Today is Friday, September 29, 2017

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

UNGRIA SAN JUAN-JAVIER, and RHODORA R. PELOMIDA as their Attorney-in-fact, Petitioner,

RT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35, ROSARIO DIDELES VDA. DE CASTOR, NEPTHALIE CASTOR IT

DECISION

ution2 dated September 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60764.

Ferolyn Castor Facurib (Ferolyn), Rachel De Castor, Lea Castor Dollolosa and Rosalie Castor Benedicto, filed with the Region
ry of Rosario's conjugal share with damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria, defendants
pondents are their legitimate children. The documents they sought to annul are (1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest inc
1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner.

ds: (1) the claim or demand has been extinguished by virtue of the valid sale of Lot No. 1615 to Eugenio; (2) the action is barred
ion proceedings.

s: (1) plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the

f the grounds alleged in the complaint is for the recovery of conjugal share on Lot No. 1615, of Pls-209 D with damages.
 mber 15, 1952, and the application to the land was dated January 17, 1952 and the patent was issued by the President on Novem

hment dated November 23, 1960 which was made a part thereof as Annex "D." Considering the marriage of September 15, 1992

bruary 4, 2000.

omplaint should be dismissed or expunged from the records pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 7; (2) reconsidering t

g this case as indigent litigants.

ng defendant actual and compensatory damages such as are proved during the hearing of this case. So also are attorneys fees and

rged.

dering the total amount of the claim, the Clerk of Court should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must req

hould be allowed to continue prosecuting the case as indigent litigants.

pensatory damages as has been proved during the hearing of this case. So also are attorney's fees and moral damages all to be pr

rged.

me shall be considered as lien on the judgment that may be entered.

ing this case as indigent litigants, suffice it to say that the same is already provided for in this order.

der.15

emporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner sought the nullification of the Order dated Novembe
reto.
 . 7 would not apply where the amount of damages or value of the property was immaterial; that the Circular could be applied on
respondents had paid the corresponding docket fees upon the filing of the complaint, thus, the RTC had acquired jurisdiction ov
nting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. It noted that the RTC's Clarificatory Order dated March
ance with the rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion.17 The CA proceeded to state that a judicious examinatio
al on the merits of the case.

17, 2004. The CA ruled, among others, that the defenses of acquisitive prescription and laches were likewise unavailing. It foun
law is ineffective against a Torrens title; that unless there are intervening rights of third persons which may be affected or preju

s:

IAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS DES

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS BARRED BY LACHES AND EXTRAORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.18

of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Respondents' complaint was filed in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (
nd Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129.19 Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, pro

n Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:

on:

stimation;

interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (20,000.00) or for civil ac
n over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x

l Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

perty, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Peso
ion expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be de

has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case based on the above-quoted provisions.

ernative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities and/or for recovery of conjugal share on the subject l
0.00; that the couple left the cultivation and enjoyment of the usufruct of the subject land to Fernando's mother and her second fa
ther, but later learned that the subject land was leased by petitioner Ceferina; that sometime in August 1999, respondents learned
ct land in favor of Eugenio, petitioner Ceferina's father, as well as an Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 exe
of a simulated Deed of Transfer.

der petitioner and the other defendants to vacate the premises and restore respondents to its possession and enjoyment therefore.
ration; hence, inexistent, void ab initio and/or a patent nullity, as well as the Affidavit of Relinquishment which was the direct re
of the subject land as conjugal owner thereof and to account and reimburse her of its usufruct; and/or to allow them to redeem th

of the parties over the subject land which is a real action. Respondents alleged that the assessed value of the subject land was 1
above-quoted Section 33 (3) of BP 129, as amended.

validity of the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest executed by Fernando in favor of petitioner's father. Respondents also sou
and/or for redemption of the subject land. Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the
within the jurisdiction of the RTC.20

ation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primaril
mount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the mon
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).22

mpanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.23 It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiat

oney claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, o

lue thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.25

estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the subje
he amount of 400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon
ontention that respondents violated SC Circular No. 7 issued on March 24, 1998 requiring that all complaints must specify the am
that:

ce every four months, or 6,000.00 a year per hectare; that defendants in proportion and length of time of their respective occupa
) for defendants Dolores Cagautan, a certain alias "Dory," and PO1 Jonas Montales, of an undetermined area, the latter having en

ective occupancy, to pay reasonable rentals to the plaintiffs in the proportion and amount assessed in paragraph 13 of the First C

satory damages such as are proved during the hearing of this case;

moral damages, all to be proved during the hearing of this case.28

ages in their prayer.

t of Appeals,29 where we held that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount of damages being asked for shall n

payment of docket fees, to wit:

payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Wh
icable prescriptive or reglementary period.

leadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow

ate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleadin
rk of Court or his duly-authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

by the evidence" does not call for the dismissal of the complaint for violation of SC Circular No. 7, dated March 24, 1988 which
vely modified SC Circular No. 7 by providing that filing fees for damages and awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens o

al would still be subject to additional filing fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It would then be the responsibility

be determined after a final judgment, since there is a need to show supporting evidence when the petitioner and the other defenda
March 30, 2000, where the RTC stated that "since there was no hearing yet, respondents are not in a position to determine how m
 ner contends that she took possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, exclusive, notorious and continuous since 19
hat, granting without admitting that the transfer of rights between Fernando and Eugenio was null and void for any reason whats

s of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.33 Prescription is unavailing not only against th
Dideles.

August 1952, but only according to respondents, the sale was null and void because it violated the provisions of the Public Land A
's application was only as settler, or for the allocation of the subject land to him vice the original settler Cadiente.

ues are factual which must be resolved at the trial of this case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity

ere allegations in the pleadings. Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to dismiss respondents' compla

ompanied by Miss Angela Jagna-an, appeared in the residence of plaintiff Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor in Bo.1, Banga, South
used telling her that she better return it to the person who requested her to do so (referring to her mother-in-law), more so that he

ted that [his] mother desires the land above-described to be sold to defendant Ceferina de Ungria which however he was oppose

y of General Santos, sometime in 1980, the latter and his surviving wife thought all the while that the land above-described was
d even been leased by defendant Ceferina de Ungria with the Stanfilco and Checkered farm;

hrough Ester Orejana, who is the half sister-in-law of plaintiff Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor that she desires to settle with them
continued with Lolita Javier as attorney-in-fact after defendant Ceferina de Ungria left to reside in Manila and which resulted la
pared to the actual value of the same land; that in that negotiation, defendant Ceferina de Ungria was challenged to show any per

al and present controverting evidence to prove the elements of laches.

 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

as assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CERTIFICATION

certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of

Flores and Edgardo A. Camello, concurring; rollo, pp. 126-132.

d. v. Asuncion, supra note 17, at 291. See also Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 75919, Ma

224 SCRA 477, 478.

pril 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 339, 350.

SCRA 578; Abadiano v. Martir, G.R. No. 156310, July 31, 2008, 560 SCRA 676, 693; Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Associa
Phil. 791, 801 (2001); Bishop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86787, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 636, 641; and Barcelona, et. al. v. B