Labor Law I
1.) [G.R. No. 125903. November 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMULO
SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ, and CLODUALDO DE LA
CRUZ, accused.
ROMULO SAULO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Accused-appellant, together with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la
Cruz, were charged with violation of Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code[1] for
illegal recruitment in large scale in an information which states
CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21911
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO,
AMELIA DE LA CRUZ and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, of the crime of
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE (ART. 38(b) in relation to
Art. 39(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No.
2018, committed as follows:
That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990 in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, by falsely representing themselves to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and
promise employment/job placement abroad to LEODEGARIO MAULLON,
BENY MALIGAYA and ANGELES JAVIER, without first securing the
required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment,
in violation of said law.
That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was
perpetrated against three (3) persons individually or as [a] group penalized
under Articles 38 and 39 as amended by PD 2018 of the Labor Code (P.D.
442).
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In addition, accused were charged with three counts of estafa (Criminal Case
Nos. Q-91-21908, Q-91-21909 and Q-91-21910). Except for the names of the
complainants, the dates of commission of the crime charged, and the amounts
involved, the informations[3] were identical in their allegations
CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21908
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO,
AMELIA DE LA CRUZ AND CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ of the crime
of ESTAFA (Art. 315, par. 2 (a) RPC), committed as follows:
That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, by means of false
pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud one BENY MALIGAYA, in the following manner, to
wit: on the date and in the place aforementioned, accused falsely pretended to
the offended party that they had connection and capacity to deploy workers
for overseas employment and that they could secure employment/placement
for said Beny Maligaya and believing said misrepresentations, the offended
party was later induced to give accused, as in fact she did give the total
amount of P35,000.00, Philippine Currency, and once in possession of the
said amount and far from complying with their commitment and despite
repeated demands made upon them to return said amount, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to defraud,
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to their own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party in the
aforementioned amount and in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges
against him. Meanwhile accused Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz
have remained at large.
During trial, the prosecution sought to prove the following material facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes:
Benny Maligaya, having learned from a relative of accused-appellant that the
latter was recruiting workers for Taiwan, went to accused-appellants house in
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, together with Angeles Javier and
Amelia de la Cruz, in order to discuss her chances for overseas employment.
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Labor Law I
During that meeting which took place sometime in April or May, 1990,
accused-appellant told Maligaya that she would be able to leave for Taiwan
as a factory worker once she gave accused-appellant the fees for the
processing of her documents. Sometime in May, 1990, Maligaya also met
with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in Baesa,
Quezon City and they assured her that they were authorized by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for
Taiwan. Maligaya paid accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz the amount
of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a receipt dated May 21, 1990 signed by
accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-
21908). Seeing that he had reneged on his promise to send her to Taiwan,
Maligaya filed a complaint against accused-appellant with the POEA.[4]
Angeles Javier, a widow and relative by affinity of accused-appellant, was
told by Ligaya, accused-appellants wife, to apply for work abroad through
accused-appellant. At a meeting in accused-appellants Quezon City
residence, Javier was told by accused-appellant that he could get her a job in
Taiwan as a factory worker and that she should give him P35,000.00 for
purposes of preparing Javiers passport. Javier gave an initial amount of
P20,000.00 to accused-appellant, but she did not ask for a receipt as she
trusted him. As the overseas employment never materialized, Javier was
prompted to bring the matter before the POEA.[5]
On April 19, 1990, Leodigario Maullon, upon the invitation of his neighbor
Araceli Sanchez, went to accused-appellants house in order to discuss his
prospects for gaining employment abroad. As in the case of Maligaya and
Javier, accused-appellant assured Maullon that he could secure him a job as a
factory worker in Taiwan if he paid him P30,000.00 for the processing of his
papers. Maullon paid P7,900.00 to accused-appellants wife, who issued a
receipt dated April 21, 1990 (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910).
Thereafter, Maullon paid an additional amount of P6,800.00 in the presence
of accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz, which payment is also
evidenced by a receipt dated April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B in Crim. Case No. Q-
91-21910). Finally, Maullon paid P15,700.00 to a certain Loreta Tumalig, a
friend of accused-appellant, as shown by a receipt dated September 14, 1990
(Exhibit C in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Again, accused-appellant failed
to deliver on the promised employment. Maullon thus filed a complaint with
the POEA.[6]
The prosecution also presented a certification dated July 26, 1994 issued by
the POEA stating that accused are not licensed to recruit workers for
overseas employment (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21911).[7]
In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was also applying with
Amelia de la Cruz for overseas employment. He asserts that it was for this
reason that he met all three complainants as they all went together to Amelia
de la Cruz house in Novaliches, Quezon City sometime in May, 1990 in
order to follow up their applications. Accused-appellant flatly denied that he
was an overseas employment recruiter or that he was working as an agent for
one. He also denied having received any money from any of the
complainants or having signed any of the receipts introduced by the
prosecution in evidence. It is accused-appellants contention that the
complainants were prevailed upon by accused-appellants mother-in-law, with
whom he had a misunderstanding, to file the present cases against him.[8]
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of estafa and of
illegal recruitment in large scale. It adjudged:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Romulo Saulo:
A. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this
Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Beny
Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, with interest thereon at 12% per
annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against the said accused.
B. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this
Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Angeles
Javier in the amount of P20,000.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum
until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused.
C. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this
Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
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Labor Law I
of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Leodigario
Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum
until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused.
D. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale as defined and punished under Article 38
(b) in relation to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines as
amended, and this Court sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00).
Being a detention prisoner, the accused Romulo Saulo shall be entitled to the
benefits of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal.
The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art.
38 (b) of the Labor Code and penalized under Art. 39 of the same Code, are
as follows:
(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as
defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34
of the Labor Code;
(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license
or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas;
and
(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually
or as a group.[10]
Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not;
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds that the
trial court was justified in holding that accused-appellant was engaged in
unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The prosecution clearly
established that accused-appellant promised the three complainants - Benny
Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon employment in Taiwan as
factory workers and that he asked them for money in order to process their
papers and procure their passports. Relying completely upon such
representations, complainants entrusted their hard-earned money to accused-
appellant in exchange for what they would later discover to be a vain hope of
obtaining employment abroad. It is not disputed that accused-appellant is
not authorized[11] nor licensed[12] by the Department of Labor and
Employment to engage in recruitment and placement activities. The absence
of the necessary license or authority renders all of accused-appellants
recruitment activities criminal.
Accused-appellant interposes a denial in his defense, claiming that he never
received any money from the complainants nor processed their papers.
Instead, accused-appellant insists that he was merely a co-applicant of the
complainants and similarly deceived by the schemes of Amelia and
Clodualdo de la Cruz. He contends that the fact that Benny Maligaya and
Angleles Javier went to the house of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz in
Novaliches, Quezon City, to get back their money and to follow-up their
application proves that complainants knew that it was the de la Cruz who
received the processing fees, and not accused-appellant. Further, accused-
appellant argues that complainants could not have honestly believed that he
could get them their passports since they did not give him any of the
necessary documents, such as their birth certificate, baptismal certificate,
NBI clearance, and marriage contract.
Accused-appellants asseverations are self-serving and uncorroborated by
clear and convincing evidence. They cannot stand against the straightforward
and explicit testimonies of the complainants, who have identified accused-
appellant as the person who enticed them to part with their money upon his
representation that he had the capability of obtaining employment for them
abroad. In the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were
motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.[13]
The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to
complainants does not weaken the case of the prosecution. A person charged
with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimonies
of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.[14] The absence
of receipts to evidence payment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused,
and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause.[15]
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Labor Law I
Accused-appellant contends that he could not have committed the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor and
employment officer at the POEA, testified that licenses for recruitment and
placement are issued only to corporations and not to natural persons. This
argument is specious and illogical. The Labor Code states that any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.[16] Corrolarily, a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any
person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or
authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor,
or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked, or canceled by
the POEA or the Secretary.[17] It also bears stressing that agents or
representatives appointed by a licensee or a holder of authority but whose
appointments are not previously authorized by the POEA fall within the
meaning of the term nonlicensee or nonholder of authority.[18] Thus, any
person, whether natural or juridical, that engages in recruitment activities
without the necessary license or authority shall be penalized under Art. 39 of
the Labor Code.
It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and
convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that
illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum, whereas estafa is malum in se,
meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction in the former, but is required in the latter.[19]
The elements of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) that the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence
or by deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[20] The trial court
was correct in holding accused-appellant liable for estafa in the case at
bench. Owing to accused-appellants false assurances that he could provide
them with work in another country, complainants parted with their money, to
their damage and prejudice, since the promised employment never
materialized.
Under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of estafa
is as follows:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under
the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Since the
penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty
next lower in degree is prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six
(6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be divided into
three equal portions of time, each of which portion shall be deemed to form
one period, as follows
Minimum Period : From 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months
and 10 days
Medium Period : From 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months
and 20 days
Maximum Period : From 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code.
When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty
prescribed in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, although
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20)
years.[21]
Accordingly, the following penalties shall be imposed upon accused-
appellant:
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny
Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of
P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be
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Labor Law I

added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant
shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2) months
of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision
mayor as maximum.[22] Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya
P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded
Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer
the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant
shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded
Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum.[23] Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario
Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.
the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant
shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded
Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon
P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.
In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case
No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-
appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case
No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-
appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the March 6, 1996 Decision of the trial court finding

accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
following modifications:

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny

Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of
P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be
added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant
shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2) months
of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision
mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya
P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded

Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer
5
Labor Law I
2.) G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION
(POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING
OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.
Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death
of her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal
ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was
not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was
killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for
damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of
the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint
was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and
should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA
nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of
the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of
P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor
General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the
agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its
subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the
questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of
law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the
petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure
would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under
Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and
monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It
replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the
Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the
POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out
of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers,
including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and
Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims
for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment. 2
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the
claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not
an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's
claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to appeal
to the Employees Compensation Commission.
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano
Saco was an overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the
fatal accident in Japan in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas
employment is defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines,
including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered
by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described as "any person working
or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall
include seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has been
employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer,
principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not
disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the
petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris,
while berthed in a foreign country. 6
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which
constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at
the time of his death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping
articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the
exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive
Order NO. 797. 7 The second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated
by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which
was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and
welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."
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Labor Law I
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for
the private respondent's signature, described the subject of the burial benefits
as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly
not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own previous
acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions
considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the
employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its
international flights, are not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the
petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its shipping articles to
the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the
Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the
analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the
definitions given be considered seamen nor are their appointments coursed
through the POEA.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial
expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No.
2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a
standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A
similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board and
had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner
claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco,
but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so
as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the
employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are
advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February
1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract
effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so, the
provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the
contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself
as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a)
of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder
provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which,
as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract
substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as
to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced,
not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate
Apellate Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition
of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It
is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics
supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for
partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the
officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of
their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a
'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. 14
7
Labor Law I
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority
to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major
powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the
legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to
be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of
the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more
frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation
of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general
are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies
laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor
Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The
model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number
of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and
before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not
unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise
of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order
itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers
to "fair and equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient
standards "Public interest" in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity"
in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience and welfare"
in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency"
in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the
United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual
Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security"
in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly
death benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also
paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In addition,
as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the
Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude
allowance of the private respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is
specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino
seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that
Section C. Compensation and Benefits.
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of:
a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers
b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master
electrician
c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.
2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be
separate and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which
the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ...
3. ...
c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall
pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for
burial expenses.
The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No.
22, issued by the National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an
follows:
Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.
8
Labor Law I

All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.
Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby
granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the LIFTED. It is so ordered.
seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract
approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security
Law and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his
beneficiaries in accordance with such laws.

The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the
working class, consistently with the social justice policy and the specific
provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working class and the
promotion of its interest.

One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its
argument that it has been denied due process because the same POEA that
issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an
uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are
vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial.
The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and
the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples
abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue
regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and
Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent
Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad
infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement
has been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be
considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down
by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations 21 are observed.

Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this
case are resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express
mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life
should have more in law.

When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales
of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced
by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged
worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the right to
assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management,
with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of
capital but its active and equal partner.
9
Labor Law I
3.) [G.R. No. 103144. April 4, 2001]
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and
CEDRIC LEYSON, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari from the Order dated November 25, 1991
issued by public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment. The
November 25, 1991 Order affirmed en toto the August 29, 1988 Order of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (hereinafter the POEA)
which found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2)
counts of contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful
deduction from salaries of workers in POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370.
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Philsa) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985,
private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for employment in
Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount of
P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for
private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson[1].
After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents
left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-
Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner.
While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a
second contract on February 4, 1985 which changed some of the provisions
of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits
and privileges[2]. On April 1, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly forced
them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours
to 60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly
salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private
respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to the
Philippines[3].
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from
petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment of
their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner
refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its
foreign principal, Al-Hejailan., with the following causes of action:
1. Illegal dismissal;
2. Payment of salary differentials;
3. Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries;
4. Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and
5. Contract substitution.[4]
The case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370.
Under the rules of the POEA dated May 21, 1985, complaints involving
employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including
money claims, are adjudicated by the Workers Assistance and Adjudication
Office (hereinafter the WAAO) thru the POEA Hearing Officers[5]. On the
other hand, complaints involving recruitment violations warranting
suspension or cancellation of the license of recruiting agencies are
cognizable by the POEA thru its Licensing and Recruitment Office
(hereinafter the LRO).[6] In cases where a complaint partakes of the nature of
both an employer-employee relationship case and a recruitment regulation
case, the POEA Hearing Officer shall act as representative of both the
WAAO and the LRO and both cases shall be heard simultaneously. In such
cases, the Hearing Officer shall submit two separate recommendations for the
two aspects of the case.[7]
In the case at bench, the first two causes of action were in the nature of
money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and were
properly cognizable by the WAAO. The last two causes of action were in the
nature of recruitment violations and may be investigated by the LRO. The
third cause of action, illegal deduction/withholding of salary, is both a money
claim and a violation of recruitment regulations and is thus under the
investigatory jurisdiction of both the WAAO and the LRO.
Several hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer on the
two aspects of private respondents complaint. During these hearings, private
respondents supported their complaint with the presentation of both
documentary and testimonial evidence. When it was its turn to present its
evidence, petitioner failed to do so and consequently, private respondents
filed a motion to decide the case on the basis of the evidence on record.[8]
10
Labor Law I
On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the
employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a
decision dated August 31, 1988[9], the dispositive portion of which reads:
CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND
SERVICE CORPORATION to pay complainants, jointly and severally with
its principal Al-Hejailan, the following amounts, to wit:
1. TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE SAUDI RIYALS
(SR2,225.00) to each complainant, representing the refund of their unpaid
separation pay;
2. ONE THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR1,000.00) for V.A. de Mesa
alone, representing the salary deduction from his March salary;
3. TWO THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,000.00) each for R.I. Mikin
and C.A.P. Leyson only, representing their differential pay for the months of
February and March, 1985; and
4. Five percent (5%) of the total awards as and by way of attorneys fees.
All payments of the abovestated awards shall be made in Philippine Currency
equivalent to the prevailing exchange rate according to the Central Bank at
the time of payment.
All other claims of complainants as well as the counterclaims of respondent
are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Under the Rules and Regulations of the POEA, the decision of the POEA-
Adjudication Office on matters involving money claims arising from the
employer-employee relationship of overseas Filipino workers may be
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter the
NLRC)[11]. Thus, as both felt aggrieved by the said POEA Decision,
petitioner and private respondents filed separate appeals from the August 31,
1988 POEA Decision to the NLRC.
[12]
In a decision dated July 26, 1989 , the NLRC modified the appealed
decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary
deductions and differentials. These awards to private respondents were
deleted by the NLRC considering that these were not raised in the complaint
filed by private respondents. The NLRC likewise stated that there was
nothing in the text of the decision which would justify the award.
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was
denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989.
Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to
the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari where it was
docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25,
1989, the petition was dismissed outright for insufficiency in form and
substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular No.
1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questioned
resolution dated August 23, 1989.[13]
Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision
of the POEA on private respondents money claims, the POEA issued a
separate Order dated August 29, 1988[14] resolving the recruitment violations
aspect of private respondents complaint. In this Order, the POEA found
petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful
deduction. The dispositive portion of this August 29, 1988 POEA Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds herein respondent
PHILSA International Placement and Services Corporation liable for three
(3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one
count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to refund the placement fees in
the amount of P2,500.00 to Rodrigo L. Mikin, P4,000.00, each, to Vivencio
A. de Mesa and Cedric A.P. Leyson plus restitution of the salaries withheld
in the amount of SR1,000.00 to Vivencio A. de Mesa.
Moreover, respondents license is hereby suspended for eight (8) months to
take effect immediately and to remain as such until full refund and restitution
of the above-stated amounts have been effected or in lieu thereof, it is fined
the amount of SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00) PESOS plus restitution,
SO ORDERED.
In line with this August 29, 1988 Order, petitioner deposited the check
equivalent to the claims of private respondents and paid the corresponding
fine under protest. From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for
11
Labor Law I
Reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated October
10, 1989.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the
LRO suspending or canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment
agency may be appealed to the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and
Employment.[15] Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 21, 1988 Order to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, in an Order dated September
13, 1991[16], public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment
affirmed en toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November
25, 1991.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari where petitioner raises the following
grounds for the reversal of the questioned Orders:
I.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF ILLEGAL EXACTIONS. THE
FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. AND IN ANY EVENT,
THE LAW ON WHICH THE CONVICTION IS BASED IS VOID.
II.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
PENALIZING PETITIONER WITH CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION. IN
THE PREMISES, THE CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION IS VALID AS IT
IMPROVED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS EMPLOYMENT.
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
HOLDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL
DEDUCTIONS/WITHHOLDING OF SALARIES. FOR THE SUPREME
COURT ITSELF HAS ALREADY ABSOLVED PETITIONER FROM
THIS CHARGE.
With respect to the first ground, petitioner would want us to overturn the
findings of the POEA, subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, that it is guilty of illegal exaction
committed by collecting placement fees in excess of the amounts allowed by
law. This issue, however, is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[17] As we have previously held:
It should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition is a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. An
extraordinary remedy, its use is available only and restrictively in truly
exceptional cases wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer
performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is challenged for being wholly void
on grounds of jurisdiction. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not include
correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of the evidence and
factual findings based thereon, which are generally accorded not only great
respect but even finality.[18]
The question of whether or not petitioner charged private respondents
placement fees in excess of that allowed by law is clearly a question of fact
which is for public respondent POEA, as a trier of facts, to determine. As
stated above, the settled rule is that the factual findings of quasi-judicial
agencies like the POEA, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only
respect, but at times even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.[19]
On this point, we have carefully examined the records of the case and it is
clear that the ruling of public respondent POEA that petitioner is guilty of
illegal exaction is supported by substantial evidence. Aside from the
testimonial evidence offered by private respondents, they also presented
documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by a duly authorized
representative of petitioner which show the payment of amounts in excess of
those allowed by the POEA. In contrast, petitioner did not present any
evidence whatsoever to rebut the claims of private respondents despite the
many opportunities for them to do so.
Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as
POEA Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1983, which enumerated the
allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of
publication.
There is merit in the argument.
In Taada vs. Tuvera[20], the Court held, as follows:
12
Labor Law I
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public,
need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter
of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and
effect the following administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations
issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment
Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical
clinics and laboratories[21]; b) Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering the
suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining
companies to the national government[22]; c) Memorandum Circulars issued
by the POEA regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong
Kong[23]; d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the
Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for
importation from the Peoples Republic of China[24]; and e) Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and
Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe
benefits to government officials and employees[25]. In all these cited cases,
the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down
as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register
as required by the Administrative Code of 1987[26].
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be
declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the
National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable
schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment
agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount
which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is
P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the
provisions of Article 32 of the Labor Code which provides, as follows:
Article 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying with a private
fee-charging employment agency for employment assistance shall not be
charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has
actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the
approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor
shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees. (italics supplied)
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation[27]. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series
of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National
Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of
administrative sanctions on petitioner was based not on the questioned
administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article 34 (a)[28] of the Labor
Code.
The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were
never cited, much less discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of the
POEA and Secretary of Labor and Employment. In fact, the said Orders were
consistent in mentioning that petitioners violation of Administrative Circular
No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for the imposition of administrative
sanctions against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner was
held liable under the said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34
(a) of the Labor Code presupposes the promulgation of a valid schedule of
fees by the Department of Labor and Employment. Considering that, as
previously discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
embodying such a schedule of fees never took effect, there is thus no basis
for the imposition of the administrative sanctions against
petitioner. Moreover, under Book VI, Chapter II, Section 3 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, (r)ules in force on the date of the effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 was never
filed with the National Administrative Register, the same cannot be used as
basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner.
13
Labor Law I
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned
administrative circular is not among those requiring publication
contemplated by Taada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a specific group
of persons and not to the general public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely
private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from
the ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association
of Service Exporters vs. Torres[29], the administrative circulars questioned
therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and
Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong,
and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said
circulars may not be enforced or implemented.
Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely
internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative
Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these
exceptions.
In this regard, the Solicitor Generals reliance on the case of Yaokasin vs.
Commissioner of Customs[30] is misplaced. In the said case, the validity of
certain Customs Memorandum Orders were upheld despite their lack of
publication as they were addressed to a particular class of persons, the
customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs. As such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall
under one of the exceptions to the publication requirement, namely those
dealing with instructions from an administrative superior to a subordinate
regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance which does not
obtain in the case at bench.
With respect to the second ground, petitioner would want us to review the
findings of fact of the POEA regarding the two counts of alleged contract
substitution. Again, this is a question of fact which may not be disturbed if
the same is supported by substantial evidence. A reading of the August 29,
1988 Order of the POEA shows that, indeed, the ruling that petitioner is
guilty of two (2) counts of prohibited contract substitution is supported by
substantial evidence. Thus:
2. As admitted by respondent, there was definitely a contract of substitution
in the first count. The first contract was duly approved by the Administration
and, therefore, the parties are bound by the terms and condition thereof until
its expiration. The mere intention of respondents to increase the number of
hours of work, even if there was a corresponding increase in wage is clear
violation of the contract as approved by the Administration, and
notwithstanding the same, the amendment is evidently contrary to law,
morals, good customs and public policy and hence, must be shunned (Art.
1306, Civil Code of the Philippines, Book III, Title I, Chapter 1, Article 83,
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended). Moreover, it would appear that
the proposed salary increase corresponding to the increase in number of work
bonus may just have been a ploy as complainant were (sic) thereafter not
paid at the increased rate.
As to contract substitution in the second part, a third contract was
emphatically intended by respondent to be signed by complainants which,
however, was not consummated due to the adamant refusal of complainants
to sign thereon.Mere intention of the respondent to commit contract
substitution for a second time should not be left unpunished. It is the duty of
this Office to repress such acts by teaching agencies a lesson to avoid
repetition of the same violation.[31]
With respect to the third ground, petitioner argues that the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal
deductions/withholding of salaries considering that the Supreme Court itself
has already absolved petitioner from this charge. Petitioner premises its
argument on the fact that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC absolving
it from private respondent de Mesas claim for salary deduction has already
attained finality by reason of the dismissal of private respondents petition for
certiorari of the said NLRC decision by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC
has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari
assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the
money claims of private respondents arising from employer-employee
relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the
said money claims that petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions,
which are distinct and separate from the money claims of private
respondents, may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the
August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of
14
Labor Law I

private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that
respondents liability for said money claims is without prejudice to and
independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case
which is the subject of a separate Order.[32]
The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying private respondent de
Mesas claim for salary deduction based its ruling on a finding that the said
money claim was not raised in the complaint[33]. While there may be
questions regarding such finding of the NLRC, the finality of the said NLRC
Decision prevents us from modifying or reviewing the same. But the fact that
the claim for salary deduction was not raised by private respondents in their
complaint will not bar the POEA from holding petitioner liable for illegal
deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the suspension or
cancellation of petitioners license.
for two (2) counts of contract substitution and one (1) count of withholding
or unlawful deduction of salary.
Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by the POEA, the
penalty for each count of contract substitution is suspension of license for
two (2) months or a fine of P10,000.00 while the penalty for withholding or
unlawful deduction of salaries is suspension of license for two (2) months or
fine equal to the salary withheld but not less than P10,000.00 plus restitution
of the amount in both instances[36]. Applying the said schedule on the instant
case, the license of petitioner should be suspended for six (6) months or, in
lieu thereof, it should be ordered to pay fine in the amount of
P30,000.00. Petitioner should likewise pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to
private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa as restitution for the amount
withheld from his salary.

Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative,
may conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of
the license of any private placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned
therein.[34] As such, even without a written complaint from an aggrieved
party, the POEA can initiate proceedings against an erring private placement
agency and, if the result of its investigation so warrants, impose the
corresponding administrative sanction thereof. Moreover, the POEA, in an
investigation of an employer-employee relationship case, may still hold a
respondent liable for administrative sanctions if, in the course of its
investigation, violations of recruitment regulations are uncovered.[35] It is
thus clear that even if recruitment violations were not included in a complaint
for money claims initiated by a private complainant, the POEA, under its
rules, may still take cognizance of the same and impose administrative
sanctions if the evidence so warrants.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 13, 1991 and
November 25, 1991 Orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor and
Employment are hereby MODIFIED. As modified, the license of private
respondent Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is
hereby suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it is hereby ordered to
pay the amount of P30,000.00 as fine. Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay
the amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa. All
other monetary awards are deleted.
SO ORDERED.

As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the
payment of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean
that it is likewise absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be
imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or withholding of private
respondents salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion
in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful
deduction/withholding of salary.

To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of

illegal exaction as POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 could
not be the basis of administrative sanctions against petitioner for lack of
publication. However, we affirm the ruling of the POEA and the Secretary of
Labor and Employment that petitioner should be held administratively liable
15
Labor Law I
4.) G.R. No. 151303. April 15, 2005
ATHENNA* INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
NONITO VILLANOS, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated May 23, 2001
and Resolution2 dated November 23, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 59594. The Court of Appeals reversed the Resolutions3 of the
National Labor Relations Commission and reinstated the Labor Arbiters
Decision4 in NLRC Case No. Sub-RAB-09-OFW-(LB)-02-00002-99.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Petitioner Athenna International Manpower Services, Inc. is a domestic
corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of workers for overseas
employment. Respondent Nonito Villanos is a contract worker recruited by
petitioner to work as a caretaker in Taiwan.
Respondent applied to work overseas thru petitioner sometime in February
1998. He alleged that he was assessed P100,000 placement fee by petitioner.
As he had only P30,000 to pay petitioner, respondent begged for a reduced
fee. Petitioner agreed and the placement fee was reduced to P94,000 only, on
the condition that the remaining balance of P64,000 shall be paid through
salary deductions upon his deployment. Respondent received no receipt for
the P30,000 cash that he advanced as partial placement fee. Instead,
petitioner gave him a schedule of his monthly salary deduction payments for
one year for his balance, which included interest and other charges,
amounting to P90,725.
In October 1998, respondents Contract of Employment with a certain Wei
Yu Hsien arrived. Under this contract, he was to work as caretaker for one
year, ten months and twenty-eight days with a monthly pay of New Taiwan
Dollars (NT$) 15,840.
On October 15, 1998, he flew to Taiwan. Respondent alleged that upon his
arrival in Taiwan, he was assigned to a mechanical shop, owned by Hsien, as
a hydraulic installer/repairer for car lifters, instead of the job for which he
was hired. He found out that Hsien was actually engaged in the installation
and repair of hydraulic machines for gasoline stations and other mechanical
shops. Since then, he traveled from one place to another, even during
nighttime as hydraulic installer/repair man for car lifters, as required by his
employer. He did not, however, complain because he needed money to pay
for the debts he incurred back home.
Barely a month after his placement, he was terminated by Hsien. On
November 14, 1998, respondent was made to sign a document stating that he
was not qualified for the position. He did not, however, sign the document.
At dawn of November 16, 1998,5 respondent was handed his salary, with the
accompanying computation and instruction for his departure to the
Philippines.
Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he immediately went to petitioners office
and confronted its representative, Lorenza Ching, about the assignment given
to him and demanded that he be reimbursed the P30,000 he paid as
downpayment. Instead of returning the said amount, petitioner gave him a
summary of expenses amounting to P30,493, which it allegedly incurred for
his deployment abroad.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a complaint docketed as POEA Case No. RV98-
12-1586, before the Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
However, because of financial constraints, he had to go home to Polanco,
Zamboanga del Norte where, on February 17, 1999, he filed a complaint
against petitioner for illegal dismissal, violation of contract, and recovery of
unpaid salaries and other benefits before the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration
Branch No. 9, Dipolog City.
In its defense, petitioner alleged that it hired respondent to work in Taiwan
for one year and that for his deployment, he was charged a placement fee of
merely P15,840 plus P5,050 for documentation expenses. Petitioner further
claimed that under the employment contract, respondent was to undergo a
probationary period of forty (40) days. However, at the job site, respondent
was found to be unfit for his work, thus he resigned from his employment
and requested for his repatriation signing a statement to that effect.
On May 14, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding petitioner
and Wei Yu Hsien solidarily liable for the wages representing the unserved
portion of the employment contract, the amount unlawfully deducted from
respondents monthly wage, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. For the remittance of illegal placement fee in the amount
16
Labor Law I

of P99,110, petitioner was held solely liable. The dispositive portion of the (5) establishing liability upon respondents severally to pay attorneys fees
decision reads: equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the aggregate amount payable to
complainant by respondents.
WHEREFORE, couched in the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered: (6) And, specifically ordering respondents to pay complainant the following,
as based on the preceding paragraphs:
(1) declaring that the respondents act for having severed complainants
employment, after service of one (1) month founded on unjustifiable grounds A.) JOINT AND SEVERALLY LIABILITIES OF RESPON-DENTS IN
and encroaching against the safeguard of fundamental due process and THIS CASE:
security of tenure clauses as well as for being in contradiction to the well a.) Supposed wages of the
engendered basic policy of the state to grant ample protection to labor, to be unserved portion of
illegal. Thus, in effect hereof, on the basis of established jurisprudence and complainants duration
mandate of the law, complainant Nonito Villanos, as a contractual employee, of employment .............................. NT$ 348,480.00;
is entitled to be paid of the supposed wages which he could have received (subject to proper future
throughout the period of employment manifested in the contract, had not conversion to Philippine Peso)
because of the unceremonious, abnormal and unlawful act of respondents in b.) Amount unlawfully deducted
having put his employment to an end after about one (1) month services, from complainants monthly
which entitlement shall be paid jointly and severally by respondents Athena wage ................................................. NT$ 11, 114.00;
International Manpower Services, Inc., [r]epresented by Lorenza Ching (subject to proper future
and/or Wei Yu Hsien, 1-11 Hsia Yuan Rd. Tali City, Taichung Country, conversion to Philippine Currency)
Taiwan, ROC, [which] specific amount is reflected in paragraph "6" hereof. (c.) Moral damages ........................ P 50,000.00;
d.) Exemplary damages P 30,000.00; and
(2) declaring further that the deductions made by respondent Wei Yu Hsien, e.) Attorneys fees ... Ten Percent (10%) of the
from the monthly wage of complainant, to be illegal, since the act is aggregate amount
incidental to the unlawful scheme of having terminated complainants of liabilities of respondents,
employment untimely in the guise of inefficiency in the performance of work whether joint or several, or
wrongly assigned to him and in breach of the provisions of the valid contract individual liabilities.
of employment having been entered into by the parties. For this reason, B.) INDIVIDUAL OR PERSONAL LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT
respondents are hereby jointly and severally directed to remit the exact ATHENA INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC.,
amount of complainants salary withheld, which amount is specifically found REPRESENTED BY LORENZA CHING;
in paragraph "6". a.) Remittance of illegal
placement fee . P 99,110.00.
(3) holding that the imposition of the placement fee of P120,000.00 against SO ORDERED.6
complainant as illegal, which in effect making respondent Athena On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the
International Manpower Services, Inc., [r]epresented by Lorenza Ching complaint for lack of merit. It found that respondent was not at all dismissed,
individually to pay complainant the exact amount which is likewise found in much less illegally. Respondent seasonably filed a motion for
paragraph "6" hereof. reconsideration, which the NLRC denied in its second resolution.
(4) imposing moral and exemplary damages arising from breach of contract Undaunted, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals ascribing grave
and bad faith of respondents, which shall be paid by respondents in solidum, abuse of discretion to the NLRC in its ruling that there was no violation of
and which amounts are specifically reflected in paragraph "6". the contract of employment by petitioner and in holding that respondent was
not illegally dismissed.

17
Labor Law I
The Court of Appeals held that Wei Yu Hsien violated the contract of
employment when respondent was made to work as hydraulic
installer/repairer, not as caretaker. The appellate court concluded that the
supposed voluntary resignation of respondent was inconsistent with his
immediate demand for refund of the placement fee upon his arrival in the
Philippines; his filing of an administrative case before the POEA
Adjudication Office; and his subsequent filing of the complaint with the
Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED reversing the questioned
resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division,
Cagayan de Oro City and REINSTATING the decision of the Labor Arbiter
in NLRC Case No. Sub-RAB-09-OFW-(LB)-02-00002-99.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, the instant appeal, raising the following issues:
1. Did the respondent voluntarily resign or was he illegally dismissed?
2. Assuming that the respondent was illegally dismissed, was it proper for the
Court of Appeals to affirm in toto the monetary awards in the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter, especially: (a) the award of his supposed salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract, i.e., NT$348,480.00 and (b)
the award of "remittance of placement fee" in the amount of P99,110.00?8
Anent the first issue, petitioner insists that respondent was not illegally
dismissed but voluntarily resigned; that respondent failed to prove that he
was made to work as hydraulic installer/repairer instead of a caretaker; and
that the documents he adduced were self-serving and immaterial.
Petitioner further contends that although the resignation of respondent was in
a pre-printed form, it did not mean his resignation was involuntary. The
requirement that the employer has the burden of proof that the employee was
illegally dismissed is, says petitioner, applicable only when the fact of
dismissal is established. Petitioner submits that, in this case, respondent bore
the burden of proving that his resignation was involuntary.
For his part, respondent avers that he did not resign voluntarily but, he was
asked to sign a letter of resignation. Furthermore, he avers that petitioner did
not explain why he was unqualified. Neither was he informed of any
qualifications needed for the job prior to his deployment, as mandated by
Article 2819 of the Labor Code.
Respondent points out that the allegation he resigned voluntarily is belied by
petitioners own admission in its position paper that he was, in fact, found
unfit for the job. He maintains that his purported resignation was obviously
inconsistent with his filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the submissions of the parties, we find no
persuasive grounds nor substantial basis to reverse the decision and the
resolution of the appellate court.
An employee voluntarily resigns when he finds himself in a situation where
he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service; thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate
himself from his employment.10
Records show that upon his repatriation from Taiwan, respondent
immediately went to petitioners office and confronted its representative,
Lorenza Ching, about the assignment given to him which was contrary to the
agreed position of caretaker, for which he specifically applied. He demanded
that he be reimbursed the P30,000 he paid as downpayment. When refused,
he lodged a complaint with the POEA. He also immediately filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal before Labor Arbiter Cresencio R. Iniego, upon his
arrival in his hometown, indicating that respondent did not voluntarily resign,
but was forced to resign, which was tantamount to a dismissal.11 Petitioner
did not refute respondents contentions regarding these incidents. Further, it
failed to prove the legality of the dismissal, despite the fact that the burden of
proof lies on the employment and recruitment agency. Thus, the presumption
stands to the effect that respondent was illegally dismissed by his employer.
Even assuming respondent was a mere probationary employee as claimed by
petitioner, respondent could only be terminated for a pertinent and just cause,
such as when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards of employment made known to him by his employer at
the time of his engagement.12 Here, it appears that the petitioner failed to
prove that, at the time of respondents engagement, the employers
reasonable standards for the job were made known to respondent. Moreover,
in this case, respondent was assigned to a job different from the one he
applied and was hired for.
On the second issue. Petitioner claims that Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042,13 entitles respondent only to six months worth of the unserved portion
of his employment contract; and that the order to refund the amount
of P99,110 as placement fee has no factual basis because respondent himself
18
Labor Law I
admitted he only paid P30,000 as placement fee, albeit, he was assessed the
amount of P94,000.
Respondent counters that he worked for only a month because he was hastily
and unceremoniously terminated; and that he was entitled to his salary
corresponding to the remaining portion of the employment contract. Further,
he demands full reimbursement of the P30,000 he paid as placement fee.
Pertinent to this issue is Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8042
SEC. 10. Money Claims. - . . .
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to
the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
...
Thus, for the computation of the lump-sum salary due an illegally dismissed
overseas employee, there are two clauses as points of reckoning: first is the
cumulative salary for the unexpired portion of his employment; and the other
is the grant of three months salary for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is lesser.
Since respondent was dismissed after only one month of service, the
unexpired portion of his contract is admittedly one year, nine months and
twenty-eight days. But the applicable clause is not the first but the second:
three months salary for every year of the unexpired term, as the lesser
amount, hence it is what is due the respondent.
Note that the fraction of nine months and twenty-eight days is considered as
one whole year following the Labor Code. Thus, respondents lump-sum
salary should be computed as follows:
3 months x 2 (years) = 6 months worth of salary
6 months x (NT$) 15,840 = NT$95,040, subject to proper conversion to
Philippine currency by Labor Arbiter Cresencio Iniego.
Under the aforequoted provision, an illegally dismissed overseas worker is
also entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum.
We note that while respondent was assessed P94,000 in placement fee, he
paid only P30,000 on the agreement that the balance of P64,000 would be
paid on a monthly salary deduction upon his deployment. Hence, we cannot
grant respondent reimbursement of the entire assessed amount of P94,000.
He is only entitled to the reimbursement of the amount of placement fee he
actually paid, which is the P30,000 he gave as downpayment plus interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum.
Lastly, because of the breach of contract and bad faith alleged against the
employer and the petitioner, we must sustain the award of P50,000 in moral
damages and P50,000 as exemplary damages, in addition to attorneys fees of
ten percent (10%) of the aggregate monetary awards.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May
23, 2001, and Resolution dated November 23, 2001, of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Athenna International
Manpower Services, Inc. is hereby DECLARED solidarily liable with Wei
Yu Hsien to pay respondent NONITO VILLANOS the amount of
NT$95,040.00, subject to proper conversion to Philippine currency, as
unpaid salary of respondent equivalent to six months service under Rep. Act
No. 8042, Section 10 as well as P50,000.00 in moral damages,
and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages suffered by respondent; and ten
percent (10%) of the aggregate monetary awards as attorneys fees, pursuant
to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner herein is also ordered to pay respondent
the amount of P30,000.00 as reimbursement of the placement fee, with 12%
interest per annum until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
19
Labor Law I
5. [G.R. No. 116629. January 16, 1998]
NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS and BARBER
INTERNATIONAL A/S, petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and NELIA MISADA, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children CAESAR and ALPHA JOY, all surnamed
MISADA and HIMAYA ENVIDIADO, for herself and in behalf of her
minor children HENREA, HAZEL, and HENDRICK, all surnamed
ENVIDIADO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the
decision dated April 25, 1994 of the National Labor Relations Commission
which ordered petitioners to pay a total of U.S.$26,641.42 as death benefits
to private respondents.
Petitioner NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., a
domestic manning corporation, engaged the services of Eduardo
P. Misada and Enrico A. Envidiado to work for petitioner Barber
International A/S(Barber), a Norwegian shipping company. Misada and
Envidiado were hired as second and third officers, respectively, on board the
vessel M/V Pan Victoria. They were to travel from Sweden to South Korea
for a period of ten months from January 1991 to November 1991.
On July 5, 1991, private respondent Nelia Misada received notice that her
husband, Eduardo Misada, died on June 28, 1991 while on board the M/V
Pan Victoria. On July 12, 1991, private respondent Himaya Envidiado
likewise received notice that her husband, Enrico Envidiado, died on board
the vessel.
As heirs of the deceased seamen, private respondents, in their behalf and in
behalf of their minor children, filed for death compensation benefits under
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Standard Contract of
Employment and the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme (NIS) for
Filipino Officers. Their claims were denied by petitioners.
Private respondents filed separate complaints before the POEA Adjudication
Office. They prayed for U.S.$13,000.00 each as death compensation under
the POEA Standard Contract of Employment and U.S.$30,000.00 for each
wife and U.S.$8,000.00 for each child under eighteen years under the
Norwegian NIS.[1]
In their Answer, petitioners claimed that private respondents are not entitled
to death benefits on the ground that the seamen's deaths were due to their
own willful act. They alleged that the deceased were among three (3) Filipino
seamen who implanted fragments of reindeer horn in their respective sexual
organs on or about June 18, 1991; that due to the lack of sanitary conditions
at the time and place of implantation, all three seamen suffered "severe
tetanus" and "massive viral infections;" that Misada and Envidiado died
within days of the other; that the third seaman, Arturo Fajardo, narrowly
missed death only because the vessel was at port in Penang, Malaysia at the
time the tetanus became critical.[2]
The complaints were consolidated and the parties filed their respective
position papers and documentary evidence. On October 20, 1993, the POEA
Administrator dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Private respondents appealed to respondent Commission. During the
pendency of the appeal, private respondents submitted additional
documentary evidence in support of their Memorandum on Appeal.
On April 25, 1994, respondent Commission reversed the POEA
Administrator and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents the
following:
"(a) To complainant Nelia F. Misada and her two minor children, Julius
Caesar and Alpha Joy, all surnamed Misada:
(1) Death compensation of U.S.$13,000.00 under the POEA Standard
Format;
(b) To complainant Himaya G. Envidiado and her three (3) minor children,
Henrea, Hazel and Hendrick, all surnamed Envidiado;
(1) Death compensation of U.S.$13,000.00 under the provisions of the POEA
Rules and Regulations; and
(2) Backwages as of July 1991 amounting to U.S.$641.42 or its peso
equivalent.
SO ORDERED."[3]
Hence this petition. Petitioners claim that:
"I
FIRSTLY, THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS WHICH DO NOT FORM PART OF
THE EVIDENCE IN THE INSTANT CASE, THEREBY DEPRIVING
PETITIONERS OF DUE PROCESS;
II
20
Labor Law I
SECONDLY, THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT OVERTURNED WHAT HAS BEEN
ESTABLISHED BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS WHICH AT BEST ARE
HEARSAY; and
III
THIRDLY, THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN REVERSING THE POEA DECISION ON THE BASIS OF
DOCUMENTS WHICH AT BEST ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE
CAUSE OF DEATH OF SUBJECT SEAMEN."[4]
Petitioners claim respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in
admitting private respondent's additional evidence on appeal. Petitioners
allege that the additional evidence were "surreptitiously" submitted in
violation of petitioner's right to due process.
The submission of additional evidence before the respondent Commission is
not prohibited by the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. After all, rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling
in labor cases.[5] The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the
interest of substantial justice.[6] In keeping with this directive, it has been
held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and
affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal.[7] The
submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other
party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.[8]
In the case at bar, the additional evidence was submitted by private
respondents before the respondent Commission in their Memorandum on
Appeal dated November 8, 1993. The decision of respondent Commission
was rendered on April 25, 1994, i.e., six (6) months after the additional
documents were submitted. Petitioners had ample opportunity to object and
refute the documents. They had the chance to submit counter-evidence
during this period but they did not do so. It was only when they moved for
reconsideration of the decision of respondent Commission that they
questioned the admission of these evidence.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one's side.[9] It is also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.[10] It is not the denial of the right to be heard
but denial of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation of due
process of law.[11]
Procedural matters having been disposed of, the substantive issue in this case
is whether respondent Commission gravely erred in finding that the deaths of
the two seamen, Eduardo Misada and Enrico Envidiado, did not come as a
result of their willful and deliberate act.
Part II, Section C, No. 1, Paragraph 1 of the POEA "Standard Employment
Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board
Ocean-Going Vessels"[12] provides that:
"1. In case of death of the seaman during the term of this Contract, the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to
the amount of U.S.$50,000.00 and an additional amount of U.S.$7,000.00 to
each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children
at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
x x x."[13]
Part II, Section C, No. 6 of the same Standard Employment Contract also
provides:
"6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity,
disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman,
provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity,
disability or death is directly attributable to him."[14]
The death of a seaman during the term of his employment makes the
employer liable to the former's heirs for death compensation benefits. The
POEA Standard Employment Contract fixes the amount at U.S.$50,000.00
and an additional amount of U.S.$7,000.00 for each child, not exceeding
four, under twenty-one years of age. The employer becomes liable once it is
established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment
contract. This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may be exempt
from liability if he can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused
by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.[15]
In the instant case, petitioners claim that the deaths of the two seamen came
as a result of their self-inflicted injuries. As proof, petitioners presented
written statements from the master of the M/V Pan Victoria, the medical
reports of Misada, Envidiado and Arturo Fajardo, the seaman who survived
the infection, and the written statements of three (3) officers of the vessel
taken during a special inquiry conducted after their deaths.
21
Labor Law I
Petitioners contend that Misada and Envidiado and Arturo Fajardo implanted
fragments of the horn of a reindeer or antelope in their respective sexual
organs while on a voyage on board the M/V Pan Victoria. The horn was left
by a Greek officer from a previous voyage. Misada found the horn and asked
for it from the Chief Officer. Misada gave the horn to the Second Engineer to
carve and shape for implantation. Thereafter, shaped fragments of the horn
were inserted by Misada and Envidiado subcutaneously into their respective
sex organs on June 19, 1991 while that of Fajardo was implanted two or three
days later. The implantations were made surgically in the absence of sanitary
and sterile facilities.
Several days later, Misada complained of difficulty in swallowing and
breathing. He had severe tonsillitis and was suffering from spasms and
convulsions.[16] The ship captain was compelled to alter course and drop
anchor at Colombo, Sri Lanka for medical treatment.[17] Misada, however,
died on board the vessel on June 28, 1991. His dead body was examined at
the Colombo General Hospital, Colombo, Sri Lanka, where the cause of his
death was placed as "acute laryngo-trachea bronchitis with pneumonia due to
viral infection."[18]
It was after the vessel left Colombo on June 30, 1991 that Envidiado started
exhibiting the same symptoms as Misada. The ship captain had to drop
anchor at the nearest port which was Galle, Sri Lanka.[19]Envidiado was
brought ashore and admitted to hospital. He died a few days later.
On July 3, 1991, Arturo Fajardo started exhibiting the same symptoms as the
two other seamen. On inquiry, the master of the vessel learned that Misada,
Envidiado and Fajardo implanted pieces of reindeer horn in their sex
organs. Fajardo's condition worsened and the master was compelled to drop
anchor at Penang, Malaysia where Fajardo was admitted to hospital on July
5, 1991. He was diagnosed to be suffering from tetanus and given medication
for said illness. Fajardo recovered two weeks later.[20]
As a result of this chain of events, the master of the vessel conducted a
formal inquiry to verify the cause of the seamen's deaths and illness. Written
testimonies as to the events leading to their deaths were taken from the
master, the Chief Officer, Second Engineer and Second Cook.
The testimonies of the officers are insufficient to prove the fact that Misada's
and Envidiado's deaths were caused by self-inflicted injuries. The testimonies
were given by people who merely observed and narrated the circumstances
surrounding the deaths of the two seamen and the illness of Fajardo. Fajardo
himself did not submit any testimony regarding the implantation. The
testimonies of the officers are, at best, hearsay. Moreover, the officers did not
have the competence to make a medical finding as to the actual cause of the
deaths. No autopsy report was presented to corroborate their testimonies. On
the contrary, Eduardo Misada was medically diagnosed to have died of
"acute laryngo-trachea bronchitis with pneumonia probably due to viral
cause."[21] This was declared in his "Cause of Death Form" after his dead
body was examined on June 29, 1991 by Dr. Sydney Prematirat, a Judicial
Medical Officer at Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Enrico Envidiado was not issued a "Cause of Death Form." While still alive,
he was examined in Galle, Sri Lanka by Consultant Physician Chandima de
Mel who found a wound in his penis and diagnosed his illness as "severe
tetanus."[22] His "Certificate for Removal of A Dead Body" dated July 8,
1991 issued by Dr. T.L. Seneviratne, Chief Medical Officer of Health,
Municipal Council, Colombo, Sri Lanka,[23] and "Certificate of Embalming"
dated July 8, 1991 issued by Keith Anthony Raymond[24] stated that
Envidiado died of "viral myocarditis-- natural causes."
The "Certificate for Removal of a Dead Body" and "Certificate of
Embalming" are not proofs of the real cause of death. Their probative value
is confined only to the fact of death.[25] These documentary evidence,
however, did not at all indicate that Envidiado died of tetanus as previously
diagnosed by Dr. de Mel. And despite Dr. de Mel's allegedly correct
diagnosis, Envidiado died a few days later.
As correctly found by respondent Commission, petitioners' evidence
insufficiently proves the fact that the deaths of the two seamen were caused
by their own willful and deliberate act. And even if the seamen implanted
fragments of reindeer horn in their sex organs, the evidence does not
substantially prove that they contracted tetanus as a result of the unsanitary
surgical procedures they performed on their bodies. Neither does the
evidence show that the tetanus was the direct cause of their deaths.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and the decision of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. 006490-
94 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
22
Labor Law I
6.) Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-58011 & L-58012 November 18, 1983
VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROGELIO
BISULA RUBEN ARROZA JUAN GACUTNO LEONILO ATOK,
NILO CRUZ, ALVARO ANDRADA, NEMESIO ADUG SIMPLICIO
BAUTISTA, ROMEO ACOSTA, and JOSE ENCABO respondents.
Antonio R. Atienza for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent NLRC,
Quasha, Asperilia, Ancheta &- Valmonte Pena Marcos Law Offices for
private respondents.
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:+.wph!1
Before the Court en banc is a motion to reconsider the decision promulgated
on July 20, 1982 which set aside the decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission and reinstated the decision of the National Seamen
Board.
To better understand the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration, we
reiterate the background facts of the case, Taken from the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission: t.hqw
It appears that on different dates in December, 1978 and January, 1979, the
Seamen entered into separate contracts of employment with the Company,
engaging them to work on board M/T' Jannu for a period of twelve (12)
months. After verification and approval of their contracts by the NSB, the
Seamen boarded their vessel in Japan.
On 10 January 1919, the master of the vessel complainant Rogelio H. Bisula,
received a cable from the Company advising him of the possibility that the
vessel might be directed to call at ITF-controlled ports said at the same time
informing him of the procedure to be followed in the computation of the
special or additional compensation of crew members while in said ports. ITF
is the acronym for the International Transport Workers Federation, a militant
international labor organization with affiliates in different ports of the world,
which reputedly can tie down a vessel in a port by preventing its loading or
unloading, This is a sanction resorted to by ITF to enforce the payment of its
wages rates for seafarers the so-called ITF rates, if the wages of the crew
members of a vessel who have affiliated with it are below its prescribed
rates.) In the same cable of the Company, the expressed its regrets for hot
clarifying earlier the procedure in computing the special compensation as it
thought that the vessel would 'trade in Caribbean ports only.
On 22 March 1979, the Company sent another cable to complainant Bisula,
this time informing him of the respective amounts each of the officers and
crew members would receive as special compensation when the vessel called
at the port of Kwinana Australia, an ITF-controlled port. This was followed
by another cable on 23 March 1979, informing him that the officers and crew
members had been enrolled as members of the ITF in Sidney, Australia, and
that the membership fee for the 28 personnel complement of the vessel had
already been paid.
In answer to the Company's cable last mentioned, complainant Bisula, in
representation of the other officers and crew members, sent on 24 March
1979 a cable informing the Company that the officers and crew members
were not agreeable to its 'suggestion'; that they were not contented with their
present salaries 'based on the volume of works, type of ship with hazardous
cargo and registered in a world wide trade': that the 'officers and crew (were)
not interested in ITF membership if not actually paid with ITF rate that their
'demand is only 50% increase based on present basic salary and that the
proposed wage increase is the 'best and only solution to solve ITF problem'
since the Company's salary rates 'especially in tankers (are) very far in
comparison with other shipping agencies in Manila ...
In reply, the Company proposed a 25% increase in the basic pay of the
complainant crew members, although it claimed, that it would "suffer and
absorb considerable amount of losses." The proposal was accepted by the
Seamen with certain conditions which were accepted by the Company.
Conformably with the agreement of the parties which was effected through
the cables abovementioned, the Seamen were paid their new salary rates.
Subsequently, the Company sought authority from the NSB to cancel the
contracts of employment of the Seamen, claiming that its principals had
terminated their manning agreement because of the actuations of the Seamen.
The request was granted by the NSB Executive Director in a letter dated 10
April 1979. Soon thereafter, the Company cabled the Seamen informing
them that their contracts would be terminated upon the vessel's arrival in
Japan. On 19 April 1979 they Arere asked to disembark from the vessel, their
contracts were terminated, and they were repatriated to Manila. There is no
23
Labor Law I
showing that the Seamen were given the opportunity to at least comment on
the Company's request for the cancellation of their contracts, although they
had served only three (3) out of the twelve (12) months' duration of their
contracts.
The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of earned wages with the National Seamen Board. The Vir-jen
Shipping and Marine Services Inc. in turn filed a complaint for breach of
contract and recovery of excess salaries and overtime pay against the private
respondents. On July 2, 1980, the NSB rendered a decision declaring that the
seamen breached their employment contracts when they demanded and
received from Vir-jen Shipping wages over and above their contracted rates.
The dismissal of the seamen was declared legal and the seamen were ordered
suspended.
The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed the decision
of the NSB and required the petitioner to pay the wages and other monetary
benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of the manning contract on
the ground that the termination of the contract by the petitioner was without
valid cause. Vir-jen Shipping filed the present petition.
The private respondents submit the following issues in their motion for
reconsideration: t.hqw
A. THIS HONORABLE COURT DID VIOLENCE TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE FINDING OF FACT OF
THE NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD THAT THE SEAMEN VIOLATED
THEIR CONTRACTS IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN THE FINDING OF
FACT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION THAT
THE SEAMEN DID NOT VIOLATE THEIR CONTRACT.
B. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT VIR-JEN'S
HAVING AGREED TO A 25% INCREASE OF THE SEAMEN'S BASIC
WAGE WAS NOT VOLUNTARY BUT WAS DUE TO THREATS.
C. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT TOOK
COGNIZANCE OF THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT; ASSUMING
THAT THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT COULD BE TAKEN
COGNIZANCE OF, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN' IT
FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD VIOLATED THE
SAME.
D, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT FIND
PETITIONER VIRJEN LIABLE FOR HAVING TERMINATED BEFORE
EXPIRY DATE THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO LEGAL AND JUSTIFIABLE
GROUND FOR SUCH TERMINATION.
E. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PREPARATION BY PETITIONER OF THE TWO PAYROLLS AND THE
EXECUTION OF THE SIDE CONTRACT WERE NOT MADE IN BAD
FAITH.
F. THIS HONORABLE COURT INADVERTENTLY DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
At the outset, we are faced with the question whether or not the Court en
banc should give due course to the motion for reconsideration inspite of its
having been denied twice by the Court's Second Division. The case was
referred to and accepted by the Court en banc because of the movants'
contention that the decision in this case by the Second Division deviated
from Wallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor (L-50734-37, February
20, 1981), a First Division case with the same facts and issues. We are
constrained to answer the initial question in the affirmative.
A fundamental postulate of Philippine Constitutional Law is the fact, that
there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts are
required to take their bearings. (Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA
948; Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98; Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA
226). The majority of the Court's work is now performed by its two
Divisions, but the Court remains one court, single, unitary, complete, and
supreme. Flowing from this nature of the Supreme Court is the fact that,
while ' individual Justices may dissent or partially concur with one another,
when the Court states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. And that
voice being authoritative should be a clear as possible.
Any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, whether en banc or
in Division, may be modified or reversed only by the Court en banc. (Section
2(3), Article X, Constitution.) In the rare instances when one Division
disagrees in its views with the other Division, or the necessary votes on an
issue cannot be had in a Division, the case is brought to the Court en banc to
reconcile any seeming conflict, to reverse or modify an earlier decision, and
to declare the Court's doctrine. This is what has happened in this case.
24
Labor Law I
The decision sought to be reconsidered appears to be a deviation from the
Court's decision, speaking through the First Division, in Wallem Shipping,
Inc. v. Hon. Minister of Labor (102 SCRA 835). Faced with two seemingly
conflicting resolutions of basically the same issue by its two Divisions, the
Court. therefore, resolved to transfer the case to the Court en banc.
Parenthetically, the petitioner's comment on the third motion for
reconsideration states that the resolution of the motion might be the needed
vehicle to make the ruling in the Wallem case clearer and more in time with
the underlying principles of the Labor Code. We agree with the petitioner.
After an exhaustive, painstaking, and perspicacious consideration of the
motions for reconsideration and the comments, replies, and other pleadings
related thereto, the Court en banc is constrained to grant the motions. To
grant the motion is to keep faith with the constitutional mandate to afford
protection to labor and to assure the rights of workers to self-organization
and to just and humane conditions of work. We sustain the decision of the
respondent National labor Relations Commission.
There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but the common thread
running through all of them is the contention, if not the dismal prophecy, that
if the respondent seamen are sustained by this Court, we would in effect "kill
the en that lays the golden egg." In other words, Filipino seamen, admittedly
among the best in the world, should remain satisfied with relatively lower if
not the lowest, international rates of compensation, should not agitate for
higher wages while their contracts of employment are subsisting, should
accept as sacred, iron clad, and immutable the side contracts which require
them to falsely pretend to be members of international labor federations,
pretend to receive higher salaries at certain foreign ports only to return the
increased pay once the ship leaves that port, should stifle not only their right
to ask for improved terms of employment but their freedom of speech and
expression, and should suffer instant termination of employment at the
slightest sign of dissatisfaction with no protection from their Government
and their courts. Otherwise, the petitioners contend that Filipinos would no
longer be accepted as seamen, those employed would lose their jobs, and the
still unemployed would be left hopeless.
This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat of
unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue against the interests
of labor; where efforts by workingmen to better their terms of employment
would be characterized as prejudicing the interests of labor as a whole.
In 1867 or one hundred sixteen years ago. Chief Justice Beasley of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey was ponente of the court's opinion declaring as
a conspiracy the threat of workingmen to strike in connection with their
efforts to promote unionism, t.hqw
It is difficult to believe that a right exists in law which we can scarcely
conceive can produce, in any posture of affairs, other than injuriois results. It
is simply the right of workmen, by concert of action, and by taking advantage
of their position, to control the business of another, I am unwilling to hold
that a right which cannot, in any, event, be advantageous to the employee,
and which must always be hurtful to the employer, exists in law. In my
opinion this indictment sufficiently shows that the force of the confederates
was brought to bear upon their employer for the purpose of oppression and
mischief and that this amounts to a conspiracy, (State v. Donaldson, 32 NJL
151, 1867. Cited in Chamberlain, Sourcebook on Labor, p. 13. Emphasis
supplied)
The same arguments have greeted every major advance in the rights of the
workingman. And they have invariably been proved unfounded and false.
Unionism, employers' liability acts, minimum wages, workmen's
compensation, social security and collective bargaining to name a few were
all initially opposed by employers and even well meaning leaders of
government and society as "killing the hen or goose which lays the golden
eggs." The claims of workingmen were described as outrageously injurious
not only to the employer but more so to the employees themselves before
these claims or demands were established by law and jurisprudence as
"rights" and before these were proved beneficial to management, labor, and
the nation as a whole beyond reasonable doubt.
The case before us does not represent any major advance in the rights of
labor and the workingmen. The private respondents merely sought rights
already established. No matter how much the petitioner-employer tries to
present itself as speaking for the entire industry, there is no evidence that it is
typical of employers hiring Filipino seamen or that it can speak for them.
The contention that manning industries in the Philippines would not survive
if the instant case is not decided in favor of the petitioner is not supported by
evidence. The Wallem case was decided on February 20, 1981. There have
been no severe repercussions, no drying up of employment opportunities for
seamen, and none of the dire consequences repeatedly emphasized by the
petitioner. Why should Vir-jen be all exception?
The wages of seamen engaged in international shipping are shouldered by the
foreign principal. The local manning office is an agent whose primary
25
Labor Law I
function is recruitment and who .usually gets a lump sum from the shipowner
to defray the salaries of the crew. The hiring of seamen and the determination
of their compensation is subject to the interplay of various market factors and
one key factor is how much in terms of profits the local manning office and
the foreign shipowner may realize after the costs of the voyage are met. And
costs include salaries of officers and crew members.
Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any
other country in the world. Otherwise, there would not be so many of them in
the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this globe. It is competence and
reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen so greatly in demand.
Filipino seamen have never demanded the same high salaries as seamen from
the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and other developed nations.
But certainly they are entitled to government protection when they ask for
fair and decent treatment by their employer.-, and when they exercise the
right to petition for improved terms of employment, especially when they
feel that these are sub-standard or are capable of improvement according to
internationally accepted rules. In the domestic scene, there are marginal
employers who prepare two sets of payrolls for their employees one in
keeping with minimum wages and the other recording the sub-standard
wages that the employees really receive, The reliable employers, however,
not only meet the minimums required by fair labor standards legislation but
even go way above the minimums while earning reasonable profits and
prospering. The same is true of international employment. There is no reason
why this Court and the Ministry of Labor and. Employment or its agencies
and commissions should come out with pronouncements based on the
standards and practices of unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who claim
they cannot survive without resorting to tricky and deceptive schemes,
instead of Government maintaining labor law and jurisprudence according to
the practices of honorable, competent, and law-abiding employers, domestic
or foreign.
If any minor advantages given to Filipino seamen may somehow cut into the
profits of local manning agencies and foreign shipowners, that is not
sufficient reason why the NSB or the ILRC should not stand by the former
instead of listening to unsubstantiated fears that they would be killing the hen
which lays the golden eggs.
Prescinding from the above, we now hold that neither the National Seamen
Board nor the National Labor Relations Commission should, as a matter of
official policy, legitimize and enforce cubious arrangements where
shipowners and seamen enter into fictitious contracts similar to the
addendum agreements or side contracts in this case whose purpose is to
deceive. The Republic of the Philippines and its ministries and agencies
should present a more honorable and proper posture in official acts to the
whole world, notwithstanding our desire to have as many job openings both
here and abroad for our workers. At the very least, such as sensitive matter
involving no less than our dignity as a people and the welfare of our
workingmen must proceed from the Batasang Pambansa in the form of policy
legislation, not from administrative rule making or adjudication
Another issue raised by the movants is whether or not the seamen violated
their contracts of employment.
The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are designed to
protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who can take care of
themselves. The standard forms embody' the basic minimums which must be
incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.) They are not collective
bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which the parties cannot
improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of time. To state,
therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition their employer for higher
salaries during the 12 months duration of the contract runs counter to
established principles of labor legislation. The National Labor Relations
Commission, as the appellate tribunal from decisions of the National Seamen
Board, correctly ruled that the seamen did not violate their contracts to
warrant their dismissal.
The respondent Commission ruled: t.hqw
In the light of all the foregoing facts, we find that the cable of the seamen
proposing an increase in their wage rates was not and could not have been
intended as a threat to comp el the Company to accede to their proposals. But
even assuming, if only for the sake of argument, that the demand or
proposal for a wage increase was accompanied by a threat that they would
report to ITF if the Company did not accede to the contract revision -
although there really was no such threat as pointed out earlier the Seamen
should not be held at fault for asking such a demand. In the same case cited
above, the Supreme Court held: t.hqw
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified
because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their
demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the
Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. But even if there had been
such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but
26
Labor Law I
natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for
petitioner, the refusal to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to
honor and respect the same, They were only acting in the exercise of their
rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law
and public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak of in the case at
bar which would justify respondents' dismissal just because of their firmness
in their demand for the fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation it entered
into without any coercion, specially on the part of private respondents.
(Emphasis supplied).
The above citation is from Wallem.
The facts show that when the respondents boarded the M/T Jannu there was
no intention to send their ship to Australia. On January 10, 1979, the
petitioner sent a cable to respondent shipmaster Bisula informing him of the
procedure to be followed in the computation of special compensation of
crewmembers while in ITF controlled ports and expressed regrets for not
having earlier clarified the procedure as it thought that the vessel would trade
in Carribean ports only.
On March 22, 1979, the petitioner sent another cable informing Bisula of the
special compensation when the ship would call at Kwinana Australia.
The following day, shipmaster Bisula cabled Vir-jen stating that the officers
and crews were not interested in ITF membership if not paid ITF rates and
that their only demand was a 50 percent increase based on their then salaries.
Bisula also pointed out that Vir-jen rates were "very far in comparison with
other shipping agencies in Manila."
In reply, Vir-jen counter proposed a 25 percent increase. Only after Kyoei
Tanker Co., Ltd., declined to increase the lumps sum amount given monthly
to Vir-jen was the decision to terminate the respondents' employment
formulated.
The facts show that Virjen Initiated the discussions which led to the demand
for increased . The seamen made a proposal and the petitioner organized with
a counter-proposal. The ship had not vet gone to Australia or any ITF
controlled port. There was absolutely no mention of any strike. much less a
threat to strike. The seamen had done in act which under Philippine law or
any other civilized law would be termed illegal, oppressive, or malicious.
Whatever pressure existed, it was mild compared to accepted valid modes of
labor activity.
We reiterate our ruling in Wallem. t.hqw
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified
because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their
demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the
Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. The records fail to establish
clearly the commission of any threat, But even if there had been such a
threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural
for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner,
who refused to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and
respect the same, They were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to
deprive them of their form of expression is contrary to law and public policy.
...
Our dismissing the petition is premised on the assumption that the Ministry
of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the
workinginan's interests and, of course, the nation as a whole. The points
raised by the Solicitor-General in his comments refer to the issue of allowing
what the petitioner importunes under the argument of "killing the hen which
lays the golden eggs." This is one of policy which should perhaps be directed
to the Batasang Pambansa and to our country's other policy makers for more
specific legislation on the matter, subject to the constitutional provisions
protecting labor, promoting social justice, and guaranteeing non-abridgement
of the freedom of speech, press, peaceable assembly and petition. We agree
with the movants that there is no showing of any cause, which under the
Labor Code or any current applicable law, would warrant the termination of
the respondents' services before the expiration of their contracts. The
Constitution guarantees State assurance of the rights of workers to security of
tenure. (Sec. 9, Article II, Constitution). Presumptions and provisions of law,
the evidence on record, and fundamental State policy all dictate that the
motions for reconsideration should be granted.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby GRANTED. The
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1
27
Labor Law I
7.) Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 78409 September 14, 1989
NORBERTO SORIANO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFSHORE SHIPPING AND MANNING CORPORATION, KNUT
KNUTSEN O.A.S., and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (Second Division), respondents.
R. C. Carrera Law Firm for petitioner.
Elmer V. Pormento for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of
public respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirming the
decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in POEA
Case No. (M)85-12-0953 entitled "Norberto Soriano v. Offshore Shipping
and Manning Corporation and Knut Knutsen O.A.S.", which denied
petitioner's claim for salary differential and overtime pay and limited the
reimbursement of his cash bond to P15,000.00 instead of P20,000.00.
In search for better opportunities and higher income, petitioner Norberto
Soriano, a licensed Second Marine Engineer, sought employment and was
hired by private respondent Knut Knutsen O.A.S. through its authorized
shipping agent in the Philippines, Offshore Shipping and Manning
Corporation. As evidenced by the Crew Agreement, petitioner was hired to
work as Third Marine Engineer on board Knut Provider" with a salary of
US$800.00 a month on a conduction basis for a period of fifteen (15) days.
He admitted that the term of the contract was extended to six (6) months by
mutual agreement on the promise of the employer to the petitioner that he
will be promoted to Second Engineer. Thus, while it appears that petitioner
joined the aforesaid vessel on July 23, 1985 he signed off on November 27,
1985 due to the alleged failure of private respondent-employer to fulfill its
promise to promote petitioner to the position of Second Engineer and for the
unilateral decision to reduce petitioner's basic salary from US$800.00 to
US$560.00. Petitioner was made to shoulder his return airfare to Manila.
In the Philippines, petitioner filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA for short), a complaint against private respondent for
payment of salary differential, overtime pay, unpaid salary for November,
1985 and refund of his return airfare and cash bond allegedly in the amount
of P20,000.00 contending therein that private respondent unilaterally altered
the employment contract by reducing his salary of US$800.00 per month to
US$560.00, causing him to request for his repatriation to the Philippines.
Although repatriated, he claims that he failed to receive payment for the
following:
1. Salary for November which is equivalent to US$800.00;
2. Leave pay equivalent to his salary for 16.5 days in the sum of US$440.00;
3. Salary differentials which is equivalent to US$240.00 a month for four (4)
months and one (1) week in the total sum of US$1,020,00;
4. Fixed overtime pay equivalent to US$240.00 a month for four (4) months
and one (1) week in the sum of US$1,020.00;
5. Overtime pay for 14 Sundays equivalent to US$484.99;
6. Repatriation cost of US$945.46;
7. Petitioner's cash bond of P20,000.00. 1
In resolving aforesaid case, the Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration or POEA found that petitioner-complainant's
total monthly emolument is US$800.00 inclusive of fixed overtime as shown
and proved in the Wage Scale submitted to the Accreditation Department of
its Office which would therefore not entitle petitioner to any salary
differential; that the version of complainant that there was in effect contract
substitution has no grain of truth because although the Employment Contract
seems to have corrections on it, said corrections or alterations are in
conformity with the Wage Scale duly approved by the POEA; that the
withholding of a certain amount due petitioner was justified to answer for his
repatriation expenses which repatriation was found to have been requested by
petitioner himself as shown in the entry in his Seaman's Book; and that
petitioner deposited a total amount of P15,000.00 only instead of P20,000.00
cash bond. 2
Accordingly, respondent POEA ruled as follows:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, respondents are hereby
ordered to pay complainant, jointly and severally within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof the amount of P15,000.00 representing the reimbursement of
28
Labor Law I
the cash bond deposited by complainant less US$285.83 (to be converted to
its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment).
Further, attorney's fees equivalent to 10 % of the aforesaid award is assessed
against respondents.
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 3
Dissatisfied, both parties appealed the aforementioned decision of the POEA
to the National Labor Relations Commission. Complainant-petitioner's
appeal was dismissed for lack of merit while respondents' appeal was
dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this
recourse.
Petitioner submits that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction by disregarding
the alteration of the employment contract made by private respondent.
Petitioner claims that the alteration by private respondent of his salary and
overtime rate which is evidenced by the Crew Agreement and the exit pass
constitutes a violation of Article 34 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 6
On the other hand, public respondent through the Solicitor General, contends
that, as explained by the POEA: "Although the employment contract seems
to have corrections, it is in conformity with the Wage Scale submitted to said
office. 7
Apparently, petitioner emphasizes the materiality of the alleged unilateral
alteration of the employment contract as this is proscribed by the Labor Code
while public respondent finds the same to be merely innocuous. We take a
closer look at the effects of these alterations upon petitioner's right to demand
for his differential, overtime pay and refund of his return airfare to Manila.
A careful examination of the records shows that there is in fact no alteration
made in the Crew Agreement 8 or in the Exit Pass. 9 As the original data
appear, the figures US$800.00 fall under the column salary, while the word
"inclusive" is indicated under the column overtime rate. With the supposed
alterations, the figures US$560.00 were handwritten above the figures
US$800.00 while the figures US$240.00 were also written above the word
"inclusive".
As clearly explained by respondent NLRC, the correction was made only to
specify the salary and the overtime pay to which petitioner is entitled under
the contract. It was a mere breakdown of the total amount into US$560.00 as
basic wage and US$240.00 as overtime pay. Otherwise stated, with or
without the amendments the total emolument that petitioner would receive
under the agreement as approved by the POEA is US$800.00 monthly with
wage differentials or overtime pay included. 10
Moreover, the presence of petitioner's signature after said items renders
improbable the possibility that petitioner could have misunderstood the
amount of compensation he will be receiving under the contract. Nor has
petitioner advanced any explanation for statements contrary or inconsistent
with what appears in the records. Thus, he claimed: [a] that private
respondent extended the duration of the employment contract
indefinitely, 11 but admitted in his Reply that his employment contract was
extended for another six (6) months by agreement between private
respondent and himself: 12 [b] that when petitioner demanded for his
overtime pay, respondents repatriated him 13 which again was discarded in
his reply stating that he himself requested for his voluntary repatriation
because of the bad faith and insincerity of private respondent; 14 [c] that he
was required to post a cash bond in the amount of P20,000.00 but it was
found that he deposited only the total amount of P15,000.00; [d] that his
salary for November 1985 was not paid when in truth and in fact it was
petitioner who owes private respondent US$285.83 for cash advances 15 and
on November 27, 1985 the final pay slip was executed and signed; 16 and [e]
that he finished his contract when on the contrary, despite proddings that he
continue working until the renewed contract has expired, he adamantly
insisted on his termination.
Verily, it is quite apparent that the whole conflict centers on the failure of
respondent company to give the petitioner the desired promotion which
appears to be improbable at the moment because the M/V Knut Provider
continues to be laid off at Limassol for lack of charterers. 17
It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one
which defeats the very purpose for which they were passed. This Court has in
many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against
narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and
stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to
avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a
literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd
results." 18
29
Labor Law I

There is no dispute that an alteration of the employment contract without the
approval of the Department of Labor is a serious violation of law.
Specifically, the law provides:
Article 34 paragraph (i) of the Labor Code reads:
Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity,
licensee, or holder of authority:
xxxx
(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the
Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up
to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of
the Department of Labor.
Finally, it is well-settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like
the National Labor Relations Commission which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally
accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 21
In fact since Madrigal v. Rafferty 22 great weight has been accorded to the
interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency called
upon to implement the same. 23
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission correctly analyzed the questioned annotations as not
constituting an alteration of the original employment contract but only a
clarification thereof which by no stretch of the imagination can be considered
a violation of the above-quoted law. Under similar circumstances, this Court
ruled that as a general proposition, exceptions from the coverage of a statute
are strictly construed. But such construction nevertheless must be at all times
reasonable, sensible and fair. Hence, to rule out from the exemption
amendments set forth, although they did not materially change the terms and
conditions of the original letter of credit, was held to be unreasonable and
unjust, and not in accord with the declared purpose of the Margin Law. 19

The purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code is clearly the
protection of both parties. In the instant case, the alleged amendment served
to clarify what was agreed upon by the parties and approved by the
Department of Labor. To rule otherwise would go beyond the bounds of
reason and justice.

As recently laid down by this Court, the rule that there should be concern,
sympathy and solicitude for the rights and welfare of the working class, is
meet and proper. That in controversies between a laborer and his master,
doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or in the interpretation of
agreements and writings should be resolved in the former's favor, is not an
unreasonable or unfair rule. 20 But to disregard the employer's own rights and
interests solely on the basis of that concern and solicitude for labor is unjust
and unacceptable.

30
Labor Law I
8.) [G.R. No. 143726. February 23, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LETICIA SAGAYAGA,
ALMA SO, VICENTE SO YAN HAN and ORLANDO
BURGOS, accused.
LETICIA SAGAYAGA, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35, convicting the appellant Leticia Sagayaga of large scale illegal
recruitment as defined in Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042 and sentencing
her to suffer life imprisonment.
The Indictment
The appellant was charged with large scale illegal recruitment in an
Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That during the period from October 1997 to December 1997 and sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping each other and representing themselves to have the
power, capacity and lawful authority to deploy complainants as factory
workers in Taiwan, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
recruit and promise employment to ELMER JANER, ERIC FAROL and
ELMER RAMOS for and in consideration of amounts ranging from
P70,000.00 to P75,000.00 which they paid to said accused, without the latter
having deployed and/or reimbursed complainants of their payments despite
demands, to the damage and prejudice of said complainants.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Only the appellant was arrested, duly arraigned, and, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The other accused remained
at large.
The Case for the Prosecution
As culled by the Office of the Solicitor General, the facts which triggered the
case in the trial court are as follows:
Re: Elmer Janer
Sometime in the last week of October 1997, Elmer Janer went to the office of
Alvis Placement Service Corporation located at AP Building 1563 F.
Agoncillo St., corner Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, to apply for overseas
employment as factory worker in Taiwan (pp. 4, 5 and 14, TSN, September
7, 1999). Appellant Leticia Sagayaga, after personally receiving Elmers
application, required him to submit the necessary documents (p. 5, TSN,
September 7, 1999).
Appellant further asked Elmer to pay seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00) as placement fee (Id.). Elmer paid the said fee to appellant in
three (3) installments, the first, on November 5, 1997, in the amount of
twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00); the second, on November 13,
1997, in the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and the third, on
November 19, 1997, in the amount of forty-five thousand pesos
(P45,000.00). All the payments were made inside Alvis Placement Agency
(p. 6, id.).
As required, Elmer also had his medical examination at the Angeles Medical
Clinic, the result of which confirmed that he was fit to work (p. 9, Ibid.).
Thereafter, he was told to wait for the arrival of the employer. After seven
(7) months, no employer arrived. Tired of waiting, Elmer demanded that he
be refunded of his money (Id.). Despite appellants promises to pay, Elmer
was not refunded of his money.
Exasperated, Elmer asked appellant for a promissory note, which appellant
executed, promising to pay Elmer seventy-five thousand (P75,000.00) on
May 6, 1998 (pp. 10 and 11, TSN, September 7, 1999). In said promissory
note, appellant designated herself as the assistant general manager of the
placement agency (Id.). When appellant failed to refund the amount to Elmer
on the date stated in the promissory note, the latter went to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and filed a sworn complaint
against appellant (p. 11, TSN, September 7, 1999).
Re: Testimony of Eric Farol
On November 20, 1997, Eric Farol first met appellant at Alvis Placement
Service Corporation when he applied for an overseas job in Taiwan as a
plastic factory worker (pp. 3-4, TSN, September 20, 1999). Appellant and
her co-accused Vicente So Yan Han discussed with Eric about the latters job
application (Id.). They required Eric to submit to them his passport, National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance, medical clearance and to pay
seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as placement fee (Id.). Eric
submitted all the aforestated requirements and paid the seventy-five thousand
31
Labor Law I
pesos to appellant in two (2) installments, for which the latter issued receipts
affixing her signature thereon (pp. 5-9, TSN, September 20, 1999). Appellant
then promised Eric that he will be leaving for Taiwan before Christmas of
1997. Failing to fulfill her promise, appellant and Vicente So Yan Han told
Eric to wait up to the month of January 1998 (pp. 10 and 11, Ibid.). When
appellant failed to comply with her commitment to send Eric to Taiwan in
January 1998, Eric demanded from appellant the refund of his money (pp. 11
and 12, Ibid.). Appellant then issued to him a check dated February 5, 1998,
affixing her signature thereon, for the amount of seventy-two thousand five
hundred pesos (P72,500.00). But when Eric presented the check to the
drawee bank for payment, the same was dishonored by reason: ACCOUNT
CLOSED (pp. 11-14, TSN, September 20, 1999).
Insistent that he be refunded of his money, Vicente So Yan Han gave him
cash amounts on different dates: February 6, 1998 - - five thousand pesos;
February 7, 1998 - - five thousand pesos; and February 17, 1998 - - one
thousand pesos (pp. 14-18, TSN, September 20, 1999). Eric was told to
return on April 4, 1998 for the full payment of the refund. However, when
Eric went back on the first week of April, appellant gave him a letter that the
full refund of his money would be given on April 30, 1998 (p. 19, Ibid). Eric
returned to appellant on April 30, 1998, but still, appellant failed to refund
the money (p. 20, Id.).
On May 8, 1998, Eric filed a complaint against appellant and Vicente So Yan
Han at the POEA (pp. 20-21, TSN, September 20, 1999).
Re: Elmer Ramos
Om September 27, 1997, Elmer Ramos went to the office of Alvis Placement
Services Corporation to apply for overseas employment as factory worker in
Taiwan (pp. 8 and 9, TSN, September 27, 1999). Initially, he took up his
application with Vicente So Yan Han who required him to submit his
passport, NBI and medical clearances and to pay seventy thousand pesos
(P70,000.00) as placement fee (pp. 10 and 11, TSN, September 27, 1999).
Elmer submitted the aforestated requirements and paid the placement fee in
two (2) installments: twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) - - paid to
appellant and Vicente So Yan Han on October 22, 1997; and fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) - - paid to Vicente So Yan Han on November 12, 1997
(pp. 11-15, TSN, September 27, 1999). Vicente So Yan Han then assured
Elmer that he would be included for deployment in the first batch on the first
week of December 1997 which, however, did not materialize (pp. 19 and 20,
TSN, September 27, 1997). Elmer decided to withdraw his application. The
documents submitted were returned to Elmer but not the placement fee he
paid (pp. 21 and 22, TSN, September 27, 1999). Instead, appellant issued a
check dated February 5, 1998 for the amount of seventy thousand pesos
(P70,000.00) (p. 22, Id.). When Elmer encashed the check with the bank, it
was dishonored by reason: closed account (p. 23, Ibid.).
On May 6, 1998, Elmer went back to the office of Alvis Placement Service
Corporation to demand the refund of his money. Elmer discussed the matter
with appellant, but the latter failed to return Elmers money. The next day
(May 7, 1998), Elmer went to the POEA and filed a sworn complaint against
appellant and Vicente So Yan Han (pp. 25 and 26, TSN, September 27,
1999). On May 9, 1998, Elmer again tried to get a refund from appellant, but
the latter only issued a promissory note assuring Elmer payment of the
seventy thousand pesos on May 14 and 15, 1998 at 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon (pp. 27 and 28, Ibid.). On May 15, 1998, appellant gave Elmer the
amount of only five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) (p. 29, Ibid.).[3]
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant restates her case as follows:
On different dates in 1997, the three (3) complaining witnesses in this case
(Elmer Ramos, Elmer Janer and Eric Farol) filed separate applications for job
placement as factory workers in Taiwan with ALvis Placement Services
Corporation, with business address at Rm. 507, AP Bldg., 1563 F. Agoncillo
cor. Pedro Gil Sts., Ermita, Manila[,] where the appellant Leticia Sagayaga
was then working as corporate treasurer.
Elmer Ramos filed his application sometime in September 1997 with the
corporation, through accused-at-large Vicente So Yan Han. It was the same
Vicente So Yan Han who asked him to submit the required documents (NBI
and medical clearances, etc.), and to pay the amount of P70,000.00 as
placement fee. He submitted the required documents, and paid the placement
fee in two (2) installments as follows: P20,000.00 was paid by him on 22
October 1997 to appellant Letecia Sagayaga and Vicente So Yan Han on the
office of the corporation; and P50,000.00 was paid by him on 12 November
1997 to Vicente So Yan Han. Then So Yan Han informed him that he would
be deployed in Taiwan in the first week of December 1997. The promised
deployment or job placement never came. He then decided to withdraw his
application and get back the documents he submitted and the money he had
paid. He was issued a check for the fee he had paid but the check was
dishonored by the bank for the reason account closed. Failing to get his
money ba[c]k, he filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas
32
Labor Law I
Employment Administration where he executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on 7
May 1998.
Elmer Janer filed his job placement application with Alvis Placement
Services Corporation in the last week of October 1997. Similarly, he was
required to submit the necessary documents and to pay the amount of
P75,000.00 as placement fee. He submitted the requisite documents and paid
the placement in three (3) installments, as follows: He paid P25,000.00 on 5
November 1997; P5,000.00 on 13 November 1997; and P45,000.00 on 19
November 1997. Thereafter, he was asked to wait for 7 months for his
employer to arrive. No employer arrive[d]. He decided to withdraw his
application and asked to be reimbursed the money he had paid. Appellant
Leticia Sagayaga gave him instead a promissory note indicating that the
amount of P75,000.00 will be paid to Elmer Janer on 6 May 1998. When no
payment was made to him as promised, he filed a complaint with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and where he executed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay on 13 May 1998.
Eric Farol filed his job placement application with Alvis Placement Services
Corporation on 20 November 1997. After submitting the required documents,
he paid the placement fee of P75,000.00 in two (2) installments as follows:
He paid the first installment of P15,000.00 on 12 December 1997; and the
balance of P60,000.00 was paid by him on 16 December 1997. The appellant
Leticia Sagayaga promised that he would be able to leave for Taiwan before
Christmas of 1997. When he was not able to leave for Taiwan before the end
of 1997, he was asked to wait until January 1998. When he failed to leave as
promised, he decided to withdraw his application and asked that he be
refunded the amount of P75,000.00 he had paid as placement fee. The check
given to him by the appellant bounced for the reason account closed.
Forthwith, Vicente So Yan Han paid him on different dates the amounts of
P5,000.00 on 6 February 1998, another P5,000.00 on 7 February 1998, and
P1,000.00 on 17 February 1998. And as he was not refunded the full amount
of the fee paid by him, he filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration and executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on 7 May
1998.
As supplied by the unrebutted testimony of the appellant, the persons who
had effective and actual control, management and direction of the business
and transactions of Alvis Placement Services Corporation were the accused-
spouses Vicente So Yan Han and Alma So. As Treasurer of the corporation,
her duties were limited to receiving money or fees paid to the agency by
applicants and to deposit the same in the bank in the name and for the
account of the corporation. Although she (appellant) received money from
the complainants Elmer Janer and Eric Farol, the same was deposited by her
with the bank under the account of the corporation. And if ever she signed
promissory notes in behalf of the corporation and issued checks to the
complainants, she did so upon the instruction and assurance of accused-
spouses So Yan Han and Alma So that said notes and checks would have
sufficient funds on their due dates. And said checks and notes were never
paid because the accused-spouses disappeared and left for unknown
addresses.[4]
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of the
crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing accused LETICIA
SAGAYAGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large
scale and sentencing said accused to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P750,000.00, and the costs.
The accused is further ordered to refund to Elmer Janer the sum of
P75,000.00; to Eric V. Farol the amount of P61,500.00; and to Elmer Ramos
the amount of P65,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
-I-
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO
WEIGHT CAN BE GIVEN TO THE CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED
THAT SHE IS NOT CRIMINALLY LIABLE BECAUSE SHE HAD NO
PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION OF THE ALVIS PLACEMENT
SERVICE CORPORATION, AND SHE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT
ITS RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES.
- II -
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AS
TREASURER OF ALVIS PLACEMENT SERVICE CORPO[R]ATION,
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS IN CHARGE (OF) THE
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE FINANCIAL AFFAIRS AND
RESOURCES OF THE CORPORATION.
- III -
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AS
THE VICE-PRESIDENT/TREASURER AND ASSISTANT GENERAL
MANAGER OF ALVIS PLACEMENT SERVICE CORPORATION, THE
33
Labor Law I
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS A TOP RANKING OFFICER OF SAID
CORPORATION, WITH AUTHORITY TO PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY IN
THE CONTROL, MANAGEMENT OR DIRECTION OF ITS BUSINESS
AFFAIRS.
- IV -
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
IN LARGE SCALE AND IN SENTENCING HER TO SUFFER THE
PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT.[6]
The appellant avers that she is not criminally liable for the crime charged
because the prosecution failed to prove that she had a direct or actual control,
management or direction of the business and recruitment activities of the
Alvis Placement Services Corporation (APSC). She asserts that she had no
knowledge of the recruitment activities of APSC and had no participation
whatsoever in its operation. In dealing with the private complainants, she was
merely performing routinary office work as a mere employee. Her
participation as an employee of APSC with respect to the employment
application of Elmer Ramos for Taiwan was to receive his placement fee of
P20,000.00. Hence, the appellant avers, she cannot be held criminally liable
for illegal recruitment in large scale. If, at all, she can be held liable only
with respect to the employment applications of Janer and Farol. Thus,
according to the appellant, the trial court erred in sentencing her to life
imprisonment.
The appeal has no merit.
Under Section 6 (m) of Rep. Act No. 8042,[7] illegal recruitment may be
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder of authority,
licensee or holder of authority, thus:
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with
his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases
where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers
fault....[8]
Under the last paragraph of the said section, those criminally liable are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of a juridical person, the
officers having control, management or direction of the business shall be
criminally liable.
In this case, the appellant, as shown by the records of the POEA, was both
the APSC Vice-President-Treasurer and the Assistant General Manager. She
was a high corporate officer who had direct participation in the management,
administration, direction and control of the business of the corporation. As
the trial court aptly declared in its decision:
Again, no weight can be given to the contention of the accused. The terms
control, management or direction used in the last paragraph of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8042 broadly cover all phases of business operation. They
include the aspects of administration, marketing and finances, among others.
From the records of the POEA, the accused appears as the Vice President
(V.P.)/Treasurer of the Alvis Placement Service Corporation (Exhibit A).
Moreover, in the promissory note dated April 30, 1998 (Exhibit K), which
the accused issued to Elmer Janer, she designated her position in the said
corporation as its Asst. General Manager (Exhibit K-1). Undoubtedly, the
positions of vice-president, treasurer, and assistant general manager are high
ranking corporate positions in any corporate body. These positions invest on
the incumbent the authority of managing, controlling and directing the
corporate affairs.
The claim of the accused that her designation in the certification of the
POEA (Exhibit A) as the vice-president of Alvis Placement Service
Corporation has surprised her because, according to her, the vice-president
was Vicente So Yan Han (TSN, Mar. 13, 2000, pp. 16-17), hardly inspires
belief. If this were true, she would have no difficulty in securing from the
POEA an authenticated copy of the list of all officials of the corporation
which they were required to file with the said Office. For no stated reason,
however, the defense omitted to secure such list and submit it to this Court.
At any rate, the accused has expressly admitted in the course of her
testimony that she was at the time the Treasurer of their recruitment agency.
As such she was in charge of the management and control of the financial
affairs and resources of the corporation. She was in charge of collecting all
its receivables, safely keeping them, and disbursing them. She testified that it
was part of her duties to receive and collect the monies paid by applicants
(TSN, Mar. 13, 2000, p. 5). Her disbursing authority has been clearly
demonstrated by her co-signing the checks Exhibits D-2 and G.[9]
The appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment as a principal by direct
participation, having dealt directly with the private complainants. In fact, she
received their placement fees and even signed, in her capacity as the
Assistant General Manager of the APSC, the promissory note on May 6,
1998 in favor of private complainant Elmer Janer, obliging the APSC to pay
to him the amount of P75,000.00. However, despite the private complainants
34
Labor Law I
demands, their placement fees were not reimbursed in full. In People vs.
Cabais,[10] we held thus:
Accused-appellant contends that she was not involved in recruitment but was
merely an employee of a recruitment agency. An employee of a company or
corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal,
together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in illegal recruitment. Recruitment is any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement[11]
In this case, the overwhelming evidence on record indubitably shows that the
appellant engaged in illegal recruitment. As aptly ruled by the trial court:
The first line of defense invoked by the accused to exonerate herself of the
criminal charge is clearly and conclusively without merit. There is no dispute
about the fact that the three complainants engaged (sic) the Alvis Placement
Service Corporation, a recruitment agency duly authorized by the POEA
wherein the accused was one of its top officers, to deploy them as factory
workers in Taiwan. Admittedly, they incurred expenses, designated as
placement fees, in connection with their documentation and processing for
purposes of their de[pl]oyment. Elmer Janer paid to the accused, who
received the payment, the total amount of P75,000.00 for his placement fee
(Exhibit J; TSN, Sept. 7, 1999, pp. 6-8). Eric Farol paid also to the accused a
similar amount for the same purpose (Exhibit E; TSN, Sept. 20, 1999, pp. 5-
8). Elmer Ramos paid to the agency the sum of P70,000.00 of which
P20,000.00 was received by the accused, and the balance of P50,000.00 was
received by Vicente So Yan Han (Exhibit F; TSN, Sept. 27, 1999, pp. 10-18).
In the course of her testimony, the accused admitted that she received these
payments by the complainants of their placement fees.
However, the expected deployment of the complainants as factory workers in
Taiwan, or even elsewhere, did not take place, without any fault on their part.
There is absolutely no evidence reflecting that the failure to deploy them was
imputable to their faults.
The evidence has satisfactorily established that the complainants have not
been reimbursed the full amount of their placement fees, notwithstanding
their persistent demands. Not a single peso of his placement fee was returned
to Elmer Janer. Instead, on April 30, 1998, the accused executed a
promissory note (Exhibit K) in behalf of the Alvis Placement Service
Corporation, undertaking to pay Elmer Janer the amount of P75,000.00 on
May 6, 1998. However, the amount covered by the promissory note was not
paid (TSN, Sept. 7, 1999, p. 11).
On the other hand, although Eric Farol and Elmer Ramos were reimbursed of
P11,000.00 and P5,000.00 in cash, respectively, and the balance of their
placement fees were covered by checks (Exhibits D-2 and G), these
transactions did not relieve the accused of her criminal liability. The
reimbursement contemplated by paragraph (m) of Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 8042 is full reimbursement of the expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with the documentation and processing of his deployment. To
rule otherwise would be offensive to the administration of justice, as illegal
recruiters could easily escape criminal liability with impunity by simply
returning an insignificant portion of the amount they collected from the
worker. The checks drawn and issued by the accused to these two
complainants, however, did not produce the effect of payment, for they were
both dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of closed account.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1249 of the Civil Code, (t)he
delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other
mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they
have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been
impaired.[12]
The appellants bare denial of her involvement in the management,
administration, control and operation of APSC cannot prevail over her
judicial admissions, the positive testimonies of the private complainants and
the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 8042 provides that illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in large
scale, viz, committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group, the imposable penalty for which is life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00.[13] In this case, there are
three private complainants, namely, Elmer Janer, Eric Farol and Elmer
Ramos. The trial court, thus, correctly convicted the appellant of large scale
illegal recruitment and sentenced her to suffer life imprisonment.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the appellant. SO ORDERED.
35
Labor Law I
9.) [G.R. No. 123146. June 17, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALONA BULI-E and
JOSEFINA (JOSIE) ALOLINO, appellants.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Appellants Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino assail the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 15, finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed in large scale
and eight counts of estafa.
On March 16, 1993, the following information was filed against Jose Alolino
and appellants, Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino:
The undersigned accuses ALONA BULI-E, JOSEFINA (JOSIE) ALOLINO
and JOSE ALOLINO for VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 38 (b), PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED BY P.D. 1920 FURTHER AMENDED BY
P.D. 2018, committed in large scale, which is an act of economic sabotage,
and by a syndicate, committed as follows:
That during the period from March 1991 to July 1992, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused representing themselves to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and hire and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad did
then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment / job placement to the following persons:
1. Constancio Macli-ing
2. Jesssica Estay
3. Sidolia Fias-eo
4. John Mangili
5. Nieva Lampoyas
6. Sabado Agapito
7. Joseph Oratil and
8. Joel Oratil
in Taiwan without first obtaining or securing license or authority from the
proper government agency
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On the same day, eight separate informations for estafa were also filed
against Jose Alolino and appellants Alona Buli-e (Buli-e for brevity) and
Josefina Alolino (Josefina, for brevity). Except as to the dates, amounts
involved[2] and the names of complainants, the following information in
Criminal Case No. 11123-R typified the seven other informations for the
crime of estafa:
That on or about the 12th day of July, 1992, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
Constancio Macli-ing by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the
accused knowing fully well that they are not authorized job recruiters for
persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Constancio Macli-
ing and pretended that they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in
consideration of the sum ofP15,000.00 when in truth and in fact they could
not; the said Constancio Macli-ing, deceived and convinced by the false
pretenses employed by the accused, parted away the total sum
of P15,000.00 in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Constancio Macli-ing in the aforementioned amount of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00), Philippine Currency.[3]
Jose Alolino was never apprehended and remains at large. Upon arraignment,
appellants pleaded not guilty to each of the nine informations filed against
them. A joint trial ensued since the cases involved the same factual milieu.
Evidence for the prosecution showed that on various dates from June 1990 to
July 1992, complainants went to the house of appellant Buli-e at No. 63
Sanitary Camp, Baguio City upon learning that she was recruiting workers
for overseas employment. A cousin of complainant Lampoyas, whom Buli-e
helped deploy abroad, introduced Lampoyas to Buli-e in 1990.[4] The
brothers Oratil went to see Buli-e about possible overseas employment in
April 1992.[5] Mangili inquired from Buli-e if she was recruiting workers for
overseas employment also in April 1992.[6] Sabado and Macli-ing
approached Buli-e for possible overseas work in May 1992,[7] while Estay,
accompanied by her sister, went to see Buli-e on June 17, 1992.[8] Fias-eo
approached Buli-e on July 13, 1992, accompanied by Lampoyas.[9]
Buli-e confirmed to complainants that she was, in fact, recruiting contract
workers for Taiwan and that, although she did not have a license of her own
to recruit, her boss in Manila who was a licensed recruiter, was in the process
of getting her one which would soon be issued.[10] Buli-e identified her
superiors in Manila to be the spouses Jose[11] and Josefina Alolino. Josefina
was connected with Rodolfo S. Ibuna Employment Agency (RSI for brevity),
a private employment agency licensed to recruit overseas contract
workers. Buli-e informed complainants that requirements for application of
36
Labor Law I
overseas work includedsubmission of bio-data, passport, NBI clearance, and
medical examination clearance to show that the applicant is physically and
mentally fit. There was also a placement fee of P40,000 of which P15,000
must be paid in advance. Buli-e told complainants that if they were interested
in applying, they may submit to her said requirements which she, in turn, will
submit to her boss who was in charge of processing the necessary documents.
In the case of complainant Lampoyas who originally applied with Buli-e for
employment in Kuwait, she was informed by Buli-e that the latter was
working for a certain Jessie Agtarep.[12] Lampoyas gave Buli-e P4,000 on
March 14, 1991 as downpayment for the placement fee and P5,000 on
August 24, 1991. Lampoyas application papers were processed by Jamal
Enterprises in Makati, Metro Manila but in 1992 , Buli-e transferred
Lampoyas application to appellant Josefina, whom Buli-e referred to as her
new boss.[13] Lampoyas was enticed to work in Taiwan instead of Kuwait and
was assured that her deployment papers would be processed more quickly.[14]
From March to August 1992, Buli-e accompanied complainants, on separate
occasions, to Manila where they had their medical check-up at Saints Peter
and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita. Lampoyas had her medical check-up in
March 1992[15] while Mangili and Joseph Oratil had their medical check-up
in May 1992.[16] On June 20, 1992, Estay had her medical check-up,[17] while
Agapito and Macli-ing had their medical examination on July 5,
1992.[18] Fias-eo had her medical examination on July 20, 1992 while Joel
Oratil had his medical examination in August 1992. Complainants paid for
the medical examination, the results of which were given to Buli-e.
Immediately after complainants had undergone medical examination, Buli-e
brought them to No. 11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro
Manila purportedly to introduce them to her boss, the spouses Alolino.
Complainants, except for Macli-ing and Agapito, were able to meet only Jose
Alolino on the same day that they had undergone medical examination. Jose
Alolino allegedly told complainants that his wife, Josefina, was in Taiwan
following up applications but he assured them that they too would be
deployed abroad in a matter of months.[19] Mangili, Estay, and the brothers
Oratil were able to meet Josefina personally when they returned to the
residence of the Alolinos in Manila to follow up their applications.[20] Fias-eo
and Lampoyas, on the other hand, never met Josefina personally although
they were able to talk to her over the telephone several times when they were
following up the status of their applications.[21] It was during these telephone
conversations that Josefina instructed Fias-eo and Lampoyas to have their
medical examinations and secure their NBI clearance in Manila accompanied
by Buli-e whom she identified as her agent.[22]
Complainants were assured by one or both of the spouses that they were
licensed to recruit overseas contract workers and that they can deploy
workers within two to three months.[23] Complainants were informed by Buli-
e and Josefina that deployment for Taiwan is on a first-come, first-served
basis and that those who can comply with the requirements, particularly the
advance payment of P15,000, shall be deployed first.[24]
On different dates from May 1992 to July 1992, complainants handed to
Buli-e at Sanitary Camp, Baguio City their advance payments of P15,000 for
which they were issued receipts.[25] Mangili paid P11,000 on May 22, 1992
and P4,000 on June 18, 1992.[26] The Oratil brothers paid P15,000 each in
installments from May 1992 to July 15, 1992.[27] Macli-ing paid P15,000 on
July 12, 1992.[28] Fias-eo gave Buli-e P15,000 on July 13, 1992.[29] In
addition to her previous payments amounting to P9,000, Lampoyas paid
Buli-e P5,000 also on July 13, 1992.[30] Estay gave P15,000 on July 21,
1992[31] while Agapito paid Buli-eP15,000 on July 22, 1992.[32] Buli-e
assured complainants that she delivered the payments to Josefina. Aside from
giving the downpayment of the placement fee, complainants complied with
the rest of the requirements which included submission of pictures, bio-data,
passports, NBI clearances and medical examination reports.
After months of waiting and despite compliance with all the requirements,
complainants were not deployed abroad as promised by appellants. From
August 1992 to February 1993, complainants trooped to Buli-es house but
Buli-e merely kept on telling them to wait. When complainants called up
Josefina by long distance telephone, they were also told just to wait.
Weary of the interminable waiting, complainants went to the POEA office in
Baguio City on February 2, 1993, to check whether appellants were indeed
licensed to recruit overseas contract workers. They were dismayed to find out
that appellants had no license to recruit in Baguio City or any part of the
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). On the same day, complainants
filed their complaints with the POEA-CAR and the Prosecutors Office of
Baguio City.
After appellants were apprehended and during their detention at the Baguio
City Jail, Josefina, through counsel, refunded complainant Fias-eo P15,000
for his downpayment on the placement fee.[33]Complainant Mangili also
demanded a refund and he was paid by Josefina, again through her counsel,
37
Labor Law I
the sum of P25,000 for his advance payment of P15,000 and
as reimbursement of the actual expenses he incurred for his application.[34]
During trial, Buli-e testified that she worked for RSI and had been referring
applicants to the agency before 1991. She met Josefina a year after she
resigned from RSI.[35] In 1990, Buli-e had an applicant for Singapore, a
certain Prescilla Laoayan from Baguio City. Buli-e referred Prescilla to RSI
which, through Mrs. Fe Go, handled the processing of her application. As
part of the requirements of the agency, Prescilla had to undergo training at
the house of Josefina, who was then the Marketing Director of RSI. In 1991,
Josefina sent Buli-e a note, through Prescilla, telling her to go to the house of
Josefina at No.11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila
to discuss matters about recruitment of workers. Buli-e went to the house of
Josefina as requested and it was then that she was appointed as an agent of
Josefina.[36] Buli-e was tasked to find job applicants for Taiwan, Korea or
Singapore whom she can refer to RSI through Josefina. Buli-e would then be
paid for each referral. When Buli-e asked Josefina if the latter was authorized
or had any license to recruit for overseas placement, Josefina answered in the
affirmative.[37]
Thereafter, Buli-e started recruiting job applicants for Taiwan, Singapore and
Korea at her house in No. 63 Sanitary Camp, Baguio City. Complainants
sought her of their own accord and Buli-e informed them of the requirements
for job application which consisted of submission of bio-data, passport, NBI
clearance and placement fee of P40,000 of which P15,000 must be paid in
advance upon instructions of Josefina.Josefina allegedly instructed Buli-e to
accompany complainants to Sts. Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita,
Manila for medical check-up.[38] Buli-e was likewise instructed by Josefina to
accompany some of the complainants in securing their NBI clearance and to
receive whatever documents complainants will be submitting including
the P15,000 advance payment, all of which should be submitted to
Josefina. Buli-e said that she submitted the documents and the payments
either to Jose Alolino or to Josefina.[39] She clarified that she did not have a
hand in securing the passports of complainants[40] and received instructions
from Josefina only when she communicated with Josefina through the
telephone or went to Manila. She averred that she and several members of
her family also tried to apply for overseas work with Josefina and paid the
latter P100,000. [41]
Buli-e presented Mrs. Nonette Legaspi-Villanueva, Unit Coordinator of
POEA-CAR, to testify that RSI was a licensed employment agency and that
Josefina was a licensed recruiter at the time that Buli-e had dealings with her
co-appellant. Mrs. Villanueva testified that she has been with the POEA
since 1985. Part of her functions included administrative and technical
supervision of the staff regarding employment, facilitation, licensing,
investigation and monitoring of the provincial recruitment authority as well
as issuance of authorization to personnel to conduct inspection of licensed
agencies in the City of Baguio.[42]Mrs.Villanueva said that, as per the
certification of the Chief of the Licensing Branch of the POEA, RSI was a
private employment agency with a license which expired on July 14,
1992. Josefina Alolino was included in the list of the personnel submitted by
the agency in July 1990 as Marketing Consultant.[43] Mrs. Villanueva,
however, clarified that licenses or permits to recruit workers are territorial in
nature so that an agency licensed in Manila can only engage in recruitment
activities within the place specified in the license although the applicants
may be non-residents of Metro Manila. She further testified that she cannot
remember if Buli-e was given any authority to recruit in Baguio City.[44]
Josefina, on the other hand, testified that on September 16, 1987, she was
appointed as one of the four Marketing Directors of RSI which was located
in 408 Jovan Condominium, Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.
RSI, represented by Rodolfo S. Ibuna as proprietor, was a private
employment agency with a license which expired on July 14, 1992. As
Overseas Marketing Director of RSI, Josefina was tasked to represent the
agency in negotiating with employers in Taiwan, Malaysia, United States and
Singapore[45] for said employers to avail of the services of RSI in recruiting,
hiring, processing and deploying Filipino contract workers. She was also
authorized to solicit applicants for overseas placement through
advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc., and to undertake screening,
evaluation and final selection of applicants. As per agreement with RSI,
Josefina was entitled to a certain share for each successful negotiation with a
foreign employer.[46]
Josefina denied that Buli-e was her agent and insisted that she never gave
Buli-e authority to recruit for RSI. On the contrary, Buli-e allegedly informed
Josefina that she was an agent of Mrs. Fe Go, another marketing Director of
RSI. Sometime in 1991, Mrs. Go referred to Josefina a certain Prescilla
Laoayan, who wanted to apply as a domestic helper in Taiwan. Upon being
told that she could not be deployed unless she would give a downpayment
of P15,000 for the placement fee, Prescilla informed Josefina that she already
gave P15,000 to an agent whom she identified to be Buli-e. Josefina then
wrote a note for Buli-e informing her that there was a problem regarding the
processing of Prescillas application. Prescilla delivered the note to Buli-e
who in turn went to see Josefina at her house in No. 11 Concorde Street,
38
Labor Law I
Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila. Josefina said that she and Buli-e
merely talked about Prescillas application and that was the first time that
Josefina met and talked with Buli-e although she had already seen her before
in the office of Mrs. Fe Go.[47]
Josefina testified that herein complainants were originally referred by Buli-e
to Mrs. Fe Go who, in turn, referred them to her. Josefina said that she
accepted referrals from Buli-e even though the latter was not her agent nor
connected with RSI because their agency accepts referrals from everyone. In
1992, Buli-e, claiming that complainants authorized and designated her to act
as their spokesperson, went to the house of Josefina several times to follow
up the progress of their applications.[48]
Josefina denied having given Buli-e instructions to accompany complainants
to Saints Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita, Manila. She also denied
having an understanding with Buli-e to receive payments from each of
complainants and to bring them to her house in Las Pias, Metro
Manila.[49] Josefina explained that the deployment of complainants was
delayed because the Taiwanese government changed its previous policy of
allowing foreign employment agencies like RSI to negotiate directly with
prospective employers in Taiwan. Foreign employment agencies were
instead allowed to negotiate only with local employment agencies in Taiwan,
which, in turn, were responsible for negotiating with the Taiwanese
employers. The change in the policy caused delay in the deployment of
complainants since the local employment agencies in Taiwan demanded
additional requirements such as additional fees. Josefina said she informed
complainants of the delay and the reason for it but complainants could not
wait to be deployed and, instead, demanded the refund of their payments.[50]
On March 2, 1993, Josefina allegedly gave Buli-e P75,000 with the
instruction that she was to give complainant Lampoyas P5,000 as
refund, and P10,000 each to complainants Macli-ing, Estay, Fias-eo,
Mangili, Agapito, and the Oratil brothers. Upon having been approached by
complainants for the refund of their money, Josefina informed them that she
already gave their refunds through Buli-e. Complainants, however, claimed
that they did not receive their refunds from Buli-e. When complainants could
not wait for the refund of their payments and failed to see Josefina who was
always out of the country due to her work, they filed the present cases.[51]
Emelita Racelis testified that she was an employee of RSI from 1989 to 1992
and was one of the two persons assigned to Josefina.[52] Ms. Racelis said that
Buli-e frequently went to the RSI, bringing applicants with her three times a
month. Among the applicants whom Buli-e referred to RSI through one of
the marketing directors, Mrs. Fe Go, was a certain Prescilla Laoayan. Racelis
said that Laoayan was endorsed by Mrs. Go to Josefina because it is the
practice that when the applicant of one of the marketing directors cannot be
deployed, the applicant will be endorsed to another marketing director with a
job opening. Josefina, however, had trouble deploying Ms. Laoayan whose
placement fee had not been forwarded by Buli-e to RSI.[53]
On July 4, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 11122-R, the Court finds the accused Alona Buli-e
and Josefina (Josie) Alolino guilty beyond reasonable doubt, by direct
participation and in conspiracy with each other, of the crime of illegal
recruitment in a large scale as defined and penalized under Article 38(b) in
relation to Article 39 of PD 442 as amended by PD 2018 and sentences each
of them to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each, and to
pay the costs.
2. In Criminal case No. 11123-R to 11130-R (8 counts), the court finds the
accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino guilty beyond reasonable
doubt by direct participation and in conspiracy with each other of the crime
of Estafa as charged in the Informations in the aforesaid 8 cases as defined
and penalized under Article 315 first paragraph in relation to No. 2 (a) of the
same article and sentences each of them, applying the indeterminate sentence
law, to an imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum in each of the aforesaid 8
cases; to indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties Constancio
Macli-ing, Jessica Estay, Sidolia Fias-eo, John Mangili, Sabado Agapito,
Joseph Oratil and Joel Oratil the sum of P15,000.00 each and Nieva
Lampoyas the sum of P14,000.00 as actual damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino being detention
prisoners are entitled to be credited 4/5 of their preventive imprisonment in
the service of their sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[54]
39
Labor Law I
In rendering the decision, the trial court ruled that by their acts, Buli-e and
Josefina, conspired and confederated with one another in the illegal
recruitment of complainants for overseas employment. Buli-e performed the
recruitment activities in Baguio and Josefina, in Manila. The trial court
specifically noted Buli-es acts of accompanying the complainants to Manila
for their medical examinations,
securingcomplainants NBI clearances and passports as well as receiving
complainants downpayments for the purported placement fee as an indication
that she directly participated in the recruitment of all complainants. The trial
court observed that Buli-e practically confessed her acts of recruitment in
open court and justified the same by claiming that she was just acting as an
agent of Josefina or was authorized to act in behalf of the latter.
As regards Josefina, the trial court held that she directly participated in the
recruitment of complainants even if she did not personally go to Baguio City
since she received the applications and other requirements such as NBI
clearances, passports, bio-data as well as the advanced payments of
complainants from Buli-e. Either she or her husband Jose, or both of them,
entertained complainants who were brought by Buli-e to their home at No. 11
Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila. The spouses
repeatedly promised to work or make arrangements for complainants
deployment abroad.
The trial court ruled that the authority given to Josefina as Overseas
Marketing Director of RSI, a duly licensed employment agency, was
confined to negotiating with foreign employers in Taiwan and she was not
supposed to recruit overseas Filipino workers. The court stressed that
assuming Josefina was authorized to recruit in Manila, she had no authority
to do so in Baguio City. Citing Article 29 of the Labor Code which states that
no license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other
than the one in whose favor it was issued or at any place other than that
stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or authority be
transferred or conveyed to any other person or entity, the trial court ruled that
appellants could not use the RSI license in Manila to recruit overseas
contract workers in Baguio City.
The trial court further noted that the license of RSI employment office was
already suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992.
Consequently, the authority given by RSI to Josefina was likewise suspended
on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992.
Finally, the trial court said that Josefinas act of returning the advanced
payments of some of complainants would not exculpate her and only proved
that she had in fact received money from complainants who were made to
believe that they would be deployed abroad at the soonest possible time.
With regard to the eight charges of estafa filed against appellants, the trial
court convicted them on the ground that all the elements of estafa were
present under each of the eight charges filed. The trial court held that
appellants through false pretenses and fraudulent acts represented to
complainants that they had the power, authority and capacity to deploy
workers abroad for a fee of P40,000, of which P15,000 should be paid as
advance payment. The false pretenses and fraudulent acts were executed
prior to or simultaneous with appellants taking the sum of P15,000 as
advance payment from each of private complainants[55] which were received
by Buli-e in Baguio City and turned over by her to Josefina in Manila.
Complainants relied on the pretenses and misrepresentations of appellants
and parted with substantial sums of money as advance payments of their
placement fees. As a result of the false pretenses and misrepresentations,
complainants were damaged and prejudiced to the extent of the sums they
had given as downpayment since appellants failed to send them abroad as
promised.
In her appeal before us, appellant Buli-e contends that the trial court erred:
I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE DEFENSE OF THE CO-
ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E THAT SHE MERELY REFERRED THE
PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES TO CO-ACCUSED SPOUSES JOSE
AND JOSEFINA ALOLINO, WHOM SHE HONESTLY BELIEVED TO
BE BONA FIDE OVERSEAS JOB RECRUITERS;
II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
HEREIN APPELLANT BULI-E AND SPOUSES ALOLINO IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIMES OF LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA; AND
III. HOLDING CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E LIABLE FOR ESTAFA
WHEN THERE WAS NO SHOWING THAT SAID ACCUSED
BENEFITED FROM THE ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION.
Appellant Josefina, on the other hand, presents the following assignments of
error:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING JOSEFINA ALOLINO
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY DIRECT
PARTICIPATION AND IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED
40
Labor Law I
ALONA BULI-E OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN
LARGE SCALE AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE
38[b] IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 39 OF P.D. 442 AS AMENDED BY
P.D. 2018 AND IN SENTENCING EACH OF THEM TO LIFE
IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF P100,000.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
JOSEFINA ALOLINO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY
DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-
ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA AS
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION IN THE AFORESAID 8 CASES AS
DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 315 FIRST
PARAGRAPH IN RELATION TO NO. 2[A] OF THE SAME ARTICLE.
We shall discuss the interrelated issues together.
Under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refer to
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and include referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not;
provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment or placement.
The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are
(1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers
defined under Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of
the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the
securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either
locally or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against
three or more persons, individually or as a group.[56] When illegal recruitment
is committed in large scale or when it is committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is
carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another, it is considered as an offense involving
economic sabotage.
The factual backdrop shows that appellants engaged in recruitment activities
involving eight persons. The recruitment activities were made by appellants
without having the license or authority to do so as evidenced by the
certification issued by Legal Officer of the POEA Regional Extension Unit,
Cordillera Administrative Region, which stated that Alona Buli-e, Hilario
Antonio,[57] Josie Alolino and Jose Alolino were not licensed nor authorized
to recruit workers for overseas employment in the City of Baguio or in any
part of the region.[58]
Appellant Buli-e herself does not deny that she had no license or authority to
recruit workers for overseas employment. She, however, insists that she had
never directly participated in recruiting complainants since it was in fact
complainants who sought her help in applying for overseas employment.
Buli-e explained that she merely referred complainants to the spouses
Alolino whom she honestly believed to be bona fide overseas job recruiters
and, since she, herself, had intentions of applying for overseas work, she
tagged along with complainants to Manila to see the spouses
Alolino. Inasmuch as she and complainants were all from Baguio City,
complainants allegedly designated her to conduct all negotiations and follow
up of their applications with the spouses.
Buli-es claim deserves scant consideration. It is true that Buli-e did not
actively seek complainants to recruit them for overseas employment. It was
complainants who sought her out. Nevertheless, when complainants
approached her, Buli-e gave complainants the impression that she had the
ability to send workers abroad by saying that although she did not have a
license of her own to recruit, her boss, who was a licensed recruiter, was
already in the process of securing her a license.[59] She not only informed
complainants of the requirements in applying for overseas employment and
even accompanied them to Manila to procure the necessary documents such
as passport, medical and NBI clearances.[60] It was she who brought them to
the house of the spouses Alolino and it was also she who received from
complainants advanced payments for placement fee which she handed over
to the spouses. Her claim that she and her relatives were also victims of
illegal recruitment by the spouses Alolino is not substantiated.
We also find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that Josefina
Alolino conspired and confederated with Buli-e in recruiting applicants for
overseas employment from Baguio City although neither she nor Buli-e had
license or authority to do so. Her claim that she did not have a direct
participation in the recruitment in Baguio City and that she merely assisted
the complainants by referring them to RSI to facilitate their papers does not
merit credence. There is no showing that complainants ever set foot in the
RSI office. They were always brought by Buli-e to the house of the spouses
Alolino in Las Pias after their medical check up. Complainants, who were
with other applicants, were entertained and generously fed breakfast or
dinner by one or both of the spouses who assured them that they would be
able to fly to Taiwan in just a matter of months.[61] Although Josefina alleged
41
Labor Law I
that the documents and payments were handed by Buli-e to the RSI office,
Josefina could show no proof to substantiate her claim. It is significant to
note that after the informations for illegal recruitment and eight counts of
estafa were already filed in court, some of the complainants were given a
refund of their advances for the placement fees by Josefina herself, through
counsel, and not by RSI.
Josefinas acts clearly show that she and Buli-e acted in concert towards the
accomplishment of a common felonious purpose which was to recruit
workers for overseas employment even though they had no license to do
so. Settled is the rule that if it is proved that two or more persons, aimed, by
their acts, at the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a
part so that their acts, although apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and
a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred even though no
actual meeting between or among them to coordinate ways and means is
proved. [62]
Josefina, however, maintains that as Overseas Marketing Director for
RSI, she was authorized to solicit applicants for overseas placement through
advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc. and to undertake screening,
evaluation and final selection of applicants.
Apart from her bare testimony, there is nothing on record to corroborate
Josefinas claim that as Marketing Director she was authorized to solicit
applicants for overseas placement through advertisements, referrals, walk-
ins, etc. Josefina did not bother to formally offer as evidence the
document allegedly supporting her claim that part of her duties as Marketing
Director included recruitment of overseas contract workers. The document
not having been formally offered in court cannot be considered, pursuant to
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the Licensing Branch of the POEA confirmed that the license of
RSI had already been suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14,
1992.[63] Consequently, even if Josefina was licensed to recruit workers for
overseas employment, her authority to do so ceased when the license of her
agency, RSI, was suspended and when it eventually expired. Josefina,
however, despite the suspension and expiration of the RSI license, continued
to engage in recruitment activities for overseas employment. Except for
Lampoyas who met Jose Alolino at the latters house in March 1992,
and Mangili and Joseph Oratil who met Jose Alolino in May 1992,
complainants were entertained at the house of the Alolinos after the license
of RSI had already been suspended. Lampoyas, Macli-ing and Mangili
completed the P15,000downpayment of the placement fee after the license of
RSI had already been suspended. The rest of complainants gave payments for
the placement fee after the license of RSI had already expired.
Furthermore, Josefinas alleged authority to recruit applicants for overseas
employment as Marketing Director of RSI was only confined to Metro
Manila. Article 29 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 29. Non-transferability of license or authority No license or authority
shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose
favor it was issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or
authority, nor may such license or authority be transferred, conveyed or
assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer of business address,
appointment or designation of any agent or representative including the
establishment of additional offices anywhere shall be subject to the prior
approval of the Secretary of Labor.
We are not persuaded by Josefinas claim that no recruitment activity was
being done outside of the territorial permit of RSI and it was only incidental
that complainants who were referred to her by Buli-e were residents of
Baguio City. As earlier discussed, there is no indication that complainants
ever set foot in the RSI office. They were always brought by Buli-e to Las
Pias, Metro Manila where they were entertained by one or both of the
spouses Alolino who repeatedly assured them that they would be able to fly
to Taiwan in a matter of months. Josefina, who claims to have authority to
recruit applicants for overseas employment in behalf of RSI, should have
known that licensed agencies are prohibited from conducting any provincial
recruitment, job fairs or recruitment activities of any form outside of the
address stated in the license, acknowledged branch or extension office,
without securing prior authority from the POEA.[64] Pursuant to the POEA
rules and regulations, Josefina could recruit applicants for overseas
employment and process their applications only at the RSI office
in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila since there was no showing that RSI had an
acknowledged branch or extension office in Baguio City or that the prior
approval of the POEA for provincial recruitment or recruitment activities
outside the RSI office was obtained.
Finally, the trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty of eight (8)
counts of estafa. It is settled that a person convicted of illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code can also be convicted of violation of the Revised Penal
Code provisions on estafa provided that the elements of the crime are
present.[65] The elements for estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another
by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or
42
Labor Law I

prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or

third person.[66]

Appellants deceived complainants into believing that they had the authority
and capability to send them to Taiwan for employment. By reason or on the
strength of such assurance, complainants parted with their money in payment
of the placement fees. Since the representations of appellants proved to be
false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is
applicable. Buli-es claim that she did not benefit from the money collected
from complainants since she gave the payments to Josefina is of no
moment. It was clearly established that she acted in connivance with Josefina
in defrauding complainants. As regards Josefina, the fact that she returned
the payment of some of the complainants will not exculpate her from
criminal liability. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise
or novation, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished
by the government on its own motion even though complete reparation has
been made of the damage suffered by the offended party.[67]

The actual damages in the sum of P15,000 awarded to each of complainants

Fias-eo and Mangili, however, should be deleted inasmuch as said
amounts have already been reimbursed by Josefina during her detention.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,

Branch 15, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the actual
damages awarded to Fias-eo and Mangili in Criminal Cases Nos. 11125-R
and 11126-R are deleted. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

43
Labor Law I
10.) Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 144786 April 15, 2004
PHIL. EMPLOY SERVICES and RESOURCES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
JOSEPH PARAMIO, RONALD NAVARRA, ROMEL SARMIENTO,
RECTO GUILLERMO, FERDINAND BAUTISTA and APOLINARIO
CURAMENG, JR., respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 54744 and its Resolution denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration therefrom.
As culled from the records, the antecedents are as follows:
On different dates from April 1996 to October 1996, respondents Joseph
Paramio, Ronald Navarra, Romel Sarmiento, Recto Guillermo, Ferdinand
Bautista and Apolinario Curameng, Jr. applied for employment in
Taiwan2with petitioner, Phil. Employ Services and Resources, Inc. (PSRI for
brevity), a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment and deployment
of Filipino Workers Overseas.3 Their applications were processed along with
the requisite papers and documents in support thereof, and they paid P19,000
each as placement fee.4 Thereafter, they executed in the Philippines separate
one-year contracts of employment with their employer in Taiwan, Kuan
Yuan Fiber Co., Ltd. Hsei-Chang. The respondents were deployed in Taiwan
as operators on different dates5 and each of them had a monthly salary of
NT$15,360 (New Taiwan Dollars), with free food and accommodation.6
After the orientation given by their employer, the respondents were told that
their schedule of work was up to 9:00 p.m.,7 except for respondent Navarra
who was made to work up to 12:00 midnight.8 The respondents were
downhearted when they discovered that, upon their arrival in their quarters,
they had no beddings, pillows and blankets.9 They encountered worse
problems in the course of their employment, viz.:
a). Irregular and deliberate charging of deductions which were not fully
accounted such as the blankets issued, charging of penalties amounting to
400 NT to all employees for a littering violation attributable only to one
employee;
b). Mandatory imposition of overtime work exceeding 10 hours without just
overtime compensation and night shift differentials;
c). Failure to comply with some stipulations stated in the Employment
Contract particularly those relating to the accommodation and lodging of the
contracted workers;
d). Lack of observance of safety precautions at work area.10
The respondents brought their problems to the attention of the management.
In March of 1997, Fabian Chua, local manager of the petitioner PSRI, made
a surprise visit to Kuan Yuan in Taiwan and was apprised of the said
complaints. However, instead of solving the problems, Chua cautioned the
respondents not to air their complaints and to simply forget about whatever
plans they had in mind.11 Disappointed, the respondents, along with their co-
workers, contacted the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)
in Taiwan and sought the latters assistance, only to be frustrated when their
requests were not favorably acted upon.12
Sometime in April of 1997, through the intercession of Chih-Hung, the
manager of the new broker Chen Dard Manpower Co. Ltd., Long Island
International Trade Co., Ltd, the overtime rate of the respondents was
increased from 55NT$ to 85NT$. The respondents discovered, however, that
work in the factory increased because of the increased volume of
orders.13 Moreover, their working conditions did not improve.
On May 10, 1997, respondent Navarra and another employee, Pio Gabito,
were summoned by the management and told that they were to be repatriated,
without specifying the ground or cause therefor. They pleaded that they be
informed of the cause or causes for their repatriation, but their requests were
rejected.14 Worse, the manager of their employer summoned the police, who
arrived and escorted them to the airport. They were even given time to pack
all their personal belongings.
Upon respondent Navarras arrival in Manila, the petitioner sought to settle
his complaints.15 After the negotiations, the petitioner agreed to pay P49,000
to the said respondent but, in consideration thereof, the latter executed a
44
Labor Law I
quitclaim releasing the petitioner from any or all liabilities for his
repatriation.16
Meanwhile, when the other respondents learned that Navarra and Gabito
were repatriated, they were disheartened at their fate. The respondents also
decided to go home, but their employer and their broker told them17 that they
would be repatriated two days later, or on May 12, 1997. They were ready to
leave on the aforesaid date, but were informed that they would have to pay
their employer NT$30,000; otherwise, they would not be allowed to go
home. As they were unable to pay the NT$30,000, the respondents failed to
return to the Philippines.18
The management and broker gave the respondents two (2) options: (a)
imprisonment for their refusal to pay NT$30,000.00; or (b) sign separate
agreements with their employer. The respondents had no other recourse but
to sign agreements19 authorizing their employer to (a) deduct the amount of
NT$30,000 from their salaries; (b) remit their salaries to the Philippines; and,
(c) deduct NT$10,000 from their salaries as "bond."20 However, the
respondents were still not repatriated. The next day, or on May 13, 1997,
their employer issued a regulation that overtime of ten hours or more would
be implemented.21 Thus, the conditions in the respondents workplace
worsened.
On May 14, 1997, respondent Paramio got ill as a result of the employers
failure to give breakfast on the said date and dinner the night before.22 His
manager still ordered him to work. When he pleaded that he be allowed to
take some rest, the manager refused. Respondent Paramio was, instead, made
to carry a container weighing around 30 kilograms. Due to his condition, the
container slipped from his hands and he injured his thumb. He was brought
to the hospital where he was operated on and treated for his wound.23 Instead
of giving him financial assistance for his hospital bills, his employer told him
a week after his release from the hospital that it would be better for him to go
home to the Philippines to recuperate. An official from the Taiwanese Labor
Department intervened for respondent Paramio and his employer was told
that it had no right to repatriate the respondent because the accident which
caused the injury happened while the latter was at work.24
Although his wound had not yet healed, respondent Paramio was made to
report for work. After eight hours of working, his broker advised him that as
per the doctors orders, he was still on sick leave from May 14 to June 30,
1997. Hence, he could not yet be compelled to work. The respondent then
stayed in his quarters to recuperate.
On June 5, 1997, respondent Paramio received his paycheck, but was
flabbergasted when he discovered that his employer had deducted NT$4,300
from his salary, representing his plane ticket back to the Philippines.
Furthermore, his sick leave from May 14 to June 5 were not included in his
check.25 Still, he was not repatriated. On July 1, 1997, he reported back to
work, only to be assigned to do the second hardest job in the company,
carrying containers weighing about 30 kilograms in the dyeing
department.26 Although his thumb hurt, respondent Paramio had to endure
the pain to earn more money.27
After a week, respondent Paramio was transferred to the Lupo Department,
the hardest job in the factory, where he was made to carry about 200 meters
of maong cloth. He then set it and carried the same to the dyeing department.
When he could no longer bear the pain in his thumb, he took a break. When
the manager saw him resting, he was ordered to return to work. Respondent
Paramio refused and contended that he could not resume work because of his
thumb injury. Incensed, the manager told him that he had to stop working
and would just have to wait for his plane ticket for his repatriation. The
respondent did as he was told.
The next day, Fabian Chua, the local representative of the petitioner PSRI,
arrived and asked the respondent why he did not report for work. Respondent
Paramio explained that his thumb injury made it impossible for him to
perform his assigned tasks. On September 23, 1997, he was given his
paycheck and a plane ticket to the Philippines. He was told that the amount
of NT$3,700 was deducted from his paycheck because he neglected his duty.
At around eight oclock that evening, respondent Paramio was repatriated to
the Philippines.28
Meanwhile, PSRI representative Fabian Chua renewed his warning to the
remaining respondents/employees not to complain about the working
conditions. But respondents Sarmiento, Guillermo, Bautista and Curameng,
Jr. could no longer bear the worsening working conditions. In October 1997,
they decided to go home. Their employer agreed to have them repatriated and
to return their respective bonds, but required them to write letters of
resignation. Respondents Sarmiento and Bautista did as they were told and
wrote the said letters.29 Respondent Curameng, Jr., for his part, signed a
mimeographed form where he agreed to return to the Philippines.30 On
October 10, 1997, the said respondents were repatriated, but were required to
pay for their own plane tickets.31
On October 22, 1997, respondents Sarmiento, Guillermo, Curameng, Jr. and
Bautista, together with respondents Paramio and Navarra, filed separate
45
Labor Law I
complaints before the NLRC Arbitration Branch against Bayani Fontanilla
for illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, refund of placement fee,
tax refund, refund of plane fares, attorneys fees and litigation expenses. The
cases were docketed as NLRC-OFW Cases No. (L) 97-10-4332 to 97-10-
4335.32
In their position paper, the respondents raised the issue of whether or not the
petitioner PSRI and Bayani Fontanilla were liable for the reimbursement of
their respective placement fees, nightshift differentials, overtime pay and
damages, and their salaries for the unexpired portion of their respective
contracts.33
The respondents argued that under Section 10, Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, PSRI was solidarily liable with Kuan Yuan for their claims. Since they
were repatriated prior to the expiration of their respective contracts for no
valid reason, PSRI was liable to pay their salaries for the unexpired portion
of their contracts.
The petitioner denied any liability on the respondents claims and asserted
that the latter were validly dismissed. It averred that respondent Paramio was
dismissed pursuant to Nos. 5 and 6, Article VIII of his employment contract.
According to the petitioner, the said clauses allow the termination of a
contract of employment prior to its expiration when the employee is (a)
suffering from HIV positive antibody or other diseases; (b) heavily wounded
or has stool parasite and cannot be cured within one month; or (c) found to
have lost the ability to work. It averred that since complainant Paramio could
no longer do his job because of his thumb injury, the termination of his
contract was valid, and his dismissal proper.34
Anent respondent Navarras claim, the petitioner PSRI ratiocinated that the
termination of his services was for a valid cause because of an altercation he
had with his supervisor. The petitioner further averred that respondent
Navarra had demanded that he be paid the amount of P50,000 and after some
negotiation, agreed to receive P49,000. Respondent Navarra received the said
amount and executed on May 23, 1997, a deed of release and quitclaim in
favor of the petitioner.35
As for the claims of the other respondents, the petitioner alleged that the
respondents Guillermo, Bautista and Curameng, Jr. voluntarily resigned, as
evidenced by their respective letters and agreement with the
petitioner.36Moreover, the termination of their employment was legal, and
their repatriation based on valid grounds. The petitioner contended that the
respondents were not entitled to a refund of their plane fare.37
With respect to the claims for tax refund for amounts withheld by their
employer, the petitioner averred that the respondents were not entitled
thereto, as the law of Taiwan mandated such withholding of taxes. If, indeed,
the respondents were entitled to a refund of the said taxes, the same should
be coursed through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the appropriate
governmental agency.38
On October 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Felipe P. Pati rendered a decision
declaring that the dismissal of the respondents was illegal. The dispositive
portion states, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring complainants
dismissal to be illegal and respondents are ordered to pay to complainants as
follows:
1. Ronald Navarra NT$46,080 or its peso equivalent; P75,000.00 refund of
placement fee; and P4,300 refund of plane fare less P49,000.
2. Recto Guillermo NT$15,360 or its peso equivalent; P75,000.00 refund of
placement fee; and P4,300 refund of air fare.
3. Joseph Paramio NT$46,080 or its peso equivalent; P75,000.00 refund of
placement fee; and P4,300 refund air fare.
4. Apolinario Curameng, Jr. NT$23,040 or its peso equivalent; P75,000
refund of placement fee and P4,300 refund of air fare.
5. Ferdinand Bautista NT$46,080 or its peso equivalent; P75,000.00 refund
of placement fee; and P4,300 refund of air fare; and
6. Romel Sarmiento NT$ or its peso equivalent P75,000.00 refund of
placement fee; and P4,300 refund of air fare.
The claim for tax refund is dismissed for not having been substantiated.39
In declaring respondent Navarras dismissal illegal, the labor arbiter held that
the petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that the said respondent had an
altercation with his supervisor. As such, respondent Navarra was entitled to
the payment of the salaries due him for the unexpired portion of his contract,
subject to the deduction of the amount already advanced to him under the
deed of release and quitclaim he had executed in favor of the petitioner.40
46
Labor Law I
The labor arbiter likewise ruled that the dismissal of complainant Paramio
was illegal. Considering that he had a thumb injury, his employer should
have given him a lighter job instead of repatriating him. The dismissal of the
remaining complainants was also adjudged illegal. According to the labor
arbiter, the petitioners defense that its employees (respondents) voluntarily
resigned deserved scant consideration.
Considering that the dismissal of the respondents was illegal, the labor
arbiter awarded the salaries due them for the unexpired portion of their
contracts, as well as the refund of their plane fare. Recognizing that the usual
placement fee of workers for deployment in Taiwan was approximately
P100,000, more or less, the labor arbiter granted each of them a refund of
their placement fee in the amount of P75,000.41
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR CA 017927-99. It raised the
following grounds:
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR IN THE
FINDING OF FACTS WHICH IF NOT CORRECTED WOULD CAUSE
GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO THE RESPONDENT42
The petitioner insisted that the dismissal of the complainants was anchored
on valid and legal grounds; as such, the labor arbiter erred in ruling for the
respondents and awarding a refund of their airfares, placement fees and
payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of their respective contracts of
employment.
On March 29, 1999, the NLRC issued a resolution43 finding that the
respondents were legally dismissed and set aside the decision of the labor
arbiter. The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby
SET ASIDE and the instant case dismissed for lack of merit.44
In reversing the decision of the labor arbiter, the NLRC made the following
findings: (a) respondent Navarra did not refute the allegation of the petitioner
that he had an altercation with his supervisor; (b) respondent Navarras
execution of a deed of release and quitclaim released the petitioner from any
or all liability on account of his repatriation; (c) the repatriation of
complainant Paramio was sanctioned by Article VIII, paragraphs 5 and 6 of
his employment contract; and, (d) the written documents executed by the
remaining respondents showed that they voluntarily resigned from their
employment.
Dissatisfied, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration45 of the
resolution, but the NLRC denied the motion in a Resolution dated May 17,
1999.46
The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court against the petitioner before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 54744. The respondents (petitioners therein) raised the
following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED WHEN THEY WERE REPATRIATED TO THE PHIL. BY
THEIR TAIWAN EMPLOYER.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE THUMB INJURY SUFFERED BY JOSEPH
PARAMIO WHILE AT WORK [SHOULD] BE CONSIDERED A LEGAL
GROUND FOR HIS REPATRIATION.
3. WHETHER OR NOT RONALD NAVARRAS REPATRIATION AND
EXECUTION OF QUITCLAIM AND RECEIPT OF P49,000 BE
SUFFICIENT GROUND TO CONCLUDE HIS WAIVER OF RIGHT
AGAINST ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
4. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR
MONEY CLAIMS.47
The petitioners prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that this Petition be given due course and after its due
consideration, REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated March 29, 1999 and
May 17, 1999 and a new one rendered REINSTATING the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter Felipe P. Pati dated August 29, 1998 with modification for the
reward of moral and exemplary damages.
Petitioners further pray for such other reliefs and remedies deemed just and
equitable in the premises.48
On May 29, 2000, the CA rendered a decision partly granting the petition in
that it nullified the March 29 and May 17, 1999 Resolutions of the NLRC
47
Labor Law I
and reinstated the decision of the labor arbiter with modification. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is partly granted
insofar as the public respondents Resolutions dated March 29, 1999 and
May 17, 1999 are set aside and the labor arbiters Decision dated August 29,
1998 is reinstated with modification on the award of refunds for placement
fees. The petitioners claims for moral and exemplary damages are denied for
lack of merit.49
The CA held that respondents Curameng, Bautista, Sarmiento and Guillermo
were constructively dismissed, as the petitioner failed to substantiate its
claim that the aforesaid petitioners voluntarily resigned from work.
The CA also ruled that the repatriation of respondent Paramio was in
violation of his employment contract. It declared that paragraph 8.2, Nos. 5
and 6, Article VIII of the said contract applied only to illnesses already
existing and discovered during employment. The "loss of ability to work"
under the contract could not be used as a ground for respondent Paramios
termination because his thumb injury was work-related.
As to respondent Navarra, the CA ruled that his alleged confrontation with
his supervisor did not amount to serious misconduct which would justify his
dismissal. It stated that the deed of release executed by respondent Navarra
barred him from instituting the said complaint. However, the CA agreed that
the money he was able to collect from the petitioner by reason of the
execution of a deed of release and quitclaim should be considered as an
advance on the amount he was entitled to.
Considering that the dismissal of the respondents was illegal, the petitioner,
as the local agent of Kuan Yuan, was declared solidarily liable with the latter
for the payment of the respondents salaries for the unexpired portion of their
respective contracts and other awards, pursuant to Section 10, paragraph 2 of
Rep. Act No. 8042.
The CA reduced the award of refund of placement fee to the respondents
from P75,000 to P19,000, which was the amount substantiated by the
petitioners.
The petitioner PSRI filed a motion for reconsideration but the appellate court
denied the said motion.50 Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed this instant petition
against the respondents, alleging that:
I
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT51
The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the
respondents were illegally dismissed; and (b) whether or not the deed of
release and quitclaim executed by respondent Navarra was valid.
Ordinarily, factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have
acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions are
generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and are binding upon
this Court.52However, when the findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC
are inconsistent, there is a need to review the records to determine which of
them should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary
facts.53 Considering that the CAs findings of fact clash with those of the
NLRC, this Court is compelled to go over the records of the case, as well as
the submissions of the parties.54
Anent the first issue, the petitioner insists that the dismissal of the
respondents was based on valid and legal grounds. Consequently, the award
of salaries for the unexpired portion of their respective contracts, and the
refund of placement fee and airfare was barren of factual and legal basis.
We rule that the respondents dismissal was not based on just, valid and legal
grounds.
Preliminarily, it bears stressing that the respondents who filed complaints for
illegal dismissal against the petitioner were overseas Filipino workers whose
employment contracts were approved by the Philippine and Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) and were entered into and perfected
here in the Philippines. As such, the rule lex loci contractus (the law of the
place where the contract is made) governs. Therefore, the Labor Code, its
implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor, apply in
this case.55
In order to effect a valid dismissal of an employee, the law requires that there
be just and valid cause as provided in Article 28256 and that the employee
48
Labor Law I
was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.57 Dismissal
may also be based on any of the authorized causes provided for in Articles
283 and 284 of the Labor Code.58
The petitioner contends that the termination of respondent Paramios
employment was sanctioned by paragraph 8.2, Nos. 5 and 6, Article VIII of
the employment contract. The aforesaid provisions are herein reproduced:
8.2 In the event the Employee is found offend (sic) one of the following
prohibitions during his/her employment, Employer may terminate this
Employment contract and repatriate him/her to his/her country of origin.
Employee shall comply immediately without objection and assume the cost
of round-trip transportation by air to and from R.O.C. unconditionally. In the
event Employer or any other person pay the airfare for the Employee,
Employee shall reimburse the fare to the person who paid it.
(5) During the period of employment, being found out suffering HIV positive
anti-body or other disease, heavily wounded or stool parasite, which cannot
be cured within one month.
(6) Being found losing ability to work.
The foregoing provision is akin to Article 284 of the Labor Code, which
provides:
Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination An employer may terminate
the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any
disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial
to his health as well as the health of his co-employees:
Furthermore, Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code provides, thus:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal - Where the employee suffers from
a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to
his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not
terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be
cured within a period of six (6) months with proper medical treatment. If the
disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not
terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The
employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately
upon the restoration of his normal health.
Applying the law and the rule, the employer is burdened to prove that the
employee was suffering from a disease which prevented his continued
employment, or that the employees wound prevented his continued
employment. Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code requires a certification from competent public
authority59 that the employee was heavily wounded and had lost the ability to
work.
In the case at bar, the petitioner did not adduce in evidence a certification
from a public authority to the effect that respondent Paramio had been
heavily wounded. It also failed to show that by reason of his thumb injury, he
lost the ability to work. Respondent Paramio was not, for a time, able to
perform the backbreaking tasks required by his manager. However, despite
his injury, he managed to perform the other tasks assigned to him, including
carrying of 30-kilogram containers with the exception of the work in the
Lupo Department.60 The fact that respondent Paramio was assigned to
perform the second hardest and heaviest task in the company shows the
heartlessness of the companys manager. Despite his wound, the respondent
tried to accomplish the work assigned to him. The least the manager should
have done was to assign the respondent to a lighter task, until such time that
the latters wound had completely healed. It must be stressed where there is
no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of
employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal.61 Consequently, respondent Paramio is entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less
under paragraph 5, Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8042.
Section 10. Money Claims
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to
the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.62
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Labor Law I
In Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira,63 we ruled that an overseas Filipino worker
who is illegally terminated shall be entitled to his salary equivalent to the
unexpired portion of his employment contract if such contract is less than
one year. However, if his contract is for a period of at least one year, he is
entitled to receive his salaries equivalent to the unexpired portion of his
contract, or three months salary for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is lower.
In Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC,64 involving Section 10 of Rep.
Act No. 8042, we held:
[W]e cannot subscribe to the view that private respondent is entitled to
three (3) months salary loan only. A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals
that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas
contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or three (3) months salary for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the
employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more.
This is evident from the words "for every year of the unexpired term" which
follows the words "salaries x x x for three months." To follow petitioners
thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only
simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and
overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is
contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that interpreting a
statute, care should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect
since the lawmaking body is presumed to know the meaning of the words
employed in the statute and to have used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat
quam pereat.
Respondent Paramio was deployed on December 6, 1996.65 His contract was
for a period of twelve months or one year.66 He was repatriated on September
23, 1997, approximately two months from the expiration of his
contract.67Since the termination of his employment was not based on any
valid or legal ground, he is entitled to the payment of his salary equivalent to
the unexpired portion of his contract. He is likewise entitled to full
reimbursement of his placement fee. Based on the record, respondent
Paramio paid a placement fee of P19,000.68 Thus, he should be reimbursed
the amount of P19,000 with 12% interest per annum.
Similarly, the petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that respondent
Navarras repatriation was based on a valid, legal and just cause. The
petitioner merely alleged that it was made clear to respondent Navarra that
his repatriation was due to the fight he had with his supervisor.69 Contrary to
the allegation of the petitioner, respondent Navarra denied this in his
affidavit, as well as in his reply to the position paper of the petitioner.
Respondent Navarra asserted that he merely enforced his rights under the
employment contract when he requested, time and again, that the provisions
of his contract regarding the accommodation be fulfilled.70 The claim of
petitioner that respondent Navarra shouted invectives against his
supervisor71 was, likewise, unsubstantiated. The petitioner did not even
present an affidavit of the superior with whom the respondent reportedly
fought. Indeed, while fighting a supervisor may constitute serious
misconduct72 and may, consequently, be considered a ground for dismissal,
in light of the petitioners failure to adduce substantial evidence to prove its
claim that respondent Navarra fought his supervisor, this ground cannot be
used to justify the dismissal. Thus, the termination of respondent Navarras
employment was without factual and legal basis.
Respondent Navarra was deployed on November 6, 1996.73 He was
repatriated on May 10, 1997, approximately five months prior to the
expiration of his one-year contract. Considering our ruling in Marsamman
Manning Agency v. NLRC,74 he shall be entitled to an amount equivalent to
three months salary, or NT$46,080. Similarly, having admitted that he paid
a placement fee of P19,00075 only, he is entitled to be fully reimbursed
therefore, plus 12% interest per annum.
As to the other respondents, the petitioner alleges that they refused to go to
work and, in fact, voluntarily resigned. It appended the daily time
records76 of respondents Apolinario, Sarmiento, Ferdinand (Bautista) and
Recto (Guillermo), as well as the resignation letters of Bautista and
Sarmiento,77 and Curameng, Jr.s written agreement with their employer.
We do not agree. The records reveal that the three respondents agreed to
execute the foregoing because they could no longer bear the working
conditions in their place of employment. Despite protestations to their
employer and the attempt to seek help from the OWWA in Taiwan, they
were victims to the following acts/omissions of their employer:
a). Irregular and deliberate charging of deductions which were not fully
accounted such as the blankets issued, charging of penalties amounting to
400 NT to all employees for a littering violation attributable only to one
employee;
b). Mandatory imposition of overtime work exceeding 10 hours without just
overtime compensation and night shift differentials;
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Labor Law I
c). Failure to comply with some stipulations stated in the Employment
Contract particularly those relating to the accommodation and lodging of the
contracted workers;
d). Lack of observance of safety precautions at work area78.
1. They dont give us day off.
2. They feed us once a day.
3. They even let us work without rest.
4. Their (sic) were so many deductions in our salaries like payment for our
boarding house, electricity and garbage fee.
5. The money they were sending to the Philippines was also reduced with the
amount ranging from P2000 to P5000.79
The petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence to overcome the
evidence of the respondents as contained in their respective affidavits.
Contrary to the petitioners claim, the said affidavits are not hearsay
evidence. The respondents were the victims of the abuses of their employer;
as such, they had personal knowledge of the contents of their affidavits.
Moreover, when there is a doubt between the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee, such doubt should be resolved in favor of
labor.80
On the letters of resignation of respondents Sarmiento, Bautista and the
agreement of Curameng, Jr., we agree with the ruminations of the appellate
court, viz:
It is not necessary that there be an express termination of ones services
before a case of illegal dismissal can exist. In the landmark case
of Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al. (171 SCRA 164) the Supreme Court ruled that "a
constructive discharge is defined as: "A quitting because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely." In the case at
bar, the petitioners were made to suffer unbearable conditions in the
workplace and the inhuman treatment of their employer until they were left
with no choice but to quit. Thus, it cannot be said that the resignation and
repatriation of complainants Curameng, Bautista, Sarmienta and Guillermo
was voluntary.
It was held in the case of Valdez vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 87:
"It would have been illogical for herein petitioner to resign and then file a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of
said complaint."
Indeed, unlike the Valdez case where there was no pronouncement of
resignation on the part of the complainant, there were written resignations
submitted by the said petitioners in the case at bar. The more important
consideration is whether such written resignations were made voluntarily.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, it cannot be gainsaid that the instant
complaint for illegal dismissal indicates that the resignations and
repatriations of the petitioners were not done freely on their part. It is highly
unlikely that these workers, after having invested so much time, effort and
money to secure their employment abroad would just quit even before the
expiration of their contract.
We have more reason to rule that the repatriations of petitioners Paramio and
Navarra were not voluntary.81
We thus rule that the respondents were constructively dismissed from their
employment. There is constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of
the employee that it would foreclose any choice by him except to forego his
continued employment.82 It exists where there is cessation of work because
"continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as
an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay."83
We find it incredible that, after all the expenses and the trouble they went
through in seeking greener pastures and financial upliftment, and the
concomitant tribulations of being separated from their families, the
respondents would suddenly and without reason decide to resign, return
home and be jobless once again. The respondents had no choice but to agree
to their employers demand to sign and execute the respective agreements.
They were stranded in a foreign land, with their remunerations considerably
diminished by numerous illegal deductions. Their plight was all the more
made unbearable by the inhumane working conditions.
We note that the agreement signed by respondent Curameng, Jr. was
mimeographed and prepared by his employer. Except for his handwritten
name, the words "Im go (sic) very verry (sic)" and his signature at the
bottom of the document, the rest of the spaces to be filled up were all blank.
Most of the contents of the agreement were even in Chinese characters.
In sum, there can be no other conclusion than that the aforementioned
respondents were illegally dismissed, and their employment contract illegally
terminated.
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Labor Law I
Under Section 10, paragraph 5 of Rep. Act No. 8042, respondents Sarmiento,
Bautista, Curameng and Guillermo are entitled to the full reimbursement of
their placement fees. Since each of the respondents remitted only P19,000 to
the petitioner, each of them is entitled to P19,000, plus 12% interest per
annum.
According to Section 10, paragraph 2 of Rep. Act No. 8042,84 the agency
which deployed the employees whose employment contract were adjudged
illegally terminated, shall be jointly and solidarily liable with the principal
for the money claims awarded to the aforesaid employees. Consequently, the
petitioner, as the agency of the respondents, is solidarily liable with its
principal Kuan Yuan for the payment of the salaries due to the respondents
corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contract, as well as the
reimbursement of their placement fees.
Under Section 15 of the same Act, the repatriation of the worker and the
transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the
agency which recruited or deployed the overseas contract worker. All the
costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the agency concerned and/or its
principal.85 Consequently, the petitioner is obliged to refund P4,300 to each
of the respondents, representing their airfare.
Anent the second issue, we rule that the deed of release executed by
respondent Navarra did not completely release the petitioner from its liability
on the latters claim. As a rule, quitclaims, waivers or releases are looked
upon with disfavor and are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public
policy and ineffective to bar claims for the measure of a workers legal
rights.86 If (a) there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person; or (b) the terms of the settlement are
unconscionable, and on their face invalid,87 such quitclaims must be struck
down as invalid or illegal.
The records reveal that respondent Navarra executed a deed of release and
waiver for and in consideration of only P49,000.88 There is no evidence that
he was informed that he was entitled to much more than the said amount,
including a refund for the placement fee he paid to the petitioner. Respondent
Navarra started working on November 7, 1996. His employment contract
was for a period of one year. He was repatriated on May 10, 1997, or after a
little over six months. The unexpired portion of his contract is, thus, five
months and 27 days. Per Section 10, paragraph 5 of Rep. Act No. 8042, he is
entitled to the payment of three months salary or NT$46,08089 and P19,000
placement fee, plus interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum. We, thus,
agree with the ruling of the appellate court, viz.:
With regard to the deed of quitclaim and acceptance, it is a well-settled
principle that the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less
compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from
demanding benefits to which he is entitled. Quitclaims executed are
ineffective to bar recovery for the full measure of the workers rights
(Medina vs. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS)-DZWX, 222 SCRA
707). The reason why quitclaims are commonly frowned upon as contrary to
public policy and they are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the
workers legal rights is because the employer and employee do not stand on
the same footing, such that quitclaims usually take the form of contracts of
adherence, not of choice. (Wyeth-Suaco Laboratories, Inc. vs. NLRC, 219
SCRA 356). Assuming arguendo that the quitclaim was executed voluntarily,
still, it cannot diminish petitioners entitlement to the full compensation
provided in their contract. At the most, such amount can be considered an
advance on his claim.90
In sum, we rule that the termination of the respondents respective contracts
of employment was illegal. Pursuant to Section 10, paragraph 5, Rep. Act
No. 8042, each of them is entitled to the full reimbursement of the placement
fee of P19,000, and interest at 12% per annum. Respondent Navarra is,
likewise, entitled to the payment of an amount equivalent to three (3)
months salary. All the remaining respondents are entitled to payment of
their salaries, equivalent to three months.
Pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 8042, the petitioner should refund the
amount of P4,300 to each of the respondents representing the expenses they
incurred for their repatriation.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54744 is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS. The petitioner is ordered to pay the following:
(1) The amount of NT$46,080 or its peso equivalent to respondent Ronald
Navarra minus the amount of P49,000 already advanced to him;
(2) To the respondents Romel Sarmiento, Recto Guillermo, Ferdinand
Bautista, Apolinario Curameng, Jr. and Joseph Paramio, their respective
salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their respective contracts;
(3) The amount of the placement fees as indicated in the respective official
receipts issued to each of the respondents, with interest of 12% per annum, in
conformity with Section 10, paragraph 5 of Rep. Act No. 8042;
(4) To each of the respondents, the amount of P4,300 representing the
expenses they incurred for their return to the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
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Labor Law I
11.) Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169973 June 26, 2006
PLACEWELL INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
IRENEO B. CAMOTE, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the September 27, 2005 Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 77145, which set aside the November 20, 2002 Resolution2 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated with
modifications the May 31, 2002 Decision3 of Labor Arbiter Arturo L.
Gamolo.
The records show that on August 15, 1999, petitioner Placewell International
Services Corporation (PISC) deployed respondent Ireneo B. Camote to work
as building carpenter for SAAD Trading and Contracting Co. (SAAD) at the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) for a contract duration of two years, with a
corresponding salary of US$370.00 per month.
At the job site, respondent was allegedly found incompetent by his foreign
employer; thus the latter decided to terminate his services. However,
respondent pleaded for his retention and consented to accept a lower salary
of SR 800.00 per month. Thus, SAAD retained respondent until his return to
the Philippines two years after.
On November 27, 2001, respondent filed a sworn Complaint4 for monetary
claims against petitioner alleging that when he arrived at the job site, he and
his fellow Filipino workers were required to sign another employment
contract written in Arabic under the constraints of losing their jobs if they
refused; that for the entire duration of the new contract, he received only SR
590.00 per month; that he was not given his overtime pay despite rendering
nine hours of work everyday; that he and his co-workers sought assistance
from the Philippine Embassy but they did not succeed in pursuing their cause
of action because of difficulties in communication.
On May 31, 2002, the labor arbiter rendered a decision holding that the
modification of respondents employment contract is not allowed under
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. No. 8042);5 thus, he should have
received the original contracted salary of US$370.00 per month instead of
the new rate given by SAAD. It was also noted that respondent did not refute
petitioners allegation regarding the non-payment of placement and other
processing fees prior to deployment. The labor arbiter also found that there is
no differential as far as respondents overtime pay is concerned considering
that he was given overtime pay based on the new rate of SR 800.00. Since
respondent rendered one hour of overtime work per day for only 18 months,
and not the entire 24 months as claimed, the total overtime pay he received is
more or less equivalent to the amount he ought to have received if the
original contracted rate of US$370.00 was used. Finally, the labor arbiter
awarded respondent attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total judgment
award for being compelled to hire a counsel to protect his rights and
interests. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ORDERING respondent PLACEWELL INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
CORPORATION to pay complainant IRENEO B. CAMOTE the amount of
PESOS: TWO HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
TWENTY FOUR ONLY (P215,424.00) representing underpayment of
wages and attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal by the petitioner, the NLRC set aside the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
is Vacated and Set Aside. In lieu thereof, a new judgment is rendered,
dismissing the above-entitled case for lack of cause of action.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in the
Court of Appeals which set aside the Resolution of the NLRC, and reinstated
with modifications the Decision of the labor arbiter. The appellate court held
that there was a diminution of respondents salary from a rate of
US$370.00 to SR 800.00 per month in clear violation of Section 10 of R.A.
No. 8042.
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Labor Law I
As to the alleged incompetence of respondent, the appellate court noted that
said allegation has not been substantiated hence should not be given any
credence. Thus, for failure of petitioner to show just cause for the demotion
of respondent, the appellate court granted the petition, set aside resolution
dated November 24, 2000 of the NLRC, and reinstated the decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated May 31, 2002, the dispositive portion of which follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution dated 24 November 2000 of the NLRC, Fifth Division
is SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 31 May 2002
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with modifications. The exchange rate
shall be that prevailing at the time of actual payment. Private respondent,
PLACEWELL INTERNATIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION is hereby
ordered jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner, IRENEO B. CAMOTE
the following:
Per POEA approved contract or $370.00 x (rate of exchange at the time of
actual payment) x 24 months = Total salary in the original contract
Less:
Salary as Modified or SR 800 x P12.00 x 24
P230,400.00
months =
Less:
Unauthorized Deductions or SR 4,885 x P12 = P171,780.00
P 58,620.00
Less:
Unpaid placement fee
Equals:
Total unpaid salary
Add:
Attorneys fees or 5% of the total unpaid salary
Equals:
Total Money Claims.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner avers that respondent failed to substantiate the allegation that he
was forced to enter into the new employment contract with SAAD which
proves that the new contract was actually voluntarily entered and agreed
upon between said parties; that if respondent was indeed forced to sign the
new contract, his claims are now barred by laches because respondent never
informed petitioner of any problem at the job site until two years after his
deployment; that the appellate courts award for unauthorized deductions in
the amount of P171,780.00 should be deleted for lack of legal or factual
basis; that respondent is not entitled to attorneys fees.
R.A. No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration to the
prejudice of the worker, of employment contracts already approved and
verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the time
of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the
expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE.9 Thus, we held
in Chavez v. Bonto-Perez10 that the subsequently executed side agreement of
an overseas contract worker with her foreign employer which reduced her
salary below the amount approved by the POEA is void because it is against
our existing laws, morals and public policy. The said side agreement cannot
supersede her standard employment contract approved by the POEA.11
Applying the same rule in the case at bar, the unauthorized alteration in the
employment contract of respondent, particularly the diminution in his salary
from US$370.00 to SR 800.00 per month, is void for violating the POEA-
approved contract which set the minimum standards, terms, and conditions of
his employment.
54
Labor Law I

Moreover, we find that there was no proper dismissal of respondent by
SAAD; the "termination" of respondent was clearly a ploy to pressure him to
agree to a lower wage rate for continued employment. Thus, the original
POEA-approved employment contract of respondent subsists despite the so-
called new agreement with SAAD. Consequently, the solidary liability of
petitioner with SAAD for respondents money claims continues in
accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042.12
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77145 dated September 27, 2005
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of P171,780
representing Unauthorized Deductions is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners contention that respondent is guilty of laches is without basis.

Laches has been defined as the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either
abandoned it or declined to assert it. Thus, the doctrine of laches presumes
that the party guilty of negligence had the opportunity to do what should
have been done, but failed to do so. Conversely, if the said party did not have
the occasion to assert the right, then, he can not be adjudged guilty of
laches. Laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time, rather, the party
must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim in order that the
delay may sufficiently constitute laches.13

The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to
perpetrate fraud and injustice.14

In the instant case, respondent filed his claim within the three-year
prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of
the Labor Code from the time the cause of action accrued. Thus, we find that
the doctrine of laches finds no application in this case.

The labor arbiter and the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding attorneys
fees to respondent. It is settled that in actions for recovery of wages or where
an employee was forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his rights
and interests, he is entitled to an award of attorneys fees.15 However, with
regard to Unauthorized Deductions amounting to P171,780.00;16 we note that
the appellate court did not state any basis for its award, thus, the same is
deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.
55