
Department, Concepcion Gonzales declared that she was present during
the marriage ceremony of Pascual Berciles and Flor Fuentebella which
was held in the Municipal Hall of Iloilo City. She described the wedding
as attended by only the members of the family and that after the
ceremony they went to the house of Pascual's parents where a small
party was held.
"The other sworn statements which merit particular discussion are those
executed by Coronacion Berciles (Exhs. "10 and 31") a sister-in-law of
the late Judge Berciles. Coronacion was presented before the
Committee as a witness for Flor Fuentebella. In her testimony, she
stated facts and circumstances about the marital relations between
Pascual Berciles and Flor Fuentebella. She declared that her husband
was the younger brother of the late Judge Berciles; that even before
Pascual Berciles became a lawyer in 1938, he and Flor Fuentebella
were introduced to her by her husband; that after she was married to her
husband, they lived together with the family of Pascual Berciles and his
wife Flor Fuentebella; that their two families had lived closely enough
during the Japanese Occupation and even after. She further stated that
the immediate members of the family with whom the spouses Pascual
Berciles and Flor Fuentebella had lived before and during the war were
his mother Evarista, his two aunts Luisa Berciles and Eusebia Gayta and
a sister Susana Berciles. These testimonial and other declarations were
latter transcribed into a sworn statement which Coronacion executed on
December 5, 1980 and submitted to the Committee. (Exh. "32").
"Of course the affidavit of Flor F. Berciles herself (Exh. "5") was
submitted wherein she stated that she was the legal wife of the late
Pascual G. Berciles and that she was married to him in Iloilo City on
March 28, 1937. The affidavit is nothing more than a self-serving
statement. Flor Fuentebella was not presented to the Committee as a
material witness. On the other hand, the sworn statement of Pascual
Berciles (Exh. "4") commands no evidentiary value at all. Mr. Santiago
Medina, former Provincial Fiscal of Cebu, who appears to have
administered the oath, in a subsequent sworn statement (Exh. "M")
denied his signature on the document (Exh. "4").
"The letters written by Judge Berciles to her daughters with Flor
Fuentebella especially the one sent to daughter Mercy Berciles (Exh.
"22") wherein he vigorously affirmed that it's only her mother, Flor
Fuentebella, and no other woman who was recognized as his wife and
loved by her parents deserve scant consideration. Pascual Berciles
could not be expected to admit the existence of his other family. This
would be disastrous to his efforts at preventing one family from knowing
the other.
From the above recital, We can readily summarize the following three (3)
conclusions therein made and arrived at by the Committee which were
approved and adopted in toto by respondent GSIS through Board of
Trustees Resolution No. 431, to wit:
"It should be noted, however, that a Civil Registry Law was passed in
1930 (Act No. 3753) containing provisions for the registration of births,
including those of illegitimate parentage; and the record of birth under
such law, if sufficient in contents for the purpose, would meet the
requisites for voluntary recognition even under Article 131. Since
Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1),
which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied
upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No
such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains
the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the
original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act
No. 3753 (Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 493; In re
Adoption of Lydia Duran, 92 Phil. 729). For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data
to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the
birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary
recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
Article 131. True enough, but in such a case there must be a clear
statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or
her own (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1); and in Exhibit 1 no such
statement appears. The claim of voluntary recognition is without basis."
As to the baptismal certificate, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that although the
baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a child of the
decedent, yet, if in the preparation of the record the decedent had no
intervention, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary
recognition of parentage. (Canales vs. Arrogante, et al., 91 Phil. 6;
Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Samson vs. Corrales Tan, 48 Phil.
401; Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1; Malonda vs. Infante Vda. de
Malonda, 81 Phil. 149). The reason for this rule that canonical records
do not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and
117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical
record is simply proof of the only act to which the priest may certify by
reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his
presence, like the administration of the sacrament upon a day stated; it
is no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage
of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require separate
and concrete evidence. (Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350).
"This Court, construing the various pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
concerning illegitimate children, has held that an illegitimate (spurious)
child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from his parents,
must prove his filiation and that this may be done by means of voluntary
or compulsory recognition of the relationship. For this purpose, the
provisions concerning natural children are held applicable, thus,
recognition is voluntary when made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing (Article
278); and compulsory when made by means of a court action in the
cases enumerated in Articles 283 and 284 (Paulino vs. Paulino, L-
15091, Dec. 28, 1961).
Neither are the family pictures, Exhs. 30 to 30-M, which, according to the
Committee, do not indicate that the marriage (between Judge Berciles
and Flor Fuentebella) took place and that if at all, the said pictures show
the presence of a family with or without the sanction of marriage. We
agree and We add that said pictures do not constitute proof of filiation.
We also agree with the finding of the Committee that "(t)he letters written
by Judge Berciles to her daughters with Flor Fuentebella especially the
one sent to daughter Mercy Berciles (Exh. "22") wherein he vigorously
affirmed that it's only her mother, Flor Fuentebella, and no other woman
who was recognized as his wife and loved by her parents deserve scant
consideration. Pascual Berciles could not be expected to admit the
existence of his other family. This would be disastrous to his efforts at
preventing one family from knowing the other." Not only do they deserve
scant consideration but also, there is jurisprudence that a typewritten
letter signed by the father is not an authentic writing. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of Feb. 27, 1923 and Dec. 7, 1927 cited in 3
Castan, 6th ed., 25; see Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law,
Vol. I, p. 379).
The records disclose that all the private respondents have left the
Philippines and are now residing in the United States. They have not
appeared at the hearing before the Committee on Claims Settlement to
testify in support of their claim of filiation and acknowledgment. And We
find no clear and competent proof, no positive and substantial evidence
presented by private respondents that their alleged father had admitted
or recognized his paternity of the private respondents Maria Luisa
Berciles, Mercy Berciles and Rhoda Berciles.
Under the law, Article 287, New Civil Code, illegitimate children other
than natural in accordance with Art. 269 are entitled to support and such
successional rights as are granted in the Code, but for this Article to be
applicable, there must be admission or recognition of the paternity of the
illegitimate child. (Paterno, et al. vs. Paterno, 20 SCRA 585, citing Noble
vs. Noble, G.R. No. L-17742, Dec. 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1104; Paulino vs.
Paulino, G.R. No. L-15091, Dec. 28, 1961, 113 Phil. 697). Article 887,
N.C.C., defining who are compulsory heirs, is clear and specific that "(i)n
all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved." And
in the Noble case, supra, the Supreme Court laid down this ruling:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, other than natural, must not only be
proven but it must be shown that such filiation was acknowledged by the
presumed parent. If the mere fact of paternity is all that needs to be
proven, that interpretation would pave the way to unscrupulous
individuals to take advantage of the death of the presumed parent, who
would no longer be in a position to deny the allegation, to present even
fictitious claims and expose the life of the deceased to inquiries affecting
his character." (emphasis supplied).
In fine, We hold and rule that the respondent GSIS committed grave
abuse of discretion in approving Resolution No. 431 which adopted the
erroneous recommendation of the Committee on Claims Settlement, a
recommendation which has no legal or factual basis to stand on.
Accordingly, the disposition made by respondent GSIS of the retirement
benefits due the heirs of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles is
consequently erroneous and not in accordance with law. Petitioners are
the lawful heirs entitled to the distribution of the benefits which shall
accrue to the estate of the deceased Judge Berciles and will be
distributed among the petitioners as his legal heirs in accordance with
the law on intestate succession. (Re: Mario vs. Chanliongco, 79 SCRA
364; Vda. de Consuegra vs. GSIS, 37 SCRA 325).
According to Article 996 of the New Civil Code which provides that "If a
widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each
of the children," and Article 980 which provides that "The children of the
deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares," the retirement benefits shall be distributed
equally to the five (5) heirs: Iluminada Ponce Berciles, Ilona Berciles
Alvarez, Ellery P. Berciles, England P. Berciles and Ione P. Berciles.
With respect to the terminal leave pay, unpaid salary and allowances
accruing to the deceased, since petitioners are the only lawful heirs of
the deceased Judge, only they are entitled to share thereto. There is no
need to disturb Our Resolution of March 17, 1981.
One final point, the issue raised by respondents that Section 25 of P.D.
1146, otherwise known as "The Revised Government Service Insurance
Act of 1977", cannot be invoked by petitioners in taking the present
appeal for the reason that the dispute between the parties have arisen
under the Judiciary Retirement Law, Republic Act No. 910, as amended
and not under P.D. 1146, and that the determination of the legal heirs of
a deceased judge covered by Republic Act 910 as amended, is vested in
the regular courts of justice.
Section 25 of P.D. 1146 provides:
"Sec. 25. Appeals. Within fifteen days from receipt of notice of decision
or award, the aggrieved party may appeal the same to the Court of
Appeals on questions of law and facts following the procedures for
appeals from the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals as far as
practicable and consistent with the purposes of this Act. If the appeal is
only on questions of law, the same shall be brought directly to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. No appeal bond shall be required. The
appeal shall take precedence over all other cases except criminal cases
wherein the penalty of life imprisonment or death has been imposed by
the trial court. Appeal shall not stay the decision of the Board unless so
ordered by the Board, by the Court of Appeals, or by the Supreme
Court."
=========
========
3. ELLERY P. BERCILES.
A. His 1/15 share of retirement Gratuity
P60,352.00
=========
4. ENGLAND P. BERCILES.
========
5. IONE P. BERCILES.
=========
The temporary restraining order issued herein per Our Resolution dated
July 13, 1981 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
KAPUNAN, J.:
That during the period between the last week of March 1989
and the first week of April 1989, in Barangay Lower Lamac,
Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have (sic) carnal
knowledge with Sandra Salcedo, complainant's daughter, a
woman who is a mongoloid and so weak of mind and in
intellect as to be capable of giving rational and legal
consent. 1
Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid
and daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had
a mind of a five-year old child, who still needed to be fed and dressed
up. Her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she expressed
herself by motions.
The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son
Alexander and wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers'
quarters inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial Headquarters, in
Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the house was occupied by Col.
Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while the lower storey had two (2) rooms,
one of which was occupied by the four security men and the other by
Alexander Salcedo and his wife.
On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named
Jacob Salcedo. Hence, the filing of the complaint 6 by Mrs. Pastora
Salcedo.
During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures
of different persons were laid on the table and Sandra was asked to pick
up the pictures of her assailants. Sandra singled out the pictures of
Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 7 Later, Sandra was brought out of
the investigation room to a police line-up of ten people, including Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to point to her
assailants. Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and
Ruel Prieto.8
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two daughters-in-
law, Joy Salcedo and Celsa Salcedo, to ask Sandra the identity of the
persons who sexually molested her. 9
Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually
molested her. Sandra revealed that Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto
were the ones who raped her. Sandra demonstrated how she was
raped. First, her thighs were touched, then she was hugged and her
panty was taken off. A push and pull movement followed. 10Celsa
testified that she was present when the victim demonstrated how she
was sexually abused by the two accused, including the way her nipples
were touched saying "dito hawak," and holding her breasts to
emphasize. She likewise went through the motion of removing her panty,
uttering at the same time "hubad panty."
During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood
Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended
party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test
conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has
a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A"
and accused-appellant type "O".
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of
the crime charged but acquitted the other accused, Ruel Prieto, on
reasonable doubt, stating that he "has a different type of blood with (sic)
the child Jacob Salcedo as his type of blood is "A", while that of child
Jacob Salcedo is
type "O".
SO ORDERED. 13
It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during
inspection tours but sometimes they were left behind and would play
pingpong or card games with Sandra at the ground floor of the house.
While Sandra was always with her mother, there were times when she
was left alone in the house with the accused. 14
A Two (2).
A Living room. 15
PROS. RAMOS:
RECORD:
A Yes pain.
RECORD:
A Yes.
RECORD:
A Yes sir.
A Yes.
A Yes.
Q Both of them?
A Yes.
A Moreno.
Q In your house?
A Yes.
A In the room.
A Yes.
RECORD:
PROS. RAMOS:
A Moreno.
RECORD:
PROS. RAMOS:
A Joel.
PROS. RAMOS:
A Yes.
RECORD:
A No more.
SO ORDERED.
PADILLA, J.:
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but
upon plaintiff"s (herein petitioner"s) second motion for reconsideration, it
ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child
of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support.
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure
to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no
showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake in the
conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests should have
been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao"s contentions and reversed the trial
court"s decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is
not in a position to determine with mathematical precision the issue
of parentage by blood grouping test, considering the rulings of this
Court ... where the blood grouping tests of the NBI were admitted;
especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who
conducted the test and it appears that in the present case, the
same Dr. Sunico approved the findings and report. ... In Co Tao vs.
Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court had given
weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it
cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct
blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as the 1950"s.
On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her
as his own. In fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of
JANICE in the latter"s certificate of live birth be deleted, evidencing
his repudiation, rather than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in
cohabiting with ARLENE, the attention given to her during her
pregnancy and the financial assistance extended to her cannot
overcome the result of the blood grouping test. These acts of JAO
cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn JANICE as his own
as the possession of such status cannot be founded on
conjectures and presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier
said, JAO refused to acknowledge JANICE after the latter"s birth.
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that
the defendant is his father.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time
of conception, ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men:
"Oying" Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, which was not even
rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who introduced
ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of
ARLENE is not wholly reliable. When the trial court said that "the
Court is further convinced of plaintiff"s cause by ARLENE"s
manner of testifying in a most straight-forward and candid manner,"
the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a movie actress may have
been overlooked so that not even the trial court could detect, by
her acts, whether she was lying or not.
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and
conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-
paternity.
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in
man which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the
presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not
indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they
are of different types will indicate the impossibility of one being the
child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and the alleged
child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and
child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a blood
test exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-
paternity. 12
Moreover,
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have
been a proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two
years after the first blood test, she, represented by her mother, declined
to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove their allegations,
even as Jao was willing to undergo such a test again.16 1avvphi1
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and
holds that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at
bar, are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent
Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented
showing any defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide
adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result of
such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific
fact.
SO ORDERED.
The Court Found Insufficient Basis to Sustain the Charges against Atty.
Trecio; Continuous Support of the Child for Several Years as the Reason
for Desisting from Charging has not been Substantiated; The Credibility
of the Witness of Tan is in Issue; Testimonies showing Unusual
Closeness between Trocio and Jewel are not Convincing to Prove
Paternity; Child Born During Wedlock is Presumed to be Legitimate
Facts:
Held:
1. The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of April 1971.
Yet, no criminal charge was filed. It was only about eight years later that
an administrative complaint was presented before the Supreme Court.
2. The complainant's explanation that Trocios threat to cause the
deportation of her alien husband should she report to anyone made her
desist from filing a charge is not credible as she had admitted having lost
contact with her husband when he learned of respondent's transgression
that very same evening.
3. Another factor that engenders doubt in the mind of the Supreme Court
is the fact that after the alleged incident, she continued having dealings
with Trocio as if nothing had happened.
5. The fact that she kept her peace for so many years can even be
construed as a condonation of his alleged immoral conduct.
6. The Court found it strange that an unwanted son, as the child would
normally have been, should, of all names, be called "Jewel."
8. The court doubted the credibility of Garcia because her distance to the
crime scene, considering that such happened in the school premises,
was not established.
12. From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been
overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was
registered in his birth certificate the legitimate child of the Tan and her
husband
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Victoria and Ma. Flordeliza, all
surnamed Baluyot, then minors, represented by their mother and
guardian ad litem, Norma Urbana which seeks the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38069-R entitled
"Felicidad S. Baluyut, Administratrix-Appellant v. Victoria U. Baluyut, et
al., Intervenors-Appellees." The decision brought to this court for review
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (now
Regional Trial Court) and dismissed the petition for intervention filed by
petitioners in the trial court.
In Special Proceedings No. 1835, entitled "Intestate Estate of Deceased
Enrique Baluyut,' filed before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
herein petitioners filed on April 29, 1965 a petition for intervention. The
petition alleged that petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the
deceased Enrique M. Baluyut; that petitioners-minors are the illegitimate
children of the deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said deceased and
petitioners' mother and guardian ad litem Norma Urbano; that petitioners
were conceived and born at the time when Norma Urbano cohabited
with the deceased while the latter was already married to Felicidad S.
Baluyut; that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of children of the deceased during his lifetime by direct overt acts
of said deceased having supported and maintained them. The
petitioners also alleged that they were deliberately excluded from the
estate of Enrique M. Baluyut (pp. 10-18, Record on Appeal).
2) That under Art. 887, (5) New Civil Code said children are
forced heirs of the late Enrique Baluyut.
3) That they are entitled to their hereditary rights in said
Estate of Enrique Baluyut under the provisions of the New
Civil Code (pp. 29-30, Record on Appeal).
On May 4,1986, the trial court issued an order (p. 37, Record on Appeal)
declaring that it considers intervenors' motion for execution as a motion
for reconsideration and amended the decision to the effect that it granted
the minors Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza monthly support pendente
lite in the amount of P150.00 payable every first day of the month to their
guardian ad litem Norma Urbano.
On April 22, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment (pp. 19-
41, Rollo) reversing the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion
of the decision states:
On June 23, 1971, We gave due course to the petition (p. 57, Rollo). On
July 1, 1971, We required the petitioners to file their brief (p. 58, Rollo).
Respondents, on the other hand, filed their brief on October 28, 1971 (p.
85, Rollo). On December 17, 1971, the petition was considered
submitted for decision (p. 87, Rollo).
The trial court found that petitioners are the illegitimate children of the
deceased Enrique M. Baluyut. This finding was shared by respondent
Court of Appeals:
The birth certificates Exhibits 'A,' 'B' and 'C' of the intervenors
do not help their case for these are not evidence of
recognized filiation by the deceased Enrique Baluyut
because, firstly, they were admitted in evidence by the lower
court merely as part of the of the witnesses who referred to
them in the course of said witnesses' testimony and hence,
they are not evidence of the facts stated in them. Secondly,
they are merely evidence of the fact that gave rise to their
execution, that is, the fact of birth and nothing else, much
leas of recognition as they are not signed by Enrique Baluyut.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Amelita Constantino alleges that she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's
Cocktail Lounge where she worked as a waitress. A day after
their first meeting, Ivan succeeded Amelita inside his hotel room
and, through a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. Afterwards, Ivan confessed to Amelita that
he is a married man. Nevertheless, they continued to have sexual
relations whenever Ivan is in Manila, and Amelita got pregnant.
Held:
5. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in
November, 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by
her own evidence- a letter dated February 11, 1975 informing
Ivan that Amelita is four months pregnant so that applying the
period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was
conceived on or about October 11, 1974.
Carmelo Cabatana vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004)
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private
respondent who was born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the
one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband left her in
the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look
for work and was eventually hired as petitioners household help. It was
while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner
brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel
and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant.
The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to
decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the child
then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child
of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia Regodos.
Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two
lower courts. As a general rule, factual issues are not within the province
of this Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal except (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings
of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooks certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, justifies a different conclusion, and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. The Court is
convinced that this case falls within one of the exceptions.5
The trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and
private respondent was based on the testimony of the childs mother and
"the personal appearance of the child."
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is
required to establish paternity and filiation.6 An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to
the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.7
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil
Code:
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may
be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity
of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.9 Thus, certificates
issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per
se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.10
SO ORDERED.
The Family Code Governs the Present Case (Retroactive Effect Unless
there is Impairment of Rights); How Legitimate or Illegitimate Filiation is
Established; High Standard is Required to Prove Open and Continuous
Possession of the Status of an Illegitimate Child; He who Alleges the
Affirmative of the Issue has the Burden of Proof; Unlawful Intercourse
will not be Presumed merely from the Proof of an Opportunity of Such
Indulgence; The Totality of the Testimonial Evidence offered by Monina
plus the Testimonies of her other Witnesses Sufficiently Prove that she
is the Illegitimate Daughter of Francisco; Certificate of Live Birth is not
Competent Evidence as to the Issue of Paternity when the Putative
Father had no Hand in the Preparation of such Document; The Lack of
Participation of Francisco in the Preparation of Documents Presenetd
render such as Incompetent to Prove Paternity; The Excluded Evidence
Cannot be Considered as Circumstantial Evidence; Family Reputation or
Tradition Regarding Pedigree (Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court); The Enumeration in the Second Part of Section 40 of Rule 130 is
Limited to Family Possessions; The Affidavit Signed by Monina does not
Disprove the Fact that Francisco is her Father; Moninas Evidence
Hurdled the High Standard of Proof Required for Establishing Illegitimate
Filiation; Francisco Failed to Prove the Existence of Laches
Facts:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against
petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the
latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mothers death and when
she was already 39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in
1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina
alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of
his family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent
for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central
Bank Examiner. Throughout the duration of the trial, Monina was able to
present total of 11 witnesses.
After the trial, the trial court ruled against Monina. Before the Court of
Appeals, Monina seasonably appealed and sought the reversal of the
decision. The appellate court reversed the decision and ruled that
Monina was able to prove illegitimate filiation as regards Francisco.
Held:
6. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the
child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.
He who Alleges the Affirmative of the Issue has the Burden of Proof
9. The party who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of
proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never
parts.
10. In the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict
must be returned in favor of plaintiff.
11. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant's.
13. It has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not be presumed
merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence. However, such
observation does not favor Franciso.
14. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only
witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act
themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual
intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victim's or
mother's word, as against the accused's or putative father's
protestations.
15. Even if Moninas mother had long passed away before the institution
of the complaint, Monina can still prove her filiation. The fact of her birth
and her parentage may be established by evidence other than the
testimony of her mother.
16. The Court readily concludes that the testimonial evidence offered by
Monina, woven by her narration of circumstances and events that
occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with Franciso,
coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly
established that he is his father and that the latter recognized Monina
through his overt acts, consistently shown and manifested throughout
the years publicly and spontaneously.
21. The Supreme Court disagrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals
that the certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal
certificates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove Moninas
filiation.
22. Since they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such
filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to
prove the same.
23. The provision may be divided into 2 parts: the portion containing the
first clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the
documents in question (the letters written by Franciscos relatives) may
not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand;
and the section containing the second phrase regarding entries in family
bibles or other family books, and the like.
24. The scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of the
provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects
which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles
which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as to the
pedigree of a person.
25. These have been described as objects openly exhibited and well
known to the family, or those which, if preserved in a family, may be
regarded as giving a family tradition.
26. The private documents presented by Monina cannot be regarded as
family possessions and may not be admitted on the basis of Section 40
of Rule 130.
The Affidavit Signed by Monina does not Disprove the Fact that
Francisco is her Father
28. Even the affidavit which Francisco had foisted on the trial court does
not hold sway in the face of Moninas logical explanation that she at first
did agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In
fact, she promptly complained to him who, however explained to her that
the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse.
29. At any rate, if Monina was not his illegitimate daughter, it would have
been uncalled for, if not absurd, for him or his lawyer to have secured
her sworn statement. In asking her to sign the said affidavit at the cost of
P15,000, he clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his
paternity of Monina.
30. Moninas evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for
the success of an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when
relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession
or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Moreover, she proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of
evidence.
33. Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if
illegitimate, Moninna filed her action well within the period granted her by
a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of
laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.
DECISION
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which
required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent
to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature and, had never
been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the
advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle
Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East Realty
Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal
Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital,
William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby,
William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and
clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao
even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure
a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open
a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company4 and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.5 William
Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking
son and had their pictures taken together.6
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both
Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her
children. She used to visit Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975.
The two children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely,
Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids lived with
Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions like
birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the
couples residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she
would usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon,
during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita
often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and later
on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a
close friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial
Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White
Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon,
gave support by way of grocery supplies, money for household
expenses and matriculation fees for the two (2) older children,
Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on November
22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy
and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his
legal marriage, "Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy."10 He then
talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He
intended to make it "engrande" and "make the bells of San Sebastian
Church ring."11 Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao
passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyaos funeral
and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a short
sleeved shirt of blue and gray12 which Mr. Liyao wore in a
photograph13 as well as another shirt of lime green14 as belonging to the
deceased. A note was also presented with the following inscriptions: "To
Cora, Love From William."15 Maurita remembered having invited the
couple during her mothers birthday where the couple had their pictures
taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew
that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not
been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband.
However, during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon
Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house
when she usually visited Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that
she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and
Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr.
Liyao at Corazons house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the
Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao
from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to
White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was
conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another
miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong
and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong and
together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong
sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided
Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food for
Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon
is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had
any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao
and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father,
Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned and separated from
his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when William Liyao
started to live with them up to the time of the latters death on December
2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enriques half
brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying
Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques testimony was
corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various
pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been
superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession of her
mother, Corazon Garcia.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.16Linda grew up and lived
with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she
got married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and
that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal
separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in San
Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town
business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father
would change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and
habits. Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other peoples
homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a strict
disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate
for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very tough, strong,
fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two
strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2,
1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974 and
was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for two
(2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He
could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime,
Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled
the collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their
lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He
was not active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also
suffered a milder stroke during the latter part of September to October
1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days and went back to
work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not put
in long hours in the office unlike before and tried to spend more time with
his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon
Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her husband and the
records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple
obtained any annulment17of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced
upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage.
Immediately after the death of Lindas father, Corazon went to Lindas
office for the return of the formers alleged investments with the Far East
Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and
Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the
company, was able to take out documents, clothes and several
laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There was one
instance when she was told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and
taking out things again."18 Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs.
Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let
Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which
belonged to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases
full of mens clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and
had never been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street,
San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her fathers death on
December 2, 1975.19Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular
arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack sometime
between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were affected and
he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict
medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed
by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level
control.20 Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon
Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty
Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any
formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an
illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the position
of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check
signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for
the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the
laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal
collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda,
driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that
he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up
his boss at 8:00 oclock in the morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the
evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night
shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It
was only after a month that he was able to report to the office.
Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly.
Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart
attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he
ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him
like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called
inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on
the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to
carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival
thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to
arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the
employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that
she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the
office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office
garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking
about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim
of Corazon. He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the
garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty.
Quisumbing when he went to the latters law office. Being the driver of
Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that he remembered having
driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty.
Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the
lawyers wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does
not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for
activities like shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by
preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired
William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when
Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court observed
that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the
latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his
confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly
acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even
introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court
saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of
the child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic
ground and by proof that marital intimacy between husband and wife
was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to
Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate court gave weight to the
testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia
and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured
legal separation, were seen in each others company during the
supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William Liyao.
The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the
baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by
petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the absence
of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates and considering that his signature does
not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that neither do family
pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard to the
passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate
court observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was
opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since
William Liyaos signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the
present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have
raised a number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of
evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the
late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently
overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own
legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father,
William Liyao?
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid
marriage is presumed to be legitimate.22 The presumption of legitimacy
of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy
to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.23
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following
the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following
its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such
a way that access was not possible;
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living
separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time
that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically
impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when
petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner
presented a document entitled, "Contract of Separation,"25 executed and
signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims
on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future.26
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is
of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning
the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may
only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.27 Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal
that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved.28 It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to
contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs -
can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.29
SO ORDERED.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The basic issue in this case revolves around the authenticity of the
signatures of the alleged vendor. Upholding the regional trial court, the
Court of Appeals opted to give credence to the testimonies of the
handwriting expert and other witnesses presented by private
respondents, as against the testimony of the attorney who had notarized
the Deeds of Sale. After due deliberation, this Court finds no cogent
reason to reverse the two lower courts finding of fact.
The Case
The Facts
The RTC explained that the expert witness had examined the forgery
scientifically; while the notary public, who was the counsel of Petitioner
Norgene Potenciano, was an interested party.7 Consequently, the forged
Deeds of Absolute Sale did not transfer any rights from Pareja to the
Jayme spouses or from the spouses to Potenciano.8
The CA also agreed with the RTC that Potenciano was a buyer in bad
faith for not having sufficiently investigated the property at the time he
bought it, when it was then in the possession of people other than the
seller.9
The Issues
Simply stated, the issues to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether the
sale of the subject property by Pareja to the Jayme spouses and, in turn,
by the spouses to Potenciano was valid and binding; (2) whether
Potenciano was a buyer in good faith; (3) whether private respondents
have the personality to demand the reconveyance of the property in
question; and (4) whether private respondents are entitled to damages.
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over
again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are
totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute
palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.19
On the other hand, Atty. Duterte testified that Pareja had personally
appeared before him and signed the two instruments himself. The former
made these categorical statements on the signature of the latter, both as
the vendor in the October 19, 1979 Deed and as a witness in that which
was dated October 29, 1979.
Equally telling is the doubt expressed by the RTC on the notary publics
motives:
"x x x. However, the Court is inclined to give more weight [to] the
testimony of the expert witness, not only because the latter
explained the forgery scientifically but also for the reason that the
notary public who notarized the questioned documents was the
former counsel of defendant Potenciano."29
Civil Interdiction
Parenthetically, this Court notes that in their narration of facts, both the
RTC and the CA automatically ascribed the accessory penalty of civil
interdiction to Pareja as a result of his conviction for murder and the
consequent life imprisonment imposed upon him by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu.32 We shall not rule on the correctness of the penalty,
since the criminal case in which it was imposed is not the subject of this
appeal. However, we remind the lower courts that life imprisonment
and reclusion perpetua are distinct penalties.
Second Issue:
Buyer in Good Faith
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in
it, and who pays therefor a full and fair price at the time of the purchase
or before receiving such notice.40
The whole evidence in this case points to the absolute lack of good faith
on the part of Potenciano. At the time he allegedly bought the property in
question, no certificate of title was ever presented to him. If we are to
believe petitioners position, there were two transfers before the alleged
sale to him. The first was from the Cuencos to Pareja, while the second
was from Pareja to the Jayme spouses. As Potenciano himself stated in
his testimony, when they executed the Deed of Sale on October 29,
1979, there was no certificate of title in the name of the Jayme spouses
or of Pareja41 or of the alleged original owners, the Cuencos.42 There
was simply a lot to be sold, and an ocular inspection thereof
conducted.43
The glaring lack of good faith on the part of Potenciano is more than
apparent in his testimony, which we reproduce in part hereunder:
"ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir."
xxx xxx xxx
"ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. GUERRERO:
Q Now, in your deed of sale dated October 29, 1979 you also
bought a house of strong materials? which was included in the
sale?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
A No, sir.
ATTY. GUERRERO:
Q Before October 29, 1979, you did not verify about it in the
office of the Register of Deeds?
WITNESS:
A No.
ATTY. GUERRERO:
Q After October 29, 1979 did you go to the Register of
Deeds?
WITNESS:
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. GUERRERO:
Q When did you fully pay the consideration, the price of the
Deed of Sale?
WITNESS:
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
A My father.
ATTY. GUERRERO:
Q In other words Mr. Witness, the money used to pay the land
came from your father?
WITNESS:
ATTY. GUERRERO:
Q You said Mr. Witness that when you filed your answer to
the complaint in this case, in paragraph 23 thereof, you caused to
be verified the existence of the certificates of title in the Office of
the Register of Deeds, that is in paragraph 23 of your answer to
the complaint. Which is true now, did you verify or did you not
verify about it?
WITNESS:
A It is only now.
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
A No.
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir."44
Equally significant is the fact that even before executing the alleged
Deed of Sale, Potenciano never checked who was in possession of the
property. He testified as follows:
"ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
A Yes, because he said that the occupants will just vacate the
premises, so I did not mind. I trusted them.
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
A Not yet.
ATTY. GUERRERO:
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir."45
Settled is the rule that a buyer of real property that is in the possession
of a person other than the seller must be wary. A buyer who does not
investigate the rights of the one in possession46 can hardly be regarded
as a buyer in good faith.
To be sure, we cannot ascribe good faith to those who have not shown
any diligence in protecting their rights. Having ruled thus, we also hold
that Potencianos right to the property he allegedly bought must fail. He
cannot take cover under the protection the law accords to purchasers in
good faith and for value.
Potenciano cannot now claim that he has already acquired a valid title to
the property. To be effective, the inscription in the registry must have
been made in good faith.47 The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens
title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with notice of a flaw.48 A
holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of
the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.49
Third Issue:
Personality to Sue
Again, we disagree with this contention. The way to prove the filiation of
illegitimate children is provided by the Family Code thus:
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children."51
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws."52
Final Issue:
Damages
SO ORDERED.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring
Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to
inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said
land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant
took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are
involved.
The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became
sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother,
Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him
work his farm. His sickness became worse that on or about September
10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up
from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped
with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the
middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual
intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1,
1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even
attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy,
who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts, can the
child be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano?
Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following
that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days
next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall
be presumed to be legitimate.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on
January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of
Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred (300)
days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only
be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to
have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next
preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it was
physically impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that
Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly
move and get up from his bed sufficient to overcome this presumption?
We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par.
(c) of Rule 123, of the Rules of Court, which is practically based upon
the same rai'son d'etre underlying the Civil Code. Said section provides:
We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or
at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and
the child was born within three (300) days following the dissolution of the
marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than
that the issue is legitimate. We have also seen that this presumption can
only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally
impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no
such proof. The fact that Maria Dueas has committed adultery can not
also overcome this presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil
Code, Vol. I, p. 92).
In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower
court did not err in declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the
spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas.
GANCAYCO, J:
Trinidad Montilde, a young lass of Tubigon, Bohol had a love affair with a
priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and in the process she conceived. When
she was almost four (4) months pregnant and in order to conceal her
disgrace from the public she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao.
Father Lumain solemnized their marriage on March 4, 1924. 1 They
never lived together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days
after the marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain. As shown
by her birth certificate her registered parents are Trinidad and
Anastacio. 2 On October 31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will
and testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter
and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights
and interests.3 This was duly probated in the Court of First Instance of
Bohol on June 11, 1938 and on appeal it was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. 4
Soon after reaching the age of majority Consolacion filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Bohol against Hipolito Paraguya for the
recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to have inherited from her
father Fr. Lumain and for damages. After trial on the merits a decision
was rendered on July 6, 1962, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
Not satisfied therewith, the defendant now interposed this appeal to the
Court of Appeals alleging the trial court committed the following errors:
II
III
(Sgd.)
DIOSDADO
REYES DELIMA
Attor
ney
for
the
Plain
tiff
I AGREE:
SO ORDERED.
(Sgd.
)
HIPO
LITO
ALO
Judg
e,
14th
Judic
ial
D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
Respetuosamente sometido.
(
F
d
o
.
)
G
E
N
A
R
O
G
A
L
O
N
Defendant Hipolito Paraguya claims right over portion G of
the Sketch Exhibit E-1, which portion is within the space
enclosed within the black lines of the sketch Exhibit E-1.
But if we examine the sketch Exhibit E-1 we will find that the
land of Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land of Roman
Lumain enclosed within the black lines. The land of Pelagio
Torrefranca is even intercepted by other lands belonging to
Juan Acidillo and Valerio Roba. If we also examine the plan
Exhibit 1 1 of the land of Roman Lumain sureyed by a
survevor, we will find that the land of Roman Lumain is
bounded on the North by Valerio Roba and Jorge Acidillo.
The land of Pelagio Torrefranca is not mentioned and
possibly it is on the North of the lands of Valerio Roba and
Jorge Acidillo.
Under the first assigned error appellant contends that portion G of the
sketch Exhibit E-1 with all the improvements belongs to him and that he
is entitled to its possession. In support thereof appellant argues
The Court should take notice that the land in the name of
former owner Valerio Roba (known as Portion G in Exhibit "E-
l") is the land acquired and owned by Rev. Father Pelagio
Torrefranca and later sold by Rev. Father Pelagio
Torrefranca to the defendant-appellant Hipolito Paraguya is
outside the land (outside the Black Lines of Exhibits "11" and
"E-1") of the late Roman Lumain as shown in the blue print
(Exhibit "ll") a map of the land of the late Roman Lumain
made and surveyed in 1910. There is no question therefore
that this Portion G (shown in Exh. "E-l") is not the land of the
late Roman Lumain, hence outside the land in question. The
Court has no jurisdiction over this land Portion G as shown in
Exhibit "E- l" for it is not a part of the land of Roman Lumain
whose properties are the ones in question (See Exhibits "11"
and "E-1" These two Exhibits "11" and "E-1" should be
compared as they are closely connected to each other.)
Under the second assigned error appellant points out that appellee
Consolacion Lumain is the legitimate child of spouses Anastacio
Mamburao and Trinidad Montilde as she was born on September 12,
1924, 192 days after the marriage of said spouses citing the provision of
Article 255 of the Civil Code (then Article 108 of the Spanish Civil Code)
ART. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not possible;
The third assigned error wherein appellant contends appellee should pay
him moral damages is obviously without merit. Appellee merely pursued
an honest claim to the property in question. No bad faith had been
imputed nor had the alleged damages suffered been established. The
essential ingredient of moral damages is proof of bad faith and the fact
that moral damages was suffered as shock, mental anguish, or anxiety
although the amount of damages suffered need not be shown. 14
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the fallo of a
decision is the primary issue in this petition forcertiorari under Rule 65
filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent Isabel's
petition for appointment as administratrix of her grandmother's estate by
virtue of her right of representation.
The trial court correctly ruled that "a motion to dismiss at this juncture is
inappropriate." The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure
to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special
proceedings. 16 The Rules do not only apply to election cases, land
registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall
under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to
dismiss may be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to
the complaint." Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before
the filing of petitioner's opposition 17 which is the counterpart of an
answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioner's motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed
almost two years after respondent Isabel was already through with the
presentation of her witnesses and evidence and petitioner had presented
two witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper
but also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from
established jurisprudence on this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in
fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this case. In fact,
the alleged conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive
portion thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision
of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the
marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is clear under paragraph 3,
Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment
of the Family Code.
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI
decision has categorically declared that the marriage of respondent
Isabel's parents is "null and void" and that the legal effect of such
declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the children
born out of said marriage are illegitimate. Such argument cannot be
sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 18 of the New Civil Code classify
what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the causes for
which a marriage may be annulled. 19
Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal
connotations and implications, Annul means to reduce to nothing;
annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to
do away with 23 whereas null and void is something that does not exist
from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it
subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated
through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply
declares a status or condition which already exists from the very
beginning.
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party,
after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void
the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents based on paragraph 3,
Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the
rights of the children are therefore governed by the first clause of
the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would
be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said
provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the
decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3,
1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking
appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren,
including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of
representation the estate of their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had
predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without
prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether the Letters of
Administration may be granted to her. Neither do the Court
adjudged herein the successional rights of the personalities
involved over the decedent's estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to "all
magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of
care should be exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a
decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the
decision becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of
thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and
instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the
body of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and
unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or
interpretation. 28
SO ORDERED.
When a putative father manifests openly through words and deeds his
recognition of a child, the courts can do no less than confirm said
acknowledgment. As the immortal bard Shakespeare perspicaciously
said: "Let your own discretion be your tutor; suit the action to the word,
the word to the action." Herein deceased father cannot possibly be
charged with indecisiveness or vacillation for he suited his action to his
word and his word to his action.
On September 18, 1953, a child named Ma. Theresa Alberto was born
out of wedlock to one Aurora Reniva with Juan M. Alberto as the alleged
father. Accordingly, she used "Alberto" as her surname in all her school
records and correspondences.
On September 15, 1978, Ma. Theresa Alberto filed a motion for leave to
intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings praying that she
be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as such,
entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The motion was granted
by the probate court.
SO ORDERED. 1
(a) The deceased gave the oppositor sums of money for her
schooling;
(a) She had her first meeting with her father at the MOPC
where he gave her P500.00 personally and two telephone
numbers where he could be contacted and where they talked
about her name, age and other matters.
(b) She had other meetings with her father at the MOPC on
which occasions her father also gave her money.
(f) When oppositor and her mother went to the PGH on the
occasion of her fathers death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand
and asked the guard to make way for her because she was a
child of Juan Alberto.
(g) After the wake for her deceased father, the deceaseds
step-mother, Saturnina Alberto, introduced her as a sister to
Joy Alberto her half-sister.
The Court of Appeals reversed the above decision of the probate court
on the strength of the following observations:
Assuming the foregoing to be true, we do not believe they
satisfy the degree of proof to establish that oppositor was in
continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the
deceased.
3) that petitioner used 'Alberto' as her surname in all her school records
and Juan M. Alberto was known to be her father;
4) that through Fr. Arcilla, a first cousin of Juan M. Alberto, money was
given to Aurora Reniva;
5) that when petitioner was about nine (9) years old, Mrs. Aurita
Solidum, the youngest sister of Juan M. Alberto, arranged the first
meeting between petitioner and Juan M. Alberto at the MOPC and
during said meeting, they talked about petitioner, the deceased gave
petitioner P500.00 and two telephone numbers;
7) that when petitioner and her mother went to the PGH on the occasion
of Juan M. Albertos death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand and asked
the guard to make way for her as she was a daughter of Juan M.
Alberto;
8) that after the wake for deceased Juan M. Alberto, his step mother,
Saturnina Alberto introduced petitioner to Joy Alberto as the latters
sister;
10) that the children of Juan M. Albertos siblings regarded her as their
cousin;
The letter itself shows that Juan M. Alberto was not completely
indifferent towards Ma. Theresa Alberto. He did provide her support
whenever he could.
The latest letter that was presented in evidence was dated March 15,
1960. At the time, petitioner and Juan M. Alberto had not yet met. About
two years later, when petitioner was nine years old, Mrs. Aurita Solidum
arranged the first meeting between petitioner and the deceased. This
initial meeting was followed by many more. Moreover, it is noteworthy
that Juan M. Alberto never took any step to stop petitioner from using his
surname. The testimony of Jose Tablizo established his recognition of
Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter. He testified that Juan M. Alberto
showed him two report cards of Ma. Theresa which showed straight
"A's." He said "Boy! Great!" and Juan M. Alberto said that those were the
grades of his daughter. 7 This testimony is now being discredited for
being hearsay. This Court holds that the same falls within the exceptions
to the hearsay rule. Sec. 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides as
follows:
A shared past intimacy between the putative parents and the clear
marks of heredity stamped on the brow of their offspring are not to be
denied. Thus, whether openly or furtively, a father in the situation of Juan
M. Alberto could not have resisted manifesting signs of concern and care
insofar as his firstborn is concerned. If, at an early age, the child shows
much talent and great promise as petitioner in this case apparently did, it
is understandable, and even to be expected, that the father would
proudly step forward to claim paternity either through his direct acts or
those of his family, or both, as in instant case.
In the case at bench, evidence is not wanting from which it may logically
be concluded that the deceased Juan M. Alberto took no pains to
conceal his paternity. No less than his younger sister, his stepmother,
his priest-cousin, several relatives and close friends were categorically
informed of the relationship and they accepted the same as fact.
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child,
in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority.
Raymond Pe Lim vs. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 112229, March 18, 1997, 80
SCAD 685
ROMERO, J.:
All too often, immature men who allow their emotions to hold sway over
their rational minds come to grief when their passions cool off, but not
before inflicting irreparable psychic and spiritual damage on their victims
and the fruits of their wanton acts. As they sow the proverbial "wild oats,"
they are heedless of the dire consequences they heap on their heads.
When the inevitable confrontation explodes and they are helpless to
extricate themselves from the messy situation arising from their
wrongdoing, eventually they invoke the help of the courts as their final
arbiter.
DNA,1 being a relatively new science, it has not as yet been accorded
official recognition by our courts. Paternity will still have to be resolved
by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal
and written, by the putative father.
Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She also
worked as a receptionist at Tonight's Club and Resthouse along Roxas
Blvd., Manila. She met petitioner during her first night on the job.
Petitioner wooed her and Maribel reciprocated his love. They soon lived
together, with petitioner paying the rentals in a succession of apartments
in Cubao, Quezon City, Tambo, Paranaque and Makati, Metro Manila.
Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already pregnant, and returned to
Manila in October of the same year.
The couple never married because petitioner claimed that he was not
financially stable. On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to their
daughter at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. The bills for
Maribel's three-day confinement at the hospital were paid for by
Raymond and he also caused the registration of the name Joanna Rose
C. Pe Lim on the child's birth certificate. After Joanna Rose's birth, the
love affair between Maribel and petitioner continued.
Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioner's feelings
toward her started to wane. He subsequently abandoned her and
Joanna Rose. Maribel tried to support herself by accepting various jobs
and with occasional help from relatives, but it was never enough. She
asked petitioner for support but, despite promises to do so, it was never
given. Maribel then filed a complaint against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila for support.
Raymond alleged that he was not Maribel's only customer at the club. In
1980, she left for Japan to work as an entertainer.
Raymond denies being the father of Maribel's child, claiming that they
were only friends and nothing more.
The trial court rendered a decision on June 10, 1971, the dispositive
portion of which states:
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner then elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the trial court's findings.
Petitioner now argues before the Court that there is no clear and
convincing evidence on record to show that there was actual
cohabitation between him and Maribel. In fact, petitioner infers that
Maribel became pregnant only when she went to Japan. In short, he
denies that he is the father of Joanna Rose. He further questions the
awarded support of P10,000.00 per month, saying that the same is
beyond his means, considering that he has a family to support.
I wrote you this letter because I would like to erase from your
mind the thought of why I can not ever [sic] you marriage
right now is because I have no longer love or care for
both Joanna & you.
You know love, the main root of the problem of why marriage
is impossible for us right now is not what my parents or my
family circle will say about you, but the financial side of it.
Okay, let say I did marry you right now disregarding my
financial stability. Sooner or later they will come to know of it
and I am sure that they will not consent it. I have no
alternative but to leave them & to stick it up with you. This is
where the financial side comes in. I can't allow myself walking
away from my family making them think that I can stand on
my own two feet but the truth of the matter is not and seeing
both of you suffer for only one stupid mistake which is I was
not yet financially ready to face the consequence.
Remember, if the time comes when things get rough for you
and you have no one to turn to, don't hesitate to call on me. I
am very much willing to be at your side to help you.
Love,
Ray
mon
d
(Emp
hasis
suppl
ied
by
Ray
mon
d
hims
elf)
From the tenor of the letter and the statements petitioner made therein it
is clear that, contrary to his vehement assertion that he and Maribel were
just friends, they were actually lovers.
In an earlier letter, this time sent to Maribel while she was in Japan,
petitioner lovingly told her to take care of herself because of her
"situation," obviously referring to the state of pregnancy of Maribel:
A
u
g
.
1
1
,
1
9
8
1
Hi Love,
Love, you said in your letter that you regret very much your
going there & wishes (sic) that you have not left anymore. I
understand your feelings to what had happened after you told
me about it in the telephone.
It was only after petitioner separated from Maribel that he started to deny
paternity of Joanna Rose. Until he got married to another woman, he did
not object to being identified as Joanna Rose's father as disclosed in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The evidence on record reveals that he even got
a copy of the said Certificate when Joanna Rose started schooling, as
shown by a receipt in his name from the San Juan Municipal Office. His
belated denial cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence which
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed the father
of Joanna Rose. 3
This article adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code that filiation
may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father."4
SO ORDERED.