Rule 15 to 19 (Motions-Intervention)

Heirs of Vinzons vs. CA 315 SCRA 541

Facts:
The heirs filed an action for ejectment against respondent Mena Edoria and several others for non-payment of rentals.
The case was dismissed after it was found that respondent was in fact advance in payment but both parties appealed the same.
In 1986, a second ejectment case was filed for refusal to enter into an agreement with them as tenants-lessees and refused to
pay the increased rent of P1.00 per square meter per month. Respondent resisted the claim alleging, among others, lack of cause
of action and pendency of the earlier ejectment case. The case was also elevated to the RTC.
While said cases were pending, a third ejection suit was filed on the following grounds: (a) expiration of lease contract
as of 1984; (b) refusal to sign written renewal of contract of lease; and (c) non-payment of rent for one (1) year and ten (10)
months. In his answer, respondent sought dismissal of the complaint because it did not pass through barangay conciliation.
The MTC and RTC ruled for the petitioners but was reversed by the CA. The CA upheld the respondents argument that
the action should be dismissed for failure to comply with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law (PD 1508). Hence this petition for
review on Certiorari.

Issue:
Whether the dismissal was proper?
Held:
Yes. Second, the challenged decision correctly dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiffs, the petitioners herein, to
avail of the barangay conciliation process under PD 1508, preliminary to judicial recourse. The Court of Appeals had found that
"there is no clear showing that it was brought before the Barangay Lupon or Pangkat of Barangay 5, Daet, Camarines Norte,
where the parties reside and the property subject of the case is situated, as there is no barangay certification to file action attached
to the complaint. 15
Paraphrasing Peaflor vs. Panis 16, "the Lupong Barangay is with jurisdiction under PD 1508 to pass upon an ejectment
controversy where the parties are residents in the same barangay or in barangays within the same city or in barangays adjoining
each other." It is clearly averred in the Complaint that herein petitioners, then represented by the widow of the late Fernando
Vinzons, resided in the same barangay, hence, covered by the said law. In Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 17, this Court
ruled that "non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by PD 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause
of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity." Defendants,
private respondents herein, objected to the failure of the parties to undergo a confrontation at the barangay level in their answer
and even during the entire proceedings a quo to no avail as the trial courts merely brushed aside this issue. Hence, the Court of
Appeals had to rectify this error by the trial courts.
In refutation of the said findings of the Court of Appeals, petitioners submit that "it is clear in the findings of fact of the MTC of
Daet, as affirmed by the RTC of Daet that before the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 1908, 1923 and 2061, demand to vacate had already
been made to the defendant after efforts to settle the controversy at the barangay level had failed." 18 This is not a factual finding
of the MTC, but an allegation in petitioners' Complaint. As mentioned earlier, the MTC merely brushed aside the issue of non-
recourse to barangay conciliation. This allegation in petitioners' Complaint that efforts to settle the controversy at the barangay
level had failed in Civil Cases Nos. 1908, 1923 and 2061, does not constitute compliance with the requirements of PD 1508 for
purposes of filing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 2137. Section 6 of PD 1508 insofar as pertinent provides:
Sec. 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving
any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court
or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the
Lupon chairman or the Pangkat . . . .
Referral to the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat should be made prior to the filing of the ejectment case under PD 1508. Legal
action for ejectment is barred when there is non-recourse to barangay court. 19 The Complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as
Civil Case No. 2137, should have been coursed first to the barangay court. Petitioners cannot rely on the barangay conciliation
proceedings held in the other cases and consider the same as compliance with the law.

Ledesma vs. CA 211 SCRA 753

Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia Ledesma entered into a contract of lease respondent Dizon for two units of her apartment building in
Malate, Manila. One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of Lease, that of monthly rental payments, was violated by
private respondent and that as of October 31, 1988, said private respondent has incurred arrears for both units in the total sum of
P14,039.00 for which letters of demand were sent to, and received by, private respondent.
Respondent allegedly failed to honor the demand letters sent to him, prompting petitioner to refer the matter to the
Baranggay. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the barangay proceeding as
she was suffering from recurring psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from the receipts and prescriptions issued
by her psychiatrist. Thus, she filed an ejectment suit against respondent for failure to vacate the premises.
The MTC and RTC both ruled in favour of petitioner but was reversed by the CA. The CA ruled that the action should be
dismissed for lack of cause of action. On appeal, Petitioner assails private respondent for raising the issue of non-compliance with
Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508(Katarungang Pambarangay Law) only in his petition for review with the appellate court and which
mislead the court to erroneously dismiss her complaint for ejectment.

Issue:
a. Whether the issue of non compliance with PD 1508 was timely raised?
b. Whether there was compliance with PD 1508?
Held:
a. Yes. We do not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was raised
only for the first time in the Court of Appeals. When private respondent stated that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by
the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that since he was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the
needed confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable settlement. Without the mandatory
personal confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the MTC. Private respondent's allegation in paragraph 4 of his Answer
that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that plaintiff has no cause of action against him as
alleged in paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that the certification to file action was improperly issued in view of the foregoing
allegations thereby resulting in non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of
the Answer are in substantial compliance with the raising of said issues and/or objections in the court below.

b. No. PD 1508, Sec. 9. Appearance of parties in person. In all proceedings provided for herein, the parties must
appear in person without the assistance of counsel/representative, with the exception of minors and incompetents who may be
assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

As found by the respondent court:

We agree with the petitioner that private respondent Cecile Ledesma failed to comply with section 6 of P.D. 1508. The
record of the case is barren showing compliance by the private respondent. Indeed, the documentary evidence of the private
respondent herself attached to the complaint buttresses this conclusion. They show that it is not the private respondent but her
son. Raymund U. Ledesma, and her lawyer, Atty. Epifania Navarro who dealt with the petitioner regarding their dispute. Thus, the
demand letter dated October 18, 1988 sent to the petitioner for payment of rentals in the sum of P14,039.00 was signed by
Raymund Ledesma. On the other hand, the demand letter dated November 14, 1988 was signed by Atty. Epifania Navarro. More
telling is the Certification to File Action signed by Barangay Chairman, Alberto A. Solis where it appears that the complainant is
Raymund U. Ledesma and not the private respondent.

As stated earlier, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal confrontation of the parties because:
. . . a personal confrontation between the parties without the intervention of a counsel or representative would
generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the disputants. In other
words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to the successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay level.
14

Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before the barangay Chairman was because of her recurring
psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 1988 15 specifically September to December 6 there is no indication at all
that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist for consultation. The only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval for petitioner.
There was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance at the Lupon Chairman's office.
Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be represented by counsel or even by attorney-in-fact who
is next of kin.

Uy vs. Contreras 237 SCRA 16

Facts:
Petitioner subleased from Private respondent Atayde other half of the second floor of a building located at corner Reposo
and Oliman Streets, Makati, Metro Manila. She operated and maintained therein a beauty parlor. The sublease contract expired.
However, the petitioner was not able to remove all her movable properties.
On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the
subleased premises her remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a mirror, a shampoo bowl, and an
airconditioning casing. 4 The argument degenerated into a scuffle between the petitioner, on the one hand, and Atayde and several
of Atayde's employees, including private respondent Winnie Javier.
The private respondent had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on them by the petitioner.
The private respondents filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati. The confrontation of the parties was
scheduled by the barangay captain for 28 April 1993. On the said date, only the petitioner appeared. The barangay captain then
reset the confrontation to 26 May 1993.
On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations for slight physical injuries against
the petitioner with the MTC of Makati. In her own counter-affidavit, the petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing of
the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents of Manila. 10
She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain that there was an ongoing conciliation between the parties. The
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The trial court denied the MTD.
Hence this petition for Certiorari under rule 65.
Issue:
Whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge in denying the MTD?
Held:
Yes. It may thus be observed that the revised (revised by the LGC) katarungang pambarangay law has at least three
new significant features, to wit:
1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.
2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or
at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located.
3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph (c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from some ambiguity when
it provides that the prescriptive periods "shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate
of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary." What is referred to as receipt
by the complainant of the complaint is unclear; obviously, it could have been a drafting oversight. Accordingly, in the
above quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the complaint or"
is not found, such that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be from receipt by the
complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification to file action issued by the lupon or the pangkat secretary.
Such suspension, however, shall not exceed sixty days.

On 15 October 1991, this Court promulgated the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. 19 Section 18 thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be
dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with.
This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.
In the proceeding before the court a quo, the petitioner and the respondent had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The petitioner further
invoked the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the decree by the Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her
instant petition, the petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the
private respondents, realizing the weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer their grievances to what
might be a wrong forum under the decree, changed tack. In their Comment, they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a
complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela, Makati, in compliance with the requirement of
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code." 20 Yet, in a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd,
which is condemnable for it disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the said law is not applicable to their cases before the
court a quo because (a) the petitioner and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality; (b)
the law does not apply when the action, as in the said cases, may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) even
assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has substantially complied with it.

Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted
on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled
by the filing of the private respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically
suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period
of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within
which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by the respondent
judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.
Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that the petitioner "had already waived the right to a
reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati, considering that the accused and the complainant are
residents of different barangays." The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of Valenzuela,
Makati; she submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of referral to
the lupon in her counter-affidavit.

Dismissal of Actions

People vs. Perez 397 SCRA

Facts:
Jesus S. Perez was charged of rape and found guilty of rape "penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610," committed as follows:
"That on or about the 17th day of January, 1997 at 12:00 noon at Sitio Baco, Brgy. Macarang, in the Municipality of Palauig,
Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with lewd design and by
means of coercion, inducement and other consideration, did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one Mayia P. Ponseca, a minor of 6 years old, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter."
He was sentenced to suffer the death penalty. On his appeal, he questions that the age of the victim was never
established thus the imposition of the death penalty was unwarranted.
Issue:
Whether the death penalty was properly imposed?
Held:
Yes. During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayias birth certificate as Exhibit "A".29 The prosecution
submitted its Offer of Evidence30 which included Exhibit "A", a certified true copy of Mayias birth certificate. The trial court admitted
Exhibit "A"31 without any objection from the defense.
The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking for identification of
evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused
admits the charge but interposes lawful defenses; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal
and civil aspects of the case.32 Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the parties. Section 4, Rule 118 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure33 provides:
"SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated,
and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the
action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice." (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on December 15, 1998, which was about twenty-
three (23) months after the rape incident occurred on January 17, 1997, Mayia testified on cross-examination that she was "8
years old last May 23."34 Thus, by deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 as shown in her birth certificate, she was
about six (6) years and seven (7) months old on January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place. We rule that the prosecution has
indisputably proven that Mayia was below seven years old at the time appellant raped her.

Saguid vs. CA 403 SCRA

Facts:
In 1987, Private respondent Gina Rey (17 y/o then) was separated de facto from her husband. Then she met petitioner.
After a brief courtship, they decided to cohabit as husband and wife. They were not blessed with children. Jacinto Saguid was a
patron of a fishing vessel. Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from
1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their
9-year cohabitation.
Thereafter, Gina, filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the
petitioner with the RTC. She was asking for the reimbursement of contributions she made to their unfinished house and the amount
she deposited in their joint bank account.
In his answer, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his
income as a captain of their fishing vessel.
On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration14 of the May 21, 1997 order, which was denied on June 2,
1997, and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte.15 Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration but
the same was also denied on October 8, 1997. The decision was affirmed by the CA but deleted the award for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to present evidence ex parte
Held:
No. Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall
have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and the court shall
render judgment on the basis thereof.20 The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration21 showing that his
failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect.22 The motion need not really stress the fact
that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses is already on record.23
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not represented by
counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present evidence ex
parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a lawyer,
petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file answer,24 the required answer stating therein the special and affirmative
defenses,25 and several other motions.26 If it were true that petitioner did not understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order
directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief.
Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion
asking the court to excuse his failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance
may result in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed.27
In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the application
of the rules. There is nothing in the Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be represented by
counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to a denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while
desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation
of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.

Yao vs. Perello 414 SCRA

Facts:
A complaint filed by petitioner before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) against a certain corporation,
PR Builders, Inc. and its managers, Enrico Baluyot and Pablito Villarin, private respondents husband. The HLURB rendered a
decision rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner and PR Builders, and ordering PR Builders to refund petitioner the
amount of P2,116,103.31, as well as to pay damages in the amount of P250,000.
Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of execution against PR Builders and its managers, and referred the writ to the office
of the Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for enforcement. Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land in Canlubang,
Calamba, Laguna, registered in the names of spouses Pablito Villarin and private respondent, Bernadine Villarin. The property
was scheduled for public auction.
Private respondent filed before the RTC, , a petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. Bagabaldo from proceeding with the public auction. Private respondent
alleged that she co-owned the property subject of the execution sale; that the property regime between private respondent and
her husband was complete separation of property, and that she was not a party in the HLURB case, hence, the subject property
could not be levied on to answer for the separate liability of her husband.
The respondent judge issued a 24 hour TRO. After conducting a conference, the respondent judge issued the assailed
resolution, granting private respondents petition for prohibition and declaring the subject property exempt from execution. On April
25, 2002, or more than a month after public respondent judge issued the resolution of March 22, 2002, petitioner filed a motion
for intervention. However, public respondent judge denied the motion. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65.

Issue:
Whether the denial of the motion to intervene was proper?
Held:
Yes. Consequently, petitioners claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said provision
requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the other hand, to allow intervention, it must
be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be
given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenors
rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not more important than
the second.5
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners right as a judgment creditor was adversely affected by the lifting of the levy
on the subject real property. Records reveal that there are other pieces of property exclusively owned by the defendants in the
HLURB case that can be levied upon.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to intervene, he must exercise said right in
accordance with the rules and within the period prescribed therefor.
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court.6 Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period set forth in the rules. The court resolution granting
private respondents petition for prohibition and lifting the levy on the subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6,
2002, after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already become final and executory.
Pinlac vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
The instant case springs from a contentious and protracted dispute over a sizeable piece of real property situated in what
is now known as Old Balara, Sitio Veterans, Barrio Payatas and Silangan, all of Quezon City. Petitioners herein are World War II
veterans, their dependents and successors-in-interest. Together, they filed a class suit primarily for Quieting of Title before the
RTC. In particular, petitioners claimed that the real property, which has an aggregate area of 502 hectares, were part of forest
lands belonging to the government; that they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied said property continuously,
adversely, and exclusively for more than thirty (30) years; and that they have accordingly filed applications for land titling in their
respective names with the appropriate government agency.
One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision (hereinafter, Vil-Ma). The individual
lot owners of the said subdivision, however, were not specifically named. Since personal service of summons could not be effected
on Vil-Ma and some of the other named respondents, petitioners moved for leave of court to serve summons by publication which
was granted. Accordingly, the summons was published in the "Metropolitan Newsweek", a periodical edited and published in the
City of Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan.
Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings, while the others, including Vil-Ma, failed to
answer, and were thus declared in default. Consequently, petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
defaulted respondents. The trial court rendered a partial judgment in favor of the petitioners.
Exactly one (1) year and fifty-seven (57) days after the above-quoted judgement by default was rendered, a Petition for
Annulment of Judgement with Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus4 was brought before the Court of Appeals by the titled owners
of the subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. They assailed the default judgement which nullified all their titles, arguing that the court a quo
had no jurisdiction over them and their respective titled properties. They also alleged that they only came to know of the adverse
judgement when petitioners sought the execution of the judgement by attempting to dispossess some of the titled owners of the
lots and making formal demands for them to vacate their respective properties. Also, they claimed that the Partial Decision against
the defaulted respondents was null and void on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud.
The trial court granted the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, granted the petition for annulment of judgment.

Issue:
a. Whether the CA was correct in granting the petition for annulment of judgment?
b. whether publication of the summons made in the Metropolitan Newsweek?
Held:
a. yes. The case before the Court of Appeals was one for annulment of judgement, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
In resolving the same, the Court of Appeals need not retry the facts. An action for annulment of judgement is grounded only on
two justifications: (I) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.14 All that herein private respondents had
to prove was that the trial court had no jurisdiction; that they were prevented from having a trial or presenting their case to the trial
court by some act or conduct of petitioners; 15 or that they had been denied due process of law. Thus, the Court of Appeals need
only to resolve the issues of lack of jurisdiction, existence of extrinsic fraud, and denial of due process of law.
The action for annulment of judgement cannot and was not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The very purpose of the
action for annulment of judgement was to have the final and executory judgement set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation.16 Whether or not the assailed Partial Decision based solely on facts and evidence presented by the petitioners is
meritorious is irrelevant and immaterial. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err, nor did it violate the petitioners' right to due process
of law, when it refused to consider all the factual issues raised by petitioners.

b. No. While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the approval of the trial court, it does not
cure the fatal defect that the "Metropolitan Newsweek" is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City .The Rules strictly
require that publication must be "in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may
order."18 The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time that the summons was to be
published. In the absence of such specification, publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements of the
rules. The incomplete directive of the court a quo coupled with the defective publication of the summons rendered the service by
publication ineffective. The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction
over the respondents,19 and failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication is a
fatal defect in the service of summons.20 It cannot be over emphasized that the statutory requirements of service of summons,
whether personally, by substituted service, or by publication, must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service
other than that prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective.
Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly complied with the rules, the service of summons would still
be ineffective insofar as private respondents are concerned. At the time the complaint for Quieting of title was filed on November
2, 1983, Vilma Maloles Subdivision no longer existed as a juridical entity. Vilma Maloles Subdivision, a partnership, was dissolved
more than six (6) years earlier, as evidenced by a Certificate of Dissolution issued by the SEC dated January 26,1976.22
Consequently, it could no longer be sued having lost its juridical personality.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Sison 612 SCRA

Facts:
The Isog Han Samar Movement filed a letter-complaint with the Petitioner, Office of the Ombudsman, accusing Governor
Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials including the Provincial Budget Officer, private respondent Maximo D. Sison.
The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13, 2004 conducted by the Legal and
Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit (COA), which found, among others, that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34
million went without proper bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds were expended without a State of
Calamity having been declared by the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were
substantially overpriced.
Petitioner found basis to proceed with the administrative case against the impleaded provincial officials of Samar. Private
respondent was required to to file their counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence against the complaint.
In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations contained in the letter-complaint and claimed his
innocence on the charges. He asserted that his function is limited to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation for the
requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds are available. He did not, in any way, vouch
for the truthfulness of the certification issued by the requesting parties. In addition, he averred that he never participated in the
alleged irregularities as shown in the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding. Further, he alleged that not one of the
documentary evidences so far attached in the letter-complaint bore his signature and that he was neither factually connected nor
directly implicated in the complaint.
The petitioner rendered a decision finding Sison and several other local officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him from service.
Private respondent appealed to the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 43. On June 26, 2008, the CA reversed and set
aside the decision of the petitioner for insufficiency of evidence. Then, petitioner filed on July 22, 2008, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently
denied by the CA
Issue:
a. whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration of the adverse decision
rendered by the CA.
b. whether the motion to intervene was timely filed?
Held:
a. No. (citing Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 19) Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to
the suit but claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim.10
Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the
persons involved.11
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should
the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to
intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or
lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.

(citing PNB vs. Garcia) Based on the facts above, the Office of the Ombudsman cannot use Garcia to support its intervention in
the appellate court for the following reasons:
First, Sison was not exonerated from the administrative charges against him, and was, in fact, dismissed for grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case,
OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. Thus, it was Sison who appealed to the CA being, unquestionably, the party aggrieved by the judgment on
appeal.
Second, the issue here is the right of the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal of its decision, not its right to appeal.
And third, Garcia should be read along with Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals15 and National Appellate Board of the National Police
Commission v. Mamauag (Mamauag),16 in which this Court qualified and clarified the exercise of the right of a government agency
to actively participate in the appeal of decisions in administrative cases. In Mamauag, this Court ruled:
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of
RA 6975 authorize either party to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent
when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government
when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the
proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and
imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be the one that is
prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining
authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the
respondent.
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the instant case. It must remain partial
and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.
It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where their decisions are appealed to a
higher court for review. The raison detre for such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding
and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without the
judges active participation.17 When judges actively participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial
and have become adversarial instead.

b. No. Furthermore, the Rules provide explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed only on July 22, 2008, after the
Decision of the CA was promulgated on June 26, 2008.
It should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court provides
that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the CA, with proof of service of a copy on the court or
agency a quo.23 Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman had sufficient time within which to file a motion to intervene. As such, its
failure to do so should not now be countenanced. The Office of the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," not
merely a passive onlooker.

Anonuevo vs. Interstate Estate of Jalandoni 636 SCRA

Facts:
In 1967, Bernardo Jalandoni, brother of Rodolfo Jalandoni, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration to
commence the judicial settlement of the latters estate.(still pending)
In 2003, a manifestation was made by petitioners and their siblings. They introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia
Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis. The
petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmotherIsabelwas, at the time of Rodolfos death, the legal spouse of the
latter.13 For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
 Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on her
behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni. As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia
and Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter.
They presented Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo; the birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia; and
their respective proof of births.
Bernardino, appointed special administrator opposed the intervention on the ground that the birth certificate of their
mother, Sylvia, revealed that Isabel and had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly
married to Rodolfo. Hence, Rodolfo and Isabel could not have entered into a valid marriage.
The trial court allowed the petitioners to intervene. The CA reversed the decision.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their
siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.

Held:
NO. A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of
sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.45 Otherwise
stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.46
Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a casethe mistake is not
simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the courts jurisdiction and
can only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for
certiorari.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis
was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis
exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
exclusive evidence of marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than
the marriage certificate.48 Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.49
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel
and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married"
and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.50 In clear and categorical language, Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a subsisting
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence,
unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested.52 In the case at bench,
the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.